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ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 4/2009

Main Topic

Europe and Af ghanistan

No 4/2009

What strategy for Afghanistan after eight years of war

Europe, a real heavyweight in international policy

The EU-Counter Terrorism Strategy

Prof. Dr. Lothar RĂźhl, States Secretary (ret), Bonn

Prof. Dr. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President of the Robert Schumann Foundation, Paris

Gilles de Kerchove, EU-Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels


Editorial Was the Irish “Yes” a response to Ireland’s fear of economic decline and at the same time an expression of yearning for the continuing protection of the mutually supportive community that is the European Union? Pure reason it may not have been, but without going overboard the EU itself showed flexibility in the run-up to the Irish referendum, thus emboldening the Irish to vote for the Treaty. The Irish “Yes”, and Poland’s ratification of the Reform Treaty shortly afterwards increased the pressure on the Czech President and on Conservatives in London, prompting a certain malicious satisfaction among those who believe it is time at long last to see reason and accept the Lisbon Treaty. It does, after all, in theory give countries the right to withdraw from the EU. The most important thing is that the Treaty will enter into force.

The stakes are high in Europe The entry into force of the Reform Treaty will ring in a new era the course of which can only be set tentatively as yet. What can the EU achieve? The accession to the EU of further countries in southeastern Europe will certainly take place, as it is needed to bring peace to that part of the continent once and for all and to offer the people living there a better future. But will the EU find the strength to take on a controversial project like Turkish accession before the day dawns when Turkey itself announces it is giving up its attempt to join? Will the EU succeed in refocusing its “Ostpolitik”? And yet another question that still remains unanswered, will Lisbon be the culmination of Europe’s ambitions, or does the EU intend to develop further, and if so, in what direction? Lisbon allows no time to draw breath and take stock. The debate about where the Union should be headed must be honest, creative, and short. Stagnation would be the enemy of progress going forward.

Security and Defence Policy

response to Moscow’s growing concern about existing security and defence structures; and also to the question as to how the different responsibilities of European and national parliamentarians can be best accommodated. 1. With defence budgets under increasing pressure, national parliamentarians need to be involved much more. Because deHartmut Bühl cisions on defence spending and troop deployment are national, national parliaments should have a bigger role in ESDP. The ESDA/WEU Assembly performs a very important consensus building role among national parliamentarians who deal with security and defence. A sound and workable solution has to be found giving the ESDA/WEU Assembly a more fitting status – one that will enable the EU derive more benefit from the contribution the Assembly can make to a European defence. 2. The EU is not a collective defence organization like NATO or WEU. The Lisbon Treaty contains two solidarity clauses, one of them dealing with cases of external aggression. But it does not explicitly mention military assistance. Consequently, the Lisbon. Treaty cannot replace Article V of the 1954 WEU Treaty. The issue is whether the WEU Treaty should be retained until such time as “real” defence capabilities form part of Union structures. 3. With respect to Russia, President Medvedev’s invitation to hold a dialogue on European Security Architecture should be taken seriously. There is no security against Russia, only in cooperation with it. Great care should also be taken that within the global reach of the EU Security Concept, European interests are respected. The Concept should better integrate Russia, while not excluding the North American partners.

This policy is beset by a number of challenges. Apart from the financial crisis and the question of where the money for equipment and operations will come from, there needs to be a

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin Headquarter Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049-1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Marco Saalbach Phone: +49/228/970 97-80 E-Mail: marco.saalbach@behoerdenspiegel.de

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published quarterly in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 4 copies for one year: 56 Euro (Euro EU Subscription). 4 copies for one year: 88 Euro (International subscription) Quarterly, including postage and dispatch (4 issues) © 2009 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin



Dr. Lothar Rühl, States Secretary (ret.)

The European Union

POLITICS and POLICIES Editorial ....................................................... 3 Europe and Afghanistan

Europe, a real heavyweight in international policy by Professor Dr. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman, Robert Schumann Foundation, Paris... 17 Europe after the Irish referendum – more coherent, more decisive, more democratic by Willem van Eekelen, Chairman, Center of the European Security Studies, Groningen ........ 19 The European Parliament and ESDP? by Christoph Raab, General Manager, COPURA and Director, European Security Round Table (ESRT) ..................................... 21 The way towards a European White Book on Security and Defence by Dr. Karl von Wogau, Secretary General of the European Security Foundation (ESF), Brussels ... 22

What strategy for Afghanistan after eight years of war by Professor Dr. Lothar Rühl, States Secretary (ret.), Bonn........................... 7 2009 – A crucial year for Afghanistan by Françoise Hostalier MEP, Paris and Jean Pierre Koucheida MEP, Paris..................... 9 Building Afghan Security Forces: the solution to the security situation by Dr. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Transformation Desk, NATO Defense College, Rome ................. 14

Towards a new European security architecture − what is Russia’s place in Europe? by Arcadio Diaz Tejera, Senator, Madrid ............ 25

Are we doing enough to protect our soldiers? An opinion contributed by Hartmut Bühl ......... 16

Half full or half empty? Comparing EU military capabilities in 1999 and 2009 by Daniel Keohane, EUISS, Paris ...................... 29 European Civil Protection Review on the 5th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management .............. 31



Gilles de Kerchove Head of EU-Counter Terrorism Unit, Brussels

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO’s new Strategic Concept should be more than a “Shopping List” by Brigadier General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Wittmann, Berlin ....................................................... 35 The US needs a strong Europe – the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. by Professor Dr. Sven Biscop, Director at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels ...................................... 38

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) – The multi-national solution for a transformational capability for NAT0 by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels............................. 52

SECURITY The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy by Gilles de Kerchove, Head of EU CounterTerrorism Unit, Brussels ............................... 41 Anti-terrorism – the role of Europol in the international process by Robert Wainwright, Executive Director of Europol, London ......................................... 44

INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS The European Union’s Think Tank by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris......................................................... 55

ESDP and NATO NEWS European Union European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) ... 57


North Atlantic Treaty Organisation .............. 60

IT International and the economic crisis in Europe Interview with Barbara Wittmann, Sales Director Public Segment, Dell Germany, and Mike Migdal, Account Executive Defence & Security, Germany, Halle .............................. 47



Afghanistan “In the next 12 months we have to make a change in Afghanistan. If not, we risk failure. The criteria of our success in Afghanistan will not be measured by how many Taliban fighters we kill, but on how many civilians we are able to protect.“ Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Armed Forces, Washington

From destruction by Soviet forces to reconstruction by NATO and other nations in the civil and military field



What strategy for Afghanistan after eight years of war by Professor Dr. Lothar Rühl, States Secretary (ret.), Bonn

The general consensus reads that NATO must not lose and cannot lose in Afghanistan, after having borne the responsibility for security over the last five years. However, the facts of today, the developments since the critical year 2005, when things began to seriously deteriorate, and the near term perspective point to a different conclusion: The West, led by the US, can lose and probably will lose the conflict with militant Islam and various national or ethnic-tribal forces in South West Asia in the coming years if control cannot be regained in the next two years in large parts of the country and particularly in the border region with Pakistan.

Is there still time to succeed? This is the conclusion at which the US generals arrived in the autumn of 2009. Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US armed forces, gave the assessment early in September to the NATO Military Committee in Portugal that American and allied troops had 18 to 24 months to succeed. This calculation is, of course, a political one on the American electoral calendar: The autumn of 2011 is the time when the pre-campaign for the US presidential election of 2012 will begin. But beyond this point of time the war will somehow continue in Afghanistan, as it will probably in Pakistan. In political-strategic terms the conflict is a spreading civil war in both countries with the tendency to tie both into a long drawn-out conflict of a systemic, societal and cultural nature: It is about political power, but also about political, social and religious order. It is, above all, about self- identification and hence about independence from foreign intervention.

Prepare an exit strategy If this assumption is correct, there is but one reasonable strategy: withdrawal. Therefore a practical “exit strategy” is the necessity of the day. History does not need to be evoked, the present is enough to make the case. Foreign forces will remain just that and their continued presence can only worsen the problem. Whatever good-willed and interested Afghan politicians, clan chiefs and progressive intellectuals with a Western education maintain, it is high time for all the Western forces to leave Afghanistan. For this purpose, it is high time for the Western powers and the entire “international community” (as far as such a political entity really exists) to separate the fight with Islamist terrorism from the situation in Afghanistan and negotiate a withdrawal with the tribal and regional leaders.

Professor Dr. Lothar Rühl Professor Dr.Lothar Rühl was born in 1927. He studied law and political science at the University of Bonn. Doctorate at the Sorbonne in Paris. 1969 to 1973 Deputy Editor-in-chief of Die Welt, 1973 to 1980 Special Correspondent for the TV channel ZDF in Brussels. 1981 to 1982 Deputy Spokesman of the German Government, 1982 to 1989 State Secretary in the MOD, Bonn. Since 1986 Professor for Political Science and European Affairs at the University of Cologne. Dr. Rühl publishes regular articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. His significant publications include “Russia’s Way to World Power” (1987), and “Germany as a European Power: National Identity and International Responsibility” (1996).

Lessons to learn from the Soviet retreat The Soviet army staged its retreat from Afghanistan between 1986 and January 1989 over three years, flanked by agreements with the main resisting forces not to interfere, particularly in the Tajik and Uzbek north of the country. The agreements were kept by the “Mujahideen” combatants and the civil war in Afghanistan went on until the victory of the “Taliban”, backed by the Pakistani army and military intelligence service. Of course, it is difficult and risky trying to repeat the exercise under different conditions and late in the political season of post-Soviet Asia. The spectre of Vietnam haunts the Americans. But the example of the political evolution of postAmerican South East Asia since 1975 shows that there may be always hidden prospects for ultimately positive developments, once the foreigners have left. Why should this be different in South West Asia with Pakistan still standing? It could be different if and when Pakistan falls and chaos spreads. Of course, the US and NATO could remain until then and withdraw to Central Asia beyond the border, at least as long as the Germans hold the escape routes in the north open for ISAF to withdraw and the Americans can use the port of Karachi. The Western forces will not be militarily beaten in Afghanistan, as the US forces were not beaten in Vietnam. But unable to win a decisive and lasting victory, assure self-supporting stability for a decade in Afghanistan and reorganize the country into a loose confederation of ethnic and tribal regions with only a nominal central authority, they will not overcome the guerrilla “insurgency”.



Some strategic questions The first strategic question is: “insurgency” against whom or what? The present government in Kabul is neither a “national” nor a democratic authority. It has no “national” roots and it has no political or ethnic legitimacy. Insurgency General elections will not suffice to confer legitimacy to the Afghan government, not even with a new “national compact” as between the tribal and regional leaders in 2001 after the US armed intervention. That perspective has disappeared as a result of the war. President Karzai is and will remain unable and unsuited to rally a stable majority of the Afghan people; the Pachtun tribes, of which he is a representative, have rejected him in their majority. The Tajik and Uzbek want control of the north as before, which they now enjoy, and they do not need a government in Kabul. Whether the artificial frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan can be controlled by anybody from outside the border regions is an unanswered question apart from the partial answer given by the last eight years: certainly not by the US and its foreign allies as occupation forces, which they have become in spite of all the assistance they offer to the population. The “insurgents” are of various kinds, mostly tribes hostile to any central authority, partly bandits out for booty, partly the narcotics producers and traders, partly the religious fundamentalists of a medieval Islam fighting for the old customs, the old order and their hold over their families without outside interference. They oppose American “nation building”, emancipation of women, schooling of girls and foreign influence. The small minority of militant Islamists with the jihadist appeal tries to reconquer the power the “Taliban” lost in 2001 to the Americans. They try to use all the rest for this purpose. The “insurgency” is not only against the government in Kabul, but also against the foreigners. This is not new in Asia. There is no simple solution, but taking away the main cause of the “insurgency” would probably not worsen the problem but rather alleviate the burden. The geostrategic role of Afghanistan in the Cold War The second strategic question is about the significance of Afghanistan and its place in South West Asia next to Central Asia. After the USSR had intervened in December 1979 in the Afghan civil war to save the socialist government in Kabul, official American thinking assumed that the real aim of Moscow’s strategy was the Persian Gulf, and that the Soviet government wanted to build air bases in southwestern Afghanistan for long range flights into the Gulf region and into the Indian Ocean, out-flanking Iran and Pakistan. The administrations of presidents Carter and Reagan imposed a “South West Asia Study” on NATO with the official demand


that the European allies make forces available to be engaged in the Gulf region in case of a Soviet attack. Several NATO allies, in particular Germany, refused and in 1981 the project was definitely abandoned by NATO. It was concluded in Brussels that Afghanistan had no strategic or geopolitical importance for the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area and that South West Asia including Iran was no place for European “out-of-area” force deployments, given the central East-West confrontation on the European continent.

The geostrategic role of Afghanistan after the Cold War What has changed since then? Afghanistan is still a landbound country between Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. Both Iran and Pakistan have political interests in it, mostly not to see it in hostile hands, in particular not under the direct influence of the other or of a foreign power. That was the main reason for Pakistan to support the Islamic resistance against the pro-Communist and pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and later the militant Islamist zealots of the Taliban movement. The Soviet Union is no more since 1991. Russian power in Asia has waned, although Moscow’s influence in Central Asia is still active and competing with that of Peking. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is no longer essential, even as it remains a playground for its secret services and for politics against India. India’s economic influence in Afghanistan is more worrisome to Islamabad in light of the Cashmere conflict with India than the internal politics of the chaotic Afghan neighbour. The combination of American and Indian interests make for a complex pattern of foreign involvement, over which Pakistan has little influence. The ancient and durable problems of central authority on both sides of the border have caused a gradual unification of the border areas under the rule of guerrilla forces and tribal assertiveness. After having intervened in the Afghan troubles and wars, Pakistan now sees itself threatened by the extension of unrest and rebellion as well as by Taliban power expansion on the Pakistani side of the artificial border with the northwestern frontier and Waziristan, uncontrolled by the Pakistani government.

No EU interest to continue war There is no strategic geopolitical position to be gained in Afghanistan for either Pakistan or Iran and less for India or America. Europe has no active interest there to be promoted or protected. For Europe the intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan was a war of choice in 2001/02, not a war of necessity. Solidarity with America was the critical issue, not the forward defence of Europe or even of the North Atlantic alliance. For America it seemed different, but only seen under the influence of the traumatic shock of “9/11”. In reality, Afghanistan posed no vital threat to the US.


2009 – A crucial year for Afghanistan by Françoise Hostalier MP*, Paris and Jean Pierre Koucheida MP*, Paris

It was predicted that 2009 would be a tough year for Afghanistan. All the countries with a presence there are suddenly in favour of a solution that is not solely military but based also on the country’s economic and social development. However none have actually changed their position, reduced their military footprint or made any significant increase in their civil commitment. For all the international conferences on reconstruction assistance, economic, social and cultural development plans, promised billions, plans to replace opium poppy with alternative crops and the commitment to crack down on producers and traffickers, poverty and malnutrition are still rife and nothing is being done to help an essentially peasant society make a decent living from agriculture. There are frequent accusations of corruption. International audits reveal that more than half of the promised financial aid goes on security, while most of the rest subsidises non-governmental organisations and pays the wages of the international regulators and experts who manage and administer the aid programmes on the ground. Even though these activities directly or indirectly serve to fuel the country’s economy, there have not been enough tangible achievements to meet the expectations and needs of the population.

The role of the Afghan state in security From a security perspective, the Afghan state is both strong and weak. The national army and police, constantly growing in numbers, are now better trained and better equipped. Armed groups with different tribal, ethnic or religious allegiances and security companies complement and sometimes replace government forces. The police force is experiencing the kinds of problems faced in many countries in transition, such as lack of motivation, low wages, lack of equipment and inconsistent levels of training and support, while their opponents continue their long-term efforts to undermine the government. The combatants retreat

Françoise Hostalier Françoise Hostalier was born in Beauvais. She holds a master’s degree in mathematics and was a certified teacher from 1976 until 1993. 1981 joined the Republican Party 1993 to 1995 Member of Parliament. 1995 Secretary of State to the Minister of National Education. Formerly head of the Popular Party for French Democracy (PPDF) and Vice-President of the Liberal Democracy (DL) party, is she now a member of the National Bureau of the Radical Party and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). 2007 elected under UMP as Member of Parliament. 2009 Vice President of the French-Afghan Friendship Group of the National Assembly. Mrs Hostalier is also Inspector General of Education, Established Groups and Schooling.

Jean Pierre Koucheida Jean-Pierre Kucheida was born in Lievin on 24 February 1943. A specialist in geography, he taught at the Lycee Henri Darras Liévin. Since 1981 continuously elected as Member of Parliament of the 12th District of Pas-de-Calais. 1981 to 2001 Mayor of Lievin and a Member of the General Council of Pas-de-Calais (1981 to 1988), 1995 to 1997 Questeur of the National Assembly. A Member of the Finance Committee, Mr. Kucheida is Vice President of the study group on the development of social and healthy living, and Rapporteur on budget appropriations for fisheries. Mr. Kucheida is President of the French-Nepali Friendship Group.

over the areas where this ethnic group predominates. Afghanistan and Pakistan are bound together in a complex relationship. War prevails on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. In Afghanistan, the conflict has taken on an international dimension. There are troops participating in the International Securi-

“We face a security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan that demands urgent attention…” Barack Obama, President of the United States of America

to their rear bases and sanctuary in Pakistan where they contribute to that country’s destabilisation. Afghanistan and Pakistan have two things in common: the role played by the Pashtun tribes and the attempt by the Taliban to gain control

ty Assistance Force (ISAF, NATO) and still others engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom led by the United States. Over 30 000 European soldiers are deployed in the Afghan theatre of operations.



Mrs Hostalier and Mr Koucheida on ESDA Mission in Afghanistan with officers of the Afghan National Security Forces Photo: ESDA Paris

A conflict with international dimensions The European armed presence has not translated into political influence, however, and is not reflected in the strategic decisions regarding Afghanistan and the wider region. Each country applies its own rules of engagement and acts according to national priorities. Seven years after the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan is still synonymous with war, insecurity and economic and social underdevelopment. The spiral into violence has both endogenous and exogenous explanations. In 2001 the defeated Taliban fighters left the towns and cities and withdrew to the villages or found refuge in Pakistan. They were able to regroup and reorganise thanks to the vast Pashtun support network that had grown during the years of war against the Soviet occupation and the Afghan communist regime.

Reasons for the rise in violence The country experienced a period of relative stability between 2002 and 2006, despite the persistent violence. The armed opposition groups – Taliban and others – were active in the east and south of the country, but were held in check by a relatively small international and Afghan military presence. In 2009 the Afghan National Army has 80 000 troops (with plans for its expansion to 134 000 by 2014) and the national police force has 80 000 officers; ISAF numbers 55 000 troops and there are 18 000 American soldiers deployed in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A). These numbers will be boosted by 21 000 American combat troops, including 4 000 devoted to training, plus equipment. Some 5 000 additional European troops were deployed for the duration of the presidential elections in August 2009. Meanwhile, the security situation in the Pakistani territories on the border with Afghanistan continues to deteriorate with persistent fighting – and the ensuing mass displacement of civilians – in the Swat valley and inside Waziristan between the Pakistan army and militia on the one hand and the Pakistani Taliban on the other. In Afghanistan, the Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) regularly attack or attempt to attack the


Afghan government and foreign troops, and buildings and structures are destroyed. In Afghanistan, violence is not residual, it is constant.

President Obama’s new strategy The response of the Obama administration was to send in more troops and step up military operations – in keeping with its predecessor’s decision. Such fighting talk does not scare the AOG – there is no sign of a mass surrender as yet – but it does raise further doubts about the real reasons behind this engagement with the public in contributor countries and with the Afghan government which is trying to increase its authority and become less dependent on foreign forces. In an effort to moderate the warlike tone of such messages, political and military leaders from Europe and America put forward arguments in support of economic and social reconstruction. However, an investment and infrastructure development plan has yet to be launched and is waiting on the payment of contributions from donor states and international institutions facing a global economic crisis.

Majority of funding goes on the military For a country of 32 million inhabitants, the 10 billion dollars pledged over five years (2006-2010) under the London Afghanistan Compact represents five dollars per capita per month. At the Paris Conference in 2008, the European states, the United States and the other countries concerned, in particular Japan, pledged a further 21 billion over five years (in reality only a further 14 billion), which represents seven dollars per capita per month.

Too little budget for civil operations These pledges for reconstruction and social and economic development and assistance represent one tenth of the sums devoted to military operations. For the 2009-2010 period, the budget allocated for American military operations in Afghanistan is over 24 billion dollars, almost half a billion per week. The United States has also promised 3.6 billion dollars of assistance for the Afghan National Security Forces (army and


players. Climate problems and recurrent droughts, war damage (particularly in irrigation areas), returning refugees and a rising population are creating an explosive social situation. Lack of organisation Several economic and industrial programmes have been launched which were soon been hampered by the lack of organisation, the inadequacy and poor quality of infrastructure and the shortage of qualified staff. The volume of contraband trade with neighbouring states exceeds that of legal trade, particularly in the case of Pakistan (by a ratio of 1 to 10, according to various international sources). Afghan heroin market One of the most serious consequences of this situation is the increase in opium poppy cultivation. Afghan heroin has a market value of four billion dollars per year, of which just over 100 million is said to fund the Taliban. Compared to the opium poppy, alternative crops such as wheat, cotton or fruit are more exacting as regards climate conditions, irrigation and technical requirements (fertilisers, machinery). French Soldiers in Afghanistan

Photo: ISAF

police). While American rhetoric claims that the military solution is not the only one, the majority of funding continues to be poured into military and security resources.

Urgent attention to Afghanistan The reality behind the words is clearly set out in the first lines of President Obama’s letter to Congress regarding the supplemental appropriations request: “We face a security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan that demands urgent attention. The Taliban is resurgent and al-Qa’ida threatens America from its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border”. In plainer terms, the situation is the same as it was back in September 2001 when it justified the US-led intervention.

The situation of women Another reason put forward to justify the international military presence is the situation of women. From an Afghan viewpoint the matter remains controversial, given the differences between ethnic groups and in social and economic status, education and religion. Women represent 47% of the population between 14 and 65 years old. Their situation has improved in urban areas, but very little has changed in the countryside where two thirds of the population live. Tradition and the strict interpretation of the precepts of Islam are also factors to be taken into account and should not be underestimated. Seeking to impose rules of conduct and dictating behaviour within families without any prior attempt at education and without accompanying social measures and economic aid to raise the standard of living is bound to result in resistance and rejection from part of the population.

The main difficulties with reconstruction Beyond questions of funding, some of the main difficulties with reconstruction are the Afghan administration’s inexperience, corruption and the lack of transparency in the distribution of aid, most of which does not materialise in the form of practical action that is visible and beneficial to the population. A further obstacle is that initiatives are scattered among NGOs, state and cooperation bodies – the EU and its member states have separate programmes in the same areas – and the fact that aid is being militarised. The Afghan people have been left disappointed by the way reconstruction has been managed, which has in part contributed to public distrust of the government and foreign

Health care Women suffer greatly from the fact that there is no public health system covering the whole country, because of a lack of infrastructure, staff and the necessary financial investment in this area in particular. The persistently high rates of child mortality, maternal death and complications arising from repeated childbirth are a direct result of the inadequate public health services. Education It is not so much the number of schools or the number of children attending school that matters here, but the quality



and type of education given. Schoolteachers do not receive adequate training. Schooling for girls often ends at age 12 because there are no female teachers to teach them. They are then confined to the home, often as a prelude to marriage. The majority of the adult population remains illiterate and, apart from an educated elite, those who are literate have only a very basic education. As a result most of the urban population is condemned to low-skilled, poorly paid work and does not earn enough to support their clan-based extended families. Justice and law When it comes to applying the law, the traditional Afghan system prevails. Seeking to impose a secular justice system in a country where the Koran (Sharia) is the primary source of law is a dangerous social and political experiment. There is a shortage of courts, judges and lawyers, and most of the population would not have the means to access a system that had to be paid for. Meanwhile, the various tribal value systems and religious interpretation apply, particularly when it comes to matters of family and property. This form of justice is more accessible to the poor, especially the rural poor, and as far as lawsuits are concerned, provides the straightforward solutions that complainants expect. This is also true of criminal cases, which are resolved according to principles of punishment and compensation. The regional environment Afghanistan cannot be reconstructed without taking into account the regional environment. Apart from China, all the states bordering Afghanistan are Muslim states. There is a greater degree of religious influence in Iran and Pakistan than in the central Asian states, but the latter are also experiencing security problems as a result of radical religious opposition. Regional economic and social development varies widely. The whole region is the scene of struggles for geopolitical influence and efforts to control energy and trade routes and establish military bases. Afghanistan is now once again the focus of attention.

Lack of an EU “grand strategy” What is striking about this geopolitical maelstrom is that the EU is not playing a decisive role. Over 30 000 European troops are deployed in Afghanistan, participating in military, security and stability, training, and reconstruction operations. The EU has a Special Representative on the spot and is conducting a police training operation. The European Commission is providing financial and technical aid. And yet aside from talk of governance, democracy and women’s rights, it is hard to discern any kind of European


strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The continuation of military operations and the definition of tactical and strategic objectives stem for the most part from decisions taken first by American Central Command (CENTCOM) then passed on to NATO via the Brunssum Headquarters in the Netherlands. The European Union is in a position to provide massive aid to all sectors, from economic and social development to security. But in reality, the EU is just one player among others such as the United Nations, the World Bank, China, India and Japan. In terms of financial aid, the EU does both a lot and little, providing 3.4 billion euros for the 2002-2006 period, but only two billion in the framework of the London Afghanistan Compact (2006-2010): in total, five or six billion euros from an economic entity that is “worth” 14.7 thousand billion euros or 30% of world GDP. What Afghanistan really needs is investment to create jobs and build transport infrastructure, dams, irrigation systems, and an energy and food industry. There are any number of European firms specialised in these areas, yet few, if any are, actually on the spot, in either a national or European capacity.

Conclusion The European Union and its member states do not seem any more inclined than in the past to become decision-making partners alongside the Afghan state and the United States. They are complementary partners, donors, providers of assistance and major troop contributors. The situation is described as alarming, yet governments are sending a limited number of troops with restricted rules of engagement, and the political objectives are not clearly defined. Financial aid is limited and there is very little investment. There is no grand strategy, no European Great Game for Afghanistan, Pakistan and central Asia. The future of the country still depends on decisions taken in the United States and above all on Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, developments in Pakistan and initiatives taken by other regional players such as India, Iran and Russia. 2009 is undoubtedly a crucial year for Afghanistan. The Afghan people have already won the first round of this terrible combat against the barbarity of the Taliban, refusing to be cowed by their threats and showing a fair voter turnout in the recent presidential elections. All local and regional players alike will be paying close attention to developments in the wake of those elections and to the results of the civil and military action by the forces on the ground.

*The authors are members of the French Parliament (Assembleé Nationale) and rapporteurs for the Defence Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European Union (ESDA/AWEU), Paris. This article will be published in the French language in “Défense”, Paris, N° 143/ January 2010 www.revue-defense-ihedn


Building Afghan Security Forces: the solution to the security situation by Dr. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Transformation Desk, NATO Defense College, Rome1

There should be little surprise at reports the commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF) has requested up to 40,000 additional troops. The deterioration of the security environment in Afghanistan is wellknown. Given the priority of protecting the Afghan population within the current strategy, the need for additional coalition forces is obvious. More troops from NATO members and partner nations, however, are only a part of the additional means needed to improve security. It is equally − if not more − critical to accelerate efforts to improve the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to eventually provide for its own security. During the “surge” in 2007 that turned around the situation in Iraq, most of the media attention was paid to the additional five brigades of US troops sent by President Bush to bring the coalition troop total up to approximately 169,000. However, the personnel available to conduct operations in Iraq also included roughly 440,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (soldiers and police) that had been trained and equipped by the US-led coalition. While it seems clear that the surge of US forces had a considerable effect, the Iraqi Security Forces also played a vital part.2

Fundamental Role of Afghan National Security Forces An essential attribute of a legitimate government is the ability to protect its own people. Sociologist Max Weber referred to this as having a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. By threatening the civilian population while simultaneously claiming to have moral superiority, insurgents attempt to undermine the most basic foundations of a government and thus overthrow it. The keystone of modern counterinsurgency strategy is getting the population to perceive the national government as being legitimate and capable. Conversely, insurgents are using a combination of “propaganda of the deed” and quiet local threats to make the GIRoA appear impotent. They are trying to disrupt the national government and spread terror in order to convince the population that supporting them is a better choice than the GIRoA, or that other than death, there is no choice at all. As the unclassified version of the McChrystal


Dr. Christopher Schnaubelt Dr. Christopher M. Schnaubelt was born in San Diego, holds the Transformation Chair at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. In 2000, he received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California Santa Barbara and is also a graduate of the US Army War College. He served as an officer in the California Army National Guard from 1981 to 2005, with assignments that included Chief of the Training Division at the National Interagency Civil-Military Institute, Commander of the 223rd Training Regiment (Combat Arms), and Chief of Policy for Combined Joint Task Force–Seven in Iraq. Prior to coming to the NATO Defense College in March 2008, Dr. Schnaubelt worked for the US Department of State as the Deputy Director for National Security Affairs, Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office, in the US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.

Assessment released to the Washington Post put it: “The insurgents wage a ‘silent war’ of fear, intimidation, and persuasion…to gain control over the population.”

Building Afghanistan’s Army and National Police An intervening force, such as ISAF, can temporarily3 improve security by protecting the population from the insurgents while the national government increases its own ability to provide such protection. In the long run, however, to be perceived as the legitimate state authority the GIRoA itself must be able to effectively secure the population. As was the case with the Bush administration’s approach, an indispensable component of the Obama administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is to help build capable and reliable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Besides the 17,000 additional US troops that President Obama had approved in February 2009, another 4,000 are being deployed specifically as trainers for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The creation of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was approved during the April 2009 summit in StrasbourgKehl. It will oversee higher level training of the ANA and assist with its development. The intent is to better integrate all of the allied efforts to increase the ability of the GIRoA to protect its population and defeat the insurgents. In addition to providing institutional training such as initial entry, non-commissioned officer, and officer training, a signifi-


cant increase in operational training will be accomplished by boosting the number of coalition troops embedded in ANSF units. These efforts will be combined with a considerable expansion of partnering between ISAF and ANSF units. The ISAF commander envisions these training, mentoring, and partnering efforts as the best and most rapid means to increase ANSF capability. Afghan soldiers receive their initial entry training at the Kabul Combined Training Center, where they complete a ten-week Basic Warrior Training Course. The ANA’s Training Command runs the center with instructor support and advice from international trainers. France and the United Kingdom provide advisory teams for officer candidate school and officer training programs. Either a NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Team or a US Embedded Training Team is embedded with each ANA combat unit to provide unit leaders with advice and greater ability to rapidly access US and ISAF resources. In addition to the Kabul Police Academy, most of the initial training for the ANP currently takes place at seven regional training centers using private contractors hired by the US State Department. Important European providers of police training include Italy, which announced a “Carabinieri Surge” at the April 2009 NATO summit. Additionally, Germany is creating another training center that will increase the number of Afghan police officers trained each year, EUPOL is working to double its current training force to 400, and the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands have agreed to provide Police Mentor Teams to support focused training in specified districts. France has been providing training to the Afghan counternarcotics police and promoting an increased role for the European Gendarmerie Force in training Afghan police officers.4

Challenges ahead in ANA and ANP Expansion Developing ANSF ability to secure the Afghan population is one of the most important pillars of ISAF operations. Yet at this stage of the insurgency, this goal still presents more of a challenge than a solution. Allied and GIRoA efforts remain some distance away from a quantity and quality of Afghan forces that would enable the withdrawal of coalition forces to begin. The Obama administration’s “Af-Pak” strategy announced in March 2009 committed to a goal of expanding the ANSF to 134,000 soldiers and 82,000 police officers by 2011. New proposals include accelerated efforts to reach the goal of 134,000 for the ANA by October 2010 instead of 2011, and to continue ANSF expansion to approximately 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police by 2013. In a counterinsurgency effort, a credible police force is more critical to securing the population than an army. Unfortunately, in addition to significant problems with corruption and inadequate resources, the ANP is suffering the highest percentage

of casualties. This hinders recruitment, particularly in the heavily contested Pashtun-dominated south. The creation of NTM-A could prove to be a significant contribution, but results remain to be seen. Even in the best case, the creation of sufficiently large and capable ANSF is probably years away. A March 2009 report by Oxford Analytica argued that a rapid, significant expansion of the Afghan National Army may be problematic due to a retention rate of only 53% and shortfalls of volunteers, qualified officer candidates, and logistical support capabilities. In May 2009, General George Casey, the US Army Chief of Staff, said that “training of local police and military in Afghanistan was at least a couple years behind the pace in Iraq….”

A Race against Time? There is a tangible feeling that ISAF is battling the clock as much as it is fighting the insurgents. Policy makers are concerned about declining domestic support for the war in Afghanistan. Some elected officials are posing a choice of either rapid demonstrable progress or a drastic reduction in the commitment of troops and financial resources. Assumption of greater responsibility by capable Afghan National Security Forces would be both a demonstration of progress and an effective means to overcome the insurgency. Yet, it is important to avoid a rush to failure that would place too much reliance on the ANSF before they can accomplish the job. It is not just quantity that matters. Quality is also an important factor. A critical element of executing the present strategy is to decide how much and how quickly Afghanistan’s army and police can be relied upon to secure the population. An early failing in Iraq was too much hurry in handing security responsibilities over to unreliable and inadequately trained Iraqi forces in lieu of deploying the necessary level of US troops. Blunders such as the creation of the Fallujah Brigade in Iraq,5 described by Thomas Ricks as having “far more in common with the insurgents than they ever would with the [US] Marines,” proved to be steps backward instead of the hoped for shortcuts to victory. Building large and capable enough Afghan army and police forces may indeed be the solution to the insurgency in Afghanistan. However, this will not produce a rapid exit for ISAF. 1 Dr. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not represent the official position of NATO, the NATO Defense College, or the US Government. 2 Furthermore, Iraqi Security Forces were complemented by approximately 92,000 “Sons of Iraq” irregular forces. 3 Experience in successful counterinsurgency efforts has shown that “temporary” can nonetheless be a period of many years — often more than a decade. 4 This force includes police officers from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Romania. 5 A former Republican Guard brigade commander was placed in charge of an Iraqi Army unit in an attempt to quickly break the impasse with insurgents in Fallujah. The effort failed miserably.



Are we doing enough to protect our soldiers? An opinion contributed by Hartmut Bühl

The lives of soldiers deployed to Afghanistan are being put at even greater risk through shortcomings on their own side. Air reconnaissance and surveillance is patchy and does not operate round-the-clock. Their equipment is not up to scratch, particularly their vehicles and helicopters. Replacement personnel are too few in number and are not always properly prepared for the mission. This is not only true of the soldiers fighting the Taliban insurgents; it also applies to military and civilian personnel involved in nation building and humanitarian aid work.

Chinks in the armour

In its 31/08/2009 issue the “Spiegel” magazine reported the insightful comment of a German commander in Kabul: “the best protection in the Afghan capital is not to get noticed”.

Blending in

What is true for the above-mentioned VIPs also applies to a wide and varied range of military tasks, including those of the dispatch riders and supply drivers. It is clear from TV footage that the streets of Kabul are crammed with look-alike Japanese vehicles whose occupants are difficult to make out. It would be a relatively simple matter to fit this kind of vehicle with armour plating and, if the right specifications were followed, to keep the vehicle’s interior safe from small The shortfalls in the fleets of arms fire, hand grenades, mortar and artillery shrapnel. Only a few compavehicles need to be sorted out nies in Europe are capable of refitting quickly. One way would be to civilian vehicles with the latest equipment to meet the most stringent procure inexpensive armoured safety standards and blend inconspiccivilian transport uously into their surroundings.

The loss of a group of Italian soldiers this summer unleashed controversy over whether their vehicles were properly equipped and protected. At the same time, fierce debate in the British Parliament in the wake of further losses in recent months brought to light undeniable shortcomings in the equipment of helicopters and transport vehicles. Germany’s vehicles...fast. former Defence Minister, in spite of The Military and the NGOs continued losses, and the contrary NGOs in Brussels have complained opinion of operational commanders in that the military vehicles sent to the field, remains convinced that the Bundeswehr is well guarantee their safety actually put them at risk. The aid workequipped to cope with conditions in Afghanistan. The losses ers want protection but are reluctant to cooperate too closely speak for themselves. with the military for fear of becoming “military targets” themselves. The European Union has just issued a call for tenders for a dozen more specially fitted vehicles for its personnel. The Priority n°1 – protect the troops news from Berlin is that local company STOOF, specialised in In the short term, resourcefulness and effort may be able to converting civilian vehicles to operate in crisis areas, and solve the technical shortcomings and supply bottlenecks that which has introduced its vehicles in Afghanistan with great have dogged transport and liaison vehicles. However, the much needed information from continuous airborne ground success, will be one of the bidders. surveillance will not be available until NATO’s AGS enters service in 2012 at the earliest. Only when that resource is Save lives, and money, fast available will field commanders be able correctly assess the Public opinion in Europe is highly sensitive to the welfare of its enemy’s strength and movements and successfully plan their soldiers and will soon make itself heard if they are sent away own operations. Even then, it will not be possible to achieve to fight with the wrong, or inadequate, equipment. It is also total protection against mines and ambushes. Transport essential to make sure the soldiers themselves have faith in vehicles considered safe on account of their armour and their the tools of their trade. Forces of all nations engaged in operamine protection equipment are not foolproof. They could tions in the field would be rightly underwhelmed if they actually appeal to the Taliban as particularly worthwhile and learned in 2011 that their Parliaments had decided to procure easily identifiable targets. High ranking military leaders and one or two dozen replacement vehicles to be delivered over a other prominent figures visiting the troops blithely rely on the period of several years. The shortfalls in the fleets of vehicles protection of these vehicles... without realising they may have need to be sorted out quickly. One way would be to procure become a military target themselves. inexpensive armoured civilian transport vehicles...fast.



Europe, a real heavyweight in international policy by Professor Dr. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman, Robert Schumann Foundation, Paris

With 23 per cent of the worldwide GDP, the EU is undoubtedly the most important economic and commercial actor, but it has to think about the means to convert its economic power into being a real heavyweight in international policy. In 2007, the EU was the top exporter in the world with about 17 per cent of the global exchange of goods. Since its latest enlargement in 2007, the EU has become the hugest area of democratic stability and prosperity in the world. Its GDP, which was 37 per cent inferior to the US one in 1957, has become nowadays superior by 6 per cent. The common market is a huge success: 500 million inhabitants with the highest average by purchase power. Finally, the Euro, which is an incredible asset of economic and political weight, is the second currency after the dollar. Nevertheless, Europe fails to be considered as a “global actor” on the international scene. This weakness results mainly from political difficulties. The EU is made of multiple Nation States which have difficulties to accept global long term European interests. This is nonetheless crucial as regards the economic growth of Asian countries led by China.

Europe on the way to a strategic actor The materialization of a European capacity in crisis management is the result of two common evolutions: the growth of the economic and commercial competences of the EU since 1957 and the appearance of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht treaty (1992). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) provides new tasks to be included in the Treaty on the EU known as „Petersberg tasks“*. In the same time, to make its diplomacy more powerful and visible, the EU created the position of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy who works as a coordinator between EU countries to shape and carry out the EU foreign policy. But the real start of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is the establishment of the “global objective” during the Helsinki European Council (one year after the Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit in 1998) that provided the EU with autonomous civil and military capacities. Finally, in December 2002, the EU and NATO signed a strategic partnership agreement on crisis management called „Berlin Plus“ allowing the Union to have an immediate access to NATO’s logistical and planning resources, including intelligence, when NATO is not involved itself.

Dr. Jean-Dominique Giuliani Jean-Dominique Giuliani was born in 1956. He has a degree in law from the Institute of Political Studies and was nominated in 2000 Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation, of which he was one of the founders. 1981 - 1992 Secretary General of the Centrist Union of the Senate in Paris; 1992 - 1998 Director of the cabinet of Mr René Monory, President of the Senate. Designated Council of the Council of State (1995), he resigned to continue as the President of the Senate. Director for the General Management of the TNS Sofres, Paris 1998 - 2001. 2002 founded JD-G.Com International Consultants and is currently Special Adviser for the European Commission (2006). Jean-Dominique Giuliani has published among others „Pour l’Europe réunie“ - 2 tome-collection „Les Notes“ by the Robert Schuman Foundation (2002).

ment are financed with the CFSP budget (300 million Euro in 2008 against 62 million Euro in 2005), which is a part of the Union budget, military operations have to be financed directly by Members States but only ten per cent of these expenses are pooled and shared out according to the Member States’ GDP. EU presence abroad in 23 successful missions From 2003 to 2008, the EU set up 23 missions which show its significant presence abroad. Six of them where important military operations (for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chad). The scope of ESDP missions can largely vary (from 10 persons in Georgia between 2005 and 2007 to 7000 in Bosnia since 2004). Atalanta- a new dimension of coopration The Union recently came to a new level in intervening for the first time in the naval field during the “Atalanta” operation. All these operations have either been planned autonomously or with the help of NATO’s resources. From time to time they may even be built in complement to NATO’s, the United States’ or the African Union’s own operations. This diversity underlines Europe’s capacity to intervene whatever the context is and its various competences despite the lack of an integrated and autonomous decision-making body.

The EU’s challenge ESDP has become a financial issue The emergence of a strong European Defence Policy is a financial issue as well. Whereas civil operations of crisis manage-

The lack of a unique body responsible for the security and defence policy is undoubtedly a fundamental obstacle to an efficient and sustainable international policy. The competence



is currently divided between the European Commission and the Council, in which decisions have to be taken unanimously.

The vital conditions to ESDP The Treaty of Lisbon constitutes an important evolution. ESDP will become a common policy. A “minister” in charge of foreign policy will be established. His or her functions will be combined with those of Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner for External Relations, creating a new institutional player strengthening coherence in external action

From now on: No „ad hoc“ solutions The failure of the institutional reforms that should have unified the post of High Representative and the post of Commissioner for External Relations condemn the Member States to find “ad hoc” means of cooperation. They have so far succeeded to act by mutual agreement because operations were often planned or decided in Adapted decision taking accordance to NATO or the UN. But also It is necessary to accept the heterogebecause Members States are close neous States interests within the EU, Lisbon Treaty: Yes prevailed enough to gather autonomously around while arranging an institutionalised hard Photo: Irish Government common values to resolve grave crises core. The treaty will thus introduce new (the financial and the Russo-Georgian ways of decision-taking (the “constructive crisis) in spite of its institutional failure and inadequate capabilabstention”, the permanent structured cooperation) to make ities. Nevertheless, they may have divergent traditions and their the development of an integrated defence policy possible involvement abroad may depend on different geographical between the Member States that are the most ready to go tropism. Whereas some of the “powerful” ones intend to forward together. preserve their prestige, rank or nuclear capabilities, the newly The scope of backlog compared to the US seems important but integrated ones wish to safeguard their newly recovered sovethere are reasons for looking at the future with confidence. On reignty. They consequently consider NATO to be more able to the one hand, the European spirit of unity has so far prevailed take care of their national security, which contributes to make over a lack of institutions. On the other hand, EU now benefits the integration of defence policy so lengthy. from favourable world circumstances. Globalization gave birth to a less western and more multi-polar world (G20 stood out as the relevant level to resolve the world financial crisis) and the EU has to acquire more capabilities to face current crises newly elected American administration concedes that the In terms of physical presence abroad, Europe is a real heavycontemporary crisis cannot be faced alone and that their inteweight but it needs to improve its credibility as it lacks material rest could be better defended like this. That is why it recently capacities to face the current crises. The European Defence gave up its antimissile shield project in Central Europe. HowevAgency (EDA) established in 2004 has failed to fulfil its aim to er, the multipolarity and the interdependence should neither be develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, a value nor an aim. Multipolar relations can lead to a conflicting to enhance European armaments cooperation and to strengthanarchy fatal for each country. en the European industrial and technological collaboration. There is no EU army but only battlegroups of about 1 500 soldiers each that are not comparable to US capabilities. Out of 2 Well balanced transatlantic relations million soldiers that are in principle able to be mobilized, only Transatlantic relations must exist only in a well-balanced and 20 % can nowadays be sent abroad, and only 3 % are engaged egalitarian way. Therefore, to become a real international in an operation. Since 2007 the EU and its members have spent heavyweight, the EU will have to seize these realities to elaboabout 200 billion euro every year on defence policy, whereas rate an appropriate, autonomous and courageous political strathe US has spent twice more in 2009. Furthermore, the expenstegy that goes beyond the plain improvement of its material es are unequally distributed between States (France and Great capabilities. We used to say that the emergence of a European Britain assume more than a third of them). In addition, the awareness would appear from the shock provoked by imminent “European army” remains an army of protection of the territory outer dangers. These dangers exist today, they are more and and not an army able to intervene outside its borders. Finally, more diversified and globalized. Europe will thus have to tackle Europe should also improve its technological investments. this issue which constitutes without doubt the next decisive Europe spent only 4.7 per cent of its defence budget in R&D in step to its political achievement after the Euro. 2008 (six times less than its American ally) and only 1.28 per cent in research and technology, while economic success also * Title V, article 17.2 depends on the strength of the civil and military research.



Europe after the Irish referendum – more coherent, more decisive, more democratic by Willem van Eekelen, Chairman of the Center of European Security Studies, Groningen In Europe, Murphy’s law seems to apply. If things may go wrong, they will, and everything takes longer than you think. Yet, progress over the past half century has been remarkable in terms of reconciliation, stability and a force for good in the world. Fortunately, the Irish people have realised that their national interest lies with the European Union, although asking any nation to correct itself within sixteen months of their earlier negative referendum was risky. Apparently the concessions made to Dublin by making clear that its strict abortion laws would not be affected, nor its traditional neutrality, have had a positive impact, and above all the arrangement that every country would keep its member of the European Commission. A second refusal would have the paradoxical impact of a return to the Nice treaty with its provisions for a reduction of the number of Commissioners. That amendment also serves as a deterrent against other countries, like the Czech Republic, to frustrate ratification.

The EU’s astonishing multifariousness The EU remains a curious mix of an integrated internal market with a rules-based communitarian system, and a fairly classical intergovernmental approach to foreign affairs and security. Not surprisingly, the ambition to be a global player, combining the large set of instruments at our disposal, has not fully materialised. With a membership of 27 and more to come, the consensus rule in the CFSP does prevent the EU from acting quickly enough in managing crises, while the coordination with the European Commission leaves much to be desired. The situation borders on the paradoxical. Javier Solana, the enthusiastic High Representative, possesses some meaningful competences, but has no access to the Union budget, while the Commissioner for External Relations has such access, but only limited competences in the field of civilian crisis management.

Dr. Willem van Eekelen Dr Willem F. van Eekelen was born 1931 in Utrecht, NL and started his career in the Netherlands foreign service with postings in New Delhi, London, Accra and NATO in Paris/Brussels. He was the Dutch “correspondant européen” for the European Political Cooperation in 1971-74 and head of the NATO and OSCE Department. Elected to Parliament in 1977, he served as State Secretary for Defence, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and as Minister of Defence. He was Secretary General of the WEU in 1989-1994 and subsequently a member of the Netherlands Senate till 2003. Currently he is a member of the Netherlands Advisory Commission on European Integration and chairman of the Center of European Security Studies in Groningen.

nal Relations, and as the chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers. An External Action Service will replace the delegations of the European Commission and represent the EU across the board. These innovations, along with the further perfection of the internal market and increase in the policy areas decided by qualified majority voting and subject to co-decision with the European Parliament, will change the way in which the EU functions. Some have raised objections: are we getting three captains (European Council, Commission and High Representative) on the ship? How will the new High Representative relate to his colleagues on the Commission, notably those responsible for trade and development? Yet, the new package is worth trying, for it favours effective implementation of agreed policies and separates the function of chairman from that of national representative.

A hybrid nature of the EU What will change The Lisbon Treaty, which now is likely to enter into force soon, makes a more coherent approach possible. At the highest level, a semi-permanent President of the European Council of heads of state and government, appointed for 2 1/2 years and once renewable, will do away with the sixmonthly presidency, which usually was too short to make any significant impact on the implementation of the Union’s agenda. Improved continuity will also favour sustained long-term policies. Solana’s successor will be double-hatted, as a Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Exter-

For the foreseeable future we have to accept the hybrid nature of the EU. Nobody has an appetite for new constitutional changes. • The communitarian system with the Commission proposing, • the Council and Parliament deciding and • the Court of Justice ensuring a uniform application of the rules, is unlikely to be extended to foreign affairs and defence. So the emphasis should be on the agenda-setting and policyinitiating roles of the new functions. They should be more that of a chairman than of a president.



ESDA/WEU Assembly fact-finding mission to the EU forces in Chad

European Defence Agency (EDA) Fortunately, the European Defence Agency has been lifted out of the first version of the European Constitution of 2003 and is now well established in Brussels. Its aim of combining requirements, research and development, joint production and procurement is still far from being reached, but at least the European defence equipment market has become substantially more transparent.

Permanent Structured Cooperation The Lisbon Treaty opens the possibility of Permanent Structured Cooperation within the Union framework, a form of enhanced cooperation among those countries whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another with a view to the most demanding missions. So far nothing has come of it, nor of other forms of enhanced cooperation, and the strongest protagonist, France, has refrained from pushing it from fear of complicating the Irish vote. Will they return to this proposal? That will depend on the willingness of the other members to do something meaningful in the security and defence field. In a Union of 27 members, more differentiation will probably be necessary. The option of enhanced cooperation in itself has a function in persuading stragglers not to fall too far behind, because actual implementation would cut them out of the loop. Then implementation would not be necessary. Yet, the emphasis on higher capabilities could be divisive between the larger and the smaller members and it will be difficult to define objective criteria which could be attained by all those having the political will to join in.

The solidarity clauses and the role of the WEU As a former Secretary General of the Western European Union (WEU), I could not help smiling when the proposal came up in the European Convention, because it smacked of reviving the


WEU with its automatic military assistance clause under another name. But the EU is not a collective defence organisation. The Lisbon treaty contains two solidarity clauses. One in case a member asks for help after a terrorist attack, and one in case of armed aggression. The latter is not as clear as Article V of NATO and the WEU (e.g. it does not explicitly mention military assistance), which means that WEU members will have to decide whether they want to keep the WEU treaty as an added security guarantee even if for Photo: ESDA, Paris all practical purposes its functions have been transferred to the EU. In any case, a solution will have to be found, possibly by giving it a new legal basis, for maintaining the WEU Assembly, already rebaptised as the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA), which performs an important consensusbuilding role for national parliamentarians dealing with security and defence. It includes the NATO Member States which do not belong to the EU as Associate Members and EU members which do not belong to NATO as observers. Its reports are of high quality, but the dialogue with the WEU Council, which does not formally meet any more, only takes place in the form of written questions and answers and the Council’s replies to the Assembly’s Recommendations. As long as the European Parliament has no formal competence in this intergovernmental area, the political relevance of the ESDA should be enhanced and its links with the new High Representative strengthened.

A new start possible Without the Irish yes, the EU would have landed in a serious crisis and a mental depression. A new constitutional conference would have been unlikely, so the danger of splitting up into different camps would have been serious at a time that the economic crisis needed more cohesion than ever in order to maintain the benefits of the internal market and the stabilising effect of the Euro. Some of the changes made by the Lisbon treaty could have been made without legal ratification, but would have been doubtful without the momentum of a perspective of a coherent role in world affairs. Much remains to be done. The new office holders will have to work together; the Council and Commission should stop their bickering; EU - NATO relations should improve with the new multilateral approach of the Obama administration and France back in the military integration of the Alliance; military capabilities should be better geared to the required missions of our time. But at least we can move forward again.


The European Parliament and ESDP? by Christoph Raab, General Manager, COPURA and Director, European Security Round Table (ESRT)

With the arrival of the Lisbon Treaty, everything will become better, so we have heard now for a while. But what will Lisbon mean for the European Parliament? Will it become stronger as an actor and what is its exact role in these areas? Since 2004 the Parliament claims that it is the primary institution of parliamentary oversight of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and it has built up key oversight elements such as annual reports on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP, which provides continuity. The Subcommittee on Security and Defence also made it a routine to pass a resolution before each ESDP mission and regularly, MEP delegations go on-site to make their own assessment of the mission performance. In general, Parliament has been very supportive of the development of ESDP. However, should the Parliament be shaping policies pro-actively?

Scrutiny Generally, the two central functions of any parliament in security and defence are parliamentary oversight and budgetary control. Today, there is still the question of where the core of the oversight of ESDP should be situated: With national parliaments, with the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA)/WEU Assembly) or with European Parliament? Each of these has its specific drawbacks: National parliaments will certainly focus more on their own piece of the cake rather than the full picture. The ESDA/WEU Assembly certainly gets the framework right, but doesn’t represent all member states as active members and more importantly, wasn’t it supposed to cease existing if it weren’t for the famous mutual defence clause that the EU did not want to take on? The European Parliament on the other hand sees the full European picture, but has the drawback of low voter turn-out and, so some say, therefore less democratic legitimacy. It therefore seems a pragmatic if somewhat unsatisfying solution to have parliamentary oversight hover between all three places.

The role of the European Parliament in ESDP If the EU will show an ambition during this decade to move ESDP from a show-case of European Integration to a policy through which it wants to defend its interest in the world, I think it is time to make the divisions of responsibilities between who makes the policy and where exactly parliamentary oversight is happening clearer. The European Parliament is in a dilemma: It claims the responsibility for ESDP oversight but lacks the resources to really

keep up with a policy domain that develops quantitatively and qualitatively at a tremendous speed. The oversight case It is certainly very constructive to have regular meetings with the national parliaments, even though those national colleagues tend not to be experts on security and defence matters. Such sessions in the European Parliament combine the right location with an appropriate mix to handle ESDP oversight, because if there is one huge advantage Brussels has over other national capitals, then that it is less shaped by national history and therefore policies are less tied down by traditions, political reflexes and restrictions: Brussels is clearly a hub for innovative thinking. The budget case There are by now some 5-6 bn Euro in the Community budget which are spent on security-related matters and that does not include the whole development policy of the EU. With this tool, Parliament can effectively shape the longer-term structure of ESDP but in order to do so it needs- as an institutionto develop a sense of the whole security picture in the budget. The diplomacy case There is another area where the European Parliament can play an important role and that is parliamentary diplomacy. The bilateral parliamentary relations with third countries or with regional assemblies are important because they take place somewhat under the threshold of day-to-day media attention, but can promote our values in other parts of the world in a non-aggressive and effective way.

The European Parliament is still to define its role in security and defence The consequence for the moment is that the European Parliament should concentrate on overseeing ESDP, raise its voice, develop a more strategic vision on the budget and fully play the diplomacy role in close liaison with the EU High Representative and his diplomatic services. Rather than major direct changes for the Parliament in the area of ESDP, the Lisbon Treaty will bring about structural, personal and political changes for the Council and ESDP. In that sense the Parliament will become a different role in ESDP. Thus, as ESDP will develop in terms of policies and capabilities, it will become a more important parliamentarian policy area for the European Parliament, but it may have to move more into a classic role of a parliament if it is to play its part.



The way towards a European White Book on Security and Defence by Dr. Karl von Wogau, General Secretary of the European Security Foundation, (ESF), Brussels

In December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), a lead document for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, including its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This document was completed five years later in December 2008. The Solana document from 2008 identifies common threats and advocates a modus operandi (‘effective multilateralism’) but it can in no way be compared to the White Books adopted by certain Member States, such as that of France. The latter does not only highlight the threats and the challenges France is going to face in the years and decades to come, but it is also an operational document as it spells out the capabilities and equipment needed for the country’s own security and foreign policy. Concerning the method, the French White Book was based on a broad consultation of many actors, including trade unions and churches.

Dr. Karl von Wogau was born 18th July 1941 in Freiburg Studies in Law and Economics in Freiburg, Munich and Bonn. Doctorate on the constitutional history of Vorderösterreich. Diploma Insead. 1971 - 1984 Manager at Sandoz Ltd. in Basel. Since 1984 partner in the law firm Graf von Westphalen in Freiburg. Member of the European Parliament from 19792009. Cofounder and Chairman of the Kangaroo Group. 1994-1999 Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy. Since 2001 President of the yearly Berlin Security Conference. 2004-2009 Chairman of the Subcommittee in the European Parliament on Security and Defence. Substitute Member in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2009 Secretary General of the European Security Foundation (ESF), Brussels. Last publication „The Path to European Defence - New Roads, New Horizons“, (Hrsg.) John Harper Publishing, 2009

The French White Book 2008: a shining example The French White Book also invites the European Union to prepare its own White Book, which could lead finally to the emergence of a more coherent and decisive foreign policy and a more efficient and cost-effective security and defence policy. The time has come for the EU to think strategically. The EU needs a European White Book on Security and Defence. If we do not want a European White Book to become a technocratic exercise or just an intergovernmental one, we have to get some inspiration from the method used by the French government, which set up an ad hoc Committee in charge of drafting the French White Book. This means that the European White Book, which should be drafted under the respon-


sibility of the High Representative, should be based not only on the concerns of the EU Member States but should also reflect the concerns of our citizens.

How to proceed In a first step, a European White Book on Security and Defence should • start by asserting the common interests of the European Union. This exercise should lead to a more coherent foreign policy and put an end to some unfortunate national initiatives which, on the whole, are undermining the credibility of the EU as an autonomous actor. The second step is to • identify the threats against our common interests and indicate how we could face them. This would be an affirmation of our will to face the threats together and to reinforce our common security and defence policy. The third and final step is to • commit ourselves to buy the equipment necessary to protect our citizens, our interests and values against the threats identified. This means that we would have to fill the loopholes, to pool our assets and to move toward some form of specialisation among the Member States. Such a move presupposes a high degree of confidence and solidarity. We can summarise this by saying that less individual sovereignty


Karl von Wogaus’s visit to Eufor as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. First briefing after landing in Chad. Photo :von Metternich, Brussels

would lead to more capacity to act together and therefore to more collective sovereignty. This would be a hard choice for our Member States, but do they really have the choice?

Adaptation of ESDP to the global geopolitical changes Today’s world is characterised by the still predominant position of the US, the comeback of Russia, the rise of China, India and Brazil, and the challenges posed by climate change, poverty, religious fanatism, etc. A European White Book on Security and Defence has to address the issue of capabilities in relation to the role the EU wants to play in the world. In the short term our ambitions are limited by our capabilities. There is no point to play along the lines of the US if we cannot deliver. In this regard, the idea that we should limit the scope of our ESDP to our neighbourhood is understandable but this assertion is a bit ambiguous. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is our ‘far abroad’. What about our warships deployed in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia to fight piracy? What can we say of the engagement of several Member States in Iraq and now Afghanistan? Instead of putting a geographical limit to our ESDP/CSDP based on past experiences and the limitation of our capabilities, shouldn’t we adopt a more dynamic approach and think according to our interests and values which deserve to be protected? The first EU naval operation ‘Atalanta’ is based on this assumption. Our Member States, which have been shaped by history, have different traditions. Some have developed high seas navies, others have continental armies, but this approach belongs to the past. In December 2008 nations came together and designed a picture of future reasonable capabilities.

The will to go ahead The European Council adopted a Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities: In order to rise to current security challenges and respond to

new threats, Europe [and not the European Union by the way] should actually be capable, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia • of deploying 60 000 troops within 60 days for a major operation, within the range of operations envisaged in the Headline Goal 2010 and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, • of planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope: • two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10, 000 troops for at least two years; • two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups; • an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept; • a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; • a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; • around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years. This ambitious declaration could become a milestone if implemented because the EU would be able to ‘go global’ in crisis management, civil as well as military. The EU can deliver more than just military power. The EU comprehensive approach, based on a mix of instruments, underpins our ESDP. Its distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management is imitated by others, starting with NATO. This is the case for example with the operation ‘Ocean Shield’ which duplicates (or complements) the EU operation ‘Atalanta’.



DEFINING THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES • Defending Europe’s values • Protecting (if not defending) our external borders against • Illegal immigration • Terrorism (outside the EU) • attack against the territory of our Member states • Protecting vital or critical infrastructures on land, at sea and in space developing the notion of EU critical infrastructure • Contributing to peace and stability in the world (= addressing regional conflicts, state failure, natural or man-made catastrophes) • Combating terrorism and organized crime inside the EU • Acting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction • Securing our energy supply (and beyond the supply of strategic commodities) • Protecting vital sea lanes from any disruption by whatever actor • Anticipating the consequences of climate change

Welcome by local Authorities in Chad

Photo : Franjulien, Brussels

50,000 troops, is not “joint” yet. Or don’t we need a small, strong and deployable force which could permanently be at the disposal of the EU?

Critical issues A White Book must address other critical issues: Shall the EU have at its disposal a permanent force? For the time being we have the Battle Groups, which until now have never been used. We have Euroforces like Eurocorps, Eurofor and Euromarfor, which also have never been used by the EU. The European Parliament recommended to put the Eurocorps at the disposal of the EU, but this large corps, with

LIST OF RISKS AND THREATS AGAINST EU’s SECURITY INTERESTS • Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction • Terrorism and organised crime • Cyber security • Energy security • Protecting our vital infrastructures • Climate change • Regional conflicts • Pandemics • State fragility and failed states • Piracy • SALW, Cluster munitions and landmines • Weaponization of space • Financial threats


Troops we deployed in an operation Shouldn’t we develop for troops under the EU flag a common status for our soldiers? They should benefit from similar social conditions and protection when they are involved in an EU operation. After the new attitude shown by the new US administration Concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a European White Book on Security should examine its consequences for the security of the European Union and its Member States.

Conclusion All these examples demonstrate the benefit the European Union can draw from a White Book on Security and Defence. On the one hand it would contribute to reinforce its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but on the other hand it would trigger a public debate which is badly needed when certain circles put into question the ‘raison d’être’ of the European Union. The EU is there to protect our citizens, our way of life and our cultural identity. Through its collective strength it can do much better than any individual country. The White Book exercise would make this very clear to our citizens. And there is no time to lose because the world is going forward: the EU as a major economic power cannot allow itself to stay behind.


Towards a new European security architecture – what is Russia’s place in Europe? by Arcadio Diaz Tejera, Senator, Madrid*

The question as to whether Europe needs a new security architecture was put back on the international agenda in June 2008 by President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia. His move is a sign both of growing concern in Moscow about its perception that Russian views tend to be ignored and of the country’s increasing self-confidence, which emboldens it to aim for the revision of the existing security structures. This was before the war in Georgia that brought Russia and NATO back to a cold war-style confrontation and shook the foundations of Europe’s security structures.

Russia’s security interests In Russia’s view, a new architecture should be based on a legally binding treaty and provide equal security for all. The treaty should be signed not only by all OSCE member states but also by the existing security organisations such as NATO, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and the OSCE itself. Russia wants to correct three major trends that it has observed since the end of the cold war and which it perceives as threatening its security interests: - no country must be allowed to assure its own security at the expense of others; - measures on the part of military alliances or coalitions of countries that undermine the unity of the common security area should not be permitted; and - there should be no expansion of military alliances in a way that threatens the security of other parties to the new treaty. Collective conflict prevention with resolution mechanisms and new forms of cooperation in the fields of non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism and organised crime should be etablished.

The pan-European approach versus inner reforms Moscow has often felt that its proposals for pan-European security have not been taken seriously. I believe that this will not be the case again. Russia rightly points to the curious situation in which the principle of equal security for all is being proclaimed at the same time at the OSCE level and within other regional security organisations such as NATO and the CSTO. The core of the Russian proposal is to strengthen panEuropean commitments and to raise their political level from that of an undertaking within the OSCE to a treaty-based obligation. The Russian President’s initiative also needs to be seen in the context of his parallel efforts to reform his country

Arcadio Diaz Tejera Arcadio Diaz Tejera from Spain, born in 1954, is a Socialist Senator who represents his birthplace of Las Palmas in Gran Canaria. Before becoming a member of parliament he was a Criminal Court judge dealing with terrorist cases. He has been a member of the Political Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU since June 2008. He is also active in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe where he is a member of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population as well as of the Sub-committee on Crime and Terrorism, Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Additionally, he sits on the Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights.

from the inside. In Russia’s case, external and internal reforms go hand in hand. In fact, internal reform is almost a pre-condition for successful efforts to review the external security system. In the end, it all boils down to creating the necessary confidence in Russia’s readiness to become part of the larger transatlantic family of democracies interested in an active governance of the common security challenges they face. However, given the difficulties with Moscow in other areas of international cooperation, such as the issue of Russia’s accession to WTO or its attitude towards a new partnership agreement with the EU, many take the view that Mr Medvedev must do a lot more in order to show that Russia is serious about change.

How Russia could meet its security interests Ever since the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, two important underlying questions have remained unanswered: firstly, what is Russia’s place in Europe? And secondly, how can the security requirements of eastern European countries and the successor states of the former Soviet Union best be met? Russia is a major geopolitical player and one of Europe’s most important actors in addressing a number of security concerns, including arms control, non-proliferation and missile defence, as well as terrorism and organised crime and related issues such as the energy trade, piracy and cyber security. As far as the second question goes, expanding NATO eastwards may not in every case be the right answer. Among other



things, it risks confining our perspective to a mainly military one, leading us to neglect other dimensions of security. A NATO expansion resulting in a more hostile attitude towards Russia within NATO would be counterproductive. But if NATO membership is not the right answer at this point in time for those countries, what should we be offering them? The recent launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (on 6 May 2009 in Prague with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as participants, is an example of what we can do. But while the Partnership aims to contribute to economic stability and cooperation in the region, it lacks a security dimension. The EU, despite the considerable progress of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is not yet capable of providing collective security for its members. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Eastern Partnership has opened up the potential for a normalisation of relations with Belarus. We should make sure that the EU’s initiative cannot be misconstrued as a partnership against Russia. Our common history demands that we continue looking for new and better ways to cooperate with one another.

The President of Russia, Dmitry Anatolyewitsch Medvedev. Photo: www.eng.kremlin.ru

“The time has come for the new generations to profoundly change and modernize Russia” Dmitry Anatolyewitsch Medvedev, President of Russia, Moscow,12.11.2009

What Russia should do to convince critics

President Medvedev’s proposal first met with a degree of suspicion, not least because it was short on detail and few people could see the point being made. Then came the war in

The Russian proposal was then taken to the OSCE, which is the natural and most relevant forum in which to discuss pan-European security issues. The OSCE summit in Corfu in June 2009 launched the “Corfu Process” which aims to structure the further dialogue on European

Russians forces answering Georgian aggression

Destroyed Georgian tank

What are Moscow’s real objectives?


Georgia and theoretical concepts were overtaken by events and the attempt to create new realities on the ground by military force. Russia ceased to show patience and restraint and acted instead. For Russia, the war proved President Medvedev right: the existing institutions are not up to dealing with the current challenges. President Medvedev’s critics believe his proposal is a ploy to set the NATO allies and the OSCE, Council of Europe and EU members wondering whether the set-up they have is the right one, by creating unwarranted uncertainty about the legitimacy, efficiency and credibility of those institutions. Many suspect Moscow of wanting to weaken the human rights dimension of the OSCE, which it increasingly regards as biased and one-sided. Other critics fear that Russia’s aim is to effectively veto further NATO expansion by seeking to maintain a recognised sphere of influence in its own neighbourhood and to keep the United States – often perceived as synonymous with NATO - at bay.



Russian missile destroyer used in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war at the coast of Sevastopol (Ukraine). Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

security. This is a good start: we parliamentarians need to follow this closely and make our own contribution to the debate. A first step was an interparliamentary conference recently hosted by the Ukrainian Parliament. We need to deepen this dialogue further and Russia should make best use of all opportunities to further explain and promote its ideas when they run up against a wall of scepticism.

How then to define Russia’s place in Europe? Russia itself has not fully made up its mind about the geopolitical role that it wishes to play. Geographically speaking, a part of Russia is European and about 75 % of its population lives in its European part. But Russia is also a Eurasian power that shares borders with both China and India. The United States is considered “European” in the political sense and is a military ally of 26 European countries. Any successful future European security architecture would integrate Russia better into Europe’s security structures without in any way excluding the United States. It is time to create negotiated setups The current set-up is insufficient to do this. It has clearly not been successful for keeping the peace, as we saw recently in Georgia. The existing structures such as the NATO-Russia Council have weaknesses that prevent us from efficiently tackling other “frozen” conflicts, as they are known, in Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Crimea, for example, or the Balkans still. Stay away from illusions Germany’s former Foreign Affairs Minister, Joschka Fischer, has suggested transforming NATO into a real European security system that includes Russia as a member. NATO has been so central to the security of its current members that he believes it also needs to play a central role in a new European security system. But it is currently as unlikely that NATO will undergo the necessary transformation as it is that Russia will deviate

from its current strategic course, which could be defined as seeking to remain a power in its own right. But the long-term consequences of such stagnation of the strategic environment are not satisfactory for anyone.

There is hope I very much welcome that Washington has understood the need to improve its relations with Russia. Presidents Medvedev and Obama have put forward a common agenda for negotiations on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. But so far, there has been little of the progress on such pressing issues as Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes that could mark a new level of mutual confidence and unite us all. The chance of a truly new beginning This is the third time since the end of the Cold War that the chance of a truly new beginning in our relations has presented itself. On previous occasions, following the break-up of the Soviet Union and in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the potential for cooperation was not exploited to the full. The US, Russia, the EU – all of us – must grasp this new opportunity, which, if lost, may not return for many years. • Need for an open-ended dialogue This is why we aim for an open-ended dialogue, involving all Euro-Atlantic countries willing to participate, on the ways and means of improving the existing European security architecture. This dialogue should first and foremost cover new measures for building mutual confidence and transparency. Without trust and transparency there is no point in trying to set up a new architecture or sign a new treaty. • Preserving the transatlantic links I believe that preserving the transatlantic link will prove essential for a successful security structure. But like many people in Russia and elsewhere, I believe that there should not be one country whose status towers above that of the rest. I find the new approach by President Obama to his country’s foreign policy very encouraging.



• Thorough review of Russia’s foreign policy That is why President Medvedev should also conduct a thorough review of Russia’s foreign policy, in particular as regards its own neighbourhood. He must have realised how damaging it is for his proposal and for Russia itself that the relations with almost all of Russia’s neighbours are characterised by lack of mutual confidence or outright tensions. Russia’s heavy involvement in the frozen conflicts has not always been constructive. Its recognition of the two breakaway regions of Georgia, its military build-up there and continuing difficulties over its observance of international commitments made in August 2008 raise question marks over the very principles President Medvedev has set out as integral to the kind of new security architecture he wants for Europe, and he should explain what role Russia intends to play in the world.

The utmost importance of EU-Russia cooperation Russia needs to decide whether it wants to be part of the greater Euro-Atlantic community of modern democracies and open societies joining forces with those seeking to define the future European and global security architecture. A common security system in which all countries enjoy equal security can only work if all partners share common values. If Russia prefers to remain aloof, resting on its laurels as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and possessor of an aging nuclear arsenal, its inclination might be to do little more than wield its power to disrupt. In such a scenario, which I hope we can avoid, and in view of demographic trends within the country and its heavy dependence on energy exports, it faces the risk of decline. Standing alone will not be sustainable.

We should strive for a win-win position for all partners Russia, its neighbours, the EU and the United States have everything to gain from a serious dialogue on the strengths and weaknesses of the current security architecture and ways of improving it. Arms control, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, climate change and the security of our energy trade are questions that concern us all in one way or another. I believe a dialogue on the new security architecture should first address those issues and only then focus on institutional aspects. The frozen conflicts, the CFE crisis and the numerous non-proliferation issues provide us with ample opportunity to show that we are able and willing to find common ground even where we used to differ. As members of parliament, we know that our citizens, our voters, do not want us to create yet more institutions or sign yet another treaty. Rather, they look to us to find answers to the pressing challenges of our times, in Europe and worldwide. *Rapporteur for the European Security and Defence Assembly(ESDA) / Assembly of WEU, Paris


Opinion Does the OSCE secretary general have nothing better to do than to slam the EU? Marc Perrin de Brichambaut must be bored out of his mind at the Hofburg to slam the European Union as he does in an article published by Europe’s World. The OSCE secretary general reproaches the EU for undermining his organisation through unilateralism that has no cause to be jealous of that of Moscow or Washington. He accuses it of having deliberately ignored the OSCE by rolling out strategies for Central Asia and the Black Sea, while his own organisation was already active in both these regions. The same thing, he says, is true for South East Europe, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (…). The secretary general is of the view that the OSCE is what might be termed an “actor of urgency” to whom the EU can turn for lessening tensions in situations where other forms of engagement have either been blocked or have proven ineffective. As proof of this, he points to the role played by the OSCE in Georgia last year, speaking of the deployment of additional military monitoring officers in the conflict zone almost immediately after the hostilities had ceased. This, he says, was an important underpinning of the French EU Presidency’s actions and since then the EU and the OSCE have co-chaired negotiations in Geneva. The Union’s monitoring mission is only mentioned a little further on to affirm that the EU has a “vital interest” in a continuing OSCE presence at its side on the ground. Would it be unseemly to remind Mr Perrin de Brichambaut that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was unable to ease tension in Georgia or to prevent the conflict in August 2008? As for the rest, there is the impression in Brussels that – with the intervention of the French president followed up by very swift deployment of a monitoring mission – the EU was the only effective mediator in that crisis. And the presence of the OSCE in Geneva is generally seen around Schuman Square as a gesture of goodwill towards a paralytic organisation. Attack is the best form of defence but it cannot conceal the OSCE’s inability to carry out in-depth reform. The Union and its member states no doubt have a role to play in this, but they cannot achieve it on their own. The secretary general’s initiatives on this are awaited with interest because if, as Marc Perrin de Brichambaut says, the OSCE is the “natural place” for dialogue on the new pan-European security treaty proposed by President Medvedev, then it cannot remain so without a complete overhaul first.

Olivier Jehin, Chief Editor EUROPE DIPLOMATIE AND DEFENCE in THE AGENCE EUROPE BULLETIN ON ESDP & NATO, Nr. 262, 20.October 2009, Brussels www.agenceurope.com


Half full or half empty? Comparing EU military capabilities in 1999 and 2009 by Daniel Keohane, EUISS, Paris

EU governments formally launched the European Security and Defence Policy in June 1999, shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo. That war exposed huge equipment gaps between US and European armed forces. Europeans did not have adequate transport or communications equipment, or enough deployable soldiers. Since 1999 therefore, EU governments have committed themselves to a number of military reform plans, to develop more useful equipment for international peacekeeping, such as transport planes and helicopters, and to encourage a reform of national armies oriented away from territorial defence towards external deployments.

Military reform in Europe A comparison of EU governments’ military capabilities between 1999 and 2009 shows that some success has been achieved in reforming Europe’s armies, even if much more could be done. Estimates from the 1999-2000 and 2009 editions of The Military Balance – published each year by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies – show a mixed picture. While military reform in Europe is a slow process, some concrete progress has been made by EU governments over the last decade – and this despite falling defence budgets combined with a constant growth in operational commitments in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chad, Kosovo and Lebanon. The 27 EU governments spent just over 160 billionEuro on defence in 1999, which has since risen to almost 210 billion Euro in 2008. However, this apparent rise is misleading, since defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen in the last ten years, from 2.1 % in 1997 to 1.7% in 2007. The figures for defence budgets – which should not be confused with defence expenditure – are even lower, having fallen from 1.8% of GDP in 1998 to 1.4% of GDP in 2008. Defence expenditure almost always exceeds planned budgets, not least because of operational pressures.

Daniel Keohane Daniel Keohane was born in 1975 in Ireland. He received his MA from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS Bologna/Washington), and his BA from Trinity College, Dublin. Previously, he was Senior Research Fellow for security and defence policy at the Centre for European Reform in London and a Research Associate at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in Washington DC. In 2000 he was a Visiting Fellow at the WEU-ISS. At the EUISS, Daniel Keohane deals with ESDP, counter-terrorism and defence industry issues.

cialised activities, how the largest (and richest) countries spend their defence budgets has an enormous impact on overall EU figures.

Too many soldiers… In 1999 the 27 EU governments had almost 2.5 million personnel in their collective armed forces, including more than 1.1 million conscripts, which are costly and much less preferable for international peacekeeping operations than professional soldiers. In 2008, the 27 EU governments had reduced their armed forces to 2 million personnel, and just over 200,000 conscripts. European Defence Agency (EDA) data shows that in 2007 the 26 Member States of the EDA (Denmark is not a member) can deploy 444,000 soldiers, but can only sustain

Highly unequal defence spending of Member States Furthermore, four countries provide roughly 75 percent of EU defence spending – the UK and France (43 percent) and Germany and Italy. Add the Dutch and Spanish defence budgets to the four bigger countries, and those six accounts for around 80 percent of EU spending. Add in Greece, Poland, Sweden and Belgium and only ten countries account for 90 percent of EU defence spending. Even if the other 17 EU countries re-programme their defence spending and focus on specific spe-

Mi-17 Transport Helicopter in Afghanistan.

Photo: Archive CAE, Stolberg



110,000 on international operations – which nevertheless represents an increase of 10 percent from the previous year. This looks like progress, but according to a 2008 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations, written by the former Chief Executive of the EDA, a massive 70 percent of Europe’s land forces remain unusable outside national territory.

Too few capabilities For different types of equipment, there are similar trends. In the land equipment sector, the total inventoried numbers of main battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and personnel carriers have all fallen, but their numbers are still high. For instance, the number of tanks has almost halved since 1999, but there are still close to 10,000 in total, many more than are needed for peacekeeping missions. For aircraft, the number of fighter jets has fallen from 3,800 to 2,400. Helicopters have also been reduced from 4,700 to 3,500, although the number of utility helicopters – a category which includes vital transport helicopters – has doubled. The problem, however, is the quality and availability, not the quantity, of EU transport helicopters. Many of the EU’s transport helicopters are not usable in certain types of conditions, such as in the desert. Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, described the problem at an EDA conference in the following terms: ‘We are all aware that there is no shortage of helicopters in Europe. Inventories are high in numbers but the problem is that they are not deployable outside Europe in sufficient numbers.’

A long list of deficiencies One of the biggest equipment weaknesses EU defence ministries identified in 1999 was a lack of transport planes (including air-to-air refuelling planes) and they have increased their number by almost 50 percent since that time. However, EU armed forces still lack strategic transport planes which can carry the heaviest loads. Transport planes are crucial for most types of military operations, including humanitarian missions – one of the reasons EU governments could not get aid quickly to South East Asia after the 2004 tsunami was because they did not have enough long-range transport planes. They only have access to 8 C-17s, and are still waiting for the first deliveries of the A400M transport plane. In December 2008, EU governments agreed to a ‘Declaration on strengthening military capabilities’, which highlighted the need for EU Member States to develop more military capabilities together. Tentative efforts to encourage greater pooling of military resources have already started, such as the multinational ‘battle groups’ – formations of 1,500 well-equipped soldiers – to which most Member States contribute.

Looking for solutions to spend better A number of EU governments would also save money by pooling more of their military equipment, especially aircraft,


which are very expensive to maintain. For example, France and Germany train their Tiger helicopter pilots together, and could use the same combat helicopter units. But pooling the support operations for fighter aircraft and transport planes could yield even more considerable savings. The EDA is already drafting proposals for pooling some of the 180 A400M transport planes that six EU countries plan to buy. In order to achieve significant cost savings, a transport fleet would have to operate from one main base, using a single planning, servicing and logistics organisation to support the fleet. In a similar vein, ten EU countries own 136 Hercules C-130 transport aircraft; five smaller EU countries own 430 F-16 fighter aircraft between them; Germany, Italy and the UK operate 570 Tornadoes, and those three countries plus Spain have started deploying Eurofighters.

And then the maritime dimension came up Until the EU initiated an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia in 2008, the maritime dimension of ESDP had generally been ignored. Military ships, like military aircraft, are expensive, and EU defence ministries have reduced their numbers of destroyers, frigates and mine warfare vessels. Conversely they have increased their numbers of aircraft carriers (by one), patrol boats and amphibious vehicles (some of which are vital for logistical support to operations). In the same way as they could do with aircraft, defence ministries could save money by pooling some naval resources, or at least coordinating their naval deployments. At a Franco-British summit in February 2003, the two governments agreed to improve interoperability among their aircraft carriers and, in particular, harmonise activity cycles and training, so that one carrier is permanently available to support EU missions.

There has been some progress made A comparison of EU military capabilities in 1999 and 2009 shows that some progress has been made, especially in cutting conscripted personnel and inventories of outdated equipment. Military reform is not easy, and it encompasses a number of areas, such as types of troops, equipment acquisition and development, and doctrine. But the EU has only slowly woken from the slumber of Cold War military thinking over the last decade, and some countries are more awake than others. As a result, there are still a number of key capability weaknesses, such as strategic transport assets. The good news is that in the coming years, based on their current procurement plans, EU countries should have a number of new strategic capabilities such as: A400M and more C17 transport planes; A330 air tankers; Eurofighter, Rafale and Joint-Strike-Fighter jets; and Franco-British aircraft carriers. EU defence ministries will also be able to use Galileo – a satellite navigation system – to guide their equipment and define their positions. All this equipment will greatly add to the military prowess of Europe’s armies in the future.

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on the 5th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management Volume No 4/2009

Review 2 009

European Civil Protection Review of the 5th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management

This was the 5th Congress More than 1.000 particpants and 90 international experts as speakers from Europe and from OutsideEurope, 27 international exhibitors

Cooperation partners

Preview on 2010 New technologies, border surveillance simulation and training. What did we learn from the Pandemie in the winter 2009/2010?


6th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management 2009 New Ideas and Technologies for Civil Protection an Disaster Management This year’s convention covered a wide-ranging field of issues with 80 worldwide speakers and 27 international exhibitors. The tandem of the President of the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), Albrecht Broemme, and the President of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Christoph Unger, both cooperation partners of the Congress, showed how efficiently different institutions disaster management are able to cooperate.

EU-NATO cooperation versus abstention Civil protection and disaster management Hans Das, Head of Unit Civil Protection and Disaster Response for the Department of Environment from the European Commission, strongly emphasised the importance of the subsidiary principle when it comes to successful cooperation between the European Union and the Member States. Whereas the responsibility to respond quickly in urgent situations is an issue of the Member States, the European Union is the provider of a frame in which common guidelines shall be fixed but not exclusively held from one authority. NATO – Joker for support of nations in the case of disasters The second international expertise on civil protection and disaster management came from Ambassador Maurits Jochems, Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO. Since the NATO does not offer support in the management of disaster in the first place, he argued that NATO is the “joker”, only to be used if the national capacities were limited to execute disaster responses.

Real progress on cooperation Two Parliamentarian State Secretaries, Joachim Fuchtel and Thomas Rache, and the former State Secretary Dr. August Hanning, mentioned the importance of a smooth and faithful communication between different institutions to guarantee successful action in times of crisis. They agreed for strengthening research. Modern advices of training -as cooperation is a great weapon of prevention, it has to be supported. Modern devices for training – as CAE Electronic presented its simulation tools for common training and exercises – should to be supported all over Europe. Border crossing training by simulation would increase efficiency.


China is looking for cooperation Dr. Jürgen Steiger, Deputy Head of the German Association for Technological Cooperation in China, and Dr. Getu Zhuoli, Division Director of the China Earthquake Administration, lectured the audience about the joint project of the organisations aiming to improve the Chinese organisation of civil protection and disaster management. “ We have an earth quake nearly every day and we are operationally prepared. But to be on top of technology we need cooperation, and we have also skills to give.”

Cooperation in the field of fire defence The Vice President of the Association of Fire Defence, Dr. Ralf Ackermann, described the magnitude of the varying levels of national associations’ organisation and recruiting ability: “Cooperation is not always easy, but we learn from each other, especially in the field of training.”

First Priority: Communication Exchange Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO of Thales Germany stressed on Networked Security through the use of innovative technologies. Solutions have to match the different requirements of safety and security in order to guarantee the application on various levels of civil protection and disaster management.

Pandemic The national focus was taken in a debate with three Federal Ministers of the Interior: Joachim Herrmann, Bavaria, Uwe Schünemann, Lower- Saxony, and Dr. Ingo Wolf, North RhineWestphalia, discussed together with Dr. Manfred Schmidt, head of the Unit Crisis Management at the Federal Ministry of the Interior. In forum the current civil protection topic were attracted the special interest: Swine Influenza. When the flu became a pandemic, there was a truly fascinating effect: A conference of concerned ministers stated that only 30 per cent of the population was supposed to be immunised. The media and the “Bund”, however, started lobbying for the need of an overall immunisation of the population, whereas the course of the disease was not as strong as expected. A wise advice could be given. Through honest information everyone should decide for him- or herself for the need of own immunisation.


Programme 2009 Thursday, November 5th, 2009

Friday, November 6th, 2009

Welcome to the Conference Christoph Unger, President, BBK Albrecht Broemme, President, THW R. Uwe Proll, Editor in Chief, Behörden Spiegel Reimar Scherz, Conference Chairman New Ideas and Impetus for Civil Protection Civil Protection in Europe: The way forward and required impetus Hans Das, DG Environment, Head of Unit Civil Protection and Disaster Response, European Commission Civil Emergency Planning - NATO’s role and contribution Ambassador Maurits Jochems, Deputy Assistant Secretary General, NATO The international dimension of civil protection – Germanys contribution within an international civil protection mechanism Dr. August Hanning, State Secretary of the Interior, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Berlin Visibility in Operations – One threat turned off Claudia Wiechmann, 3M

Conference continued Reimar Scherz, Chairman of the Conference National and international modernisation concepts Modernisation of Fire Brigades within the context of national and European Requirements Jochen Stein, German Fire Brigades Association and Head of Bonn Fire Brigade Visualise, Analyse, Manage – The integration is decisive Dr. Stefan Zloczysti, Key-Account Manager, MSA Auer and Dr. Peter Ladstätter, Sales Manager, ESRI Deutschland Networked Security through the use of innovative technologies Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO, THALES Deutschland A common approach: the national Civil Protection-Architecture Examples from Operations Chairmans: Volker Strotmann, Head of Unit Operation, THW Ralph Tiesler, Vice President, BBK Speakers: Albrecht Broemme, President, Federal Agency for Technical Relief Colonel (GS) Dieter Bohnert, Head of Unit CiMiC, Bundeswehr Joint Support Command Wilfried Gräfling, Head of Berlin Fire Brigade Joachim Müller, German Red Cross Dieter Wehe, Head of the Police NRW SoKNOS – How does IT-Research improve Civil Protection? Wilfried Gräfling, Head of Berlin Fire Brigade Dr. Thomas Ziegert, Head of Project SoKNOS

Panel Sessions I – V Technological Innovations for Civil Protection Research for optimised Security – an international Challenge Thomas Rachel, Parliamentarian State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin Chances and Challenges of new technologies for Civil Protection Ralf Kaschow, Business Development Manager, 3M Theses debate Technological Innovations in the field of Civil Protection Chairman: Hans-Joachim Fuchtel, Parliamentarian State Secretary, President of the “THW Bundesvereinigung e.V.” Introduction: Dr. Wolf-Dieter Lukas, Head of Unit 5 „Key Technologies – Research and Innovation“, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin Speakers: Albrecht Broemme, President, Federal Agency for Technical Relief Tjen-Khoen Liem, DG Enterprise, European Commission Dr. Gerhard Steinhorst, Member of the Board, German Weather Service Christoph Unger, President, Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance National Fire-Fighters in the European Context Dr. Ralf Ackermann, Vice President, German Fire Services Association (DFV) Extreme-weather-analytics and climatic projection − How to realize the technological challenge Dr. Gerhard Steinhorst, Member of the Board, German Weather Service Stategic Preparedness for Authorities in the case of Pandemic Strategic Preparedness for Pandemic – Crisis Management and Emergency-Planning Thomas Lembeck, Deputy Head of Essen Fire Brigade Provisioning and Procurement for the Emergency case: How can authorities prepare themselves for Pandemics? Prof. Dr. Rainer Koch, Institute for Fire and Rescue Technologies, City of Dortmund and Armand Schulz, University of Paderborn

Panel Sessions VI – IX Parallel Session A (in the PLENUM) FORUM OF THE FEDERAL MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR Forum of the Federal Ministers of the Interior Current topics of Civil Protection Chairman: R. Uwe Proll, Editor in Chief, Behörden Spiegel Speakers: Joachim Herrmann, Minister of the Interior of Bayern Dr. Manfred Schmidt, Head of Unit Crisis Management, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Berlin Uwe Schünemann, Minister of the Interior, Niedersachsen Dr. Ingo Wolf, Minister of the Interior of NRW Parallel Session B (in the PARKSAAL) INTERNATIONAL MODERNISATION CONCEPTS How China enhances the national Civil-Protection-Structure Getu Zhuoli, Division Director,China Earthquake Administration Dr. Jürgen Steiger, German Association for technological Cooperation (GTZ), Deputy Head of GTZ China

Panels 2009 Panel I: Information Technology in Civil Protection Options for Education and Operation Panel II: Volontary commitments for Civil Protection A Model for Europe? Panel III: International Fire-fighter-Cooperation Training – Practices – Operations Panel V: 115 – the Number for Disaster Management calls Panel VI: Communication Technologies in Operation PMR: Where do we stand today? Panel VII: Research and Technology Panel VIII: Protection of critical infrastructures Panel IX: Equipment for Units in Operations Panel X: Cross border training and simulation in Disaster Management



Exhibitors and the spirit of innovation During the 6th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management, 27 exhibitors exposed the newest technologies and innovations. Politicians, experts of administration and industries were successfully brought together for presentations and discussion. 3M Germany constantly develops new, innovative products which have become a symbol for protection and security. The annual spending for research and business development easily stands a million Euros. This secures leading positions in the important global markets. 3M offers solutions for special requirements: pandemic prevention, breathing- and ear protection systems, communication solutions, protection gear, etc. Reliability, easy use and efficiency are the requirements for materials used in disaster management operations CAE as the world’s leading provider of simulation technology and related services offers training solutions for civil and military clients all over the world. Thereby they provide a global network of training camps and branches with more than 6.500 employees. Simulations are frequently used in all levels of training including of pilots, aeronautical staff as well the management in the operational leadership. With the help of the simulations, actual operations are prepared. The technologies help to develop operation systems, risk and danger analyses and emergency planning. To support the management, CAE initiates intersections between simulation systems and management information systems. The Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) Inc. is situated in Redlands, California. ESRI is the most successful global company association in the field of geographical information systems (GIS), active in more 90 countries worldwide. The GIS-technique of ESRI has nowadays more than a million users in administrations, companies, universities and associations. The modes of application range from easy accessible internet information systems to complex special programs in simulation. ESRI Inc. is substituted by ESRI Germany, which was established in 1979 close to Munich (Kranzberg). They are the exclusive distributer of the products on the German market.


Pro DV is an IT-professional with lots of experience how processes and branches work. In the center of coaching, development and client services stand open and interoperational applications that help build support in the decision-making process. Those systems are applied in the public administration, energy supply and the financial economy. The goal is to strengthen the branch of safety and security. Another part of Pro DV business is consulting. With regard to efficient use of resources, a strong relationship with a client and ideal working processes are combined able to offer modern solutions for a successful business. SoKNOS is searching for a project to promote security successfully for public administrations and organizations in general. The question is evaluated on the one hand with regard to the result of a huge disaster, but also in everyday scenarios. The project is supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and managed by SAP AG. SoKNOS looks for an approach to a solution to guarantee a fast, secure and longterm ability to act. Therefore, they enhance the efficiency of decision-making processes in the creation of operation leaders and crisis committees. Thales is a world-leading technology company for aeronautic navigation, astronautics, defense and security. The composition of the company is unique. With 25.000 engineers and researches, Thales is able to design, produce and install new systems, including the aim at a high standards of security. They are present worldwide with many branches and cooperation with their local clients, always searching for individual solutions. Thales Germany is one of the biggest branches, with 5700 employees and its HQ near Stuttgart.

Pauline Seewald, Congress Manager, Behörden Spiegel

Next European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management: 8/9 September 2010, Bonn


NATO’s new Strategic Concept should be more than a “Shopping List” by Brigadier General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Wittmann, Berlin

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the most successful alliance in history, is based on the Washington Treaty of 1949, a remarkably short and focused document, expressing NATO’s value-based goals of freedom, peace and security, and establishing in its articles 4, 5 and 10 transatlantic consultation, mutual assistance against armed attack and openness for new, like-minded members.

An outdated Strategic Concept The Treaty’s concretisation has, during the Cold War, been the military strategy issued by the Military Committee (MC) in the MC 14 series and, after the end of the East-West conflict, the “Strategic Concepts” of 1991 and 1999. Thus, the present one is ten years old and was formulated before “9/11“, the Afghanistan mission, the largest round of enlargement, the extension of Partnerships, the deterioration of the relationship with Russia, the European Union’s progress in security and defence policy, and the evolution of an ever more diffuse security landscape. Such an outdated document no longer provides valid strategic guidance. However, for years there was great reluctance to set about a revision of the Concept, to “open Pandora’s Box”. A “divisive process” was feared, which bears the question, though, whether Allies are not so divided on many subjects that a “uniting effort” is required in order to recreate unity, recommit and reengage Allies, regain trust in the world and recapture public interest and support. At the Strasbourg/Kehl 60thanniversary Summit in April 2009, the tasking for the development of a new Strategic Concept was at last agreed by NATO Heads of State and Government. This calls for an impetus in political will and for a thorough debate, in the public and among governments, about a number of critical themes. When this author two years ago proposed 12 such themes in a German national newspaper, Lothar Rühl, a nestor of German strategic thinking, growled that “many themes are not yet a concept”. That is granted, but the right questions must be asked, and much conceptual and diplomatic homework has to be done before pen should be put to paper in drafting.

Disunity and problems It must be acknowledged that not only, with the disappearance of the unifying, monolithic threat by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, forging joint decisions has become more diffi-

Dr. Klaus Wittmann Dr. Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.) was born in Lübecki in 1946. In 2008 he ended a 42 year career in the GER Bundeswehr service that included troop command, academic phases (university studies in history and political science as well as a year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), political-military work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters, and positions in higher military education. His last assignment was Director of Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defence College, Rome). He was closely involved in the creation of NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. His latest publication is “Towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO” (NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 10, September 2009).

cult, but also that the cleavage dating from the Iraq crisis is not fully repaired and that the Alliance appears to some extent split between regional groupings with different security experiences and interests: those advocating a global orientation (US, UK, partly Canada); others emphasizing cooperative security and NATO’s regional character (“old Europe”, but far from being united); several new members who, particularly after the Georgian war, insist on the priority of article 5 and collective defence; and the Southern Allies focusing on the dangers in the Mediterranean region. On numerous themes important for NATO’s policy and strategy in the future, considerable disunity prevails and potentially centrifugal forces loom. But if the debate produces fresh clarity on security policy within member countries, more honesty about divergent views and interests, and eventually greater unity and cohesion, then the process could be as important as the product. Expectations should not be too high that a Strategic Concept could create a lacking consensus, nor should it gloss over the cracks. But in its preparation the important subject areas need to be candidly debated in a truly strategic dialogue - with the aim to narrow down differences. The new Secretary General has launched the procedure in an “inclusive and participatory approach” and an “interactive process with the broader public”. This will be good for widespread discussion, but might complicate finding consent among governments.



Heads of States and Governments at the opening ceremony of the 60th NATO Summit in Kehl/Strasbourg

Themes for the strategic dialogue The purpose and role of NATO need to be redefined, with a resolution of the “schism” between collective defence emphasis and expeditionary orientation, and a convincing explanation is needed of NATO’s now three main roles: protection of its members, further stabilisation of Europe and its periphery, and peace missions “out of area”. (These correspond to the ”three phases” in NATO’s history, but the previous task is not wholly replaced, rather the new one is added.) Transatlantic unity Transatlantic unity is to be re-established, overcoming the temptation of “coalitions of the willing” and the view that “the mission defines the coalition”. The cooperation with the European Union and its security and defence policy (ESDP) has to be brought to function, and the creation of NATO’s new Strategic Concept should be harmonised with the further development of the EU Security Strategy. Moreover, the relationship with Russia needs a new basis requiring a mutual learning process. New security challenges Today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges call for an innovative approach and the awareness that the military is but one element of any solution. What threats the Alliance is facing, and how dangers and potentialities can turn into threats must be part of the examination. Regarding new security challenges, realistic analysis and conclusions are required concerning WMD proliferation, terrorism, organised crime, maritime security and piracy, energy security, cyber security as well as the relationships of climate, demography, food and water with security. The implications of


Photo: NATO

the relatively new paradigm of “human security” and of the UN-proclaimed “responsibility to protect” must also be discussed. Furthermore, though not in possession of the answers, solutions and instruments, NATO must also debate long-term trends such as the concurrence of globalisation and fragmentation (“failing states”), the cumulative effects of climate change, demographic shifts, the rise of new great powers, resource competition, and religious radicalism, and think about how to contribute to preventive stablilisation. Rethink „defence“ In that context, the role of military power as one tool of policy requires some conceptual debate, where not least the principle of deterrence and today’s meaning of “defence” need to be rethought. This leads to the discussion of nuclear policy and strategy, which cannot be avoided as it was 10 years ago, of anti-proliferation measures, missile defence and the importance of space. Comprehensive Approach The discussion of broad cooperation includes the “Comprehensive Approach”, NATO’s cooperation with the UN and other International Organisations (IOs) as well as with Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs). Reflection about multinationality and about private military companies belongs into this context. Soul-searching is necessary with regard to principles and lessons to be heeded in peace missions and operations. The new Strategic Concept should not focus on Afghanistan, but certainly reflect the learning process there, and express greater modesty with regard to realistic goals and criteria for “success” in distant countries with particular history, traditions, societal structures, values and beliefs. The debate


should also produce clear statements on what NATO (once jestingly compared to a Swiss army knife with all functions extended) is not competent for. Partnership Partnerships and NATO enlargement are another large field for the strategic dialogue with the potential for quite diverging views which must be candidly addressed. In arms control and confidence-building NATO should raise its profile. Furthermore, its activities in education and training, security sector reform (SSR) and demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration (DDR), as well as in civil emergency, disaster relief and Science for Peace have acquired such an importance that they should figure in the Strategic Concept, hopefully with the sideeffect that they be better coordinated with national bilateral activities. Transformation NATO’s transformation with regard to the military concerns the balance between homeland protection and defence vs. the expeditionary orientation, including guidance on the required military capabilities. This should include a critical look at the “Transformation” activities and the over-complication of this concept. This not least refers to their exclusive focus on the military side, whereas NATO requires also political and internal transformation − concerning the decision-making process, the bureaucratic structures as well as the need for common funding and for pooling of resources. Geographical areas of interest Beyond the “functional” areas and topics, the Alliance should dedicate part of the strategic dialogue and, possibly, also some statements in the new Strategic Concept, to the main regions of the world in which NATO has interests, e.g. the Western Balkans, the broader Middle East, the Maghreb, South Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, East Asia, Africa, and the High North. Communication Finally, the need for public support must be addressed, requiring public diplomacy and strategic communication, but also efforts of the member states to make their own peoples understand the requirements of security. Even more important is credibility in that NATO’s members honour words with deeds, match decisions with resources.

Beyond a list of topics This long inventory of subjects should not itself be misunderstood as a “shopping list”. But all these topics must figure in the strategic dialogue, and consensus on the “smaller” subjects may flow from enhanced unity in the “big” ones. Then priorities must be identified. The Strategic Concept will not

provide all the answers, but it should reflect new-found consensus on the salient topics. Essentially, it will have to answer convincingly what NATO is good for (purpose and identity), how it is authorized to fulfill its tasks (legitimacy), and finally what is does and how it works (efficiency). And it should establish a mechanism for much denser, fundamental consultation as well as for more thorough analysis and evaluation of the trends, dangers and opportunities in the evolving global situation, transcending event- and crisis-driven, near-sighted superficial debates. For this the Alliance should create an analysis and assessment capacity in NATO Headquarters, whose findings would help to inform Council consultations on a much broader array of topics than to date.

The outcome must be cooperative security strategies Will the new Strategic Concept be a forward-oriented document, providing genuine strategic guidance? Experience shows that a wholly innovative process is only possible in a truly revolutionary situation as in 1990/91. Normally theory follows reality, concepts come after the events. Thus the 1999 Strategic Concept mainly was a codification of Alliance policy as it had developed in the preceding period. Still, a “clean sheet” approach is desirable, although not everything should be thrown overboard. There are elements of change and of continuity. For instance, the “fundamental security tasks” of the present Concept should remain valid, which are security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management and partnership. The new Strategic Concept will have to reach three “audiences“: the governments of NATO member states, whom it should remind of their (hopefully) re-established consensus, solidarity, resolve and commitment; the NATO defence planners and military, who require clear guidance; and the public of NATO’s members as well as of the world, who should be helped to understand NATO’s role, functions and competences – and its character as a force for good. The initiative to develop a new Strategic Concept is an opportunity for NATO to come to terms with internal strategic disunity and often doubtful political will, to redefine its purpose and missions (excluding what it is not competent for), to advertise its “brand” in order to improve the organization’s image, to regain public support and to proclaim a strategy of “Cooperative Security”. That could be the outcome: a strategy of “Cooperative Security” – cooperation among Allies and Partner states, cooperation among the “interlocking institutions”, cooperation within the Comprehensive Approach, cooperation with Russia and cooperation in the arms control field – an offer to the world in a truly comprehensive approach to security in the 21st century.



The US Needs a Strong Europe – The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. by Professor Dr. Sven Biscop, Director of the Security & Global Governance Programme at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable” are the words found in the 2003 European Security Strategy. Their sincerity is unquestionable. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has relied almost solely on the United States to provide security on the continent. During the Cold War, American troops insulated Europe from the Soviet Threat. In the 1990s, the US stepped in when the EU failed to act in Kosovo. This decade, the scenario has changed. Terrorist attacks in 2001 left the US feeling vulnerable and vengeful. European NATO allies showed their support by invoking Article 5, but support dwindled when former President George W. Bush neglected to give NATO a primary role in the war in Afghanistan. The war in Iraq worsened relations, with key European allies publicly condemning the invasion.

Now is the time for renewed US-EU cooperation Over the past nine years, there have been disputes over the validity of the Iraq war, disagreements over how to deal with nuclear proliferation in Iran, and diverging priorities on international affairs. While the US focuses on the Middle East, EU members have occupied themselves with Eastern enlargement, the Georgia crisis, and energy negotiations with Russia. Despite, or perhaps because of these disparities, the US needs Europe’s support now more than ever. European leaders concerned with recovery from the financial crisis, implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and the accession of candidate states, let alone domestic matters, may find this notion unappealing. However, now is also the right time for Europe to increase its cooperation with and support for the United States. Following are five main reasons why now is the ideal time for Europe to answer America’s call to action. The new global security environment The first reason is that we find ourselves living in a new security environment. Gone is threat of traditional warfare, but in its place several new threats have arisen. Nuclear proliferation, failed states, terrorism, biological and chemical weapons, energy dependence, and cyber threats have emerged as new threats to protect ourselves against. These threats have a few similar traits. First of all, diplomatic talks and negotiations can do much to dissuade many of these threats. Military force is not automatically the first step, or even a useful step at all. Secondly, these threats are cross-border, inter-regional, and never confined to


Dr. Sven Biscop Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop was born in 1976. He completed his degree in political sciences/public administration at Ghent University (Belgium) by winning the best thesis award for his work on European security and defence policy. He is Director of the Security & Global Governance Programme at Egmont – the Royal Institute for International Relations, the think tank associated with Belgian Foreign Affairs, which he joined in 2002. He is a Visiting Professor for European security at College of Europe in Bruges, at the Ghent University. He also has been a visiting professor at Renmin University in Beijing and Carleton University in Ottawa. He is editor in chief of Egmont’s journal “Studia Diplomatica” and he has published “The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power” (Ashgate, 2005) and “The EU and the European Security Strategy – Forging a Global Europe” (Routledge, 2008, co-edited with Jan Joel Andersson)

just one state. Nuclear proliferation in Iran threatens all European allies equally. Energy dependence or shortages in Germany have great implications for France as well. Cyberspace knows no national borders. The integrated nature of today’s world, especially amongst EU member states, means that most problems are common problems, and common problems demand common solutions. Finally, these threats are unpredictable and sometimes unforeseeable. While long-term actions such as poverty reduction, development programmes, and binding international laws can seek to prevent such threats, there is no foolproof formula. States must be prepared to respond with speed and unity. Collaboration with the United States is thus unavoidable. It would be of great detriment to both European allies and the United States to not devote their full energies into cooperating on these matters. US foreign policy goals need EU support The second major reason is that the US is overstretched and entangled in difficult conflicts in the Middle East. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved much more challenging and deadly than initially expected. Realistically, a successful end to either war is not yet in sight. Nevertheless, the US gives


importance to and continues to engage in other issues, such as the Middle East Peace Process, closing the prison in Guantanamo Bay, and seeking to halt nuclear proliferation in Iran. President Barack Obama has repeatedly expressed his intention to continue to engage in these and other important issues on the international scene, as well as attending to pressing domestic concerns. He has confirmed what should have already been clear to European leaders – the US will need help. It cannot engage itself in all these matters and seek peaceful solutions without active and strong support and engagement from the EU. Europe will then also have to contribute to the strategic debate, notably on Afghanistan. Imminent new security strategies The third reason that the timing is right, is that within the next year we can, or should, expect new strategic documents from the EU, the US, and NATO. In April, NATO allies commissioned a new Strategic Concept. Obama’s administration is expected to publish his first National Security Strategy (NNS) by the end of this year. The EU needs a strategic paper on military security, elaborating on its European Security Strategy. The anticipation of these strategic documents means that across Europe and the United States, policy makers, scholars, and experts will be thinking about the same issues and how to best approach them. The US and Europe would do well to make the most of this common point of reflection and collaborate on a common strategy, which gives it a unique opportunity to influence NATO’s Strategic Concept, which most appropriately would contain the common points between Obama’s NSS and European strategy. Permanent Structured Cooperation Calls for a stronger and more united EU military force have been heard for decades. The fourth reason, that they should finally be taken seriously, emerges because a new structure will soon be in place to facilitate this. With Ireland’s recent approval of the Lisbon Treaty, it appears as though the Treaty will finally come into force within the next few months. An important feature of this Treaty is Permanent Structured Cooperation. This mechanism allows willing member states to bind each other to great military commitments, without being hindered by neutral and non-aligned states who have no interest in boosting their military strength. If used to its full potential, this mechanism could create a quasi-coalition of the willing. It will undoubtedly be viewed in a more positive light, as the ‘permanent’ designation implies that this coalition will be defined by member-states who are willing to commit. The new US administration The fifth and final reason that now is the right time for Europe to be stronger for the United States, is that the new administration presents a new American outlook and perspective on

world affairs. Though it is unlikely that previous administrations would have snubbed offers of more troops and commitments from Europe, a genuine attitude of cooperation from the American side was not always evident.

Barack Obama has already changed the attitude of partnership Former President Bush’s National Security Strategies (NNS 2002 & NNS 2006) did not give the reader the impression that multilateral action and approval was a priority. Cooperation was described as other states working with the US, rather than states working together. Europeans understandably felt that in order for them to increase commitment, the Americans would have to adjust their attitude. In his nine months in power so far, current President Obama has embodied this shift in attitude. Respectful of his Allies and the values of diplomacy, Barack Obama is perhaps the most widely respected American President that Europe has ever seen. European leaders have not been shy about expressing the renewed sense of hope they felt with his election, feelings that are evidently still present, if one considers the quick praise Obama received for most recently winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

Documentation Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by Article 28a of the Treaty on European The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 28a(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to: (a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and (b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 28b of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.



The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy by Gilles de Kerchove, Head of EU Counter-Terrorism Unit, Brussels

The dilemma for all policy makers on Counter - Terrorism is that success is invisible, and failure all too visible. Even things that look like success, such as the capture of terrorists, are actually to some extent failures: either failures to protect ourselves against attacks, or at least failures to stop people becoming terrorists. Achieving success is all the more difficult because the policy impetus is at its greatest in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident. The need to take visible action in response to a terrorist outrage can make possible measures which the on day before the attack had seemed politically impossible. However, these measures tend to concentrate on things which will have an immediate visible effect. The biggest success of the EU so far against terrorism has been to construct a comprehensive strategy. This means that we can maintain a constant campaign, even when the issue is not in the headlines.

Gilles de Kerchove Born in Brussels in 1956, Mr. de Kerchove studied law at the Catholic University of Louvain and subsequently Yale Law School. From 1989 to 1995, he was Chef de cabinet to Belgian Ministers of Justice. From 1999 to 2000, Mr. de Kerchove was Deputy Secretary of the Convention drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. From 1995 to 2007, he was Director for Justice and Home Affairs at the EU Council Secretariat. Mr. de Kerchove has published a number of books on European law, and in addition to his current position as EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, holds professorships at the Catholic University of Louvain, the Free University of Brussels, and the University Faculty Saint Louis.

and countering radicalisation, and how to disengage radicalised individuals from violent movements. We have worked hard to develop proactive communication to The lead responsibility within the EU on the fight against counter radical messages, and to try to ensure that the lanterrorism remains very much with the Member States. Howevguage we use in communicating er, since 9/11, and in particular about terrorism does not inadsince the horrendous attacks in vertently make the problem Madrid and London, there has The biggest success of the EU so far worse. In this context the Eurobeen a general realisation that against terrorism has been to construct pean Commission has organised international terrorism poses a conferences with Euromed threat to the Union as a whole. a comprehensive strategy countries on the role of the Countries which had never media in preventing incitement. thought of themselves as the The Commission has also done much to stimulate and support targets of terrorism have suddenly found themselves in the contacts between academic and policy experts to develop front line. One of the most effective things which the EU has knowledge and expertise on the subject of radicalisation. been able to do in practice has been a process of “peer group review” in which best practice from those with the most Protect experience has been shared across the Member States. The second objective of the EU strategy is to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, The Strategy including through improved security of borders, transport and The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy covers four strands of critical infrastructure. work: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response. This includes measures to improve the protection of borders and the security of transport, including security at European Prevent ports and airports, in particular following the aborted attack The first objective is to prevent people from turning to terroron a transatlantic aircraft in the UK in 2006. We have also been ism by tackling the factors conducive to the spread of terrorlooking at the identification and protection of critical infraism. These can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in structure. Europe and internationally. The creation of the European Explosive Ordinance Disposal The EU has adopted an action plan which includes a number of Network (EEODN) is a key achievement of the EU Action Plan initiatives on subjects like radicalisation in prisons, countering on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, together with a violent radicalisation through the Internet, the training of Directive on the identification and traceability of explosives for imams, developing the capacities of local police in recognising



civil use. Further work is being done to develop databases to facilitate police work in this area, as well as on CBRN security. Pursue and investigate The third objective of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally, to impede planning and communications, to disrupt support networks, to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and to bring terrorists to justice. The flagship success in this area is the European Arrest Warrant, which is being more and more frequently employed as a tool against terrorism and other forms of major crime. One of the most high-profile cases was the rapid arrest and return from Italy to the UK of one of the suspects in the attempted bombings in London on 21 July 2005. Previously, the return of suspects from one Member State to another was a complex issue, which took an average of nine months. That is now down to 43 days. We have taken a series of initiatives to combat the financing of terrorism and are now working on a European Evidence Warrant and mutual recognition of confiscation orders. A lesson learned from many major terrorist attacks is the need to further improve information exchange. The EU has adopted a number of measures to improve this such as the „Prüm“ decisions in 2008, which will facilitate the exchange of DNA, fingerprinting and vehicle data. Cooperation among security and intelligence agencies in support of policy making by the EU has been enhanced through the modernisation and expansion of the EU Situation Centre, which provides frequent highlevel assessments of the terrorist threat. The EU’s own law enforcement bodies, Europol (see article Europol page 44) and Eurojust, are each involved in ongoing terrorism-related investigations in Europe, and transatlantic cooperation has been enhanced by the stationing of US liaison officers at Europol and Eurojust. The European Police College (CEPOL) has initiated counter-terrorism training programmes for senior police officials. Respond The fourth objective of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the coordination of the response, and the needs of victims. The victims of terrorism need our sympathy and support. By confronting terrorists with the criminal reality of what terrorism really means, they are powerful advocates of counter-terrorism. The European Commission has been active in helping victims of terrorism and their families, in particular by financing a network aimed at stimulating trans-national cooperation


between associations of victims of terrorism and enhancing the representation of victims’ interests at the EU level. Military assets and capabilities have been identified which could support coordinated disaster response efforts, and procedures have been finalised for matching transport needs and available military owned or chartered transportation facilities from Member States. Several initiatives have been taken to improve consular protection of EU citizens in case of terrorist attacks or natural disasters in third countries, and we hold annual multinational exercises to test the readiness of Member States to assist each other in cases of man-made or natural disasters.

The International Dimension The global reach of terrorism means that it has to be tackled on a global scale. The EU has high-level political dialogues on counter-terrorism with a number of major countries such as the USA, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia, Japan and Egypt, and an annual dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to combat terrorist financing. In 2006, with strong backing from the EU, the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly, showing global support for the fight against terrorism. The main financial instrument for direct support to other countries in their efforts to tackle counter-terrorism is the Instrument for Stability (IfS). This can provide short-term support in specific crisis situations, while the long-term IfS focuses mainly on trans-regional threats. Key priorities are to support the implementation of UN counter-terrorism standards and to promote regional measures addressing counter-terrorism in South Asia, especially Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Sahel region and in Yemen. Counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives with Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco have brought together aid projects financed by Member States and the European Commission. The Commission supports a wide range of CT-related projects, notably in the fields of border protection and countering of terrorist financing, in regions ranging from the Balkans to South-East Asia. Through its military and civilian crisis management operations under the ESDP, the EU contributes to improving the overall security environment in a number of volatile areas around the world. The EUPOL missions in Afghanistan and Ramallah are particular examples of how we are helping to develop civilian policing capacity in areas where the absence of proper law enforcement has contributed to conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. By establishing good and responsive governance, we can give people a real stake in achieving a better future without the political violence which has marred the past.


Anti-terrorism – the role of Europol in the international process by Robert Wainwright, Executive Director, Europol, London

European efforts to control terrorism have a relatively long history, but the modern era of EU policy in this area dates back to the 1970s. The Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence group (TREVI) was formed in 1975 by European police officials to exchange information and provide assistance on terrorism and related international crimes. Additional cooperation arrangements, such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorist Group, were also established in the Brussels structures. The threat from terrorist networks and their ability to operate across international borders has further developed since then, and demands an effective response from law enforcement authorities and a high level of co-operation and a permanently high level of vigilance within the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

Europol and counter-terrorism Although terrorism was not part of Europol’s mandate until 1998, terrorism was among the international criminal problems that motivated the creation of the police organisation. The drafting of the Europol Convention in 1995 already mentioned “the urgent problems arising from terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime” in order to justify the need for enhanced police cooperation by means of information exchange between Europol and the member states. In 1997, a counter-terrorism preparatory group was created to formulate Europol’s role in matters of counterterrorism. Subsequently, the EU Council of Ministers signed the Amsterdam Treaty that approved an extension of Europol’s mandate to specifically include counter-terrorism. Nowadays it is an established, high-priority area of work for the organisation. The European Preparedness Programme (EPP) Although Europe suffered a number of major terrorist incidents since the 1970s, the events of 9/11 served as the most important catalyst in the development of new counter-terrorism legislation in the EU and a higher prioritization of counter-terrorist activities among Europe’s police organizations, including Europol. Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, a Europol Operational Centre was created to provide a 24-hour service for the exchange of information. A few months later, on November 15, 2001, a specialised Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) became fully operational at the Europol headquarters. After one and a half years, the CTTF was disbanded and subsequently restored after the Madrid attacks in 2004.


Rob Wainwright Rob Wainwright was born in 1967 in Carmarthen, Wales, UK. Having graduated in 1989 from the London School of Economics, University of London with a BSc, he joined the UK Civil Service where he held various managerial functions. Between 2000 and 2003, Mr. Wainwright was the Head of the UK Liaison Bureau at Europol, and he was also managing the Europol National Unit in London. In 2003, he was promoted to the position of Director International of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), where he was responsible for its international operations and for developing and implementing the UK strategy against facilitated illegal immigration. From 2006 onwards, he was Chief of the International Department of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). He became Director of Europol in 2008.

The First Response Network at Europol In 2006, the second CTTF was also disbanded and replaced by the First Response Network as part of the Europol Preparedness Program (EPP). The network provides a platform for immediate response, to which every European Union Member State has nominated participating counter-terrorism experts. All of these experts have been trained on the Europol ICT applications, thus ensuring a rapid deployment of the First Response Network at Europol. The Counter-Terrorism Unit of Europol The fight against terrorism remains a top priority for the European Union. In order to combat the cross-border activities of terrorist networks, Europol’s Counter-Terrorism Unit supports law enforcement investigations by providing operational and strategic analysis and a range of other forms of operational support. Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Unit assists Member States in ensuring the security of major international events by providing threat assessments and specialist advice. The Counter Terrorism unit is also responsible for monitoring the situation in relation to several forms of illicit trafficking, namely small arms and ammunition, explosives, as well as weapons of mass destruction, also known as CBRN, and related precursors.


Terrorist attack on London 2005

Photo: Europol

“The form of terrorism we have been facing, since the atrocious attacks against New York and Washington on 9/11, is new. It is more fanatical, more lethal, more global than anything we have known so far. In our European Security Strategy, we have identified terrorism as one of the key strategic threats facing Europe.” Javier Solana*

The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) One of Europol’s most important functions is to monitor, and report developments on, the threat from terrorism. Europol analysis in this area is published annually in the TE-SAT and in other more specialised threat assessments. These reports provide law enforcement officials, policy makers and the general public with a informed understanding of the threat.

same applies to all the mentioned forms of illicit trafficking. Europol has reacted to this evolving requirement and enhanced its permanent counter-terrorism structure and capabilities. Operational and strategic support is provided to Member State authorities through a common platform for the exchange of sensitive information and the development of best practices. Acting as a key information broker in the EU and dedicated operational support centre, Europol makes a major contribution to counter-terrorism activities in Europe.

Outlook Terrorism will remain a major threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future, and therefore all forms of terrorism and extremism have to be taken into account and monitored. The

* speech by Javier Solana in Berlin from 7 October 2004 titled “Terrorism in Europe: How does the Union of 25 respond to this phenomenon?”, Council document number S0266/04



IT International and the economic crisis in Europe Interview with Barbara Wittmann, Sales Director Public Segment, Dell Germany, and Mike Migdal, Account Executive Defence & Security, Germany The European: Mrs Wittmann, Dell is a company especially well known for its notebooks, desktops, servers and storage products. Which of these products is your particular favourite and who are your most important customers for the product range as a whole?

see clear signs of stabilization, but no economic boom, yet. At Dell, we have always been fully focused on profitable growth. To further grow our business, we are going to start a product offensive in the coming weeks and months, keep our costs down and further increase the use of contract manufactures.

Dell: Our company is much more than a mere hardware The European: Could you provider. As an IT solutions provider we are able to offer Barbara Wittmann, Sales Director Public Segment, Dell Germany give some figures? Photo: Behörden Spiegel our customers the full range of products and services Dell: Today, approximately they need to establish and 50% of our revenue comes run an efficient, standard-based IT infrastructure. Our product from outside the US. So while the US economy continues to portfolio includes desktops and mobile solutions, servers and have a significant impact on Dell’s overall performance, restorage systems as well as software and professional services. gions like EMEA and Asia are of tremendous and growing Our customer base ranges from the consumer to small, mediimportance for our business. From an EMEA perspective, there um and large businesses, as well as public sector customers are in fact significant regional differences as far as the ecoand governments. To get even closer to our customers and to nomic situation is concerned. This is something we are obviserve them even better going forward by delivering fully tailorously taking into account, too. Apart from that, we also see made solutions, we re-structured our company back in Februdifferences in how the stimulus packages are being applied by ary 2009, removing the former regional individual countries. Generally, they have not organization, establishing a fully yet reached all the entities that are identifycustomer-centred global structure. This ing projects to spend those budgets on. organisation enables us to accelerate The European: How do things look in Europe innovation, increase responsiveness and drive competitiveness. where you have a well-established footprint? How have you organised yourselves, and The European: The economic crisis this which is your most successful customer last year has dashed many hopes. Sales segment? have plummeted worldwide. There are differing opinions about Dell. To what Dell: At the beginning of 2009, we extent has Dell begun to bounce back? have dispensed with our regional Are there regional differences? structures. Today, we are organized globally around major cusDell: After a long period of steep tomer segments – large enterprise, economic decline which has hit the IT public sector, small and medium industry especially hard, we seem to businesses as well as consumers to Multitouch-Tablet-PC for “Outdoor” use (Military, Police and other use) Photo: DELL have reached the bottom now. So we serve our customers with faster



nover, at least, the IT industry has faced the challenge of Green IT. How are you adapting your products to Green IT?

Barbara Wittmann in discussion with Mr. Mike Migdal and Mr. Bühl.

innovation and greater responsiveness. In this structure, the public sector is one of the biggest segments globally. The European: That means there has been a fair degree of streamlining and Dell management now has direct influence on developments at the bottom end. Has it been worthwhile to shed whole layers of management? Surely individual regions have specific needs. Dell: Dell has traditionally had very flat hierarchies. By introducing our new global structure, however, we successfully removed unnecessary overlaps, enabling us to respond to specific customer circumstances very quickly. Today, decisions can be made even faster and closer to our customers. As the head of our Public business in Germany, I have direct access to Paul Bell, who is in charge of Dell Public worldwide. He is just 2 hierarchy levels above me and he reports directly to Michael Dell. That makes decision making very easy and extremely quick. From a customer perspective, we see that customer needs and expectations are usually very similar across the globe. If you look to Asia or the US for example, our customers in the area of education in these regions are not very different from those in Europe, the only difference being that the size and distribution of budgets vary by country. From our point of view, the key factor is to help solve the challenges of our customers in the field of education. Every country wants to improve the quality of education and IT is often a key driver for efficient distribution of knowledge. Healthcare is another example where certain developments are picked up extremely fast in emerging markets. In those markets, you have to start working with new technologies fast. The European: Moving on to another topic, perhaps we can consider the products themselves. Since CeBIT 2008 in Han-


Dell: In fact, Green IT has been part of Dell’s mission and culture for several years now. Michael Dell himself made this one of the key priorities for our company nearly three years ago. At Dell, we are very committed to minimizing the environmental impact at each stage of the lifecycle, from product design to manufacturing and operations to customer ownership and product recycling. We’re also Photo: Behörden Spiegel making it a priority to drive ‘green’ into every aspect of our global business. We have taken very concrete steps to achieve our goals, ranging from the industry’s only free recycling program for consumers, designing energy-efficient products, committing to carbon neutrality and most importantly engaging in a meaningful dialogue with customers. The European: In that sense, you are certainly in tune with the times. But let me ask: to my considerable irritation, when I bought my Dell laptop two years ago, it came with a huge amount of packaging. When you took us through your positive points earlier, you didn’t in fact mention packaging and transportation. Dell: Things have moved on since then. Back in December 2008, Dell clearly committed to eliminating 20,000,000 lbs of packaging by 2012 by shrinking packaging volume by 10%, increasing to 40% the amount of recycled content in packaging, and increasing to 75% the amount of materials in packaging to be curbside recyclable. Today our packaging has been cut down to a minimum, which makes for easier recycling, reduces transport costs, and so leads to even more energy savings. The European: You have just said the key word: Energy. Talking about notebooks for example, it is pretty easy for your customers to get information on the average power consumption. But what is the position with your larger customers? They – and I’m thinking particularly here of the public sector – have proprietary applications. How do you deal with their requirements and expectations? Dell: We provide our customers dedicated assessment services to give them clarity on the energy consumption and the socalled carbon footprint e.g. of their facilities and data centers. We provide them with a thorough diagnosis and recommendations how to optimize their IT infrastructure to maximize


efficiency and lower energy usage. So we work very closely with our customers to determine the most suitable design for them. The European: May I please put my next question to Mr Migdal. Mr Migdal, how do you view the reuse of raw materials. Is it worthwhile taking back the customers’ old appliances and can anything be recovered from them? Mike Migdal: Absolutely yes. The recovery and re-use of old computers is a key component of our supply chain, and we offer to our commercial customers certified Asset Recovery Services which guarantee a secure, non-polluting way of disposing used IT equipment like desktops, notebooks, server and storage systems, etc. By using these services, our customers can make sure that their old computer systems – regardless of the manufacturer – are either resold or recycled properly and in an environmentally friendly way and natural resources are preserved. Mrs Wittmann: I would like to add something else you should know. Throughout our entire supply chain we make absolutely sure that employee rights are being observed at any stage. We don’t accept things like child labour nor poor or hazardous labour conditions, and we clearly demand from all of our partners to meet our own high standards as well. The European: Mr Migdal, I would like to turn now to the military and security fields. Dell is well placed in both. Dell: That’s correct. In this segment we are very strongly positioned and one of the biggest suppliers of IT solutions and suppliers in the field of defence. The European: But Mr. Migdal, does that include NATO? Dell: Yes, NATO too. Projects with them involve security-related projects, which I cannot talk about directly but I can describe our capabilities in terms of a two-step approach. Dell has a global team for Defence. We are able to adapt our products and services to specific military situations. That ability has made us a preferred partner and also a key supplier to this community. The European: Where from are you operating in NATO? Dell: We have a regional team that supports NATO and operates interactively with the host nation defence teams providing worldwide reach. It is this international team that delivers comprehensive solutions to NATO forces in Afghanistan, for example, or anywhere else in the world.



ment is involved, it will be about 80 days before the Force deploys. That gives us the opportunity to step up with support. We can define the IT and adapt it, as necessary, to the specific processes being operated. Together with the user we define how much support we can and must provide in the IT processes. The end result in a so-called deployable data centre tailored to the force. It is then assembled and sent to a transfer point and from there it accompanies the force to their theatre of operations. Latitude 2100 Notebooks for Schools

The European: Do you have employees providing support in the field? Dell: Yes we do. The European: So NATO signs the necessary framework contracts with you. The individual Member States can then ‘order from the menu’ when they put together their contingents for deployment. They can achieve standardisation relatively easily that way.

Photo: DELL

The European: And at some point the troops return home. How do you get everything back as efficiently as possible?

Dell: From our point of view one question leads to another. How do I recover the IT or, if necessary, how do I deal with it in the area of operations? We have a lot of experience to call on. The European: The hand grenade solution? Dell: If the customer doesn’t bring it back they are able to destroy it. We have an external unit that that allows them to physically destroy the classified ‘red’ computer media but not the entire computer system.

Dell: You can see it in that way period. The European: It is important to be able to deploy quickly today while keeping the logistics effort to a minimum. What the EU and NATO need above all are mobile command posts and mobile computer centres that are well equipped, easy to assemble (container solution), compatible and interoperable, and, on top of that, secure and easy to use. Dell: That is exactly what NATO and EU contingents need in the field. Let me clarify that as far as possible with all due regard for confidentiality. The European: It would interest my readership if you could describe what happens when a deployable computer centre is used by an EU nation or NATO member state in the field. Dell: Our team not only gets the deployable computer centre ready, i.e. picks up the tools and actually puts it together, but also helps prepare the regiment, task force or EU battle group, from a technology perspective, when the order to deploy has been issued. The European: How far ahead of operations is that usually? Dell: Under normal circumstances, unless an ad hoc deploy-


The European: Mrs Wittmann, may I put one last question to you about the EU without, I hope, going too far ...The EU must be the only „authority“ in Europe that does not really have its own IT resource. It will however have to acquire one. Do you see the EU as an emerging market? Dell: On that point let me say that in the event of such a positive development we are also well prepared and positioned to counsel, support and equip the EU wherever necessary. We keep an eye on the terrain and our philosophy of driving standards as far forward as possible will give us an advantage when it comes to implementation. The European: Thank you for granting us this interview. The European wishes you every success!

*Barbara Wittmann has been the General Manager of Dell Halle GmbH in Halle (Saale) since August 2005. In addition to that, she serves as Sales Director Public Segment in Germany. Slavic studies at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich. 1994 Management Consultant at “The LEK Partnership” in Munich and London. 1997 University of Texas at Austin/USA, obtaining her master’s degree in Business Administration (MBA) in 1999. 1998 Ms. Wittmann joined Dell in Austin. 1999 Business Development Manager. 2000 Dell Germany, holding several management positions in Finance, Marketing and Sales. 2004 Manager for the Software & Peripherals business. Barbara Wittmann is married and has a son. She lives with her family in Halle (Saale).


NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) – The Multi-National Solution for a Transformational Capability within NAT0 by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels*

Modern day events remind us that we face new threats in the 21st Century that we did not expect. Hostilities occur where we do not expect them and against adversaries for whom we have not planned. And despite all our preparations, we are not able to always predict when these threats will blossom into crises. But we do now know this - The speed at which they develop into crises and the global implications of regional conflict demand a global awareness that enables nations to respond rapidly and that allows commanders to prepare and deploy their forces on short notice. The fielding of capabilities that will enhance the effectiveness of that response becomes critical.

AGS – relevant for military and civil use NATO has long expressed the need for capabilities to support our forces engaged in out of area operations, principal among these being an airborne ground surveillance capability. The importance of this capability to NATO and to our forces as a transformational event cannot be understated, and its relevance to both military and military-civilian operations has never been more apparent.

On September, 15 NATO nations completed the signature process of the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMoU) to participate in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) programme. With the signing of the PMoU, the NATO AGS Management Organisation (NAGSMO) was officially formed, and the NATO AGS Management Agency (NAGSMA) was authorized to procure the NATO AGS core capability. The RFP has already been released to Northrop Grumman, the prime contractor, and contract award is expected in 2010. The AGS core capability will be supplemented by interoperable national assets as part of a larger Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system of systems.

NATO AGS has in some respects made a significant contribution to NATO transformation. From the political perspective, a predominance of Alliance nations have agreed to pool both their technologies and their resources toward acquiring this

Alliance Airborne Ground Surveillance in operations 2012 Photo: Northrop Grumman



“Situation Awarness is a key capability for operational success“ General (ret.) Harald Kujat answering questions of the The European The European: General Kujat, you dedicated a lot of time and energy to AGS. When you had been nominated Chairman of the Military Committee in 2002, one of the first actions was the launch of AGS, which was finally an issue at the Prague summit 1992, where heads of state and government gave the green light to procure AGS as a NATO owned and operated system. What is your feeling when you hear that AGS is finally launched? General (ret.) Kujat: Actually I initiated that project already as German CHOD. I was very concerned because of the lack of situational awareness in operations and I asked Dr. Enders from EADS and Mr. Crosby from Northrop Grumman whether their companies could close that gap in a joint transatlantic endeavour. Our aim was to reach an initial operational capability as early as 2008. Unfortunately AGS has been filibustered by some NATO nations for years. Afghanistan teaches us that this was a terrible mistake. The European: What is the political and strategic value of AGS for NATO and EU? General (ret.) Kujat: Situational awareness is a key capability

capability, which by most measures is the largest and most complex such acquisition the Alliance has ever undertaken. Participating nations span the Atlantic Ocean, making this truly a transatlantic programme. Charter alliance members and new member states alike are participating in the programme and are leveraging their individual national investments in leading-edge technologies to develop and field a capability too expensive for all but a few nations to afford independently. Their ability to overcome individual national issues to realise agreement for the common good of the Alliance can be truly transformational for NATO, as it provides a model for future acquisitions. In return, national political leaders and command authorities will have a common ground situation assessment and reliable, irrefutable evidence of hostile intent in near real time to exercise the full range of diplomatic and military responses required to resolve conflict at its earliest stages and maintain the peace.

for operational success and it helps very much to protect our soldiers. This capability will be available both for NATO and EU missions. AGS as a US-European project will immensely strengthen the transatlantic link. I thought it could also help improve European defence technology through the development of a state of the art radar system. Unfortunately this was not achievable. The European: The UK is operating its own system and will serve as a complement to NATO AGS. Can you imagine that the EU could one day develop its own system operating for EU civil and military forces and - on the basis of the Berlin plus agreementalso for NATO as a complement to NATO AGS? General (ret.) Kujat: As I said, my original idea was that Europe would make a major technology contribution to this important system. The European defence industry is definitely in a position to co-operate with top US companies as well as produce defence equipment of the highest standards. The strategic and operational value of AGS cannot be overestimated. The challenges of the future require, however, new and additional capabilities, which we can only achieve together, military and industry, Europe and US.

AGS – a model for transatlantic industrial cooperation From the industrial perspective, NATO AGS provides a good model for transatlantic cooperation as well. The leading European and North American systems integrators are involved in the programme, applying the lessons learned from current operational national systems. National industries from all participating nations will have direct work in the programme, and the participating national industries are leveraging both their core competencies and their leading-edge technologies to field this capability.

Information dominance through AGS – protection for our soldiers But, from the military perspective, NATO AGS provides an even greater transformational effect for our forces. Without an organic, wide-area, high performance ground surveillance



GLOBAL HAWK HALE UAV Photo: Northrop Grumman

capability, the Alliance would not have the ability to carry out the transformation that is possible with the unprecedented information that AGS will provide. It adds the missing piece for information dominance – foreknowledge. This capability provides “eyes in the sky” to force commanders and will be a critical enabler for the NATO Response Force and a key building block for the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). Until now, this wide area ground surveillance capability has only been fielded by a few nations, making their availability for NATO operations limited. Even when nations could be relied on to support NATO with their own limited ground surveillance capabilities during a crisis, NATO still would not have day-to-day access to these assets in peacetime for civilian missions. For the first time, NATO and EU commanders can rely upon a NATO owned and operated capability to provide timely detection of developing threats requiring an international response. And force commanders will now be confident of having early and reliable indications and warning of developing threats to peace, whether they are massing Taliban forces hiding among civilians in the villages of Afghanistan or fast boats preparing to hijack oil tankers and freighters in the Gulf of Aden.

AGS is a force multiplier par excellence The deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan and EU battle groups in Bosnia serve to remind us of the variety of new missions the AGS system will be called upon to support – not just traditional management of threats to political boundaries but also threats within a political boundary. These occurrences will require the AGS core capability to contribute to a range of new missions, such as force protection, border surveillance, treaty verification, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) support, maritime surveillance and counter-piracy and the fight against terrorism, to name a few. These operations also have humanitarian applications, and NATO AGS will also be called upon to support missions such as humanitarian and


disaster relief, civilian convoy protection, search and rescue, civilian infrastructure resource protection, and the war on drugs. And, since the AGS capability will be available to support the full range of NATO operations and will be available to support EU operations as well, AGS will provide a force multiplication effect on NATO and EU forces, allowing coalition forces to be “tailored” or specifically modified to fit the mission. And the ability to provide an accurate ground situation picture to both NATO and national commanders adds the ability to protect our forces from harm, providing a confidence building measure in capitals that its national force contribution can be kept safe.

Mechanisms in NATO The AGS Capability Steering Committee (CSC) is responsible to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) for the Programme to acquire the AGS Core. The Alliance Ground Surveillance Support Staff (AGS3) supports the CSC, drawing upon the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency for contracting support as necessary. The AGS3 serves as the informational hub between the AGS nations, NATO bodies and industry. The AGS Implementation Office (AGS IO) at SHAPE is responsible for ensuring the successful operational integration and employment of the NATO AGS Core Capability.

To put into practice The realisation of the NATO AGS core is a realisation of a commitment made by nations at the Prague Summit and revalidated at Istanbul. But it is far more than that to our nations. It is also the realisation of a commitment made to our military forces and civilian populations to protect them when in harm’s way. * The Author was from 2002 -2005 Co-Head of Marketing of the International Consortium TIPS (Transatlantic Industrial Proposed Solution for AGS) and from 2005 -2007 Team Lead Communications of the Joint Venture AGS Industries


The European Union Think Thank by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris

The EUISS is continually striving to improve the capacity of the European Union to deal in a coherent and consistent way with global and regional challenges, and in particular with political and security issues arising in its neighbourhood

Multilateralism in a multi-polar world We do this in support of the EU’s declared aim of achieving effective multilateralism, in which context the EU itself can act as a global player. This necessitates giving a clear multilateral perspective to its bilateral relations with other major players in the international system – what we now tend to call ‘multilateralising multipolarity’ – while simultaneously contributing to the reinforcement of regional integration and cooperation. This is why we privilege the concept of an open Europe, where the international action of the Union reflects its founding values of international rule of law, human rights and association between states. The fact that it is seen as an ‘international public good’ places a heavy responsibility on the Union, testing its ability to lead the international community in facing the kind of world disorder that is causing such human suffering from Sudan to Iraq and the wider Middle East.

Europe’s global neighbourhood The United States is the paramount global power and a key strategic partner of the Union, vital to any project of effective multilateralism. Thus the United States and Euro-American relations represent a strong strand of research within the EUISS. The annual European Union Washington Forum, held in Washington D.C. and organised in cooperation with the European Commission and the European Presidency, deals with critical international issues on the European and American agendas. Equally, the study of relations with global players like China, India or Brazil and regional powers like South Africa, all strategic partners of the EU, is critical for our objective of effective multilateralism. The research activities that we conduct in this area are reflected in a number of publications on issues of global governance. Europe’s relationship with the new emerging powers is the major topic of important events held by the EUISS, such as its annual conference and its Forum in New Delhi. The annual conference takes place every autumn in Paris and is opened by the High Representative for the CSFP: since 2007 one of its primary themes has been how the EU can engage with new global players to achieve effective multilateralism. In autumn 2009, the Institute organised the first EU-India Forum on effective multilateralism in New Delhi.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos Álvaro de Vasconcelos was born 1944 in Campanha-Porto Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris since May 2007. Prior to this, he was a cofounder of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon from 1981 to 2007, where he launched several networks including the Euro-Latin American Forum and EuroMeSCo. A columnist in the Portuguese and international press, he is an author notably in the areas of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Euro-Mediterranean relations and on the theme of world order, such as Portugal: “A European Story, La PESC”: Ouvrir l’Europe au Monde, “The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order”, and “A European Strategy for the Mediterranean”.

Europe’s periphery – crisis and turmoils The EUISS devotes particular attention to areas on the periphery of the EU where crises and turmoil counterpoint the desire to forge a common destiny with Europe. The debate on how to achieve the goals of creating a democratic and prosperous Euro-Mediterranean community, set forth in Barcelona in 1995, is back on the agenda with the Union for the Mediterranean and is a priority for the EUISS. Equally important is the imperative to keep Russia committed to continental cooperation for peace and development while, at the same time, the Union should do its part to consolidate the democratic process in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in line with the objective of the new Eastern Partnership. The Institute has also been trying to cater to the increasing worldwide ‘demand for Europe’ by opening is Visiting Fellows programme to researchers from both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods and other parts of the world.

Breadth of analysis The EUISS works to provide the Union with timely, forwardlooking analysis, covering both immediate priorities for EU foreign, security and defence policy and the great challenges of modern times. The latter range from • human rights to democracy, • development to peace, from proliferation to terrorism, • energy to the environment, • rearmament and the fate of arms-control regimes to the link between security and justice. None of these are new, but since the end of the Cold War gave



way to an era of unfettered globalisation, such issues have become an integral part of international affairs. As the EU’s growing global role broadens its policy interests, and as it expands its outreach, the EUISS has an increasing role to play in contributing to forging a European security culture based on the Union’s founding fundamental values – that of a distinctive political entity that has delegitimized power politics among its member states. In short, the EUISS is evolving in line with the spirit of consistency, coherence and ‘unity in action’ that are the main objectives of the reform that the Lisbon Treaty brings to CFSP and ESDP, and effectively acts as the Institute for Foreign and Security Studies of the European Union.

policy options being generated both within its neighbours and further afield. While developing its own European research capacities, opening up to the world also means the EUISS works to systematically involve non-European researchers in the full range of its activities. To reinforce its presence in Brussels and interaction with the European Institutions, the EUISS has opened a Brussels office based in the building of the Council of the European Union and regularly organises meetings and book launches in Brussels. In short, the EUISS’s objective is to think strategically, work regionally and act globally.


Publications All of the research work conducted at the EUISS, whether by its permanent research team or by Visiting Fellows or Associate Researchers, is published in our different publications, which are also made available on our website. The Institute’s flagship publications are its series of Chaillot Papers. The Institute also publishes Occasional Papers, books, reports and policy briefs, as well as a quarterly newsletter. In 2009 two topics dominated our research activities: the new American administration and the way the EU should respond to it, and the 10th anniversary of ESDP. The latter has given rise to two publications. One, “What ambitions for European defence in 2020?”, published in July of this year, focuses on the prospects and aspirations of ESDP over the next ten years. The second, “European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)” (forthcoming) consists of an overview and appraisal of ESDP in the last ten years. Both these publications underline the importance of research in European security policy, in particular with regard to identifying and analysing the lessons learned from the different missions. Javier Solana stated in his preface to What ambitions for European defence in 2020?, that ‘this book is therefore an important contribution to the strategic debate, looking ahead to where ESDP could and should be ten years from now. It covers the range of key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.’ All of these topics were high on our agenda in 2009 and will remain so in 2010.

A network of networks Europe places cooperation at the heart of its perceptions of global policy and since it has no monopoly on innovative thinking on world affairs, it is crucial that the EU’s institutions, thinkers and planners become more aware of the debate and ideas being put forward in the wider world. It should be informed of the strategic visions, the security concerns and the


Recent papers and reports: Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009 Chaillot Paper - n°119, November 2009 Margarita M. Balmaceda, Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz Gromadzki, Andrei Liakhovich, Astrid Sahm, Vitali Silitski, Leonid Zlotnikov edited by Sabine Fischer Risky business? The EU, China and dual-use technology Occasional Paper - n°80, October 2009 by May-Britt Stumbaum Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s contribution Occasional Paper - n°78, April 2009 by Eva Gross European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda Report - n°4, January 2009 Esra Bulut , Sabine Fischer, Giovanni Grevi, Daniel Keohane, Luis Peral, Walter Posch, Jean Pascal Zanders edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Marcin Zaborowski

Books: The Obama Moment November 2009 edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Marcin Zaborowski What ambitions for European defence in 2020? [2nd edition] October 2009 Claude-France Arnould, Juha Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Stefano Silvestri, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Alexander Stubb, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Alexander Weis, Richard Wright edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos Find more publications on the EUISS Homepage www.iss.europa.eu


European Union European Commission Report on the Integrated Maritime Policy for the EU

General Council Military Committee: Meeting of EU Chiefs of Defence

On 15 October, the European Commission presented a Progress Report outlining the achievements of the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) over the past two years. The report, which had been requested by the European Council of 14 December 2007, also outlines the next phase of the IMP, which should feature more structured stakeholder involvement, strong integration of the IMP into other EU policies and into the EU institutions, and, most importantly, coordinated responses to the challenges arising from climate change and the economic crisis. A detailed policy document to develop these six strategic orientations will be published during 2010. Furthermore the Commission presented concrete proposals on two major IMP issues – the integration across sectors and countries of maritime surveillance and the international dimension of Europe’s maritime policy.

On 3 November, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) met at the level of Chiefs of Defence (ChoDs). Europe’s chiefs of defence reviewed in Brussels all military operations under the EU flag and witnessed the handover of power from outgoing EU military committee chair, French General Henri Bentégeat, to Sweden’s Håkan Syrén. In a press conference after the meeting, General Håkan Syrén underlined the importance of civilmilitary cooperation given that there is often a need for conflict prevention and stabilization. He said that the ESDP process “progressed well during this first decade. Ten years is a fairly short time in this context. But and the EU has launched six military missions and over fifteen civil military missions, which is quite an impressive number.”

European Council EU summit in Brussels on 29/30 October At their summit in Brussels on 29 and 30 October, the EU heads of state and government took note of the preparatory work in view of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and endorsed the Presidency’s report on guidelines for the European External Action Service (EEAS). They invited the future High Representative to present a proposal for the organisation and functioning of the EEAS as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with a view to its adoption by the Council at the latest by the end of April 2010. In this context, the European Council also recognised the need, as underlined in the European Security Strategy, for the European Union to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor, including in its relations with strategic partners, in its neighbourhood and in conflict-affected areas. Furthermore the European Council endorsed the conclusions of the Council meeting of 27 October on Afghanistan and Pakistan and welcomed the adoption of the plan for strengthened EU action in the region. The heads of state and government also called for the enhancement of the operational capacities of Frontex as well as progress in its development. The European Commission was invited to present proposals to that end early in 2010, including the preparation of common operational procedures containing clear rules of engagement for joint operations at sea, and increased operational cooperation between Frontex and countries of origin/transit.

Former EUMC chairman calls for a civil-military EU-Headquarters In an interview with Agence Europe published on 5 November, General Henri Bentégeat said that the creation of a permanent European military headquarters was not on the agenda anymore due to the fears this prospect produces in the United States. There was fear of further competition between NATO and EU, with duplication of the NATO headquarters SHAPE, said the General. In his view, there could be something more acceptable that corresponds to a specific need that is characteristic of the European Union: a civil-military headquarters which could resolve the problem, that the Europeans still lack a “conduct” dimension. The General underlined that he was not sure if the set up of such a headquarters would be possible but that he thinks it was something worth considering.

Eurojust and Europol concludes new agreement On 1 October, at the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in The Hague, Eurojust and Europol signed a new cooperation agreement. The objective of the new agreement is to enhance the cooperation between Eurojust and Europol in fighting serious forms of international crime. The Agreement governs modalities for closer and increased cooperation, as well as provisions for the exchange of general and personal data, in accordance with Eurojust’s and Europol’s data protection rules.



European Defence Agency (EDA) Facilitating SMEs’ access to the defence market On 9 October, the EDA Steering Board in National Armaments Directors formation approved “Guidelines for facilitating SMEs’ access to the defence market”. These non-binding Guidelines address a number of issues crucial for SMEs: access to information, equal conditions for main- and subcontractors, minimum reaction time for smaller contracts, protection of SMEowned Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and fostering industrial cooperation with SMEs in R&D/R&T projects. The Guidelines are complementary to the Small Business Act for Europe, the Code of Conduct on defence procurement and the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain. These documents are directed towards facilitating SMEs’ access to the market and ensuring transparency and competition in the defence market.

UAS Air Traffic Insertion During the ICAO civil/military global air traffic management forum on 20 October, the European Commission and EDA stressed the good cooperation on the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) subject and the need for an integrated civil/military approach in Europe to reach full and seamless integration with the manned aviation. EDA highlighted the major strategic technology development in the Sense & Avoid area and, specifically, its flagship project MIDCAS. The mission of MIDCAS is to demonstrate the “Unmanned Aircraft System Mid-air Collision Avoidance Function” being compatible with UAS operations in non-segregated airspace and acceptable to the manned aviation community. The support to foster European Standardisation of Mid-air Collision Avoidance for UAS is a central activity throughout the project. The international civil/military audience welcomed the strategic civil/military approach of Europe in the domain of UAS Air Traffic Insertion as well as the need for a common, transatlantic way ahead.

EU-US Relations 2009 Summit in Washington On 3 November, EU and US leaders met in Washington DC. Participants from the side of the Commission were the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso and Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The EU Presidency was represented by Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, assisted by High Representative Javier Solana. Issues discussed at the summit included major global challenges such as the economic recovery, climate change and development but also a range of foreign policy issues such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East. The European and American leaders also adopted a Declara-


2009 EU-U.S. Summit Declaration 3 November 2009 (excerpts)

The EU and US leaders agreed: “(…) To strengthen our cyber security dialogue to identify and prioritize areas where we can work together to help build a reliable, resilient, trustworthy digital infrastructure for the future. (…) We welcome the joint statement adopted by our Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 28 October 2009, in which we commit to enhancing our policy and operational cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs matters. Our partnership will benefit our people and address our common challenges of maintaining security and individual rights while facilitating travel, business and communication. We face common threats from those who seek to commit acts of terrorism and transnational crime, including the challenge of terrorist travel. (…) - Will develop our working relationship on mobility and security matters, including border, readmission and travel document security policies. We welcome the signature of the working arrangement between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the EU border security agency Frontex and we will work closely to implement it. (…) - Agree to a joint declaration on non-proliferation and disarmament highlighting the need to preserve and strengthen the relevant multilateral measures and in particular the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, expressing support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and calling for the start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in January 2010. The statement reiterates the necessity for Iran and the DPRK to fulfil their international nuclear obligations. (…) - Renew our commitments in Afghanistan and the region to initiatives that will increase the capacity of the Afghan government to take responsibility for delivering better security, stability and development for the Afghan people. We welcome in this context the recently adopted Plan for Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We look forward to working with the new Afghan administration and renewing efforts to promote good governance, respect for human rights, gender equality and democratic development. “


tion on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and agreed to enhance their policy and operational cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs matters. Furthermore a new EU-US Energy Council has been created, which held its first meeting in the margins of the Summit.

Appointments: The EU Military Committee (EUMC) has a new chairman On 4 November, High Representative Javier SOLANA welcomed General Håkan SYRÉN as the new Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and handed over the chairmanship from General Henri Bentégeat. The new Chairman underlined: “One of the things I’m hoping for is to be able to give the political level freedom of action with the military capabilities that the Member States have placed at the EU’s disposal. Then I want to help ensure that civil-military cooperation is developed. In addition, I’m going to present clear proposals for Member States’ planning of their own defence forces based.” General Håkan Syrén – Chairman of the EU Military Committee Håkan Syrén – new Chair General Håkan Syrén was born on 31 of the European Union January 1952 in Växjö, Sweden. He Military Committee graduated in 1973 from the Swedish (EUMC) on EU military Naval Academy as a Lieutenant in the requirements Coast Artillery. Photo: Mona Boholm, Försvarsdepartementet Career: 1973-79 Instructor and Platoon Commander. 1980 Student at the Swedish War College, Stockholm. 1984 Staff Officer at Navy Staff, Stockholm. 1988 Student at the Naval War College, Newport, USA. 1989 teacher of Strategy, Swedish War College, Stockholm. 1990 Head of Planning Department, Navy Staff, Stockholm. 1992 Commanding Officer Marine Amphibious Battalion and Coast Artillery Regiment. 1996 Head of Operations, Planning Department, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. 1999 Secretary to the Defence Commission, Ministry of Defence. 1999 Chief of Joint Military Intelligence and Security, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. 2004-09 Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces.

New Executive Director at ENISA The EU’s ‘cyber security’ Agency ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) has a new Executive Director as of 16th October. Dr Helmbrecht, former President of the German IT Security Agency (BSI), was born in 1955 in Castrop-

Rauxel, Germany. He has more than 30 years of professional, management experience in the IT sector. He has gained experience in various sectors of society, including energy industry, insurance company engineering, aviation, defence, and space industry, before becoming President of BSI in 2003. Dr Udo Helmbrecht Dr Helmbrecht clarifies his visions for Photo: Behörden Spiegel the Agency as its new Executive Director: “I will strive to help the Agency to work more closely, handin-hand, with the European Institutions, trustfully and actively together with the Member States and to promote cooperation between governments, businesses and NGOs to the benefit of citizens in the European Union. (…). Ultimately, the economy of Europe is at stake if we do not manage security matters properly and adequately. “

Change of command at HQ EUROCORPS On 25 September 2009, the Chiefs of Defence from Eurocorps framework nations handed over the command of Eurocorps from Spanish Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch to German Lieutenant General Lothar Domröse, who had been Chief of Staff of ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan from January 2008 to January 2009 Lieutenant General Lieutenant General Hans-Lothar Hans-Lothar Domröse Domröse was born in 1952 in Photo: EUROCORPS Hanover. He entered the Bundeswehr in 1973. Studies of economic and organisational sciences. 1984 General Staff officer training. 1989 Security Policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery. 1993 Planning Staff MOD, Bonn. 1986 Branch chief, HQ SHAPE in Mons. 1998 Chief of Staff at Military District Command VII, Leipzig and 3rd KFOR operational contingen as Chief of Staff of Multinational Brigade South, Prizren/Kosovo. 2000 Commander of the Mechanised Infantry Brigade 41 in Torgelow. 2003 Head of the German team at CENTCOM in Tampa/Florida/USA during operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004 Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, MOD Berlin. Afterwards, from 2006 until 2008 Commander of the Special Operations Division in Regensburg. 2008 Chief of Staff at HQ ISAF in Kabul / Afghanistan.



North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO NATO’s new Strategic Concept discussed at Luxembourg seminar On 16 October , the first of four main seminars on NATO’s new Strategic Concept was held in Luxembourg. The aim of these seminars is to guide the development of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and work towards defining the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks. The event was hosted by Luxembourg’s Ministries of Defence and of Foreign Affairs and brought together members of the Group of Experts on the new Strategic Concept, appointed by the Secretary General, as well as government officials, military representatives and many other opinion leaders. On this first seminar, participants discussed the changing security environment, NATO’s core tasks, the Alliance’s political role and its strategy in the 21st century. Dr Madeleine Albright, who chairs the Group of Experts, presided over the meeting. On 13 November, the Group of Experts held their second key seminar with leading civilian and military experts in Brdo, Slovenia, to discuss NATO’s operations and the “comprehensive approach”. In his welcoming remarks, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted planning, the relationship between security and development, and partnerships as key areas where improvement is needed. The next seminar will take place in Oslo in January.

The group of Experts (“Wise men”) Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed 12 experts to lay the ground for NATO’s new Strategic Concept. Dr. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, chairs the group with Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, former CEO in Royal Dutch Shell, as vice-chair.

Members of the Group: Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona (Italy) Ambassador Marie Gervais-Vidricaire (Canada) The Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP (United Kingdom) Ambassador Ümit Pamir (Turkey)

Some Allies sign declaration of intent for HIP helicopter initiative In the margins of the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Bratislava on 23 October, NATO Allies buried the French-UK Helicopter initiative which was managed by the European Defence Agency (EDA). Nine (9) ministers signed a declaration of intent Russian-sourced helicopters need refurfor their contribution bishment and simulation installations for to a multi-national training. Photo: Archive CAE, Stolberg helicopter initiative with the aim to refurbish Russian-sourced transport helicopters. The Declaration of Intent was signed by the Czech Republic, Albania, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the UK. The HIP Helicopter Task Force, created in February 2009 and led by the Czech Republic, is responsible for the development of a multi-national transport helicopter programme for NATO. The idea is to help those countries that do not have the resources to deploy and run a transport helicopter operation on their own. Over the past eight months the HIP Helicopter Task Force has been encouraging NATO Allies to provide resources and expertise so that those Allies, including the Czech Republic and Hungary, who operate transport Helicopters such as the Mi 8, Mi17 and CZR Mi 17/1, would have the assistance necessary to set up a multi-national deployable operation. Membership in this initiative is open to any country willing to contribute with experience, know-how and/or capabilities. It is hoped that other Allies will join this cooperative programme. Up to now only Bulgaria besides the Czech Republic and Hungary seems to be ready to contribute, offering some few platforms.

Ambassador Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra (Spain) Ambassador Dr Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz (Germany) Mr. Bruno Racine (France)

German New Foreign Minister at NATO Headquarters

Ambassador Aivis Ronis (Latvia) Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Ambassador Yannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece)


On 3 November, Germany’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido Westerwelle, met with Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at NATO Headquarters where they discussed efforts in Afghanistan, NATO relations with Russia and pro-


The German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle with the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh at NATO HQ. Photo: NATO

gress on the development of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and nuclear disarmament. Minister Westerwelle stated in a press conference that he wanted Germany to be “a country free of nuclear weapons”. He added that this issue “is a question which concerns all allies” and that any steps and any discussion “will take place in a multilateral framework.”

MISCELLANEOUS Procurement South Africa cancels order for the A400M On 5 November South Africa announced that it had cancelled a big contract for Airbus military planes in a new setback for the troubled A400M program. The contract for the A400M was agreed five years ago. The director for programs at Airbus, Tom Williams, said at the group’s headquarters in Toulouse that the cancellation was a “complete surprise.” “We are so close to the first flight. I have a lot of confidence it will fly before the end of the year.” . The South African Air Force was in dire need of a way to upgrade the aging Herculus C130S planes, she underlined.

ESRT NATO Headquarters hosts high-level Ukraine consultations On 16 November, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen chaired the seventh Informal High-Level NATO-Ukraine Consultations with the participation of Defence Ministers and other senior officials from Ukraine and NATO countries, at NATO HQ in Brussels. Participants exchanged views on the ongoing transformation of Ukraine’s national defence and security structures and practices, particularly in the context of the current economic climate Centre to right: Valerii Ivashchenko (Acting and Ukraine’s first Defence Minister, Ukraine) with Ambassador Annual National Claudio Bisogniero (NATO Deputy Secretary Programme. General) Photo: NATO Earlier this year, Ukraine developed its first annual programme to outline the steps it plans to take to accelerate its Euro-Atlantic integration. Secretary General Rasmussen noted the significant progress achieved so far on defence reform, but stressed that, even faced with the current economic climate, Ukraine must persist with its goals of internal reform and alignment with Euro-Atlantic standards. In speaking at the opening of the meeting, Mr Rasmussen said “the national programme was an important step because it will help Ukraine to modernise, to the benefit of the Ukrainian people.” He added that the Alliance will continue to support Ukraine along that journey.

On September 9th, the European Security Round Table (ESRT www.security-round-table.eu) in cooperation with the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung organized its 4. Annual Conference 2009 on the “Integrated Approach − a more efficient EU foreign, security and defence policy”. The discussions on the Integrated Approach have brought up interesting insight regarding the necessity of a civil-military approach for tackling the upcoming challenges. A particularly interesting discussion was on potential changes of the procurement rules for civilian ESDP missions and a proposal to hold bilateral military exercises in BosniaHerzegovina, based on the experience of NATO's “Partnership for Peace” programme. The ESRT will pick up these issues again next year.

ESRT-Meeting at the devices of the Representation of Baden-Württemberg in Brussel. Photo: COPURA



List of authors and articles published in former editions






Baroness Taylor of Bolton ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps Bayer, Tomur The Role of Turkey for European Security Beer, Angelika MEP Interview: Is Energy a Factor of Instability for Europe ? Brok, Elmar MEP The European Parliament’s real influence on the CFSP Brook, John Interview: A plea for organized cooperation between transatlantic industries for Security and Defence Bruzek, Oliver European Industry is ready to close EU’s Capability Short falls − Example Transport Helicopters Budde, Hans-Otto Protection on Operations − The Army’s Protection Philosophy Bühl, Hartmut EU-NATO Relations − grave deficiencies Eyes in the sky to protect forces Cameron, Alastaire Testing Times for European Crisis Management Chizhov, Vladimir Russia and the European Security Dr. Enders, Thomas Interview: Airbus strives for open competition Favin Lévêque, Jacques, General (ret.) The French and Europe united in diversity D. F. Froh, Richard NATO Ballistic Missile Defence – a Capability for the Alliance and Protection for Europe Gayet, François The role of ASD in European Security and Defence Dr. von Goetze, Clemens The future of ESDP – Ways to improve European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Gray, Andrew Addressing helicopter shortage: EDA’s role Guillou, Hérvé Interview: A Natural Marriage – Conversation of the Civil and Military Security Market Hammer, Andreas A European Defence Market − from vision to reality Dr. Hellenthal, Markus Maritime Safety and Security as a Central Piller of a comprehensive Security Strategy Herteman, Jean-Paul Interview: A strong Base in Europe for Global Ambitions Höfer, Gerd MP Towards a European Army de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap NATO at 60 – Work ahead Iturrioz, Elvira Cortajarena MP Forces Protection − the soldier of the future Juraske, Ingo The role of industries in the provision of Secure Information Infrastructures for NATO and the EU Dr. Kõuts, Tarmo MP, Vice Admiral Cyber defence – the Estonian experience and how Europe can protect its societies Kujat, Harald NATO-Russia Relations: Press the Reset Button Laitinen, Ilkka Interview: Border Security: FRONTEX is operational and steadily improving Lambsdorff, Alexander Graf MEP The Defence Package: An important step towards a better ESDP Dr. Lazarevski, Pande Security Network Innovation − Macedonian’s Contribution to the European Union Leakey, David, Lt. General EU Military Staff and ESDP – a work in progress











Dr. Lutz, Reinhold ESDU No 1 Galileo – on Giant Leap for Europe ESDU No 2 Mahon, Tim Journalist Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy ESDU No 3 Dr. Margaras, Vasilis Working together, thinking differently? The cooperation amongst EU officials in ESDP missions Masseret, Jean-Pierre ESDU No 1 European Defence: Where do we go from here? ESDU No 3 Merrit, Giles Burying the hatchet in the EU-NATO turf war Milososki, Antonio ESDU No 3 The role and contribution of Macedonia in stabilizing the Balkans Nash, Patrick ESDU No 1 EUFOR Chad/RCA – Progress and Ongoing Success ESDU No 1 Ortega, Manuel Medina MEP Russia and the Defence of Europe Pack, Doris MEP ESDU No 3 What the European Union should do for the stability in the Balkans – the human factor Piebalgs, Andris ESDU No 3 A European energy policy for the 21st century Pirlet, André ESDU No 1 The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Pitarch, Pedro ESDU No 1 What Legitimacy for the EUROCORPS? ESDU No 1 Raab, Christoph The Politico- Military Organization of the European Union Raab, Christoph ESDU No 3 The European Parliament’s role in the EU decision-making process Rebuffi, Luigi ESDU No 1 The European Organization for Security (EOS) – Strategy ahead Sedivý, Jirí ESDU No 3 Improving NATO’s Expeditionary Capabilities Solana, Javier ESDU No 1 European Security and Climate Change Dr. Solaya, Milos ESDU No 3 Russia in the Balkans – traditional influence versus western interests Dr. Stehr, Michael ESDU No 2 ATALANTA − Europes first naval Anti-Piracy-Operation as part of ESDP Taylor, Adrian EUSG ESDU No 2 A European White Paper on Security and Defence is not sufficient Verheugen, Günter ESDU No 3 Internal market for the EU’s defence and security industries by 2012 Voigt, Karsten ESDU No 2 Interview: What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration Walter, Robert MP ESDU No 1 Realistic Structured Cooperation Procedures in the Field of Security and Defence Walter, Robert MP ESDU No 3 The ESDA, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Lisbon Treaty Weingarten, Bert ESDU No 3 Cyberwar – NATO’s exposed flank Dr. Paul Weissenberg ESDU No 1 The Role of the EU Security Research Weis, Alexander ESDU No 2 The European Defence Agency (EDA) Wenzler, Bernd ESDU No 2 Protecting our soldiers van de Winckel, Luc ESDU No 3 Can industries take the lead in filling the gap between defence and governments’ security? Dr. von Wogau, Karl MEP ESDU No 1 The Role of the European Parliament for Security and Defence




















































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