ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 12

Other Topics • NATO and th e EU • Protection

Maritime Security Photo: MC1 Cassandra Thompson/US Department of Defense

Worldwide cooperation for freedom of the seas

A governance for Europe in maritime affairs

Tunisian elections – first milestone on the long road to stability

Georgios Koumoutsakos MEP

Michael Gahler MEP

Edition 1/2012

EDITORIAL

Obituary according to the truth also struck a chord with the doubting societies in the free world of the West, where he came to be admired as a symbol for freedom.

Václav Havel is dead. He died shortly before Christmas at his country house in Hradecek, at the age of 75. Václav Havel was a “velvet” revolutionary, a fighter for human rights and democracy. He was a statesman of historic proportions and a great European.

Václav Havel

It was not Havel’s way to dwell on the past and to search for causes, but rather to forge ahead; for him it was all about a moral renewal of individuals and societies.

In 1978 the poet and playwright Havel 1936 – 2011 became the co-founder of and spokesman Václav Havel, the rebel with a will of for Charta 77, the dissident movement that iron, was President for 13 years. He was drew its inspiration from the signing of the not always understood in his own country. As a staunch Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Following an open letter addressed defender of democracy and human rights and with his ideas to the then President of Czechoslovakia, Husak, in which Havel about human and social renewal, Václav Havel was a respectblamed the regime for the moral crisis in society and accused ed figure in both East and West. The part he played in bringing it of contempt for human rights, he was declared an enemy of the two sides of Europe back together will be remembered the state and spent years in prison. This period shaped him long after his death. into a politician and he became the driving force behind the democratisation process in Eastern Europe. Václav Havel had the ability to stand both for power and morality, for politics and poetry and for the law and the human spirit. He did not crave power, believing rather in the strength of words and their power of conviction.

“He is the figure who represents the reunification of Europe”, said the then President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Busek, in his tribute to the late President. Havel was one of Europe’s great men.

Havel’s moral condemnation of totalitarianism as the cause of the crisis of humanity and his efforts to live differently and

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Editorial Deputy: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2011 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Emily B. Landau, Director of the arms control program, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University

Dr Henri-Paul Hude Philosopher and Director Center for Military Ethics, Coëtquidan

POLICY and POLITICS 3

Obituary by Hartmut Bühl

European Union: Half time in the European Parliament New leaders European Union: The Danish Presidency Documentation

Crises on Europe’s doorstep 20

Interview with Michael Gahler MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

Democratic elections in Tunisia – first milestone on the long road to stability The Tunisian example could serve as a model

Emily Landau, Tel Aviv

Facing Iran: Stepped-up pressure just might work First signs of impact

Europe and NATO 8

Dr Zdzislaw Najder, Warsaw

The uniqueness of Europe Credibility has replaced power

Security and Defence Policy 26

The future of common European security and defence policy – time for change Progress in the CSDP depends on nation’s willingness

Daniel Valéry, General (ret.), Paris

Reflections on the defence of Europe The role of European defence remains to be defined

Dr Henri-Paul Hude, Coëtquidan

Gert Verhellen, Brussels

Pierre Delsaux, Brussels

Commission Task Force on Defence Industry and Market Making better use of SMEs in the defence market

NATO’s new Strategic Concept and its use It is time for a new NATO

Jean-Paul Herteman, Paris

The European defence industry Europe should spend more wisely

A politico-philosophical analysis of NATO NATO’s importance for the EU

Arnaud Danjean MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Markus Kafurke, Nicholas Stone and Louis Tillier, Paris

Send for the Great Blue Fleet – EU Naval Diplomacy Europe’s vocation is at sea

Manfred Rosenberger, Soustons

Die for Europe or intervene for strictly national interests? A number of barriers remain to be overcome

Corine Caballero, Paris

Interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP – avenues for the future A framework for scrutiny

CONTENT

Jean Paul Herteman Chief Executive Officer, SAFRAN, Paris

Volker Smid, President Hewlett Packard Germany, Böblingen

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS Maritime Security

Protection

Georgios Koumoutsakos MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy – steps forward A strategic concept has to be the way forward

Dr Michael Stehr,Troisdorf

Bruno Reynaud de Sousa, Lisbon

Piracy: a phenomenon or a strategy? Piracy is a wider law enforcement challenge

Interview with Volker Smid, Böblingen

Providing Information Security is an ethical obligation The need to agree on the objectives and to act in unison

Magnus Ovilius,Brussels

Protecting global trade in transit – an industry perspective How to apply security measures

Lorenzo Fiori, Rome

Cross-sector collaboration on Cyber Security & Defence Finding an appropriate response

ATALANTA: an operational success in figures Pirates are still going strong

Anne -Cathrin Schreiber, Kassel

CBRNe Defence: an obligation to protect Europe’s citizens Fast detection is a priority

Hans-Jürgen Hohnen, Potsdam

New challenges in a new security environment Adaptable products with a high protection factor

Jennifer Gruber, Cassidian

Early detection enabling the effective protection of coastlines Creating information superiority

61 List of authors 2011

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Half time in the European Parliament

European Parliament elected new President and Vice-Presidents In January, MARTIN SCHULZ (S&D, DE) was elected NEW PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP). He will lead the EP for the next two and a half years until the end of the legislature in June 2014. His election resulted in the final change to the composition of the Conference of Presidents, the body that brings together Parliament’s president and political group leaders. The Parliament also elected 14 Vice-Presidents, and five Quaestors. The parliamentary committees elected their chairpersons and their deputies. photo: European Parliament

Vice-Presidents

› Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI): Chair: Matthias GROOTE (S&D, DE)

Conference of Presidents

› Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO): Chair: Malcolm HARBOUR (ECR, UK)

Joseph DAUL (FR), Chair of the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) Hannes SWOBODA (AT), Chair of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) Guy VERHOFSTADT (BE), Chair of the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Rebecca HARMS (DE) and Daniel COHN-BENDIT (FR), Co-Chairs of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) Martin CALLANAN (UK), Chair of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Lothar BISKY (DE), Chair of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left Francesco Enrico SPERONI (IT) and Nigel FARAGE (UK), Chairs of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD)

Quaestors Astrid LULLING (EPP, LU) Jim HIGGINS (EPP, IE) re-elected Lidia GERINGER DE OEDENBERG (S&D, PL) Bogusław LIBERADZKI (S&D, PL) Jir̆í MAS̆TÁLKA (GUE/NGL, CZ)

Committees

Gianni PITTELLA (S&D, IT) Miguel Angel MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ (S&D, ES) Anni PODIMATA (S&D, EL) Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS (EPP, ES) Georgios PAPASTAMKOS (EPP,EL) Roberta ANGELILLI (EPP,IT) Othmar KARAS (EPP, AT) Edward McMILLAN-SCOTT (ALDE, UK) re-elected Isabelle DURANT (Green/EFA, BE) Alexander ALVARO (ALDE, DE) Rainer WIELAND (EPP, DE) Oldr̆ich VLASÁK (ECR, CZ) Jacek PROTASIEWICZ (EPP, PL) László SURJÁN (EPP, HU)

› Constitutional Affairs (AFCO): Chair: Carlo CASINI (EPP, IT) › Foreign Affairs (AFET): Chair: Elmar BROK (EPP, DE) › Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI): Chair: Paolo DE CASTRO (S&D,IT) › Budgets (BUDG): Chair: Alain LAMASSOURE (EPP, FR) › Culture and Education (CULT): Chair: Doris PACK (EPP, DE) › Developmen t (DEVE): Chair: Eva JOLY (Greens/EFA, FR) › Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON): Chair: Sharon BOWLES (ALDE, UK) › Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL): Chair: Pervenche BERÈS (S&D, FR)

› International Trade (INTA): Chair: Vital MOREIRA (S&D, PT) › Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE): Chair: Amalia SARTORI (EPP,IT) › Legal Affairs (JURI): Chair: Klaus-Heiner LEHNE (EPP, DE) › Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE): Chair: Juan Fernando LÓPEZ AGUILAR (S&D, ES) › Fisheries (PECH): Chair: Gabriel MATO ADROVER (EPP, ES) › Regional Development (REGI): Chair: Danuta Maria HÜBNER (EPP, PL) › Transport and Tourism (TRAN): Chair: Brian SIMPSON (S&D, UK) › Budgetary Control (CONT): Chair: Michael THEURER (ALDE, DE) › Petitions (PETI): Chair: Erminia MAZZONI (EPP, IT) › Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM): Chair: Mikael GUSTAFSSON (GUE/NGL, SE)

Subcommittees › Security and defence (SEDE): Chair: Arnaud DANJEAN (EPP, FR) › Human rights (DROI): Chair: Barbara LOCHBIHLER (Greens/EFA, DE)

EUROPEAN UNION

Documentation Danish EU Presidency – Priorities for Europe Excerpts from the Presidency Programme “Europe at work” (Introduction) 1. A responsible Europe Sustainable growth as well as job creation require that Europe emerges safely from the crisis by pursuing a responsible policy, ensuring sustainable public finances and implementing the necessary structural reforms. At the European Council on 9 December 2011, a number of important decisions were taken with respect to enhancing fiscal policy discipline with the aim of securing economic stability in Europe. During the Danish Presidency, work will need to be done on implementing these decisions in order to enhance fiscal policy and economic coordination as part of the short-term and longterm efforts to tackle the debt crisis. Similarly, a key goal of the Danish Presidency will be to ensure the consistent implementation of the first full European Semester and the measures adopted earlier to strengthen economic governance, also based on a strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and a new cooperation on addressing the economic imbalances and common requirements of national budget rules. The negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU budget for the period 2014-2020 will be one of the largest single issues for the Presidency. The new EU budget must reflect the present economic situation and focus on the areas where the EU can make a difference. The goal will be to conclude the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework by the end of 2012. The Danish Presidency will strive to move negotiations forward and thereby prepare the ground for the final negotiations. 2. A dynamic Europe The return of growth and higher employment to Europe must be secured in both the short and long term. The Single Market is a cornerstone of EU cooperation, which over the last two decades has tied Europe together and created increased growth and prosperity. More than ever we need a sustainable Single Market that creates jobs and stability as well as prosperity for Europeans and companies in the EU. Growth in Europe requires the further development of the Single Market in a way that benefits both citizens and companies, and it also requires that we strengthen education, research, innovation, gender equality and the European labour market. The Single Market must be a dynamic single market that is digital, innovative and requires creative solutions. It should constitute a strong basis for leading high-tech companies and create more green jobs. Lastly, the EU must use its economic strength to open new international market opportunities and to promote free and fair trade, thereby enhancing the growth of European companies. 3. A green Europe Europe should promote the transition to a green economy and enhance its focus on sustainability. This requires enhanced efforts to bring about this transition and tackle the rising problems of environmentally harmful production methods, over-utilisation of important natural resources and climate change. The EU must strive to achieve its climate and energy targets regarding increased energy efficiency by 2020 as well as expansion of renewable energy, enhanced energy efficiency and a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Action must be taken to formulate an effective and green

Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt with the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, in Denmark, 11 January 2012 Photo: audiovisual service©European Union 2012 “In a globalised world, only a joint European effort will be truly effective. To ensure the safety and freedoms of our citizens. To combat terrorism and cross-border crime. To manage our borders. To establish a well-functioning European Asylum System. Beyond our own region, the EU’s voice must be heard even more clearly as we promote our common values and protect our interests. The Presidency will support and assist the High Representative and the European External Action Service.” The Danish Prime Minister during her speech in the European Parliament, 18 January 2012

transport policy, common green standards in the Single Market and the widespread adoption of sustainable consumption and production patterns. An agricultural sector that embraces environmentally, nature and climate-friendly farming methods is also part of the solution. Similarly, action is to be taken to bring about a sustainable reform of the EU fisheries policy. The funds for research and development within the environmental and energy sector must be increased. Lastly, the Presidency will also work towards ensuring a strong European voice at the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. 4. A safe Europe The safety of citizens and Europe’s international influence in a globalised world is most effectively promoted and safeguarded through joint efforts and strong European cooperation. Europe’s international influence within security, trade and development must be maintained. The Member States must enhance cooperation regarding a well managed asylum and migration policy as well as regarding effective action to fight and prevent both terrorism and cross-border crime. The Danish Presidency will support the wish of EU neighbouring countries for closer cooperation, including access to EU markets, and contribute to ensuring that the enlargement process continues as a responsible enlargement policy. The Presidency will actively support EU institutions and Member States in their efforts to strengthen the EU’s global role. Lastly, the Danish Presidency will actively work towards ensuring that the European External Action Service (EEAS) becomes a strong and effective actor and towards securing better coherence between the EU’s policy within the sectors affecting developing countries. source:Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU, www.eu2012.dk

The European Union has for a long time overestimated its political and military potential in the area of security and defence. For most Member States NATO continues to take priority. The recent change in US strategy, with a major shift of security and defence interest to the Pacific region, calls for a serious discussion not only about EU-NATO relations, but also capabilities.

We must preserve the culture and structures of cooperation and solidarity

The uniqueness of Europe by Dr Zdzisław Najder, Warsaw The current crisis of the eurozone has become a crisis of the Union, the most serious since 1945. Some, like Dr Nile Gardiner of Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Washington, DC, believe that the case is terminal. Europe may have a future as a free trade area, but an integrated Europe with a common currency is a phantom invented by politicians. Thus, according to Eurosceptics, many of them gleeful, all present efforts to solve the problems within the EU structures are doomed to failure. Most European politicians prefer to believe that the crisis, not the first the community has passed through, should be taken as a call for reform.

Back to the basics of the European Union What is certain in my view is that the crisis ought to force all of us to go back to the basics, to ask the fundamental questions: what is the EU for? What are the alternatives? A year ago at the annual Forum at Klingenthal,* I said: “Con-

Dr Zdzisław Najder Dr Zdzisław Najder is a Professor of the Humanities (philosophy, literature) and a civic activist. He is President of the Joseph Conrad Society (Poland) and of the Weimar Club. Born in 1930 in Warsaw, he studied philosophy and Polish literature in Warsaw, and later on philosophy at Oxford University. He has taught at several European and US Universities. In early 1976, in Poland, he secretly founded the PPN (Polskie Porozu-mienie; Niepodległościowe / Polish League for National Independence), a group which published a political programme postulating Poland’s full sovereignty and democracy. He was also Advisor to the Polish underground movement “Solidarity” (1982-89). In 1984 he was sentenced to death (in abstentia) in Warsaw. After the annulment of his sentence he returned to Poland in February 1990.

temporary Europeans rarely realise the importance of the date of 18 April 1951. On that day, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands signed the treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community. Ever since (and let us hope, forever) an armed conflict between the Member States has become impossible − not only legally, but practically. This happened for the first time in European history. For the first time in the history of all continents, in fact.” The Founding Fathers wanted to eliminate violence, and not only in military, but also in economic and political forms, from the relations between European countries. Differences and conflicts of interests will not disappear, but will have to be settled not by that most traditional means: force, or a threat to use it, but by negotiations and compromises. Power will be harnessed for cooperation and solidarity. Thus, what was created sixty years ago was not the result of a “natural”, spontaneous development. It was, and remains to this day, a piece of a new, consciously created human reality: against Darwin, against the laws of nature, of which the law of the jungle is the purest form. This new entity will not grow like a wild tree – because it is artificial. Artificial in the same profoundly human sense as Mathias Grünewald’s Isenheim altarpiece in Colmar is artificial, or as are the spires of the Strasbourg cathedral. We have to tend them, look after them carefully, so they will not be damaged by the natural vagaries of climate and time.

The EU was developed on stony ground For three thousand years of its recorded history wars and strife were the staple of our continent. On this stony ground we have developed the EU, which is historically and geographically a unique institution. No other assembly of sovereign nations has ever tried something like that and on such a scale. All conflicts have to be settled by the use of argument. Of course,

Photo: Pawel Kabanski / flickr.com

Europe and NATO

EUROPE AND NATO

the arguments of, say, Germany carry more weight than those of, say, Portugal – but still they are arguments grounded in political credibility, not physical threats. In fact, credibility has replaced power as a measure of importance of particular states. We can and ought to be proud of this unique contribution to global history. But it has to be safeguarded. In the last issue of the Revue du Défense Nationale Pierre Hassner reminds us of von Clausewitz’s words that war [= violence not regulated by law] is like a chameleon: it changes shape.

New decision-making rules are necessary In 1951 economic means were used to achieve political ends. But later these economic means were left, more or less, to their own institutional resources. Too much, as we see now, has remained exposed to particular interests and to market forces – which are a part of Darwinian nature (and would not produce a single ramp for the handicapped). As early as in 1997 Jacques Delors warned of forthcoming trouble, if monetary integration was not supplemented with structures coordinating the economic policies of member countries. Now on 16 December the heads of 26 governments agreed that an immediate amendment is necessary, in the form of intergovernmental agreements. Presently, the needed communal institutions do not exist or are too weak. Decisions still have to be taken by national governments. We ought to assess new decision-making rules from the point of view of their purpose, which is to facilitate concerted development. Our purpose remains: to preserve the culture and structures of cooperation and solidarity. And the logical means is: an ever closer union!

The EU – a unique phenomenon We are sometimes at a loss how to define this unique phenomenon. We all share the Charter of Fundamental Rights and participate in the common market; most of us share frontiers, the currency, etc. But the word “federation” is at the same time attractive, scary and misleading. I believe we should stop trying to put a classifying stamp on our Union. It is unique, and it shall remain sui generis. A fitting formula is “imagined community”. Benedict Anderson famously used it as a definition of “nation”. I think one day we shall be ready to apply it to the EU.

* Klingenthal is the place south of Strasbourg where each year, under the auspices of CIDAN (Association CIVISME-DEFENSE-ARMEE-NATION) and in cooperation with the Fondation pour le progress de l’homme (FPH), Charles Léopold Mayer, the Goethe Institute brings together a number of European personalities in order to reflect upon the different aspects of Europe.

EUROPE AND NATO

The European countries have specific common interests to defend as well as their own priorities

Reflections on Europe’s defence by General (ret.) Daniel Valéry, Paris* be confined to the Petersberg tasks 1 and that collective deOur societies are confronted with a multitude of threats and it is vital to protect them by means of an effective security and fence is the responsibility of NATO alone would be to accept defence policy. Such a policy must be based on a continually leading our European peoples into a serious dead end in the updated assessment of potential risks and threats and give future. Clearly what is missing in the way our defence is organrise to a range of practical provisions defining objectives and ised is an intermediate level between the national defence and structures, the means of obtaining intelligence and of interNATO that is complementary to, not in competition with, the vention and the mode of action. two other levels and which is responsible for dealing with The possible scenarios vary widely in nature and scale. The exceptional situations that cannot otherwise be resolved. necessary responses will vary accordingly; and their effectiveness will depend on: Structured cooperation for Europe • a good analysis of the situation; The European countries have specific common interests to • a rapid and targeted response; defend as well as their own priorities, which means that they • the deployment of the right human and material resources to must have a sufficient capacity for autonomous decision-makresolve the problem at hand. ing and action and be recognised as influential players on the Those resources will comprise, first and foremost, existing and international stage. They are best placed to assess the risks immediately available capabilities (police, fire brigade, civil and threats that concern them directly and to determine how protection forces, active forces to counter them. Finally, in etc.) adapted to a given level of the event of aggression they risks and threats. An exception“Defence policy cannot be confined to dealing must be capable of swift al situation that those first-levautonomous action, either with the challenges of the moment.” el forces cannot cope with will pending NATO action and require exceptional measures, complementary to it, or such as intervention by national reserve forces, which must be even as a temporary substitute for it, especially in cases where planned for, or by external players, ranging from neighbouring NATO is engaged in other theatres. countries to larger players such as the European Union or In fact the advantages of such an intermediate level of defence NATO. are accepted in principle. In the past it led to the concept of the European pillar of the Alliance and more recently to the concept entrenched in the various draft treaties of “structured Graduated response cooperation” bringing together European states wishing to be A graduated response would appear to be the obvious solupart of a defence community. tion in order to deal with natural or technological risks, but seems to pose a problem when it comes to defence. Every One may wonder why those concepts have so far failed to be state fully understands that it has the first responsibility to act translated into reality. That anomaly can be explained by the when it is the target of an attack (by terrorists, for example), fact that the process of European integration has not given even though it may afterwards receive external support. The defence the place it deserves and has allowed the developconcept of a national defence therefore remains inviolable and ment of major divergences among the Member States, leading is naturally accepted by governments, which consider themto an aberrant situation in which European participation in selves responsible for the security of their citizens. international stabilisation operations conducted by the Union In the case of an attack against the Alliance as a whole, it is of under the CSDP is seen as totally separate from a European course up to NATO to play its role in coordinating the engagedefence stricto sensu. Indeed, the latter has been almost ment of its Member States’ forces. totally neglected due to countries’ inability to agree on a Another possible scenario is a more limited attack against European collective defence responsibility. several European states that does not affect all Alliance memThis situation encourages the official line according to which bers. In that case the countries concerned need to be capable the CSDP and NATO together cover the full range of Europe’s of an autonomous response, in particular when the United defence requirements; this is a misleading and dangerous States is not immediately available or has other priorities. notion that owes its popularity to the fact that it is politically It would be risky to rule out such a scenario. Indeed, to claim so convenient. that EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

NATO is an inherited instrument, not well adapted to curr How a European level of defence can be organised? It is difficult for the European Union to provide the solution, given that a non-negligible number of its Member States reject the idea of a European defence, having opted either to remain neutral or to leave it up to NATO alone to protect their citizens and interests. It has to be admitted that the EU today is not a real political union and that it is unlikely to become one in the near future. The solution is to be found in an intergovernmental structure embodying the notion of structured cooperation and bringing together those EU Member States that wish to participate in and are prepared to contribute to a European defence. Such a sub-group within the Union, with autonomy in its field of responsibility, could logically have been built on the basis of WEU (Western European Union, an organisation founded in 1954 and composed of ten full Member States bound by a collective defence clause). Unfortunately, that possibility was recently lost when it was decided to wind up WEU in 2011 without making any provision for a new structure that could form the basis for structured cooperation in the area of defence.

The CSDP needs a long-term vision The prospect of finding an appropriate response to the need for a European defence still looks remote; success hinges essentially on how much interest the political authorities of the states concerned are prepared to take in it. Defence policy cannot be confined to dealing with the challenges of the moment. It must also look ahead to potential threats in the short, medium and long term. In light of the current situation defence authorities should: • acknowledge the current gaps in our collective defence and bring them to the attention of citizens, who must not be left in the dark about the conditions of their security; • set about remedying the shortcomings identified at European level by adopting a solution along the lines of structured cooperation and by launching an immediate, albeit informal, process of reflection among European states that so desire about the risks and threats to be taken on board and the practical cooperation to be organised among them.

A politico-philosophical an

by Dr Henri-Paul Hude, Philosopher and Director of the Center for M (Edit.) NATO is the armed branch of the liberal empire. But now, given the weakened credibility of the United States as the sole global power and the challenges to its global liberal policy, there is a need for a new global power to co-lead, in order to provide genuine long-term global peace and security. Europe will remain a nonentity if it does not turn itself into a security and defence community. Europe can and must emerge from NATO. The role of philosophy is to pose, in a non-provocative and impartial fashion, essential questions that are all too easily avoided. If the experts in the matter are to be believed, the NATO “machine” is currently indispensable for the security of its European members as well as for a degree of global stability, to the extent that both call for military action by a coalition. Indeed, such operations require an international headquarters and global operational military capabilities. NATO, for the moment, is the only machine that fits the bill. But this poses a number of questions.

Is NATO necessary for peace? The objective need for NATO goes hand in hand with a more subjective sense of its necessity that is doubtless due to the sympathy or antipathy underlying our political preferences, but also to the impression that no-one any more is entitled to assert an opinion, take a decision or launch an initiative outside of the general consensus. It is not easy to determine how much of that consensus can be attributed to a concern for coordination and how much is due to the psychological collectivism induced by a relativist approach.

“One cannot imagine a political union that is not first and foremost a defence community” Henri-Paul Hude, Coëtquidan

* General Valery was Military Governor of Paris from 1989 to 1992. 1 The Petersberg tasks, adopted in 1992 in Petersberg (near Bonn) by the WEU Member States, define the defence missions that those countries were prepared to conduct together. The concept was taken over by the EU, whose Member States include the former WEU countries, and gradually incorporated into the different EU treaties, in particular the Lisbon Treaty adopted on 13 December 2007. They comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

Notwithstanding the most recent extensions of its role, NATO’s prime task remains the defence of the western democracies. However, psychological collectivism and politically correct relativism have become a danger for the critical faculties and capacity for crisis-resolution of democracies, as well as for their security and futures. Hence there would be a serious problem if their security institutions were shaped, if only in part, by a culture that posed a threat to democracy.

EUROPE AND NATO

ent requirements, but it would be disastrous to abandon this alliance

nalysis of NATO

Military Ethics, Coëtquidan

Without peace, no solutions to the major problems The first component of the universal common good is world peace. For if there is peace, the enormous problems facing humankind can perhaps be resolved; without peace they surely cannot be, unless we consider war as the great leveller. The answer in order to establish universal peace cannot be simply to set up a kind of police force capable of prohibiting war, which becomes a criminal offence. Such a solution would merely reproduce at international level the system that applies at the level of a state. The power of the state puts an end to violence by disarming specific groups and imposing upon them as a natural law a culture of peace (Hobbes). Similarly, the power of the empire puts an end to inter-state violence by disarming states or depriving them of their freedom of action and imposing upon them the culture of a truly universal peace.

Dr Henri-Paul Hude Henri Hude is a philosopher and director of the Center for Military Ethics at the Research Center of the Saint-Cyr Military Academy, Coetquidan. He studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure , Paris and earned his doctoral and postdoctoral degrees from the University of the Sorbonne (Paris-IV). He taught as a professor at the John Paul II Institute in Rome and has been a senior research fellow at the US Naval Academy (Annapolis, 2010). He served as headmaster of Stanislas College ,Paris He is a member of the board of directors of the European session of the International Society of Military Ethics of which he was the founder. Henri Hude is the author of numerous works. His Ethique des décideurs, 2004, was awarded (2005 Prix Montyon) by the Académie Française. His last book is Démocratie durable. Penser la guerre pour faire l’Europe (Enduring Democracy.

What is NATO’s authority? In such a system, NATO is indeed the equivalent of the police force or imperial guard, whose job is to impose “natural law” by checking all aspirations for independent action by political gangsters (dictators, nationalists, fanatics, racists, etc.). The Hobbesian imperial solution would call for the institution of a world authority assisted by an appropriate force. Considering the mortal danger that a major war today would represent for mankind, one cannot totally refute the relevance of a solution in which peace is imposed by the empire. Yet when one tries to imagine mankind united and at peace under a single imperial power, one feels a different kind of unease and dissatisfaction that cannot be dismissed either. - There are different kinds of imperial power: The authoritarian empire of a state; the UN is a “democratic” approach to the same problem. - The universal liberal empire, in association or not with the UN solution. That liberal empire may be more or less realistic and authoritarian. NATO is the army of that liberal empire, in association or not with the UN. The authoritarian imperial solution is a nightmare; the UN solution is appealing, but too weak; the liberal imperial solution is tolerable in the absence of a better solution, but remains rather frustrating. NATO perceives itself as part of the solution to the problem of violence in the world in the context of a peace policy imposed by the liberal empire, and secondarily by the UN.

What is the role of the EU? If a political union is above all a defence community, a military alliance is in essence a political alliance. In a military alliance that is more than a simple coalition, political communities

agree to engage, up to a point, in a relationship of mutual trust and sacrifice. A real political community, such as a nation, is by definition a mutual defence alliance that its members will fight to protect. One cannot imagine a political union that is not first and foremost a defence community. This is of crucial importance for NATO, because the debate about its enlargement (in geographic terms and in terms of its missions) quite simply signifies that for some people it was no more than a temporary coalition that should have disappeared after the collapse of the soviet empire, while for others the Alliance is a transatlantic political community that necessarily has an existence of its own.

Europe’s place within NATO Since the EU is not a defence community, it is by no means paradoxical to state that NATO is politically superior to the European Union. Hence, if one wishes Europe to be more than NATO, politically speaking, then it has to be a military alliance, whatever relations that hypothetical alliance may have with NATO. Political Europe, if it is to exist, has to be first and foremost an alliance. NATO exists, and political Europe enjoys a minimal existence within NATO, like an unborn child inside its mother. If a subgroup within NATO becomes autonomous, we have a sub-alliance within the Alliance. And if Europe (the term can only refer to certain European countries) indeed becomes a genuine military alliance that is more than a coalition (or economic interest group), then it exists de facto politically. NATO doubtless provides the true matrix for Europe, which can and must

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

exist, because the United States is no longer strong enough on its own to guarantee the future of democracy, even in the US.

The hegemon and its interests The US, whether it likes it or not, has to understand that it can only rely on an entity that is capable of resisting it. If one wants allies, one must treat them as such; it is a matter not of politeness, but of accepting that the other should be a power in its own right. If in such a context of freedom one wants allies that are useful in times of real crisis, then one must accept the risk associated with their power and freedom. And one has to be pretty sure of oneself not to want such allies! Europe If Europe existed, it would, just like the United States or China, have duties other than only that of defending itself. It would also have to help keep order in the world: it would have to exercise co-leadership. A policy of peace is a policy of power, law and peace. And an alliance only makes sense if it exercises political power, the very power that can be monstrous if wielded unjustly and which, when exercised justly and at the appropriate level is the essence of politics itself. It is therefore not unusual for a military alliance to take a practical interest in all aspects of politics, from the angle of defence. NATO and the US NATO is an instrument for exercising the imperial (liberal) function assumed by the United States. The question with regard to NATO’s future is therefore: what will be the power of the United States in the future? For a long time the US benefited from an exceptionally strong internal moral consensus. But that is no longer the case. The free world trade that is necessary for the imperial (liberal) approach leads to an erosion of the middle classes, undermining the foundations for any stable democracy and destroying the cohesion of such an imperial (liberal) policy. And without an empire, the US will be hard put to maintain its global economic and monetary position and hence the prosperity of its middle classes. Caught up in that contradiction it has so far managed by increasing the public debt, but that approach has now reached its limits. The centre of gravity of its population has shifted towards ethnic groups that are a long way from its democratic traditions. This negatively affects its economic model, political make-up and liberal empire, as well as its social balance and cultural unity. For all these reasons the US no longer meets the criteria for exercising, on its own, its imperial (liberal) responsibilities, in conditions that are reassuring for others. The result sooner or later has to be a major crisis within NATO. America is distancing itself from Europe as its strategic and economic focus shifts more towards the Pacific region. The US realises that it is obliged to make choices, to encourage the

European countries to rearm and to reorganise themselves independently, and to leave them in charge of certain theatres. For these reasons it no longer seems reasonable for the European countries to rely on the United States and NATO for their defence, even though NATO continues to be indispensable as a kind of political matrix for Europe.

Universalism versus globalism Underlying all major military questions are political issues and must be approached from a universal standpoint. Such “universalism” is not naïve idealism. Clearly, to focus on the universal common good is rare: almost everywhere, not least of all in the hegemon itself, it is the national interest that prevails. And if military questions continue to pose themselves so acutely, it is because violence is deeply rooted in every human being. Universalism must not be confused with what is known as “globalism” and for which, above and beyond the populist criticism, a precise definition exists. “Globalist” politics claims to be an integral part of democracy in theory but leads in practice to the disappearance of genuine democracy by destroying the middle classes and the demographics of the oldest democracies. “Democracy” is gradually reduced to the power exercised by an ideological elite that it is impossible to control or remove and that, so it is claimed, has sole legitimacy as the only enlightened, progressive and liberating force. The definition of a universalist policy that exceeds globalism is a prerequisite for a revival of political life in the western democracies. If the democratic powers that exercise the “imperial function” were to conduct a different universalist policy, there would still be a place for NATO, or at least for a “NATO function”. Hence the question we must ask is: what should be the task of such an institution? Thus NATO is not an institution that would by definition necessarily serve to impose a “globalist” policy, even if today, operating under the control of such a policy, it cannot avoid being used for its implementation.

Conclusion NATO is an inherited instrument that is perhaps no longer well adapted to requirements, but which we should certainly not get rid of, even if its future usefulness depends on conditions that are not met today. NATO is the armed branch of the liberal empire. The United States’ weakened credibility and the contradictions inherent in its traditional global liberal policy call for the emergence of a new global partner with which to exercise the liberal function, and that partner for the moment can only be Europe. Europe will be above all a defence community, an alliance, or will remain a political nonentity. NATO can provide the matrix for political Europe. Such a political vision can form the basis on which to address other issues such as NATO enlargement, its missions, etc.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A more “neutral” concept for the Alliance needs to be defined

NATO’s new Strategic Concept and its use by Gert Verhellen, M.C.J., Attorney-at-law, Brussels NATO changed its concept in 2010, leaving its Treaty untouched but modifying its Strategic Concept, which should, according to NATO, serve as its road map for the next ten years. This may be too long, as at the present time the NATO Concept does not seem to be completely in step with the public’s perception.

Changed global situation The global situation has changed in comparison to the geopolitical situation at the origin of NATO, most definitely as far as the continent of western Europe is concerned. It might be useful to list some differences between the current situation and the one in 1949, the year in which the NATO Treaty was signed. The open struggle between the communist and capitalist-inspired economies and between democratically-elected governments and the dictatorial political systems of the period just after the Second World War, with the control of the West European continent (and the British Isles) at stake, was decided in favour of a democratic system formally styled on the western systems and especially in favour of a capitalist system, albeit with more or less social market components. The political vision struggle has subsided; the economic power struggle lingers on but has been deprived of its political aspect. Basically, it comes down to a struggle between any states concerned merely to defend their national interests, irrespective of fundamentally different political visions.

Multiplicity of upcoming powers Thus the geopolitical situation has changed in so far as the duopoly of political concepts has been replaced basically by one (capitalist-inspired) system under the explicit lead of the US, the only remaining superpower, but economically a multitude of ascending and descending powers exist, which at some point in time might match each other’s strength. In the forties and the fifties there were direct borders between the two major opponents and there was a direct threat of a military invasion by the communist-ruled countries, in order to impose their political and economic model; this is not likely anymore as no alternative to the democratic political model is

at hand. Given that the NATO Concept focuses on mutual assistance in the event of one member being directly attacked (a reaction) as opposed, for example, to supporting a wilful deed on the part of one of its members (an action), NATO in principal played a passive role, limited to preparing for a worst-case scenario (Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty). This idea is not new: the Attic Sea Alliance in ancient Greece did exactly the same to confront Trojan power.

Mutual assistance This is in line with the UN Treaty, where only the UN Security Council is entitled to decide on an active role or intervention. This concept seems to have been modified since the nineties, as political NATO has been depoliticised (not opposed to the communist system anymore) and at the same time has become an instrument for US foreign policy in particular. This started during the intervention in Kosovo; the KLA was armed to fight the Serbian forces, but then refused to hand its weapons in and the army (in Europe, on the continent) had to be called in, in the form of NATO troops, with German participation in particular. However, since France’s full participation in NATO, this tendency has been reduced. The US later tried to free itself of its obligations under the NATO Treaty, perceived as an encumbrance, for example by not taking advantage of the help of NATO members following the 9/11 attack on its territory, although they had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. And this happened, by the way, at an incredible speed, for anyone who has previously attended similar meetings during the yearly NATO exercises.

A shift in US geopolitical objectives The US has the tendency periodically to act unilaterally in matters of common interest, including, for example, by using the concept of a “pre-emptive strike”, which is not foreseen in the UN Treaty, to which Art. 1 of the Washington Treaty refers. Whereas under President Kennedy it was considered that there were two equal partners on either side of the Atlantic, this no longer appears to be the case. Furthermore, since the fall of the Berlin Wall the US focus has moved from Western Europe to Asia, a shift that was materi-

News: NATO Defence ministers support Smart Defence On 2 February, NATO Defence Ministers discussed in Brussels ways to make a maximum use of limited financial resources in

times of economic austerity. Ministers agreed on cooperating more on multinational initiatives and looking into areas where

Smart Defence would make a difference, including surveillance and reconnaissance, logistics and training.

EUROPE AND NATO

alised by the subsequent withdrawal of US military hardware from Western Europe for use in the Gulf Wars. This shift together with a strong (political) commitment to NATO, was confirmed by President Obama during a speech at the Pentagon on 5 January 2012.

The consequences for NATO’s Strategic Concept Even the “new NATO” of 1999 and the Strategic Concept of November 2010, which hierarchically speaking comes under the Washington Treaty, cannot really bring the NATO concept of a passive defence alliance, directed principally against the communist Soviet Union (with a big Russian input), into line with reality, as the name and concept stick too closely to the initial concept. Apparently, the idea of joining NATO seems to be very difficult for the Kremlin to accept, despite all previous efforts and the proclaimed “open door”. Capabilities NATO capabilities, according to the Strategic Concept, are used “to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations”, thus for non-defensive purposes and overseas, such as for the recent action in Libya (this time without a visible role of the US, however). This amalgamation, especially for continental Europe, is not acceptable, at least not in the long term, and might even cause an alienation of the original NATO purpose of collective defence. Basically the new role seems not yet to be sufficiently democratically legitimised within Europe. Enlargement NATO enlargement might have been strongly desired by Poland and the Baltic States (especially for emotional/psychological reasons), but NATO’s ultimate goal is not at stake anymore, as the previous enemy is no longer there. There is still a strong desire for NATO in Turkey, although the relationship with other members and the US in particular seems recently to have become cooler. One reason could be the use of NATO as an attempted gateway into the EU, as happened some years ago. Taking into account the reactions in Moscow, where NATO enlargement is perceived as an unfriendly move (to say the least) and thus counterproductive to cooperation and stability within Europe, as there and in the rest of Europe, “NATO” is still closely and exclusively linked to the Cold War era. A further enlargement of NATO in order to block a strengthening of the EU might be a legitimate goal of the US (endorsed by the UK) but has nothing to do with this passive defence alliance and its possible strengthening. Out-of-area perceptions and perspectives The operations in Afghanistan and more recently in Libya are perceived by the public at large as quite far removed from NATO’s initial concept. The leading nations in these operations

are not the same and do not share their military and other means on a big scale. The perception is that these actions are conducted by NATO in order to make use of existing tools (command and control, infrastructure etc.) rather than because these missions are an obvious part of its political mission. In order to bring this perception into line with reality, the basic (political) concept of NATO (the Washington Treaty), i.e. mutual assistance in the event of an attack against one of the partners, could be lifted into a separate organisation that is politically oriented rather than operational, and without a big infrastructure. The nuclear capability could possibly remain on that level.

A new form of NATO In order to use current NATO assets (personnel, know-how and infrastructure) for UN and NATO missions, a redefinition of the organisation’s goal in the direction of a more “neutral” (different from “passive”) concept would appear to be necessary and could also pave the way for bringing in more partners. In this way the organisation might become proactive (e.g. in line with the Strategic Concept: in order to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations), rather than solely reacting. As for its name, “North Atlantic Conflict Settlement Organisation” or “United Nations Conflict Settlement Organisation” or something similar might fit. Such a change, of course, will require a political decision by the parliaments of the different NATO Member States. But all existing NATO capabilities, for example in Washington, could be kept in place. However, it would in effect leave all other members in a position to rethink their direct contributions, possibly at a minimum level with an ad hoc increase in the field according to the needs of the moment, in order to enable operations. But this is not a major change as compared with the current situation. The military contributions of the continental EU countries, for example, could take the form of joint brigades etc.

Gert Verhellen Gert Verhellen is a partner in the Brussels-based law firm VERHELLEN-JOSEPH. He is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Belgian reserve forces. He started his career as a professional officer of the Tank Corps, based in Germany. He finished law school with a master in business economics (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) in 1990 and Master of Comparative Jurisprudence in 1991 (New York University). As a reserve officer, he was a. o. attached to the Belgian delegation to the NATO HQ before being attached to the Belgian General Headquarters’ Legal Service.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A Great Blue Fleet of EU Navies on a global deployment would be a strong symbol of unity and intent

Send for the Great Blue Fleet – EU Naval Diplomacy by Markus Kafurke, Nicholas Stone and Louis Tillier, Commanders, Students at the Ecole de Guerre, Paris (Edit.) The US became a true world actor at the start of the 20th century symbolised by the success of the 1907 Great White Fleet deployment. Now that the EU has its own Foreign service, a Great Blue Fleet of EU Navies on a global deployment would be a similarly strong symbol of unity and intent. What is more, existing infrastructure makes such a task eminently feasible. Three students, all Naval Commanders at the French Ecole de Guerre in Paris, have been designing a more than interesting picture how Europe could not only win profile and credibility in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also create a powerful component of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) protecting Europe’s interest at the sea. The proposal made by a British, French and German commander could shape Lady Ashton’s European External Action Service (EEAS) and means in a broader military sense an implementation in the best sense of Pooling and Sharing of capabilities by minimizing cost. Might nations be prepared to go in this direction or are they still prisoner of their national ambition? On the 1st December 2011 the Lisbon Treaty entered its 3rd year in force. Baroness Catherine Ashton was appointed as the first High Representative, a post that also carries the portfolio of Vice President of the European Commission as well as head of the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS). The rise in importance of this service has been progressive, with its work extending beyond the often cited diplomatic sphere into security policy, ensuring the EU continues the work strands started by the Petersburg missions

Markus Kafurke Born in 1971 near Frankfurt/M., Commander Markus Kafurke joined the German Navy in 1990. After his flight training in the United States, he served as a helicopter pilot, deploying on frigates during multi-national exercises as well as mandated operations. His last posting was to the German Naval Office in Rostock, where he worked on the integration of helicopters and aviation facilities on board surface ships. He is currently in Paris for Advanced Staff Training on the 19th Promotion of the Ecole de Guerre.

(1991) and confirmed by the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Lisbon (2007). These missions vary from simple advisory and military assistance to crisis management and conflict prevention, yet military missions under the EU banner are very low profile, in stark contrast to the real weight and influence, at least in terms of population and GDP, that the Union has at its disposal. The best known EU military mission is the Counter Piracy operation ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia, in support of the World Food Program, yet even this is more of a policing role using military means.

Military forces in the spirit of the EU Construct One explanation for the EU’s failure to project itself militarily stems from its founding; an economic union of former adversaries in the spirit of “never again” rather than a union to counter a military threat. To the concept of a common market were added other pillars, including defence and security, and the EU took a broad spectrum approach to global crisis management with the option of military force as but one part, albeit with little clout. But does this equate to a failing? How can we best use the respective militaries within the spirit of the EU construct? The Great White fleet marks exit of U.S. isolation To ignore this question would be to misunderstand the many uses of a nation’s Armed Forces as a force for good. The first half of the 20th Century witnessed the rise of the USA to a true global power. In 1907, as the head of a country on the up and

Nicholas Stone Born in 1976 near Bristol, England, Lieutenant Commander Nicholas Stone joined the Royal Navy in January 1999. Specializing as a Logistics Officer, he has served at sea in Frigates, Submarines, Aircraft Carriers and for the Flag Officer Sea Training, and ashore in the Navy Command HQ. His last assignment was to the UK’s Joint Force Support HQ in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, before moving to Paris for Advanced Staff Training on the 19th Promotion of the Ecole de Guerre.

Louis Tillier Born in 1975 in Roubaix, Commander Louis Tillier joined the French Navy in 1995. Specialising as an operations officer, he has served at sea in frigates, a submarine and amphibious ships. His last assignment was as commanding officer of the mine hunter Orion, in Toulon, from December 2009 to June 2011. He is now in Paris for Advanced Staff Training on the 19th Promotion of the Ecole de Guerre.

EUROPE AND NATO

part, be easily overcome, especially considering that of the 27 EU members, 21 are also in NATO. In order to make a Fleet a credible force rather than a simple gimmick, it would need representation in sufficient strength from across the Union commensurate with the desired effects. During port visits it would represent the EU and could support the EEAS by hosting official visitors. In a similar vein, it would be an excellent backdrop for the promotion of the European defence industry German frigates on a surveillance mission Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Michael Starkey as well as the merchant marine. Port visits would need to be targeted to maximise the development of EU relations with partners and regional organoften underestimated, President Theodore Roosevelt isations. One can already envisage a route from Europe’s despatched a naval force, entitled “The Great White Fleet” on neighbours (Russia and the eastern/southern Mediterranean) a circumnavigation of the globe. The 19 warships, all painted to the maritime and emerging nations (China, India, Brazil, white (perhaps as a symbol of peaceful intent), covered some Japan) and the seats of regional or international organisations 80.000km and visited 20 countries, including Mexico, Brazil, (New York for the UN, Jakarta for ASEAN (Association of South Chile, Japan, China, New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, Sri East Asian Nations), Singapore for APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Lanka, Egypt and Turkey. They were on hand to deliver assisCooperation), Montevideo for MERCOSUR (South American tance in the aftermath of the 1908 Sicilian earthquake in a Common Market) and Alexandria for the Arab League in Cairo). show of solidarity with Italy at a difficult time. The feedback was extremely positive, with the Great White Fleet showing the US flag on all seas and continents and marking the country’s A Great Blue Fleet is much more than a vision exit from isolation and its desire for a role on the world stage. Unfortunately we cannot rule out the requirement for the Fleet This use of gunboat diplomacy, although now outdated, to be engaged in something other than diplomatic operations. caught the imagination and was a strong symbol of intent. The likelihood, during the course of a deployment of this range that the units would find themselves in the proximity of a EU Great Blue Fleet as a cornerstone for CFSP natural disaster or humanitarian crisis is, sadly, not low. The EU today remains, to a certain extent, an emerging politiHaving a Fleet able to respond at immediate notice would cal actor, in that it has not been devolved all powers of action correspond with the EU’s intention to assist or intervene, and from the Member States. This being the case, symbols of unity is something that Navies are well practiced at. A similar comare necessary; could following the US example provide one? parison could be drawn from Op ATALANTA; although piracy is What of the EU as a maritime power? Certainly the sum of the the main focus, units undertake an array of missions alongparts, military or civil, ranks the whole as a big player. Member side, from technical or medical assistance to high seas rescue. States’ involvement in the transportation, offshore exploitaThe Fleet should therefore be shaped to be able to cover most tion, renewable energy and shipping insurance industries eventualities, subject of course to the agreement/consensus of across the world’s oceans make the EU a maritime power, Member States. In many ways, a Great Blue Fleet is realistic as dependant on the sea for commerce. Why not deploy a “Great the assets already exist, the ships, the EEAS, the experience of Blue Fleet” in support of not only these, but also to further the working together and an EU HQ. All that remains is the will to EU’s diplomatic efforts? Member States reactions to the use of try it. the naval tool will undoubtedly vary, but their assets could be better exploited. Made up of warships of various nations all flying the EU ensign next to their own, the fleet would represent the EU and be a shining example of unity amidst diversity. On 22 December 2011, High Representative Catherine Ashton issued Our units are already well versed at operating together. With a a Report on the European External Action Service, one year after its rich heritage from nearly half a century of Standing NATO launch. Maritime Groups, as well as numerous multi-lateral exercises, > The Report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/7bzv8l4 the practicalities of deploying a EU force should, for the most

News: Ashton Report on EEAS

How to stabilise a region in turmoil and counter asymmetric threats: a crucial political challenge for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

The population showed astonishing maturity in its support for the democratic process all over the country

Democratic elections in Tunisia – first milestone on the long road to stability Interview with Michael Gahler MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg The European: Mr Gahler, you were head of the EU election observation mission for Tunisia’s first free elections and spent weeks doing this job in the country’s different regions and cities. Shortly after the election you gave a very positive preliminary report on your experience to different media around the globe. A few days ago you presented your final report to the Tunisian authorities and public in Tunis. Could you sum up that assessment, including view to the development of the situation in the other Arab countries? What signal does the electoral process and final result in Tunisia send out to the Arab world? Michael Gahler: First of all, it is important to underline that EU election observation is about accompanying an entire process. We were present from 8 September, prior to campaign start and beyond 23 October (election day), until 20 November, that is, after the final results were officially announced. In the final report of 6 January 2012 I retain my generally positive assessment, especially as regards the overall non-violent conduct of the campaign, the broad political consensus to hold these elections – there was not a single boycott call and more than

Michael Gahler MEP Michael Gahler was born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main. Since April 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament. Currently he is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Transport and Tourism Committee and serves as the EPP Coordinator in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. In addition he is the Chairman of the Delegation for the Relations with the Pan-African Parliament. Following his experience as the Head of the EU Election Observation Mission in Pakistan in February 2008, Mr. Gahler accepted the offer from VP/HR Catherine Ashton to serve as the EU Chief Election Observer for the Elections in Tunisia on 23 October 2011.

1500 lists stood in the 27 domestic constituencies – as well as the non-partisan handling of the process by an overall respected independent electoral commission, and an open, pluralistic media environment. The European: What was the response in EU countries to the call to give Tunisian citizens abroad the opportunity to vote, and who organised it? Michael Gahler: Indeed, for the first time ever we also observed voting abroad in four EU countries (Belgium, Germany, France and Italy). You are right, the vote for Tunisians abroad took place between 20 and 22 of October in a total of 371 polling stations in six voting districts. There were no specific problems with the EU governments concerned: those of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. For the preparation and implementation of the election abroad we observed three kinds of problems: first, difficulties in cooperation with some host nations, in particular Canada; second, the challenge of selecting election officials not attached to the previous regime; third, the presentation of different results at various moments in Italy. The European: I was really surprised to see that the organisation was so difficult yet at the same time so smooth. Michael Gahler: Given that all stakeholders were conducting this exercise for the first time, there were some technical hitches in the run-up to the elections. However, that did not affect the vote-casting on election day. Whereas full transparency at all times and at all levels is required in the process of compiling votes, this transparency for observers and party representatives was not applied to a satisfactory degree. While in this case this was not due to any malicious intent to

Photo: Ezequiel Scagnetti ©European Union

Crises on Europe’s doorstep

CRISIS AROUND EUROPE

manipulate the results, in future elections it will be essential to practise full publication of all results as soon as possible in order to avoid allegations of fraud, from whatever side. The European: What lessons can be learned for other statebuilding processes? Michael Gahler: Legitimate governance starts with a credible election; citizens want to make their choice - this is a lesson for all reform and transition states. The Tunisian example could serve as a model both for neighbouring Libya and for its western neighbour Algeria. The latter followed the EU election observation closely and has already officially invited the EU to be present at its next election. Countries in which the reforms are rather being implemented top-down, like Morocco or Jordan, can also draw conclusions that are applicable to them. The European: You didn’t mention Egypt. Michael Gahler: With regard to Egypt I foresee a far more complicated development, given the sheer size of the country and its enormous social problems, leading to a much larger radical Islamist vote. Moreover and contrary to what is happening in Tunisia, the army seems to be seeking a continued political and economic role in the politics of the country. The European: Are you satisfied with the way in which the postelection process in Tunisia is taking form? Is there a degree of consensus about the country’s democratic future? Michael Gahler: The Constituent Assembly has only just settled the issue of its internal regulations and is about to start work on the new constitution. It is good to see a tripartite coalition government representing a continued openness to cooperation and compromise. All major parties, both before and after the election, have reiterated their support for an open and democratic society. The European: What about the complaints of Tunisian women? There are reports in the press that the new government may not respect equal constitutional rights for women. Is the Islamic Ennadha party, the largest party in the Constituent Assembly, exercising its influence in the direction of an Islamist state? Michael Gahler: Some questions, doubts and suspicions are of course being raised amongst the more progressive segments of society. And given the fact that some Islamist structures seem to be testing the ground to see what society is prepared to accept, I think that it is always good to remain vigilant in defence of human rights, and women’s rights especially. However, the largest party, Ennadha, has made very clear that it intends neither to change the existing legal provisions guaranteeing women’s rights nor to refer to the Sharia in the new constitution. The proof of these political statements will be in the way its members conduct themselves during the work on the new constitution this year.

The European: Mr Gahler, since you are a member of the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, I would like to extend my questions to certain other political issues relating to the region as a whole, including the Middle East. Michael Gahler: That is fine by me. Tunisia is a particular aspect, but when it comes to overarching issues of social development and security, it is the whole Mediterranean basin that is concerned. The European: The flare-up of the youth protest in the ArabMediterranean basin seems to me to have set in motion a whole process that it is difficult to control. Democratic ideas do not find any fertile ground in which to develop and I foresee future disappointment and radicalisation, even if we are witnessing for the most part hopeful developments in Tunisia. I feel that we have seen only the first act in the drama of the Arab revolution. Michael Gahler: Of course we must look at every country individually, but I am convinced that democratic ideas do fall on fertile ground. Previous rulers who oppressed parties with a religious base argued that they wanted to prevent the establishment of fundamentalist theocracies. I am convinced that parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have become more moderate in the process of developing the perspective of governing the country. Not only are they aware that it takes a lot of pragmatism to address the country’s huge social challenges, they also know that the majority of the people who toppled the old secular authoritarian rule would not like to surrender their newly acquired freedoms to a religious dictatorship. The European: The Arab spring has provoked a somewhat cooler reaction from one Mediterranean country, namely, Israel, which is very concerned about the developments going on around it in the Arab world. Could the currently not very stable situation develop into an armed conflict? What can the European Union do to foster Israel’s security? Michael Gahler: Israel should be happy at the prospect of being surrounded by more democratic countries in future. It would

The editor in chief with Michael Gahler MEP in his Brussels office. Source: Michael Gahler, privat

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

There is growing determination to put a stop to Iran’s nuc

Facing Iran: Stepped-up Pr

by Emily B. Landau, Director of the Arms Control program, Institute

Flushed with the joy of freedom

Photo: Ezequiel Scagnetti ©European Union

be good if it no longer had to claim that being the only democracy in the region obliges it to maintain a high level of securityrelated spending. The legitimate demand not only of the Arab nations, but of the entire international community, for a solution to be found to the outstanding issues between Israel and the Palestinians requires that more credible pressure be brought to bear by the Middle East Quartet on both sides. Israel should not only seek “security”, but also understand that real long-lasting security is only possible through a negotiated peace accord. No additional obstacles should be strewn along the way ahead. To my mind, every new building or settlement in contested territory is an additional stumbling block on the road to a just settlement. The EU should not only criticise further construction activities, but think of creative measures to convince the current Israeli government that with its policies it is not contributing to a more secure future for Israel. The European: Concerning who should take the lead for stabilisation efforts in the region: should it not be an obligation for the Mediterranean Union to engage? This would be a good test for this Union, which up until now seems to be little more than a chimera. Michael Gahler: Currently, the Union for the Mediterranean physically exists in the form of a secretariat in Barcelona. The political focus on the Arab spring now offers us the chance within the framework of our Neighbourhood Policy to bring about change by interacting with an increasing number of legitimate governments that are pursuing a reform agenda, and for our established instruments, adapted to specific needs, to be made operational. We have been successfully using them for many years in connection with the transformation processes in our eastern neighbourhood. Although the objective towards the south is not eventual full EU membership, but rather a level of “everything but institutions”, this could lead in the long run to an enormous amount of economic and political integration. We, and the nations of the region, would benefit from this very close interaction and it would have a stabilising effect on our neighbourhood.

In response to Iran’s ongoing defiance in the nuclear realm, the past couple of months have seen a notable increase in international pressure on Iran that aims to convince it to get serious about backing away from its military nuclear ambitions. International actors are finally moving closer to implementation of some of the harshest sanctions yet. The Obama administration signed into law on New Year’s Eve sanctions that target the Central Bank in Iran, and the EU has just decided on an embargo on oil imports from Iran, which will be fully implemented from early July, although the immediate implication is that no new contracts for oil will be signed with Iran. Both the US and Europe have also taken decisions to apply sanctions to Iran’s petrochemical industry.

Sanctions and their impact Sanctions on the Central Bank and on Iranian oil exports had been avoided in the past because states continue to rely on Iranian oil, and due to fears of a spike in the price of oil that could result from a decision on these measures. This time, however, the new decisions on sanctions are being made amid reports of concerted efforts to get a number of oil producing states to agree to increase their oil output in order to keep prices stable. So while Greece, Italy and Spain (dependent on Iranian oil) are seeking prolonged grace periods to find alternative sources, the French foreign minister is clarifying that assurances have already been given by some oil producers to increase their output, although they prefer not to go public at this stage.

Additional measures In addition to sanctions, and in the face of Iran’s intransigence, there are indications of late of stepped-up efforts to forcibly

Dr Emily Landau Dr Emily Landau is a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, where she is also director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project. She also teaches in the International School at the University of Haifa and is involved in the Expert Advisory Group for Euro-Mediterranean affairs. She holds a BA and MA from Tel Aviv University, and a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She has published and lectured extensively on CSBMs in the Middle East, Arab perceptions of Israel’s qualitative edge, Israeli-Egyptian relations, Israel’s nuclear policy and arms control policy, proliferation challenges in the post-Cold War world with particular emphasis on the Iranian nuclear challenge, and the Arms Control and Regional Security working group of the Madrid peace process (ACRS).

CRISIS AROUND EUROPE

clear efforts

ressure Just Might Work

e for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University slow down Iran’s nuclear progress, through action that includes cyber attacks, targeted killings of Iranian scientists with instrumental roles in the country’s nuclear program, as well as a series of explosions in facilities with direct relevance to the development of a military capability. Beyond the direct damage that has been caused, these acts of sabotage have also highlighted Iran‘s vulnerability to attack from within. One of the features of sabotage is the lack of a return address, and Iran’s vulnerability and growing isolation is exposed also by its inability to identify the executors.

All options are on the table Finally, official statements – primarily in the US – have given new life to the stale refrain of “all options are on the table” for confronting Iran‘s military nuclear ambitions. Statements by Secretary of Defense Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey over the past few weeks have clarified US resolve with a new forcefulness. These officials are saying that the US will prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, without the usual addendum about the dire consequences of employing military force against yet another Middle East state.

First signs of impact In the face of these new developments, Iran is showing signs of pressure. It is lashing out with threats – including recent warnings to the US and Europe not to impose an oil embargo, or else it will close the Strait of Hormuz; warnings to the US not to bring its aircraft carrier back into the Gulf; and warnings to Saudi Arabia not to increase its output of oil if an embargo on Iranian oil is put in place. Iran has also taken action – storming the British Embassy (that seems to have been carried out with at least the tacit consent of the regime), and announcements about moving uranium enrichment to the underground facility near Qom. But no one seems to be backing down in the face of Iranian threats, and the action taken against British diplomats only served to increase the level of international (and especially British) fury. Barack Obama sent a message directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei, via secret channels, that closing the Strait of Hormuz would mean crossing a clear US redline, and such action would trigger a forceful US response.

Israel prefers not to be at the forefront In light of the identity of the protagonists behind the new international determination to confront Iran, one pertinent question is whether there might be a change in the makeup of the leading group of states confronting Iran. With Russia and China currently outside the dynamic, the US and Europe are

Documentation EU-Iran Relations The EU is still Iran’s principal trading partner, importing €14.5 bn of goods from Iran, and exporting €11.3 bn (2010 figures – both being less today than in the past). 90% of EU imports from Iran are oil and related products. In 1998, Iran and the EU began to look at ways to formalise and enhance their relationship. The Council adopted a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive trade and co-operation agreement and a political dialogue agreement with Iran in 2001, with negotiations in both spheres starting in 2002, and running up to 2005.During the same period, a human rights dialogue was conducted until Iran declined to participate after 2004. The EU wished gradually to deepen relations with Iran, pending progress by Iranian authorities in four areas: the human rights situation in Iran, Iran’s attitude to the Middle East Peace Process, support to terrorist movements, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear. This phase came to a halt in 2005, due to revelations on Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and Iranian refusal to fully cooperate with the IAEA. At its September 2005 meeting, the IAEA’s board of governors found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, because of “many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement”. Subsequently, the Iranian nuclear issue was reported to the UNSC in March 2006. EU sanctions are meant to persuade Iran to comply with its international obligations and to constrain its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes. The measures both implement UNSC resolutions and include additional autonomous EU measures. The EU sanctions were last strengthened on 23 January 2012 when the Foreign Affairs Council inter alia imposed an import ban on Iranian crude oil and froze the assets of the Iranian central bank within the EU. For more information on restrictive measures see page 24. Source: Council of the European Union

shaping up as primary actors. And within Europe, clearly there are differences in the level of commitment to the goal of stopping Iran, with France and Britain now at the forefront. Might the P5+1 group of states be replaced by a more determined trio: the US, France and Britain? This is a possibility, perhaps with one or two additional like-minded states. Israel – while

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Fact sheet Restrictive measures on Iran 23 January 2012: EU announces new sanctions on Iran’s central bank and an embargo on oil imports from Iran to be fully implemented from early July 2012. November 2011: In reaction to the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, the UK as well as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands recall their ambassadors to Iran. 21 November 2011: The United Kingdom unilaterally imposes sanctions restricting financial cooperation with Iranian banks. 1 February 2011: EU adopts motion calling for implementation of the EU bans, as well as the opening of an EU delegation in Tehran to keep diplomatic channels open. 22 January 2011: Negotiations between the EU, US, UK, Russia, France and Germany and Iran in Istanbul break down. December 2010: Meetings in Geneva between Iran and the United States, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and China do not lead to any agreement. 25 October 2010: The EU enacts new sanctions against Iran targeting the energy, insurance, transport and financial markets. Iranian uranium-enrichment plant

Photo: iranwatch.org

understandably highly concerned about Iran’s nuclear progress – should refrain from placing itself at the forefront of the international effort to stop Iran. Israel has always said it prefers for the international community to spearhead efforts in this regard, and it should support the new and increased determination currently being displayed.

Continuous pressure could make Iran blink A final point relates to fears that have been raised in media commentary lately, regarding the risks of taking a more determined international stance against Iran. Pundits have warned of the dangers of escalation, as well as the fear that Iran would “redouble its efforts” to achieve a military capability. These fears seem to be without basis. Iran might be trying to escalate, but right now it is looking quite weak and ineffective. As for the redoubling of efforts or increased motivation to achieve a military capability, Iran is already moving forward as fast as it can, and is noticeably determined and motivated. So easing the pressure for these reasons would make no sense. Increasing the pressure, however, could ultimately make Iran blink. The fact that high-level IAEA officials met with Iranians in late January, specifically to discuss concerns about Iran’s suspected secret military nuclear program, may be a first crack, and an indication that pressure can work.

26 July 2010: EU imposes tougher sanctions on Iran, aiming to block investments in oil and gas, and curtailing Iran’s refining capabilities. 19 January 2010: Iran rejects the IAEA brokered deal from April 2009. 8 April 2009: E3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, Russia and U.S) offer Iran a “freeze-for-freeze” deal, freezing sanctions if Iran freezes its nuclear program. 10 November 2008: Iranian banks are added to the EU list of sanctions. April 2007: The Council of the European Union publishes a list of prohibited technology associated with Iran’s nuclear program, and bans export of and investments in companies associated with the prohibited areas. 2007: EU foreign policy-chief Javier Solana meets regularly with Iranian officials August 2005: Negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and Iran are put on hold due to Iran’s nuclear program. 26 November 2004: The EU and Iran sign the “Tehran Agreed Statement” according to which Iran will temporarily suspend all uranium-enrichment activities during negotiations its nuclear program. 2003: EU/E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) begin negotiations with Iran on nuclear issues, urging Iran to comply with IAEA directives.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy has been marked over the last two years by flagging political will and national egotism. The great heterogeneity within the European Union affects not only political issues but also industrial behaviour. What is clearly lacking is a common EU code of conduct for the education, training and protection of crisis-management forces.

Progress in the CSDP depends of nations’ willingness and national preoccupations

The future of the common European security and defence policy – time for change by Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament, Brussels (Edit). It has become a tradition for the Chairman of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) to give a keynote speech on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to the Berlin Security Conference, the most important Congress on European Security and Defence. This Conference, which recently convened again for the 10th time, has developed into a genuine platform for pragmatic discussion on European Security and Defence.The current SEDE Chairman, Arnaud Danjean, takes the view that progress could be made if nations were ready to engage. In his speech he drew attention to the great heterogeneity among European nations in terms of political/diplomatic resolve and operational capabilities. Sometimes simply history and prejudices are the obstacles that stand in the way of developing the political power of the CSDP. Certain new initiatives such as “Weimar Plus” * are hopeful signs that the CSDP will be able to progress in the near future. The creation of an Operational Headquarters is crucial: indeed this is a sine qua non for future engagements that would seem to be accepted by all nations, save one. That nation, as in many other cases, is the United Kingdom, which is not willing to support progress of the CSDP through the creation of common European tools.

First of all, let me thank and congratulate the organisers for this successful 10th edition of the European Security and Defence Congress. It is a yearly milestone for all of us who are engaged and committed to the strengthening of a European defence policy. And every year it allows us to draw lessons from the latest developments, and to pave the way for the years ahead.

The slow pace of 2010 has been overcome Some of you might remember that last year at the 9th Berlin Security Conference in 2010, I delivered a very short speech tainted with concerns and frustration regarding the 2010 developments in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy. It was a disappointing moment, when the CSDP looked totally marginalised on the European leaders’ agenda, and the momentum provided by the Lisbon Treaty did not seem to be bearing any fruit. This year I think we could be cautiously optimistic. Not that all the events that have happened this year have explicitly reinforced the CSDP. But 2011 proved to be a very demanding year for European armed forces, and this operational momentum, combined with an even stronger budgetary pressure, has led all Member States and all European institutions to again consider the CSDP framework as a relevant one for tackling some urgent issues.

The military intervention in Libya Of course, the major event in terms of operations was the military intervention in Libya. The European Union as such was not involved and this simple fact could lead us to conclude that this missed opportunity has just showed dramatically how irrelevant CDSP continues to be for most of the Member States. But as the Libyan operation is coming to an end, I think the lessons learned should be more carefully considered and balanced. No EU operational involvement Indeed, the fact that all military interventions took place in the sole framework of NATO is at first sight an obvious setback for CSDP. The only operation under the EU label, EUFOR Libya,

Photo: audiovisual service©European Union 2012

Security and Defence Policy

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

remained totally virtual and was never actually deployed. And no European operation was ever seriously considered, be it for surveillance of the embargo, something the EU would have been able to carry out. Nevertheless, we all know that, more than technical reasons, there were ideological and political difficulties in engaging CSDP in the Libyan case. One can regret that, and I strongly do, but this is a reality and we have to look ahead. Libya: a test case for European capabilities So, beyond that first impression, which does not look at all positive for CSDP, the Libyan operation showed that European countries, within the NATO framework and along with other allies (notably Arab countries such as Jordan, the Emirates and Qatar) could act decisively with great military determination and with the relevant capacities. We experienced a kind of a military stress test for European countries’ military capacities, and to a large extent, despite some traditional shortfalls (intelligence, air refuelling), the military equipment proved to be reliable and efficient. This is a very important point, which is beneficial for any European defence policy in the future, whatever the label is. We can build on this operation, work hard on filling some gaps and improving some structures, but there is a solid, robust base among some European countries allowing us to move ahead. The US is no longer willing or able to intervene for Europe Thirdly – and this is in my opinion the main lesson from this case – Libya gave us the confirmation that the US is not willing or able to intervene systematically in crises in which its interests are not directly at stake, typically in the surroundings of Europe. This was bluntly recalled by Secretary of State Gates in Brussels last June, and this wake-up call to the Europeans has been dramatically illustrated by the Libyan affair. The EU needs to seriously re-think its defence policy in the light of this closing US umbrella. It needs to show more political willingness in terms of defence and to seriously invest in its capabilities in order to be able to defend its interests when it needs to. This strategic lesson should be the backbone of any serious effort on European defence policy. And it will remain valid for the years to come and shape the new framework in which EU Member States have to think and act.

Unfortunately there is no common sense on CSDP Of course, the Libyan crisis still revealed the great heterogeneity among European states in terms of political willingness, diplomatic determination and operational capabilities. And this fact goes far beyond the Libyan crisis. Some European states prevent any moving forward out of purely ideological prejudice towards a European defence policy, while some have to deal with complex political and historical contexts when it comes to military intervention and

Arnaud Danjean MEP Arnaud Danjean has been Chairman of the EP Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) since 2009. He was born in 1971 in Louhans. Graduate (1992) and Postgraduate Diploma (DEA) in politics from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (1993). 1994 – 2004, Ministry of Defence, Paris. 2004 – 2005, Representative of the Secretary-General of the EU-Council/HR for the CFSP in Kosovo. 2005 – 2007, Adviser in the private office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Director-Adviser, EZL Consulting, Paris. Mr. Danjean is a member of the UMP National Council (Saône-et-Loire) and an elected member of the Burgundy Regional Council.

others are simply deficient in crucial capabilities, making their operational involvement a virtual option. These discrepancies have to be addressed.

How to generate new impetus? It is the merit of the High Representative to have put on the table, last summer, a report listing the opportunities provided by CSDP in order to overcome in a pragmatic way these heterogeneous views among Member States. We might not come to an overall and decisive agreement on all the proposals. But this should not be considered as a setback. It is, on the contrary, a necessary exercise on the most sensitive issue of European construction. Expecting spectacular results is not realistic. We are dealing here with sovereignty issues. No need to rush and to alienate. But let us put on the table, in the debate, the real strategic, budgetary and operational options that all EU Member States are confronted with. This must lead to pragmatic solutions, and I’m sure that there is a space for such an outcome. As all too often in Europe, it is only when facing a deep crisis and taking note of failures that we can give a new impetus. After two years of stumbling political will, let’s hope that political determination has returned. Key initiatives In this regard, together with the HR/VP report, the new impulse given by the polish presidency and the Weimar plus initiative (France, Germany, Poland, joined recently by Italy and Spain) must be most welcome, as well as the willingness to move ahead with the implementation of the disposition of the Lisbon Treaty. The urgent need for an EU Operational Headquarters The areas where progress is much needed were once again exposed by the Libyan crisis, as mentioned earlier. In terms of the decision-making process, the CSDP structures, especially the military ones, are simply not up to the task. There is no

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Europe’s security and defence industry is up to date but M permanent military planning and conduct capability that can be mobilised swiftly in a crisis context. Needless to say, the weeks or months needed to activate a national operation Headquarter (OHQ) are not conducive to effective crisis management. This daunting issue is once again back on the agenda, thanks to the Weimar initiative, and this time it needs to be addressed: we need to overcome ideological stumbling blocks and to be pragmatic. We simply need it, we need a permanent OHQ. It is cheaper than the system in place now, it is more effective: it simply makes sense. It is time to move forward pragmatically and to explore all the options.

Developing relevant capabilities Less controversial but just as important is the issue of capabilities. European countries need to invest in the necessary capabilities to lead basic military operation, this is obviously crucial to any defence policy. Defence budget cuts do not leave room for waste anymore. This congress has been named “time to change”, and this call is especially relevant in the field of defence budgets. The behaviours and the policies have to take this dramatic change into consideration. Europeans must agree on their needs and acquire certain capabilities in common, when it does not make sense and/or it is too expansive for each national army to do so on its own. The various initiatives that we have seen the past year to move forward with the pooling and sharing of military capabilities are very encouraging. We need to identify concrete projects that can be launched quickly, using the European defence agency, fostering cooperation between the agency and NATO, to yield rapid results. Priority fields include air transport (strategic and tactical), R&D, training. So, you can see that the European defence agenda ahead of us is ambitious, but most of all very demanding. All these challenges and the new developing threats will require new methods, new ways of thinking, new ways of sparing and spending money, and new ways of deciding. More collectively. In a more European way. I can only hope that when we meet again next year, all these initiatives will have become reality.

The European Defence Indu by Jean-Paul Herteman, CEO, Safran, Paris In any debate on European defence, at some point, someone says something like: “Our defence industry lacks competitiveness. It is far too fragmented and it needs restructuring”. And then it goes on with: “Restructuring will have a huge social cost. And this social cost cannot be shared equally by the Member States: there will be losers and winners”. And sometimes it may end with: “Let us go for a flagship program shared by many of us, it is probably the best way to build something”. I will discus a few ideas regarding that old – but today more critical than ever – debate on the European defence industry and I dare to be a little provocative.

Europe is a world-class producer of military equipment First of all I do not believe that our European defence industry is globally non competitive. In most fields, our European made equipments are world class in military effectiveness, from missiles to ships, from aircraft and helicopters to tanks and protection of the soldier. Regarding the development costs of equipment as well as the lead time, they are often just a fraction of the US corresponding ones. The unit production cost is also world class even if volumes are often smaller and the euroto-dollar exchange rate may not help. Nevertheless, as can be very well understood, some Member States may prefer buying equipment more or less off the shelf, leaving a part of the development cost to, for example, the US taxpayer and taking advantage of high volumes. And when we work together to share an equipment program, we usually spend very large amounts of money to customize the product to each national specification. This results in short production runs of each version of the product and an excess in fixed cost and program management complexity. Domingo Ureña Raso, President of Airbus Military, observed recently that the A400M transport aircraft has one maker, one chain of European suppliers but still has six different versions, answering to the specifications of different Air Forces. He questioned whether the restructuring should not also take place on the demand side.

I thank you very much for your attention and wish all of you a fruitful congress.

Fragmentation and the social cost of restructuring

* Weimar Plus is a proposal put forward by the Polish Presidency in 2011 in order to bring EU crisis management forward and the process is now being opened up to other EU countries. The proposal calls for enhanced cooperation with NATO through a “ Berlin Plus in reverse”. The proposal aims to broaden the Headline Goal 2010 into a comprehensive civil-military one.

Let us have a look at what happened when the commercial Aircraft industry was restructured over the last forty years. We will see further on that there are links and similarities between these two industries. Forty years ago, faced with competition dominated by Boeing and McDonnel Douglas in large commercial aircraft, the European governments decided to pull their efforts together. After a long and complex evolution, this

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Member States have to spend more together

ustry

“The role of the industry is obviously not to draft public policies. It is instead to say what is feasible, what can be achieved. It is also to say what would make no sense or just a limited sense.” Jean-Paul Herteman at the 10th Berlin Security Conference, November 2011 Photo: Dombrowsky

resulted in Airbus and made it a world champion. The organizational move has been one of the keys to this outstanding success, but the other decisive key has been technology and innovation that Airbus has uplifted to a truly leading edge level when McDonnel Douglas did not innovate much, leading to a slow but not recoverable decline. A few lessons may be drawn from this structural transformation of our civil aircraft industry in Europe. The first one is obviously the danger of fragmentation in the face of raising non European competition. The second one is that the total number of employees of course does not depend mainly on the organization of the industry but mostly on the number of aircraft or the number of military equipment to be built. The third lesson is that restructuring of the civil aviation, in the frame of European common market rules, including the ban of offsets has not led to any massive transfer of employment from one member state to another. Should the demand side in defence decide to further unify itself, what would be the reaction or response from the Industry? It would likely adapt itself as it did in the commercial aviation sector and create more value by focusing on key product and technology. We obviously cannot have 27 shipyards making complete − and completely different − ships but the supplier base for our ships will be there, where the know how is and the skilled workforce is, all over Europe. Keep in mind that geographic “just return” is a powerful tool, it’s very present in minds but when it goes up to the point that a new

program is creating more or less artificial capability, a duplication of assets, it will create more issues than opportunities. The number of jobs will depend less on the organization than on the volume of the business. In the private sectors in the best case, restructuring may provide something like a 10% level of synergies. It can easily be offset by strong and unified demand as shown by the success of Airbus. Airbus by itself employs only about 80 000 people. There are three or four times more people in the supplier’s chain on engines, equipment to thousand small and medium companies. Maybe we should not focus only on primes and national or European champions but as well on technology, excellence, jobs in the supplier’s chain.

European champions Let us be pragmatic. European champions are wonderful but there are sectors where we may have several European champions. In helicopters: we have two world leaders with a total market share at least equivalent to the market share of Airbus. Aircraft engines; we have two companies, each of them managing successful transatlantic partnerships as the prime aircraft manufacturers are on both side of the Atlantic. It makes sense for suppliers like engines manufacturers to set up transatlantic partnerships and if you look at the cumulated market shares by Safran and Rolls Royce, it may be better than Airbus. At the other end of the spectrum, our number of primes – I say primes, not companies – in some sectors may be a weakness in this changing world but there will never be a unique solution to plug in everywhere. Let us be pragmatic.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

China, and some others recognize this dual nature and use the concept of strategic activities, which encompasses all the research and industries contributing to the global security of their citizens. They recognize that the dual nature of these strategic industries is one of their essential features: the defence activity is a frontier, providing differentiating technological innovation. This in turn benefits civilian products, closing the success loop. The civil market provides production volumes and amortization which make the few military products more The modular air-to-ground Safran AASM is a new generation smart guided weapon. affordable. Photo: © JF Damois/Safran The USA, Russia and China have this strategic view of the technological and industrial means of their superiority, and an active policy of non dependence. They What should be done control technologies and access by foreigners through far The first thing is that we cannot consider the defence sector as ranging policy tools like the Control of Foreign Investment in an isolated one. This is part of the problem but maybe a part of the US (CFIUS) and ITAR, the International Trade in Arms the solution as well. With the exception of some very specific Regulation. sectors, most industrial actors in defence are dual. They offer their technology solutions to defence, civil aviation, civil space, security or telecom. Safran, for example, draws 20% of its Appropriate solutions for Europe global revenue from military customers and the rest from the We are facing a growing challenge. Forty years ago, our induscivil markets. Military and civilian engines are designed and tries started emerging from the ashes of World War II. From produced by the same design teams and same production there, we have reached the world’s best level in almost every facilities, the same cost structure and the same supplier base. field except in electronic chips and some critical raw materials. Just two figures: Safran last year produced 1400 commercial However, our world stage is changing fast. aircraft engines and 18 jet fighter engines. Just imagine what China now represents 20% of the world civil aviation market the cost of those 18 military engines would have been if they against 30% for Europe. Before the end of this decade, the had to be produced in stand alone facilities. proportions will be inverted. 60% of today’s world military markets are with the emerging economies and the figure will keep growing. Emerging nations The necessary linkage of civil and military have growing and legitimate ambitions and means to become Everywhere in the world, military technologies depend on less dependent on foreign technologies and products. public budgets. Civil businesses are mostly the result of our – The challenge is both addressed at our high-tech civil activities private – investment. Nevertheless, the destinies of the civil and our military one, and we either raise to that challenge on and military markets and industries are clearly linked. both sides, or not at all. The countries with a world power ambition like the USA or

Jean-Paul Herteman Chief Executive Officer, Safran, Paris Jean-Paul Herteman is a graduate of Ecole Polytechnique and of Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace. In 1984, he joined Snecma and assumed until 1995 among others the positions of Quality Director (1989 – 92), Mechanical Division Manager and Deputy Technical Director (1993 – 95). In 1995 CFM56 Program Manager at Snecma and Executive Vice President of CFM International; 1996 Vice President Engineering of Snecma. In 1999 Executive Vice President and General Manager of Snecma Rocket-Engine Division and was then appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Snecma Moteurs in 2002. From 2004 till 2006: President, Defense Security Branch and Chairman & CEO of Sagem Défense Sécurité.

We have to face the reality and if not, we risk having very few options left in the coming years when it comes to military strategies. We need better focus on priorities, more willingness to make proactive choices between technology dependence and non dependence. We need economies of scale and less fragmentation between different national versions of equipment or system. We need to increase the share of the budgets devoted to technology development, including the training of our best students, an investment before being expense. Whatever our difficulties may be, our European defence and aerospace industries today are strong. We can be proud of it. It is a legacy we can transmit to the younger generation and to tomorrow’s world. We must “spend better and spend more together” as Javier Solana said.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

A new initiative to strengthen Europe’s Defence industry and market

Commission Task Force on defence industry and market by Pierre Delsaux, Deputy DG, Directorate General Internal Market and Services of the European Commission Europe is facing difficult times with most Member States being in an economic downturn and under enormous financial pressure. No doubt, public debt and the consolidation of state finances are today the most important challenges in Europe and will certainly remain so in the foreseeable future.

global scale. However, current strengths are the fruits of investments which were done many years ago. The challenge today is to maintain in spite of severe budget constraints the capacity to develop at affordable prices the military capabilities of tomorrow.

In such a financial and political environment, it does not come as a surprise that many Member States have significantly reduced their defence budgets. Unfortunately there is little hope that this tendency will be reversed any time soon. On the contrary, given the gravity of the financial situation, further cuts are by far more likely than budget increases.

To achieve this objective, far reaching structural reforms are necessary. As long as defence and security remain national prerogatives, the main responsibility for reforms will remain in many areas with Member States. In this context, it is crucial to consolidate the demand side and to ensure jointly the necessary investments in key technologies of the future.

However, one could also argue that the problem is how Europe spends its money rather than how much it spends: The combined defence budgets of the 27 EU Member States represent roughly € 200 bn per year, which is still a considerable sum. At the same time, more than 50% of this expenditure covers manpower costs, and spending on personnel is twice as high as on equipment. These figures are particularly striking in comparison with the US, where only 22% of the total defence expenditure is allocated to personel and the investment part 50% higher than the expenditure for manpower. In other words: due to structural deficiencies, Europe’s defence systems produce too little capabilities for too much money.

Structural reforms are crucial

But there is more than just allocation of resources within national budgets. Market structures in general are far from optimal and up to date. Member States still try to maintain a maximum range of military capabilities on a national basis. Moreover, most defence purchases are done purely nationally, and wherever possible preference is given to national suppliers. Thus, fragmentation along national lines persists at all levels – on the demand side, in the regulatory framework and on the supply side – and results in costly duplications and inefficiencies. All this has devastating effects on Europe’s military capabilities, but also on Europe’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) which is developing and producing these capabilities. For the time being, many European defence companies are still doing well, with exports to third countries at least partly compensating for the shrinking of home markets. This proves that European industries are in many areas at the cutting edge of technology and competitive also at a

However, defence and security also have economic, financial, industrial and technological aspects where the Commission can support Member States in their endeavour. It can do so via its regulatory power and its competences in policy areas which have directly or indirectly a bearing on defence markets and industries. The most prominent examples for this are the two Directives on defence procurement and defence transfers which were adopted in 2009. These Directives introduce specific EU legislation and the principles of the Internal Market into national defence markets. They streamline regulatory frameworks, enhance EU-wide competition and foster cooperation. In short, these Directives are today the regulatory backbone of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM).

Pierre Delsaux Pierre Delsaux is Deputy Director General in charge of the Single Market at the Directorate General Internal Market and Services of the European Commission. He was born in Belgium in 1957. After studying Law at the University of Liège, he obtained his Master of Law at the Northwestern University, Illinois US, in 1983. He was Legal Secretary at the European Court of Justice from 1984 to 1987. His career within the European Commission has included working in the Directorate General Competitition (19911994). Recently Pierre Delsaux actively contributed to the European Commission reaction to the financial crisis in the areas of corporate reporting and governance, governance of supervisory and standard setting organisations, both at the EU and global level. His interests also include the application of community law across the EU, as well as the functioning of the internal market.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Building on this acquis, the Commission has now set up a Defence Task Force which aims at further strengthening EDEM and EDTIB. This clearly shows the importance and the commitment the Commission attributes to this project. Created recently, the Task Force has just established its terms of reference, working methods and procedures. Its main mission is to consolidate the Commission’s defence acquis, develop it further and explore additional options for action. This implies to ensure the full implementation of the two Directives, but also to systematically assess what else the Commission can do to strengthen Europe’s defence industries and markets. In order to ensure the coherence of the Commission’s efforts across the whole spectrum of its competences, the Task Force brings together all Directorates General concerned by defence and security issues. The Task Force is first and foremost a project of the Commission. However, we are fully aware that progress can only be achieved if all stakeholders are involved. Consequently, the External Action Service and the Defence Agency will be closely associated to the work of the Task Force. In many areas, discussions will also be held directly with Member States. Last but not least, meetings with industry are planned as well.

The four prioritized areas of the task force The Task Force has organised its work in four priority areas: Internal Market, Industrial Policy, Research & Innovation and Institutional issues. In each area, a Rapporteur is currently developing a work programme which will then be the basis for discussion and cooperation with stakeholders. Possible actions can cover a broad variety of issues, ranging from security of supply and offsets to defence SMEs and civil-military synergies. It is still too early to say which form these actions will take, but we clearly want to be concrete and efficient and reach rapidly tangible results. In the current situation of economic and financial crisis, protectionism and national egoism may be a temptation, but they are clearly no sustainable solution. This is true in general and for defence in particular. The Commission is fully aware of the strategic, political and technological importance of defence markets and industries. We are convinced that Europe needs a competitive EDTIB and a fully-fledged EDEM to develop the capabilities it needs for its security. Via its new Defence Task Force, the Commission will contribute to achieving these objectives.

Rubrik?????????????????!!!!!!!!!!!

Documentation The European Commission’s defence task force In November 2011 Commissioner Michel Barnier confirmed at a security and defence conference in Brussels, that the European Commission is setting up a new EU defence policy task force to help Europe’s defence industry to remain competitive in world markets . This initiative is likely to involve the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate Generals of the Internal Market, Research and Development, Industry, Transport, Energy and Legal Services. The aim of such a task force is to ensure that the EU defence procurement directive and the intra-EU defence products’ transfer directives are transposed into Member States national legislation. Furthermore, it aimed at exploiting synergies between the security and the defence industries, developing common norms and standards, as well as ensuring coherence on security of supply issues.

> His full speech is available in French at: http://tinyurl.com/6vehnf2

“In the field of defence, as in economic affairs, we need more Europe, not less. This is especially true today, as the effects of the economic crisis are increasingly felt in the dramatic reductions in military spending that can be seen in all Member States”, said Commissioner Barnier at the Brussels conference. photo: EU-commission

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Documentation The International Society for Military Ethics in Europe Providing a focus for analysis, development and sharing of best practice in the area of professional military ethics, across and beyond the European defence community. The International Society for Military Ethics (ISME) is the first organisation to bring together scientists, academics, and military practitioners who are engaged in research, education and training in the field of professional military ethics. In 2005 ISME was incorporated in the United States as a not for profit organisation, having been for many years simply an informal meeting of interested parties. It now holds annual mid-winter conferences, alternating between the National Defence University (Washington) and the University of San Diego (California). In 2011, in order to better focus their work on specific European approaches to the analysis, development and promotion of best practice throughout the armed forces of the members of the European defence community, some European members and interested institutions decided to create a new chapter of ISME, based in Europe. The inaugural conference was held at the Ecole Militaire in Paris on 16 and 17 June 2001. The new Euro-ISME was registered as a not for profit organisation under French law, pending conversion into a European association, once such a possibility exists. Euro-ISME aims particularly to:

• establish a European forum for the discussion and exchange of ideas on professional responsibility and military ethics; • promote comprehensive and systematic analysis in the field of military ethics and of the law of armed conflict, in accordance with the principles of human rights; • initiate research on European and worldwide ethical traditions, as well as on the behavioural norms that guide and limit the conduct of the armed forces; • enhance the quality of ethics education in European armed forces and the armed forces of partner countries who request advice; • support educational institutions and the military command chain in analysis and topical studies into behaviour on operations and their impact on military ethics; • promote the harmonization of ethical principles and standards of conduct so as to encourage the creation of a shared culture of responsibility and ethical thinking in Europe; • make available knowledge about this culture to other continents via a global network of regional societies for military ethics. > Internet Forum : www.euroisme.org

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

How to create an ethic for European military crisis management forces

Die for Europe or intervene for strictly national interests by Manfred Rosenberger, Colonel (ret.) and Dr David Whetham, Senior lecturer at King’s College, London The Libyan population was successfully protected from Gaddafi’s war against his own people by the rebels empowered and assisted by a NATO operation. This helped them to overthrow the dictatorial regime. Would lessons learnt be the conclusion that for a variety of reasons, it must be seen as a „wake up call for the European NATO members“. If we are to take the responsibility to protect idea seriously, not only must European countries have the necessary military capabilities to act but also the willingness for joint action. The strengthening of the juridical basis We could also come to the conclusion that the everlasting discussion on diversity in military cultures between Member States – from those who are more enthusiastic about military intervention to those that rather tend towards restraint – can not make us forget about the key question of a common European security and defence culture: is an intervention in an out-of-area crises on behalf of Europe worth shedding blood for, or is military engagement always going to be driven by the interests of (one or more) specific nations within Europe? In order to really accept this responsibility to protect as one of the universal responsibilities, in other words as a human duty to protect civil populations against the excesses of totalitarian and dictatorial regimes, it is important to strengthen, the juridical basis for multinational intervention in international relations has to be strengthened. The European Union, building on its substantial experience of the reconciliation and unification processes does not need to wait for additional legitimation to create a culture of responsibility and ethical principles for the use of force. Every nation that has contributed force elements to multinational crisis management has, at least to some extent, thought through the issues and has developed own codes of conduct and standards for rules of engagement respecting international law. What is really necessary now is to promote a common understanding of the responsibilities of every actor, during the decision making process as well as during operations.

Harmonization of practices and discourses Military ethics is a comprehensive framework of practices and discourses intended to guide the armed forces and their members to act in accordance with established values, legal understanding and cultural norms. At the same time these practices and discourses must substantiate the referential values in the eyes of the entire citizenship. One of the first

Manfred Rosenberger Manfred Rosenberger, Colonel (ret.), is interim Executive Director of the International Society for Military Ethics in Europe (Euro-ISME). Born in 1948 at Lörrach, he started his military career in 1968 with the Bundeswehr. In 1978 he joined the General Staff College (Hamburg) as an airborne infantry officer. 1980: Student at the École Supérieure de Guerre, Paris. 1987–1989: Commander of the 251st Paratrooper Battalion in Calw. Among other positions, he was in charge of the desk office for Franco-German (F/G) military cooperation within the MOD, Berlin. 1997–2001: Military Director, Secretariat of the F/G Security and Defence Council, Paris. 2001–2005: Chief of Staff /Director of Studies, Federal College for Security Studies, Berlin Member of the Executive Board, International Society for Military Ethics (Euro-ISME),

Dr David Whetham Dr David Whetham is a Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, a partner of the UK Defence Academy. He holds a Philosophy degree from the London School of Economics and a Masters Degree in War Studies from King’s College London. In 2001/ 2002 he was with the OSCE in Kosovo. In 2003 he joined King’s College as a permanent member of staff. Other activities: Visiting Fellow with the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College, Canberra. Resident Fellow at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis and Visiting Lecturer in military ethics at the Baltic Defence College and the Kuwaiti Staff College. A cofounder of the European Chapter of the International Society for Military Ethics (Euro-ISME), he is now a member of its Executive Board.

questions which military ethics must answer is that of the subject from which the legitimating of the use of the force is derived. Davenport, for example, affirms that professional soldiers clearly have to distinguish between the interests of the nation or the national government and those of humanity in order to prioritize action in favor of the last. With regard to European crisis management forces, politicians, military and actors of the European civil society share in equal measure the responsibility for discourse and guidance in order to set common values and cultural norms. They have to work in harmony in the (re-) orientation of the security sector and the definition of political, juridical and ethical conditions of military service. This concerns in particular

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

• the development and implementation of active politics of fraternalism, solidarity and peace dedicated to efficiently prevent crises; balancing reconciliation of differing interests; • the engagement with and improvement of International Law with special focus on the enhancement of terms and conditions of humanitarian intervention; • the respect of ethical norms regarding decisions concerning the use of armed forces and the technical and moral choices in development and procurement of arms and equipment; • the provision of psychological support for soldiers in operations and the provision of military chaplains for all religions practised in national armed forces and multinational elements or other spiritual and pastoral support; • the appreciation and backing of the service delivered by the military and other crisis management forces in order to maintain and/or reinforce peace.

Breaking taboos and setting new principles While political and military cooperation between European states is increasing, different countries provide ethics education for their individual Armed Forces in different ways (if at all). Differing national Rules of Engagement can already mean that partners within a coalition will approach the same issue in different ways, causing friction and confusion. Once a lack of common ethical understanding is added to the picture, the implications for everyone involved, particularly civilians in areas of military operation, can be profound (e.g. the acceptable degree of risk that can be transferred to the civilian population as part of a state’s military force protection policy). Rather than risking the adoption of the lowest common denominator in this area when working in coalitions, harmonising approaches in this area and adopting best practice across Europe could have a profound affect on the performance of military operations. In this respect, the SAFE-programme ( see The European, Volume N° 11; page 31) promoted by the European Parliament should not only focus on a rapprochement of procedures, rules of engagement or social standards but also on creating a common understanding of traditions.

The role of public ceremonies To establish the discussion on common culture of responsibility and ethics for crisis management forces in public opinion, the integration of delegations from multinational European forces in public ceremonies, like the parade of French forces on the Champs Elysées, should not remain a symbolic singular action but become a regular activity alternately organized in different European capitals. The November 11th marking the end of World War 1 could be used to commemorate all those who have served and paid the ultimate sacrifice for the causes that their state’s believed in, along with the civilian victims of armed conflict around the world. The participation of multinational elements in the

annual public oath-taking ceremony of Federal armed forces on the 20th July in front of the Reichstag, could for example actuate a common reflection on the difficult relationship between duty of allegiance and resistance against totalitarianism.

How to harmonize military ethics education While such harmonization would be advantageous for many reasons, there are a number of barriers that must be overcome. In the area of military ethics harmonization: • currently, there is no way of comparing and contrasting the political and ethical education that is done across Europe because there is no single place where current practises are recorded in this specific area of activity; • there is actually little or no consensus in military ethics pedagogy about which approaches are most effective in improving understanding and behaviour; • how does one measure effectiveness in this area and what exactly is being judged? Even if one makes progress in addressing any of the above issues/questions, how does one go about transmitting and disseminating best practice? Formed in part as a response to such issues, the recently inaugurated International Society for Military Ethics in Europe not only promotes a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas in this field but also proposes to initiate research on European traditions and to support educational institutions in topical studies on ethical behavior on operations. The second Euro-ISME annual conference is scheduled for 14th and 15th of June this year at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham with the proposed theme of “Military Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect: A Statement of Universal Values or Ethical Imperialism?” In the longer term, Euro-ISME is proposing the creation of a European Centre for Military Ethics, federating different framework partners like King’s College London, Military Academy at St Cyr, Zentrum Innere Führung at Koblenz. The core military institutions would begin with the UK, France and Germany as a first step, followed as quickly as it is practical by other competent institutions such as the Netherlands Defence Academy, the Baltic Defence College etc. We are conscious that these idealistic aspirations will not be achievable comprehensibly across all of Member States of the European Union immediately. There are many restraints, and traditional barriers that hinder the breaking of taboos. For that very reason, in a first step, those problems that hinder different actors to bear their responsibilities or hamper the harmonization of codes of conduct should be analyzed, explored and tested. What quickly becomes obvious is that for all the differences in appearance, there exists already a remarkable agreement on core issues.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

News: European Security & Defence activities Arnaud Danjean MEP bids farewell to Eurocorps as it leaves for Afghanistan For the first time a representative of the European Parliament bade farewell to a European multinational unit on the eve of its deployment. On 4 January 2012 an official farewell ceremony was held for the 300 Eurocorps troops prior to their departure for a 12-month stint in Afghanistan. This will be the fourth deployment for this multinational unit, since 2002 a certified High Readiness Force (HRF) in addition to being a NATO Response Force (NRF). This engagement follows two previous operations in the Balkans and a first deployment in Afghanistan in 2004/2005.

tasks. “There is always a residual danger, but I remain confident”, he said. A contribution for Europe Arnaud Danjean underlined the importance of the operation in Afghanistan for the security of Europe as a whole and for the reconstruction of the Afghan state. “You, the soldiers of Eurocorps, have been excellently prepared for this dangerous operation thanks to your commanders, and I am confident that you will perform your duties with great professionalism. At this time of transition in Afghanistan you are making a vital European contribution to solidarity”. He noted that the Eurocorps was not yet the official core of the European defence structure that was needed in order to live up to the future challenges.

nation mechanisms and develop recommendations on how to overcome them. The results will be introduced at the ESRT’s Transatlantic Cyber Conference on 2 May 2012 in Washington D.C. and at the International Cyber Conference in Brussels in September 2012. This endeavour is part of the ESRTs intention to sharpen its profile, expand networks and deepen contents. > www.security-round-table.eu

New Chairman of the EU Military Committee appointed On 23 January 2012, the Council appointed General Patrick de Rousiers (France) as chairman of the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) for a period of three years as from 6 November 2012. General Patrick

Source: Beh Spiegel 1-2012

ESRT set up event cycle on Cyber Security Photo: Eurocorps

The flags of the eight participating nations flew above the parade ground of the Eurocorps Strasbourg headquarters as Eurocorps Deputy Commander Brigadier General Walter Spindler inspected the troops accompanied by the Chairman of the European Parliament Subcommitee on Security and Defence, Arnaud Danjean. The Eurocorps is prepared In his address General Spindler explained that the Corps had undergone more than 18 months’ intensive training in order to prepare for this new challenge, with the emphasis not only on work in the staff centres but also on the security of the men and women who would be performing a range of

The European Security Round Table (ESRT), with support by the Estonian Ministry of Defence and in cooperation with the US think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) currently sets up an event cycle of conferences and briefings focusing on the coordination of Cyber Security in an international context. A key component is a high-level Expert Working Group with members from Cabinet Malmström, UK Cabinet, NATO, US State Department, OSCE and other international institutions, which is to substantially deepen the approach towards this topic. A first meeting has taken place in December 2011. The aim is to assess key weaknesses in international coordi-

General Patrick de Rousiers Photo: French MoD/ www.defense.gouv.fr

de Rousiers will replace General Håkan Syrén (Sweden), who took up office as chairman of the EUMC on 6 November 2009. General de Rousiers has been working since September 2010, for the Minister of Defense as General inspector of the armed forces. Amongst his various responsibilities he was recently appointed as head of an interagency working group in charge of a “defense and security threats and challenges” working group for the French White Paper updating.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Parliamentarians should not lose anymore time in finding a mechanism for cooperation

Interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP – avenues for the future by Corine Caballero-Bourdot, Secretary General Parliaments Security Defence Europe (PSDA), Paris The Lisbon Treaty did not transform the European Union into a super-state. Whether the EU will be an influential player in the future international order will therefore depend on its capacity for effective action through its institutions, as well as on its Member States, which will continue to play a decisive part in the field of foreign and security policy.

Democratic ‘oversight’ of the CFSP That being the case, parliamentarians can play a particularly useful role in providing democratic oversight and support. Indeed, Article 10 of Protocol No.1 to the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, which came into force on 1 December 2009, stipulates that, “A conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament (CEP), the Council and the Commission. That conference shall in addition promote the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy [CFSP], including common security and defence policy [CSDP]. Contributions from the conference shall not bind national Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions”. Such a “Conference” will only provide real added value if the national parliaments and the European Parliament play their full part in the effort to achieve the EU’s post-Lisbon global ambitions in the field of foreign policy and world governance.

Involvment of national parliaments and the EP The future of interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP – policy areas that will remain intergovernmental – is inconceivable without the involvement of the national parliaments, for they are the ones to vote defence budgets and to authorise the deployment of troops abroad. It is equally inconceivable without the support of the European Parliament, whose members are also elected by universal suffrage and which has information rights as well as budgetary powers in the field of the CFSP. Thus both national parliamentarians and MEPs have fundamental and complementary roles to play in acting jointly as a relay for European public opinion. The political engagement of parliamentarians is crucial for bringing Europe forward. The

Corine Caballero Corine Caballero-Bourdot is Secretary-General of “Parliaments Security Defence Europe” (PSDE). She has been for 20 years as an international civil servant within Western European Union (WEU), beginning her career on the “intergovernmental” side of the organisation, where she worked for the WEU General Secretariat in London, then Brussels. She then moved to the “parliamentary” side, working for the WEU Assembly in Paris, where she was, successively, Head of the Research Office, Deputy Head of the Political Section/Head of External Relations and Head of the Press Office. She is the author of numerous reports on issues of European defence and international security. She recently drafted an Occasional Paper on “Interparliamentary scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – avenues for the future” for the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

members of the Conference will need to have the will to tackle the substantive issues while providing a political vision, not only in the short, but also the medium and long term. Any influence that this Conference may bring to bear will depend on the expertise acquired by its member parliamentarians and its capacity for consensus-building. By means of a transparent debate that tackles the real challenges, this Conference could play a crucial part in monitoring and supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It could help raise awareness among European citizens and win their support for Europe as a major player in a multilateral and multi-polar world in the making.

Recommendations What can be done to implement without further delay the possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty for developing interparliamentary cooperation on the CFSP, including the CSDP, in an optimum and cost-effective fashion? How can cooperation among the national parliaments and the European Parliament be organised effectively, and for the benefit of Europe’s citizens? Following work done by the European Parliament, the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments and COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union), a number of ideas are already on the table and the discussions continue.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Practical organisational aspects One positive point is that the negotiations have moved on from the major principles to the very practical organisational aspects for this new interparliamentary structure for scrutiny of the CFSP/CSDP. This was far from self-evident, since Article 10 of Protocol No.1 to the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the EU only raises the possibility of organising such conferences without making it an obligation, and the whole business could therefore have remained a dead letter. However, a consensus still remains to be found and the devil is in the details. There are still numerous obstacles to overcome. There is a recognised need to organise interparliamentary conferences in order to debate issues of CFSP/CSDP in compliance with the provisions of Article 10 of Protocol No.1 to the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments. It is also agreed that “contributions from the conference shall not bind national Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions”, as stated in Article 10 of Protocol No.1. Everyone agrees that the aim of those conferences should be to provide parliamentary oversight of CFSP/CSDP as opposed to any real form of control entailing the power to sanction. Those interparliamentary conferences will above all serve the purpose of providing information, making national parliamentarians more able to scrutinise their own governments with regard to the intergovernmental dimension of the CFSP/CSDP, and allowing the European Parliament to exercise its role in the European institutional framework. Furthermore, it is clear that the EP and the national parliaments need to define together how to organise and promote “effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation” as called for by Article 9 of Protocol No.1. There is also unanimous agreement on the need to avoid creating a new body or institution for the parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP/CSDP, and to keep the cost to a minimum.

Documentation COSAC COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union) was established in May 1989 at a meeting in Madrid, where the Speakers of the Parliaments of the EU Member States agreed to strengthen the role of national Parliaments in relation to the Community matters by bringing together their Committees on European Affairs. The next COSAC plenary meeting will take place in April 2012. Source: COSAC http://www.cosac.eu/

debate the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The organisation of interparliamentary meetings on Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the Common Security and Defence Policy, may appear innocuous, yet it brings to the forefront questions that are fundamental for the future of Europe, in particular that of democratic scrutiny, the legitimacy of Union action and the issue of the very nature of the Union.

The role COSAC has to play It therefore seems reasonable that the instrument for promoting those exchanges of information and best practices among the national parliaments and the EP should be none other than the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union, in other words, COSAC, even if Protocol No.1 refers strictly speaking to “a” conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs. COSAC has the merit of existing and its framework could easily be adapted in order to hold its regular meetings (bringing together the chairmen of the European affairs committees of the national parliaments and MEPs) back-to-back with the interparliamentary meetings on the CFSP/CSDP (bringing together the chairmen of the foreign affairs, defence and European affairs committees of the national parliaments and MEPs). Hence it would make sense to adapt the COSAC framework in order to organise regular interparliamentary conferences to

Europe’s shared seas and oceans bring both growth and jobs, but only good governance and integrated management may secure their sustainable use. Therefore, the promotion of our common European maritime heritage and the strengthening of our maritime identity are of vital importance.

The Union has adopted first funding mechanisms to support the Integrated Maritime Policy

The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy – steps forward by Georgios S. Koumoutsakos MEP*, Brussels/Strasbourg

Europe is a Maritime Continent having a 70.000 km coastline and being surrounded by two oceans and four seas. 90% of the Union external trade and over 40% of its domestic trade is transported by sea. Given that approximately 350 000 people work in ports and related services together generating an added value of about € 20 billion, it is clear that Europe’s well-being is inextricably linked with the sea.

The development of an integrated approach The Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), which was established in 2007, advocates an integrated approach to the management and governance of the oceans, seas and coasts, and fosters interaction between all sea-related policies in the EU. It constitutes a valuable tool that enables Europeans to establish better governance in maritime affairs for optimal results at a regional, national, European and international level. Several

Georgios S. Koumoutsakos MEP Georgios S. Koumoutsakos MEP has been Member of the European Parliament since 2009. He is Member of the Committees on Transport and Tourism and on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. He is also Vice-Chairman of the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. He studied Political Science and Law in Greece, and received a MA in War and Defence Studies, University of Strasbourg and a MA in International Politics, Free University of Brussels (ULB). During his professional career he worked among others in the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Hellenic Republic (1995 – 1997) and he was tasked with European defence and security and EU-NATO relations at the Permanent Mission of Greece to the Western European Union and the EU (until 2001). He was also Chief of Staff in the office of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petros Molyviatis (2003 – 2004). He was Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2004 until his election to the European Parliament in 2009.

initiatives have been financed through preparatory actions and pilot projects, and a series of tools have been devised, such as common systems for maritime surveillance (see Documentation) and spatial planning, or the recent Marine knowledge 2020 initiative.

Funding mechanisms for the IMP The first funding mechanism for the further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy was adopted on 17 November 2011 by a vast majority of the European Parliament. After long and difficult negotiations, a first reading agreement with the Council was reached ensuring the necessary legal basis for financing of € 40m for activities related to the implementation of the IMP until 2013. The funding will allow the continuation of the activities and pilot projects operating up to now under the policy. Maritime sectors in all Member States will be able to benefit from the programme and a genuine European added value shall be created. The Programme to support the further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy shall have the following objectives: • Promoting integrated maritime governance at European, national and regional level so as to ensure that decision making takes a broader view of all the actions that impact on the seas; • Pinpointing the specific challenges and needs of European sea basins in relation to the various individual sectoral policies; • Contributing to a Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) which brings together all the sector-specific surveillance and monitoring systems, so that national authorities are better equipped to monitor activities and react to unlawful ones or to threats at sea reinforcing the safe, secure and sustainable use of maritime space. CISE can be an additional asset in the European Union efforts to effectively address the

Photo: Jason R. Zalasky/U.S. Navy

Maritime Security

MARITIME SECURITY

scourge of piracy, which has become a global threat both to human life and safety of seafarers and other persons, and to regional stability, world trade, all forms of maritime transport and shipping; • Encouraging the development of a proper marine knowledge infrastructure leading to reliable and high-quality marine data; • Supporting sustainable economic growth, innovation, competition and employment in maritime sectors and coastal regions, such as initiatives to improve social mobility among young people and fostering training, education and career opportunities in maritime professions. Provisions have been also incorporated for measures needed to be taken for a coastal, maritime and island tourism strategy. • Fostering the protection of the marine environment and conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity; • Improving the external cooperation and coordination; in this respect, ratifying and implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international instruments is essential; • Enhancing the visibility of maritime Europe.

A long-term financial perspective The long-term funding of the further development and implementation of this policy is guaranteed, providing the IMP with a longer-term financial perspective and allowing a more strategic approach. The main directions and orientation for the funding of Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) are outlined in the European Commission proposal of 29 June 2011 for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020. The proposal provides that a significant part of the EU budget should continue to be dedicated to fisheries and maritime policies, while most of the current CFP and IMP financial instruments will be integrated into a single fund. Managing maritime affairs in an integrated way means better management and coordination and a major simplification due to the unified rules and procedures. Europe’s shared seas and oceans bring both growth and jobs, but only good governance and integrated management may secure their sustainable use. Their contribution to the economic prosperity of present and future generations cannot be underestimated. Therefore, the promotion of our common European maritime heritage and the strengthening of our maritime identity are of vital importance, and as such it has to be illustrated in the forthcoming legislation. In this respect, it is particularly encouraging that the recent proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund on Integrated Maritime Policy indicates that € 432 million will be solely dedicated for the development of the Integrated Maritime Policy. *As a Member of the Transport and Tourism Committee he was the rapporteur on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Programme to support the further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy, adopted on 17.11.2011 by the plenary session of the European Parliament.

Documentation Global piracy: reported attacks, from 1992 to 2011 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

Source: Deutsches Maritimes Institut (IMB) as of 31.12.11

The development of Integrated Maritime Surveillance A Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) is currently being developed jointly by the European Commission and EU/EEA Member States. So far, EU and national authorities responsible for different aspects of maritime surveillance – e.g. border control, safety and security, fisheries control, customs, environment or defence – collect data separately and often do not share them. Political Initiatives In October 2010, the Commission drafted a Roadmap towards establishing the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the surveillance of the EU maritime domain (available at: http://tinyurl.com/btg6zoo) CISE will integrate existing surveillance systems and networks and give all concerned authorities access to the information they need for their missions at sea. It will make different systems interoperable so that data and other information can be exchanged easily through the use of modern technologies. Pilot projects Two Pilot Projects focus on how to realise cross-border and cross-sector maritime surveillance data exchange on an experimental scale. While the BluemassMed interest area is the Mediterranean Sea and its Atlantic Approaches, the MARSUNO project geographically encompass the Northern Sea Basins. The European Commission will use the results from two Pilot Projects in the process of establishing an Integrated Maritime Surveillance.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Pirate gangs have proved to be adaptive to the naval force

Documentation Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean: Reported attacks and hijackings (IMB)

1.1. – 31.12.2005:  attacks = 45;  hijackings = 15 ships, 241 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 3/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2006:  attacks = 20;  hijackings = 5 ships, 87 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 4/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2007:  attacks = 44;  hijackings = 12 ships, 177 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 3.7/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2008:  attacks = 111;  hijackings = 42 ships, 815 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 2.6/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2009:  attacks = 217;  hijackings = 47 ships, 867 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 4.6/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2010:  attacks = 219;  hijackings = 49 ships, 1016 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 4.5/1. 1.1. – 31.12.2011:  attacks = 237;  hijackings = 28 ships, 480 sailors;  Ratio attacks/hijackings = 8.5/1.

News: UNHCR figures The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) released on 31 January 2012 figures showing that more than 1 500 irregular migrants or refugees drowned or went missing last year while attempting crossings of the Mediterranean Sea. UNHCR also revealed that a record of 58 000 irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees managed to make it to European shores last year after setting off in boats from Asia or North Africa. > More information: http://www.unhcr.org/

ATALANTA – Three years of by Dr Michael Stehr, Attorny, German Maritime Institute, Bonn (Edit) The absence of an effective central government and the protracted civil war in Somalia make it a breeding ground for organised crime such as the smuggling of arms, drugs and human beings. Since the 1990s the Somali civil war has also gone to sea. Given Somalia’s proximity to the world’s busiest sea lanes, piracy was bound to develop. Piracy considerably increased in March 2008 when the Puntland authorities stopped paying “coast guard” personnel. Pirates from the Horn of Africa specialised in the hijacking and ransom business find a safe haven in this country at war. Pirate gangs boost Somalia’s war economy with millions of dollars. In 2011 pirate gangs again stepped up their activities but were considerably less “successful” in terms of the number of hijackings. Dr Michael Stehr, Reserve Officer, German Navy, Maritime correspondent of this magazine takes stock after three years of ATALANTA .

Achievements of ATALANTA EU-NavFor ATALANTAs Press Release of 16th December 2011 reports on the forces activities: “Since the inception of the EU NAVFOR mission in December 2008, over 770,000 tones of food-aid has been moved in 118 escorted transits which are usually a single merchant ship with a warship escort …” Additionally ATALANTA has thwarted roundabout 150 actual pirate attacks on merchant or fishing vessels.

Prolongation and extension of mandates United Nations Security Council extended its mandate to the End of 2012 already in November 2011 with UN-SC Res. 2020. The EU also extended its mandate to the End of 2012 and added a new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to fight piracy in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean states. This mission named Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB) is aimed at supporting the already existing maritime capacity in the region, as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach with the aim of strengthening the ability of the affected regions to govern their own territorial waters and to “reinforce their capacity to fight piracy,” as an EU statement said. In December 2011 German mandate was extended to the End of 2012 by the German Federal Parliament.

Successful containment of piracy since 2011 Since 2008 warships from many Navies- such as Europe, USA, China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and Malaysiawere engaged in repressing piracy. The Navies greatest

MARITIME SECURITY

es’ strategy and enlarged their hunting-ground

f successful operations achievement was to give reliable security to the choke point Gulf of Aden. Pirate gangs proved to be adaptive to the naval forces strategy of securing the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in Gulf of Aden. They enlarged their hunting-ground to the Indian Ocean up to the coastal waters of Pakistan and India, the eastern parts of the Red Sea and the Mozambique Channel. Indian Ocean is a vast area – there are not enough naval assets to provide convoying or even help in case of a raid. Some Nations (inter alia: PRC, Iran, Spain, Netherlands …) and lots of Ship-owners reacted: since 2011 a rising number of vessels transiting Indian Ocean are secured by military detachments or armed private security teams. This proved to be successful: not one of them was hijacked until today. Navies actions provided a kind of containment and security in defined areas and for a minority of vessels (WFP/ World Food Programme) But not before Nations and Ship-owners reacted with “arming” their vessels, the amount of hijacks was brought down in the second half of 2011. Proactive action of NATO- and EU-Navies with reconnaissance of beaches and coastal waters prevented pirate gangs from an “arms race” – otherwise pirate gangs would have already chosen to invest more money to upgrade their abilities with bigger boats and more firepower like machineguns to counter and overwhelm especially private security teams (these usually comprise four men who do not use automatic weapons). Thanks to the NATOs and EUs Navies efforts, Somalia piracy remains a lowcost-business. To sum up: Only these two elements in common could bring down the number of hijacks.

Further options to solve the problem The described strategy of containment proves to be successful. But decisive victory against pirate gangs and defeat of Piracy is exclusively possible on shore. An engagement of foreign powers seems not a realistic option given the proven xenophobia of Somalian people and experiences made in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia proved to be totally unsuccessful so that improvements seem to be unlikely. Strengthening and reconstruction of several local governments or authorities providing security at least in coastal parts of Somalia may be a realistic and lasting solution. EU´s cooperation with Somaliland is an example for this, even with setbacks like the surprising “amnesty” to dozens of imprisoned pirates in October 2011. Nearly 90 pirates were imprisoned in the new Prison of Hargeisa, but following a court decision more than 60 of them

250

200

150

100

0 1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

Total no. of attacks (green); incl. hijackings (blue); incl. boardings, hijacking avoided using safe room (grey); Estimated no. of attacks/hijackings against small ships: x 2-4 Source: Deutsches Maritimes Institut (IMB) as of 31.12.11

were set free-rumour has it that money was paid for this. Meanwhile cooperation with Somaliland was ended by EUMembers. PRC now fills the gap in cooperating with Somaliland and providing vast sums to improve infrastructure in Somaliland, especially Berbera Port, which will be managed by chinese administrators in future, entering competition with the port of Djibouti. The European Union now concentrates on cooperation with Puntland financing the improvement of the facilities as of prisons in Garowe and Bosaso.

Dr Michael Stehr Dr Michael Stehr was born in Hannover, Germany, on September 13, 1966. He is a lawyer with experience as a staff member of the scientific branch of the administration of the German Bundestag. Dr Stehr has been Law of the Sea editor for the German periodical MARINE FORUM since February 2000, (www.marineforum.info ), dealing with Piracy and seaborne terrorisme, European Security and Defence Policy, International Law and Law of the Sea. Dr Michael Stehr is a board member of EuroDefense Germany.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Piracy may be regarded either as a criminal phenomenon or as part of a wider political agenda

Piracy: a phenomenon or a strategy? by Bruno Reynaud De Sousa, Ph. D. researcher at the Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon (Edit) The current EU focus as regards piracy is chiefly on the naval engagement in the waters off the coast of Somalia. However, in the past, actions falling under a broader definition of piracy focused European attention in a more direct, ruthless and poignant way.

Maritime piracy in the past On January 22nd 1961, the Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Group hijacked the Santa Maria, a Miami-bound Portugueseflag cruise ship, killing one of the ship’s officers as he offered resistance. Control of the vessel would later be handed over to Brazilian authorities, following an agreement with the group granting the hijackers political asylum. Almost twenty years later, during the late 1970’s and mid1980’s, the Polisario Front carried out several brutal attacks on fishing vessels sailing the Canary-Saharan fishing bank, of which the cases of the Zuiderster-8 (six crewmembers killed, two wounded) and the Cruz del Mar (summary execution of seven crewmembers, including two teenagers) both in late1978, the Rio Vouga in mid-1980 (fifteen crewmembers taken hostage), the El Junquito (one crewmember killed, six taken hostage, vessel was sunk) in late-1985, are all stark reminders.

Today’s perception of piracy More than three decades later, European States’ perceptions of maritime piracy have somewhat changed. Both the 1961 hijacking as well as the attacks by the Polisario Front bring to the fore several considerations, most of which are of a legal nature and that nowadays have yet to be fully solved. Whilst the legal definition in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is as clear, as are its present day limitations, piracy construed in broad terms may be looked at from a wide-spectrum approach, encompassing armed robbery, hijackings and maritime terrorism. In the 21st century, piracy may, thus, be regarded as either a phenomenon related to criminal exploits, or as an item of a wider agenda (political, criminal, or both) being pursued by a set of actors towards accomplishing different sets of objectives. Setting aside maritime terrorism, piracy’s degree of organization can greatly vary. Depending on the latitude, a different modus operandi is employed, the attack radius capability and its objectives diverge, and the pirates’ degree of resolve differs. Accounts by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC-CCS) of the four attacks on the coast of Guinea (Conakry) taking place throughout 2011, differ from the hijackings on

Bruno Reynaud De Sousa Bruno Reynaud De Sousa is currently a Ph. D. researcher at the Catholic University of Portugal. He is also a research fellow at Association DECIDE – Security, Defence Citizenship, while also assisting with EuroDefense-Portugal national activities. He was born in 1982 in Porto, Portugal. He studied Public law at the International Catholic University of Portugal, Porto School of Law, and holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from the College of Europe, Bruges. From 2008 – 2009 he worked for the European Commission, DG External Relations, where he was responsible for EU relations with North America, and from 2010 – 2011 he was assigned to the Porto Judicial District within the Ministry of Justice of Portugal.

Benin’s coast (Cotonou anchorage) during the same period, which, in turn, are still short of the high-intensity hijackings off the coast of Somalia.

High and low-intensity piracy Whereas links between low-intensity piracy and organized piracy are convoluted, the fact of the matter is that weak or failed coastal States lack the capabilities to inhibit pirates from perpetrating attacks. Although organised high-intensity piracy off the coast of Somalia differs from instances of low-intensity piracy currently on the increase elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea, random armed robbery at sea left unchecked may be a stepping-stone for future hijackings. In Southeast Asia, groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) have engaged in the use of piracy as part of a strategy of maintaining maritime instability and ensuring a degree of maritime domain over key areas. Equally, it is arguable that the Shabab – a Somali militant group close to al-Qaeda that controls areas of southern and central Somalia – is pursuing a strategy with a maritime component: recent reports of kidnappings perpetrated by pirates on Kenya’s northern coast (a French national was abducted and taken by speedboat to Somalia) renew concerns. Moreover, as calls are made for increased international law enforcement efforts towards tracking international transfers of funds originating in ransom payments made to pirates, international links of Gulf of Aden pirates were recognized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as recently as November 2011 (UNSC Resolution 2020).

MARITIME SECURITY

Failed States – failed seas In due course, failed States lead to failed seas. While the existence of inextricable links between State failure – or even State collapse – and the emergence of pirates ashore is questionable, the fact of the matter is that unenforced sovereignty is subject to appropriation. Enabled by the intrinsic unrestricted freedom of the seas, a trend in this seizure is traceable in view of piracy dynamics underway at West and East African latitudes. Indeed, in August 2011, the insurance industry’s Joint War Committee added to its high-risk list of areas the waters off Benin, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) together with Nigeria’s EEZ, north of latitude 3º N. Piracy can be resorted to as a means of creating, maintain and managing a maritime instability status quo that, in turn, improves conditions for the furtherance of other maritime criminal activities such as trafficking in drugs, weapons, human beings or counterfeits. Due to a handicapped capability to enforce the rule of law, threats born ashore such States may more fluently spill over into the maritime domain, more easily reaching EU maritime borders.

The EU’s perception of piracy EU Member States, by and large, perceive piracy as having a negligible impact, being an issue shrouded by legal constraints and that does not resonate among citizens. Consequently, the end-state of counter-piracy efforts – chiefly those off the coast of Somalia – remains guarantying the flow of goods and vessel traffic. The naval engagement is, thus, geared towards maintaining an acceptable level of maritime control, not attaining maritime dominance over the area, or a degree thereof. Ultimately, the desirable end-state of piracy suppression is, thus, not formulated and is, perhaps, accepted as unattainable. In the case of the piracy in the Strait of Malacca, a coordinated

response by coastal States managed to address the situation in a most effective manner, leading to a significant decrease in attacks. Conversely, it is arguable that such a response cannot take place at West and East African latitudes, absent a momentous EU commitment.

A wider law enforcement challenge Even though piracy is but one concern in the wider maritime security context, it increasingly requires the EU to think in strategic terms and outside the box. Given the undying existing legal constraints, the EU’s added value seems to reside, first and foremost, in the work being carried out by FRONTEX and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), towards building up a framework that permits a coherent engagement of different naval and maritime assets, both foreign and local. Piracy is, in essence, a wider law enforcement challenge. For this reason, it is a matter concerning States along with the international organizations and security arrangements they integrate. Such solutions as allowing the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) or the “Convoy Escort Program”, constitute a drift towards the privatization of law enforcement in the maritime domain, bound to crash into several legal barriers. Crucially, increasingly resorting to and enabling the employment of PCASPs will result in renewed uncertainty for all stakeholders concerned, as pirates are proven to eventually reorganize and adapt to changes in their environment. Overall, counter-piracy efforts will continue to provide the EU with a valuable opportunity to increase internal coherence as well as to develop multilateral cooperation in law enforcement, security and defence matters – ranging from maritime surveillance and awareness to advances in Private and Public International Law.

The European – Security and Defence Union THE NEW MAGAZINE FOR EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE COMMUNITY Please send your Subscription order to Re-Fax to +49(0)228 9709738 Karin Dornbusch · Advertising Manager · Phone: +49(0)228 9 70 97 40, E-Mail: subscription@euro-defence.eu

3 issues, including postage and delivery:

Company:

International subscription: 66,- Euro

Subscription EU 42,- Euro

VAT no.:

Address (Street, Zip-Code, Town, Country):

Phone:

Fax:

E-Mail:

Date, Signature:

Further information about the magazine can be found on www.magazine-the-european.com

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Greater interaction is needed between technology developers and regulatory authorities

Protecting global trade in transit – an industry perspective by Magnus Ovilius, Senior Vice President Government Relations for Smiths Group, Brussels This article gratefully acknowledges the work made by the World Customs Organisation and the Security & Defence Agenda on protecting global trade in transit. Used by more than 180 governments and their agencies worldwide, Smiths Detection is a global leader in developing and providing security detection solutions for protecting global trade in transit. Customs and border protection requirements are constantly evolving. Traditional fiscal roles continue but there is now additional emphasis on the identification of threats to security. The priorities have moved from monitoring cross-border cargo and reducing international shipments of contraband, to screening for explosives, arms, dirty bombs and weapons of mass destruction. Due to the potential catastrophic impact of using a container to transport or deliver chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear weapons, measures to combat these threats which may vary geographically and over time, must be high on the priority list of authorities.

Rapid detection of threats is the challenge Containers today are used to smuggle goods, drugs and even people. In addition, they are the target of theft. These threats may also be applicable to occupied vehicles such as cars and vans in the land transport area resulting in the need for threat assessed occupied vehicle scanning where the threat from bulk and sheet explosives may add yet another concern. Identifying these threats is increasingly more challenging. Terrorists and criminals become more creative in their methods of delivery and disguise. Whether the threat is strategically hidden inside an occupied vehicle or concealed in the middle of a shipment, the challenge is rapid detection without disrupting the flow of goods and to limit the costs stemming

HCV Stationary – The HCVS constitutes the optimized approach for customs or security inspections. For custom and police authorities, this system is an indispensable tool in preventing smugglers and terrorists from continuing their illicit operations through main border points. It can can be equipped with single or dual view technology as well as high energy discrimination. These solutions ensure the detection and exact location of suspicious objects such as smuggled goods, weapons, explosives or drugs. Photo: Smiths Group

Magnus Ovilius Mr Ovilius is Senior Vice President Government Relations for Smiths Group where he is responsible for global government relations issues & group initiatives. He holds a degree of Master of Laws from the University of Lund in Sweden. He received military training as an officer with the Swedish Armed Forces (Royal Coastal Artillery) serving as an operations officer in the UN Forces in Lebanon. Prior to joining Smiths Group, Mr. Ovilius was a senior civil servant with the European Commission where he has held various management positions, most recently as Head of Sector Preparedness and Crisis Management in the Directorate General for Justice Freedom and Security. He was responsible for the formulation, implementation and evaluation of European Union policies to fight against terrorism, including defence-related aspects of counter-terrorism, law enforcement-led civil protection, critical infrastructure protection, crisis management, CBRNE policies, G8 Roma/Lyon meetings and Security Research.

from security measures. Although a very well functioning system, trusted cargo handler concepts should not be trusted blindly. Unpredictable and random checks are needed to effectively counter threats. One country or one trusted operator cannot be treated the same way over 5 years without some sort of checks. To remain vigilant, these processes need to be constantly monitored and evaluated based on ongoing threat assessments.

Transit cargo security – a transversal issue Security of transit cargo is also a transversal issue, linking border control, customs, transport, ICT issues, logistics and law enforcement in the fight against terrorism and crime. The

MARITIME SECURITY

trade supply chain involves a variety of different parties, all of which handle large volumes of goods and information, and whose accurate and timely performance is critical to the proper functioning of the supply chain. In addition, the trade supply chain comprises very different modes of transport: maritime, air, rail and road transport, each exhibiting different characteristics and security needs. The international nature of transport and the associated security challenges require a coordinated approach between national administrations with regard to risk management, incident response, data sharing, training and risk prevention. Governments are now increasingly looking at the potential for technical equipment for scanning cargo to help meet their objectives by increasing efficiency in examinations. But this is not sufficient as industry needs to collaborate more closely with governments to identify potential threats and prepare for evolving customs and border requirements.

A security system which minimises delays and costs The more rigid the security requirements are, the greater the potential delays in transport times, which in turn may introduce additional costs. Yet, given the cost and time involved, a full physical examination of all goods is not a solution either. We cannot add security measures which increase delays when you have to unload large container ships at a major container port. A container ship with 13,000 containers does not have the time. A risk-based approach rightly focus resources on high-risk cargo while facilitating easy passage for legitimate trade but should at the same time ensure that relevant detection technologies are used in conjunction with intelligence. This is only possible if the private sector who provide the security and the regulators who do the risk and threat assessment have a greater dialogue. Put it simple, we need to interact more in order to be cost efficient. We need to work together to deliver what we all want to see: a trade supply security system that offers the highest levels of protection for cargo and goods at the same time as minimising disruption, cost and fuss. To this aim, the following recommendations should be considered: 1. Foster greater interaction between technology developers and regulatory authorities on trade supply chain security by creating a European Platform for Public-Private Dialogue with the aim of bringing together relevant stakeholders; 2. Define and implement a common architecture for the integration of trade supply chain security solutions and services in a ’one stop system’, based on relevant risk assessment methodologies. 3. Improve mutual recognition regarding certification and advance notification with other relevant trade supply chain security programmes outside the EU; 4. Coordinate and prioritise trade supply chain security funding to define and deploy next generation screening solutions.

Documentation European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) On 12 DECEMBER 2011, the European Commission proposed a Regulation establishing a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) with the aim of increasing coordination within and between Member States to prevent and tackle serious crime, such as drug trafficking and the trafficking of human beings, and to diminish the death toll of migrants at sea. The proposed Regulation will now be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council with a view to making EUROSUR operational by the end of 2013 Exchange of operational infomation Under the EUROSUR mechanism, Member States’ authorities responsible for border surveillance (border guards, coast guards, police, customs and navies) will be able to exchange operational information and cooperate with each other, with Frontex and with neighbouring countries. The exchange of information in the framework of EUROSUR will take the form of ‘situational pictures’, which can be described as graphical interfaces presenting data, information and intelligence. In order to improve the capability of detecting small vessels, Frontex will also set up a service for the common application of surveillance tools, combining, among other things, satellite imagery with information derived from ship reporting systems. National coordination centres Each Member State with land and maritime external borders will have to establish a national coordination centre for border surveillance, which will exchange information with other national coordination centres and Frontex via a protected communication network. In November 2011, Frontex interlinked on a pilot basis with the first six national coordination centres via a protected communication network. The remaining national coordination centres of Member States will be connected in 2012 and 2013. Together with Member States and other EU agencies, Frontex is currently developing the other components of EUROSUR, which focus in particular on the detection of small vessels used for smuggling human beings as well as drug trafficking. > Draft Regulation: http://tinyurl.com/7an3rw6 Source: European Commission

News: Cargo: new security measure As of 1 February 2012, all cargo carried into the EU will be subjected to new security measures. A new EU Regulation 859/2011, adopted in August 2011, introduces new requirements to increase security of cargo flying into the EU. Any airline carrying cargo or mail into the EU will have to be designated for each station they are operating from as “Air Cargo or Mail Carrier operating in the Union from a Third country airport” (ACC3). All cargo carried by ACC3 shall be screened or security controlled and their security status shall be indicated in an accompanying documentation. The regulation also includes additional security measures for High Risk Cargo, defined as cargo originating from some specific countries, or cargo subject to significant tampering. These new rules pose a real challenge to airlines and freight forwarders worldwide because they have to ensure that EU requirements are implemented at all airports in foreign countries. > The Regulation is available at: http://tinyurl.com/7ygadys

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Only improved situation awareness allows proper decision-making for the engagement of forces

Early detection enabling the effective protection of coastlines by Jennifer Gruber, Director Technical Sales Security Radars, Cassidian Facing terrorist attacks, migratory movements and illicit intrusions, governments frequently do not find efficient solutions for their main problem: the early detection of potentially dangerous movements close to their coastlines and borders. This is particularly true for littorals where heterogeneous vegetation and terrain together with environmental conditions such as fog, rain and other physical disturbances hamper the detection capabilities of conventional optical sensors. Therefore, potential threats frequently remain undetected preventing security forces from fulfilling their main task: protecting their people.

Assured ground a sea surveillance Today, the latest radar technologies can solve this problem. Apart from having a higher range and a wider field of view than e.g. optical sensors, radars are almost unaffected by environmental conditions such as mist, rain, darkness or even sandstorms. If combined with advanced distance and motion information devices, this results in more efficient and reliable security systems.

Jennifer Gruber Jennifer Gruber studied International Business Administration at the University of Cooperative Education Villingen-Schwenningen, Germany and the University of Jaen, Spain and wrote her thesis about the introduction of a helicopter warning system on the US market. Since 2006 she has been working for EADS: she started in the sales and marketing department of the defence electronics area of Cassidian, the defence and security division of EADS. In 2009 she took over the lead of a strategy project in the fields of military mission avionics. In 2010 she developed the marketing of the newly established security radar business within Cassidian. Today, she is working as Director Technical Sales Security Radars within Cassidian.

sea at the same time. SPEXER radars have already proven their performance as part of integrated security systems in various regions worldwide. This new generation of sensors provides early warnings and offers a clear overview of situations, thereby enabling security forces to act very efficiently at an early stage.

Proven reliability In order to cope with the challenges of scenarios with asymmetric threats, Cassidian has developed the SPEXERTM security radar family, a series of high-performance surveillance radars providing automatic detection, classification and tracking of numerous objects on the ground, in the air or at

The Spexer family The latest “member” of this security radar family is the SPEXER 2000 Coastal – a security radar optimized for the surveillance of coastal areas and maritime infrastructure such as oil fields and harbours. With an instrumented range of up to 43.2 NM

Cassidian's SPEXER 2000 Coastal radar ensures early detection of threats in littoral areas.

Photo: Cassidian

MARITIME SECURITY

high Doppler resolution. This is essential for the detection of small targets such as swimmers in the sea or persons on land in areas with high sea and/or land clutter. Typical situations include for example the detection of a rubber dinghy that leaves a boat and that brings people on land who e.g. are smuggling goods. The SPEXER 2000 Coastal reliably detects, tracks and classifies these targets owing to its extremely high Doppler resolution.

Result Using innovative electronics, the radar provides an extremely high availability. This results from a graceful degradation capability and a high High-performance microwave components – shown here cleanroom assembly at Cassidian's Ulm MTBCF (mean time between critical facilities – give radars superior detection capabilities. Photo: Cassidian failures), which grants low life cycle costs. SPEXER 2000 Coastal easily integrates into any command & control system and is ready for (80 km), its high Doppler and velocity resolution as well as its networking with other radars or optronics, e.g., an external high sea clutter suppression, it is able to detect, track and optical camera can be cued to verify alarms. classify even very small and slowly moving objects such as Approximately 50 radars of the SPEXER 2000 variant – specifiswimmers, rubber dinghies, single pedestrians, but also fast cally designed for border surveillance – have been delivered objects such as speed boats in particular in rough sea-state. for integration in a huge border surveillance system and Due to a unique signal processing architecture, the SPEXER production is still running for other projects. Furthermore, 2000 Coastal is able to reliably detect sea, land and air tarspecific versions for close-in surveillance are under developgets: Today, simultaneous land and sea surveillance due to ment. the different physical conditions over land and sea usually demands the deployment of different sensors. With SPEXER Thus, experience clearly shows the advantages of latest-tech2000 Coastal, this is not necessary any more resulting in lower nology AESA radars over conventional solutions if it comes to costs over the complete life cycle. protecting coastal areas. Improved situational awareness gives security and political leadership the time needed to Latest AESA technology make sound decisions and to deploy forces efficiently. It is the first operational land-based coastal surveillance radar worldwide using the latest AESA (Active Electronically Scanning Array) technology which provides superior performance compared to conventional reflector antenna radars. The radar has a multi-tasking capability, which permits individual objects under suspicion to be tracked while at the same time providing continuous sector surveillance, which is the socalled quad beam mode. Thus, SPEXER not only collects information on specific targets and intruders, but also monitors the overall scenario at the same time. This is not possible NATO’s missile defence command will be located at HQ Allied Air with mechanically rotating antennas. Command Ramstein, Germany, as it was confirmed during the NATO Defence ministers meeting on 2-3 February. NATO’s Ballistic Missile Due to these multi-mode surveillance features, one SPEXER Defence capability will rest on nationally contributed weapon 2000 Coastal offers the performance of two or even more systems and sensors employed by a coherent NATO command and conventional radars and overcomes the disadvantages of control system. Key elements of this command and control capabiliconventional, mechanically rotating radars. A specifically ty are under development at HQ Allied Air Command Ramstein. important operational feature of SPEXER 2000 Coastal is its

News: NATO missile defence

Any danger to our lifelines, whether of natural origin or a man-made disaster or attack can have knock-on effects. Decision makers need reliable information to react quickly and effectively to any emission of CBRN warfare agents or industrial pollutants.

Complex, challenging and growing, the CBRNe threat demands improved reconnaissance capabilities

CBRNe Defence: an obligation to protect Europe’s citizens by Anne-Cathrin Schreiber, Sales Manager CBRN Defence Systems, Rheinmetall MAN, Kassel

Today, more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances and weapons continue to pose a serious and growing threat. In particular, increased proliferation of biological and chemical weapons must be expected, as these are cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons. No one can say whether the efforts of groups such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will ever succeed in preventing the further spread of such substances, or, for that matter, in bringing about their global elimination.

RMMV Mobile CBRNe reconnaissance systems International efforts notwithstanding, nothing thus far has been able to stop the gradual spread of nuclear weapons and the knowledge and infrastructure necessary for making them. Moreover, the increasing industrialization of the planet pres-

Anne-Cathrin Schreiber Anne-Cathrin Schreiber works as Sales Manager CBRN Defence Systems for Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles’ CBRN Defence Department. She holds a Master of Business Administration (FH) and graduated as Marketing-CommunicationEconomist (VWA).She worked many years in the NBC-RS project business for Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH as management interface between Rheinmetall and one US customer. Previously, she worked abroad as deputy lead customer satisfaction and training specialist for an American hardware company. Before that time she supervised and assisted the development and implementation of a new sales channel for a music software company in Hamburg. In addition, she is the Chairwoman of a European task force “Leadership & Lifelong Learning” for a international business network.

ents major risks as well: planners have to take the possibility of an unintended release of industrial pollutants (known as a “release other than attack”, or ROTA) just as seriously as the threat of a terrorist attack. In light of this situation, military and civilian decision-makers must be able to react quickly and effectively to any emission of CBRNe warefare agents or industrial pollutants. Fast and reliable detection of any release of CBRNe agents or industrial pollutants is the first priority. With the scope and complexity of future military and civilian operational scenarios steadily increasing, this capability is likely to become more and more important in coming years. As one of the world’s leading makers of high-mobility CBRNe reconnaissance systems for military operations and civil defence, Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles GmbH (RMMV) has spent over two decades developing and perfecting such systems. During this period, the company has created an extensive array of products that meet the wide-ranging expectations and requirements of demanding users around the world. Focused first and foremost on protecting people, Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles will continue to produce forward-looking, customer-oriented solutions for military and civilian defence scenarios. In order to meet the rapidly evolving threat posed by CBRNe agents, RMMV is now developing a new generation of compact, multifunctional, operationally flexible CBRNe detection systems.

Taking heed of the CBRNe threat Although many security experts see the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction and disruption as a clear and present danger, public perceptions vary considerably, and are often tinged by irrational, ill-informed thinking. In fact, a sober,

Photo: Rheinmetall

Protection

PROTECTION

unbiased discussion of the risks we face has yet to take place in the public sphere. The distorted perceptions this gives rise to can conceal considerable risks in their own right. After all, overestimating or underestimating the actual threat posed by a CBRNe release could pose a real danger to the civilian population, and potentially do far more harm than good. Nor are politicians immune to such misconceptions. Nevertheless, any serious appraisal of the risks to Europe’s security must include a rational analysis of the threat posed by CBRNe to soldiers and civilians alike – the sine qua non for working out effective ways of protecting our societies. In future, interdisciplinary cooperation between the armed services, relief organizations, medical first responders, and industry will play a crucial part in detecting and neutralizing contaminants. In the process, the special skills and expertise of the respective players will have to be bundled and synchronized.

The significance of interdisciplinary cooperation The sheer unpredictability of CBRNe events means that military and civilian decision-makers and first responders are basically unable to prepare for specific incidents of this kind, and are forced to react with little or no warning. This is why it is so important to bundle existing expertise into interdisciplinary partnerships, as well as to draw in the civilian population to make sure people react in a rational manner, thus helping to limit the number of casualties and keeping overall damage to a minimum. Continuous interdisciplinary cooperation paired with secure, reliable, timely transmission of information between the participating partners is indispensable, and must be maintained throughout each of the interdependent CBRNe defence phases: Pro Act – Prevent – Prepare – Respond – Aftercare.

The media, too, have a vital role to play in the aftermath of a CBRNe incident: rather than fuelling panic, responsible, wellinformed reporting can actually help to avoid it.

Operational challenges Warding off the CBRNe threat in the 21st century requires innovative, extremely flexible, fully networked solutions – the kind of solutions that come from close and continuous cooperation between users and manufacturers. Modern, mobile equipment, flexibly deployable and affordably priced, coupled with superbly coordinated, networked core capabilities will assure Europe’s ability to react in emergencies. The trend is toward high-mobility, lightweight CBRNe reconnaissance systems that can be used in a military, civil defence or disaster relief context. In the coming decade, double-digit rates of growth are expected in this segment. However, budgetary constraints and a shortage of trained personnel pose great challenges to governments and manufacturers of CBRNe detection systems alike. Here, striking the right balance between human beings and machines is vital. Existing solutions tend to focus on technology as a means of detecting contaminants quickly and reliably, backed up by training and instruction designed to ensure competent operation of the systems. But what about the people who are affected by a CBRNe attack? What can be done to support the emergency services, who will most likely by overwhelmed by the complexity of a CBRNe event and almost certainly lack adequate resources? What can individual citizens do to make Europe more secure? The psychological, physical, social and political effects of an incident will be critical in shaping public reaction and determining the success of rescue and relief operations.

photo: Rheinmetall

In order to provide effective support to first responders and relief agencies, self-help concepts are needed that can be quickly implemented for different parts of the population. Age, origin, education and health all play a demonstrable role in this context.

Dialogue and exchanging best practice in the EU Ensuring a resilient and effective interdisciplinary response to a CBRNe event requires diverse, regular training and drills in a variety of operational and environmental scenarios. In doing so, the specific strengths and vulnerabilities of individual EU Member States and the groups involved need to be taken into account and unified in an overarching European concept. In addition, it is important to conduct in-depth case studies of environmental and natural disasters and major industrial accidents (e.g. Fukushima in 2011 or the Akja toxic spill in Hungary in 2010), and to assess their impact on Europe. It is the EU’s task to act as coordinator and driving force here, aiming for well-targeted progress.

Raising awareness and training What can be done to prepare for a CBRNe event? The release of toxic substances in a public transport system or of hazardous materials in a sports stadium; a stricken nuclear reactor or biological hazards in the food or farm sector; chemical spills, environmental disasters, canisters of mustard gas

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Attacks can be made at any time, from anywhere on the g corroding at the bottom of the sea… the list of risks is alarmingly long. The value of a well-grounded, comprehensive knowledge of CBRNe incidents and of knowing how to react to them appropriately cannot be overstated. If we want to be able to react to an incident in a fast, well targeted, sustained way, this kind of knowledge needs to be available in every EU country and at all levels of society. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima in 2011 makes this very clear. The public have to be aware of the problem, and be trained to know what to look for and what to do in the event of an emergency – and this applies to all five of the CBRNe defence phases mentioned above, each of which overlap and influence the other.

The way ahead Realistic, practical training and reconnaissance concepts are one way of acting in a preventive, pro-active way. Even though many countries in Europe allocate very little in the way of resources for training activities concerning the growing CBRNe threat, the requirement for such measures is on the rise. The private sector is already developing new training products to

NBC Detection Vehicle

photo: Rheinmetall

serve this segment of the security market, while the European Commission has responded by launching a number of project initiatives. To date, however, many training concepts have been oriented exclusively to military users or specially trained first responders and civil defence organizations. Measures for raising public awareness of the CBRNe threat and teaching people how to respond to an emergency would do even more to strengthen Europe’s preparedness. For example, this would reduce the pressure on the emergency services and increase the probability of successful outcomes during rescue operations. It ought to be possible to draw on the knowledge and experience of all CBRNe experts, users and manufacturers alike, contributing to speedy implementation of the concept.

Cross-sector collaboration by Lorenzo Fiori, Senior Vice President – Chief Technology Officer, ICT security and info assurance are definitely consolidated requirements set by any customer, ranging from governments to small enterprises. The exposure to risks connected to cyber threats is constantly increasing, being more critical for those nations and communities which are more technologically advanced and with a large content of critical activities dependant from ICT infrastructure. That’s why at the summit in Lisbon in November 2010 the Nations formally recognized the need to cooperate on cyber security and, subsequently, cyber defense became a top priority to NATO, fully embedded in its new strategic concept.

From cyber security to cyber warfare Talking about cyber security and cyber defense could be however limiting. Today in fact cyber warfare is a reality to be seriously considered. Military combatant traditionally operated in four dimensions: land, sea, air and space. Rapid technological advances and modern society’s increasing dependence on IT technology have given rise to the fifth dimension of the battle-space: the cyberspace. Cyber actors, from individual hackers through criminal groups and terrorists up to rogue states can today easily combine to launch a customized cyber threat. Attacks can be made at any time, from anywhere on the globe, can be heavily camouflaged within the existing traffic on the web and can develop extremely quickly. Anyone with a network connection is a potential target, making the damage easier to inflict and with greater potential consequences. This means that new defence and security techniques need to be developed and that countering the cyber threat is extremely challenging, aggravated by the difficulty to prove the source of an attack. Furthermore scant legislation exists around appropriate responses and there is little in the way of a solid deterrent for attackers.The cyber warfare is a sort of “silent” war in the sense that, unlike traditional battles, the impact is not measured in body-count or land captured but rather in bits and bytes of data encrypted stolen or manipulated. But the effects can be now escalated till to be even physically destructive.

The cyber “dilemma” What are the structural elements that differentiates a traditional conflict from a cyber attack in simple terms? These are in essence four: Attribution: it is hard – if not impossible – to prove beyond any doubt the true source of a cyber attack Retribution: even if the source was known, no real geo-political

PROTECTION

globe, can be heavily camouflaged within existing traffic on the web

on Cyber Security & Defence Finmeccanica Group, Rom framework for appropriate response is in place yet. Disproportion: the damage caused by a cyber attack can vastly outweigh the resources and manpower of the attacker consequences comparable to those of a traditional weapon. Deterrence: there is currently little in the way of a deterrent to cyber attackers. Traditional military superiority cannot preclude them. Technology superiority can help, but it is not enough.

Lorenzo Fiori Born in Milan on 20th of January 1959 Graduated at University of Politecnico di Milano in Mechanics and Electronics Engineering He has been working in Aerospace and Defence for more than 20 years. Since 1st of July 2010 appointed as Senior Vice President – Chief Technology Officer of Finmeccanica Group.

New conceptional approaches Given the above, cyber security defence requires unconventional concept development and a “non-traditional” doctrine, including an innovative highly unusual approach by institutional organisations, civil society and private sector in defeating the threat, bearing in mind that the vast majority of cyber assets are outside governments direct control and, again, threats are at global nature. It is hard to believe that a threat developed in and disseminated throughout an open and vast system like the Internet can be neutralised in isolation. In such a respect to address vulnerabilities in cyberspace, governments will look for and benefit from close collaboration with partners, ranging from private sector to academia up to other international organizations.

Cooperation as key response to cyber “dilemma” To defeat cyber threat a mix of procedural, operational and infrastructural elements is necessary to be considered by all related stakeholders, both public and private. At least: • Need for transparency on threat evolution and threat intrusions (or attacks). • Coordinated approach for searching for malware data, i.e. intelligence gathering and analysis for preventative purposes. • Establishment of a minimum set of standards such as the use of common criteria for threat assessment. • Rationalization of ICT/cyber policy, procedures and training for risk analysis & risk assessment as the level of risk of the cyber system in one participants is directly related to that in another. • Transnational interoperability between Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Security Operational Centres (SOCs) in case a national SOC system fails due to a cyber attack, i.e. fall back. • Common approach to simulation and exercises, including the development of a shared cyber-labs to test cyber environments and ICT/cyber resilience and procedures. This would also support the development of common CONOPS for Cyber Defence, and improve operating procedures. Cooperation across public and private sector is therefore no

longer deferrable given also that the cyberspace is more than internet, it is rather the interdependent network of information technology which includes internet and also the telecommunications network (again public and private), the computer systems, the embedded processors and controllers, particularly those of the so defined Critical National Infrastructures Transnational cooperation across PP sectors. The approach should be preferably based on a very simple and intuitive scheme whereby the public sector needs private sector’s know how (i.e. from industry specialists, providers, operators, utilities etc) and, in turns, private sector needs public sector “power” (i.e. from governmental institutions particularly those of military and paramilitary organizations) to defend against global emerging threats that can undermine safety & security and economy & prosperity which are vital for any country to grow. Therefore, the collaboration must be felt as a sort of natural imperative with reciprocal benefits to everybody. Under the above, innovation is also fundamental. Both public and private sectors must prioritize solutions that can be adapted to align with new technologies and with new threats/attacks. Solution might also require innovative approach to organizational aspects enabling cooperation to activate. Flexibility and scalability of solutions are therefore key ingredients around cyber innovation policy. Resilience of the solutions Resilience of the solutions needs to be carefully addressed, traded off and then shared. In such a respect the awareness gained till now (i.e. lesson learnt, particularly on incident management) combined with “tactical” responses already in place (i.e. resilience adaptation to existing CIS) should foster the development of mitigation measures (i.e. “strategic” planning) commensurate with any threat identified as critical to the safety, security, economy and prosperity of the countries. To support the trade off around these measures a risk based

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Finmeccanica keycap S3Defend S3Defend inspects all network sessions, regardless of protocol, for suspicious activity. When detected, S3Defend raises an alert, stores evidence and automatically starts a source/destination deep analysis. All suspicious files and sessions are submitted to TEM (Trust Execution Monitor) engine for static/dynamic malware analysis, provided with both onpremise server and cloud-based sandboxes. S3Defend supports SNMP and syslog data push for integration with third parties SIEM to correlate events. TEM’s result analysis and the output of correlation allow a deeply understanding of network and system anomalous behavior to enable S3Defend fine tuning.

Archangel

The Secure Operation Center (SOC) – Pescara provides a flexible and comprehensive set of management and monitoring services that can be quickly tailored according to any customer specific needs. Security services offer efficient perimeter security with around-the-clock devices maintenance, real-time monitoring, event correlation, and analysis of the customer’s infrastructure and critical applications for

strategy is key to address which minimum level of resilience can be acceptable and shareable across countries in order to better prevent, defend and recover from future attacks as no one can afford full (360°) protection. To share best trade-offs implies also to find synergies across higher standards and commercial needs. In terms of responsiveness, laws and regulations are to be harmonized not only to prosecute but also to proactively encourage – on priority – info-sharing, then prevention, remediation and quick response e.g. through incentive mechanisms that can also be extended to fund the increment to the level of the resilience spread over the network, thus decreasing the vulnerability level of the network. Harmonization requires also the concurrence around standards and best practices (including those around the security of the supply chain) to be shared and replicable in all countries and also to be kept constantly updated with threat & technology evolution (not only because obsolescence but also in view of new technology such as cloud computing or IP V6). Finally, the importance of culture meant as grow of sensitivity and knowledge under a disciplined and structural approach. Public/private sector collaboration should leverage the Academia for the development of culture and education around cyber, collaborating together not only on new technology but also on skills & competencies for cyber specialists and professionals. It is clear that all the above require resources, the funding of which could represent if not an impediment at least an excuse to take time before acting against grow of cyber threats. In such a respect it is important to bear in mind the consequential cost of cyber threats which are already today quantified as massive

fast response to security threats. Incident Handling services cover the full lifecycle of the incident management, from planning and analysis to emergency response and forensics evidence collection.

SOC – Pescara

Archangel is the SOC for high risk Customers. Archangel provides 24x7 protective monitoring on systems up to secret classification, and is designed to meet the accreditation needs of the most demanding Customers.

and keep on top of the priorities those potential advantage offered by a proactive funded cooperation across public and private sectors enabling huge savings on the consequential costs, therefore maintain the balance well on the positive side.

Experience The Finmeccanica Group has a long standing experience on cyber particularly in Italy and in UK where SOC are operated H24/7D for internal to the Group cyber security needs and for customers’ needs. For the last 10 years the Group has delivered cyber security value added services from its SOC to many customers ranging from small – medium to large enterprises, throughout Critical National Infrastructures, Banks, Public Administrations up to Governmental Institutions such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interiors and Ministry of Defense.

The way ahead is open cooperation The Group has adopted a systemic approach based on intense dialogue and collaboration with the stakeholders involved on cyber security and defense, open to partnership with other cyber specialists & industries and with Academia. The systemic approach in Italy and UK has been recently extended to support international and collaborative initiatives such as MNE7 (Global Commons), NIAG (Cooperation between NATO and private sectors), NATO (FFCI with ATC) to all of which the Group can contribute with its experience gained in operating cyber security since beginning 2000. It is only through open collaboration between public and private that cyber threat can be better fought and hopefully defeated.

PROTECTION

News: NATO Security & Defence activities The NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011 On 26 January, NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched the first ‘Annual Report’ highlighting NATO’s activities and challenges in 2011. This assessment of Alliance activities focuses on four areas: NATO operations, emerging security challenges, the modernization of NATO as well as NATO’s growing partnerships. These areas are examined against the backdrop of the financial crisis and are preceded by a foreword from the Secretary General. (excerpts/foreword) From Libya to Afghanistan and Kosovo, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, the Alliance was committed to protecting its populations and active in upholding its principles and values. We enabled the Afghan security forces to start taking the lead for security for over half of the Afghan population. We successfully concluded our training mission which has contributed to improving Iraq’s security capacity. 2011 was also a benchmark year for reforms. We took significant steps to further streamline our structures, enhance our effectiveness and reduce our costs. At the same time, we strengthened our capabilities in many areas, including the prevention of cyber attacks. And we enhanced our connectivity by increasing cooperation with our partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, as well as with many other countries across the globe. This is a transatlantic Alliance that, despite the economic crisis, has once again demonstrated its commitment, capability and connectivity. In 2011, our new Strategic Concept was put to the test. This report – the first of its kind – shows that we successfully met that test. At the start of the year, few would have imagined NATO would be called to protect the people of Libya. But on 31

March, NATO took swift action on the basis of the historic United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. We saved countless lives. And seven months later, we successfully completed our mission. When I visited Tripolion 31 October, Chairman Jalil of the National TransitionalCouncil told me, “NATO is in the heart of the Libyan people.” Operation Unified Protector was one of the most remarkable in NATO’s history. It showed the Alliance’s strength and flexibility. European Allies and Canada took the lead; the United States provided critical capabilities; and the NATO command structure unified all those contributions, as well as those of our partners, for one clear goal. In fact, the operation opened a completely new chapter of cooperation with our partners in the region, who called for NATO to act and then contributed actively. It was also an exemplary mission of cooperation and consultation with other organizations, including the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and the European Union. Throughout, NATO proved itself as a force for good and the ultimate force multiplier. These achievements give me great confidence as I look forward to 2012. Clearly, economic challenges are likely to remain a dominant factor and decisions taken today may shape our world for decades to come. Our task is to make sure we emerge stronger, not weaker, from the crisis we all face. But we can draw great strength from an enduring source: the indivisibility of security between North America and Europe. NATO is a security investment that has stood the test of time for over six decades and continues to deliver real returns for all Allies, year after year. 2012 will be marked by our Chicago Summit in May. This will be an opportunity to renew our commitment to the

Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presenting his Annual Report, 26 January 2012 Photo: NATO

vital transatlantic bond between us and to redouble our efforts to share the burden of security more effectively. We will take important decisions to keep NATO committed, capable and connected. Afghanistan remains by far our largest operation, with over 130,000 troops as part of the broadest coalition in history. 50 Allies and partners are determined to ensure the country will never again be a base for global terrorism. (…) At Chicago, we will also take measures to improve our capabilities. During our operation in Libya, the United States deployed critical assets, such as drones, precision-guided munitions and air-toair refuelling. We need such assets to be available more widely among Allies. In the current economic climate, delivering these expensive capabilities will not be easy. (…) The answer lies in what I call “smart defence”: doing better with less by working more together. In Chicago, we will deliver real “smart defence” commitments, so that every Ally can contribute to an even more capable Alliance. (…) > The Annual Report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/6nvc7zb

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

To secure global networking needs global development capacity used to the full

Providing information security is an ethical obligation by Volker Smid, Chairman of the Management Board, Hewlett-Packard Germany The European: In the old days a computer was just a computer. Now it has become a high-performance medium and the manufacturers who used just to produce hardware are now opting for a broader approach embracing not just the supply of peripheral equipment but also the provision of additional services such as IT security. And yet last autumn your company surprised the world with its decision to move out of the PC business. Then, only two months later, the new HP management changed course and announced that the company would continue to sell computers. Surely a new strategy cannot be drawn up that quickly, or was it for purely economic reasons? After all, lately the PC business has represented an annual turnover of 40 billion euros: what is the new strategic positioning of the PC sector within HP? Volker Smid: After the completion of a review of strategic options for the PC business, HP announced in October that it will remain part of the company. Keeping the PC business within HP is right for customers and partners, right for shareholders, and right for employees. Together we are stronger. Moreover, a fact that seems to have slipped to the back of people’s minds during the discussions in autumn is that over the last years we have considerably developed and integrated our portfolio in the critical business areas of IT management, services and security software. The European: That pragmatic approach has been understood, but at the same time, customers and partners are wondering about their future relations with HP following that management reshuffle. I imagine that a few strategic issues are still hanging in the balance. Volker Smid: HP is the world’s biggest IT company and it has confirmed its strategic positioning. We combine our leading role as a supplier of IT infrastructure with that of a provider of software and services. In this way we provide comprehensive IT solutions for science and research, governments and companies, with a view, for instance, to innovative product development, the modernisation of business processes and services in public administration, the health services and the security area, new mobility concepts and the supply of energy, to mention just a few important areas. Our customers can rely on us. The European: The subject that interests us here, of course, is how IT security can be improved across the full spectrum of requirements. In a remarkable address to the 10th Berlin Security Conference in November 2011 (www. ), you stressed your desire to target the civil and military areas in equal measure. Could you

elaborate upon that, in order to make the connections clear to our readers? How might this be done? Volker Smid: We all depend on a safe and undisrupted global flow of information. Yet that global information flow is also vulnerable to global threats. An attack on the information system can take on national proportions, when, for example, it targets a country’s major economic sectors, its transport system, internal security, banking system or armed forces. Given that a major economic power like Germany is part of a vast international network and in view of the global dimension of banking systems, any long-lasting disruption of information systems can also have global consequences. This is why the IT high-tech industry is called upon to develop and offer solutions for the security and protection of all sectors, and above all those that constitute a country’s critical lifelines. The European: What form could the protection of those critical lifelines take? Volker Smid: Let me explain that in more detail. What we need in order to guarantee that everything continues to function, both in the civilian but also, and above all, military security sectors, is an exchange of sensitive or mission-critical information. That is the basis for quick and successful action in order to use competitive or informational advantages to meet one’s own objectives. This presupposes the existence of a secure and efficient communications network even beyond the organisation’s boundaries. The European: But this means that everyone has to agree on the objectives?

Example of a secure boardroom

source: HP

PROTECTION

Volker Smid: We must agree on the objectives and act in unison. In view of the threats, that is an ethical obligation. For we have to realizethat everything that brings us together in a common effort to act jointly and responsibly, both in the economic sphere and in our private lives, and in the effort to build and consolidate peace and prosperity, is in danger from increasingly large-scale and sophisticated attacks. The European: Where do you see the biggest threats coming from and what list of measures do you propose? Volker Smid: According to the prevailing doctrine, risk management must form the basis for operational IT security. But the result in many cases is a mixture of red tape and technical naivety. This is why there is a need for new approaches, in order to bring about effective interaction between risk management and IT security, between internal priorities and observation of the outside environment. The European: And how should one set about this? What would be the best approach? Volker Smid: There are three steps to be taken: prevention, identification of the effects and reduction of those effects. The top-down approach of the Information Security Mangament System (ISMS) needs to be supplemented by specific bottomup approaches for individual areas, in order to keep up with the rapid changes in the different fields of security. The European: Don’t we need a change of paradigme here? Volker Smid: You are right. Above and beyond the requirements I mentioned we need a general change of paradigm. Instead of just reacting to threats by protecting weak spots we need to take a proactive approach vis-à-vis the attacker: every access to the system, whether by men or machines, needs to be recorded, correlated and analysed for suspicious behaviour. Ideally this should enable an attack to be detected in its early stages. The European: How can we achieve such early detection? Volker Smid: If we want to avoid a situation in which ISMS documentation becomes worthless the moment it is written, we need a risk model that is technically anchored in the security systems, because only then it can respond sufficiently quickly to changes in the model, the technology or the threats. The European: Would the authorities even be able to maintain such a security model on their own? Volker Smid: No, I hardly think so. Few companies or administrations would be able to cover all aspects of the ISMS mentioned here. On the contrary, if they were to try to do it all themselves they would end up with weak spots. The European: Could you explain your security approach in a little more detail for the benefit of our readers?

Volker Smid President Hewlett-Packard, Germany. Born in 1960, he joined HP in January2009 . In his career he was the CEO of Prompt Medical Systems for Germany, Austria and Switzerland, then he joined POET, a provider of eCommerce solutions, being responsible for the North America business. Later he transferred to Parametric Technology corporation (PTC) as Senior Vice president for EMEA and Asia-Pacific. He then became president of Novell for the EMEA Region. Volker Smid is Vice President of the executive committee at BITKOM (Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media).

Volker Smid: I have already set out the three steps: prevention, identification of the effects, and their reduction. On top of this come increased networking, mobilisation and web-based applications on the part of the IT company, which these days is coming to resemble not so much a fortress as a marketplace. An increasing number of applications need to be made available on the Internet, outside the firewall, in order to be accessible for organisation-wide communications, including with mobile staff members. The applications are increasingly intertwined, enabling direct or indirect access to back-end systems. The European: So conventional perimeter protection is no longer sufficient? Volker Smid: Conventional perimeter protection, which means securing the outer boundaries of the company’s IT system, can do little to help against that. The European: So this means that the human factor is critical? Volker Smid: In the field of information security, as in all areas, the human factor plays a role. Systems are used by people, and that means that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data can always be compromised by simple errors, negligence, “laziness” or even malicious intent on the part of a company’s own staff. The European: With the worldwide spread of technology the number of potential attackers is continually on the rise. What else do we need to do? Volker Smid: Secure global networking can only be achieved if available global development capacity is used to the full. For that we need to keep investing in research and development in order to support this risk management approach that helps companies and organisations turn standards and best practices into the necessary processes. The European: Herr Smid, thank you for the interview.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

This period of asymmetric threats calls for a high level of civil-military cooperation

Challenges in a new security environment – a German view by Hans-Jürgen Hohnen, State Secretary (ret.), Potsdam For decades we lived with an orderly vision of the world. It was bloc against bloc: the Warsaw Pact versus NATO. For decades the armed forces were the essential guarantors of our external security. The threat of mutual assured destruction enabled peace and stability to be maintained in most of Europe, Germany in particular. And in the event of war, The Hague Land Warfare Convention laid down the relevant rules under international law. Today the situation in Europe and worldwide is a different one entirely: we live in a world in which none of the old rules apply any more. Individual terrorists or extremists, for whom there are no rules, can threaten whole states; criminal gangs can endanger state systems.

Asymmetric threats The conventional threat of a confrontation between the East and West blocs has disappeared; the threats we face today come from so-called rogue states, from civil strife and above all from terrorism. We live in an era of asymmetric threats. But where, precisely, are the threats and how do we counter them? The Achilles’ heel of our highly civilised high-tech society is our critical infrastructure, the systems that permeate our whole lives like nerve fibres. The supply of water and of energy, transport systems on land, water or in the air, the health system with the risk of epidemics, the financial system: all of these make us highly vulnerable. And a particular danger for our society is our dependence on IT systems – the infrastructure of infrastructures – without which almost nothing else can function. Any damage to those critical lifelines, whether as a result of natural disasters, accidental failure or terrorist attacks, can have wide-ranging knock-on effects that can permanently disrupt public life or cause society to collapse altogether. It is therefore vital to consider how we can protect our highly

Hans-Jürgen Hohnen He was born in 1955 in Korschenbroich. Studies of Management Sciece. He obtained diploma in 1981. Until 2000 different management and executive positions of the Police in Northrhine-Westphalia. Obtained Senior Office Rank of the Police, Head of Department Cologne. 2000 – 2006 Ministry of Interor. Brandenburg, Head of department Public Order and Security 2011 States Secretary.

vulnerable infrastructure. Before I consider the main stakeholders, let me describe the new structures to be built in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. In most of the missions aimed either at protecting critical infrastructure or mitigating the consequences after an attack on such infrastructure, it is human beings that play the key role.

The obligations under Lisbon The Lisbon Treaty contains a solidarity clause obliging nations to assist each other for crisis prevention and disaster management, but also military support. For the Member States this means having to adapt and make available capabilities that can be called upon by the new EU Crisis Management Centre (ECMC). It also means rethinking what so far has been a nationally focused effort. This is a big step forward that is valid above all for cross-border incidents that exceed the capabilities of the countries concerned: but what about the national capabilities needed to deal with incidents at home? I feel that solidarity cannot be taken so far that it would mean neglecting national requirements. It should become a legally binding obligation for the EU Member States to be able to deal with all kinds of normal catastrophes at national level, rather than relying on the resources provided out of solidarity by other Member States, before their own national capabilities are even deployed. I would like to illustrate my point by considering the situation in Germany, with its decentralised system composed of 16 Länder that are relatively independent in terms of crisis management.

Military power It is the specific responsibility of the armed forces to protect the peace against attacks from outside or against the forms of aggression defined under international law. The fact is that fewer and different capabilities are needed in order to counter the military risks associated with failed states or civil strife; thus the trend is to scale down the armed forces and the associated budgets. The Bundeswehr alone has had its troop numbers reduced from about 500 000 at the time of Germany’s reunification to 250 000 as a first step (peace dividends), and a further reduction to a troop strength of about 185 000 soldiers is planned. The problem is that those military resources then fall considerably short or are no longer avail-

PROTECTION

able at all to provide the kind of assistance that they commonly provided in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attacks in the past. That is why we must reconsider our crisis-prevention planning. I am convinced that we need to engage in even more comprehensive civil-military cooperation than before in order to cover requirements. This is the way to achieve our objectives.

crisis-management forces engaged in operations involving the possible use of weapons. For the moment civil crisis-management forces do not enjoy the same high level of protection as the military forces deployed on the same mission. It is my request that no police officer should ever be sent on a national or international mission without personally adapted equipment.

Civil capabilities

Private security companies

The Federal Disaster Relief Agency is a highly competent organisation that should be at the centre of crisis prevention, both at national and international level. The demographics and budget constraints in the different Länder and municipalities of Germany pose a particular challenge in that respect, for instance for fire brigades or other organisations. In each Land they have their own structures and cultures. There is thus a need to harmonise materiel and equipment in order to create compatible disaster-management units. Notwithstanding the particularities of the Länder, their slogan should be “separate, but not separated”. Those units could then more easily be made available to the EU. A high degree of compatibility of national means is in my view a prerequisite for cooperation with other nations. The future EU Crisis Management Centre would certainly appreciate such an evolution. But Member States’ industries are looking to the EU to provide standards, for these are still lacking when it comes to the proper organisation of research and development activities with a view to achieving compatibility and interoperability.

Private security companies, which employ some 170.000 people in Germany, have become an important pillar in the area of internal security. They provide a range of security services – at major sporting events and concerts, in the areas of airline security and the protection of people and property – that these days have become indispensable. It is necessary here to improve qualifications and standards by means of a system of certification.

The police The police in the Länder (about 250 000) and at federal level (some 40 000) have the task of guaranteeing public safety on a daily basis and in exceptional situations. They can provide considerable resources and capabilities for use in large-scale emergencies and disaster situations. They also play an essential role in protecting society from terrorist attacks and major crimes. This diversity does not make it easy to equip the different police units. But the principle should be to harmonise equipment and personal protection to a certain level. It has to be a priority to provide all police officers with the same level of personal protection meeting high technological standards and incorporating the means to communicate with other civil protection and military forces. Of course, our police officers doing service abroad in countries like Afghanistan need a different kind of protection than their colleagues working in a medium-sized town in Germany. And one other remark: if we are serious about the so-called comprehensive approach – meaning close civil-military cooperation for all EU operations – we must agree on the need to review the protection of our civil

Critical infrastructure There are further factors with respect to infrastructure that must be taken on board in any comprehensive situation assessment and threat evaluation. The increasing privatisation of formerly public services, such as local public transport and healthcare, has tended to reduce the level of disaster preparedness of national institutions. This is understandable, for financial reasons, but we must realise that it is difficult to make a business case for security, because security costs money. And it frequently creates problems with staff and works councils: quite often it is simply seen as a nuisance. Only to a certain extent has it been possible to fill the resulting gaps by means of public resources and regulations. The German Government’s “National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure”, adopted on 18 June 2009, tries to reconcile those diverging requirements.

Future strategies safeguarding internal security The military protection of our external security using large weapons systems has become less important than before: the protection of our critical infrastructure and internal security has become the new priority. Tanks and combat aircraft can no longer guarantee the security of our citizens in Europe as they did for many decades. But there is still a link between external and internal security and those who hoped that military budgets could be shifted to internal security were mistaken. We will need to develop a range of new products and services adapted to the task of protecting our highly civilised society from serious disruptions and damage, whether these be caused by natural disasters, accidents or terrorist attacks. It is also necessary to further develop the different forms of cooperation between the various players and processes in the field of security.

EUROPE’S EVENTS

SECURITY and DEFENCE POLICE 15th EUROPEAN POLICE CONGRESS Berlin, 14/15 Feb 2012 www.european-police.eu SECURITY:

DISASTER MANAGEMENT 8th EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON CIVIL PROTECTION Bonn, 18/19 Sept 2012 www.disaster-management.eu

Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Council of the European Union

Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger, Federal Minister of Justice

Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director, FRONTEX

Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response

Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of the Interior

Angelika Beer, Chair Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention, EastWest Institute (EWI)

Dr Thomas de Maizière, Federal Minister of Defence

General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the EU Military Committee

Dr Zbigniew Włosowicz, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Republic of Poland

SECURITY:

BSC BERLIN SECURITY CONFERENCE 2012 – 11th CONGRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE Berlin, 27/28 Nov 2012 www.euro-defence.eu SECURITY AND DEFENCE:

Information and participation contact: Hartmut Bühl, Behörden Spiegel Office Brussels Avenue des Celtes, 30, B 1040 Bruxelles Tel/Fax: +32 2 732 31 35, GSM: +49 172 32 82 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr

Helga Woll Behörden Spiegel Office Bonn Am Buschhof 8, D 53227 Bonn Tel/Fax: +49 228 97 09 70 E-Mail:helga.woll@behoerdenspiegel.de

www.behoerdenspiegel.de

List of Authors

List of authors and articles in 2011 Name/Title

ESDU N°

Page

Name/Title

ESDU N° Page

Arnould, Claude-France.................................................. N° 10 ...... 29 European Defence Agency (EDA): Role and perspectives

Dascalu, Ioan ................................................................ N° 10 ...... 16 The enlargement of “Schengen” and the new role for Romania

Bachar, Abraham ........................................................... N° 10 ...... 50 The Israeli approach to crisis and consequences management

de Kerchove, Gilles ....................................................... N° 10 ....... 57 Cyber Threat – the need for an EU response

Barnier, Michel .............................................................. N° 10 ........ 7 Towards a new Europe

Dr Czirwitzky, Thomas ................................................... N° 9 ........ 48 Protection of the soldier – a question of requirements and industrial capabilities

Bayar, Murad ................................................................. N° 10 ...... 37 Right time and proper platform for armament cooperation between Turkey and the EU

Dr Levitt, Matthew ......................................................... N° 10 ...... 21 The time after Bin Laden – Reduced interest but realistic warning

Beer, Nicola .................................................................. N° 9 ........ 31 The International Climate Conference in Cancún

Dr Martens, Rainer ........................................................ N° 10 ...... 32 Technology for future aero engines – Sophistication of products

Bellouard, Patrick10 ...................................................... N° 10 ...... 34 A success story of European cooperation – 10 years of serious work

Dr Stehr, Michael .......................................................... N° 11 ...... 58 ATALANTA – a continously successful protection operation for the freedom of sea

Berger, Yosef .................................................................N° 9 ......... 53 Active protection of the soldier through guided weapons

Füle, Stefan.................................................................... N° 11........ 12 The European Union is ready to fully engage

Bock-Müller, Klaus ........................................................ N° 9 ........ 51 Out of the danger zone – Virtual Reality simulation systems reduce risks and costs for training

Gahler, Michael MEP...................................................... N° 9 ........ 34 Galileo and GMES – Essentials for Europe

Bouvier, Antoine ............................................................ N° 10 ...... 39 The benefits of 10 years of integration in the missile sector

Georgieva, Kristalina ..................................................... N° 9 ........ 12 Towards a stronger European Disaster Response

Bozinovic, Davor” .......................................................... N° 11 ...... 34 Achieving long-term stability in Afghanistan – the role of the “Comprehensive Approach

Ghattas, Joseph A. ......................................................... N° 10 ...... 42 A governance platform for fighting security threats in a time of transformation

Bruzek, Oliver ................................................................ N° 10 ........ 8 How to make Europe a nation? Lisbon can’t be the end

Gomes, Ana MEP............................................................ N° 9 ......... 21 Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Plan

Bühl, Hartmut ............................................................... N° 11 ...... 28 The European soldier – quo vadis

Greenway, John.............................................................. N° 9 ........ 42 How to communicate security and defence

Bühl-Cazaubon, Nannette .............................................. N° 9 ........ 46 MEADS – a contribution to NATO missile defence

Griesbaum, Ralf ............................................................ N° 11 ....... 46 Medical container solutions for the protection of crisis management forces

Bühl-Cazaubon, Nannette ............................................. N° 10 ...... 48 Training and preparedness – key elements for the EU crisis and disaster management Burford, Mike................................................................. N° 11 ....... 51 Vehicle-based GPS receivers for harsh environments – GPS Protection against explosives is vital Busuttil, Simon MEP ..................................................... N° 10 ....... 11 The EU Border Guards that Frontex needs – Reduce the influence of nations

Gualtieri, Roberto MEP .................................................. N° 10 ...... 24 The CSDP and its development after Lisbon Guillou, Hervé ................................................................ N° 11 ...... 40 Cyber protection – which strategy for industries Hancock, Michael MP..................................................... N° 10 ...... 22 The Arab Spring, Libya and Europe – Europe’s lethargy to support the way

Danjean, Arnaud MEP ................................................... N° 9 .......... 6 EU Security Strategy – the way ahead

Hauk, Peter ................................................................... N° 11 ...... 20 The importance of the Regions for the stability of Europe – The EU needs strong regional authorities

Das, Hans ...................................................................... N° 10 ...... 46 The role of the future European Emergency Response Centre

Henderson, Doug ........................................................... N° 9 ........ 46 The French-British Accord – what about?

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Hostalier, Francoise MP and Jean-Pierre Kucheida, MP .............................................. N° 10 ...... 27 The CSDP: The way ahead – there is no leadership Hübner, Danuta MEP...................................................... N° 11 ....... 18 The Regions of Europe – cornerstones for prosperity Jehin, Olivier ................................................................. N° 10 ...... 30 Strengthening the European defence “acquisitions” pillar Katzenbeißer, Stefan ..................................................... N° 11 ...... 60 A surveillance system for the immediate and nearby vicinity of maritime platforms Kauth, Robert ................................................................ N° 11 ...... 44 Military bridges - the highest standards for protecting forces Keinert, Michael ............................................................ N° 11 ...... 36 Protection technologies for saving lives – guided by the human factor Knops, Mathias ............................................................. N° 11 ...... 53 Security versus flexibility – information security fights Wikileaks and Facebook

Naumann, Klaus ............................................................ N° 9 ........ 38 NATO’s New Strategic Concept Nick, Christoph ............................................................. N° 9 ........ 30 Climate Change: Threat and challenge Niebel, Dirk ................................................................... N° 11 ........ 9 Development Policy and the comprehensive approach – a German contribution Palomeros, Jean-Paul .................................................... N° 10 ....... 60 The French Air Force – its challenges and commitments Petersen, Lars ............................................................... N° 9 ........ 56 Unclassified satellite data for intelligence observations Prof. Dr Davutoglu ......................................................... N° 11 ....... 15 Turkey’s accession to the European Union – a historic project Prof. Dr Giuliani, Jean-Dominique .................................. N° 11 ........ 6 Towards a new European Treaty – Europe needs the French-German motor

Kühl, Hans .................................................................... N° 10 ...... 44 The CBRN threat and resulting challenges for the European Union

Schaake, Marietje MEP ................................................. N° 10 ...... 54 Balancing Cyber Security and Human Rights – the rights of citizens must be respected

Kujat, Harald ................................................................. N° 9 ........ 27 A footprint for European Ballistic Missile Defence

Schönbohm, Arne ......................................................... N° 10 ...... 58 Cyber Crime and Cyber War – we have to cease being passive

Laitinen, Ilkka ............................................................... N° 10 ...... 14 Frontex and the crisis in the Mediterranean – the most important SAR organisation

Souren, Joseph E.L. ....................................................... N° 11 ...... 54 A paradigm shift in IT security – Hardware-based authentication and encryption

Liebetrau, Peter ............................................................ N° 11 ...... 39 Military packaging solutions – durable protection for all types of weather

Treche, Klaus-Peter ...................................................... N° 11 ...... 49 Supporting NATO in the next decade

Lindberg, Helena .......................................................... N° 9 ........ 24 Addressing a reality of trans-boundary risks and European Solidarity Lisek, Krzysztof MEP ..................................................... N° 11 ....... 24 The impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the Member States

Verret, Denis ................................................................. N° 9 ........ 44 Do we need a permanent structured cooperation… Yes, we do need a “PESCO” von Wogau, Karl ........................................................... N° 9 ........ 40 A White Book on Security and Defence

Malmström, Cecilia ....................................................... N° 9 ........ 18 The EU Internal Security Strategy – towards a more secure Europe

Weale, Graham ............................................................. N° 9 ........ 32 Climate change: Small steps are better than hanging on to a global breakthrough

Nachtsheim, Georg ........................................................ N° 11 ...... 26 Multinationality – Enhancing Europe’s Military capabilities

Wilf, Einat MP ............................................................... N° 10 ...... 19 For the Palestinians’ sake – an Israeli view of the problem

12 Volume No , 2011 for Citizenship European Award Winner of the & Defence − European Security t Review on

Defence Security and

Independen

The magazine for European security issues

ISSN 2192-6921

Issued three times a year – February, June and November – in english

Other Topics • NATO and the EU • Protection

of Defense

Special distribution at EUROSATORY 2012

urity Maritime Sec

for Europe A governance affairs in maritime tsakos MEP

Photo: MC1

Cassandra Thompson/US

Department

operation for Worldwide co e seas th freedom of

ons – first step Tunisian electi to stability road on the long Michael Gahler

MEP

Georgios Koumou

Edition 1/2012

Three issues per year, price 42,- Euro

Deadline for the June edi tion: may 23rd

For further information or orders please consult www.magazine-the-european.com or order the current issue for € 16,Behörden Spiegel-Gruppe, Am Buschhof 8, 53227 Bonn

esdu

Published on Mar 26, 2020

The European Security and Defence Union Issue 12

Published on Mar 26, 2020

esdu

Go explore