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ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 10

Main Topic

Migration Cyber Security

Disasters around Europe − how to engage them?

Balancing Cyber Security and Human Rights

Frontex and the crisis in the Mediterranean Basin

Interview with Marietje Schaake MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Interview with Ilkka Laitinen Executive Director, Frontex, Warsaw

MIDDLE-EAST: Is the time not right for peace and security? Edition 2/2011


EDITORIAL

Editorial

The case for European renewal What most worries me is not the current crises. Such problems as the

In this connection he boldly called for a Euro-

financial and migration issues can be resolved through determined

pean defence to foster Europe’s ability to take

action by the international community.

responsibility for its own defence and make

But the muffled anti-European nationalisms now emerging in virtually

the EU into a robust and credible partner for

most European societies, and particularly on the far right of the

the United States. The defence capability, he

political spectrum, are genuine cause for concern. They are fuelled by

said, should be supplemented by a European

contempt for the political establishment and supported by those who

Civil Defence Force able to respond to humani-

are disgruntled with the European Union (EU).

tarian crises and take action globally − a pro-

This anti-European passion has managed to generate a negative trend

posal Barnier had made in his report on crisis

across Europe by filling a breach so far left open by a European Union

management in 2006.

Hartmut Bühl

unable to convey a heartfelt community of values transcending national concerns.

Plead for a more humanist approach If Barnier’s call for a more humanist approach focused on human

I believe that this trend can be reversed, but that the impetus for such

dignity can be successfully conveyed throughout the EU, that to me

a move will have to come from public figures committed to the goal of

would be a step forward in itself. It includes a call for a more humanist

a “new” Europe and with the ideas and dedication to take the intellec-

approach to refugees. And I also wish the political leaders of the EU

tual and spiritual lead in European renewal.

and its Member States would henceforth refuse to make concessions to the right wing and the disgruntled in their countries, as long as the

European renewal

incorrigible remain unreconstructed.

EU-Commissioner Michel Barnier delivered a noteworthy speech on Europe Day (9 May) at the Humboldt University in Berlin, in which he

Barnier’s call to give a renewed Europe the necessary strength through

took the renewal of Europe as his theme.

a social market economy is compelling. After 60 years, it is still faced with the British free market vision. The only way out is joint pressure

He said that in the current global crisis, the need for Europe is stronger

and persuasion.

than ever, but he wondered whether European citizens still want it and whether it will still exist in the year 2050.

Michel Barnier has given a great European speech. Asked what the

Europe, he said, has focused too much on the mechanics of integra-

founding fathers would have to say about today’s EU, he said, “they

tion instead of professing the values that bring us together − the spirit

would say that the union of Europeans is not an option, but a vital

of freedom, the quest for social justice and a civic spirit based on hu-

necessity to be able to protect ourselves and gain respect.”

manism. What we need, he said, is the desire to be together, and we must not leave this to the right wing.

Barnier called for an EU political and diplomatic culture, with a European foreign minister using the European diplomatic service (EEAS) to convey European culture and values.

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Editorial Deputy: Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Paris Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2011 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Gilles de Kerchove EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Brussels

Dr. Einat Wilf MP Jerusalem

POLICY and POLITICS Editorial

European Union

Security and Defence

7

“Towards a New Europe” Speech of Michel Barnier on 9 May 2011 in Berlin − Documentation

24 The CSDP and its developments after Lisbon

Oliver Bruzek, Aachen

27 The CSDP − the way ahead

Roberto Gualtieri MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Capabilities are still missing Françoise Hostalier MP and Jean-Pierre Kucheida MP, Paris

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How to make Europe a nation? Lisbon can’t be the end

There is no leadership Claude-France Arnould, Brussels

Simon Busuttil MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

11 The EU Border Guards that Frontex needs Reduce the influence of nations Ilkka Laitinen, Warsaw

14 Frontex and the crisis in the Mediterranean The most important SAR organization

29 European Defence Agency (EDA): Role and perspectives Breakthrough − now! Olivier Jehin

30 Strengthening the European defence “acquisitions” pillar Commentary

Ioan Dascǎlu, Bucharest

16 The enlargement of “Schengen“ and the new role for Romania The country has made enormous efforts

Dr. Rainer Martens, Munich

32 Technology for future aero engines Sophistication of products Patrick Bellouard, Bonn

34 A success story of European cooperation

Europe and the Middle East Dr. Einat Wilf MP, Jerusalem

19 For the Palestinians’ sake An Israeli view of the problem

10 years of serious work Murad Bayar, Ankara

37 Right time and proper platform for armament cooperation between Turkey and the EU A reliable partner is looking to Europe

Dr. Matthew Levitt, Washington

21

The time after Bin Laden Reduced interest but realistic warning Michael Hancock MP, London

22 The Arab Spring, Libya and Europe Europe’s lethargy the way to support

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Antoine Bouvier, Paris

39 The benefits of 10 years of integration in the missile sector An idea, a will and persistence


CONTENT

Murad Bayar Undersecretary, Ministry of National Defence, Ankara

Claude-France Arnould CEO, European Defence Agency, Brussels

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Joseph A. Ghattas, Paris

Cyber Security − the threats and solutions

42 A governance platform for fighting security threats in a time of transformation A wake-up call for administrations

Marietje Schaake MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

54 Balancing Cyber Security and Human Rights The rights of citizens must be respected

Hans H. Kühl, Dörpling

44 The CBRN threat and resulting challenges for

Gilles de Kerchove, Brussels

57 Cyber Threat − the need for an EU response

the European Union A crucial issue for the EU

National responsibilities but common policy Arne Schönbohm, Munich

58

EU-Crisis Prevention − new structures and coordination

Cyber Crime and Cyber war− we have to cease being passive The EU is asked to be pro-active

Hans Das, Brussels

46 The role of the future European Emergency Response Centre The Commission is pushing forward

Armed and Civil Capabilities in crisis management General Jean-Paul Palomeros, Paris

Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Paris

48 Training and preparedness − key elements for the EU crisis and disaster management Simulation in training is a better spending

60 The French Air Force − its challenges and commitments Strong commitment and excellent performance

Abraham (Avi) Bachar, Tel Aviv

50 The Israeli approach to crisis and consequences management A very strong commitment by the society

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

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EUROPEAN UNION

Documentation

“Towards a New Europe” Speech of Michel Barnier, Member of the EU-Commission and former French Foreign Minister, on 9 May 2011 in Berlin (excerpts) (…) The Eurocentric world of the early 20th century has given way to a multipolar world, with inter-dependent players and a centre of gravity which is shifting eastwards. Competition means the long-standing economic supremacy of the West is at risk and is forcing Europe to rethink its model of growth. Technological progress has multiplied the impact of the human population on its environment and threatens to exhaust our resources and areas of unspoiled nature. (…) Will Europe be a global or just a regional power? So there should be one big question which should concern and motivate the leaders of our continent: In 2050 − when our children are in their prime − will it still be in Europe that things are done and decided? Will Europe be a global power which is capable of defending itself and promoting its values, ideas and interests? Or, will we witness a lack of political courage, vision and shared will? Will Europe be unable to cope with the dynamism of other regions of the world, and be paralysed at home by national populism and selfishness leading it to resign itself to being nothing more than a regional power? (…) Why are we together? What more should we do together? Where do we want to go? What are the geographical frontiers and political limits of this joint undertaking? We need to demonstrate urgently once more that Europe has a purpose and that we have a common interest in being together in the 21st century. (…) A political Europe is needed I believe that Europe needs to be united to be strong, and that to be respected, we need a political Europe. Such a political Europe can only be constructed on the basis of a large, integrated market. But at the same time, this market will only consolidate itself and work better if citizens and businesses in every region take true ownership of it. And if Europe’s young people, those most affected, once again find social mobility is open to them. (…) In this new world, fragile and unstable as it is, Europeans also need to understand the extent of the major change in the United States, which no longer considers Europe to be one of its security challenges. This is both good news and a new challenge for us. In terms of security (terrorism, cyber-attacks, organised crime) or defence (regional conflicts, collective defence of our continent, nuclear proliferation), no European Member State can face all these threats alone. (…) It is the reason we need to move towards a truly European defence policy.

The famous Berlin Humboldt University − the right place for a speech on Europe Photo:www.capl.washjeff.edu

Restart a European Defence Community 60 years on, work on a European defence community needs to be restarted, if necessary through the “structured cooperation” which is now possible under the Lisbon Treaty. A true military staff structure, systematically bringing together research efforts and resources, and favouring European products when purchasing equipment. (…) The EU needs to set up a permanent capacity to plan and carry out operations in the way suggested by Poland, Germany and France. All in all, the objective must be that Europe is ready to take responsibility more and more for its own collective defence, but also become a robust and credible partner for the United-States. (…) Jean Monnet liked to say “I am not optimistic. I am determined!” Without a doubt there are many reasons today to view European construction with pessimism. But there are even more reasons to be determined. (…) Tell citizens the truth Citizens need to be told the truth. The truth about where we are headed. The truth about what we are within this union. And about what we are not. We are a continent where every people, every religion and every opinion is respectable and respected. And yet, we are not a single European people. We cannot be a European nation. There is no question of a federal state which would take the place of the nation states or the regions. We need nations to bring citizens to terms with the European project. We need nations to combat nationalism. And, at the same time, we need Europe to take control of globalisation and make it more human, in a word, to make it succeed. (…) The new Europe needs to be a veritable “Federation of Nation States”. It needs a strong identity and a strong voice. (…)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

European Union With Lisbon, the EU has made a step forward. Might the solidarity clause create more confidence between the nations and promote progress? Oliver Bruzek .......................................................................... 8 Simon Busuttil MEP................................................................ 11 Ilkka Laitinen ....................................................................... 14 Ioan Dascălu ......................................................................... 16

Lisbon was a step in the evolution of the EU − what are the objectives and how to proceed?

How to make Europe a nation? by Oliver Bruzek, Director, Aachen “Nations are not something eternal. They have their beginnings and they will end. A European confederation will very probably replace them”. The French writer and scholar, Ernest Renan, ventured this statement in his speech at the Sorbonne on 11th March 1882. However, he did not do this without emphasising in the same speech that nations were therefore not an insignificant phenomenon but were necessary in that epoch; indeed, “…their existence is the guarantee of liberty which would be lost if the world had only one law and only one master”.

Europe needs a big picture When we look at things from today’s perspective and as the question of the future of Europe remains unresolved, one thing above all appears to be missing: the big picture − the vision of the future. Our debates are limited to overcoming day-to-day economic, social and political problems, in which we pretend our nations (or states) in Europe enjoy an autonomous freedom of action in a globalized world that has not existed for a long time. The issue of the aim of European politics must finally come back onto the agenda, and we can scarcely afford to shirk it. After all, setting a clear objective has a decisive impact on social developments on our continent as

Oliver Bruzek Director, International Markets, CAE (Stolberg) since 2008. He was born in 1968. 2007 − 2008: Director General, Brain-World (Ulm); 2002 − 2007: Director Government Relations, EADS Defense and Security (Ulm); 1999 − 2002: Marketing Consultant, Euromissile (Paris); 1997 − 1999: Advisor on Defense and Security Politics, German Parliament (Bonn); 1992 − 1997: Eurocorps, (Strasbourg). Author and Co-author of various publications, e.g. “Wörterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik” with Bühl and Kujat (Hamburg, 2001)

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well. The strengthening of an extreme right-wing nationalist mentality in large parts of Europe, which is now also gripping a core country such as France to an ominous degree, is a product of the people looking to adopt a pseudo-nationalist posture. It reflects the absurd notion that the states of Europe would be capable themselves of providing answers to global challenges. Fears are also freely stoked by pointing out the gap in prosperity which still exists in Europe in an attempt to pull the political rug out from underneath solidarity which is genuinely needed. The fact that there are gaps in prosperity within our nation states is also omitted. Each year 13 million marriages in Europe are registered between couples of different nationalities and every third child born in Germany today is from a migration background.

There are no longer national solutions in the future In this age of mobility and communication, our nations (which in any case have never been homogeneous since the time they were formed) have begun to change. Keystones such as ethnic origin, language and religion are losing their dominance in relation to the states of Europe. In reality, today we live neither in nations which are firm strongholds of society nor in conditions where our states are capable of acting and surviving alone − but they are at least competitive. None of the current discussions going on these days about a possible transfer society in Europe, the issue of how we deal with refugees at various European borders, the reckless gambling with treaty issues, such as the Schengen Agreement, serve to resolve a single problem, let alone set the new directions we need for the future. They only serve to abet destructive forces: the die-hards who are jeopardising the legacy of the last 65 years and want to catapult Europe back into the first half of the 20th century.


EUROPEAN UNION

The principle of subsidiarity We do of course have strong regions with strong identities in Europe, and no-one wants to dilute this artificially. On the contrary − it is specifically for this reason that we have quite rightly introduced the principle of subsidiarity as the supreme maxim and fundamental restriction governing European administration. This principle cannot however be seen as a one-way street. Whenever the actual possibility of fulfilling their duties proves to be too overwhelming for regions or even for states, it must be possible − indeed, it must be entirely desirable − for a transfer of sovereignty to take place.

Security in Europe is indivisible This statement is one of the natural keystones of European society. This is why it has to be in the fundamental interest of all nations within the Union that the Union functions. That might sound banal, but in reality this banality is put to the test time and again. How far have we managed to turn our respective national interests into a truly common interest and how great is the danger of fragmentation? Let’s look at the area of foreign, security and defence policy: As I see it, three basic questions should be answered: Misleading debates How are the security interests of Europe defined today, and to what extent is there a common − and let me emphasise this common perception of risk? Some examples: Does France want to restrict itself to the Mediterranean region or will the Poles keep a unilateral eye on Russia because this corresponds best to their respective national situations? In Germany’s discussion on energy dependency, is it really a question of Germany’s dependency or that of the whole of Europe? How misleading are the debates on integration that are held in various countries of the Union and during which the term “Europe” is virtually never mentioned? The list can be supplemented in any way you like and sometimes appears to drop off the political agenda altogether. Differing views on the menaces to Europe To what extent does there actually exist within the Union − and this question is directly related to the first − consensus over the priority of the threats which encompass our Union? In debates up until now, it has seemed as if terrorism, nonproliferation and climate change are right at the top of the list of threats. For many years, we have been debating − entirely properly − about asymmetric conflicts and conflict scenarios. However, when we look closely at our neighbouring regions, we see that the potential conflicts that were suspended after 1990 have not by any means been resolved but could become a real threat at any time to Europe as well − and demand coordinated action across Europe at the very least (for example, Georgia or Belarus). It seems to me that we are not well prepared for the future if we continue to neglect these risks.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

How to ensure strategic security objectives? If we do not have conclusive answers to the first two questions, in the current situation we will continue to run the risk that although we call it a common European interest we do not implement it as an active policy. We will stay at the level where at best national strategies are drafted and then set into the European context as a more or less cosmetic operation. There will be no chance of planning and above all providing the necessary resources at the level of complexity required which would make it possible in the first place to prepare effectively and efficiently for the feasibility and achievement of strategic aims − in other words, through joint planning and preparation for the deployment of armed forces in the widest variety of scenarios.

Strengthening Europe in the world Anyone today who answers these questions by stating that security is the supreme duty of the nation state and therefore is a mark of inalienable sovereignty is simply not taking account of the reality. The definition of European interests and their protection − not through a coherent and coordinated policy but through a truly common and therefore single foreign, security and defence policy − also generate a sense of identity internally as well. Ernest Renan was right to ask the question: “A community of interest is assuredly a powerful bond between men. Do interests, however, suffice to make a nation?” And he provided his own answer: “I do not think so. Community of interest brings about trade agreements, but nationality has a sentimental side to it; it is both soul and body at once; a customs union is not a homeland.”

Anyone on the global stage who wishes not only to be heard but also to be taken seriously must not be vulnerable to division in the event of a crisis as we have been in almost all the crises of the past two decades, whether in the Balkans, in Iraq or recently in respect of the Libyan issue. There is an urgent need to strengthen the European Parliament with regard to these questions and for it to obtain considerably more expertise in foreign and security policy issues but equally in defence policy issues.

Scrutiny This will also incidentally require considerably greater cooperation between the European and national parliaments. Inviting elected representatives from Brussels regularly to meetings of national parliamentary defence committees would be one conceivable approach, not only to promote direct dialogue but also to allow the interdependencies to become clearer on both sides. A further specific measure might be the gradual harmonisation of the terms of office of the legislatures and election dates in Europe. This should be possible 12-15 years in advance and would support better joint formulation of foreign and security policy objectives specifically and remove the temptation to engage in domestic tactics. A statement by Renan to end with, which describes the natural development of Europe and its citizens: “The modern nation is therefore a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts”.

Europe has to define and to find its destination Nevertheless, I am sure that ultimately this path will lead to a positive “demarcation” of Europe in relation to other parts of the world which will be based on values and which should not by any means be misunderstood as isolation. Souls can also develop in what Europe “becomes”. And ultimately in what Europe “is”, it will have other and more effective global options for action and increase its diplomatic influence. But − and this should equally be recognised unreservedly as a natural duty of Europe − it will also be better able to safeguard its own prosperity in competition. To do this, there is an urgent need not only to create the instruments but also to grant them the necessary power and to devolve sovereignty. This is precisely what must ultimately be achieved through the elements of the agenda agreed by the Council of Europe (e.g. the Ghent Process, Franco-British Agreement, European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation) or they will remain ineffective in the long term. In the case of the latter, the European External Action Service (EEAS) will also turn out to be a bad investment.

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Documentation Declaration of Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950: “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. (…). A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”


EUROPEAN UNION

The European Parliament sees the need to make Frontex less dependent on Member States

The EU Border Guards that Frontex needs by Simon Busuttil MEP, Rapporteur on FRONTEX Legislation, Strasbourg/Brussels The Arab Spring and its effects on migratory flows in the Mediterranean once again woke us up to the reality of how badly Europe needs a common approach in managing its external borders. Even before the events in Tunisia triggered off the Arab Spring in the first place and even long before the Schengen tensions manifested themselves between Italy and France, the European Parliament’s report on Frontex that I presented in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee had already clearly spelt out the kind of Frontex that Europe needs. It should have been obvious for all. But the removal of internal borders within the Schengen area rendered the external borders of EU Member States a matter of common concern and it made the need for an integrated management of external borders even more compelling.

Free movement with secured external borders With 42.672 km of external sea borders and 8.826 km of land borders, the Schengen free-movement area comprises 25 countries (including three non-EU states) enabling free internal travel for nearly half a billion people across the continent. The abolition of internal borders facilitated freedom of movement for citizens in an unprecedented manner. But it was evident that this zone of freedom of movement required a coordinated approach in securing external borders. And whereas external borders should remain open and efficient for bona fide travellers and for people who need protection, they must be closed for cross-border crime and for other illicit activities. This is where Frontex comes in. Set up in 2004, the agency has faced a rapidly changing scenario in migratory flows at the Union’s external borders over the past years. It has been active in several land, air and sea joint operations. But its effectiveness has not reached expected levels. There are a number of reasons why this was the case.

Frontex was too dependent on Member States One of the recurring problems was that Frontex was too dependent on Member States for the success of its missions. In particular it depended on them to “lend” their personnel and equipment for its missions. If they failed to live up to the pledges − and they invariably did − the missions failed or lacked effectiveness. Indeed, the participation of Member States in Frontex missions has been patchy and pledges for equipment low. Another problem was the lack of cooperation from third countries. A mission in the proximity of a third country can hardly

Simon Busuttil MEP Simon Busuttil has been a Member of the European Parliament from Malta since 2004. A lawyer by profession, he specialised in European Affairs and has followed EU affairs since 1994. Before being elected to the European Parliament, he led the public communications campaign ahead of Malta’s referendum on EU membership and was a member of Malta’s negotiating group. As a MEP he leads the European People’s Party (EPP) in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee and covers issues that include the common European immigration and asylum policy.

be effective if that third country refuses to cooperate. Overall these shortcomings seriously hampered the efficiency and impact of the Agency. The European Parliament has always provided the necessary support to the Agency, notably through significant budget increases over the years.

The EP always supported the Agency Parliament has also repeatedly called for improvements in the Agency’s enabling legislation in order to address its shortcomings and improve its efficiency. Thus, when the European Commission put forward proposals to revamp the agency’s founding law in 2010, we welcomed it. We proceeded to prepare our own amendments to the law in order to reflect the Parliament’s expectations. We did so on the basis of several consultation meetings with the agency itself, with individual Member States, organisations representing migrants’ interests as well as with the Commission itself. The result was a report that put together more than 100 amendments to the law.

The EP’s main proposals and the state of play At the time of writing we are in the process of negotiating a compromise with the Council of Ministers, through the socalled trilogues. We are trying to reach a first reading agreement under the Hungarian Presidency because we understand the urgency of getting this law through. There are several new proposals on the table. I will here limit myself to mentioning the main issues which are being negotiated with Council. These are the following: • European Border Guards First of all we want to give the agency the political visibility that it deserves. When national border guards from different

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Member States participate in its missions, they are called by weird Euro-jargon such as “Frontex Joint Support Teams” or bizarrely “RABITS” which stands for “Rapid Border Intervention Teams”. Yet, during Frontex missions, national border guards are acting as EU border guards and we want to call them by that name so that everyone can understand their role. This is why we want a change in nomenclature to simplify matters and increase the visibility of the agency and its missions. • Fundamental Rights There is no doubt that Frontex should fully respect fundamental rights when carrying out its duties, and the EP has supported the European Commission’s proposals in this regard. However we went further because we wanted to go beyond mere declarations of good intentions. We wanted a mechanism to monitor and ensure that human rights are truly respected. This is important because we have often heard stories about treatment of people that raised concerns. This is why the European Parliament wants an advisory body or forum to be set up to monitor the respect of human rights and to scrutinise cases of possible breaches. We also want independent monitoring of certain Frontex operations such as return operations. And in the case of breaches of human rights we want Frontex missions or operations to be suspended or terminated. • Data Processing There is a lot of sense in giving Frontex the capacity to process personal data obtained during its missions because this could help it use this data to play a greater role in combating crossborder crime and irregular migration. It is incredible that it did not have this power so far and as a result, it was never able to process and make use of personal data obtained during its missions. We want to give it the power to do so. At the same time, however, we want to provide for due safeguards that one expects in the interest of the protection of privacy. Thus, data should be processed for limited purposes and, not for whatev-

News: EU Migration-Package On 4 May 2011, the European Commission adopted a Communication on Migration, which covers various aspects of migration policy including elements for strengthened border control and Schengen governance. Several aspects of this Communication were criticised by the European Parliament. As a first follow-up, the Commission presented on 24 May a “migration package”, including a Communication on better management of migration flows from the Southern Mediterranean region. Communication of 4 May: > http://tinyurl.com/66glr86 Communication of 24 May: > http://tinyurl.com/3tmqgyl

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er reason, such as when there are reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in cross-border criminal activities, in irregular migration activities or in human trafficking activities. There should be strict criteria on how this data should be handled and transmission of data to Europol is to be made on a “on a case by case basis”. • Lease and Purchase of Equipment As previously stated one of the main problems that has Frontex constantly encountered was a lack of resources which was due to Member States not living up to their commitments when they pledge to lend equipment for use in Frontex missions. In order to make sure that this problem is addressed once and for all, we want the Agency to be able to equip itself by the means of purchasing or leasing its own equipment, at least for a minimum set of assets that are necessary for basis operations.The most cost-effective options must be preferred. • Compulsory Solidarity As a corollary to previous point, Parliament wants the agency to finance the joint operations, rapid border intervention missions, pilot projects, the deployment of equipment and also return operations. At the same time, we would like Member States to guarantee the contribution of personnel for the European Border Guard System as well as their contribution of equipment. In other words, once a Member State has made a pledge to participate in missions, it should not be able to pull out of its own commitment. In this vein, we want Parliament to be regularly informed on what each Member State has committed to the agency’s pool of border guards and assets so that we can draw our political conclusions. • Parliamentary Scrutiny The European Parliament is keen to ensure that EU agencies are fully accountable to elected representatives and therefore to taxpayers. Frontex is no exception and this is why we are insisting on increasing the scrutiny powers of Parliament in relation to the operations of the agency, such as its working arrangements with third countries and so on.

“More Europe” in the coordination of Member States Once these issues are settled I hope that we can proceed to an agreement with the Council. In this case the agreement would have to be approved by the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament and subsequently in plenary. I sincerely hope that the new legal changes are agreed and enter into force as soon as possible because we are all too aware of the need to provide a stronger response to the challenge of migration and the management of the EU external borders. EU Member States need more Europe in coordinating their borders. And Europe needs a stronger Frontex agency that can get this job done.


German Armed Forces using rsIntCent® analysis and evaluation software

rola provides systems to the German Armed Forces for intelligence gathering and evaluation and to support operational command and control. German Navy units have already been using the IT solution from Oberhausen for two years now. In the meantime the German Armed Forces’ Operations Command is also using the software for information analysis and evaluation for the protection of German forces deployed in Afghanistan. rsIntCent® is currently being introduced within the scope of the SIEKA project for structured information gathering and evaluation in communications intelligence. For operations in war zones and crisis areas it is of vital importance that all accessible information is made available to enable proper assessment of the operational situation and appropriate protection of the deployed units. Individual items of information must not only be collected, but also correlated in the proper context to enable networks, e.g. networks of suspected terrorists, to be analysed. This gathering, collation and analysis of information all has to take place in advance of an operation to maximise the reliability of the basis for planning. Up-to-date information must also, however, be gathered and efficiently analysed during the actual operation. In terms of the IT support, the process of gathering, analysing and evaluating the information must therefore be a dynamic process. Only in this way can changes in the situation be categorised as threats. And only in this way is it possible to react within the shortest possible time.

With the aid of the rsIntCent® system from rola, individual items of information from the widest possible range of sources (human sources, electronic sources, sensors) are collected in a database. Numerous evaluation and analysis mechanisms are then applied to the individual items of information to create an information space, and relationships, for example between individual persons, between persons and locations or between persons and incidents or events (IED attacks, meetings) etc., can be detected and visualised in diagrams and charts − a significant contribution to the situation assessment! This information can also be exchanged between operational units and the involved command and control centres, even between units of different nations thanks to the software’s multilingual capability. Coordination processes are noticeably accelerated, with significant benefits for the efficiency of the individual operations. The system also provides a significant contribution to force protection. rola Security Solutions was in all cases able, within an extremely short time, to provide the full specified functionality of the IT solution on time, ready for immediate use and within budget − including development of project-specific concept documents (e.g. the IT security concept) and in compliance with all statutory data protection stipulations. Further information is available at www.rola.com.


THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Frontex has significantly developed and proven its added value to the EU’s humanitarian objectives

Frontex and the crisis in the Mediterranean by Ilkka Laitinen, Brig Gen, Executive Director, FRONTEX, Warsaw Frontex is no stranger to the Mediterranean. Since the Agency became operational in 2005, the southern maritime border has been one of the most important theatres for its operational activities. Today the EU’s southern neighbourhood is undergoing unprecedented changes. Nevertheless, from an EU bordermanagement perspective the situation can be described very much as “business as usual.”

Frontex is the largest European search and rescue organisation

Brig Gen Ilkka Laitinen is Executive Director, FRONTEX, Warsaw He was born in Nurmes, Finland, on August 22, 1962. He became promoted Brigadier General Boarder Guard in 2006. Deputy Head of Division, Frontier Guard HQ (Director of International Affairs) 2002 − 2005; Counsellor (Justice and Home Affairs), Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union 2000 – 2002; Coordinator of the Frontier Guard Headquarters on Schengen and EU affairs 1998 − 2000; National representative at the Council WP Schengen Evaluation 1999 − 2005; Director of the EU Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) 2003 − 2005

Socio-political events in North Africa and the Middle East − the so-called “Arab Spring” of popular uprisings − have focused public and media attention on the plight of irregular migrants and the dangers of migrants at sea. The public has been rightly the governments of Italy and Libya − has now re-opened. But shocked by media footage of horrifically over-crowded and due to the political context of this reopening, the situation − unseaworthy vessels, dramatic search-and-rescue operations, and Frontex’s operational response to it − is very different. and deaths at sea. But for the border-control authorities of the Member States affected, and for the crews involved in FrontexThe Arab Spring and the new state of migration coordinated operations at sea, such scenes are all too familiar. With the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the situation on Frontex is Europe’s largest search-and-rescue organisation, the EU’s southern maritime border started to significantly and saving lives at sea has always been one of the central change. That there would be an increase in both for irregular pillars of the Agency’s operational focus. The large numbers of economic migrants and refugees was to a large degree prepeople (tens of thousands) attempting the perilous and often dictable. Just what form and fatal journey from West Africa direction it would take was to the Canary islands before not. Frontex’s Risk Analysis 2006 were what sparked Hera, “Prevention is always better Unit, Situation Centre and Joint the first-ever Frontex Joint than a cure.” Operations Unit were stretched Operation. This operation, like never before to create a which is still running and has comprehensive range of possible future scenarios and approbeen supplemented by Hera II, was largely responsible for priate operational responses for short-, medium- and longclosing down the West African route and preventing not only term border management needs. Although many of these have illegal migration into the EU, but also countless unnecessary since been discarded, the challenge of predicting likely future deaths on the high seas. patterns is an ongoing one. Indeed, it is an important part of Frontex’s founding mandate to provide such a situational picCriminal networks ture to Member States and other stakeholders. This is one of The facilitators and criminal networks responsible for people the ways in which, behind the scenes, the Agency is supportsmuggling are not easily deterred, however. As one route is ing its partners and adding value to Member States’ activities. shut down another emerges, and the pattern of migration Although Frontex is most visible to the public through operachanges rather than stops. The routes change, the numbers tional activities such as last year’s RABIT Operation, what we change, but the phenomenon itself remains remarkably stable. as an agency provide behind the scenes is of vital importance. Since the closure of the West African route, the channels have progressively shifted east, first to the Central Mediterranean Intelligence versus efficiency (Libya-Italy) then to the Aegean (Turkey-Greece), and then to Any operation is only as good as the intelligence on which it is the Greek-Turkish land border in the Evros river region, where based. It is for this reason that the Agency has invested a great Frontex conducted its first-ever Rapid Border Intervention deal of money and effort into creating a state-of-the-art SituaTeam (RABIT) deployment. The Central Mediterranean route − tion Centre where all aspects of the current situation are once effectively closed through a bilateral agreement between

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Migrants from Arab countries in the harbour of Lampedusa

monitored around the clock to provide as close to a real-time intelligence picture as possible for Frontex and external stakeholders. This is one of the most important ways in which Frontex is currently adding value to the efforts of Member States and other partners. Another is through experts on the ground: Italy is a very well-equipped country when it comes to border control.

Nations come to Frontex for expertise, not for assets When nations request operational assistance at their sea borders in response to concrete situations, it is not a call for assets, but rather for expertise. The mix of migrants is very fluid, i.e. the nationalities of the migrants and the languages and dialects they speak changes with the flows. For this reason, screeners (to assist local authorities in determining the nationalities of migrants) and de-briefers (to conduct interviews with a view to intelligence gathering on the networks responsible and the routes used) are of vital importance to the ongoing operational efforts of Member State authorities. We are also providing experience and expertise in the area of return operations to enable swift and effective repatriation of illegally staying third-country nationals. As always, each Member State remains responsible for and in charge of its own portion of the external border − the role of Frontex is to provide whatever operational or informational assistance is required. For obvious reasons, the details of such provisions are closely guarded. At an operational level, Frontex has long been active in the Mediterranean through both the European Patrols Network, which coordinates the routine surveillance activities of Member Sates in the region, and through Joint Operations Indalo,

photo: FRONTEX

Aeneas, Poseidon and − in response to a request by the Italian authorities in February − Hermes.

Joint Operation Hermes In early February, following the socio-political turmoil in Tunisia, the migratory flow from Tunisia to Italy increased sharply, reaching dramatically high levels February 11-13, with 36 incidents on the island of Lampedusa and the arrival of 2,750 irregular migrants. The exponential increase in the number of migrants leaving Tunisia was chiefly opportunity-driven. The main contributing factors were a critical mass of migrants willing to emigrate and a lack of controls along Tunisia’s shores due to a temporary law enforcement deficit and military re-distribution to important urban centres for security reasons. The good weather and sea conditions, and the geographic proximity to Lampedusa, made attempting the crossing an attractive option. On February 15, Frontex received a formal request for assistance from the Italian Ministry of Interior in light of the extraordinary seaborne migratory pressure from Tunisia to the Italian Pelagic Islands. The requested assistance was in the form of a joint operation to strengthen surveillance at the EU’s external borders. In response to the Italian request, Frontex launched Joint Operation Hermes on February 20 along the Pelagic Islands. The Member States provided aerial assets and experts for debriefing migrants in support of activities carried out by Italian authorities. The operational area of Hermes was later extended to cover possible migratory flows towards Sardinia. During the first part of Joint Operation Hermes, the main migratory flow towards Italy originated from Tunisia and comprised Tunisian nationals. These were mostly young men see page 16

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

travelling alone in search of low-skilled temporary jobs in the European Union, such as in agriculture or construction, or seeking to join relatives in a Member State. Between the beginning of the year and the end of April, more than 22,500 Tunisian migrants were detected in the operational area of JO Hermes. However, as a consequence of the bilateral agreements between Italy and Tunisia, resulting in the strengthening of police surveillance along the Tunisian coast and the start of regular repatriations of Tunisian nationals, the intensity of the migratory flow from Tunisia has been decreasing since the end of April. Since March 2011, new migration flows from Libya, originating mainly in the sub-Saharan and Horn of Africa regions, have been targeting Lampedusa, Linosa and Pantelleria. Also, migration flows from Egypt have been targeting Sicily and Calabria.

The EU is facing, with the migration in its south one of it

The enlargement of Schen by Police Quaestor Ioan Dascǎlu, Secretary of State, Head of the D Twelve years ago, the European Treaty of Amsterdam established for the first time the objective of maintaining the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice. An area in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with adequate measures to prevent and combat crime. The challenging and evolving situation taking place these days in the Southern Mediterranean area has confirmed that common actions, shared responsability and a true sense of solidarity among Member States are more necessary than ever.

External borders are of crucial importance for the EU What about prevention? However the situation develops as the weeks and months ahead unfold, Frontex will continue to support the Member States affected through situational awareness and intelligence gathering as well as, where appropriate, through operational activities. But however necessary these activities are, they represent a response rather than a solution. Prevention is always better than a cure. It is for this reason that one of Frontex’s priorities with regard to the southern border is to initiate operational cooperation with Tunisia. Saving lives at sea should be a last resort; the best way to tackle the dangers of illegal migration is to prevent migrants from setting out in the first place, and this requires much more than a response. It requires forward-looking integrated border management at a policy level. Only by implementing a four-tier approach incorporating cooperation with countries of origin, cooperation with countries of transit, border control, and a comprehensive immigration strategy within the EU, can irregular migration be effectively tackled. Until all these elements are in place, we will always be reacting to migration rather than managing it.

Also, these events have demonstrated, once again, that effective and reliable control at the external borders is essential. The lifting of border control between the Schengen Member States requires in the same time to reinforce security at the Union’s external borders. Each state manages its external borders not only to control access to its own national territory but also to control entry to the EU and Schengen area. It acts in the interest of all Member States and it holds responsability for all EU citizens. In the same time, the situation of these Member States that are confronted with high pressure at their external borders must be recognised and approached in full respect of the principle of solidarity and in my opinion, this is what Schengen really is about. Schengen is also one of the most popular and successful achievements of the EU: an area where shared responsibility, mutual trust and confidence are the core values governing all the actions of its members.

Enlargement now enhancing EU’s credibility As several times in the past years, Schengen area is nowadays preparing for a new enlargement wave, with two EU countries Romania and Bulgaria. Regarded in the wider context of the African events, this process may appear as not very timely.

News: Ethics of Border Security On 29 April 2011, Frontex published its Study on the Ethics of Border Security. The aim of the study is to provide information on the ethical standards laid out by EU Border Guard services via an analysis of national Codes of Conduct and the ethical standards expected at the EU level. Together with the recently adopted Frontex Code of Conduct, this study is a vital part of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, which aims to embed the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in every aspect of Frontex’s work. The study is available via the Frontex website: > http://tinyurl.com/6h29mnb See also Frontex’ Annual Risk Analysis 2011: > http://tinyurl.com/68tcmls

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There are voices claiming that the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, especially now, when Europe is facing one of its most important security challenges in recent years, will weaken the credibility of the Union’s ability to control the access to its territory, and undermine the mutual trust.

Romania’s efforts in border control are exemplary Not only that Romania safeguarded the external border of the Union in an exemplary manner until now, but this protection will be further strengthened by the enhancement of the technical, human and training capabilities which came with our Schengen accession preparations as well as by our already increasing involvement in FRONTEX operations and other


EUROPEAN UNION

ts most important security challenges. Nevertheless, the enlargment has to take place

gen and the new role for Romania epartment of Public Order and Safety, Bucharest relevant instruments for mutual cooperation in this area of expertise. Despite the fact that Romania is not yet a Schengen Member State, our country already acts as one of them. Our law enforcement institutions are already working in the logic of Schengen spirit, putting common actions and shared responsibility first. Since the beginning of the Schengen accession process, Romania, with the full support of its European partners, was committed to achieve the existing standards as well as to ensure the other Member States of the rightfulness, consistency and seriousness of its efforts. These are not facts unilaterally stressed by Romania, but are also aspects pointed out by the evaluation experts in our Schengen reports, adopted in the relevant bodies at communitarian level.

Schengen accession is not a reward but an additional obligation

Ioan Dascǎlu Police Quaestor Ioan Dascǎlu has been Secretary of State, Head of the Department for Public Order and Safety since 2007. He startet his Police Carreer in 1995 in Bucharest and earned his Master in Community Law and Antidrug Justice from “Vasile Goldis” (Arad) Law Faculty IoanDascalu had been trained a.o. in the U.S. (FBI) and at the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. He was engaged in the Kosovo UNMIK Peacekeeping mission. His most important positions were: 2007 − 2010 Romanian Home Affairs Attaché in the EU, 2005 − 2006 Chief Inspector of Timis County Police Inspectorate, 2003 − 2005 Chief Inspector of Arad County Police Inspectorate.

border considered as low risk can become subject to critical migratory pressure. Organised crime constantly adapts its methods and routes and we want to be ready to counter any possible vulnerability at our external borders. It is not an issue concerning only Romania and Romanian citizens but all the European citizens.

We followed this logic of professionalism and commitment, because we are fully conscious that the Schengen accession is not a reward offered to our country, but an obligation deriving from our Accession Treaty, and also an additional responsibility regarding the security of the EU external border. We share the same interest and resolution of the other MemSolidarity and reliability − the two drivers for ber States in achieving a high security level at the external Romania borders of the EU as well as in countering illegal migration, In the Schengen area, each participating state is co-responsitrafficking in drugs and human beings. ble for exercising its responsibilities in a reliable manner. This Romania contributes to the EU soliis what we have prepared for and “Schengen is also one of the most darity principle by participating in the this is what we are currently majority of FRONTEX operations popular and successful achievements doing. As recent events have taking place at EU external borders. illustrated, a weakness at the of the EU: an area where shared As a full FRONTEX contributor, we external border can undermine the have provided a professional and credibility of the EU’s capability to responsibility, mutual trust and swift response to any Member States’ control entry on its territory as confidence are the core values govern- well as mutual confidence berequest for assistance, in their endeavor to manage the illegal migratween partners. ing all the actions of its members”. tion flows and control the external We are confident that the future borders, as it is the case now, at the accession of Romania in the southern external border. Schengen area will not only safeguard the area of freedom, security and justice but will also pave the way for its further and continuous development. Romania is aware of Europe’s expectations In the light of the recent situation from the Mediterranean, I The migratory pressure at our external border is far from being believe that the Schengen area should be strengthen and must at the level of other EU states’ external borders. Despite the rely on what Jean Monnet called “la solidarité de faits” − the fact that organized crime groups at the border with the Repub‘solidarity of facts’. Through its actions, Romania proved many lic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine were not identified as hatimes this kind of solidarity, solidarity which is now part of the ving a major impact on the EU security, we are still very alert way we think and act. and understand that very quickly, a section of the external

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Europe and the Middle East President Obama advocated on 19 May 2011 a borders-and-security-first approach to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and articulated his view that the territorial solution should be a return to the 1967 lines, while respecting the agreed territorial swaps. Dr. Einat Wilf MP....................................................................................... 19 Dr. Matthew Lewitt ................................................................................... 21 Michael Hancock MP.................................................................................. 22

DOCUMENT

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967 Following the Six-Day War in June 1967, the UN General Assembly discussed the situation in the Middle East. A final draft for a Security Council Resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on 22 November 1967. It was adopted on the same day. In the coming decades, Resolution 242 was to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts. The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: - Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; - Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity - For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; - For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; - For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to pro-

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Green line Separation Barrier Route (April 2006) Jerusalem city limits unilaterally expanded by Israel 1967 Palestinian territory ( West Bank and Gaza Strip ) Areas regarded by Israel as not being part of the West Bank Proposed / Israeli High Court-demanded Barrier Route changes 1- Palestinian territory transferred to State of Israel 2- Israeli territory transferred to State of Palestine East Jerusalem areas transferred to State of Palestine Israeli settlements to be evacuated Israeli settlements to be incorporated in State of Israeli Territorial Land Exchange Percentages ( in terms of West Bank area ) according to Israeli methodology (left) and according to Palestinian methodology (right)

Olmert’s Final Status Map, West Bank and Gaza, October 2008 Credits: Foundation for Middle East Peace

mote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.


There is new hope for steps towards peace after the Obama and Netanyahu speeches in May 2011

For the Palestinians’ sake by Dr. Einat Wilf MP, Jerusalem In the flurry of the oratorical duel between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one important agreement between the two has been overlooked. The President and the Prime Minister agreed and emphasized that any real peace would entail Palestinian recognition of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

The Obama-Netanyahu dialog is a step forward Many supporters of peace in Europe and around the world have viewed this as a step back, thinking that the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand − now supported by the American President − is merely a hawkish ploy to avoid negotiations and a sad mark of Israel’s low self-confidence that it needs the Palestinians − of all people − to tell it what it is. But this demand is neither. It is the one core demand that, once met, will mean that peace is truly possible. Indeed, Israel does not need Palestinian recognition of its identity as the homeland of the Jewish people. Those who have dreamt, created and built it, have done so with one purpose in mind − to create a homeland for the Jewish people. It is Israel’s raison d’être − its very reason for existing. Rather, it is the Palestinians − for their own sake and dignity − who need to recognize this.

Historical aspects to consider Zionism remains a political movement of self-determination for the Jewish people. The Palestinian national movement was about resisting Zionism and its program of building a state for the Jewish people. In the process of resisting, and given the continued failure of resistance, the Palestinians have told themselves a story according to which Zionism is a colonial movement, which has brought strangers to their land, strangers that − faced with determined resistance − are destined, sooner or later, to leave their land. In doing so, the

Palestinians might have been telling themselves a comforting story of hope, but ought to discard, if they are ever to have a state of their own.

To turn from hope into a state of action Hope is generally considered a positive word − but if it prevents engagement with reality, while living in suspended waiting for some make-believe future that will never materialize, then it is neither positive nor helpful. Those who feed this hope do the cause of peace and Palestinian statehood no favor. Zionism, unlike colonial movements, was a movement of people who have come home. As such, it was not about exploiting the (sadly, non-existing) resources of a foreign land, but about exploiting the only resources the Jewish people ever had − their own brains and ingenuity − in order to build a country, literally from the ground up. Building a country requires the mobilization of a people. As long as the Palestinians continue to divert their own countrybuilding resources into resisting Israel and hoping for its disappearance (and yes, hoping that Israel would become just some generic country with a Jewish minority among Arabs is hoping for its disappearance), there will be no peace and they will have no state. And yet, should the Palestinians finally recognize that in creating the state of Israel, the Jewish people have come home, they will signal to the world, to Israel, but above all, to themselves, that they have chosen to leave behind the siren call of resistance to colonialism and are ready to get down to the remarkable, difficult and immensely rewarding task of building a state they can call their own.

Dr. Einat Wilf is a member of Knesset on behalf of the Independence Party and sits on Israels, Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

Arab and Jewish refugees − more than 60 years of suffering, absorption and integration Integration of Jewish and Arab Refugees after 1948 In 1948, about 600,000 Jewish refugees fled from Arab countries to Israel (photo on the left), and about 540,000 to 720,000 of the Arab population of Mandatory Palestine fled to Arab states from the portion of Palestine that is now Israel (photo on the right). While the Jewish refugees became full Israeli citizens, many Arab refugees remained “refugees“ unaided by the neighboring Arab countries.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Documentation

Jerusalem − changing fortunes of a city touched by God

U. S. President Obama’s speech on the Middle East, 19 May 2011 in Washington (Excerpts) (…) For decades, the conflict between Israelis and Arabs has cast a shadow over the region. (…)At a time when the people of the Middle East and North Africa are casting off the burdens of the past, the drive for a lasting peace that ends the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever. That’s certainly true for the two parties involved. For the Palestinians, efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in failure. (…) Palestinian leaders will not achieve peace or prosperity if Hamas insists on a path of terror and rejection. And Palestinians will never realize their independence by denying the right of Israel to exist. As for Israel, our friendship is rooted deeply in a shared history and shared values. Our commitment to Israel’s security is unshake-

able. (…) But precisely because of our friendship, it’s important that we tell the truth: The status quo is unsustainable, and Israel too must act boldly to advance a lasting peace. (…) So while the core issues of the conflict must be negotiated, the basis of those negotiations is clear: a viable Palestine, a secure Israel. The United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states. The Palestinian people must have

the right to govern themselves, and reach their full potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state. These principles provide a foundation for negotiations. Palestinians should know the territorial outlines of their state; Israelis should know that their basic security concerns will be met. (…) That is the choice that must be made − not simply in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but across the entire region − a choice between hate and hope; between the shackles of the past and the promise of the future. It’s a choice that must be made by leaders and by the people, and it’s a choice that will define the future of a region that served as the cradle of civilization and a crucible of strife. (…)

Speech of Israli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to a joint session, US Congress, 24 May (Excerpts) (…) The peace agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan are vital, but they’re not enough. We must also find a way to forge a lasting peace with the Palestinians. Two years ago, I publicly committed to a solution of two states for two peoples: a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state. (…) We’re not the British in India. We’re not the Belgians in the Congo. This is the land of our forefathers, the land of Israel, to which Abraham brought the idea of one God, where David set out to confront Goliath, and where Isaiah saw a vision of eternal peace.

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(…) But there is another truth: The Palestinians share this small land with us. We seek a peace in which they’ll be neither Israel’s subjects nor its citizens. They should enjoy a national life of dignity as a free, viable and independent people living in their own state. They should enjoy a prosperous economy where their creativity and initiative can flourish. (…) Peace would herald a new day for both our peoples, and it could also make the dream of a broader Arab-Israeli peace a realistic possibility. (…)

President Abbas must do what I have done. I stood before my people - and I told you it wasn’t easy for me. I stood before my people, and I said, “I will accept a Palestinian state.” It’s time for President Abbas to stand before his people and say, “I will accept a Jewish state.” Those six words will change history. They’ll make it clear to the Palestinians that this conflict must come to an end, that they’re not building a Palestinian state to continue the conflict with Israel, but to end it. And those six words will convince the people of Israel that they have a true partner for peace. (…)


EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

After Bin Laden’s death, the terrorist threat by Al Qaeda to the West remains clear and present

The time after Bin Laden by Matthew Levitt, Director, The Washington Institute, Washington While loss of Bin Laden is a major blow to the morale of Al Qaeda, terrorist threat to the West remains clear and present. Nearly 10 years after the attacks of 9 11, and a year to the day after the Times Square bomb plot, U.S. Special Forces killed Al Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden in a safe house some 40 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan. Many pundits were quick to point out that Bin Laden became little more than a figurehead for Al Qaeda long ago and dismissed his death as little more than a moral victory. In fact, it now appears from the intelligence gathered at his compound that Bin Laden continued to play a hands-on operational role even while he remained in hiding. Perhaps more importantly, he was the face of the organization and the voice of its extremist narrative and ideology. His death could mark a turning point in the decade-long global struggle against terrorism.

A major blow to the morale of Al Queda In the near term, Bin Laden’s death presents an opportunity for terrorist recruiters and fund-raisers. Like that of Che Guevara, Bin Laden’s countenance will appear on T-shirts and posters for a long time to come. As an advertising and fundraising tool, he may prove to be as effective in death as he was in life, as least in the short term. But the loss of Bin Laden is more than just the loss of a household name; it is a major blow to the morale of Al Qaeda foot soldiers and the stability of the leadership of the Al Qaeda core. Bin Laden’s deputy, the Egyptian physician-turned-terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri, will undoubtedly succeed the dead man as chief of Al Qaeda. But whereas Bin Laden was a unifying figurehead, Zawahiri is a divisive figure whose accession to the top spot in the hierarchy may well rekindle simmering tensions between Al Qaeda’s Egyptian, Yemeni and other members and followers. Such tensions have a long history within the organization.

The Arab Spring and Al Qaeda Further, it can’t be overstated that Bin Laden’s death, on the heels of the Arab Spring, comes at a sensitive time for Al Qaeda. The upheavals throughout the region have presented an especially acute challenge to Al Qaeda’s nihilistic ideology and world-view. In a matter of weeks, a bunch of Arab youth succeeded in doing relatively peacefully what Al Qaeda and its ilk failed to accomplish through many years of indiscriminate violence. With some of Al Qaeda’s original ideologues recanting their support for the group’s acts of violence, and the Middle East

looking not toward the terrorist network , which offers no alternative to the status quo, but toward technocratic political reformers who offer a concrete platform for near-term change, the loss of Bin Laden will be especially felt. In fact, just in the weeks leading up to Bin Laden’s death, a PewResearchCenter survey of Muslim publics around the world found little support for the Al Qaeda leader.

Western societies remain favoured targets Yet, as can be expected, all is not rosy. Despite his death, the groups, franchises and followers Bin Laden founded and inspired continue to aim at Western targets. Just some weeks ago, German authorities arrested three suspected Al Qaeda operatives who were reportedly in the final stages of planning terrorist attacks in Germany. This is just the latest international plot to highlight the fact that the terrorist threat to the West remains clear and present. Not only Al Qaeda and franchises like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but affiliates like Lashkar-e-Taiba and homegrown extremists inspired by Al Qaeda’s radical narrative and ideology, remain intent on, and, to varying degrees, capable of, carrying out terrorist attacks.

Bin Laden’s death will not end terrorism Whether Bin Laden is dead or alive, some of these organized terrorists and homegrown violent extremists will continue to demonstrate a resolve to take overt, operational steps to carry out terrorist actions. Indeed, his death may push some over the radical edge and mobilize others already radicalized to carry out terrorist plots. But it is also true that intelligence operations force our adversaries to react, creating communications, travel and funding trails that can lead to further disruptions These will not end terrorism, which has spread well beyond the Al Qaeda core, but they could usher in further counter-terrorism successes in the long war against the asymmetric threat of global terrorism. The death of Bin Laden is more than just a violent shake of the tree; it is more like chopping down the tallest tree in the forest. Matthew Levitt is Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute.

News: New head of Al Qaeda The Egyptian “Doctor” Aiman al-Sawahiri, to date Nr. 2 behind Bin Laden, was selected Head of Al Qaeda on 16 June, 2011.

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The lack of unity of leading EU-Members shows how the continent remains haunted by its past

The Arab Spring, Libya and Europe by Michael Hancock MP, London The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), also known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, has not been at its best recently. The belated and timid reaction to the historic events unravelling in the Arab world has revealed the weaknesses of the post-Lisbon Union. The EU is struggling to confirm itself as an actor to be reckoned with and as a bloc defending the interests of its 500 million citizens. The new Treaty has so far failed to re-invigorate the Union.

No consideration to using CSDP means The lack of unity among leading EU member states when voting in the UN Security Council on the resolution to protect Libya’s civilian population served as a strong reminder of how the continent remains haunted by its past and still fails to forge joint positions when it really counts. Although the conflict is on our doorstep and despite the fact that European countries are the main consumers of Libyan oil and gas, it would appear that at no point was any serious consideration given to making use of CSDP instruments. For example, although the evacuation of civilians falls within the remit of the Petersberg tasks which are recognised by the Lisbon Treaty, the member states chose rather to organise their own separate evacuation operations and made no use of the EU instruments created for that purpose. As regards the delivery of humanitarian aid to people in Libya, the EU has put itself in an impossible position whereby others − in this case the UN Agency for Humanitarian Aid − determine whether the EU will be able to carry out the humanitarian mission it has decided upon. This is certainly not what was intended when the ESDP/CSDP was created. If the EU wants to be the global player it claims to be, it needs to be able to act autonomously when our interests are at stake. The crisis in North Africa and in Libya in particular is also a European problem and Europe should act accordingly. As things stand now, the EU is not even capable of confirming its reputation of at least being a wielder of soft power that can transform regimes, countries and regions. Currently, it is at best a bystander, while others − member states as well as other institutions − influence and shape events.

The EU should seek a stronger role in key regions North Africa is one example where this should be done immediately. We need to respond to the various grassroots revolutions taking place there and see them as an opportunity, not a threat to stability. Currently, the focus is too much on short-

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Michael Hancock MP Mr. Hancock was born 1946 in Portsmouth. Since 1971 he has been a Member of the House of Commons and the longest serving member of the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons. Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe since 1997 and Member of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) / Assembly of WEU in Paris. His function in the ESDA was Vice-Chairman of the Political Committee. He was also the leader of the Liberal Group in the ESDA.

term problems, such as an alleged influx of migrants and threatened energy supplies. The EU must mobilise as much as possible, even in times of budgetary constraints, in order to support the people in the region and their aspirations for the rule of law, democracy and social opportunities. This is an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change this part of the world for the better and the fruits of today’s investments will be reaped tenfold in the future. It is also important to be involved as early as possible in the renewal of these societies, not least of all because of the future repercussions of their revolutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the short term, the new governments will in all likelihood have difficulties containing their peoples’ deeprooted anger against certain policies pursued by Israel, policies that are only superficially sanctioned by the West. While we must respect Israel’s security interests, our standing among the people of the Arab world will not improve unless we help bring about lasting change for the Palestinians.

Three scenarios to follow in Libya As far as the situation in Libya is concerned, I see three scenarios for the coming months: In the first scenario the current military impasse will continue and a low-intensity war will simmer on. Western support for the rebel movement will not include heavy weaponry and there will be no deployment of ground troops to Libya. Moammar Qaddafi’s forces will eventually run out of arms and munitions and will have to retreat, but there is no guarantee of this as Qaddafi still has substantial financial resources at his disposal and the arms embargo is far from perfect. Moreover this can take time, too much time for NATO and others to stand by and watch. In the second scenario, Qaddafi will withstand the rebel forces


EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

and remain in power, keeping control over the western part of the country. This is the scenario of a divided Libya. As a consequence of a ceasefire agreement between the two sides, international buffer forces will be deployed to monitor the line of division. A variant of this scenario is that international mediation will put an end to the fighting and the country will be placed under temporary shared management, with the future option of a referendum on independence for the eastern part. At the UN, NATO and elsewhere, contingency planning for such a scenario has already begun. However, the opposition to Qaddafi is not limited to the eastern part and any planning for the separation scenario should acknowledge that fact. The third scenario is one of military escalation. In principle, this would require the UN Security Council to issue a new mandate. It has been argued that the deployment of ground troops to establish protection zones for the civilian population may already be covered by the existing Resolution 1973 which indeed foresees the use of all necessary means to protect the population. Some argue the exclusion of ground forces addresses a large-scale deployment only, which would allow the establishment of secure zones (for example in Misrata) with the help of deployed soldiers. Nobody can predict the outcome of a military escalation, but this is the scenario most likely to include the end of Qaddafi.

We shouldn’t give any chance to Qaddafi However, let us not forget what Colin Powell once said: “If you break it, you own it”, in particular as we do not know what the intentions of the various groups that make up the Transitional Council really are. Military escalation could lead to a situation like that in Iraq. It will certainly mean a prolonged presence of NATO or of other international forces on the ground. I do not favour any of these scenarios in particular. I do believe, however, that NATO, the EU and all those who have asked for Qaddafi’s removal need to think seriously about the ways

News: EU boosts aid for Libya Against the background of the humanitarian needs triggered by the conflict in Libya, the European Commission increased on 23 May 2011 its aid by € 20 million. This brings to € 70 million the Commission’s support to the civilians affected by this crisis, and boosts the overall humanitarian response of the European Union to almost € 125 million. The extra funding will be used to assist the vulnerable groups affected by the conflict such as internally displaced persons, third country nationals and Libyan refugees in neighbouring countries. The new financing will provide shelter, food assistance, water, sanitation, emergency healthcare, protection, demining and coordination support.

Tahrir Square in Cairo during the rebellion in February 2011 Photo: Peta de Atzlan/flickr.com

and means of breaking the current deadlock. Either they agree to step up their support to the rebels or they agree on negotiations with Qaddafi and his family. Whatever we do, it should be consistent with international law. Many believe that the scenario of a divided Libya is the easiest and most face-saving option for NATO and the West, and enables the military action to be ended soon. However, following the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, allowing Qaddafi to remain in power or to control parts of the country may have serious consequences for the other ongoing revolutionary movements, in particular in Bahrain and Syria.

The EU should deploy humanitarian operations In any case, today, the EU is not in a position to change the tide of events in the region in general or in Libya in particular. Nevertheless, we should not leave Egypt and Tunisia to cope with the massive influx of Libyan refugees on their own: the presence of those people ultimately constitutes a threat to the stability of those countries and to their ongoing transformation and democratic transition. With my parliamentary colleagues from the European Security and Defence Assembly, I therefore call on the EU to deploy a humanitarian relief operation making use of the EU’s civil-military instruments under the CSDP in order to deliver aid to the displaced persons in Egypt and Tunisia who have fled the conflict in Libya. The EU should also prepare a strategy to support these people when the current conflict ends, including assistance for their return. Furthermore, it is important to seek and obtain contributions from Arab countries to implement such a strategy.

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Security and Defence In the defence sector, the EU has in reality not more than a declaratory role. There is some hope, but nowhere real progress. Roberto Gualtieri MEP............................................. 24 Françoise Hostalier MP/ Jean-Pierre Kucheida MP ...... 27 Claude-France Arnould............................................ 29 Olivier Jehin.......................................................... 32 Dr. Rainer Martens.................................................. 32

Patrick Bellouard.............................................. 34 Murad Bayar..................................................... 37 Antoine Bouvier ............................................... 39 Joseph A. Ghattas............................................ 42 Hans H. Kühl ................................................... 44

EU Security and Defence urgently needs new impetus. Can the comprehensive approach save CSDP?

The CSDP and its developments after Lisbon by Roberto Gualtieri MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg The European Parliament (EP) adopted, with the support of all of the pro-European political groups (EPP, S&D, ELDR, Greens), the “Report on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty”. The Report is an important contribution to the debate on the future of the CSDP, containing not only concrete proposals on different aspects of CSDP, but also offering a broader view of the EU’s problems and opportunities as a global security actor. It also offers a strategic partnership between the EP, the EU institutions and other stakeholders with the goal of a consistent and coherent security and defence policy embedded in the EU external and internal action.

The Leitmotiv: A comprehensive approach The Leitmotiv of the Report is the comprehensive approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. This approach is, on one hand, required by the transformations in the international system and the emergence of a multi-dimensional and trans-national concept of security. On the other hand, it is

Roberto Gualtieri MEP He is the Social and Democrats coordinator for the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence. His political career began in 2001 as Member of the Rome Secretariat of the Democratici di Sinistra and is currently a Member of the National Direction of the Democratic Party. In addition to his work as the Deputy Director of the Gramsci Foundation, he is also the Director (with José Luis Rhi-Sausi) of the “Annual Report on European Integration” (Il Mulino Editor). Mr. Gualtieri is an author of various books on Italian and international history of the 20th century and a contributor of many articles to newspapers and magazines. He holds a degree in Literature and Philosophy, as well as a PhD in Contemporary History.

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made possible by the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service. The Report underlines how the Lisbon Treaty (with the new role of the HR/VP, the end of the pillar structure and the placement of the CFSP/CSDP within the legally binding institutional framework of EU principles) encourages convergence of different policies, instruments and legal bases within a comprehensive approach. This contributes to peace and security becoming a cross-cutting objective of EU external and internal action. We are starting to have some initial examples of such a new comprehensive and flexible approach to framing CFSP and fully harnessing CSDP assets toward the service of EU external action. This new approach has overcome traditional procedural and institutional barriers, while at the same time fully respecting the prerogatives of the different institutions. A good example has been the EU Military Staff’s coordination of military capabilities in support of civilian-led humanitarian relief operations during the 2010 Pakistan floods. Yet there is still much to be done. The Report expresses concern for the inadequate speed of development in this process. The main obstacle is, of course, political and is linked to the attitude of the Member States towards CFSP and CSDP. The unwillingness of the EU Member States to define a common position on the Libyan crisis is definitely a bad signal. It is worth noting that the Parliament clearly states in the Report that ad hoc coalitions of the willing and bilateral cooperation cannot be considered as viable substitutes for CSDP. This is because today no single European State has the capacity to be a significant security and defence actor.

Lack of mutual trust can be fatal That is why the Report calls on the Member States to improve internal cohesion and mutual trust in the area of foreign and defence policy. It also urges the European Council to draw up,


while engaging in a political dialogue with the European Parliament, a true European Foreign Policy Strategy combining the various dimensions of EU external action. The dialogue is important because a strong CFSP/CSDP based on a real comprehensive approach requires the support and cooperation of all the EU institutions. The new legislative, budgetary and political prerogatives of the European Parliament make its role greater and more necessary than it may seem, especially if we take into account the way in which the Council makes decisions on CFSP and CSDP.

It must be said that after the Southern Mediterranean events, such a body is under experimentation. The Parliament welcomes these developments and supports strengthening the crisis management board in line with the Report.

Policy needs corresponding means

According to the European Parliament, a comprehensive approach to security, which fully involves the different instruments of EU external action, and gives priority to conflict prevention, political response to crises, disarmament and non-proliferation, does not contradict the need for credible, reliable and available military capabilities. On the contrary, these capaThe High Representative / Vice President (HR/VP) bilities are essential. The Report underlines the risk that current Another key actor in a strong CSDP is of course the HR/VP, economic austerity may lead to cuts not concentrated at the actually Baroness Ashton, whose new responsibilities repreEuropean level, which might sent a merging of functions, mareduce national military king her role central to the “… the European Parliament is ready to fully capabilities while still mainprocess of bringing the various exert its new prerogatives to support CSDP as taining the overlapping roles. instruments, actors and procedures of EU external action into a a fundamental instrument to enhance the EU That is why the Report contains a strong call for smarter coherent relationship. That is strategic autonomy and uphold its values.” defence spending based on why the European Parliament the “Europeanization” of encourages the HR/VP to be national defence models and proactive and commits itself to the pooling of a larger prosupport her in every effort aimed portion of defence capabilities. While welcoming the recent at implementing a consistent and coherent CFSP/CSDP. Here initiatives (Ghent framework, German-Swedish paper, Weimar the function of the EEAS is crucial. initiative), the Report underlines that the moving without delay to the operative phase is crucial. Crisis management board The Report contains many proposals on strengthening and coordinating the civilian and military crisis management strucThe crucial role of the European Defence Agency tures. In fact, the Parliament calls for establishing a crisis maIn this respect a crucial role should be played by the European nagement board composed of the CSDP structures, the peaceDefence Agency, which according to the Treaty should particibuilding, conflict prevention, mediation and security policy pate in defining a “European capabilities and armaments units, and the geographical desks with the participation of the policy”. For this reason the EDA should be strengthened both Commission humanitarian aid, civil protection and internal sein terms of political commitments by the participating Member curity structures. This board should provide contingency States and in terms of its human and economic resources. But a planning and crisis response management, coordinating the new European capability and armaments policy requires the use of the various financial instruments and the deployment of strong commitment and participation of all of the EU institucapabilities available to the EU. This should be done without tions, bodies and Member States. The Parliament calls for an prejudice either to the specific decision-making process and extraordinary European Council meeting dedicated to security legal basis of the deployment of civilian and military capabiliand defence, aimed at giving political impulse and strategic ties under CFSP/CSDP or to the use of Community instruments. dimension to this policy.

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Stop the competition between the EU Institutions At the same time, the Report proposes establishing a strong partnership between the Commission, Parliament, Council and EDA to support security-related research and enhance dual-use capabilities through the Eight Framework Programme. It also recommends that Member States comply with the deadlines for the full transposition of the directives on transfer of defence-related products within the Union and on procurement in the fields of defence and security. This is in order to strengthen and make more efficient and competitive the European defence market.

It is high time for a combined EU civil-military HQ In the field of military CSDP, the Report supports the creation of a military Operational Headquarters to be co-located with the civilian HQ in order to overcome the current imbalance in the planning and execution of civilian and military operations. The recent difficulties experienced in the Libyan crisis, linked to the political divisions among Member States, are in part a consequence of the lack of such a structure. In this respect, the Parliament welcomes the HR/VP’s recognition of the need for an EU military capability and is ready to contribute to the cost-

efficiency analysis called for by Ms. Ashton. If properly conducted, such an analysis would likely show that the costs of not having an OHQ are greater than the costs of establishing it.

Internal and external security are definitively linked together The Report contains many other proposals, for example on a Battlegroup specializing in niche capabilities suited to low-intensity conflict and on charging Battlegroup costs under the Athena mechanism. It also focuses on the current missions, on the relationship between external and internal security, and on the partnerships between the EU and other organisations and States. Politically, its adoption signals that the European Parliament is ready to fully exert its new prerogatives to support CSDP as a fundamental instrument to enhance the EU strategic autonomy and uphold its values. We hope that the other European and national institutions will understand this message and will contribute to overcoming the current difficulties by translating the provisions and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty into reality. Such steps will transform the EU into a real global security actor, able to face the challenges and seize the opportunities of the new century.


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The multitude of missions and budget constraints risk overstretching the EU’s military capabilities

The CSDP − the way ahead by Françoise Hostalier MP, Paris and Jean-Pierre Kucheida MP, Paris (Edit.) The so-called “legacy report” is the ninth in a series of documents on European security and defence policy to be produced by the European Security and Defence Assembly was its last report before the final closure of WEU at the end of June 2011. These highly appreciated reports of delegated members from national parliaments, brought together in the Defence Committees of the Assembly, had a certain influence on decisions of the national parliaments and in the different Institution of the European Union however they couldn’t help to make a real breakthrough either in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) nor in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toward to more coherent decision making, adapted to the needs.

Europe is not willing to take coherent decisions on security and defence Today, unfortunately, events seemed to have proved us right: Europe is unable to take a coherent decision on political, humanitarian and military action in response to the bloody battles for freedom being waged by peoples of the Maghreb and Middle East. We seem to have learned nothing from our recent and painful history: the Balkan wars, Sarajevo, Srebrenica … Today, 15 years on, when the going gets tough, we still take refuge behind the NATO banner. Our report describes the current structures and procedures that exist under the CSDP and proposes ambitions for a European defence. It suggests certain improvements in terms of institutions and defence capabilities and reviews those areas of the CSDP where European cooperation needs to be stepped up.

There is no director to conduct the European “orchestra” in CSDP As far as institutions are concerned, the structures and procedures exist already: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EU-MS, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). But there is no-one to conduct the orchestra: there is, in other words, no operational headquarters to provide the coordination that is essential in order to guarantee the necessary responsiveness in the event of a crisis. We describe the permanent operational cooperation that gives Europe access to military capabilities that directly match its requirements or can be adapted as necessary: the Euroforces and the battlegroups 1500, as well as bilateral cooperation initiatives among European states (e.g. the recent FrancoBritish Treaty and the German-Swedish agreement).

Françoise Hostalier MP Françoise Hostalier was born in Beauvais. She holds a master’s degree in mathematics 1993 to 1995 Member of the French Parliament. 1995 Secretary of State to the Minister of National Education. Formerly head of the Popular Party for French Democracy (PPDF) and Vice-President of the Liberal Democracy (DL) party, she is now a member of the National Bureau of the Radical Party and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). 2007 elected under UMP as a Member of Parliament. Member of the National Defence and Armed Forces Committee. Rapporteur on behalf of the Defence Committee of ESDA. 2009 Vice President of the French-Afghan Friendship Group of the National Assembly.

Jean Pierre Kucheida MP Jean-Pierre Kucheida was born in Lievin on 24 February 1943. A specialist in geography, he taught at the Lycee Henri Darras Liévin. Since 1981 continuously elected as Member of Parliament of the 12th District of Pas-de-Calais. 1981 to 2001 Mayor of Lievin and a Member of the General Council of Pas-de-Calais (1981 to 1988), 1995 to 1997 Questeur of the National Assembly. A Member of the Finance Committee, Mr. Kucheida is Vice President of the study group on the development of social and healthy living, and Rapporteur on budget appropriations for fisheries. He is Chairman of the Defence Committee of the ESDA.

As regards defence equipment and the armaments industry, we describe the difficulties of cooperation among European states and the role of the European Defence Agency, which remains too limited. The EDA, which has a too small operating budget, should become a tool for harmonising and rationalising efforts in the field of defence equipment at European level, in order to enable Europe to assert itself against the United States’ dominance in the field of future technologies and dumping by countries with emerging defence industries. The European states are sovereign, of course, but they must understand the urgency of reaching agreement among themselves on these issues, for the threats are very real.

How to prepare for the future? Our report suggests a number of avenues to be explored in order to define the aims and ambitions of the CSDP. The most legitimate of its ambitions is to guarantee peace for

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future generations in Europe, which, let us not forget, was the fundamental aim of Europe’s founding fathers. This requires a common political resolve, unfailing solidarity on the part of states, a pooling and sharing of competences and capabilities in order to serve that common cause, not just within Europe’s borders but also beyond them, when our security or interests are under threat. Intervention requirements may vary. Depending on the type of threat or crisis, there may be a need for humanitarian assistance, crisis management in the wake of a natural disaster, measures to establish or consolidate the structures of a constitutional state or military intervention.

The CSDP has to become a true “protector” The CSDP must therefore be ambitious in scope. It must first and foremost be a tool for protecting the EU’s interests. The report sets out a number of measures that are essential for that purpose. In the institutional area, what is lacking, essentially, is a capability for the planning and conduct of military operations analogous to that which exists for civilian missions. From the financial standpoint, the common effort is not shared sufficiently equally among member states. Looking at the euro zone, it is very unfair to point the finger of blame at certain countries which have trouble complying with the Maastricht public deficit criteria when they are fully assuming their share of the common defence.

Nobody “wants” to engage the structured cooperation The permanent structured cooperation foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty must be organised and quickly put in place, as must the EU Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and CSDP. In the field of capabilities, the main aspect in need of improvement is the EU’s operational credibility. The EU must be recognised as a reliable and effective player on the international stage. Its member states must therefore show themselves to be united and resolved. For that they need the support of their public opinion, which to a large extent depends on the Union’s capacity to handle information. The EU must do more to publicise its action under the CSDP and make the functioning of the European External Action Service transparent.

The EU needs performing civil capabilities In terms of civilian missions, in order to deal with crises like those currently affecting the countries of the Maghreb, the EU must be able to mobilise extensive civilian capabilities in order to make experts and trainers available for long periods. In response to disasters like the quake in Haiti, and as stressed by Herman Van Rompuy in February 2010, it is necessary to create a European intervention force that can be rapidly mobilised in the event of a natural disaster.

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More generally speaking, the Member States have vital security interests on their own territory: internal security against the threats of terrorism and organised crime, as well as in terms of security of supplies of energy and raw materials, the evacuation of a country’s nationals, etc. The CSDP must be able not only to respond to outside requests for assistance but also be organised so as to defend the Member States “civilian” interests.

Military capabilities: Still the same shortfalls As regards improving purely military capabilities, a glance at the proceedings of the different force generation conferences suffices to show that it is always the same capability shortfalls that are deplored: helicopters, strategic lift, UAVs, land units, etc. Those shortfalls are the direct result of the Member States’ limited defence budgets, which represent on average only 1.4% of GDP. As regards the use of forces dedicated to EU operations − the battlegroups 1500 and Euroforces − the main area in need of improvement is that of rapid operational availability, which is decisive for responsiveness. Finally, the report identifies areas in which the CSDP needs developing (see box):

Conclusion To conclude, it might have been hoped that an instrument that was so difficult to put together, namely the Lisbon Treaty, should provide a political dimension capable of harmonising and channelling the individual contributions of the Member States towards a common European goal. It might have been hoped that Europe, with the necessary material and institutional resources (which of course can still be improved), should at last be capable of taking action if our interests were threatened or if, in the name of values, it seemed essential to intervene. The recommendations in our report are a strong appeal to that effect.

Recommendations Military advice and assistance, in order to Europeanise what is currently being done bilaterally, in particular in Africa; Action at sea (particularly surveillance), to improve coordination of the civil (FRONTEX) and military action of the different states involved; The space sector, to carry out ambitious programmes such as Galileo, Kopernikus and MUSIS, by giving the EDA a role in coordinating military needs; Cyberspace, an area of potential conflict and risk for the security of states and their citizens; “Crisis” intelligence, which could be extended to security intelligence and put under the responsibility of a European agency, yet to be created.


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The EDA supports Member States’ efforts to improve European defence capabilities

The European Defence Agency (EDA) − role and perspectives by Claude-France Arnould, CEO, European Defence Agency (EDA), Brussels

Established in 2004, anticipating the Lisbon Treaty, EDA is the only agency mentioned in the EU treaties, and the only one whose Steering Board meets at the level of Defence Ministers. This double specificity puts it in a unique institutional position and gives it political impetus at the highest level. The Agency is a tool at the service of its Member States.

Flexible and compact EDA is small (fewer than 120 staff) but its expertise is widely acknowledged. Its personnel generally have a defence or military background with extensive experience. They work in an integrated manner within the Agency; and have close links to expert counterparts in Member States. Staff are on fixed contracts: this ensures that the Agency is continuously rejuvenated, and cements relationships between it and the defence establishment of its Member States. The Agency has a budget of some 30 million euros. But it acts as a powerful lever: the projects it launches and manages generate anything between 100 and 250 million euros in ad hoc budgets. Its budget should not thus be seen in isolation: in military parlance, it acts as a force multiplier. EDA’s flexibility is also manifested in the configuration of the projects it runs. There are two types of project: opt-out (all Member States participate unless they choose not to); and opt-in (formed by two or more Member States). EDA thus works à la carte: depending on their strategic priorities, their operational requirements, or their interest in a specific project, Member States decide the extent to which they participate in the Agency’s core work of projects and studies. In other words, it is the place where Member States who wish to develop capabilities in cooperation can do so. But it is also a key facilitator in developing the capabilities necessary to underpin the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union.

The full capability spectrum EDA covers the full capability spectrum of capability development, from upstream Research & Technology (R&T) to Operational Deployment. In the area of R&T, for example, the Agency is working on the technologies of tomorrow that will be needed in the area of maritime countermine warfare. It also works with the European Commission on dual use (civil and military) technologies linked to the fight against the from Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. EDA is

Claude-France Arnould Claude-France Arnould has been the Chief Executive Officer of the European Defence Agency (EDA) since 2011. She is a former student of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and holds an aggregation in Classics, a degree in art and archaeology and she studied at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), Paris. Earlier in her career she was from 1994-1998 a First Councillor at the French Embassy in Bonn. 1998 − 2001: Director of International and Strategic Affairs at the Prime Minister’s Defence General Secretariat (SGDN), Paris 2001-2009, Director for Defence Issues at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels, 2009-2010, Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels.

also playing a role in bringing to the attention of its Member States the issue of technological non-dependence: indeed, it organised a conference on this subject in April 2011 in Budapest, together with the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA). Turning to the operational deployment of capabilities, the Agency has trained almost 120 helicopter crews, more than half of which have deployed to Afghanistan. In another concrete example - the fight against improvised explosive devices - the Agency has developed a forensic analysis laboratory to counter these weapons that can be so devastating for our armed forces. This laboratory will be deployed to Afghanistan this summer under a French national lead, and with the active involvement of a number of other member states. These are also examples of Pooling & Sharing. But there are others, such as Air Transport, Unmanned Aerial Systems, Maritime Surveillance, and Satellite Communications. Pooling & Sharing is not new to the Agency: in a way it has been EDA’s modus operandi from the outset. Pooling & Sharing has toplevel impetus: Ministers of Defence discussed the issue at their meetings in the Foreign Affairs Council and the EDA Steering Board on 23 May. They acknowledged the important contribution by EDA to this initiative and tasked it to submit proposals in the autumn on how it might be best taken forward.

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Defence and other EU policies The strengthening of the European Defence technological and Industrial Base is a priority for the Agency. It achieves this through a close dialogue with defence ministries and industry: full transparency is the key. The Agency has thus established Codes of Conduct for industry as well as a Code of Conduct on offsets. The Agency is also playing a central role in striving to strike a balance between the single market on the one hand, and the specificities of the defence sector on the other. To this end, it has organised a high-level seminar on Article 346. EDA is active in maximising civil-military synergies. Its expertise is available to, and utilised by, Member States in their consideration of the defence implications of a range of broader EU policies and initiatives, such as Radio Spectrum, Single European Sky, Cyber Defence, UAS and Space. The Agency is where defence ministries can identify and articulate their interests vis-à-vis these policies. Indeed, at the Steering Board meeting on 23 May, Defence Ministers addressed the defence implications of these policies: they acknowledged the positive

role that the EDA was playing, welcomed its relationship with the European Commission, and encouraged to keep up its good work.

EDA and its partners The Agency does not live in a bubble. Relationships with the broader defence community are vital. In the same way that EDA is developing its relationship with other EU institutions such as the Commission, it is also working with third parties. It already has an Administrative Arrangement with Norway, which facilitates close practical cooperation. A similar Arrangement will be signed with the European Space Agency on 20 June at Le Bourget; and, in due course, with OCCAR. An Arrangement with Switzerland is also in preparation. The Agency has established and is developing its relationship with NATO. And a number of other other third states, such as the US, Ukraine and Russia, also have dialogue and cooperation with the Agency. 1 Denmark does not participate.

Commentary

Strengthening the European defence “acquisitions” pillar Commentary on the role of EDA by Olivier Jehin, Editor-in-Chief Europe Diplomacy and Defence, Brussels While the Lisbon Treaty was largely conceived to allow a further qualitative leap in European defence matters, over the past few months CSDP has become the poor relation of a European Union having to face a deep crisis. Budgetary constraints brought on by the crisis and, in many Member States, by the bad management of public finances, have eaten still further into a political will that was already hardly perceptible. The root causes are well-known: demilitarisation of a large number of countries; different views from those who cannot picture the EU as a power or refuse to see it act in the field of defence; German pacifism; France’s return to the NATO command structure; the AngloFrench defence pact, and so on. This results in the absence of any new missions, thus giving the EU no more than a declaratory role, while implementation of the treaty becomes bogged in theological debate. A silver lining at the horizon There is, however, a silver lining to this somewhat gloomy picture. I shall just mention three rays of hope peeping out from behind the clouds. • The first relates to the ambiguity of Anglo-French cooperation, which is allied to the uncertainty hanging over the next French elections. For the British, this is a marriage of reason with a partner whose political stability is not guaranteed and which will itself be faced with difficult budgetary decisions over coming months. Furthermore, with their commitment in Libya, the two partners have also demonstrated their great dependence on the United States. Finally, Barack Obama’s reaffirmation of the “special relationship” with London, together with additional measures of favour for the British partner, seem well and truly intended to counter-balance the

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cross-Channel bilateral cooperation. The effectiveness and the duration of the Anglo-French cooperation therefore remain to be seen. • The second ray of hope is based on Poland’s determination to: move forward in implementing the treaty during the second half of this year, despite the high risk of this being purely rhetorical; actually carry out all that has been said about the pooling and sharing of capabilities; and above all create a permanent civil-military operations planning and conduct capability. • In the current context, however, hope is above all based on defence procurement. Despite the fact that it seems difficult to make progress with pooling and sharing or with specialisation, it must be said that application of the public procurement directive for the defence industry could quite rapidly bring about defragmentation of the market, consolidate the industrial base and, with a bit of luck, make member states understand that the best way to save money is to streamline and consolidate demand. The clock is running To help the defence industry and national armaments directorates understand this, it is imperative for the European Commission to undertake the first infringement procedures in coming weeks. This, with the help of lawyers, is the only way that the internal market − which seems today to have become the only way to bring about European integration in the defence field − will gradually take shape. It is in the interest of our armed forces, while also being in the interest of maintaining our technological capability and our future strategic autonomy. Source: Agence Europe, Europe Diplomacy and Defence, Nr. 421 , 13.5.2011


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

News: NATO strengthens its position on Libya NATO Defence ministers extended Operation in Libya On 8 June, NATO Defence Ministers met with the Defence Ministers of the partner countries that are contributing to protect civilians in Libya. NATO decided to extend Operation Unified Protector for a further 90 days.

NATO Defence Ministers adopted new Cyber Defence Policy On 8 June, following the direction provided by the Strategic Concept, the NATO Defence Ministers have adopted the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence. The aim of the revised policy is to offer a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber threats and building resilience. All NATO structures will be brought under centralised protection, and new cyber defence requirements will be applied. The policy integrates cyber defence into NATO’s Defence Planning Process and sets the principles on NATO’s cyber defence cooperation with partner countries, international organisations, the private sector and academia. In parallel, a cyber defence Action Plan has been agreed.

NATO Defence Ministers’ Statement on Libya (Excerpts) “Today, we the Defence Ministers of Allies and operational partners in the NATO-led operation Unified Protector met to take stock of the situation in Libya and to reaffirm our commitment to support the enforcement of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. These provide a clear mandate to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, and to enforce the no-fly zone and arms embargo. (...) We condemn the continued attacks by the Libyan regime against its own population and its refusal to comply with international community demands as laid out in UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. We have intensified our efforts, including through the deployment of additional fixed and rotary wing strike aircraft, and are determined to continue our operation to protect the Libyan people for as long as necessary. We have therefore extended Operation Unified Protector for a further 90 days from 27 June.. (…)

French Rafale engaged over Libya. Photo: Dassault Aviation

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Towards a new generation of aeroengines − less consumption, less Co2 and less noise

Technology for future aero engines by Dr. Rainer Martens, Chief Operating Officer, MTU Aero Engines, Munich Quieter, thriftier and cleaner, that’s what tomorrow’s engines will need to be. MTU Aero Engines has for years been working on new technologies to further improve the environmental compatibility of future engines. The effort is worth the trouble: industry experts see good growth opportunities for aviation. By 2020, they expect air traffic to double. Closely cooperating with the major players in the business, Germany’s leading engine manufacturer develops novel propulsion systems and technologies in all thrust and power categories and is involved in essential national and international research projects.

The future belongs to the geared turbofan (GTF) engine Pratt & Whitney and MTU Aero Engines are collaborating on the PurePower PW1000G engine to develop a game-changing propulsion concept. The new technology holds the promise of reducing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions by 15 percent each, and of cutting present perceived noise levels in half. The concept is catching on with airframers: Airbus is offering the geared turbofan engine for its re-engined A320neo. This could be the application for which the largest quantity of geared turbofans will be required; for the European aircraft manufacturer estimates that the market will need some 4,000 of this type of aircraft, taken over its entire life. Bombardier has also selected the GTF as the exclusive engine to power its new CSeries; Mitsubishi will equip its MRJ with this new type of propulsion system, and Irkut has chosen it for its MS-21. What sets the new GTF propulsion system apart is that it features a reduction gearbox between the fan and low-pressure turbine. With today’s engines, the two are seated on a common shaft, and the turbine drives the fan. Uncoupling them allows the fan with its large diameter to rotate more slowly and the turbine to rotate much faster. This lets the individual components achieve their respective optimum speed, greatly boosting the geared turbofan’s efficiency. The result is a significant reduction in fuel consumption, emissions of carbon dioxide and noise; moreover, the propulsion system is much lighter than a conventional engine as it has fewer stages, and hence a lower parts count. MTU contributes the high-speed low-pressure turbine to the GTF, one of its key components. Germany’s leading engine manufacturer is the sole manufacturer in the world capable of offering this technology. Moreover, Pratt & Whitney and MTU have collaborated to design a new high-pressure compressor. The new transonic compressor will achieve a compression

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Dr. Rainer Martens was born 1961, He became Chief Operating Officer of MTU Aero Engines in April 2006. He is a member of the MTU Board of Management with overall responsibility for engineering and production. Dr. Martens studied Mechanical Engineering at Hannover University in Germany and the University of Birmingham to the UK. He holds a doctorate in mechanical engineering. Before his current position he was plant and site manager at the Airbus plant in Bremen, after spending five years as the Head of MTU’s manufacturing center for turbine blades, Dr. Martens was previously also Managing Director of CIM-Fabrik Hannover GmbH in Hannover.

ratio of 17:1 with no more than eight stages, and will appreciably enhance efficiency. That’s enough to beat most commercial models by a wide margin. MTU is responsible for the forward four stages and Pratt & Whitney for stages five to eight. The innovative compressor is a 100-percent blisk construction. Blisks (blade integrated disks) are a high-tech rotor design in which the disk and blades are produced as a single piece, eliminating the need for blade roots and disk slots. This increases strength and lowers weight.

Clear Air Engine (Claire) In partnership with Bauhaus Luftfahrt, MTU has developed an ambitious program to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions of aircraft engines. Under the Clean Air Engine (Claire) technology project, a CO2 reduction of up to 30 percent is scheduled by 2035. With the initiative, the ACARE-targets will be clearly exceeded, and noise levels at the same time drastically reduced. The program is bases on the geared turbofan engine and has three stages. Plans are, in the first stage (by 2012), to lower CO2 emissions by about 15 percent and cut the perceived noise levels in half, using technologies that have been matured for production by that time. In the second step, the CO2 emission reduction will be raised to at least 20 percent by 2025. The key to success is even more efficient thrust generation − for instance by the further development of the GTF or through the use of a shrouded, counter-rotating fan, the concept for which had been developed by MTU already back in the 1980s. By 2035, MTU ultimately expects to achieve the full target of a 30 percent reduction when in the third and last stage, utilization of the energy in the core engine will be further optimized, e.g. by the use of a heat exchanger.


Besides this, MTU has major roles also in the national German Aviation Research Program and the European Union’s Clean Sky, Newac and Dream projects.

Research programmes MTU is the leading industrial partner on the German Aviation Research Program. The company cooperates closely with universities and research institutes, focusing on the development of new improved-efficiency high-pressure compressor and low-pressure turbine technologies. Part of the program, moreover, is devoted to optimizing blisk manufacturing techniques. MTU has carved out a globally leading position in blisk technology. New solutions helping to reduce manufacturing costs accentuate the company’s leading position. • Clean Sky is the largest aviation technology research initiative in the history of the European Union. The program was launched in the fall of 2008 and is scheduled to run until at least 2014. As part of the initiative, the leading European engine manufacturers are building five different engine demonstrators, and MTU is responsible for one of them. The engine is based on geared-turbofan technology. Another focus of MTU’s activities will be on the high-speed low-pressure turbine for the next generation of GTF engines. The aim is to demonstrate the maturity of the technologies for new, lower-weight constructions and materials when subjected to further increased mechanical and thermal loads, and to validate advanced aerodynamic blading designs. These technologies serve to make future GTF engines even more efficient and lighter in weight. • Newac (New Aero Engine Core Concepts) is a European-level program now about to be completed. Under this program, major European engine manufacturers led by MTU, and universities and research institutes, focus on new concepts for the core engine, ranging from enhanced conventional gas turbine and intercooled to recuperative engine cores. MTU concentrates on the active control of high-pressure compressors. An attempt is made to make future compressors more efficient. • Dream (ValiDation of Radical Engine Architecture SysteMs) The objective of Dream technology project is to develop new engine concepts. Partnering with other engine manufacturers, MTU Aero Engines is working on innovative turbine mid structure and smart active clearance control solutions. With technology activities like these, MTU is solidifying its standing as a partner in cooperative ventures with the leading manufacturers in the business. It excels especially in highpressure compressor and low-pressure turbine technologies, manufacturing and repair techniques.

Congress Languages: English / French / German

The Future of European Security and Defence – time for change 8 – 9 November 2011 andel’s Hotel & Convention Center Landsberger Allee 106 10369 Berlin, Germany Opening of the 10th Congress by • Michel Barnier, Member of the EU Commission, Commissioner for International Market and Services, Brussels • Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, Brussels • Bogdan Klich, Minister of National Defence, Warsaw • Thomas de Maizière, Federal Minister of Defence, Berlin

90 International Top Speakers, among others • Claude-France Arnould, Chief-Executive EDA, Brussels • IGA Patrick Bellouard, Director OCCAR-EA, Bonn • Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris • Roberto Gualtieri MEP, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Brussels • Prof. Dr. Hans-Gert Pöttering MEP, 2007-2009 President European Parliament, Brussels • Christian Schmidt, Parliamentarian State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Berlin • Jir̆í S̆edivý, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Prague • General Håkan Syrèn, Chairman EU Military Committee, Brussels • Lieutenant General Ton Van Osch, Director General EU Military Staff, Brussels • Robert Walter MP, 2008-2011 President ESDA/WEU Assembly, London/Paris

Keynote Speeches Industry Dell, AGT, Cassidian, Hewlett Packard, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, SAFRAN

Registration

www.euro-defence.eu

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European Armament Cooperation needs more harmonisation of national requirements

A success story of European cooperation Interview with Patrick Bellouard, Director, OCCAR-EA*

The European: Mister Bellouard, you are celebrating these days the 10th anniversary of this International Organisation. You are after a period of growth of the agency the third Director since OCCAR obtained its Legal Status in 2001. Could you define shortly what the added value of OCCAR is to Europe’s Armed Forces? Mr Bellouard: OCCAR is a lean and agile European Organisation, customer-oriented and offering through-life leading edge programme management and corporate governance practice. The principles and the structure of OCCAR pave the way for better efficiency and cost effectiveness in the management of collaborative armament programmes. This setup was created to make available to Europe’s Armed Forces the highly complex

such as procurement agencies that usually limit their field of action to development and production. The European: And your vision? Mr Bellouard: My vision, the vision of OCCAR, is that we want to be a centre of excellence, and the first choice in Europe, in the field of the collaborative acquisition of defence equipment. The European: And what does it mean in terms of values? Mr Bellouard: We are convinced of OCCAR’s fundamental role in the establishment of a customer orientated European Procurement capability for defence equipment. We consider profes-

“In the domain of the European Defence co-operation we consider EDA and OCCAR to be natural partners, whereby OCCAR is situating itself downstream of EDA in the capability development process“. equipment needed according to their harmonised and agreed requirements, within the shortest feasible timelines and at minimum possible cost. The European: What is OCCAR’s mission and what is your vision? Mr Bellouard: The mission of OCCAR is to facilitate and manage collaborative European armament programmes through their life cycle and to manage technology demonstrator programmes, to the satisfaction of our customers. The European: Important seem to me in this sentence the words “through their life cycle” Mr Bellouard: You are fully right. These words are highlighting one of the major differences between OCCAR and other entities

Patrick Bellouard since 1 March 2008, Director OCCAR in Bonn. He was born in June 1952 and graduated as engineer in the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l’Aéronautique et de l’espace in 1977. 1979: Fighter pilot. 1986 to 1989: head of management helicopter engines programs in the DGA. 1989 to 1992: technical adviser to the French National armament director. 1992 to 1998: French Embassy in Washington DC, MOD and DGA, Paris. 2004 to 2008: Coordinator of the French Prime Minister for the European Galileo program.

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sionalism, teamwork and a positive attitude toward change as key values to reach the level of excellence. We consider the cultural diversity present in our organisation as a stimulating force for innovation and continuous improvement. The integrity of our staff members is of utmost importance while dealing with the financial resources and weapon systems of our Nations. The European: OCCAR has a limited number of Member Nations: six nations out of the 27 EU States. In 2005 Spain was the last accession to OCCAR. How can you explain this stagnation? Mr Bellouard: It is fully clear that since 2005 OCCAR went through a period of relative stability in terms of Member Nations. It has to be noted however that since then, more Nations joined OCCAR, not as Member Nations, but as Participating States. Whilst Turkey and Luxemburg were already participating in A400M, and the Netherlands in BOXER, also Sweden, Finland and Poland joined the OCCAR family in the framework of the ESSOR programme in 2009. In most cases, these Nations do not seem to feel the need to influence the governance of the organisation while benefiting from it for the management of the programmes they are participating in. The European: Will those countries become future members? Mr Bellouard: This is hard to predict and more a matter for OCCAR’s Board of Supervisors, than for the OCCAR-EA Director. As we understand it, non-Member Participating States are very satisfied with the OCCAR model, with the way they are treated as OCCAR-EA’s customers and with the cost-efficiency of the

*Organisation Conjointe pour la Coopération en matière d’ARmement (Executive Administration)


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

services they get. In the case of any enlargement the confirmed and still relevant fundamentals of OCCAR as founded more than 10 years ago would remain fostered and continue to insure value for money for the Nations. The European: This leads me to the question of the future role of OCCAR in the European security and defence structure. There is on the one hand the European Defence Agency (EDA) as a very political instrument which is going to find its role in the armament sector and is covering all 27 EU Member States. And there is on the other OCCAR’s actual programmes hand OCCAR as a veritable Photo: OCCAR, Bonn centre of excellence for collaborative defence equipment programmes. How can fruitful cooperation be possible taking into account such huge diversity? Mr Bellouard: In the domain of the European defence co-operation we consider EDA and OCCAR to be natural partners, whereby OCCAR is situating itself downstream of EDA in the capability development process. In this context, one way of looking upon the mission of EDA can be to promote the co-operation between the member nations in order to create more opportunities for collaborative defence programmes. OCCAR is then best placed to manage these collaborative defence equipment programmes for maximised benefits resulting from cooperation.

The European: What could be the content of such an agreement between the EDA and OCCAR? To leave to you the excellence to deliver effective programme management services in the widest sense for which EDA has actually no capabilities? Mr Bellouard:The idea of an Administrative Arrangement between EDA and OCCAR, underpinned by a Security Agreement between the EU and OCCAR, was launched at the level of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in 2008. The baseline was to ensure that the activities of both Organisations are mutually reinforcing non duplicative, but coherent and complementary. We hope that the approval process on the EUside will be conluded soon. The European: May we discuss then your business model? Mr Bellouard: In our business model the OCCAR Programme Division is the sole interface between our customers (the participating states) and Industry. We strive for a strong industrial partner who will act as prime contractor. The European: In which form? Mr Bellouard: This prime contractor can be a European system integrator or a consortium. One of OCCAR’s main principles to obtain value for money is that the selection of the contractor is done on the basis of competition. The European: Are there enough companies to do this? Mr Bellouard: Only a few companies are really able to act as prime contractor and system integrator for complex weapon systems, which makes the selection of the prime contractor on the basis of competition very difficult. In such case, OCCAR will opt for a controlled competitive environment. This means that the prime is not selected on basis of competition but is encouraged to select the subcontractors on a competitive basis and has to demonstrate this course of action. The European: That needs a model for customer relationship Mr Bellouard: Surely, we have a model for this issue: The Programme Board, which is at the same level of representatives as

The European: Is there a concrete example? Mr Bellouard: This co-operation is already visible throughout two EDA Category B Collaborative Programmes for which the management is entrusted to OCCAR, namely the ESSOR programme and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) Programme. So, although both organisations are very different in nature, as you stated, and have overlapping but different objectives, they already have proven that efficient cooperation producing tangible results is possible between them. The European: Is there a cooperation agreement? Mr Bellouard: This already smoothly functioning relationship at various levels, particularly at working levels, deserves a boost under the format of an official Administrative Arrangement between both organisations.

Patrick Bellouard discussing with Hartmut Bühl at OCCAR’S Bonn Central office Photo: OCCAR, Bonn

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European: And on the corporate level? Mr Bellouard: The relations of OCCAR-EA with the Nations are run through the Board of Supervisors, where the National Armament Directors are representing their Ministers of Defence. These relations are governed by the OCCAR Convention and a series of OCCAR Management Procedures available on our Internet site www.occar-ea.org .

Nations involvment in OCCAR business

the Board of Supervisors, comprises only delegates from States participating in a specific programme, whether they are OCCAR Member States or not. This means that for all the relations with the Nations related to the core business, each Programme has its own Programme Board and Programme Committee, augmented by Programme Working Groups and Expert Groups as required; these relations are mainly governed by the Programme Decisions. The relationship of each Programme with the industries concerned is ruled by the contracts concluded in accordance with the OCCAR rules and in close cooperation with the Participating States involved and signed by me. The European: Thus I have to learn what are the OCCAR programmes and how you are managing these programmes? Mr Bellouard: OCCAR Programme Management is focused on delivery through close customer involvement, a genuine Through-Life Programme approach implying multi-disciplinary Programme Teams guided by Programme Decisions with High Level Objectives, state-of-the-art Programme Management and Corporate Governance practices, continual improvement and clear decision-making and accountability lines based upon empowerment. The European: What are the key differentiators? Mr Bellouard: The key differentiators of OCCAR-EA are the concept of the Central Office, which is a powerful pool of expertise and services for the Programmes, allowing the Programme Divisions to remain lean and mean, fully focused on their core business; and enabling the intensive exchange of best practices and experience between the various programmes.

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The European: How do you deal with the “national special” requirements for a system? Is there any system in your portfolio which is unique in design? How can OCCAR influence nations concerning the requirements of a product? Mr Bellouard: In order to reap the many potential benefits of international defence equipment cooperation, it is essential that the Nations harmonise their requirements as far as possible. This effort the nations have to do between them Photo: OCCAR, Bonn is often happening nowadays in the EDA context and we will always try to be of as much support to the nations as they will allow us to be. The European: That means that you maintain a base line? Mr Bellouard: But of course, strictly. Again for cost-effectiveness reasons, specific national requirements can be accommodated through the introduction of modularity and differentiated modules or by the definition of the required number of type versions. This still will result in increased but contained costs to be accepted by the Nations involved. The European: A view to the future. Are there programme opportunities which OCCAR might integrate in the next two years? Mr Bellouard: The prime opportunities for OCCAR to consider in terms of programme business for the future are the start of In Service Support phases for the OCCAR programmes that are on the verge of concluding Development and Production. This already succeeded for COBRA and TIGER, and is being prepared fully in the FSAF and A400M contexts. The European: And in the framework of the EDA OCCAR cooperative relationship? Mr Bellouard: A number of possibilities already are being discussed with programmes such as the Biological Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme (Bio-EDEP) and the Advanced European Jet Pilot Trainer (AEJPT). We are clearly favouring the relationship with EDA, but OCCAR can of course also continue to integrate programmes stemming directly from Nation. The European: Mister Bellouard, I thank you for the interview.


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Turkish defence industries having achieved a global competitive capacity, are now keen to cooperate

Right time and proper platform for armament cooperation between Turkey and the EU by Murad Bayar, Undersecretary, Ministry of National Defence, Ankara

Considering global trends and current challenges, we have to ensure that the technologically advanced capability be improved so as to enable us to operate efficiently in the face of a wide array of diversified threats. A strong and indigenous capability infrastructure will ensure that our national and global interests are secured. This can be interpreted not only as building an indigenous defence industry, but also as deepening international defence integration.

Creating synergies − Turkey is keen to cooperate In addition, taking into account shrinking defence budgets, especially in Europe, co-operation has become indispensible in terms of providing best-value solutions to obtain cuttingedge technologies. The international partnership concept is now being taken more seriously than ever before, as many nations with similar requirements are eager to collaborate to create synergies. Turkey, meanwhile, particularly in the last decade, has made considerable strides towards its goal of modernising its armed forces and creating indigenous defence products in order to reduce arms import-dependency and to cultivate its own export markets. It has been the policy that defence procurement should, through joint ventures with overseas companies, provide the stimulus for industrial development. The Turkish Government has encouraged foreign investment, and there are a number of very significant co-production deals between Turkish and foreign companies involving important transfers of advanced technology to Turkey. Turkey is now keen to export and remain competitive in the defence sector.

Murad Bayar Murad Bayar is States Secretary for defence industries in the Turkish Ministry of Defence (SSM) and is in this position the chief procurement official of Turkey since 2004. He is an electronics engineer with master’s degrees from North Carolina University and Yale University. States Secretary Bayar startet his career 1987 with Turkey’s military-owned electronic company Aselsan. He worked for the SSM between 1989 and 1998 and thereafter began working at the international consulting firm Booz Allen Hamiltons in New York before coming to his current function.

Turkey has aimed to conduct effective supply activities in accordance with the expectations of the users, to improve international cooperation in the field of defence and to establish an effective institutionalized structure to realize the above-mentioned activities per our Strategic Plan. A growing trend began in the sector in 2007. $352 million in defence exports in 2006 has gradually increased to approximately $830 million in 2009, and sectorial turnover increased to $2.3 billion from $1.7 billion in 2006. Platforms not produced in Turkey, such as aircraft and submarines, are projects that even leading countries prefer to implement through consortiums. Thus, Turkey should aim at supplying the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces by affiliating our industry with international consortiums for these projects.

The Turkish procurement policy

Increased competitive capacities of the Turkish defence industry

Turkey’s procurement policy is implemented by the Under-Secretariat for Defence Industries (SSM), which undertakes technical, financial and industrial project evaluations. The strategic priorities of SSM are Procurement Management, Industry and Technology Management and International Cooperation. The 2007-2011 Strategic Plan policies published by SSM include: • having 50% of system requirements met through local infrastructure by 2011; • using cost + contracts for R&D and local development; • achieving defence exports valued at $1 billion per annum by 2011.

The global competitive capacity of the Turkish defence industry has gradually increased, especially in recent years, and Turkish companies have become contractors in national procurement projects and reliable partners in many respectable international projects. Thanks to the international projects, Turkish companies have begun to form an effective working culture with the world defence industry for new cooperation opportunities in the future. International defence industry cooperation has a reciprocal triggering relationship. As its technological infrastructure improves, our industry strengthens its stance as a suitable candidate for new partnerships, and as it participates in new international projects, it is able to improve its capabilities. One of

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Turkish Forces participate regularly in NATO and EU-Missions

the most important features of Turkey’s new international cooperation is the role of not only key industrial institutions, but also of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).

Overlapping security goals and defence priorities The issue that primarily needs to be addressed at present is that Turkish and European security goals and defence priorities mostly overlap. This in turn can lead us to try to identify a mutually beneficial forum where procurement and defence industry cooperation in the real sense can be pursued. In parallel with strategies focusing on increasing local capacity to achieve industrial self-reliance, Turkey has considered European countries to be among its preferred partners for major defence systems. These include helicopters, naval platforms and electronic warfare systems. Defence cooperation with Europe stems from common threat perceptions with considerable potential. By being a partner in large-scale European defence programmes, such as A400M, and recent joint initiatives in Advanced UAV, Turkey has been able to enhance its capabilities, integrating them through “supply chains” into the European industrial base. In these projects, the Turkish aviation industry entered into very successful partnerships. The integration of our industry with international industry, its ability to get more business, and improving technology and capability via these projects is still in progress. Similarly, the Turkish aviation industry’s involvement in the A400M Project developed a culture of working with the main players in the sector and created potential for new partnerships in critical activities, both in “joint production” and design and development.

Multinational programmes are mutually supportive It should therefore be underlined that, given the level of experience and capabilities obtained over the last decade

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through multinational programmes, Turkey’s membership in OCCAR would surely strengthen armaments cooperation between Turkey and the EU. For its part, Turkey has always focused on developing and maintaining strong relations with its European counterparts and would like to see a shift in perception towards the advantages of its industrial capabilities. Currently, SSM carries out large-scale programmes. By 2010, the total contract volume of its 14 naval platform programmes exceeded $8 billion. The National Corvette (MILGEM), for instance, has been designed to meet vaPhoto: ESDU archive rious requirements, including reconnaissance, surveillance, target identification, early warning, defence of bases and harbours, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations and surface-to-surface and surface-to-air warfare. In context of the programme, ASELSAN and HAVELSAN are responsible for the development and integration of combat systems, whereas the sonar system has been designed and developed by TÜBiTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey). In that sense, MILGEM is a unique example of cooperation in the Turkish defence industry.

Turkish security and defence industries are enabled for global export As a result of our continuous efforts to enhance the capabilities of the local industry, fortified with our proven design and sub-system solutions, the Turkish defence industry now has the capability to export various systems to various countries around the world. Yonca Onuk, one of the leading exporters in the area of composite hulls, has delivered improved rapid-intervention crafts and patrol boats to Georgia, UAE and Pakistan. ASELSAN has delivered the STAMP to Malaysia and the UAE and signed a contract involving Software Defined Radios with the Pakistani Armed Forces. In the land sector, FNSS, one of Turkey’s leading armoured vehicle companies, has signed a $600 million contract with the Government of Malaysia to equip their armed forces with Pars IFVs. In 2009, 21% of the Turkey’s aviation exports were achieved by Alp Aviation. Turkey attaches great importance to continuing its enhanced dialogue with the EU, and Turkey’s catalytic role in NATO-EU relations has led to some tangible changes in the European perception of defence and security. In conclusion, all of these accomplishments demonstrate the Turkish defence industry’s competitiveness and reliability as partner in the international field.


SECURITY AND DEFENCE

MBDA − a test case for a realistic European Armament Cooperation?

The benefits of 10 years of integration in the missile sector Interview with Antoine Bouvier, CEO of MBDA, Paris

The European: Mr. Bouvier, MBDA will be celebrating its tenth anniversary later this year. What does this mean for you? Mr Bouvier: It was actually on 18th December, 2001 when BAE Systems, EADS and Finmeccanica, the three major forces in the aerospace sector in Europe, signed the agreement which would pool all their missile activities into a new company, MBDA. From this union, a model has emerged that is very special, even unique, in the world of defence. The European: MBDA operates within a particularly sensitive area. Mr Bouvier: Indeed, namely guided weapons − also referred to as complex weapons − which feature in the range of defence equipment that delivers effects and which are capable of conferring superiority during a military engagement or confrontation. Although its activities see it intimately linked to state security and sovereignty, MBDA has established technological and industrial capabilities in four major European nations (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). In due course, this will be five as a result of our positioning strategy in Spain. The European: What is the added value of such cooperation? With four or five partners, won’t cooperation become too complicated? Mr Bouvier: Cooperation is not an end in itself. To be viable and lasting, it has to take the best of each one of its different elements so that the operational excellence of products and programmes achieved together exceeds the individual capability of each nation working in isolation.

Antoine Bouvier Antoine Bouvier is Chief Executive Officer of MBDA since June 2007. He was born in Paris in 1959 and graduated from the Ecole Polytechnique (1980 – 1983) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1983 – 1986). From January 2002 until joining MBDA, he was CEO of ASTRIUM Satellites. Prior to that, he was Executive Vice President in charge of Eurocopter’s Commercial Helicopter Division. In 1990, he joined Aerospatiale’s Commercial Aircraft Division. From 1992 until 1994, he was Secretary General and Industrial Director of the ATR GIE. Between 1994 and 1998, he was ATR’s Vice-President of Operations, going on to become President of the ATR GIE from 1998 until 2001.

Mr Bouvier: The viability of MBDA, as is the case without doubt for all defence businesses, rests on a strategy committed to export and globalization. In this respect, MBDA’s distinct model rests on four pillars: European cooperation, national sovereignty, operational excellence and globalisation. I will now look at each one of these in more details. The European: Yes, it would be fine to learn about the setup of your company. Mr Bouvier: Fifteen years ago, what is now MBDA used to be six national missile companies, all competing with each other, all having very strong culture, history and vision of where the missile business is going. In these 15 years, we have been able, step by step, to set up what is now MBDA, an integrated European company with a unified vision.

The European: Could you illustrate this? Mr Bouvier: If I had to give just one example of this philosophy, I would choose the beyond visual range, air-to-air missile Meteor programme for which MBDA is the prime contractor and in which the five nations I mentioned above, as well as Sweden, are cooperating. This missile, which will be in production as of 2013, will ensure a clear, long-term air superiority for Europe’s three combat aircraft: Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon. It will also contribute to the renewed appeal of these aircraft on the export market.

The European: Wasn’t the first significant step in 1996 the formation of Matra BAE Dynamics (MBD)? Mr Bouvier: Indeed, this came about when France and the UK launched the SCALP/Storm Shadow stand-off missile programme together as an alternative to U.S. procurement. Looking back, this can be seen as a strong vote of confidence in Anglo-French cooperation. The second step came in 2001 with the formation of MBDA and, with it, the inclusion of MBDA Italy and the subsequent introduction of MBDA Germany in 2006.

The European: Finally, in a Europe where budgets are witnessing a long-term downward trend.

The European: Will the experience you have help in creating new forms of cooperation with nations’ administrations?

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Mr Bouvier: During this time, MBDA has acquired an unparalleled experience in balancing cooperation between European countries while still respecting individual strategic priorities. This unique experience is no longer limited to programmes, but is gradually being extended to all areas of the business through an industrial and capability strategy negotiated with its domestic countries. In the United Kingdom, through a Portfolio Management Agreement signed with the Ministry of Defence in March 2010. The European: And what is the role of MBDA? Mr Bouvier: MBDA will lead the transformation of the Complex Weapons sector for the next ten years. It will transform the way these weapons are supplied and supported in order to deliver the best equipment to the front line, while sustaining a healthy UK industrial base and bringing significant savings for the taxpayer. The European: How far are you in this partnership? Mr Bouvier: This state-industry partnership is now well understood in France as well. Hence, at the London summit on 2nd November 2010, the French and British governments called on MBDA to participate in the reorganization of the complex weapons sector as the single European prime contractor. We take particular pride in the final declaration of the summit

which states that this experience will serve as a test case for the rest of the defence industry. The European: I have some doubts if the newly agreed-upon French-British cooperation would be successful. We saw two agreements in the last 25 years on deep cooperation without any result in the end. Mr Bouvier: This Franco-British rapprochement might be criticized in some quarters for being seen to be creating a twospeed Europe as far as defence is concerned. At MBDA, we see this completely differently. Just as the launch of the SCALP / Storm Shadow programme between France and the United Kingdom 15 years ago enabled the foundation of a first joint business which quickly expanded to include four countries, the observations and principles of the industrial policy that have inspired the Franco-British rapprochement of today could be shared by all. The European: But the strategic interests are not shared with other European States. France and the UK are nuclear powers with totally different horizons than e.g. Germany or Poland. Mr Bouvier: Missiles and complex weapons lie at the heart of sovereignty. This is even more true in relation to deep strike and air superiority. Yet France and the United Kingdom now recognize that they can not independently assure the level of funding and technology necessary for this sovereignty and are both in agreement on the need for mutual dependence. The European: This new framework goes well beyond what we have already come to understand by cooperation. Mr Bouvier: Cooperation has until now taken place programme by programme. This new framework has many implications. Accepting a certain level of dependence and specialization for a given nation in turn means ensuring its partner nations have full access to its specialized skills and technologies and are prepared to do so for the long-term. We need a level of mutual commitment to the investments made by each party in the technologies that will be shared by all. This commitment must serve a product policy that reflects the acquisition policies of partner countries, as well as the operational requirements and equipment needs of their respective armed forces.

Firing of an Aster-Missile by Night

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Š MBDA, Michel Hans

The European: The French UK operation in Libya conforms to what you said, but it also fits with my strategic understanding. Is this the beginning of adapting operational requirements, thus creating centres of excellence? Mr Bouvier: In other words, specializing industry through centres of excellence, thereby making savings while maintaining the skills base, guaranteeing access to technologies and converging of operational needs are all closely linked. In this respect, I am convinced that the present experience gained by the British and French conducting operations in Libya will help converge future arms requirements for both of their air forces.


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The European: Let me come back to some figures to situate MBDA. In the missile field, what is your standing in Europe? Mr Bouvier: Ten years ago, the creation of MBDA was part of a wider trend leading towards the concentration of defence industries in the western world, a move reflecting the end of the Cold War and its logic of weapons mass production. MBDA now represents 70% of the European missile industry in terms of sales and is able to export 40% of its production. If only because of its size, MBDA has become the sole business able, within the current context of contracting defence budgets, to guarantee security of supply with regard to missile technology to its domestic nations. The European: The EU, supported by European industries, is striving for a common security and defence market with an independent technology and research base. Will this be sufficient for the European defence industries? Mr Bouvier: Still, since MBDA’s creation, the challenges have increased tenfold. European nations are deployed in an unprecedented number of overseas operations (Afghanistan, Iraq, Gulf of Aden, Libya, Ivory Coast etc.) which are putting significant pressure on their armed forces and equipment. The budget crisis which is besetting Europe today makes it even more urgent to better coordinate procurement policies between different countries. But that’s not enough. The European defence industry will not maintain its position in the world without exploiting the growth opportunities in emerging countries which, understandably, expect that their own investment will serve their industrial base. The European: The example of MBDA shows that a pure defence company can survive. Mr Bouvier: Thanks to its 15 year track record of managing balanced cooperation, MBDA possesses an unmatched understanding of the very close link between the preservation of its customers’ sovereignty and the necessary search for industrial efficiency. This expertise is a unique asset when it comes to seizing the opportunities offered by globalization to the benefit of our domestic customers. The European: Could MBDA serve as an example for Europe? Mr Bouvier: After all these years, we at MBDA are well aware that each new defence review carried out by our domestic countries confirms the need to specialise in their technologies of excellence, to cooperate with their closest allies, and to pass on, through exports, the structural reduction of European investment levels. This is the very same model on which MBDA was founded. In all reality, it is difficult to see other sustainable model in existence within today’s European defence industry. The European: Mr. Bouvier, my congratulations to the 10th anniversary of MBDA and thank you very much for the interview.

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Growing, challenging risks make evident that the EU needs a comprehensive security approach

A governance platform for fighting security threats in a time of transformation by Joseph A. Ghattas, Vice President, European Public Sector, CA Technologies, Paris

The European Union (EU) as a whole as well as its individual members face growing, challenging risks such as the increasing numbers of people seeking asylum, environmental disasters, terrorism, growing rates of cybercrime, cyber-attacks and increasingly interdependent critical information infrastructures. To cope with them, security and safety authorities on all levels must strengthen their collaboration and execute towards a common strategy. However, to achieve this a new quality of governance is necessary to plan, build and act on the fundamental steps to transform security and safety authorities into a new, more agile architecture. A critical success factor for this transformation will be a governance platform to accelerate the implementation of new functions and ensure operational excellence while mitigating risks and delivering verifiable value to the citizen.

A plead for a comprehensive governance platform As stated in the objective 3 of the Communication from the Commission entitled “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, security of IT networks is one essential factor for a well-functioning information society”. The rapid development and application of new information technologies has also created new forms of criminal activity. Cybercrime is a global phenomenon causing significant damage to the EU internal market. While the very structure of the internet knows no boundaries, jurisdiction for prosecuting cybercrime still stops at national borders. Member States need to pool their efforts at EU level. The High Tech Crime Centre at Europol already plays an important coordinating role for law enforcement, but further action is needed.” A governance platform has to be an integrated solution that gives key stakeholders a real-time view into their organisation’s initiatives, resources and investments. It empowers them to improve decision-making, engage all government organisations − by bridging the gap between strategic planning and execution − and extend portfolio management across the administration. This platform not only improves governance practices and minimises risks, it also helps maintaining and extending the ability of action.

Striving for efficient use of resources The right governance platform creates a single source of the truth through which all requirements can be evaluated, prioritised and managed. This would give security authorities visi-

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bility in how resources should be used efficiently. Though there will be always some kind of unpredictability. Therefore it is impossible to achieve effective governance, security portfolio planning and risk management without seeing exactly how much and what type of work resources are allocated to. With such a solution it will be much easier to capture, classify, evaluate, and approve all the sources of a certain demand, so work can be prioritized and resources get allocated to the highest-risk threats.

How to conduct strategic planning Generally, a government’s goal should be to create a strategic plan to respond to all validated threats and safety demands and prepare for potential new threats. A comprehensive governance platform would enable such a strategic planning by: • Enabling the setting of strategic goals • Helping to identify investment areas • Creating an ongoing roadmap for transformation • Aligning administration portfolios with the government strategic and operational initiatives As an example, securing critical information infrastructures such as electricity generation, financial services, telecommunications and others requires a strategic approach to ensure effective operational coordination of all homeland security and cyber security organizations in the EU and its neighbors. To achieve this, capabilities and capacities as well as different skills and equipment have to be evaluated prior to handling critical situations. With that, all participating institutions would benefit as gaps and overlaps could be identified early and countermeasures could be taken proactively.

What the EU and Member States should achieve To execute on a common strategy, the EU and its members would need to increase their efforts on collaboration, eliminate redundancies and share best practices to bring optimal results from the most valuable asset − the staff. Another aspect of building a comprehensive security architecture is the evaluation of risks and investments associated to specific projects, missions or services. For security authorities contributing to a superordinate strategic plan, it is not enough to believe that its projects and services provide value. In fact, they must be able to effectively demonstrate that timelines and budget targets are met. However, even the best project plans are often derailed by unexpected risks and unresolved


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issues. With the right project governance in place risks are captured, evaluated and scored, to focus mainly on those with the highest impact and probability.

The EU needs a commonly agreed security budget... Having cost, time and risk controls in place, the EU and its members will be able to adjust financial planning for all investments related to a common EU security architecture, whether they are individual services, shared services or simply assets. These controls become even more important when requirements change over time. A good example is the increasing organised internet-based crime and cyber attacks. To counter this trend it is essential to have the right intelligence in place and to know on what level different security organisations across the EU can and should cooperate. A good starting point would be to have a commonly agreed security portfolio with a clear understanding of who is contributing to what. Based on a comprehensive governance platform it should be easy to achieve such a security portfolio management for each and every contributing organisation allowing them to centrally manage the entire transformation at

every key stage, including: • Defining the strategy and goals both in organisational and technological terms • Mapping the current and target state post-transformation • Establishing a transition plan and identifying the resources and costs involved • Managing the execution of transformation projects • Monitoring and reviewing progress both at a project and program level.

... to be prepared on new threats Fundamentally, how the EU and its Member States manage the planning and execution of the transformation of their security and safety authorities will have a direct impact on its success in facing new types of threats. An integrated Project and Portfolio Management approach will not only provide the insight and control needed to drive complex transformation programs, but will also crucially provide the flexibility to adjust plans as external and internal conditions dictate. With the right governance solution, security authorities can become true security service providers embedded in an EU security architecture.

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Is there any sense of complacency about the probability of future use of CBRN weapons?

The CBRN threat and resulting challenges for the European Union by Hans H. Kühl, Colonel (ret.) Berlin

Despite non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, the value ascribed to CBRN weapons (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) in some regions of the world is increasing instead of declining. Certain regional powers, rogue nations and nonstate actors are increasingly eager to obtain CBRN weapons. The confluence of the demise of the Soviet Union, the changing nature of warfare, the globalization of information technology, and the revolution in chemical engineering and biotechnology have also resulted in new CBRN threats.

Trouble spots in the surroundings of Europe Judging from the recent past, future large-scale battlefield use of CBRN weapons is highly unlikely. However, contemporary forms of conflict could again generate incentives to use such weapons on a different scale. This could involve regional powers facing superior opponents in traditional or asymmetric warfare, or actors committing terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the use of toxic chemicals, pathogens, and radioactive substances in improvised CBRN warfare and terrorism, as well as employment of CBRN weapons by governments to fight insurrection, is not a moot option. This did happen in the recent past. The trouble spots in Asia, the Middle East, and most recently North Africa are further complicating the situation. North Korea’s, Iran’s, India’s, and Pakistan’s WMD arsenals, as well as the CBRN capabilities Israel and some of its neighbors supposedly have, are likewise not encouraging any sense of complacency about the probability of future use of a wide range of CBRN weapons.

Accidents and natural disasters A CBRN threat to Europe stems not only from regional conflicts and transnational terrorism. Natural accidents or industrial disasters can also contribute. Like Fukushima, they are not predictable and can contain risks in unknown dimensions with devastating consequences. When CBRN weapons are used offensively against the military or the population, the consequences can be out of all proportion to the effort. CBRN weapons are valued not only for their physical effects but also for their psychological consequences. The power of these weapons lies not only in the harm they inflict. It also lies in the extensive and indiscriminate nature of that harm, and the resulting psychological effects of dissolution and despair. Attacking both the military and the population is

the hallmark of such attacks, which not only seek to combat opposing forces, but also to eviscerate the political will to use force and to diminish public support. Albeit caused by natural disaster, Fukushima displayed that scheme. The case involved altered public opinion, diminished public support for the use of nuclear energy, and a shift in politics. Europe needs a balanced comprehensive approach The civil sector and the military must increasingly contend with a wide range of potential CBRN hazards and weapons at home and abroad. In order to maintain a functioning government, to ensure health and safety, to protect the environment, and to guarantee continuity of operations in an environment threatened by CBRN weapons and hazardous materials, a broader comprehensive and balanced approach is required. More synchronization within the EU Considering the five stages of the European CBRN Counter Mea sures Concept, a unified effort for the reinforcement and successful implementation of international legal norms, as well as the synchronization of political, diplomatic, economic, and military threat reduction efforts, clearly fit most into the European portfolio of deterrence and prevention. Protection, response, and recovery are primarily operational level domains held by nations. Consequently, the prime challenge is to closely coordinate with nations and international organizations. Moreover, Europe could provide nations and interested parties the platform for identifying threats and risks, coordinating research and development, harmonizing capabilities, and increasing civil-military cooperation. Considering the range and magnitude of potential CBRN threats, as well as the intent and capabilities of contemporary adversaries, the future cannot be predicted. Nor can we predict the precise contours of those threats or how to exactly counter them. Against potential military and terrorist perpetrators, the indisputable requirement for security in the present and future is to be as consistently effective as was deterrence during the Cold War era. Equally challenging is the efficient preparation for overcoming the aftermath of natural disasters and major industrial accidents. To stay relevant in times of shrinking budgets and changing security environments, there is an obvious need to continuously reorient or refocus Europe’s CBRN defense and countermeasures capabilities.

Born in 1947, H.H. Kühl joined the German Armed Forces in 1967. Graduated from the Command and General Staff College. National and international staff appointments. Command at the battalion and brigade level. Commandant of the German NBC Defense School and Chief of the Army NBC Defense Forces.

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EU Crisis prevention − new structures and coordination The EU Commission continues actively the cooperation with main actors Hans Das ........................................ 46 Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon.................. 48

Abraham (Avi) Bachar...................... 50

With the built-up of efficient operational staff capabilities, the EU shows its will to perform

The role of the future European Emergency Response Centre by Hans Das, Head of Unit Emergency Response, DG ECHO-Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Brussels The size and frequency of both natural and man-made disasters is on the rise. The year 2010 alone brought the earthquake in Haiti, the floods in Pakistan, and the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. In Europe, severe floods and storms as well as forest fires and the eruption of volcano Eyjafjallajökull have made headlines. With Japan being hit by the triple disaster of an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incident, the year 2011 continues the general trend. In fact, the recorded annual number of disasters worldwide has increased fivefold from 78 in 1975 to nearly 400 today, and although the EU disaster response is well-established overall, new initiatives are needed to cope with these growing challenges. One such initiative is the establishment of the future European Emergency Response Centre.

European assistance to Japan and Libya The 11 March earthquake in Japan with its ensuing tsunami wave and damage of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant are a strong reminder that even a highly developed country can be overwhelmed by disaster and needs to have reliable partners to provide support then. In response to the Japanese request for assistance, the EU reacted promptly. 14 Member States have made generous offers of assistance via the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), resulting in the delivery of 400 tons of EU assistance, including sophisticated protection equipment, as part of a coordinated EU effort to help Japan. Nine Member States have also made financial donations, alongside with the Commission’s € 10 million funding decision. The MIC was in constant contact with the Japanese authorities and, amongst others, a team on the ground to identify the most pressing needs, to pool the European in-kind assistance and to offer it as a single, consolidated package. Throughout the emergency operation, Japan insisted on the need for a coordinated European approach combining the assistance of

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the different Member States. The Civil Protection team also coordinated the use of free-of-charge transport options to Japan, processed requests for European co-funding of transports where necessary, and enabled the delivery of the in-kind assistance directly to the affected prefectures. The burden on local capacities was thus minimized, and Japan highly appreciated the almost autonomous operation. The Commission is also increasingly taking advantage of the synergies and complementarities between humanitarian aid and civil protection, as was recently shown by the Libya case. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism assisted in the evacuation of ca. 5,800 EU citizens and, in close cooperation with the International Organization for Migration and the UNHCR, in the repatriation of more than 30,000 third country nationals who were stranded mostly at the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. At the same time, DG ECHO made 40 million EUR available to fund emergency humanitarian assistance for the population affected by the Libyan unrest, including repatriation efforts for

Hans Das Hans Das is Head of DG ECHO’s Emergency Response Unit since 1 May 2010. Previously, Hans Das was among others: 1997 Head of Legal Department in the International Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1999 Legal Officer at the United Nations Housing and Property Directorate in Kosovo and affairs department of the Ministry of the Flemish Community of Belgium (20002001). In 2004, he joined the European Commission. 2007, as a Policy officer in the Civil Protection Unit, he was one of the main drafters of the revision of the European civil protection legislation and became Acting Head of the new unit responsible for disaster response, which includes the EC Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).


third country nationals. By using the two instruments and building upon their respective strengths, the Commission was able to deliver a fully joined-up and integrated response.

The need to step up European disaster response capacities The challenges posed by the increasing impact of natural and manmade disasters as well as lessons learnt from the most recent emergencies suggest that while the EU disaster response is well-established overall, there is, however, also room for further improvement. From the nations’ ad hoc offers to a system of pre-planned allocations As of now, for instance, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is based on ad hoc offers of assistance from Member States. When a country requests assistance, this request is communicated to the Member States via the MIC and offers are subsequently collected. This system makes prior planning of operations difficult because it is not clear which assets will be available. In addition, there is a need for the EU’s civil protection and humanitarian aid instruments to be linked even more closely in order to arrive at greater operational coordination. Also, the central coordinating role of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs could be better supported through a coherent EU contribution to UN-led relief efforts. The creation of new capabilities for the EU The Commission Communication “Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance” of October 2010 presents options to address the shortcomings of the current European disaster response system that were outlined above, while also stressing that better response capacities need to go hand in hand with further efforts in the fields of prevention and preparedness. Most importantly, the Communication suggests the creation of a European Emergency Response Capacity and a European Emergency Response Centre. • EU Emergency Response Capacity The Emergency Response Capacity is envisaged in the form of a pool of pre-identified civil protection assets from states participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Registration of assets in this pool would be voluntary, but once Member States had agreed to provide assets to the pool, they would be expected to make them available for EU disaster relief operations both inside and outside the EU when called for − except when the assets are needed for domestic emergencies. This system would greatly improve the predictability of the availability of key assets without generating significant extra costs because the assets are already available for national purposes and would remain under national command and control during their deployment in EU operations.

• European Emergency Response Centre The second cornerstone of the Communication, the European Emergency Response Centre, will be established by merging the ECHO and the MIC crisis rooms, i.e. the crisis rooms for humanitarian aid and civil protection within DG ECHO, into one genuine response centre, operational on a 24/7 basis and responsible for the coordination of the EU’s civilian disaster response.

The establishment and role of the new Emergency Response Centre For the new Emergency Response Centre to function effectively, a qualitative shift from information sharing and reacting to emergencies towards a more proactive role of additional planning, monitoring, preparing, operational coordination and logistical support is needed. The centre is envisaged to ensure a continuous exchange of real-time information with both civil protection and humanitarian aid authorities on the needs for assistance and the offers made by the EU Member States and other actors. Both for disasters within and outside the EU, this ensures that the assistance offered is needs-based and arrives in a quick and coherent manner. Operational coordination with the EEAS and… A consolidated Emergency Response Centre will also facilitate operational coordination with other EU actors, e.g. the geographic departments of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU delegations in the field. At the same time, European humanitarian aid does not form part of the EU’s external cooperation with third countries neither in terms of development aid nor in terms of political or economic relations. That is why the new Emergency Response Centre will remain part of DG ECHO and not come under the purview of the EEAS with its political mandate. Protecting the humanitarian principles is of high importance here. …more efficient coordination within the Commission For disasters in third countries, it is clear that the better the EU organizes itself internally, the easier it can integrate into an overall relief effort, coordinated by the United Nations. The Emergency Response Centre could streamline information flows between the EU and the UN, support the UN cluster system and the UN humanitarian coordinator on-site, and better report on overall financial and in-kind assistance provided by the EU and its Member States, e.g. by combining the two main web-based tools of coordination and reporting thus far, the 14 points system for humanitarian aid and the CECIS system for civil protection. Finally, the Emergency Response Centre of DG ECHO could, over time, be developed into a platform providing support also for other services within the Commission that deal with major disasters.

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The European Union has to develop an EU Crisis Management Planning and Training Network

Training and preparedness − key elements for EU crisis and disaster management by Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Journalist, Paris

During the last year, the EU started an important process of developing adequate tools to support and coordinate European civilian crisis and disaster management. This process seeks to make European humanitarian assistance and crisis response activities as effective as possible. The process should strengthen disaster preparedness, prevention and response efficiency and enhance coordination with EU partners on the ground. Against this background, preparedness and training become a key element of effective European civilian crisis and disaster management capability. During the last two years, we saw a series of particularly severe natural disasters, ranging from flash floods and storms in Western Europe, large-scale floods in Central Europe and volcanic ash clouds after the eruption in Iceland, to the earthquake in Haiti and the nuclear disaster following the recent earthquake in Japan. Furthermore, we should not forget that governments in Europe are more than ever faced with the challenge of protecting their populations and critical infrastructures against the growing and diversifying range of threats posed by terrorist activities.

Computer-based simulation has proven its worth already in the military sector... A coordinated management is indispensable when it comes to cross-border disasters affecting more than one EU Member State. These days, crisis and disaster management missions have become a complex task with a wide range of scenarios and a large variety of actors involved on the ground (civilian and military). Such complex missions need a comprehensive approach taking into account military and civilian elements for more integrated missions. The EU has a wide range of instruments for responding to major disasters, including using Member States’ civil protection assets through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and providing humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters outside of the EU. But the increase of both natural and manmade major disasters during the last few years made clear that existing structures have to be strengthened. That is why last year, the EU kicked off an important process of developing adequate tools to support and coordinate European civilian crisis and disaster management. In this field, given the complexity of possible scenarios for crisis management, computer-

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Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon has been Editorial Deputy for the magazine The European − Security and Defence Union since 2010. She is an independent journalist specialised in the field of Security and Defence. She was born in 1968 and grew up in Germany and in France. She studied literature at the University of Bonn and later Political Sciences in Paris at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (IEP). Before becoming a journalist, she worked as independent conference lecturer for different German political foundations and the German Bundestag. She lives in Paris since 1998, where she first worked for two years as editorial assistant for the German magazine Der Spiegel. Since 2003 she has been special correspondent of the German Publishing Group Mönch, and since 2008 she also works for the CSDP focused information service of the Brussels based office of Copura GmbH.

based simulation technologies appear as interesting and effective tools allowing for preparation, training and coordination. Simulation allows to identify and understand key factors, interactions and interdependencies of processes in the real world and to create corresponding models in a virtual world. In the military sector, computer-based simulation tools have proved their worth in training management and active staff. The German Armed Forces e.g. have been using a command and staff training simulation (called SIRA) for more than 15 years, and another five European countries use this system as well. SIRA is based on the simulation software GESI, which has been developed by CAE Elektronik GmbH, a subsidiary of CAE Inc., based in Canada and a worldwide leader in the fields of simulation and modelling technologies.

... is decisive for European civil crisis management While in the military sector simulation has a long history, within the civil protection domain simulation for civilian crisis management is still a newly emerging technology. But recently, the German Armed Forces and the German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BKK) agreed on jointly using SIRA in the scope of long-standing civil-military cooperation (see News p. 49). This cooperation also in a way represents an important step in bridging gaps between civilian and military crisis management. This cooperation even includes coordination on future developments of simulation


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technology to exploit synergies as far as possible. When we consider crisis management, we should take into account the increasing pressure on EU civil security authorities to safeguard citizen’s security, as well as the limited resources, budgetary cutbacks and a broad spectrum of potential threats. It seems more than logical that modern simulation technology which proved its worth in the military sector, could also provide decisive support for crisis management in Europe: simulation technology offers the possibility to replicate the complexity of the real world in a digitized one, including e.g. the replicaRed Cross crisis management personal in a computerbased simulation crisis management tion of a region with its topography, climate, exercise Photo: CAE infrastructure, population, civil protection organisations with the available emergency response capacities, etc. It allows then to assume any crisis situation or disaster event and to investiing information on disasters, monitoring hazards, preparing gate e. g. the consequences for the affected population and scenarios and coordinating the EU’s disaster response efforts. the critical infrastructures in the region. In this way crisis But on the industry side, there is the idea that the EU could managers will be able to understand interdependencies more make even a further step: easily, to test respective response plans and to identify possiThe idea is that the Union should develop its own simulation ble consequences of their actions and decisions. Furthermore, capacity by creating a kind of “European Crisis Management simulation technology could be an enabling factor to gather Planning & Training Network”, which would technically and European crisis managers in order to train them in realistic conceptually network all European crisis management compecross-border scenarios on how to co-operate most efficiently tencies to enable joint planning and training. The core element to manage in a coordinated way all kinds of crisis situations. could be a EU Simulation Competence Centre which would coordinate EU-wide simulation-related activities. Under this view, the EU will either conduct its own simulationThe idea of a European Crisis Management Planning assisted training courses or will support EU Member States in & Training Network the conception of such courses. Under the guidance of this One of the key elements of the European Commission’s ComCentre, impacts on the EU’s critical infrastructures and citizens munication from last year, “Towards a stronger European could be investigated to identify measures of prevention and disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitariappropriate emergency response plans. And in crisis situaan assistance”, was setting up a European Emergency Retions, the Center could provide simulation-based forecasts on sponse Centre which should be responsible for the coordinathe course of disasters and evaluate respective EU countertion of the EU’s civilian disaster response. The Centre should measures. serve as a platform for a more efficient EU response by collect-

News: A new civil-military culture in German crisis prevention German Armed Forces’ simulation technology will be used by German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) On 6 April, the German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) and the German Armed Forces Support Command (SKUKdo) jointly presented the application of simulation technology for future civil protection exercises. The German Armed Forces originally developed the computer-based simulation programme SIRA (based on the Simulation software GESI) for army-tactical education and training, which means that the German Armed

Forces use SIRA for training military commanders and staff without expensive deployment of forces and resources. In February 2011, the BBK and the German Armed Forces agreed on jointly using SIRA in the scope of long-standing civil-military cooperation. The cooperation also includes joint further development of the software. Ulrich Aderhold, Managing Director of CAE Elektronik GmbH, the company which developed the GESI simulation software, explained

that for his company this agreement “sets the course for GESI in the civilian sector.” He added that the current catastrophes have shown just how important foresighted safety provisions and efficient crisis management are and that with the help of this simulation system, operation headquarters and staff can, in complex exercises, receive optimal preparation for all conceivable danger scenarios.

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Without active participation of the society in crisis prevention, there will be no efficiently

The Israeli approach to crisis and consequences management Interview with Abraham (Avi) Bachar, General (res.), CEO of Israteam, Tel Aviv

The European: General, you are a provider of security solutions to the Israeli government and you are international consultant. Mr Bachar: I would not say “security solutions”, just because we are not a security company. The European:And what then is the nature of your enterprise? Mr Bachar: In Israel there are about 250 security companies, but there is only one, our company, dealing with crisis management. So I prefer to say that I am an international consultant for “crisis and consequence management” The European: Do you make the distinction because you differentiate between the nature and/or the quality of crises? Mr Bachar: When we talk about the crisis management in terms of terrorist attacks, I am a provider of a segment on the security solutions. But if we are talking about crisis management in disasters such as earthquakes, in these cases I have nothing to do with security. The European: So you are a solution provides and aware of the great effort necessary to organize crisis prevention in the EU so as to make it an important global partner in providing humanitarian aid. What is here to learn from Israel? Mr Bachar: When I am teaching how to create crisis response plans, I say that the first thing to understand is the threat. The major difference with Europe is just the nature of the threat. The Israeli people are under threats from all directions − war, terror, earthquakes, pandemics etc. In my opinion, the European governments haven’t realized yet the threats from the Islamic fundamentalism. The European: And everything might happen at the same time. Mr Bachar: This should make us more aware and more prepared, otherwise we will not exist as a nation. When European societies understand that they have a threat, believe me, they would do what is necessary, but governments and the EU Institutions have to define and redefine that threat. The European: Without the participation of society, there will be no efficiency. But how do you prepare for all threats? Mr Bachar: When I start to work on preparedness of a country or organisation for a crisis, I always ask the decision makers to what extent they will be able to get public participation in the system they intend to build.

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Abraham (Avi) Bachar Abraham (Avi) Bachar, Brigadier General (res.) is the CEO of ISRATEAM 98 Ltd since 1998, after retiring from the Army where he held the position of the Chief of Staff, IDF Home Front Command from 1995 to 1998. Avi Bachar holds a MA in Public Policy (Tel-Aviv University) and in Political Science (Haifa University) and he is graduated of the National Security College. He was from 2007 to 2009 Chairman of the National Emergency Energy Organization.

The European: For what purpose? Mr Bachar: Because no nation in the world has enough resources nor has enough power to deal with a large-scale crisis. You have to have participation of the population just at the beginning, because designated units need time to understand the situation and to arrive at the scene. From our experience, we learned that the first minutes are the most important for saving lives!! The European: So you use the population to provide first assistance before specialists and respective units or elements arrive. How exactly do you employ the population? Mr Bachar: By making people know and understand the nature of the threats, training them for a first intervention, and giving them necessary equipment such as gas masks. So they will be able to give the very first aid to the casualties in the event and if necessary to get them out of the hot zone. The European: Let me take up the issue of CBRN, as you just mentioned gas masks. The Europeans have re-considered this field and are preparing against CBRN threats. Mr Bachar: Yes, I’ve heard about it. The European Parliament is rather active, which is somewhat understandable. Even if a direct military threat to Europe is missing, there are other threats such as terrorist attacks, which will remain active for some time. The European: Let us come to your practice. When you have developed a strategy for a customer and are going to implement it, how long will it take to field the necessary material and human resources? Mr Bachar: That is a difficult question to answer, but it usually


EU-CRISIS PREVENTION

takes years to understand and prepare everything. And as you know, the level of preparedness is a never-ending process. The European: Is Israel well-prepared for all types of crises? Mr Bachar: Are we well-prepared? Certainly we are doing our best, but this is a never-ending story. One thing is clear: You never can say you are ready. You always have to improve yourself and your allies. The European: What does this mean in reality? Mr Bachar: We are well-prepared, but not well enough. Believe me, we are not prepared well enough for war, and especially not for the next war, because we always prepare for “the last war”. We are not prepared almost at all for earthquakes; we know what should be done, but we are far from accomplishing it. The European: Because it takes a lot of resources and the country has other priorities? Mr Bachar: You need resources for other things as well, such as education and health. So, one of the biggest difficulties is deciding on the policy. What are the threats we are going to deal with? Once you have defined the threats, you also have consequently to allocate the resources. It is very important to realize this limitation on preparedness. You have to realize that you will never be prepared for everything. The European: May I concentrate on CBRN prevention and countermeasures. What is your strategy after the first elements of “population” have intervened? Do you have CBRN-stocks centralized, or do you have them located everywhere? What is the delay “lead time” for intervention? Mr Bachar: Everyone uses the catchword CBRN, and some are adding an “E” for Explosives. Nothing against this catchword,

but it leads to grave misunderstandings. For me it is a big mistake to put those different things all together in one basket, whereas each issue has its own nature and significance. The European: Why? Could you explain? Mr Bachar: Chemical events − for example − will begin and end within very short time. Because the chemical is in the air (if it is not in an enclosed space) and if there is some wind, it will dissipate in a few minutes. If you don’t react immediately in minutes, you have no chance to save lives. We call it the “golden hour” because a reaction to a chemical event may depend on the first 10 or 20 minutes, and consequently you have to store all material locally. For a B-event, you have to prepare otherwise. The European: Let us talk about that. Mr Bachar: For a biological event, the preparation is very different. In such an event you will know that the event has occurred, only three or more days later when symthoms starts to occur producing effects / At that time, you engage mostly the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the hospitals. Then you have to call for specialists prepared for a biological event for pandemic investigation, as opposed to the generally prepared first responders. The European: That must also mean that the doctrines are very differently organized for B-events, C-events, etc. Mr Bachar: That’s right. For a biological event, you can have a centralised stockpile and centralised units because you have about 24 hours to come into the area, distribute medicine, and deploy part of the population, as you need a lot of man power. Only the army can normally do this. Much personnel is required, but the material alone can be transported in a single 5-ton truck. In short, tell me what is the threat you want to deal with

General (res.) Bachar during the interview in the office of Israteam in Tel Aviv (left). Avi Bachar and Hartmut Bühl at the Rabbin Memorial in Tel Aviv (right). Photos: H. Bühl

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

and I will tell you how to build your response, but don’t mix up the threats. The European: What about nuclear events, which is another totally different field? Mr Bachar: That was proven through Fukushima. I sent a delegation to there and did my observations. The European: Then let us speak about Fukushima. You already mentioned the “golden hour”. For me, the question is how much you jeopardise the health of the first responders to make them operationally capable of saving other lives. Mr Bachar: The Fukushima situation was that we saw the power plant releasing radiation and workers trying to prevent a major disaster by jeopardising their lives while working there for about a month without fully protective equipment just because there is not any fully protective gear for all kinds of radiation, which enaables the first responder to still accomplish its mission.

“tell me what is the threat you want to deal with and I will tell you how to build your response, but don’t mix up the threats”.

The European: It is just that which I want to understand. Similar to other technologies, if you want to put somebody in a top-level suit to be fully protected, it might be that he is safe, but simply too late to get in action. But that is one philosophy. Is there a strategy in Israel regarding the level of protection that is provided and the operational capability resulting from that? Mr Bachar: That is a vital question. I have started to talk about new level of response. Usually, we talk about the “first responders“ acting the first. The European: What does it mean new level of response? Mr Bachar: I started to talk about what I call the “first liners”. What I mean is that in every institution or in each community, you have to have some people which are better equipped and have better knowledge of how to deal with the event, They will give the real first aid to the population in the event, just because the “first responders” will almost always be too late. The European: Could you give an example for “C”? Mr Bachar: Take a chemical event in an airport. You know that most airlines in the world look to protecting the flight, but no one pays attention to the airport itself. There are a lot of people at an airport in a very small space. Someone could smash a bottle of Sarin and cause hundreds of deaths within a few minutes without even having to get on the aeroplane.

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The European: There are a lot of security and other employees on the airport. Would you give them a special role? Mr Bachar: Everyone of them should have what we call “escape plans”, like the “security” plan at the Guard. The European: And what will the security people a chemical event? Mr Bachar: Oh, indeed, they prefer to run away, and as the security people are much faster than the population in the airport, they will run away leaving most of the population behind to die. The European: And so you came up with the “first liners”? Mr Bachar: The idea is to give the “first liners” some kind of protection. I underline that they are not first responders. Consequently, e.g. every policeman in the airport takes with him his gas mask, which normally remains in the car. The European: Because nobody likes to carry it. Mr Bachar: Yes, that is why we need to equip them with a very small “pocket gas mask” to use for ten minutes just to see what is going on and to get out, calling headquarters for support and then acting on site. Sometimes you can help or save people just by telling them what to do. The European: And how are hospitals prepared to deal with mass casualties? Mr Bachar: In Israel, every hospital has to be prepared for mass casualty events and we have measures for what should be done in the hospital for coping with “C” ,”B”, ”R”, “N” or“E”,. We have two exercises per year, and thus in two years we have had four exercises: war, chemical, toxicological and one surprise drill. The European: What is toxicological? Mr Bachar: This concerns war, during which there could be combined events: biological, chemical and high-explosive. The European: All your planning seems to be a comprehensive approach where military and civil security is a unity. Mr Bachar: This is different from European thinking, where the EU societies see always a problem in mixing the military and civil. The civil side has a certain fear of the military The EU is on its own comprehensive approach nor and believe me, that. But the future is comprehensive and both communities have to learn how to behave and collaborate without animosities. The European: Could you give some advice? Mr Bachar: Take what the EU Commissioner Georgieva has mentioned in the interview with The European in the last edition of your magazin on pp 12 The European: Thank you very much for this interview.


COMPANY PORTRAIT

125 Years of Automobiles − from the Coach to the Armoured Vehicle In 1865, Mr. Karl August Stoof began to manufacture coaches in Kanin, a town in Brandenburg, Germany. This lead to the family enterprise STOOF-International. The engagement with frameand-body construction went on until 1989, when STOOF transformed into a leading international company constructing armoured vehicles. STOOF Family Enterprise stands for the ideals and traditional values that are the key elements of the high quality of German engineering. Let us take a short glance back into the history of automobiles.

History In 1886, Mr. Carl Benz registered his patent for the Motorcar No 1. This was the beginning of automobile development in Germany. In 1888, Mrs. Berta Benz drove the Motorcar No 3 for a 106 km long ride from Mannheim to Pforzheim. Only three days later, she drove back and caused immense attention as a lady driving an automobile: thus she reinforced her husband’s economic success. This first Motorcar ride was not only a success for the Benz company; at the same time it was the spark for all automobile manufacturers.

such as armoured luxury vehicles, TROJAN® armoured Toyota Land Cruisers, armoured 4 x 4 vehicles, armoured lorries, moneyboxes, sally ports, security containers, as well as armoured vehicles for the police and military.

The priority of customer wishes STOOF-International combines trademark vehicles with the individual wishes of customers to manufacture high-class and certified armoured vehicles. Each individual customer wish is documented in a three-dimensional computer layout. Manufacturing of vehicles will not start until the customer is satisfied with the computer animation.

Build-up and certification The trademark vehicles are completely dismantled prior to their reconstruction with special parts and armour. From the planning stage until the finishing of the final product, everything lies in the hands of STOOF-International. The armoured and certified cross-country vehicles, such as the Toyota TROJAN® VR6, are entirely constructed with certified armoured materials.

STOOF-International today

Shelling tests

Today STOOF-International, with all company branches, is located in Borkheide (Brandenburg, Germany). The company comprises of Research, Development and Construction departments. In addition, a 25.000 m2 test track is available for drivers training under high standards of protection. All elements of the utmost security standards are thus concentrated in Borkheide. Nearly 150 years of experience with vehicle construction and manufacturing have lead to the highest competence and perfection. Highly individual counselling and mentoring ensures customerorientated special security concepts. The versatile range of STOOF-International products comprises custom-made items

The Toyota TROJAN® VR6 went through a very tough shelling test involving a broad variety of calibres. The test was passed successfully during the first trail. Other experiments, with a 15 kg TNT charge at a distance of two meters and with a DM 31 (anti-personal-mine) underneath the vehicle, showed no mine splinters or other negative impact in the vehicle’s interior. Following these very impressive tests, STOF-International has proven to be a security expert constructing armoured vehicles. National and international customers as well as large organisations (GOs and NGOs) around the world rely on the competence of STOOF-International. Hans Peter Buch

Photo:Fred Stoof

STOOF-Coach

Photo: STOOF International GmbH

Shelling Test on Toyota TROJAN® VR 6

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Cyber Security − the threats and solutions Cyber security is more than technical implementation. It is also strategic decision making on an integrated approach bringing all aspects together in an EU Cyber Strategy Marietje Schaake MEP ...................................................................... 54 Gilles de Kerchove........................................................................... 57 Arne Schönbohm ............................................................................. 59

Security measures must respect human rights in the EU and when considering EU’s global role

Balancing Cyber Security and Human Rights Interview with Marietje Schaake MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European: Cyber crime is without any doubt a global phenomenon. What are the risks for the European Union as a whole? Mrs Schaake: The internet has made possible global communication and interaction. As with any online activity, criminals can work together well across borders and act globally. We need more cooperation among law enforcement organizations and officials in Europe. The risks of cyber attacks particular to the European Union should be analyzed in detail before we agree on a specific strategy. The European: Aren’t there enough industry-funded reports? Mrs Schaake: Yes, the vast majority of comprehensive research on cyber crime is available through reports funded by the Information and communications technologies (ICT) industry. But there is a need for more independent scientific research. I would add that developing policies on cyber crime should go hand in hand with safeguarding internet freedom. The resulting policies should also be subject to democratic oversight.

Marietje Schaake MEP Marietje Schaake is a Member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Democratic Party with the ALDE political group since 2009. She serves on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, where she focuses on neighbourhood policy human rights, with a specific focus on freedom of expression and press freedom; and Iran. In the Committee on Culture, Media, Education, Youth and Sports, she works on Europe’s Digital Agenda and the role of culture and new media in the EU’s external actions. Before joining the European Parliament, she worked as an independent advisor to governments, diplomats, businesses and NGOs, on issues of transatlantic relations, diversity and pluralism, civil and human rights and integration. She studied American Studies and New Media at the University of Amsterdam.

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The European: It seems to me that you are rather downplaying the actual status of the discussions. Mrs Schaake: Talking about cyber security is over-hyped, so it is important to keep a realistic viewpoint. To put it in perspective, no cyber attack has had the impact of 9/11 in terms of casualties. The European: What are the general objectives of cyber attacks? Mrs Schaake: Cyber attacks can be conducted based on different motives. They can be waged to undermine a corporation, organization or government. Generally, attacks are made by either states, politically motivated networks, organized crime syndicates, or individuals. The problem is that the attack is not always visible or even known to the targeted system, organization or individual, making it difficult to accurately detect. The European: Can you see any trends? Mrs Schaake: Increasingly, we can observe attacks by governments against citizens. In the weeks before the street demonstrations and violent crackdowns in Syria, the government deployed aggressive technologies to break into citizens’ emails and social media accounts to gather information. This information was then used against the people to track opposition voices and networks as well as to harvest personal data. The European: And similar crimes in other countries? Mrs Schaake: In Egypt, for example, the government turned off the internet and mobile connections entirely in an unprecedented crackdown. Equally unprecedented was the fining of Mubarak and two of his ministers, who were held accountable by the courts for resulting economic losses. The European: Isn’t this an important step forward? Mrs Schaake: It is an important step, but not including human


rights violations in the charges, such as limiting speech and press freedom or creating an environment in which human rights violations went undocumented, is a missed opportunity. The European: I think we should try to find a definition for cyber crime. Would you make an attempt? Mrs Schaake: Cyber crime is defined very broadly as any crime involving a computer. Many people believe it means different things, so there is a need for more understanding and shared definitions. Advertising a stolen bike online is a very different ‘cybercrime’ than deploying the computer worm Stuxnet, even though both would fit under the same current definition. The European: The public and the private sectors appear linked when it comes to cyber crime. Are they in the same boat? Mrs Schaake: The public and private sectors face similar threats and have to work together to mitigate these; risk management and prevention are important. As with any security situation, 100% security does not exist. The difference is that the private cyber security sector makes more money when the perception of a threat is more serious. The European: And what role do governments have? Mrs Schaake: Governments in principle should act to protect citizens and critical infrastructures. In a recent parliamentary session, I urged the Commission to carry out its own research to find out which means are appropriate and proportionate and to ensure that cyber security measures do not violate the fundamental rights of citizens. The European: It seems that prosecuting internet crime stops at national borders. Is this a weak point? Mrs Schaake: While physical borders are less important on the internet, laws are made in the context of nation states. Governments are responsible for protecting their citizens. In Europe, there is free movement of people, capital, labour and services. In addition, we can speak of a fifth freedom, the free movement of information and data. The European: Are EU citizens aware of this? Mrs Schaake: European citizens need to know their rights in the European context. With globally-used cloud services such as Twitter, the question is how European governments can best protect their citizens. Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice subpoenaed Twitter to hand over the private information and communications of an EU citizen. There should be increased awareness of the laws applicable when an online service is used. The EU should ensure that the rights of its citizens are guaranteed. People increasingly rely on the services of commercial actors incorporated in different countries.

The European: In 2013, all European citizens should have access to the internet. Will the EU have ready at that date its own strategy? Mrs Schaake: Developing an EU strategy on cyber crime should be based on solid independent research. It will be a process of constant tweaking; I would prefer to focus on content and results rather than dates as an assessment of success. The European: What could be the essentials of such a strategy? Mrs Schaake: An EU strategy should be carefully balanced, where we take account of citizens’ fundamental rights, real risks as opposed to perceived dangers, and make sure the policy is subject of democratic oversight. The European: How do cyber security and internet freedom go together? Mrs Schaake: Cyber security and internet freedom are two sides of the same coin and need to be considered as such. When I hear discussions on the threats of cyber attacks, and the lengths to which proposals to stop them go, I can’t help but think of the ‘war on terror’. By now we know that the medicine can be more harmful than the disease, and we must be very careful not to repeat the mistake of compromising fundamental rights for alleged security. We must not compromise the freedom we are seeking to protect! The European: You alluded to cyber crime and cyber war. Could you define the difference between these? Mrs Schaake: A cyber crime is a criminal act carried out via computer networks or even with the use of only one single computer. The term cyber warfare recalls ground wars and casualties, suggesting a larger scale. The acts which have been classified as cyber warfare are like acts of espionage or sabotage, or acts initiated by one government against another. In cyberspace, non-state actors are becoming more important, so to speak of only nation states as actors would unduly limit the scope. The European: When can we speak of an attack? What are the criteria? Mrs Schaake: A judge should decide that on a case by case basis; it is impossible to make generalizations. There are different levels of harm that attacks can cause. Also, individuals have varying levels of responsibility. Many people own computers through which attacks are jointly launched via viruses, even though that is not the owner’s wish. Levels of intent and impact will be important criteria in defining attacks and in holding the attacker accountable. The European: Next, we should discuss responsibilities. What role will the European Union play within the designed strategy?

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Actively or passively acting, or only advising? Mrs Schaake: Information flows across borders, and so will information which is transmitted with malicious intent. Thus, a trans-national approach is desirable: Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament should coordinate their activities. The European Union’s network and security agency, ENISA, could play such a coordinating role. Additionally, a more active dialogue with businesses and civil society should be sought. Different players represent different interests that are difficult to separate. The European: How do you envision such cooperation with the Member States, more precisely between the EU institutions and the nations? Mrs Schaake: Many national centres of expertise already exist. The European Union should foster their collaboration and communication. Knowledge should be shared at the European level, so we can prevent attacks where necessary. The European: In Member States, communication and responsibilities are rarely centralized. How will the EU communicate with relevant national authorities? Mrs Schaake: When building the European strategy, we should seize the opportunity to redesign any inefficiency in the whole communication process. It remains to be seen whether this will be mainly a top-down system, or organized in a way where coordination and cooperation are stimulated. Laws differ among Member States, and we should learn from the way good as well as poor practices play out. The European: How do you see communication and coordination with third countries, which entails a sort of global networking? Mrs Schaake: There are a growing number of international organizations and multilateral initiatives dealing with cyberspace, such as NATO, UN-IGF or the G8. Governments of some third countries are part of the problem; others are part of the

News: ENISA on Cyber Cyber security − map on good practice in Europe On 8 June 2011, the European Network and Information Security Agency ENISA launched online an updated edition of its “Country Reports”, which provide an overview of the “state of the art” in network and information security in each of the 30 countries of the 27 European Union Member States and the 3 members of the European Economic Area. The updated Report shows that European countries are highly varied in how prepared they are for dealing with cyber crime, network attacks and network resilience. The Report can be found via the ENISA Website: > http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/sr/country-reports

solution. As with any subject, it is important to identify allies and to set standards that ensure security without compromising the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. The United States recently stated that cyber attacks may be labelled as an 'act of war', which would justify military retaliation. The EU must react to this statement and define its own parameters and norms in the context of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. The European: How could this experience be used by the public sector? Can Europe make use of U.S. experiences or those of NATO? Mrs Schaake: Governments should not rely solely on the private sector. A new EU strategy should encompass capacity building in the public sector, and the private sector can help in this objective. Europe should certainly learn from the U.S. and NATO approaches and share valuable knowledge, but at the same time act independently and in the best interest of its citizens. The European: What should be the EU’s first steps in becoming an efficient coordinator of cyber defence? Mrs Schaake: The first step should be research into the real risks of cyber attacks. Afterwards, the EU should define its own role in the overall strategy. The European: And how do you see an optimization of the coordination of anti-cyber threat measures at the different levels and sectors? Mrs Schaake: That is a difficult question to answer at a time when we do not clearly know the real threats. We must begin to gather independent knowledge on a number of issues. However, when finding an optimal level of coordination, internet users’ fundamental rights should be taken into account at all times. Optimization does not mean constant surveillance of all internet traffic. The European: Are there special efforts for special sectors? Mrs Schaake: The extension of the ENISA mandate is currently being discussed. Now would also be the time to discuss the overall budget for network security for the coming years. The European: How do you see the role of the European Parliament in making other institutions push forward? Mrs Schaake: The European Parliament should refrain from being a limiting factor or taking too long to act. However, due to the complexity and delicacy of the topic, the Parliament should also not rush its decision making. It is important to include various stakeholders, and to bring knowledge to decision makers so that better-informed decisions are made. The European: Mrs Schaake, I thank you for the interview.

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CYBER SECURITY THE THREATS AND SOLUTIONS

Cyber space is a key enabler in European Societies for their social and economical development

Cyber threat − the need for an EU response by Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Brussels In recent weeks our physical borders, the Schengen area and internal controls between Member States have been a key concern for security and migration reasons. But when discussing future security challenges, we should not forget that in cyberspace these boundaries hardly exist.

Cyber space in area of security concern Cyber space is a key enabler for social and economical development but is also an area of concern when it comes to security, data protection and privacy, or agitation through hate speech or terrorist propaganda. Painful experience but also successful investigations have taught us the lesson that terrorists are always keen to adopt new technology. They are using cyber space regularly and in a more and more professional way − to incite to commit terrorist attack, to recruit and to instruct. They are constantly improving their tactics and capacities and will make use of every tool they can master to target us where we are vulnerable. Cyber security has thus become a key concern − from a perspective not only of espionage and organised crime, but also of counter terrorism. Last summer the Stuxnet virus was a wake-up call that more has to be done. As cyber space does not follow physical borders, we can achieve cyber security only through international cooperation. Stuxnet has disclosed how exposed and vulnerable critical infrastructures can be to cyber attacks. Although cyber terrorism is − for the moment − not the major hazard, cyber space could become an attractive target for terrorist groups. Cyber attacks can be performed through cheap tools from all around the world and even a small attack can have huge impact. Terrorists can also profit from a certain anonymity on the net. We have to intensify our efforts before terrorists acquire the know-how and capacities.

Cyber security needs international cooperation Cyber security is primarily an issue of Member States competences and responsibilities. But the cross border nature of cyber space, the interdependence of our infrastructures (like communication, energy or transport), creates the need to have standards and measures in place all around Europe, and if possible beyond. A more intense discussion on cyber security has now started in the EU and in cooperation with our partners. Last November the EU and the US agreed to set up a working group on cyber security and cybercrime. A first joint EU-US cyber-incident exercise has been announced for the end of 2011.

How to achieve a higher level of security When fostering EU cooperation we can build on a number of achievements (see box), but there is still a need to come forward with a more integrated approach at the EU level. This also requires distinguishing clearly the task in the EU from the work done in the military arena − like at NATO. To achieve a higher level of cyber security we should address the following issues: • The EU institutions must be better protected: The Commission and EEAS have been recent victims of cyber attacks. Vice President Kroes had appointed of a group of wise men to explore the set-up of an EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). • The establishment of a European Cybercrime Centre by 2013, which will include both national and European alert platforms (ICROS − Internet Crime Reporting Online System) to report cyber/internet crime. • We need to achieve a minimum level of cyber security preparedness throughout the EU. The new Commission Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection “Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security” highlights plans to enhance EU preparedness by establishing a network of well functioning National/Governmental CERTs by 2012, the development of a European Information Sharing and Alert System by 2013 or a European cyber-incident contingency plan by 2012.

EU Achievements in cooperation • The creation of ENISA, the European Network Security Agency. The evolving threat requires a new mandate and enhanced activities − to support the EU institutions, Member States and the private sector. A new mandate is currently under discussion. • In 2009 the Council − in its Resolution on a collaborative EU approach to Network and Information security − endorsed an Action Plan including initiatives like a European Forum for Member States. • The first European-wide exercise, “Cyber Europe 2010”, was held in November 2010. • The Commission has tabled a proposal to step up the fight against cyber crime. In particular the emergence of large-scale simultaneous attacks against information systems and use of ‘botnets’ made it necessary to update the existing Framework Decision on attacks against information systems. • At Member State level several states have recently adopted cyber security strategies or established a National Cyber Response Centre. Mr de Kerchove's new Discussion Paper on the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy presented on 7 June 2011, is available at: > http://tinyurl.com/452tpwt

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Cyber security and its strategic dimension But cyber security is not only about technical implementation, it is also about strategic decision making. There is a need to discuss an integrated approach bringing all aspects together in the form of an EU cyber strategy − integrating also aspects like industrial policy − so that the EU can rely on secure components. A debate on an international a code of conduct for the internet is needed for example to protect humanitarian infrastructures like hospitals against cyber attacks from states and how to achieve a better framework internationally (the majority of States worldwide do not have any legislation criminalising cyber attacks). In view of new developments like cloud computing, we also have to discuss threats and challenges. Cloud computing can help to better integrate data, to achieve more security, but it also creates risks. Sovereignty over data and applications, transparency and privacy are important issues to be preserved also in the cloud. We have to create a new security awareness to avoid being taken by surprise by new threats (as a possible amplified impact of malicious insiders in the cloud or an increased reliance on the general connectedness of the internet). These are concerns from a counter terrorism perspective but also far beyond. We have several EU initiatives to build on, but cyber-space will continue to challenge our EU policy making and coordination. Born 1956 in Brussels, Gilles de Kerchove was Director for Justice and Home Affairs at the EU Council Secretariat from 1995 to 2007.

News: ESRT Conference on Cyber Security On 14 June, the European Security Round Table (ESRT) organised a conference entitled “Shared Threats − Shared Solutions: Towards a European Cyber Policy”, which was initiated by the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Keynote speakers included the Estonian Defence Minister, Mart Laar, as well as Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs, and Richard Wright, Director for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, European External Action Service. This initial conference in Brussels aimed to kick-start a discussion about a comprehensive policy approach to Cyber Security and to sharpen the awareness among EU-Institutions that have coordinated activities in a number of areas of EU competences.

Christoph Raab, Director of the ESRT, welcomes the Estonian Defence Minister, Mart Laar, at the Cyber Security Conference. Photo: ESRT

More information: www.security-round-table.eu

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Does the cyber threat usher us into an area of existential

Cyber crime and cyber war by Arne Schönbohm, CEO, BBSG, München Can the European Community withstand the new challenges of cyber crime and cyber war? How real is the new threat of cyber attacks? Estonia came under massive cyber attack in the spring of 2007, Georgia in 2008, Kyrgyzstan in 2009 and the Iranian nuclear programme in 2010. All these countries were, at the time of the attacks, involved in conflicts with other countries.

The Internet − a new domain of “warfare” The Internet has been called the “fifth domain of warfare” alongside land, air, water and space. Cyber attacks are aimed at severely disrupting a country’s social and economic life and damaging its economy. To illustrate our vulnerability and the extent to which we are interconnected, the trade in emission certificates within the European Union can serve as an example. In January 2011, hackers brought down the European Union Emission Trading System, in which 20% of all emissions certificates are traded. They penetrated several national registries, for example in Romania, stealing about 1.6 million certificates in November 2010 and an additional 2 million with a value of about € 30 million in January 2011. The Stuxnet worm attack on the Iranian nuclear programme in Bushehr similarly illustrates the severity of the new threat. SCADA supervisory control programmes are used to monitor industrial processes in refineries, power stations and manufacturing plants and to control and display automated operations. An attack on such a programme could cause an accident with extremely serious consequences.

Flexibility versus vulnerability With the number of cyber attacks on companies and governments increasing and the damage they cause on the rise, close NATO attention to the issue is fully warranted. A majority of the Member States of the European Union are members of NATO and are economically strong. The are generally highly networked, globally active and endowed with modern armed forces that can engage in network-centric operations and are interconnected via standardisation. Commercial off-the-shelf systems are increasingly being procured. These systems, already in widespread use in the business world, are less expensive and can be acquired more quickly than customised products; they can thus support more rapid adjustment to changing technology, providing much-needed flexibility. But commercial off-the-shelf products make users more vulnerable, since defects − so-called “trap doors” − that even experts have difficulty recognising can be deliberately designed and built into these software systems. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO calls for


CYBER SECURITY THE THREATS AND SOLUTIONS

applications similar to the nuclear?

− we have to cease being passive collective self-defence when an “armed attack” is carried out on one or more parties. Cyber attacks on states are, however, not included in this definition, even though they can cause damage far exceeding that caused by an armed attack. Article 5 should be extended to cover cyber attacks. The existence of “trap doors”, mentioned above, also makes it necessary to continuously monitor the suppliers, developers and producers of security-critical goods to be procured as well as the integrity of employees and to provide ongoing training.

Arne Schönbohm Arne Schönbohm is General Manager, BSS BuCET Shared Services ( BSS AG). Studies of International Management in Dortmund, London and Taipei. 1995-2008, DASA / EADS. Retired from EADS as Vice President Commercial and Defence Solutions. Mr. Schönbohm is editor of “Deutschlands Sicherheit − Cybercrime and Cyberwar” (2011)

The line between cyber crime and cyber war There is no longer a clear distinction between the two. The same viruses, Trojans and other attack programmes are used for both purposes. During the war between Georgia and Russia, Russian Business Network cyber crime organisation was apparently using to attack Georgia virtually at the behest of the government. The purpose of cyber attacks In most cases, cyber attacks are carried out to earn money. Last year for the first time more than 246,000 crimes perpetrated on the Internet were recorded across the Federal Republic as a whole, an increase of nearly 20% from the previous year. Examples of such crimes are counterfeiting, fraud and theft of development documentation, access codes, etc. According to Interpol, some 162 million credit card data sets were put up for sale or traded over the Internet in 2009, enabling the card to be used without restriction. Such credit card data are said to represent purchasing power of US$5.3 billion. Europol has reported that credit card information can provide a return of US$30 per card, bank data between $10 and $25 and even access to an e-mail account up to $10. Other data such as pension scheme numbers, telephone numbers and birth dates also constitute a lucrative market. Lucrative business Criminals gain access to the data by penetrating the data systems of networks such as hotel booking platforms and the Sony Playstation network, to give just two examples. Such cases have occurred in Germany. In 2009 alone, 100,000 credit cards that had been used in Spain during a particular period of time had to be exchanged. Businesses especially are suffering increasing losses. Analysts have calculated that organised crime generated more profits from cyber crime than from drug trafficking in 2009, for the first time. The German Ministry of the Interior, said that the potential damage to the German economy alone amounts to € 50 billion per year.

Countermeasures require clear jurisdiction What steps can be taken to effectively thwart cyber crime? Private-sector Internet users, companies, national governments and the European Union must henceforth optimise their security measures to combat cyber attack. Government has a duty to fully protect the country’s economy and its external and internal security, including in cyber space. But jurisdiction remains a problem. The “Cyber Europe 2010” cyber security exercise carried out in November showed that 55% of the participants were not confident they would be able to quickly identify the right contact, in the event of a crisis, even with the available directories. Much remains to be clarified in this area. Yet the only way to limit damage to businesses and governments and to optimise security is to define areas of responsibility, ensure short communication paths and respond rapidly.

Security-focused business model One of the main duties of every government is to ward off risks to public safety and public order and to safeguard the country’s economy. One important aspect of this effort is the protection of the R&D systems of individual industrial sectors. Despite all the newly developed protective technologies and the ongoing improvement of security systems, espionage attacks still occur, as we have seen. These can result in loss of know-how and data. Hence there is a need to increase security spending as part of corporate risk reduction. Auditing firms should take this risk on board by performing crisis-management audits and insurance companies could sell policies covering such losses. The additional costs would have to be borne by companies, but the costs could be calculated in advance and would certainly be lower than the cost of a comprehensive loss. In addition, this business model could spawn new growth industries. The introduction of preventive measures is a matter of political will on the part of the European Union and its Member States. They must cease to be passive and become pro-active in cyber space.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Air Forces in Europe are in a deep transformation process while suffering from budget cuts

French Air Force − its challenges and commitments by General Jean-Paul Paloméros, Chief of the Air Staff, French Airforce, Paris

First, I would like to thank the editorial staff of The European Security and Defence Union for this opportunity given to the French Air Force (FAF) to share its views on our future. Our air force, fully engaged all over the world and especially over Libya today, is passing through hard economic turbulence. This presents an occasion to address some of the common issues our European air forces are currently facing and the possible ways to deal with them. I will briefly present you with the current state of FAF capabilities and the transformation we are currently implementing following our 2008 White Paper. I will then expose the perspectives we envisage, especially in terms of cooperation.

General Jean-Paul Paloméros General Jean-Paul Palomeros has been Chief of the Air Staff, French Air Force in Paris since 2009. He was born 1953 in Paris and holds certificates from the French Air Force Academy and the UK Royal Air Force Staff College. In his career, General Palomeros, a fighter pilot, has gained broad experience in planning and commanding and in missions. Among others: 1995: Air assistant to the commander of the UNPROFOR, Ex-Yougoslavia 1996: Base commander, Cazaux AFB, 1998: Chief of the “General Plans and Studies” office, FAF HQ, Paris, 2002: Chief of “Plans, Programs and Assessment”, Joint Staff, Paris.

A broad spectrum of missions While ensuring permanent air policing and search and rescue missions, French aviators have to manage crises in Libya and Afghanistan and simultaneously comply with other operational commitments in over a dozen different theatres of operation in the world. The challenge is real: with shrinking budgets, the path to prepare our forces for future challenges is very narrow. The FAF is today facing what I would call a paradox. First, we have set up rare and autonomous 3D capabilities such as: • SMRN GAEM (Strategic Medium Range Nuclear Air to Ground Enhanced Missile) • MALE UAV (Medium Altitude Unmanned Air Vehicle) • COMINT-ELINT • CSAR (Search and rescue) • GRAVES (Static Large Space Surveillance RADAR) • STORM SHADOW (the French version of a precision conventional long range strike) The FAF has been ensuring a 24/7 short delay air defence alert since 1964, even addressing slow and low-flying aircraft, with dedicated helicopters. By 2014, we will operate a fully renovated radar network, as well as enhanced autonomous satellite identification capabilities. This new command and control (C2) system will implement ACCS-ready NATO software. Eventually, C2 will be able to integrate our Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) systems, as soon as they are released into service. Part of NATO I should mention here the FAF’s integration in the NATO Command Structure. We have in fact always been part of NATO operations and exercises. For instance, our 4 Mirage 2000 aircraft undertook 162 air policing missions over Lithuania from

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January to April 2010. When this article is published, they will be there again, for another 4-month mission. Six year of success with the Rafale We have also been operating the Rafale for six years now. This combat-proven aircraft − in Afghanistan and today in Libya − appears to be the airman’s “holy grail”. It is our first truly multirole fighter: from air-to-ground gun strafing to nuclear supersonic cruise missile delivery (a unique capability in Europe) and with electro-optical imaging reconnaissance, ensuring its air-to-air protection. Operation Unified Protector over Libya In terms of current operations and crisis management, the FAF is engaging six of its airbases and 30 aircraft for operation Unified Protector over Libya. To this we should add 3500 airmen and 80 aircraft of all kinds, including 30 fighters, permanently operating outside of France. The FAF is currently engaged in 13 countries around the world, from Japan to French Guyana, from Gabon to Afghanistan. Finally, I would mention the FAF backbone: our human resources. One famous French philosopher, Jean Bodin, used to say that wealth is nothing but men. It is a fact that innovation and a willing spirit can achieve much and can compensate technical weaknesses. That is the reason why transmission of expertise and know-how are of vital importance.

Loss of strength − the FAF faces some fragilities The most significant reduction involves our public affairs


ARMED AND CIVIL CAPABILITIES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

reform, with a broad resource reduction plan engaged 3 years ago. This entails: • A cut in personnel of 25% (15000 airmen), leading to a target of 50,000 airmen by 2014 • A reduction by one third of our combat fleet to 270 aircraft • Closure of 10 out of 40 FAF bases In addition, the fragile global economic situation has a direct consequence: a slow pace of modernization of our ageing fleets. With rapidly increasing total costs of ownership, we should beware of winning easy battles today, by buying new equipment at attractive prices, only to lose them tomorrow, considering the very high support and maintenance costs. On the other hand, flying old aircraft also means taking greater risks. Finally, we have to face formation problems: we should be able to support both last-generation and 50-year-old equipment. I would of course highlight what I call the everyday “battle” for technical and logistic support. It is one we cannot afford to lose. This “battle” covers several aspects of strategic importance, such as the outsourcing debate, with a level of expertise we should retain.

The question of the “next war” French defence and security White Paper analyses lead to one conclusion: The world will remain uncertain and dangerous. Numerous emerging countries invest in aerospace power, with modern weapons and last-generation aircraft. Thus, the probability of a long and hard conflict, against well-equipped and modern air forces, does exist. We do not forget that the origins of our success in operations is to be found 15 years ago. Today, capabilities and “polyvalence” are the result of my predecessors’ decisions made in the 1990s. We have to build the air force we need not only to fight today’s conflicts, but also the ones of tomorrow and the days after. History tells us that lack of vision becomes a strategic liability.

The comprehensive approach I would add that we should continue to reinforce a truly efficient joint vision. For crisis resolution, a comprehensive approach is essential. Cooperation is the only way, as we are all facing the same threats and problems. I would add that cooperation is fostered by the economic situation, and that multilateral or bilateral cooperation has to make sense in political, operational and industrial fields. Indeed, everyone understands the need for a critical mass, yet we can’t do anything but cope with political agendas! In our field, progress implies stopping autosuggestion and getting rid of ideological taboos: step by step, pragmatic agendas and win-win strategies should rule. We also must not forget that interoperability is paramount. It appears to me that we must cooperate to: • optimize our existing capabilities, like Strategic Transport;

• share very specific ones, like CSAR; and • develop new ones, like cyber warfare or UCAV. Successful cooperation We have examples of cooperation that works, both military and industrial: the promising European Air Transport Command in Eindhoven, the AJets, which has been training European fighter jet pilots for 10 years now, the A400M support, METEOR, STORM SHADOW, etc. Our challenge is facing today’s wars and being ready to fight tomorrow’s threats. That is why we should define a leading guide and common concept on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence and UAVs toward a common research, industry and military policy. Challenges We should also be concerned about space warfare. One can regret it, but space has definitely been militarised since the very beginning, when Sputnik demonstrated Russian ballistic capabilities. I am convinced that European air forces have to develop coordinated strategies on satellite protection, to take one example. Concerning cost reductions and savings, the other main challenging threat we are all facing today, we should be careful about short term vision. Strategic programs need long-term strategies, and the bigger the investments are, the more stable their execution should be. Last but not least, real life has convinced me about the importance of local initiatives and innovation. Transformation will not work without the airmen: esprit de corps is all. Motivation relies on solidarity.

Conclusion Following the French Defence Review, French airmen are engaged in a deep transformation, working hard to hold their ground in long-term operations and fight along their traditional allies. We are trying hard to strike a balance between our commitments in current crises all over the planet, and our will to continue owning a complete range of capabilities needed in future conflicts. The beginnings of this century and the very recent weeks have undoubtly confirmed air power as an essential sovereignty tool. The professionalism, commitment and bravery of airmen have been plain for all to see. Not only is their involvement in operational theatres held in the highest esteem, but so is their support to help ease the humanitarian and natural disasters that too often occur around the world. So let us push our thoughts and minds further, not forgetting our past, but preparing next “big one”. That is the reason why the FAF is more eager than ever to cooperate and share experience with its allies. I am rather confident. History taught our continent that Europe can rely on the women and men of its air forces, not only to accomplish the mission, but also to imagine the future of air power.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

News: CBRN Security A European Network for CBRN law enforcement units

7th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management

On 9 June, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted Conclusions on the creation of a European network of specialised CBRN law enforcement units as it was set out in the EU CBRN Action Plan. The Council invites the Member States together with the Commission and Europol to set up such a network to facilitate the exchange of information and good practices, organise joint training exercises and update them on the latest developments in this area. The Council called on the Commission and Member States to explore options for financial support for the establishment and functioning of this network. Full text of the Conclusions: > http://tinyurl.com/5wx5glf

OCCAR celebrated its 10th anniversary On 1st June 2011, OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’ARmement) has celebrated the 10th anniversary of the organisation’s legal status with a conference named the “OCCAR 10 Year Event”. The event, organised together with the German MoD, as Germany holds the Board of Supervisors’ (BoS) Chairmanship for 2011, took place in the World Conference Centre in Bonn. In the presence of Mr. Schmidt, German State Secretary for Defence, Mrs. Arnould, newly appointed Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and Mr Nimptsch. One of the important strands is Through Life Management (TLM), a concept that is in full development within the organisation and which will contribute to a high extent to the continued recognition of OCCAR as a centre of excellence in collaborative defence programme management.

AFCEA Europe welcomes a new General Manager

September 28th and 29th 2011 − City Hall, Bonn Bad Godesberg 2011: Protection 2.0 – Human-Technology Interaction

www.disaster-management.eu

Organiser:

As of February 2011 AFCEA Europe, has a new head. Commodore Robert Howell, RN (ret.) was replaced by Klaus-Peter Treche, a former German Air Force Major General . AFCEA, a non-profit association with an international membership of some 35,000 drawn from many nations, is represented in some 130 Chapters around the world. It is a community of communications and information technology professionals AFCEA’s interests include both military and civil aspects of C4ISR technology and its applications to crisis management, disaster relief, environmental protection and law enforcement, as well as defence operations. TechNet International 2011: In autumn this year the AFCEA Brussels office is running a major technical exhibition and symposium, in the Heidelberg Convention Center on 20/21 October on “Supporting NATO in the Next Decade”. For the first time this event is being organized in conjunction with the NATO C3 Agency’s “Industry Conference” which will be held on 19 October > www.afceaeurope.org.

Poland will foster CSDP Karl von Wogau's European Security Foundation (ESF) held a meeting in Brussels on CSDP on 21 June 2011in view of the Polish Presidency. MOD Warsaw's States Secretary, Zbigniew Wlosowicz, underpinned, that Poland will not only avoid that CSDP looses ground but will do the utmost to foster CSDP, coming up with new ideas and proposals.

Supported by:

EU-Commission

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COMMUNICATION

Facing an Increasingly Diverse Threat Nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in the world. Air attack is and will continue to be the main threat that most countries need to defend against. However, air superiority is expensive, logistically demanding and can never guarantee protection against the wide spectrum of emerging threats. GBAD (Ground Based Air Defence) is unquestionably the most cost-effective solution. MBDA Germany’s technical expertise has enabled the company to develop an impressive product range of GBAD systems to meet the wide range of potential airborne threats and to protect sensitive military and civilian assets as well as deployed forces. The fundamentals of effective GBAD defence are best understood by considering the range of threats, both existing and currently in development. These threats are typified by: • The proliferation of low cost, highly accurate precision guided bombs and missiles • The new generation of high-performance Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) • Emerging and improving UAV (Unmanned Air Vehicle) and UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) technology • Supersonic combat aircraft featuring improved stealth technology • High value targets such as ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) aircraft and airborne C2 (Command and Control) • Low altitude helicopters and cruise missiles using the terrain to conceal their approach The diversity of threat calls for a mix of weapon systems including point defence systems to protect high value military and civilian zones such as airfields, port facilities and power plants, systems that provide area defence of military zones and civilian conurbations as well as mobile systems to provide protection for deployed forces or for large public gatherings at major international events. MBDA Germany has over 50 years of experience in the design, development or logistic support of air defence systems. A major strength lies in MBDA Germany’s ability to provide throughlife, incremental enhancements to in-service systems as operational requirements evolve. MEADS, PATRIOT, SysFla/LFK NG, STINGER, ROLAND and GEPARD are all examples of this customer focused approach. MBDA Germany is bringing its air defence expertise to the new approach for structuring the future capability of the Bundeswehr in the area of air defence (working title: LuftVerteidigungsVerbund 2020) which is to be defined by the end of 2011. Due to the superior capabilities the MEADS core system,

On an Italian ARIS Prime Mover, the completed MEADS MFCR Transceiver Group has undergone rotation testing at 15 and 30 rpm Photo: MBDA

The MEADS BMC4I Tactical Operations uses an open systems architecture that supports netted-distributed operations Photo: MBDA

the MEADS components and the existing architectures and facilities are to be used further in a future air defence system. The system combines superior battlefield protection with new flexibility to protect forces and critical assets against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems and aircraft. MEADS improves capability to defend troops and critical assets through improvements in range, interoperability, mobility and full 360-degree defense capability against the evolving threat. MEADS defends up to eight times the coverage area with far fewer system assets and significantly reduces demand for deployed personnel and equipment, which reduces demand for airlift.

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Profile for esdu

The European Security and Defence Union Issue 10  

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