VOX VICTIMÆ THESIS
How does a living being become a victim ?
VOX VICTIMAE
– how a living being becomes a victim
Emma Varga
Photography BA
Budapest Metroplitan University
Thesis advisor: Péter Pettendi Szabó
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS victim – authority – sacrificum – victima – animal
ABSTRACT
How does a living being become a victim? When did we become so detached from life that we built systems around it to decide who is worthy of living? What happens to those who are not worthy? What happens when we are not worthy? Who is it that selects, categorises, decides – and who empowered them? Sacrifice was originally a sacred act; today we make sacrifices, we become victims on the altar of power, political ideologies and scientific progress instead of gods. Which body becomes a tool, a sacrifice, and which remains protected? What happens when we no longer defend life, but the system? Who is to say what is life and what is not? “Man is the cruellest animal.”1 writes Nietzsche. But is it really the animal that is cruel or is it man who can build a system around cruelty?
MAIN LITERATURE
AGAMBEN, GIORGIO: Homo Sacer (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998., Translated by DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN)
DERRIDA, JACQUES: The Animal That Therefore I Am (Fordham University Press, New York, 2008., Translated by DAVID WILLS)
SINGER, PETER: Animal Liberation (Harper Perennial, New York, 2009.)
1 NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH: Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Modern Library, New York, 1917., p.244., Translated by THOMAS COMMON)
V.
2 HOMER: Iliad (The Iliad of Homer: Rendered Into English Prose for the Use of Those Who Cannot Read the Original, Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1898., Translated by SAMUEL BUTLER, p.3.)
3 ATWOOD, MARGARET: The Edible Woman (Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1970., p.298.)
“Man is the cruellest animal.”4
4 NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH: Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Modern Library, New York, 1917., p.244., Translated by THOMAS COMMON)
I. INTRODUCTION
The word animal comes from the Latin word anima, which means soul – or breath. This is probably because their existence is based not only on their morphological structure, but also on their soul, which enables them to have a direct relationship with the surrounding world. They are not just bodies, but living beings open to the world around them. Today we hardly ever look at them in that way. An animal – and often a human being – is a functioning body that can be freely appropriated, used, eliminated, sacrificed
“In our culture, we talk about sacrifice only in a metaphorical sense, but in that way, very often. Usually, the focus is not on the act of sacrifice, but on the object “sacrificed”, i.e. not the sacrificium, but the victima. In this sense, victims are those who suffer, who must pay the price so that others may enjoy certain benefits, and victims are those who ‘fall victim’ to crime.”5
The victima is a common occurrence in our 21st century society, even if we do not necessarily call it by that name. Today, it no longer appears primarily in sacred space, but as a consequence of mechanisms that determine what is a valuable life and what is considered disposable. Drawing on these ideas, my aim is to open a discourse on the forms of sacrifice that still exist today, to draw parallels between the roles of humans and animals in society, to reflect on hierarchy and mechanisms of power – to explore how the living become victims. It is a very complex subject, with many different aspects, approaches and perspectives to consider. In my text, due to the limitations of space, I will not fully explore all of them.
5 SPAEMANN, ROBERT: Megjegyzések az áldozat fogalmáról (Áldozat, Eucharisztia, 2018. 01. 12., 12.p., Translated by GÖRFÖL TIBOR), https://vigilia.hu/archivum/index.php?route=product/product&manufacturer_id=8683&product_id=25603
II. “(…) AND THE SMOKE WITH THE SAVOR OF THEIR SACRIFICE
ROSE CURLING UP TOWARDS HEAVEN.” 6
“Others have figures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill with living men, which being set on fire, the men perish enveloped in the flames. They consider that the oblation of such as have been taken in theft, or in robbery, or any other offense, is more acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting, they have recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.”7
II. 1. THE ORIGIN AND SYMBOLIC SPACE OF SACRIFICE
Sacrifice is an ancient rite, dating back to prehistoric times. Animal sacrifice has been performed as early as the Mesopotamian era, but it is present in almost all cultures, from Native American tribes, through African communities, to European nations. From the great religious systems – even in the Bible or the Koran – to small, isolated tribal communities, it is present everywhere.
It is essentially a symbolic act, and its purpose can be to communicate with higher powers, gods, to pray to them, to offer atonement or even to give gratitude. It can range from blood sacrifice (in the form of animals or humans) to the offering of food or drink, or even self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is less often associated with the concept of sacrifice, but it is important to highlight it as it is included within this category. Examples can be the self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ in the Christian religion, the mummification of sacred animals in ancient Egypt, the ritual sacrifice of animals, the Greek hecatombe (sacrifice of a hundred cattle) to celebrate the gods, and the Roman ritual of suovetaurilia (sacrifice of pigs, sheep and calves). The Aztecs often sacrificed their captives, their defeated enemies, who were usually dismembered, burned or even cooked. One of the biggest celebrations in the Islamic religion is a sacrificial feast called Eid-al-Adha (or íd al-Adha), which is entirely based around the rite of sacrifice. The spirit of the holiday is built around the veneration of animals and meat, according to them Allah has given man the power and ‘permission’ to slaughter animals and then consume their meat, so before slaughtering them they say a prayer to Allah for them to remember that each life is sacred.8
If the process of sacrifice is indeed as brutal as the above quotation suggests, how could it have become a solemn, sacred act? It can become a religious, elevated act because the community sees it not as destroying, but as an opportunity to restore order.
6 HOMER: Iliad (The Iliad of Homer: Rendered Into English Prose for the Use of Those Who Cannot Read the Original, Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1898., Translated by SAMUEL BUTLER, p.3.)
7 CAESAR, IULIUS: De Bello Gallico (6.16, Translated by W. A. MCDEVITTE)
8 Eid al-Adha, https://www.lidotours.hu/news/eid-al-adha/13
II. 2. FROM SACRED TO PROFANE – NEW FORMS OF SACRIFICE IN THE PRESENT
Flesh is a body that once lived, breathed and moved. All living things are formed from the same substance – there is no difference between humans and animals through flesh. The distinction is made by our gaze through the creative power of language – which body do we consider consumable, which we revere, which we elevate to a sacred status. This is still the case today.
In the 21st century, sacrifice is still present, but no longer only in sacred space, with ideological systems and economic/political institutions replacing deities as the higher powers – and thus the subject of sacrifice has changed. Animals’ bodies are still sacrificed today, whether in slaughterhouses or in laboratories for scientific experiments. In the name of science living beings are reduced to mere tools. Marginalised groups, whether human or animal, can easily become victims of power, politics and propaganda. All these practices follow the logic of archaic rites: in the name of “order and development”, those assigned to it must bear the fate destined for them on behalf of the whole community.
In the thoughts of René Girard9 , scapegoating is an important step in this process. When tensions in a particular community of a society become unbearable, they begin to project them onto a particular individual (or group). Thus, through projection, a scapegoat is born who must take responsibility for the consequences of the actions on behalf of the whole community. Its exclusion, removal or sacrifice allows the community to be liberated and purified. However, this mechanism is not always conscious (although unfortunately we can see more and more examples of this happening even now), often the community actually believes that the scapegoat is indeed guilty, so that its victimization is justified and fully deserved. In this way, the mechanism is part of the apparatus that maintains the illusion of normality – a seemingly spontaneous but in fact well-planned process. The scapegoat becomes a victim not because of its own actions or inner qualities, but because it is assigned to this position. A position that can be taken, pointed to – and by which the community redefines itself. It has a function: it is the instrument of establishing order. The term scapegoat first appeared in the third book of Moses, in which the Hebrew word for scapegoat is azazel, just as the fallen angel.10
The Socratic principle “which of the two seems to (…) be the worse – doing wrong or suffering it?”11 was later pondered by many philosophers. Opinions are divided, some agree with it, some criticise it (Ferenc Sánta’s The Fifth Seal deals with different aspects of this dilemma), but one thing is certain, it cannot be ignored, especially when considering the role of the victim. In doing so, he assigns a position to the victim in which the ethical integrity of the doer is more important than the subsequent consequences. In modern societies, the figure of the victim can be presented not only as a passive sufferer, but also as a normative
9 GIRARD, RENÉ: The Scapegoat (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1989., Translated by YVONNE FRECCERO)
10 Azazel (Definition & Facts, Britannica, 2025. 03. 28.), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Azazel
11 PLATO: Gorgias (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3., Translated by W.R.M. LAMB. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967., [474c.])
reference point. This highlights the structural workings of injustice. In this sense, victimisation is not merely suffering but also has a certain ethical implication. Since the purpose of the sacrifice is to restore order, we “owe gratitude” to the sacrifier as well as to the victim. Thus, there are situations nowadays where it is “worth” identifying oneself as a victim, and many people try to take advantage of this, to connect with this group of people. The danger is when we do not think in terms of self-sacrifice, when we do not want to become a victim in the sense of taking all the consequences, but only want to be associated with the group that has already been victimised, to identify with the name without having ‘earned’ it, when we only want to enjoy the benefits of being chosen, of possessing moral truth. It is dangerous to abuse this role or to appropriate it as an identity: victimhood is a trauma, not a rank.
III. THE INTERTWINING OF EXISTENCE AND POWER
“How to look at biopolitics from the perspective of culture – not power?”12
–If that is possible at all. The Foucaultian concept of biopolitics emerged in the second half of the 1900s. He thinks about strategies of power, about the ways in which power is used to control people’s lives and bodies. In short, control of life and death.13 The term derives from the Greek word πολιτικός (politikos), which means ‘relating to the ruling of a country/people’14. It is linked to the prefix βίος (bios)15, which is one of their words for life:
“The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word “life.” They used two terms that, although traceable to a common etymological root, are semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group.”16
Life itself, existence, is dealt with by ontology, the only philosophical discipline that is not primarily concerned with the existent, but instead with the fundamental questions of existence. The term derives from the Greek word ὄντως (ontos), meaning ‘being, existence’, and the suffix λογία (logia), meaning ‘study of’.17 In short, the study of existence.18 Martin Heidegger deals a lot with this question, for example, as he explains in Being and Time,
12 CSÁSZI LAJOS: Biopolitika és kultúra (Új Mandátum, Budapest, 2007., p.19.)
13 PORTEVIN, CATHERINE: Vivons-nous à l’ère de la biopolitique?, (Philosophie magazine, 2020. 10. 28.), https://www.philomag.com/articles/vivons-nous-lere-de-la-biopolitique
14 Politic (Etymonline), https://www.etymonline.com/word/politic
15 Βιος (Abarim Publications, Theological Dictionary, New Testament Greek), https://www.abarim-publications.com/DictionaryG/b/b-i-o-sfin.html
16 AGAMBEN, GIORGIO: Homo Sacer (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998., p.9., Translated by DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN)
17 Ontology (Etymonline), https://www.etymonline.com/word/ontology
18 Ontology: Theory and History, https://www.ontology.co/
in Western philosophy the question of being is often relegated to the background, and the existent is examined instead.19
Yet existence is not the same as existents, but their foundation, their precondition of possibility. Being is beyond each existent, and thus beyond power itself – which thus has no ‘power’ over being – the opposite is true, being ‘possesses’ existents. The potency of power lies in its ability to determine what counts as life or what counts as reality. As Michel Foucault recognised, an important step in the exercise of power is the categorisation, definition and the labelling of certain groups. Until this distinction is established, power does not have the possibility to control. Distinction, labelling, is therefore not an intellectual exercise, but the essential basis of power. It is made possible by language and its creating power, the tool for creating reality, which ultimately determines what and who can be considered as existing and thus shapes social reality.
But what is power? Is it possible to give an exact definition? Byung-Chul Han, for example, has devoted an entire book to this question, which he begins:
“There is still theoretical chaos about the concept of power.”20 “Power will therefore be regarded as being based on the fact that we do not know exactly what it is.”21
Power is not only what is imposed on the individual from the outside, but also what structures it from the inside. It speaks not through the language of constraint, but through the promise of possibility. The radicality of the way power works lies precisely in the fact that it is not (always) perceived as an attack – it becomes internal, it is tamed, and thus it becomes natural. It not only commands, but suggests, not only compels, but also inspires insight. It speaks the language of freedom, while gradually narrowing our room for manoeuvre. It becomes total precisely because we no longer know where it begins. “Free power is not an oxymoron.”22 This is perhaps its most dangerous mode of operation: when power is no longer what we fear, but what we trust.
19 HEIDEGGER, MARTIN: Lét és idő (Osiris, Budapest, 2007., Translated by ANGYALOSI G., BACSÓ B., KARDOS A., OROSZ I., VAJDA M.)
20 BYUNG-CHUL HAN: Mi a hatalom? (Typotex, Budapest, 2023., p.7., Translated by CSORDÁS GÁBOR)
21 BYUNG-CHUL HAN: Mi a hatalom? (Typotex, Budapest, 2023., p.8., Translated by CSORDÁS GÁBOR)
22 BYUNG-CHUL HAN: Mi a hatalom? (Typotex, Budapest, 2023., p.15., Translated by CSORDÁS GÁBOR)
IV. CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE
“On one hand, posthumanism merely refers to the ontological state in which many people currently live, that is, with chemically, surgically or technologically modified, transformed bodies or in close, networked relationship with machines and other organic forms. On the other hand, “posthumanism” attempts a new conceptualization of the human, mainly as its critical embodiment. Posthumanism studies cultural representations, power relations and discourses that have historically placed humans above other life forms, in a certain central, directive role.”23
IV. 1. ANTHROPOCENTRISM
Our society’s way of thinking is strongly determined by anthropocentrism, human beings place themselves at the centre of existence, they relate everything to themselves, they view the world around them, their environment, other living beings and position them according to this. Consequently, we tend to anthropomorphize everything.24
Anthropomorphism is when we assign human qualities, characteristics, properties to a given thing, object or animal.25 Similarly, zoomorphism is a common phenomenon.26 Both are common tools in art, from fairy tales to mythology and contemporary trends, as they are good tools for satirical and critical representation of human society and power structures.
Among contemporary philosophers, the posthumanist approach is gaining ground, which reassesses our place in the world, criticises the anthropocentric worldview, and reevaluates the relationship between human and non-human forms of existence. It raises the fundamental misunderstanding of the existence of other living beings, which cannot be confined within our framework and interpreted through our human parameters. One specific branch is animal studies, which deals with animals as a blind spot in classical philosophy. It deconstructs the boundaries we have drawn, questions the supposed dichotomy between humans and animals, and criticises the exclusivist thinking of humans.
Posthumanism in general does not envisage a utopian, futuristic human or even a future without man, it does not talk about the ‘improvement’ of man (as transhumanism does), it does not talk about clones or robots (there is the branch of speculative posthumanism which does indeed open up a debate on this), it merely seeks to find man’s place in the modern world which has changed considerably as a result of scientific and biotechnological progress.27
23 NEMES Z. MÁRIÓ: Ember, embertelen és ember utáni: a poszthumanizmus változatai (Helikon, sz. 64. évf. 4. sz. (2018.), p.376.)
24 Anthropocentrism – an overview (Science Direct Topics), https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/anthropocentrism
25 Anthropomorphism, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/anthropomorphism
26 Definition of Zoomorphism, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/zoomorphism
27 FERRANDO, FRANCESCA: Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism and New Materialisms and Relations, (Existenz 8, 2. sz. [2013]: p.26–32., Translated by LOVÁSZ ÁDÁM)
Many believe we are already living in it, that posthumanism is thinking about our current epoch.
“(...) in many ways, there is a ‘posthuman condition’ that has already happened, that we are living in, and that we have entered after the traumas of the world war, the mass graves and the gas chambers destabilized classical humanism.”28
The most fundamental message of posthumanism is that we cannot confine other living beings, animals, within our own framework, we cannot judge them in proportion to ourselves. We cannot hold on to our anthropocentric view, which conceives of man as merely existing at a higher stage of evolution instead of the top. It is questionable in which direction posthumanism will lead us, it is not easy to decide whether it is just another philosophical dead end or whether society could really benefit from taking its ideas on board. As Veronika Darida writes, the question is: “Can human thought ever take a truly posthuman, animalistic perspective? And if so, would this not be the end of us?”29
IV. 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE DICHOTOMY
“The animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the authority to give to the living other.”30
But what is an animal? There are many different definitions, and because of biodiversity, it is not possible to treat them all as a single category. For example, in the 1828 edition of Webster’s Dictionary, animal was described as “An organized body, endowed with life and the power of voluntary motion; a living, sensitive, locomotive body; as, man is an intelligent animal.”31 If man is indeed regarded as an intelligent animal, the question may legitimately be asked: where is the line drawn between man and animal? This is not easy to judge, as the dividing line is not clear-cut and is shaped by ever-changing cultural and social narratives –so exploring parallels can be as valid as looking for differences. “I'm sure our genomes are more alike than they should be.”32 – says Donna Haraway about dogs in one of her essays.
The Western world is characterised by an anthropocentric view, with members of our society tending to see themselves as a more evolved entity, superior to nature and other living beings. This is mostly justified by humans’ superior intelligence, ability to use language or self-awareness – but contemporary philosophical discourse is progressively deconstructing this sharp distinction, which goes beyond an examination of anatomical and cognitive aspects, and is deeply embedded in cultural, ethical and philosophical discourses.
28 LOCKER DÁVID: Poszthumanista gyorstalpaló – és a problémáim vele (Kultagora, 2019. 09. 21.), https://kultagora.blog.hu/2019/09/21/poszthumanista_gyorstalpalo_es_ami_a_problemaim_vele
29 DARIDA VERONIKA: Az állat tekintete (Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 60 (3), 2016., p.105.)
30 DERRIDA, JACQUES: The Animal That Therefore I Am (Fordham University Press, New York, 2008., Translated by DAVID WILLS, p.23.)
31 WEBSTER, NOAH: Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, ’Animal’, https://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/animal
32 HARAWAY, DONNA: When Species Meet (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2008., p.16.)
All these arguments have been refuted many times, these abilities are not exclusive to humans, they are also present (in some form) in other species. What really distinguishes us, however, is the desire for art, the ability and skill to consciously create images, and these can indeed be the basis for differentiation. To quote the thoughts of Vilmos Csányi:
“Man, for example, is the only species capable of creating culture and society, even though our genes differ by only about one percent from chimpanzees.”33
The real difference between humans and animals, then, is that while other species just exist in the world, we can give meaning to it. This gives us the ability to create, but also power –control over the world – making us both creator and destroyer, artist and executioner –this is what makes us truly different from all other living things.
“Why then have you created me, if not to destroy?
–I did not create you, I only did it in my anger!
–But it has happened! I am the lightning; I am the power of the world!”34
This dialogue is said at one point in the animated film Four Souls of Kojot, directed by Áron Gauder. The story nicely illustrates the ambivalence outlined above, the force that creates the world – which initially gives life, shapes the world, creates living beings and habitats for them, creates order – becomes destructive when it loses control, creating chaos. This scene is not just a mythical tale of the origins of destruction and ruin, but a reflection of the way our society works, where the act of creation is a blind and impulse-driven gesture of power. The created being here is not order but the embodiment of out-of-control anger. The creator is no longer the guardian of the world, but an entity confronted with the consequences of its own power.35
The film is about a Native American story of creation and the relationship of indigenous people with nature and animals. Their world view and way of life could be an inspiration for Western societies. They do not see themselves in the same way as our society does, they did not dispose of other creatures for their own ends, they did not consider themselves superior but instead sought to be as close to nature as possible, to do as little harm to their environment as possible. They believed that all creatures were children of Mother Earth, so if they were to kill an animal, they apologised for it, but they did not do so unnecessarily, they took only what was necessary to survive. The Western mindset is very different.
“The fact that our geological era is known as the ‘anthropocene’ stresses both the technologically mediated power acquired by anthropos and its potentially lethal consequences for everyone else.”36
33 CSÁNYI VILMOS: Az emberi természet biológiai gyökerei (Nemzeti Audiovizuális Archívum, https://nava.hu/id/me-56/nava.hu/id/me-56/)
34 Four Souls of Coyote (2023., director: GAUDER ÁRON, BAUMGARTNER ZSOLT, appr 48-49. min., https://www.imdb.com/it/title/tt11736638/?ref_=mv_close)
35 Four Souls of Coyote (2023., director: GAUDER ÁRON, BAUMGARTNER ZSOLT, appr. 46:50-50:15. min., https://www.imdb.com/it/title/tt11736638/?ref_=mv_close)
36 BRAIDOTTI, ROSI: The Posthuman (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013., p.66.)
The term anthropocene is a proposal for a new designation for our present era, the era of Earth’s history dominated and controlled by humans. The term was first suggested in the 1920s by Alexei Petrovich Pavlov, then mentioned in the 1980s by Eugene F. Stoermer.37
It was only at the turn of the millennium that it became more widespread, when Paul J.Crutzen wrote about it under the title The Anthropocene. They defined the meaning of the term as an era in which the global environment is being shaped by humanity, rather than the other way around. 38
“The Anthropocene is a geochronological event that is reshaping our fundamental views and representations of the world. The Anthropocene as a geological boundary and event is a series of disappearances and cataclysms resulting from the damaging action of forces unleashed by humans, which poses a crossroads for the natural and social sciences and challenges philosophy and aesthetics.”39
IV. 3. “RETURN TO NATURE” – THE CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOCENTRISM
“The standing of animals, even those closest to us, still presents vexed moral, legal, and political issues, and the range of possible positions is not very different from the range that was available to Victorians. (...) The study of animals (...) remains marginal in most disciplines, and (...) it is often on the borderline between disciplines.”40
The animal turn is a paradigm shift in contemporary discourse, radically reinterpreting the relationship between humans and animals, criticizing the anthropocentric vision and the exceptionalism of humans. It expresses the idea that man is not inherently a privileged being, superior to nature, but equal to other entities, that its existence is dependent on nature, inseparable from other living beings.
“Human and animal lives have always been entangled and that animals are omnipresent in human society on both metaphorical and practical, material levels. Animals play a crucial role in cultural metaphors, myths, and identity-making, in which they function as objects of both fear and desire. (...). They are even inside our bodies in the form of friendly and unfriendly micro-organisms or, for many, as processed and consumed meat.”41
37 HORVÁTH MÁRK: Az antropocén (Prae Kiadó, Budakeszi, 2021., p.66.)
38 CRUTZEN, P. J., STOERMER, E. F.: The Anthropocene (Global Change Newsletter 41., 2000.)
39 HORVÁTH MÁRK: Az antropocén (Prae Kiadó, Budakeszi, 2021., p.66.)
40 RITVO, HARRIET: On the Animal Turn (Daedalus 136, sz. 4. (2007.), pp.121-122.)
41 ANDERSSON, BJÖRCK, JENNBERT, LÖNNGREN: Exploring the Animal Turn (Pufendorfinstitutet, Lund, 2014., p.5.)
Both in cultural representation and philosophy, this paradigm shift has brought about significant changes, placing both animality and the dynamics of human-non-human relations on new foundations. “Thus, as the animal turn breaks new ground, it also revisits perpetually unanswered questions.”42
A cardinal question, therefore, is how humans define themselves, and we must return to it from time to time, since man is not a stable concept, but is constantly changing because of various social and cultural dynamics. In the 21st century, this is once again relevant, with technological developments bringing about changes that make this reflection necessary. Other living beings, such as animals, can serve as a good reference point. As the concrete jungle increasingly engulfs us, as generations grow up glued to screens, the need to be closer to nature, the utopian desire to ‘return’ to nature, is becoming more and more frequent. But, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggests, and later Vilém Flusser agrees, it is a one-way process, a dead end, there is no return to nature – at least not in the way we might think. Because of technological and cultural progress, for modern, civilised, socialised man, ‘nature’ no longer exists as it once did – only experiences of nature through various man-made constructs, models and apparatuses. If we were to try – or rather to be forced – to return, we would quickly find that modern man has become completely incapable of living in this sense today.
What we can do, however, is to reassess the hierarchy of society, our relationship with the living things around us – all living beings. Rethinking our relationship with animals is not just an ethical question, it is a political one. Perhaps the majority of humans are not rulers of the world, the apex of evolution, but are becoming a marginalised group like all other living beings. The exploitation of animals reflects man’s hierarchical and exclusive thinking. We must ask ourselves: how do we treat marginalised groups, be they minorities, the oppressed or social outcasts? Power makes not only the animal kingdom but also most people vulnerable victims.
42 RITVO, HARRIET: On the Animal Turn (Daedalus 136, sz. 4., (2007 ): p.121.)
V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANIMAL BODIES INTO TOOLS AND COMMODITIES
“The slaughterhouse is a mirror of the human condition that we allow to be in practice in our daily lives. (…) How can we deal with human structures and hierarchies without looking at those which are considered to be the lowest, or even product?”43
V. 1. LEBENSUNWERTES LEBEN – I.E. A LIFE UNWORTHY OF LIFE
In his book Homo Sacer, 44 Giorgio Agamben devotes a separate chapter to the concept of lebensunwertes Leben, i.e. a life unworthy of life. He applies the concept to those lives that become worthless to society, so that the authorities can decide to neglect, destroy or use them. The concept was originally used to describe the dehumanisation that took place in Nazi Germany. They categorised people, and groups who were labelled as inferior (such as Jews, gypsies, homosexuals or people with disabilities) were systematically excluded from society and deprived of their basic rights and human dignity. They were stigmatised as ‘burdensome’ and ‘useless’ lives of the nation. Importantly, Agamben argues that this practice is not only a phenomenon of the past but is just as present today – only in a different form: the state creates the figure of Homo Sacer: one who is allowed to be killed freely but not sacrificed. Outside the scope of legal protection and the religious community, excluded from the legal order, but still under political control, this state of being outside the law is the paradox of modern governance: sovereign power both gives and takes away the right to exist. The notion of lebensunwertes Leben is therefore not only a concept of the past, but also present all around us, especially where the fate of lives excluded from the law (refugees, prisoners, outcasts) becomes an object of political indifference.
Timothy Snyder, who deals with the Holocaust in several of his works, has a similar train of thought. In his book Black Earth, however, he not only interprets it as a past event that has come to an end but also points out that it could easily occur again in the – perhaps not so distant – future, and analyses how it might happen.
“The history of the Holocaust is not over. Its precedent is eternal, and its lessons have not yet been learned.”45 “There is little reason to believe that we are morally any different from the inhabitants of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, or that we will be any less receptive to the kinds of ideas that Hitler so successfully promoted and put into practice.”46
Thus, it is reasonable to think about these patterns.
43 Why the Slaughterhouse Became a Powerful and Enduring Motif in Art (Artnet News, 2024. 02. 20.), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/slaughterhouse-art-2436867
44 AGAMBEN, GIORGIO: Homo Sacer (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998., Translated by DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN)
45 SNYDER, TIMOTHY: Black Earth (Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2015., p.15.)
46 SNYDER, TIMOTHY: Fekete Föld (XXI. Század Kiadó, Budapest, 2016., p.355., Translated by SOPRONI ANDRÁS)
A parallel can be drawn between marginalised people and laboratory animals, since they exist as objects of consumption or commodities for society, whose lives are not considered valuable but are used solely for biotechnological development, medical science or economic interests. How can we consider animal life as worthless while trying to protect our own at all costs? They are not protected by legal status, they are reduced to mere objects, so that their neglect or the taking of their lives is in some cases not only a legitimate but an expected sacrifice on the altar of science. These mechanisms reinforce the subordinate status of animals. But they also provide opportunities not only for the exploitation of animals, but also for the exploitation of marginalised groups.
It is also important to point out that animals are not a homogeneous group, there are also advantaged and marginalised species and groups. As the well-known Orwellian phrase goes; “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”47 It is not possible to put a completely obvious equivalence mark between any two species – they can be divided into different sub-categories, separated into farm animals, domestic animals, companion animals, wild animals or laboratory animals. For example, companion and domestic animals have significantly higher protection and life value in the eyes of society. It may be worthwhile to examine the reasons for this distinction. Their protection is based on an emotional, aesthetic basis, reflecting the hierarchy of the human world, not formed in a spirit of ‘equality’ but as a means of maintaining human dominance, for the sake of pleasure – not according to natural but culturally constructed criteria. In contrast, the status of farm and laboratory animals is based on serving material and scientific ends. Some wild animals are considered exotic, with only a narrow group of them having protection linked to their rarity and endangerment, but for this very reason they are easily targeted by trophy hunters, often despite their protection. Livestock are categorised as means of production, so their lives are only important as long as they are economically useful, for example, as long as a cow gives milk or a hen lay eggs. Those who do not meet these criteria are easily expendable – simply because the social order does not provide them with another role.
Michel Foucault quotes an essay by Jorge Luis Borges in the foreword to The Order of Things. Here we are introduced to a rather surreal categorisation of animals in a chinese encyclopaedia – although it is worth bearing in mind that Borges is not averse to the use of fictional references:
“(…) animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i)frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.”48
– in any case, even if it is fictional, it gives us some ideas about why and how humans try to categorize certain things, in most cases not by nature but by cultural constructs. Often, as in Borges’ example, this separation is surreal and artificial, serving only to maintain hierarchy and dominance. It is usually the word of power that decides what or who becomes protected or expendable.
47 ORWELL, GEORGE: Animal Farm (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1946., p.112.)
48 FOUCAULT, MICHEL: The Order of Things (Random House Inc., New York, 1970., p.15.)
V. 2. SACFRIFICE ON
THE ALTAR OF SCIENCE
How does a living creature become a laboratory subject, a sacrifice on the altar of science? The role of animal experimentation and laboratory animals in scientific research raises serious moral and philosophical questions. The use of animal samples, especially in the field of medicine, is seen by many as essential for scientific progress, but the rights of animals cannot be ignored. How can their rights be managed while experiments can be useful for advancing medicine and scientific development? The question may also be asked: although animal experimentation for medical purposes is justified from a scientific point of view, is it equally indispensable and morally right to exploit them in the beauty industry? In these cases, the aim is merely to satisfy consumer needs, and the results are not for health but for beauty, which is even less justification for the suffering of animals, since they are used purely for comfort. Peter Singer, in his chapter on Animal Liberation49 titled Tools for Research, devotes special attention to this issue. He thematises other problems that often escape the attention of others. One of his concerns is that methods tried and tested in animals are not always convertible to biological processes in humans and do not always lead to successful results. At times, science works like a sophisticated slaughterhouse: sterile, orderly and precise – but once the threshold is crossed, the distinction between meat and meat disappears.
Therefore, it is not just animal experiments that we need to think about – the human body has also been the scene of cruelty in the name of science. Nazi doctors such as Josef Mengele or Sigmund Rascher carried out ‘scientific research’, such as sterilisation and genetic experiments, in the name of racial protection. These are documented in detail, often accompanied by critical insights from eyewitnesses, for example the book Doctors from Hell50 details the horrors that took place there, showing that the medical oath and human dignity count for nothing when scientific advancement or ideological purpose overrides ethics. The Nuremberg Code (1947) and the later the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) were designed to set out a clear set of rules for human experimentation: voluntary consent, respect for human dignity, proportionality and the minimisation of suffering are essential. Then, in 1966, Henry Knowles Beecher, an American physician, published a study51 detailing ethically questionable medical research – including some that continued after the Conventions. For example, the Tuskegee syphilis trial is a good example, where no treatment was deliberately given to African-American men to study the natural course of the disease. They also show that human rights protection is not automatic for everyone, and if not properly controlled, useless, disposable lives can easily become a testing ground.
“We have learned that everything is ephemeral, and everything has only relative value! There is only one exception to this: freedom.”52 – But what does freedom mean in a world where some creatures are born with a predetermined destiny? Does freedom even exist, or are we just clinging to the illusion of it? In the context of human experimentation, the above-mentioned conventions drew ethical boundaries, but these remained permeable – they were drawn by species. Animals do not speak, do not rebel, do not question – they are ideal subjects. Human freedom, if there is any, is a privilege in a world that has ‘learned’ from the
49 SINGER, PETER: Animal Liberation (Harper Perennial, New York, 2009.)
50 SPITZ, VIVIEN: Doctors from Hell: The horrific account of Nazi experiments on humans (Sentient Publications, Boulder, Colorado, 2005.)
51 BEECHER, HENRY K.: Ethics and Clinical Research (Springer, Boston, 1966., in Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Biomedical Ethics and the Law), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6561-1_14
52 DR. NYISZLI MIKLÓS: Dr. Mengele boncolóorvosa voltam az auschwitzi krematóriumban (Magvető, Budapest, 2010., p.153.)
Holocaust, but has not applied the lessons, only given a new name to the victim. The body remained, the race and label changed. The most painful thing about animals is not that they are victims, but that since the presence of man they have not been able to live in any other status than the one imposed on them by the system – they do not experience the loss of freedom, because it was never theirs to experience. This is also true for certain groups in society.
The issue is also thematised in literature. Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Heart of a Dog is a great example, with many related philosophical and ethical questions. A dog is transplanted by doctors into an anthropomorphic being. They try to extend this to both its external appearance and its internal characteristics, because they want to make it fully human. The dog-man will eventually be recognisable as human, but will inherit primitive, base instincts and patterns from his animal nature, such as hating cats. He cannot conform to the anthropocentric society in all areas and become culturally assimilated into an intellectual being. In his words, “There is absolutely no call to learn to read when one can smell meat a mile off.”53 As the story progresses, his criminal tendencies become more and more frequent, his bourgeois actions offend people, he is unable to evolve morally at all. There are still animal traits lurking in the depths of the “human” soul, and the work foreshadows that moral and intellectual development is essential, without which man will descend back into chaos. It suggests that man is not a stable construct, but rather a constantly changing form of existence. It raises questions about what happens when we try to anthropomorphise animal nature, what makes someone truly human?
Human existence is not merely based on our biological characteristics or morphological structure but is also determined by cultural and intellectual qualities. Can we cross the boundaries between human and animal? It is absolutely impossible. And in the absence of moral and intellectual foundations and development, it can be downright harmful. The transfer of human qualities and characteristics does not guarantee becoming human. Becoming human in the book is an ontological, identity-forming phenomenon. In the end, the boundaries are completely blurred. “You have to realise that the whole horror of the thing is that he already has not the heart of a dog but the heart of a man.”54 Here he is not only thinking about human existence on a moral and morphological plane, but also on an ontological one. If the body can be biologically manipulated through scientific experimentation, what makes the individual truly human? In addition to blurring the philosophical boundaries between animal and human, also reflects here on the ethicality of science and the dignity of the individual. The treatment of animal bodies and living beings as mere tools raises both scientific and moral and philosophical dilemmas. The suffering of animals must be seriously considered not only from a medical but also from a moral point of view.
Bulgakov’s piece is a philosophical reflection on the branch of medicine, an operation which, at the time of writing, was not yet capable of successfully carrying out similar operations. Although the mixing of different species and the blurring of the boundaries between man and beast are often depicted in art and mythology (think of the Egyptian gods, the sphinxes,
53 BULGAKOV, MIHAIL: The Heart of a Dog (Raduga Publishers, Moscow, 1990., p.6., Translated by AVRIL PYMAN)
54 BULGAKOV, MIHAIL: The Heart of a Dog (Raduga Publishers, Moscow, 1990., p.60., Translated by AVRIL PYMAN)
the Mesopotamian Lamassu, the Hindu Ganesha, or the stories of Daedalus and Icarus), this branch of medicine is still in its beginnings. Although blood xenotransfusion (interspecies blood transfusion) was experimented with as early as the second half of the 1600s (with only limited success), and skin xenotransplantation (interspecies transplantation of tissues/organs)55 was tried by many in the 1800s, early attempts at organ transplantation only began in the early 20th century. The first documented attempt was in 1906, with a pig’s kidney, which allowed the patient to survive for only three days, and the first heart transplant in 196456 . Their failure was hampered by the immune system’s capacity to absorb the organs, which eventually rejected them. To overcome this, genetic modification, the ‘creation’ or ‘transformation’ of animals more suitable for xenotransplantation, which eliminates the risk of zoonosis (infections from animals to humans), was considered as a solution. It is no longer only technical issues that need to be considered here, but also ethical and biopolitical issues. Who has the right to rewrite the laws of nature, and to what extent or on what grounds? When does the identity of a living being ceased to exist, when do we speak of natural and when of artificial identity? If we are kept alive by the tissues of other species, where does human existence begin and end? Medical science is also ambivalent on the subject, on the one hand, there is a need to somehow make up for the lack of human organs, on the other hand, these experiments have not yet been a complete success, they are a kind of last resort, performed on patients to give them a last chance, since they usually only survive for a few days with the help of the new organ. We certainly need to rethink our relationship with animals from this point of view, since xenotransplants rewrite the boundaries between species, both morphologically and philosophically.
V. 3. “(…) THAT’S WHAT YOU GET FOR BEING FOOD.” 57
An analogy is also drawn between the social role of the animal and the female body, as both have become the prime targets of domination, power and consumerism throughout history. This parallel is not only metaphorical but also highlights social mechanisms: the female body is often treated in the same way as the animal body, and its subordination and objectification are closely linked to the power structures exercised over it.
“The term ‘biopolitics’ is a catch-all term, (...) it contains the emancipatory aspiration of feminist movements to treat the female body not as part of the biological reproductive cycle (...) but as a socially constructed and historically changing concept.”58
Margaret Atwood, for example, demonstrates this through her novel The Edible Woman, which raises many related philosophical questions about the construction and role of the female body and identity. In her work, symbolic cannibalism is a central motif, presented as an analogy for the control and exploitation of the female body by society and its “consumption”: “(…) that’s what you get for being food.”59 In the book, the protagonist,
55 Xenotransplantation – an overview (Science Direct Topics), https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/xenotransplantation
56 HUDDLESTON, JOHN & SIEMS: A Brief History of Xenotransplantation (The Annals of Thoracic Surgery 113, sz. 3. (2022. 03. 01.), 706–10., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.athoracsur.2022.01.005)
57 ATWOOD, MARGARET: The Edible Woman (Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1970., p.298.)
58 CSÁSZI LAJOS: Biopolitika és kultúra (Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2007., p.9.)
59 ATWOOD, MARGARET: The Edible Woman (Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1970., p.298.)
Marian, gradually abandons the consumption of animal products, as she begins to identify the animal body, meat, with her own body, with the female body in general. As a consequence, for her, eating is no longer a purely biological necessity. For her, not-eating becomes a social act. The process is not only the result of an individual mental dysfunction. It can be interpreted as a reflection on social phenomena; both the way in which the patriarchal society’s desire for possession metaphorically devours and oppresses women and on the way in which the power structures of capitalist society reduce the body and identity to mere commodities or tools. It thus highlights not only individual but also collective social mechanisms that categorize human beings not as biological entities but as products endowed with cultural and economic meanings over which various power systems exercise biopolitical power that they control.
The parallel between the objectification and commodification of the female and the animal body reveals that mechanisms of social subordination and exploitation are deep-rooted, mutually reinforcing structures based on the exercise of power over life.
VI. THOUGHTS
The purpose of my thesis is not to offer solutions, nor to set out rules that, if followed, could clear our consciences or exonerate us. After all, not every question has an exact answer or a universal truth that everyone can apply. Instead, my aim is to present philosophical dilemmas, to initiate a discourse, because although there are not always definite or universally true answers, it is inevitable that we will be confronted with these questions. We need to understand the mechanisms that target certain groups today, because if we do not recognize them in time or if we do not care about them, we can easily become their next targets ourselves.
How does the living become a victim? When have we distanced ourselves from life by building systems around it that decide who is worthy of it? What happens to those who are not worthy? What happens once we are not worthy? Who is it that appoints, classifies or determines – and who empowered them to do so? Sacrifice was originally a sacred rite, but today we sacrifice or become sacrifices on the altar of power, political ideologies and scientific progress. Which body becomes a tool, which a victim and which can remain protected? What happens when we no longer defend life, but the system? Who is to say what is life and what is not? “Man is the cruellest animal.”60 – writes Nietzsche. But is it really the animal that is cruel or is it man who can build a system around cruelty? How long do the concepts we operate with – human, animal, body, flesh – protect us and when do they begin to destroy us? Where does the gaze that does not see but only categorises begin? Is flesh really just a substance? I will not give an answer – perhaps there is none, instead I will quote the lines of István Örkény:
“Attention! For us mammals, it is not a minor question whether we mince the meat or whether we are minced.”61
60 NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH: Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Modern Library, New York, 1917., p.244., Translated by THOMAS COMMON)
61 ÖRKÉNY ISTVÁN: Egyperces novellák, Fasírt (Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2018., p.546.)
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Ontology (Etymonline, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ontology)
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Xenotransplantation – an overview (https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/xenotransplantation)
Zoomorphism (https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/zoomorphism)