ThickEvaluation
SimonKirchin
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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Formyparents
Acknowledgements
Thisbookhasbeenalongtimeinthemaking,almostcertainlytoolong.However, oneniceaspectofhavingspentagoodwhilethinkingthroughanumberofissues, andstewingonmanyproblems,isthatIamabletothankalargenumberofpeople. Ihopethatthisdoesnotcomeacrossasanover-longOscarsspeech.Allofmythanks herearegenuineandnecessary.IalsoapologizetoanyoneIhaveforgotten.
ThisbookstartedlifeastwoorthreepagesinaPhDthesisthatIwrotewhilea studentatSheffield,withthegroundworkbeinglaidwhenIwasanundergraduateat Oxford.AtthelatterIhadthegoodfortunetobetaughtbythreeexcellentphilosophersandtutors:BillChild,DavidWiggins,andTimWilliamson.Thosefamiliar withthematerialinthisbookmaydrawtheconclusionthatDavid’sworkinfluenced medirectly.Isuspectthatisn’tthecasebecauseIwasprobablytoounreceptivean undergraduatetoappreciatehisworkfully.Idorememberthatallthreetaughtme thevalueofrigorousargumentandtheimportanceofcloseattentiontothework ofothers.WhileatSheffieldIwassupervisedbyDavidBellandRichardJoyce,a supervisoryteamthat,frommypointofview,couldnothavebeenbettered.David taughtme hadtoteachmeagainandagain,I’msorrytosay theimportanceof beingprecisewithone’swordsandthoughts,whileRichardwasafantasticguideto metaethics.IfondlyrememberthedisagreementsIhadwithbothofthem.Sheffield inthemid-to-late1990swasalovely,supportiveplacetobeagraduatestudent,and Iowemuchtothemanypeople,bothFacultyandpostgraduates,whowerethere, notably:GavinBoyce,PeterCarruthers,KeithFrankish,DaveHemp,ChrisHookway, MariaKasmirli,SteveMakin,Stefano Mafredi,EwanMcEachran,Betty-Ann Muir,DavidOwens,JennySaul,BobStern,ToddThompson,LeifWenar,and StevedeWijze.
FollowingmytimeatSheffieldIspentthreeenjoyableyearsasalectureratBristol. Now,asthen,theperiodwhenonehas finishedaPhDandislookingforapermanent academichomeisadifficultandtryingaffair.Thisisnotjustbecauseoneishopeful oftheprizeofapermanentacademicposition.Oneisalsospreadingone’sintellectualwingsandgrowingasathinker.IamgratefultomanypeopleatBristolforthe supporttheygavemeasIdeveloped,particularlyChrisBertram,JessicaBrown, JimmyDoyle,KeithGraham,JamesLadyman,AdamMorton,AndrewPyle,Mauricio Suarez,andCarolynWilde.IwasatemporarylectureratBristolatthesametimethat DavidBain,RachelCooper,PatrickGreenough,andFinnSpicerfoundthemselvesin thesameboat,andIthinkmyselfluckytohavehadsuchwonderfulcomrades-in-arms.
IhavebeenattheUniversityofKentsince2003,anintellectualhomethathas morethansuited.Myhorizonshavebeenexpandedandmythoughtssupportedby manycolleaguesandfriends,bothwithinthephilosophydepartmentandoutside.
IamespeciallygratefultoKristofferAhlstrom-Vij,DavidCorfield,GraemeForbes, JonathanFriday,HelenFrowe,EdwardHarcourt,EdwardKanterian,HansMaes, ToddMei,JulienMurzi,RichardNorman,LubomiraRadoilska,KelliRudolph,Sean Sayers,JuliaTanney,RobinTaylor,AlanThomas,andJonWilliamson,allofwhom havehadtolistentometalkaboutthickconceptsonandoffforyears.StevePethick andMurraySmithhavebeenparticularlylong-sufferingandkindwiththeirtimeand thoughts.IamthecurrentDeanoftheFacultyofHumanities,aFacultythatishome toalargenumberofcolleagueswhovalueeducationasmuchasresearch,andfor whomcreativityinthoughtandinpracticeisparamount.Governmentsandothers allaroundtheworldthreatenwhatisgoodinouruniversities,eveniftheytrytohelp, andIfeelblessedtoleadsuchatalentedandfriendlygroupofpeoplewhoendeavour tokeepthe flamealive.
Myphilosophicalthoughthasbeensupportedandchallengedbymanypeople outsidetheuniversitiesIhavecalledhome,inprivatereading,inpresentations,and inconversation.(HereIamsuretomissoneortwonames.)Therollcallmaybe large,butitisheartfeltnonetheless:OlleBlomberg,AnnaBergqvist,MichaelBrady, VittorioBufacchi,RogerCrisp,DanielElstein,GuyFletcher,MirandaFricker,Brad Hooker,TomHurka,JeanetteKennett,BrentKyle,GeraldLang,IainLaw,Jimmy Lenman,MaggieLittle,JohnMcDowell,BrianMcElwee,DavidMcNaughton,Alex Miller,AaronRidley,ToniR nnow-Rasmussen,ConstantineSandis,SamScheffler, ElisabethSchellekensDammann,NeilSinclair,PhilipStratton-Lake,BartStreumer, JohnSkorupski,FolkeTersman,DanielWhiting,JonWebber,RalphWedgwood, EricWiland,NickZangwill.I’mparticularlygratefultoMichelMeliopouloswho invitedmetoZurichtopresentpartsofthisbookwhenitwasindraftataworkshop inSeptember2014.SimonKeller,inanactofcompletesupererogation,readand commentedonthemanuscriptwhenitwasclosetobeing finished,thusenablingme topolishandimproveit.
Sevenpeoplestandoutasbeingofparticularsupportasthisstudywasbeing written.IhavelearntagreatdealfromtheworkofSimonBlackburn,Sophie-Grace Chappell,JonathanDancy,AdrianMoore,andMichaelSmiththroughtheyears,but IsinglethemoutbecauseofthemanyfruitfulconversationsIhavehadwiththem andforthesupporttheyhavegiven.IknowIamnottheonlyonewhocansaythat theyhavebenefitedfromthetimeandthoughtofthesefamous five,andIrecordmy thanksasothershavedonebeforeme.Iwasluckytobeworkingonthetopicofthick conceptsatthesametimeasDebbieRobertsandPekkaVäyrynen.Iamgratefulfor allthetimeswehavesharedideasanddiscussedthematerialinthisbook.Debbie readadraftofChapterSixwhenIwascloseto finishingandhelpedmetostrengthen whatIwasarguingfor,andmyoverallviewwouldnotbewhatitwasifitwerenotfor thenumberoffriendlydisagreementsIhavehadwithPekka.
Thoughtsareonething,turningthemintoabookquiteanother.Asmanypeople haveexperienced,PeterMomtchiloffatOxfordUniversityPressexercisesmuchwise judgementandpatience,andisoneoftheverybestofphilosophicalmidwives.
IamalsogratefultoMatthiasButler,ClementRaj,ChristineRanft,andJeremy Langworthywhohelpedseethisbookthroughtopublication,andtotheanonymous refereeswhohelpedsavedmefrommanyerrorsandwhoencouragedmetosharpen myideasandarguments.
Ialsoacknowledgethanksforpublicationofpreviouswork.ChapterFiveisa rewrittenversionofmy ‘TheShapelessnessHypothesis ’ , Philosophers’ Imprint (2010),pp.1–28.TheearlypartofChapterSixisarewrittenversionofpartofmy ‘ThickConceptsandThickDescriptions’,whichappearedinmyeditedvolume ThickConcepts (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),pp.60–77.
Abookthathastakenthislongtoseethelightofdayneedsmorethanjust philosophicalsupport.Manyofmynon-academicfriendsandfamilyhavehadme lecturethemontherelevanceoftheracyandthesignificanceofslobs.Theyhave donesowithunfailingpoliteness,evenifsomeoftheirsuggestions—‘ThickEvaluation?WhynotjustcallitStupidThoughtsandhavedonewithit?’—Ihavehadto putaside.Myparents,totheirgreatsurprise,producedandnurturedaphilosopher, andtheyhavesupportedmeinmorewaysthanonethroughoutmanyyears. Idedicatethisbooktothemwithmuchloveandrespect.Penny,Freddie,and Mollyhavehadtoputupwithmy ‘bookmelancholia’ andhavedonesowithhugs andkindness.TheyhavealsoshowninsightsintomyownthoughtthatIhadmissed. IwouldnotbethethinkerorpersonIamwithoutthem.
Kent
Spring2017
1 Introduction
ImagineItellyouthatMaddyisbad.Perhapsyouinferfrommyintonation,orthe contextinwhichwearetalking,thatImeanmorallybad.Additionally,youwill probablyinferthatIamdisapprovingofMaddy,orsayingthatIthinkyoushould disapproveofher,orsimilar,giventypicallinguisticconventionsandassumingIam sincere.However,youmightnotgetamoredetailedsenseoftheparticularsortsof wayinwhichMaddyisbad,hertypicalcharactertraits,andthelike,sincepeoplecan bebadinmanyways.Incontrast,ifIsaythatMaddyiswicked,thenyougetmoreof asenseofhertypicalactionsandattitudestoothers.Theword ‘wicked’ ismore specificthan ‘bad’.IhavestillnotexactlypinpointedMaddy’scharactersince wickednesstakesmanyforms.Butthereismoredetailnevertheless,perhapsa strongerconnotationofthesortofpersonMaddyis.Inaddition,andagainassuming typicallinguisticconventions,youshouldalsogetasensethatIamdisapprovingof Maddy,orsayingthatyoushoulddisapproveofher,orsimilar,assumingthatweare stilldiscussinghermoralcharacter.
Thisimaginaryandsomewhatstiltedscenariointroducesthetopicofthisstudy. Conceptssuchas BAD and GOOD arenormallyreferredtoasthinevaluativeconcepts (hereafterjust thinconcepts),whereas WICKED, SELFISH, KIND, BRAVE, DECEITFUL and manymoreexamplesinethics,aresaidtobethickevaluativeconcepts(hereafter, thickconcepts).1 Therearemany,manyexamplesofthickconceptsbeyondthe ethicalrealm.Artworkscanbeelegantandjejune,teacherscanbewiseandignorant, childrencanbeangelicandcheeky,adultscanbechildlikeandchildish,gardenscan bedelicateandcluttered,academicscanbemodestandpompous,andsoon,andso on,andsoon.
Thesupposeddifferencebetweenthinandthickconceptsisaphenomenonthatis relativelyeasytospot:wearepickingoutevaluativeconceptsthataremoreorless specific.Mattersbecomeharderwhenwetrytocaptureexactlywhatisgoingon. Hereisaroughandreadydistinctiontogetusstarted.Oftenthedistinctionisputso thatwhereasthinconceptsareprimarilyorwhollyevaluative(inwhateversenseis givento ‘evaluative’),thickconceptsmixevaluation,orevaluativeconceptualcontent,withsomethingthatmightbecallednonevaluative,descriptiveconceptual
1 Whenreferringtoconceptsasconcepts,Iwritethemcapitalizedashere.Whenreferringtoand mentioningassociatedtermsandwords,Iwritethemthus: ‘ generous ’ .
content,ormixwithittoamoresignificantdegreethanhappenswiththinconcepts. Inotherwords,theapplicationofathinconceptisprimarilyorwhollyconcerned withgivingasenseofapprovalordisapproval.Incontrast,athickconceptwilldo that and giveasense,ormoreofasense,ofwhatthethingislikethatisso categorized,asensebeyondthefactthatitistobelikedordisliked.Oftencommentatorsreferto ‘normativity’—eitherinadditiontoevaluativecontentorasasubstituteforit andthusmakereferencetothefactthatboththinandthickconceptscan provideguidanceandreasonsforaction,evenifonlydefeasibly.Withinthisframework,thinconcepts’ primeorwholefunctionistypicallythoughttobetoprovide suchguidanceandreasons,whilethickconceptsdothisandadditionallyreflectthe worldsomehow.So,forexample,wecouldsaythatitwouldbe(prudentially)wrong towalkalongthecliffedge,andwecouldalsosaythattheedgeisdangerous.The ‘ wrong ’ issimplyanexpressionofareasonnottodosomething,whilethe ‘dangerous ’ willindicatesuchareasonandalsoindicatesomethingaboutwhattheedgeis like,suchasthefactthatitiscrumbling,craggy,andhighup.
Fromthisroughandreadydiscussionmuchphilosophicalintriguefollows.For example,howisevaluativecontentanddescriptivecontentsupposedtorelateina thickconcept?Whatdowemeanbythesetwolabelsanyway?Istalkofevaluative anddescriptivecontentthebestwayofcapturingthephenomenon?Perhapsthe evaluativeelementshouldbeseenasfunctioninginadifferentway,notassome conceptualcontentthataimstocaptureormapontotheworld,butasanattitude thatweexpresstowardsthatworld,forinstance.Isthereadifferenceinkindbetween thinandthickconcepts,oristhedifferenceonlyoneofdegree?Dothedifferences betweenevaluativeconceptsfromdifferentdomains(ethical,aesthetic,prudential, etc.)affectwhatstorywetellaboutthethinandthethick?Whythinkthereare differentevaluativedomainsanyway?
Someofthesequestionsandotherswillberaisedandansweredinthisbook.My chiefconcernisthenatureofevaluativeconcepts:canwealwaysseparatetheminto differentconceptualcontents,andwhatisthecharacterandfunctionofthose supposeddifferentcontentsinthe firstplace?
IntherestofthisIntroductionIdo fivethings.First,IlayoutwhatIdiscussand argueforinthisstudy.Second,Ioutlineeachchapter.Third,Iofferabriefhistoryof thedistinctionbetweenthinandthickconceptsthatalightsonsomeofthethoughts mentioned.Fourth,Ipickoutafewcontraststhatareatworkinmydiscussion. Lastly,Ibrieflyindicatesomeinterestingandrelevantquestionsthat,unfortunately, havetobeleftaside.InChapterTwoIbeginmydiscussioninearnest.
(a)Inthisbookbattlelinesaredrawnbetweenseparationistsandnonseparationists. Iargueforaversionofnonseparationism.
Separationists believethatallputativethickconceptscanbedividedintodifferent elements.Manyseparationistsdividethickconceptsintosomeverythinevaluative elementandsomedescriptive,nonevaluativeelementorelements.Itispartoftheir
picturethatnotonlyshouldwesoseparate,butalsothatevaluationanddescription areradicallydifferentkindsofthingordifferentkindsofconceptualcontent.Just nowIwroteofsome ‘descriptive,nonevaluativeelement ’.Inthisdebatethisphrasing isstrictlyaredundancy:descriptiveconceptualcontent justis nonevaluativeconceptualcontent.2 Butthispointisworthmakinganddrawingourattentionto.Itisalso worthdwellingalittleontheEnglishinvolved.Separationistsshouldtypicallyspeak ofevaluativeanddescriptive elements or parts or components becausethesewords implythatwhatareprimaryaretheseparable,independentlyintelligiblefactorsthat makeupthethickconcept,notthethickconceptitself.
Separationists,althoughunitedintheircorebelief,differonmanymatters.They disagreeaboutwhattheevaluativeanddescriptiveelementsareandhowthinthe evaluativeelementneedstobe.Theyalsodisagreeabouthowmanyelementsare typicallypartofathickconceptandabouthowtheyarerelatedtoeachother. Further,theyalsodisagreeastohowtotreattheevaluativeelement.Toelaborate, themostfamoustypesofseparationistarenoncognitivists.Theytypicallycharacterizetheevaluativeelementasanevincedattitudeorcommand.However,cognitivist treatmentsarealsopossible.Cognitivist-separationiststreatsomethinevaluative element,suchas GOOD,asafree-standing,independentlyintelligibleconceptthatis separablefromanynonevaluativeconcept. 3
Asmentioned,Iarguefora nonseparationist accountofthickconcepts,andargue furtherforaparticularunderstandingofthisbroadview.Allnonseparationists believethatthickconceptsuniteinsomewaybothevaluativeanddescriptive conceptualcontent:suchcontentcannotbeseparated.Assuch,theymaywellrefer toevaluativeanddescriptive aspects (ratherthan elements or parts),assuchphrasing impliestheprimacyofthethickconceptnotitsfeatures.However,Iamparticularly keentostressthatweshouldgobeyondmerelythinkingthatthickconceptsunite evaluativeanddescriptivecontent.4 Why?Expressingmattersinthiswaycouldbe takentoassumethatthereissomeseparationbetweentwothingsorparts,albeita separationthatisthenovercome.Iemphasizestronglyandpositivelythatthick conceptsareevaluativeconcepts,plainandsimple;theyareasevaluativeasthin conceptsare,justthattheyaremorespecific.Thisthemegivesthisbookits title, ThickEvaluation .Thesimple perhapsseeminglysimplistic wayinwhich Iintroducedmattersatthestart,bysayingthatthickconceptsaremorespecificand thatthinconceptsaremoregeneral,turnsouttobethekeywayofthinkingabout thickconceptsandtheirrelationtothinones.So,toputthisanotherway,Iworry wheneverIhearothercommentatorssayingthatthinconceptsarepurelyevaluative
2 However,innocentandacceptableasthisidentityis,Idodrawattentiontoitandquestionitin ChapterSixwhenIdiscussthelabelsthatoneappliestothevariousconceptualcategoriesthatareinplay.
3 SeeElsteinandHurka(2009),pp.516–17fordiscussion.
4 Iusethisphrasingmyselffromtimetotime.ItisjustthatIdonotthinkwecanleavemattersthere, andweshouldnotaimonlytoshowthatthereisthisintertwining.Thatlastideaisreallythepointbehind ChapterFive.
whereasincontrastthickconceptsmixevaluativeanddescriptiveconceptualcontent.Ithinkthatthickconceptsarealso ‘purely ’ or ‘wholly’ evaluative,simplybecause Ihaveacertainviewofwhatitisforsomethingtobeevaluative.Thisideawillbe elaboratedanddefendedthroughoutmystudy.5
Allnonseparationistsarecognitivists.Theyallthinkthatthickandthinconcepts canbeusedtodescribetheworldbypickingoutpartsofit thepartsofitthatare good,just,unfair,elegant,andthelike andthatinsomesenseknowledgeofthe worldmightbeconveyedbytheiruse.Notethatweshouldnotconfusethetwo usesof ‘descriptive’ Ihaveintroduced.Ihavejustused ‘describe’ toindicatehowany wordorideamightfunction:usedinasuitablefashioninalanguage,anyword, evaluativeornot,canbeusedtotrytopickoutsomeaspectoftheworld.Earlier, whenIwroteof ‘descriptivecontent’,Imeantsomethingdifferent:atypeofconceptualcontentthatdoesnotcaptureorconveyanyvaluejudgement.Weshouldbealive tothisdifferencethroughout.
Despitebeingunitedintheircognitivism,nonseparationistsalsocomeinseveral varieties.Toexplainhowmynonseparationismdiffersfromothertypes,hereare threefurtherpointsIarguefor.First,andcarryingonfromthemainthemeofthick conceptsbeingpurelyevaluative,Iarguethatwhilethereareclearlysomenonevaluativeconcepts,thereisahugegreyareaofconceptsthatcannotbeclearly categorizedaseitherevaluativeordescriptivebythelightsofamoretraditional, separationistunderstandingof ‘evaluative’.And,Idostickmyneckout:Isuggest stronglythatthereisthisgreyarea,asopposedtotherebeingasharpdistinction betweentheevaluativeandthenonevaluativeordescriptive.Thisfollowsfromthe viewIdevelopaboutthickconceptsandthewayinwhichmanyreal-lifeexamples work.Idonotregardthelackofasharpdistinctionasa flaw,fortosoassumeis partlytobuyintotheviewofevaluationpropagatedbyseparationists.Indeed,the factthatreal-lifeexamplesthreatensuchasharpdistinctionshouldindicatethe implausibilityofseparationism.
Thesecondpointelaboratesthe first.Ithinkthattherearesomeconceptsthatcan becountedasevaluative(onacertainunderstandingofthatnotion)thatsome theoriesandtheoriststhinkshouldnotbe.Someofthemostradicalcontenders thatIsuggestare SIMILAR and RELEVANT,buttherearefarlessradicalexamplessuchas MACABRE, CONTORTED,and GROTESQUE.Suchexamplesraisethisquestion:dosuch concepts,wheneverlegitimatelyapplied,havetohaveeitherapositiveornegative pointtotheminordertocountasevaluativeconcepts?Myanswertothisquestionis aclear ‘ no ’.Isetupadisagreementbetweentwobroadviews.The conservative view ofevaluationrestrictsevaluationtoclearpositiveandnegativejudgementsalone.In
5 Thispossibilityisbarelydiscussedintheliterature.Thereisa flavourofitinWiggins(2006), pp.378–9,note20,andmorestronglyinDancy(1995),p.268.ThemostdetaileddiscussionisRoberts (2013)whichtakesthearticulationofthisviewasitsmaintopic.Idiscussthislastpaperinnote29, ChapterSix.
moredetail,itistheviewthataconceptcanbecountedasanevaluativeconceptonly ifineveryinstanceofitsusethereisaclearandobviouspositiveornegativestanceor viewbeingexpressed.The liberal view whichistheviewIfavour claimsthata conceptcanbeevaluativeoverallandinanyparticularinstanceofitsuseevenifin someinstancesthereisnopositiveornegativestancebeingexpressedwhenitis employed. 6 Muchofthisbookisanattempttomoveusawayfromthinkingof evaluationassimplyexhaustedbythebare,minimalnotionsofgoodandbad,right andwrong,ayesandano,and,asIfrequentlyputit,theconceptsof PRO and CON orof proandconevaluation.ThislastpairofoptionsIuseasmybarestthinconcepts.As such,thiswholeworkisameditationonthenotionofevaluationandanargumentfor aparticularconceptionofwhatevaluationis.
Third,Iarguefor ‘evaluative flexibility’.Athickconceptcanbeusedtoindicate someprostanceinonecase,andaconstanceinanother,andyetwecanstillbe talkingoftheverysameconcept.(Forexample,thedangerousnatureofacliffcanbe areasonnottowalkalongit,butitcanalso,insomecontexts,beareasontodoso.) Myviewisopposedtotheideathatwehavetwodifferentyetsimilarconceptsbeing appliedinthesetwoinstances,onethatisaproversionandonethatisaconversion. Inmyviewthickconceptsholdtogetherarangeofpointedevaluations basically pro,conandneither ofvariousstrengths.Isuggestthatevaluative flexibility fits verynicelywiththenonseparationismIarguefor,andnonseparationismin general.Notethatitdoesnotcutagainsttheideaexpressedintheprevious paragraph.Positiveandnegativestan cesareessentialtoathickconceptbeinga thickconcept,thatistheyareanecessarypartoftherange.ItisjustthatIdonot thinktheyhavetobepresentandapparentineverysingleuseforaconcepttobe treatedasanevaluativeconcept.
Withthesethreepointsintroducedwecancontrastmynonseparationismwith othersorts.First,anonseparationistmightsaythatanyandeverythickconceptonly everhasonetypeofpointedevaluation,beitproorcon.Second,anonseparationist mightsaythatwhilethickconceptshavebothevaluativeanddescriptiveaspects,such conceptsaredifferentfrom,andperhapsclearlyandsharplydifferentfrom,nonevaluative,descriptiveconcepts.(And,almostcertainly,alsodifferentfromthin concepts.)Thissecond,differentsortofnonseparationismshowsupclearlythe importanceandvalueoftheoverallpositionIadvocate.Someonemaybeswept alongwiththeideaIhavealreadymentionedaboutevaluativeanddescriptive conceptualcontentbeingnonseparablyintertwined.However,asIhavealready said,ifweacceptthisatfacevalueandthinkthatthisisthekeyideatoarguefor, thenweseemtobeimplicitlybuyingtheideathattherearealwaystwosortsof conceptualcontent,albeittwosortsthatwhentheycometogethercannotthenbe
6 Ileaveasidethroughoutthisstudythecomplicationofspeakerversushearermeaningsowecanfocus onthedifferencesbetweentheviewsthemselves.InChapterSixIsharpenthesetwoviewsalittlemoreand contrastthemwithtwomoreviewsofevaluation.
pulledapart.Inmyviewthatgivestoomuchtoseparationisminthe firstplace,for thisviewessentiallyreliesontherebeingtwosortsofconceptualcontentand,indeed, oftreatingevaluativecontentasbeinguniform.Themoreinterestingandbetter oppositiontoseparationismisthesortofnonseparationismIfavour,onethatsays explicitlythatthickconceptsarejustevaluativeconceptsthatareasevaluativeasthin concepts,andthatthereisavarietyoftypesofevaluation.Inaddition,Ithinkthatmy viewmakesverygoodsenseofeverydaythickconcepts.Incaseitneedsunderlining, Ithinktherearethinconceptsandnonevaluativeconceptsaswell.Itisjustthat Ibelievethatthickconceptsarenotsimplyproductsoftheircombination,nonseparableorotherwise.
Ihavethoughthardaboutlabels. ‘Nonseparationism’ maysuggestthetypeof positionthatIhaveindicatedaworryabout:twoormorepartsthatcannotbe separatedinsteadofapositionthatcastsdoubtonthickconceptsbeingmadeupof partsinanyfashion.However,Idonotwanttoproliferatelabelsandmyattentionis forthemostpartfocusedonarguingagainstseparationism.Itisenoughforustobe alivetothedifferenceIhavedrawnbetweentypesofnonseparationismandbeaware that all nonseparationiststhinkofthickconceptsasbeing ‘unitaryconcepts’ . 7 Itis justthatIwishtoemphasizesomethingthatothersdonot,thattherearedangers inbeingsweptalongbythephrase ‘nonseparableintertwiningofevaluativeand descriptivecontent’ .
(b)BeforeIsummarizeeachchapter,Ishouldsaysomethingabouttheunderlying currentsatworkinmywriting.Ibelievestronglythatwhenarguingforapositive philosophicalviewitisoftenvitaltounderstandthewholeterrainandbeginby gettingundertheskinofone’s(seeming)opponents.Soitiswiththisdebate.The wholediscussionofthinandthickconceptsdrawsuponanumberofideasand questions thedistinctionbetweenevaluationanddescription,thenatureoftheir relation,whatitistobe ‘thin’—thatarefoundationalandthatcanbeaskedand answeredinavarietyofways.Gettingahandleontheterrainitself,andframing thingscorrectly,iscrucialinshapingadecent finalview.Further,Ibelievestronglyin thiscasethatonecanseethemeritsofthenonseparationistviewIargueforonlyby thinkingindetailaboutseparationism first:whatseparationistshavearguedfor,and whattheycouldpossiblyarguefor.
Inthisspirit,then,the firsthalfofthebookisdevotedwhollytounderstandingthe terrain.Nonseparationismwillemergeaswegothroughthis firsthalf,butthefocusis onseparationism.
NotealsothatalthoughIsaysomethingaboutthenatureofevaluationatthe startofthenextchaptersoastostartusoff ineffectoutliningsomethingofthe conservativeviewintroducedabove Idonotbeginwithalengthymeditationon
7 ThistermisfromAltham(1995),p.162.
thecharacterandconceptionoftheevaluativeandthenplungeintodebates betweenseparationismandnonseparationism.Thatwouldbetoputthecartbefore thehorse.Amatureunderstandingofev aluationhastocomelater,onceother mattersareinplace.
Thisbookpresentsthreeargumentativestrategiesbywhichnonseparationistscan defendtheirviewagainstseparationism:(i)afocusonthe(supposed)evaluative element,arguingthatseparationistscannotthinkofthinconceptsbeingpriorto thickconcepts;(ii)afocusonthe(supposed)descriptiveelement,arguingthatit cannotbeidentifiedsoastogiveusafullyformedconceptthat,whenjoinedwith somethinevaluativeelement,isenoughtomimicathickconcept;and(iii)afocuson thenatureoftheevaluativeinthe firstplace.Strategies(i)and(ii)arenotmutually exclusiveand,infact,theyarebestviewedasworkingtogether.Ithinktheyare importantbutthattheyultimatelydonotwhollyconvince.Ithinkthatitis(iii)that isthemostimportantandfertileideatoraiseagainstseparationism.Alongwith detailingtheterrain,Iregardmydevelopmentof(iii)asmymaincontributioninthis work.Asanargumentativestrategyitsitsonitsown,althoughonecanunderstandit andhowitissupposedtowork onlyif oneunderstandsthe firsttwoandtheir limitations,whichiswhyIspendtimedetailingthem.Thebroadnegativethought thatemergesagainstseparationismisthatwhenonereflectsonthenatureofthe evaluativeandthinksthroughexamples,separationismisshowntobeaverycurious andstrangewaytounderstandthickconcepts.
Thatlastpointisimportanttounderstand.Thisbookdoesnotcontain any knockdownargumentsagainstseparationismorfornonseparationism.Idonotbelieve thatseparationismisincoherentorthatitcanberevealedasfundamentallyinconsistentwithsomethingwealltaketobebasicandimportantinoureverydaylives, forexample.Instead,bythinkingthroughvariousaspectsofoureverydayevaluative livesIthinkthatthenonseparationistpictureIpaintmakesbettersenseofthese aspects,andtheseparationistpicturelesssense,indeedthatitisastrangewayto viewevaluation.
Talkofdifferentpicturesmaysoundpleasant,butitcanresultinadepressingend point.Aclashbetweentwofundamentallydifferentphilosophicalviewscanresultin argumentativemovesbeingmadebybothsidesthatsimplybegthequestion.That canmaketheheartsink.Ithinkthereisnopointindenyingthattheremaybe somethingofthatinthisdebate,howeverIdoprefertoemphasizethepositive. Ibelievethatadeepeningoftheaccountprovidedbynonseparationismprovestobe instructive.Evenifnoknock-downargumentcanbegivenagainstseparationism, Ithinkthatneutralsshouldbepersuadedtomyside.ThatisthetaskIsetmyself.If Iamlucky,someseparationistswillquestiontheiraffiliationinaddition.
Ibegin,in ChapterTwo,bythinkingaboutseparationism.Separationistsbelieve thatsupposedthickconceptscanbeanalysedascontainingdifferentelementsand aspects,normallysomevalue-freedescriptiveconceptualcontent,andsomeevaluativecontent,whichisnormallyverythin.Thisitselfbringswithittheideathatto
evaluateisinsomewayeithersimplytoapproveortodisapprove,andthatthisis whatmarksthedifferencebetweenevaluativecontentanddescriptivecontent. Despiteabroadsweepofagreement,separationistsdisagreeaboutmanythings, someofwhichIhavelistedearlier.InChapterTwoIdiscusstwobroadtypesof separationismandpresenttheiradvantagesanddisadvantages.Ialsothinkaboutthe strengthsofthepositionoverallwhiledrawingattentiontoitslikelyweaknesses.
In ChapterThree Iextendourunderstandingoftheterrainbythinkingabouttwo importantmodelsofconceptualrelations,modelsthatattempttocapturetherelation betweenfamiliesofgeneralandspecificconcepts.Thetwomodelsarethe genus–species modelandthedeterminable–determinatemodel.InshortIarguethatseparationistsarecommittedtotheformer.Indeed,Iarguethatthe genus–species model whenappliedtothinandthickconcepts justis anexpressionofseparationism. Integraltothismodelisthateachindividual species conceptiscreatedfromthe combinationoftheoverall genus conceptandsomeunique differentia. 8 Inthecaseof separationism,somethinevaluativecontentisthe genus concept,whilethe differentia isthedescriptivecontentseenasuniquetoeachthickconcept.
Aswellasdetailingbothconceptualmodels,Isuggestthatneitherisappropriate forunderstandingthinandthickconcepts.(Althoughseparationismappearstobe the genus–species modelinanotherguise,thatdoesnotmeanthatnonseparationists shouldadoptthedeterminable–determinatemodel.)Whydrawsuspiciononboth models?Thereasonisthatbothsitbadlywithevaluative flexibility,theidea Iintroducedabove.IdetailthisideainChapterThree,castitinapositivelight, andshowwhyitdoesnotcombinewellwithseparationism.Herewehaveonly ‘suggestion’,not ‘conclusiveargument’.Evaluative flexibilityreturnsinChapterSix becauseotherelementsofmyviewwillenrichitandbeenrichedinturnbyit. ProgressismadeinChapterThree,however,becausewearebeginningtounderstand theterrainmoreandwecanseethelimitationsofthe genus–species modeland separationism.AttheendofChapterThreeIbrieflydiagnosewhereadifferentway ofunderstandingthickandthinconceptualrelationscanenter.
AtthispointinthebookIwillhaveintroducedandexaminedseparationism,and detailedtheterrainofthedebate.Iamtheninaposition,in ChapterFour,to introduceandconsiderthe firstanti-separationiststrategy,thatwhichfocusesonthe evaluativeaspectofthickconcepts.
I firstarguethatthereisadifferenceinkindbetweenthethinandthethick;both ourconceptualmodelsdependonthat.(Ialsonote,inpassing,thatthewayinwhich theboundaryshouldbedrawnshouldinturnmakeusquerywhethertheseparationistenterpriseisasplausibleasitinitiallyappears. 9 Ipickthisupagainin
8 Or,uniquetotwothickconceptsthatsharethesame differentia butwhichhaveadifferentthin genus
9 Thisdiscussionbringsoutthedifferencebetweensayingthatthinconceptsare ‘wholly’ or ‘mostly’ evaluative.The firstmayindicateadifferenceinkindbetweenthethinandthethick,whilethesecond indicatesadifferenceofdegree.
ChapterSix.)Iusethebarestthinconcepts, PRO and CON,alothere.Iargue,through considerationoftheworkofAllanGibbard,thatseparationistsarebetteroffworking withaverythinsortofevaluativeelementintheiranalysesofthickconcepts.
ThisbuildstothemainpartofChapterFour.Inorderforthe genus–species model toapplytothinandthickconcepts,thin genus conceptshavetobethoughttobe conceptuallypriortothick species concepts,thickconceptsbeingthecreationof ‘ genus plussome differentia’.Iconsiderwhat ‘conceptualpriority ’ mightamountto inthisdebate,andarguethatthereisnoconvincingargumentfortheconceptual priorityofthethin.But,inaddition,Iarguethat ‘thickprioritarianism ’ isnotagood ideaeither.10 Ifanythingemergeswithsomeplausibility,itisathirdpositionIlabel ‘noprioritarianism’.Thisistheassertionthatneitherthinnorthickconceptshave conceptualpriorityovertheotherwhenconsideringhowthesetwobroadtypesof conceptrelate.Thatsaid,althoughIthinkthatthisdiscussionisinstructiveandthat itshowstheweaknessesofseparationism,Ialsosaythat atmost itstandsasasetof weightyconsiderationswithwhichseparationistshavetodeal.Aneutralmaynotbe whollyconvincedbythebestargumentsIlayoutagainst ‘thinprioritarianism’,let aloneaseparationist.
Thisisalltothegoodinmyoveralldiscussion,becausethis firstargumentative strategy,whilehelpingtounderstandthedebatemoreclearly,alsoshowsthatmoreis requiredfornonseparationiststochallengeseparationistssuccessfully.
Thistakesusto ChapterFive.Whilethe firstargumentativestrategyconcentrates onthe genus partofthemodel,thesecondconcentratesonthe differentia thatis supposedlyuniquetoeachandeverythickconcept.Thisbringsintheso-called disentanglingargument andthe shapelessnesshypothesis.Thedisentanglingargument isanargumenttotheeffectthatwecannotseparateevaluativefromdescriptive contentinthewaythatseparationistsenvisageforthickconcepts.Thisisbecause evaluativeconceptsareshapelesswithrespecttodescriptiveconcepts:wecannot mimictheextensionofevaluativeconceptsbydescriptiveconceptualcontentalone. Thereisalottosayabouttheargumentandhypothesisandtheyhaveundoubtedly beeninfluential.Iclaimthattheargumentisnotwhollysuccessful,althoughthat doesnotmeanthatseparationismwalksawayunscathed.Isuggestapossible differentconclusionfromtheoneoftenreached.However andagainthischimes withmyoverallnarrative thisisweakerthanidealfornonseparationists.Inshort, theyneedsomethingmorethanthe firsttwoargumentativestrategiesdiscussedin the firsthalfofthisbook.
Oneideathatemergesfrommytreatmentofthesecondargumentativestrategyis thatitmeetsseparationismonitsownterms,somethingmentionedabove.Thissets thescenefor ChapterSix.Separationistsbelievethatevaluativeanddescriptive conceptualcontentarenotjustseparatebutdifferent.Thesecondstrategy,if
10 Withapologiesfortheuglinessofthisandotherlabels.
adopted,isanattemptbynonseparationiststoshowthatevaluativeanddescriptive contentcanintertwineinsomenonseparablefashion.But,asIhavealreadyindicated,takenatfacevalueandalone,thisphrasinggivesawaytoomuchtoseparationists.Itassumesimplicitlythatonecandivideevaluativefromdescriptivecontent inthe firstplace.Further,itfailstoquestionexplicitlythenarrowandconservative viewoftheevaluativethatisbeingassumed.ItisinChapterSixwhereImakegood onthevariouspositiveideasIhold.Muchofthischapterconcernshowthick conceptsthreatenthesupposedlyclearandobviousdistinctionbetweentheevaluativeandthenonevaluativeinpartbyshowingasplausibletheliberalviewof evaluation.Ialsoconcludemyargumentforevaluative flexibility.
Asshouldbeapparent,alotofmydiscussioncomestogetherinChapterSix. ReaderswillhavetoforgivemeaseverysooftenIsaythatIwillelaborateordiscuss somethingfurtherinChapterSix.Asalsomaybeapparentaswegothrough, ChaptersTwotoSixarethecoreofthebook.The finalthreechaptersarebriefer, anddesignedtobeso,butdiscussimportanttopicsallthesame.
In ChapterSeven Icontinuemymotivationforanddefenceoftheliberalviewof evaluationspeci fi callybyfocusingonrecentargumentsfromPekkaVäyrynen.He arguesthatthickterms forhefocusesontheseratherthanconcepts canconvey proandconevaluations,butitisbesttoassumethattheytypicallydosoonly becauseofcontext,toneofvoice,andotherfactors.Ineffect,hedeniestheclaim thattheyare,inhiswords, ‘ inherentlyevaluative ’.Whatevaluationssuchterms carryorconveyisamatterofpragmatics,notsemantics,andarethereforeonly accidentalornonessentialtothem.Thiscutsagainstmyviewofthickconceptsand myviewofevaluationingeneral,forIdothinkthatproandconevaluations,and themoregeneralevaluativeconceptualcontentthatthickconceptshave(that whichreachesbeyondpointedproandconpoints)ispartofwhattheyessentially areandmarksthemasaspecialpartofoureverydaythought.Väyrynenlaysbare hisviewofevaluationthatisclearlyconservative.Havingoutlinedmypositiveview inthepreviouschapter,inthischapterIdeepenitbyshowingthatVäyrynen’ s argumentsarequestionable.
In ChapterEight Idiscusstwomoretopics,bothofwhichrelatetothesocial aspectofthickconcepts.The firstisapotentialworryfornonseparationists.One reasonpeoplehaveforbelievingintheshapelessnesshypothesis andoneIacceptto someextent isthatonecannotfullyappreciateathickconcept(whatitis,howitis used),unlessonesomehowappreciatestheevaluativepointoftheconcept.Butthis raisesaninterestingquestion:towhatextentdoesonehavetoacceptandhold sincerelytheevaluativepointoftheconcept?Ifoneanswersthatananthropologist hastoholdsincerelytheviewsofthepeoplesheisstudying,forexample,thenitmight makemanyifnotallsuchinvestigationsimpossible.Imapawayoutofthisproblem fornonseparationismandthisleadsmetoextendmyconclusionofChapterSix,that therealproblemfacesseparationism:itmakesanthropologicalunderstandinglook difficulttoachievebecauseithasacuriouswayofunderstandingthickconcepts.
Thisleadsmetoasecondtopic.BernardWilliamsargues,quitefamously,that thickconceptsformmoreofoursocialworldthanthinones,andthattheyoffera betterhopeforusmaintainingconfidencethatourevaluativepracticesarejustified. Thisroleforthickconceptsiscontextualizedbyusimagininghowwemighttreatour evaluativepracticeswhenweconfrontothergroupsthatthinkandconceptualize differentlyfromhowwedo.IarguethatWilliamsiswrongtothinkthatthick conceptsofferbetterhopethanthinconceptsonthispoint.OverallWilliams presentsafairlypessimisticviewofourevaluativepractices.Ioffersomethingthat ismoreoptimistic.
In ChapterNine Idrawthingstoaconclusion.Althoughthisisastudyofatopic inthephilosophyofvaluethatisquitespeci fic,ithasimplicationsformetaethics generally.Oneissuethatrequiresdiscussionishowweconceiveofthickconcepts andtermsinrelationto(supposed)thickfeaturesorproperties.Thatis,howdothe waysinwhichhumansthinkandcommunicaterelatetothestuffthatmayexistand towhichwemaybetryingtorefer?Inthis finalchapterIconsiderwhatmyprevious discussionmeansforevaluativecognitivismandevaluativerealism.Myaimhereisto setdebatesaboutthinandthickconceptsinsomecontextandtoshowwhatisat stakewhenitcomestodiscussionsofrealism.Myaimisnottoargueforthebrandof cognitivismthatIfavour.Thatisatopicforanothertime.
(c)AlthoughIdrawuponanumberofwritersinthisstudy,thisisnotahistorical treatmentofhowthickconceptshavebecomeafocusofphilosophicaldebate.Inthis section,however,Isituatemydebateintherecenthistory.
AsfarasIamaware,Williamscoinedtheterm ‘thickconcept’,inhis Ethicsandthe LimitsofPhilosophy (abbreviatedas ELP).Interestingly,inthisworktheterm ‘thin concept’ neverappears.Instead,Williamsusesphrasessuchas ‘themostabstract concepts’ . 11 Itisworthnoting, first,thatheexplicitlydefinesthinandthickconcepts differentlyfromhowIhavedone,andinsteadusesaframethatsuggests ‘normativity ’ andthepossibilityofconceptsencodingreasons.Thesloganoftenusedwhen discussingWilliams’ viewisthus:thinconceptsare ‘action-guiding’ whilethick conceptsareboth ‘action-guiding’ and ‘world-guided’.Despitethisdifference betweenus,wecanseethatWilliams’ chiefconcernistoargueagainstthesupposed separationofthickconceptsintocomponentparts,nomatterhowthosepartsare captured.Healsothinks,asIhavesaid,thatthickconceptsaremoreimportantthan thinoneswhenitcomestothepossibilityofevaluativeknowledgeandunderstanding oursocialworld.
AlthoughWilliamsisfamousforexcitinginterestinthinandthickconcepts,to startourstoryaboutthickconceptsherewouldbeunwise.Manyintellectualhistories
11 Hementions ‘thinconcepts’ bythatlabelinWilliams(1996),p.25,butdoessowithoutany indicationthatthisisanewdevelopment.SamuelSchefflerinhis1987reviewof ELP talksof ‘thin concepts’.SchefflertellsmethathismemoryisofWilliamshappilyusing ‘thinconcept’ atthetimeofhis writing ELP,soitsabsenceisprobablysomequirkofnophilosophicalsignificance.
arethemselvesaimedattellingaparticularview.12 Hereismybrief,impressionistic versionthatnotestwoothersources.
First,duringthelate1950sPhilippaFootandIrisMurdochrananOxfordseminar inwhichtheybegantoquestionrecentworkinnoncognitivism,speci ficallythe prescriptivismofR.M.Hare.13 Theyalsohadintheirsightsthefact–valuedistinction moregenerally.Formanyprominentthinkersduringthetwentiethcentury,the separationofandcleardistinctionbetweenfactsandvalueswasanarticleoffaith. WhenMaddysaysthatPaddyiswearingbrowntrousersorthattodayisSunday,she istryingtostatefacts.WhenshesaysthatPaddyisgoodsheisascribingavalueto him.Althoughitlooksasifwecanpickoutvaluesasmuchaswepickoutfacts,and thattheyformpartofthestuffoftheworld,forthosethatholdtothefact–value distinctionthetwoareverydifferent.Factsarethingsintheworld,whilevaluesseem asiftheymaywellnotbe.Oftenthefact–valuedistinctionwasgivenanaturalistic edge,withtheoriststhinkingthattobea(proper)factistobethesortofthingthatis studied,orcouldbestudied,bythenaturalsciences.Modernnaturalsciencehasno roomforvalues:itcannotmeasurethem,ortestthem,anditseemsimpossibleto sensethemwithanyofthenormal fivehumansenses.Sosomeotherandquite differentexplanationisneededofourvaluejudgements.Aspartofthisview,doubt wascastontherealityofvalues.Additionally,questionswereraisedaboutthe characterofourlanguageandpsychologywhenwejudgethataparticularthing hasacertainvalue.Someofthosethatreliedonthefact–valuedistinctionexplicitly conceivedofitasadevelopmentofHume’sis–oughtdistinction.14
ItiseasytoseehowHare’sprescriptivismand,say,A.J.Ayer’semotivismstepin here.Wehavesomesupposednonevaluative,factual,descriptivestuff.Wehave nonevaluativeconceptsthatweusetopickthisstuffoutandcategorizeitasdifferent things.Someofthisstuffisfurtherseenasgoodandsomeofitasbad.Wethenhave sometheorythattellsushowitisthatsuchvaluejudgementsareconveyedandwhat theirexactfunctionis.Somenoncognitivistsemphasizetheemotivestancethatsuch
12 SeeAppiah(2008),chapter1foranicediscussionofthisidea.
13 ThebestdiscussionsoftheirideasareinFoot(1958)and(1958–9),andMurdoch(1956),(1957),and (1962).Williamsnotesthatthisseminarwasoneoftheinspirationsforhisworkonthickconcepts: Williams(1985),note7pp.217–18.Thepreciseideahecitesisthatonecannotunderstandanideaunless oneseesitsevaluativepoint,anideaIdiscussinChapterEight.
14 Putnam(2002),esp.chapter1,isverygoodonthehistoryofthedevelopmentofthefact–value distinction(althoughPutnamprefers ‘dichotomy’)anditsrelationtoHume.Oneshortdiscussionisworth repeating.Heendsthat firstchapterwiththoughtsaboutCarnapandthedistinctionbetweenobservational andtheoreticalterms.Observationaltermsarethosethatrefertopropertiesforwhichthereisasimpletest procedurethatcandeterminewhetherthesupposedpropertyinquestionexists.(Examplesinclude ‘blue’ , ‘hot’,and ‘warmerthan’.)Theoreticaltermsarethosethatrefertohypotheticalphysicalproperties(suchas ‘charge’)thatweintroducetoexplainandpredictcertainobservablephenomena.Putnam(p.25)imagines ahistoriandescribingsomeoneascruel.This,insteadofbeingatheoreticalterminCarnap’ssense,isa “termthat figuresinacertainkindofreflectiveunderstandingofthe rationale ofconduct,inunderstanding bothhowtheagentfeelsandactsandhowothersperceivetheagent’sfeelingsandactions”.Putnam imaginesCarnapdismissingcruelty,therefore,assome “metaphysicalnonsense” .
judgementshave,andgetustothinkaboutevincedBoosandHurrahs.Others,such asHare,getustothinkaboutcommandsandprescriptions.
Present-dayphilosophersareusedtothefact – valuedistinctioncomingunder pressurefromanumberofsources.FootandMurdoch,throughconcentrationon Hare,canbeseenasquestioningwhetherthereissuchadistinction,andwhatone mightmeanbytalkingofthe ‘factual ’ inparticular.WhenwesayofPaddythatheis honest,orfair,orwicked,orstylish,arewetryingtopickoutsomefactabouthim orascribeavaluetohim?ForFootandMurdochitisverylikelythatweare ascribingvalues.Butitisnotsoobviousthatwearenotalsopickingoutsomething factualand,further,thatitwouldbeunwisetoseparatethesetwoaspectsofthe onething.Theirreasons oratleastFoot ’ s forthinkingthiswillbeoutlinedin ChapterSix.
AsecondpointworthnotinginourbriefhistoryisthatalthoughWilliamscoined ‘thickconcept’,beforehimGilbertRyleusedthephrase ‘thickdescription ’ todescribe ideasinthegeneralballpark.15 Athickdescriptionissimplyamorespecificsortof descriptionthatisrequiredinordertocategorizeanactionorthing.Togiveahintof theidea,considerthedifferencebetweenthemoregeneral THINKING andthemore specific REFLECTING, MEDITATING,and DAYDREAMING .Rylemixesthiswithhisideathat amongrelevantlysimilaractionsandthings,describedinsimilarways,thereneed notbeaseparableandidentifiablecoreorbasethingthattheyallhaveincommon. Soreflection,meditation,anddaydreamingarealltypesofthinking,butitisnotasif thereisaspecificisolatablething thinking thatiscommontoalloftheindividual instancesandwhichisattachedtothreeother(separable)thingsinturntocreate thosethreeinstancesofthinking.
ImentionRylehere,notjustbecauseofhisuseoftheword ‘thick ’,butalso becausehethinksofsomedescriptionsasbeingabstractionsfromother,thicker descriptions,echoingWilliams’ labellingin ELP.Williamswouldhavebeenawareof Ryle’sworkandacomparisonoftheirideasisinstructive.IdiscussRyle’sviewofthick descriptionsandcomparehisthoughtswithWilliams’ viewsofthickconcepts,againin ChapterSix.
Alongsidethesepoints,itisworthremarkingthatwritersotherthanWilliams prominentlySimonBlackburn,JonathanDancy,AllanGibbard,SusanHurley,John McDowell,HilaryPutnam,andDavidWiggins weremakinginterestingpoints aboutthickconceptsduringthe1980sand1990s.Althoughmystudyisprimarily ahistorical,Iwilldrawontheworkofsomeofthesewritersinthecomingchapters. 16
15 Ryle(1966–7)and(1968).Althoughthephrasefeaturesprominentlyintheselatepapers,theideaof therebeinghigher-levelsofdescriptionthatcontrastwithbareorminimaldescriptionsissomethingthat runsthroughalotofRyle’swork.IhavenotbeenabletoascertaintheextenttowhichRyle orHare knewoftheFoot–Murdochseminar,letalonewhethertheyattended.
16 ItisalsoworthmentioningCliffordGeertzwho,inGeertz(1973),usedRyle’sideastogreateffectin reflectingonwhatgoesonwhenoneattemptstounderstandothercultures.AlthoughIdonotdiscussher work,Lovibond(1983)isalsorelevant.
