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thephenomenalbasisofintentionality
PHILOSOPHYOFMIND
serieseditor:DavidJ.Chalmers,AustralianNationalUniversity andNewYorkUniversity
ThinkingWithoutWords
JoséLuisBermúdez
IdentifyingtheMind
U.T.Place(author),GeorgeGraham, ElizabethR.Valentine(editors)
PurpleHaze
JosephLevine
ThreeFacesofDesire
TimothySchroeder
APlaceforConsciousness
GreggRosenberg
IgnoranceandImagination
DanielStoljar
SimulatingMinds
AlvinI.Goldman
GutReactions
JesseJ.Prinz
PhenomenalConceptsand PhenomenalKnowledge
TorinAlter,SvenWalter(editors)
BeyondReduction
StevenHorst
WhatAreWe?
EricT.Olson
SupersizingtheMind
AndyClark
Perception,Hallucination,andIllusion
WilliamFish
CognitiveSystemsandtheExtendedMind
RobertD.Rupert
TheCharacterofConsciousness
DavidJ.Chalmers
PerceivingtheWorld BenceNanay(editor)
TheContentsofVisualExperience SusannaSiegel
TheSenses
FionaMacpherson(editor)
AttentionisCognitiveUnison ChristopherMole
ConsciousnessandtheProspectsof
Physicalism
DerkPereboom
IntrospectionandConsciousness
DeclanSmithiesandDanielStoljar(editors)
TheConsciousBrain
JesseJ.Prinz
DecomposingtheWill AndyClark,JulianKiverstein, andTillmannVierkant(editors)
PhenomenalIntentionality
UriahKriegel(editor)
ThePeripheralMind IstvánAranyosi
TheInnocentEye NicoOrlandi
DoesPerceptionHaveContent? BeritBrogaard(editor)
TheVarietiesofConsciousness
UriahKriegel
Panpsychism
EditedbyGodehardBrüntrupand LudwigJaskolla
ConsciousnessandFundamentalReality
PhilipGoff
SeeingandSaying BeritBrogaard
ThePhenomenalBasisof
Intentionality
AngelaMendelovici
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.Itfurthers theUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,andeducation bypublishingworldwide.OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversity PressintheUKandcertainothercountries.
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica.
©OxfordUniversityPress2018
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicense,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereproduction rightsorganization.Inquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove.
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer.
CIPdataisonfileattheLibraryofCongress ISBN978–0–19–086380–7
987654321
PrintedbySheridanBooks,Inc.,UnitedStatesofAmerica
ToDavid,Eleni,andVera
Contents
Preface xi
Overview xv
partone introduction
1.FixingReferenceonIntentionality 3
1.1.AboutnessandDirectedness 3
1.2.TheOstensiveWayofFixingReference 5
1.3.OtherWaysofFixingReference 9
1.4.WorrieswiththeOstensiveDefinition 14
1.5.Conclusion 19
2.GoalsandMethodology 21
2.1.WhatisaTheoryofIntentionality? 21
2.2.Theory-IndependentAccesstoIntentionality 23
2.3.Conclusion 28
parttwo alternativetheoriesofintentionality
3.TheMismatchProblemforTrackingTheories 33
3.1.TrackingTheories 33
3.2.OverviewoftheMismatchProblemforTrackingTheories 35
3.3.BackgroundandAssumptions 36
3.4.AMismatchCase:PerceptualColorRepresentations 38
3.5.OtherMismatchCases 44
3.6.Objections 46
3.7.ReliableMisrepresentationandtheSignificanceofTracking 57
3.8.Conclusion 59
AppendixA:ObjectionstotheMismatchProblem 59
4.FunctionalRoleTheoriesandTrackingTheoriesAgain 70
4.1.TheFunctionalRoleTheory 71
4.2.WorrieswithShort-ArmFunctionalRoleTheories 72
4.3.WorrieswithLong-ArmFunctionalRoleTheories 76
4.4.TheRealProblemwithBothTrackingTheoriesandFunctional RoleTheories 79
4.5.Conclusion 80
partthree thephenomenalintentionalitytheory
5.ThePhenomenalIntentionalityTheory 83
5.1.ThePhenomenalIntentionalityTheory 84
5.2.ArgumentsforPIT 86
5.3.IdentityPIT 93
5.4.ChallengingCases 97
5.5.Conclusion 100
AppendixB:TheExtentofPhenomenalIntentionality 101 AppendixC:TheMultipleArisabilityofIntentionalStates 104
6.PIT’sStatusasaTheoryofIntentionality 109
6.1.IsPITaTheoryofIntentionalityinTermsofPhenomenalConsciousness? 109
6.2.IsPITTrivial? 114
6.3.IsPITInteresting? 115
6.4.IsPITNaturalistic? 116
6.5.Conclusion 119
partfour challengingcases
7.Thought 123
7.1.TheChallengeforPITfromThought 124
7.2.Thoughts’PhenomenalContents 127
7.3.Self-AscriptivismaboutThoughts’AllegedContents 139
7.4.IsDerivedMentalRepresentationaTypeofIntentionality? 152
7.5.Conclusion:PITaboutThought 154
AppendixD:DerivedMentalRepresentationinPerception 154
AppendixE:Attitudes 156
8.NonconsciousStates 160
8.1.TheProblemwithNonconsciousStates 161
8.2.DerivativistStrategies 163
8.3.StandingStates 169
8.4.AllegedlyNonconsciousOccurrentStates 184
8.5.Conclusion 191
partfive theaspectview
9.IsIntentionalityaRelationtoaContent? 195
9.1.TheRelationViewandtheAspectView 196
9.2.TwoWorrieswiththeRelationView 200
9.3.TheAllegedVirtuesoftheRelationView 206
9.4.Conclusion 229
AppendixF:TheAspectViewandAdverbialism 230
AppendixG:ContentsasFirst-orSecond-OrderStatesorProperties 232
AppendixH:AnInternalTheoryofTruthandReference 235
partsix conclusion
10.Conclusion:IntentionalityandOtherRelatedPhenomena 243
10.1.ReturntoOtherWaysofFixingReferenceonIntentionality 244
10.2.RadicalInternalism 247
glossary 249
bibliography 255
index 267
Preface
thisprojectbegan15yearsagowhen,asanundergraduateatMcGill,Iset outtowritemyundergraduatethesisonphenomenalconsciousness.Afterreading DavidChalmers’ TheConsciousMind,Idecidedthattherewasn’tmuchmorefor metosayonphenomenalconsciousnessandresolvedtosteerclearofthetopic.SoI turnedtotheproblemofintentionality.ButIsooncametorealizethatattemptsto understandintentionalityindependentlyofphenomenalconsciousnessultimately fail.What’smore,Icametobelievethatintentionalityisinfactoneandthesame thingasphenomenalconsciousness.Iwrotemyundergraduatethesisonprecisely thistopic(andtheidealistconsequencesItooktoensue),andthenmyPhDthesis onthissametopicagain(minustheidealism).Thisbookistheculminationofthese efforts.
TheideaspresentedherehavebenefitedfrompracticallyeveryphilosophicalinteractionIhaveeverhadwithfriends,colleagues,students,andmentorsatMcGill University,PrincetonUniversity,theAustralianNationalUniversity,theUniversity ofWesternOntario,andelsewhere.IwasespeciallyluckytobenefitfromtheexceptionallyrichintellectualenvironmentattheAustralianNationalUniversity,whereI spenttimeasapostdoctoralfellowattheCentreforConsciousnessandasavisitor.
ManyoftheideasinthisbookhavebeenpresentedintalksIhavegivenatthe AustralasianAssociationofPhilosophyConference(2008and2011),theEuropean CongressofAnalyticPhilosophy(2011),the23rdWorldCongressofPhilosophyat
theUniversityofAthens,theCanadianPhilosophicalAssociationMeeting(2013, 2014,and2017),thePacificAmericanAssociationofPhilosophyMeeting(2013), PrincetonUniversity,theAustralianNationalUniversity,theUniversityofToronto, theUniversityofMelbourne,theUniversityofWesternAustralia,theCentralEuropeanUniversity,theUniversityofCrete,OaklandUniversity,VictoriaUniversity atWellington,TulaneUniversity,theUniversityofTexasatAustin,theUniversity ofWaterloo,CornellUniversity,theUniversityofWashingtonatSt.Louis,the UniversityofMinnesota,CUNY,theUniversityofWisconsin–Madison,Yeshiva University,WellesleyCollege,WayneStateUniversity,CharlesSturtUniversity, Ruhr-UniversitätBochum,andtheUniversityofWesternOntario.Ithankthe audiencesatthosetalks,andespeciallymycommentatorsMikeCollins,TimCrane, JanetteDinishak,MarkHerr,DavidIvy,CharlesSiewert,andBradThompsonfor theirhelpfulandincisivecommentariesandoursubsequentdiscussions.
IamespeciallyindebtedtothePhenomenalIntentionalityReadingGroup—Tim Bayne,DavidBourget,RobStainton,andChrisViger—forreadinganearlyversion ofthismanuscriptandprovidingvaluablecriticismsandconcretesuggestionson bothcontentandpresentation.Thefinalversiongrewoutofourmanydiscussions. IamalsoextremelythankfultoCharlesSiewert,DeclanSmithies,LauraGow,and AdamPautzforreadingthismanuscriptinitsentiretyandprovidingextremelyhelpfulandincisivefeedback.ThanksalsotoDanielStoljarandtheANUPhilosophy ofMindWork-in-ProgressGroupforreadinganddiscussingseveralchaptersofthis workandprovidingextremelyhelpfulfeedback.Iamalsothankfultothosewho readandprovidedhelpfulcommentsonancestorsofvariouschapters,especially FrankJackson,GilbertHarman,JackWoods,AdamPautz,UriahKriegel,DavidPitt, PhilippKoralus,JimmyMartin,PaulBenacerraf,AnthonyAppiah,GideonRosen, JeffSpeaks,andDavidDavies.
Thisbookhasalsobenefitedfromnumerousdiscussionsthathavehelpedmesee manyissuesinanewlight.ThankyoutoDerekBaker,SamBaker,JohnBengson, MarkBudolfson,DavidChalmers,TimCrane,KatiFarkas,BillFish,Tamar Gendler,TerryHorgan,JoshKnobe,DanKorman,UriahKriegel,JohnMaier,Carla Merino,MatthewMoss,DanielNolan,GurpreetRattan,SusannaSchellenberg, VanessaSchouten,DanielStoljar,JackieSullivan,andBasvanFraassen.
Iamespeciallygratefultomydissertationsupervisors,FrankJacksonandGil Harman,forencouragingmetowritethedissertationIwantedtowrite,which formedthebasisofthisbook,andtomyundergraduatethesissupervisor,David Davies,forencouragingmetowritetheundergraduatethesisIwantedtowrite, whichformedthebasisofmydissertation.IowespecialthankstoJeffSpeaks,who raisedanobjectiontomyundergraduatethesisin2004thatinspiredtheviews
Preface xiii defendedinChapter7,andtoDavidChalmers,whosuggestedthatmyideasmight workwellasabook.
Iowespecialgratitudetomyparents,LinaandMarius,forexemplifyingboth insightandrigorinacademicworkandfortheirlove,support,andconfidenceinme. IamespeciallygratefultomymotherandmyfamilyinGreece—especiallyGiagia, Maria,andTryphon—forcreatinganearutopianworkenvironmentformeatour summerhouse.Mostofthisbook(aswellasthethesesitisbasedon)waswritten there.
TheeditorsandproductionteamatOUPhavebeentremendouslyhelpful throughoutthepublicationprocess.ThanksespeciallytoPeterOhlin,David Chalmers,IslaNg,RajSuthan,ThomasMcCarthy,andSangeethaVishwanthan.
MygreatestdebtbyfaristoDavidBourget,mypartner,frequentco-author, and(near)doppelgänger.WhenIfirstmetDavidin2008,Iwassurprisedtofind someonewithalmostexactlythesamephilosophicalviewsasme.Thisbookhasbeen heavilyinfluencedbyallourdiscussionsthroughouttheyears,duetowhichourviews havealmostentirelyconverged(someresidualdisagreementsremainconcerningthe materialofChapter9).Davidhasreadeverychapterofthisbookmultipletimesand discussedeverysingleideainitwithme,providinghelpfulcriticismsandevenmore helpfulconstructivesuggestions,andinmanycasesspendinghoursanddayshelping meworkthroughkeyideas.Iamimmenselythankfulforallhishelp,aswellasfor hisunwaveringmoralsupportandencouragement.
Overview
theaimofthisbookistodefendaradicallyinternalisttheoryofintentionality, theaboutnessordirectednessofmentalstates,onwhichintentionalityissimply identicaltophenomenalconsciousness,whichisanintrinsic,non-relationalfeature ofmentallife.Thisviewhasbeendescribedtomeasobviouslyfalse,unfashionable, andflyinginthefaceofeverydayintuitionandcognitivescience.Ithasalsobeen describedtomeastriviallytrueanduninteresting.Iaimtodefendaversionofthis viewthatistruebutnottrivial,interestingbutnotfalse,andsurprisinglyconciliatory withourintuitiveandscientificunderstandingofthemind.
Mytarget,intentionality,canbeunderstoodastheobserved“aboutness”or “directedness”ofmentalstates.Weintrospectivelynoticethatmanymentalstatesin somewayorotherseemto“present,”“represent,”orbe“about”things.Forexample, youmightnoticethatyourcurrentvisualexperiencesrepresentapagebeforeyou, somemarksofvariousshapesandcolors,andperhapsthewordsthatthesemarks form.Youmightalsonoticethatyourcurrentthoughtsrepresentthatthereisapage withmarksandwordsbeforeyou,somethingtodowithyourownmentalstates,or aneedforacupofcoffee.Intentionality,roughly,isthisphenomenonofaboutness ordirectednessthatwenoticeintheseandothereverydaycases.
Myaimistoofferatheoryofintentionality,atheorythatdescribesthedeep natureofintentionality,or,inotherwords,thattellsuswhatintentionalityreally is,metaphysicallyspeaking.Examplesoftheoriesofintentionalityincludetracking
theories,onwhichthemostbasickindofintentionalityisacausalorotherkind oftrackingrelationbetweeninternalrepresentationsanditemsintheworld(see, e.g.,Dretske1986andFodor1987),andfunctionalroletheories,onwhichthemost basickindofintentionalityisamatterofinternalstates’functionaldispositions withrespecttootherinternalstatesandperhapsalsowithrespecttoitemsinthe environment(see,e.g.,Harman1987andBlock1986).
Thisbookproposesaverydifferentkindoftheoryofintentionality,thephenomenalintentionalitytheory(PIT),whichtakesthemostbasickindofintentionality toarisefromaconceptuallydistinctmentalfeature,phenomenalconsciousness, thefelt,subjective,or“whatit’slike”(Nagel1974)aspectofmentallife.Thisand relatedviewshaverecentlybeendefendedbyvariousauthors,includingHorgan andTienson(2002),Loar(2003),Farkas(2008b,2008a),Strawson(2008),Siewert (1998),Montague(2010),Bourget(2010a),Mendelovici(2010),Kriegel(2011), Pitt(2004,2009),Pautz(2013a),andMendeloviciandBourget(2014),andhave historicalrootsintheworksofBrentano(1874)andHusserl(1900).Thisbook proposesaversionofPITthatisnotonlymotivatedonin-principlegroundsbutalso empiricallyadequateinthatitcanaccommodateallcasesofintentionality,including thosethatarecommonlythoughttoposeproblemsforPIT.
Iproceedasfollows:Chapter1ofPartIfixesreferenceonourtarget,intentionality.Iarguethatwhilethenotionsofaboutnessanddirectednessgesturetowardthis target,theyaretoofuzzytoprovideuswithafirmgriponit.Iproposetoreplace thesenotionswithanostensivereference-fixingdefinition,whichcanbecontrasted withothercandidatedefinitionsthattakeintentionalitytobewhateverplayscertain roles,suchasrolesinfolkpsychologicalorscientifictheoriesofbehavior,rolesin securingtruthandreference,orsimplyrolesinexplaininghowwegetaroundin theworld.Onmyapproach,intentionalityisaphenomenonweobserveandwant toexplain,ratherthanapositinatheoryprimarilyaimedatexplainingsomething else.
Chapter2ofPartIspecifiesthekindoftheoryofintentionalityweareafterand describestwotheory-independentwaysofknowingaboutourintentionalstates: introspectionandconsiderationofpsychologicalrole.
PartIIconsidersandarguesagainstwhatItaketobethetwomaincompetitors tomyfavoredapproachtointentionality,trackingandfunctionalroletheories. Chapter3ofPartIIarguesthattrackingtheoriesfaceamismatchproblem:there arecasesinwhichwerepresentacontentthatdoesnotmatchanythingwecan plausiblybesaidtotrack.Thetrackingtheory,then,isempiricallyinadequate,since itcannotaccommodatealltherequiredcases.Chapter4ofPartIIarguesthatthe mismatchproblemalsoafflictsthebestversionsofthefunctionalroletheory.Now, whilethemismatchproblemshows that thetrackingtheoryandthebestversionsof
thefunctionalroletheoryarefalse,itdoesnotpinpointtheprecisereasonsfortheir failure.Chapter4furtherarguesthatthefundamentalproblemwiththesetheories isthattrackingrelationsandfunctionalrolessimplydonothavewhatittakestogive risetointentionality.
PartIIIturnstomyfavoredapproachtointentionality,thephenomenalintentionalitytheory(PIT),onwhichthemostbasickindofintentionalityarisesfrom phenomenalconsciousness.Chapter5ofPartIIIpresentsandmotivatesPIT.I arguethat,unliketrackingtheoriesandfunctionalroletheories,PITprovidesthe rightkindsofingredientstoaccountforintentionalityandisnotclearlyempirically inadequate.IdistinguishbetweendifferentversionsofPIT,focusingespeciallyon myfavoredversion,strongidentityPIT,which,roughly,takeseveryintentional propertytobeidenticaltosomephenomenalproperty.Chapter6ofPartIII considersandrespondstosometheoreticalworrieswithPIT,suchasthatitisnot naturalistic.
PartIVfurthersupportsPITbyconsideringcertainchallengingcasesfortheview. Indoingso,itfleshesoutmyfavoredversionofstrongidentityPITandshows thatitisbothinterestingandtenable.Chapter7ofPartIVconsidersthechallenge raisedbythecaseofthoughts,whichappeartoberichinintentionalcontentbut poorinphenomenalcharacter.Iarguethatthoughtshaveakindofcontentthat doesindeedarisefromtheirfairlyimpoverishedphenomenalcharacters,thoughthis contentiscorrespondinglyimpoverished.Ifurtherarguethat,althoughthoughtsdo notphenomenallyrepresentmanyoftheirallegedcontents,theydothenextbest thing:they derivatively representthem.Iproposeself-ascriptivism,aviewonwhich wederivativelyrepresentvariouscontentsbyascribingthemtoourselves,whichisa matterofbeingdisposedtohavethoughtsacceptingourselvesorourphenomenal contentsasrepresentingthesefurthercontents.Although,asIargue,theresulting kindofderivedmentalrepresentationdoesnotqualifyasakindof intentionality,it qualifiesasakindofrepresentationonabroadsenseoftheterm.
AnotherimportantchallengeforPITisthatofaccountingformentalstates thatwetaketobeintentionalbutthatappeartohavenophenomenalcharacter. Suchstatesincludestandingstates,likebeliefsanddesiresthatwearenotcurrently entertaining,aswellasoccurrentstatesthatwearenotawareof,suchasnonconsciousstatesinvolvedinlanguageprocessing,blindsight,andearlyvisualprocessing. Chapter8ofPartIVaddressesthesechallenges.Iarguethatstandingstatesarenot genuinelyintentionalstates.However,Ialsosuggestthatself-ascriptivismcanbe extendedtoaccommodatestandingstatecontentsandperhapsevenstandingstates intheirentirety.
Chapter8alsoarguesthatmanynonconsciousoccurrentstates,suchasstates involvedinearlyvisualprocessing,areneitherintentionalnorderivativelyrepresentational.Whilethispositionmightseemfairlyextreme,even“flyinginthe faceofcognitivescience,”itisarguablyverymuchinlinewiththestandardview onthematter.Itagreeswiththestandardviewthatsuchoccurrentstatestrack orcarryinformationaboutvariousitemsintheenvironmentandplayvarious functionalroles,anditalsoagreesthattheyrepresentvariousitems,ifallwemean by“representation”issomethingthatboilsdowntotracking,carryinginformation, orhavingafunctionalrole.Thekeydisagreementwiththestandardviewdoesnot concernnonconsciousoccurrentstates,butrather conscious occurrentstates.
PartV,whichconsistsinonlyonechapter,Chapter9,turnstothequestionof whetherintentionalityisarelationtodistinctlyexistingentitiesthatplaytheroleof contentorwhether,instead,intentionalityissimplyanaspectofintentionalstates orsubjects.Iargueinfavorofthelatteraspectviewofintentionality.Whileitmight bethoughtthatthealternativerelationviewhasvariousvirtuesthattheaspectview lacks,suchasaccordingwithcommonsense,allowingforpubliccontents,helpingus makesenseofstructuredintentionalstates,andaccountingforconditionsoftruth andreference,Iarguethattheaspectviewfaresnoworsethantherelationviewwhen itcomestotheseallegedvirtues.
Themaingoalofthisbookistooffer,fleshout,anddefendatheoryof intentionality,butitalsohasasecondaryaim.AsImentionedabove,Chapter1 willarguethatitispossibletogetagoodgriponthephenomenonofintentionality withoutdefiningitintermsoftruthandreference,ourabilitiestogetaroundin theworld,folkpsychology,orthescientificstudyofthemind.Throughoutthis book,Ireturntotheseallegedrolesofintentionalityandarguethatitturnsoutthat mostofthemarenotinfactplayedbyintentionalityitselfbutbyvariousclosely relatedphenomena:Therelevantabilitytogetaroundintheworldisexplainedbya combinationoffactors,includingintentionalityandtrackingrelations;thenotions ofrepresentationimplicitinfolkpsychologydon’tcorrespondtointentionalitybut tosomecombinationofintentionalityandderivedrepresentation;conditionsof truthandreferencemightenduprequiringsomethingmorethanmerelyhaving intentionalstates,likeaprimitivecorrespondencerelationorourspecificationsof howwe’dliketobeinterpreted;andthenotionsofrepresentationinvokedinthe mind-brainsciencesareoftenamatteroftrackingrelationsandfunctionalroles. Theconcludingchapter,Chapter10,returnstotheallegedrolesofintentionality andsummarizesthesefindings.Theendresultisapictureonwhichintentionality, aspickedoutostensively,isamatterofphenomenalconsciousness,andthevarious otherrolesintentionalityissometimesthoughttoplayareinfactoftenplayedby distinct,althoughsometimescloselyrelated,phenomena.
I Introduction
myaimistoprovideatheoryofintentionality.Beforecomparingcompetingtheoriesofintentionality,itisimportanttofixfirmlyonourtarget andtogetclearonwhatkindoftheoryweareafter.Chapter1proposes anostensivewayoffixingreferenceonintentionality,whileChapter2 specifieswhatkindoftheorywewantandoverviewstwosourcesof theory-independentknowledgeofintentionalitythatwecanusetotestour theories:introspectionandconsiderationsofpsychologicalrole.
1 FixingReferenceonIntentionality
theaimofthisbookistoprovideatheoryofintentionality.Theaimofthis chapteristoclarifyjustwhatatheoryofintentionalityisatheory of.Itisimportantto getclearonthisbeforewestart.Atheoryofintentionalityisatheorythattellsusthat intentionalityhasaparticularnature,butifitisunclearjustwhat“intentionality” refersto,thenitisunclearwhatitisthatsuchatheorysayshasthatnature.
Iproposetogetclearonourtargetbydefiningitostensivelyusingintrospectively accessibleparadigmcases.Myostensivedefinitioncanbecontrastedwithalternative definitionsthatmayormaynotenduppickingoutthesamething.Iwillsuggest thattheostensivedefinitiondoesabetterjobofcapturingthecorenotionweare interestedin.Butfirst,Iwillsaysomethingaboutwhycommoncharacterizations ofintentionalityintermsof“aboutness”and“directedness,”thoughtheysucceed ingesturingtowardourtarget,donotprovideasatisfactorywayoffixingfirmly uponit.
1.1AboutnessandDirectedness
Intentionalityissometimescharacterized,atleastasafirstpass,asthe“aboutness”or “directedness”ofmentalstates(andperhapsotheritems)tothingsthatmayormay
notexist.Wemightsaythataperceptualexperienceofacupis“directed”atacup, thatathoughtthatitisrainingis“about”theputativefactthatitisraining,andthat abeliefinSantaClausis“about”SantaClausortheputativefactthatSantaClaus exists.
Thischaracterizationofintentionalityhasrootsinanoft-citedpassagefrom Brentano,whoisoftencreditedwithintroducingthenotionofintentionalityto contemporarydiscussions:
EverymentalphenomenonischaracterizedbywhattheScholasticsofthe MiddleAgescalledtheintentional(ormental)inexistenceofanobject, andwhatwemightcall,thoughnotwhollyunambiguously,referencetoa content,directiontowardanobject(whichisnottobeunderstoodhere asmeaningathing),orimmanentobjectivity.Everymentalphenomenon includessomethingasobjectwithinitself,althoughtheydonotdosointhe sameway.Inpresentation,somethingispresented,injudgmentsomethingis affirmedordenied,inloveloved,inhatehated,indesiredesiredandsoon.
(Brentano1874,p.88)
Therearemanyexamplesofcontemporarycharacterizationsofintentionalityin termsof“aboutness”and“directedness.”Forinstance,Siewert(2006)writes:“Intentionalityhastodowiththedirectednessoraboutnessofmentalstates—thefact that,forexample,one’sthinkingis of or about something”(p.1).Similarly,Speaks (2010b)writes:“Theclosestthingtoasynonymforintentionalityis‘aboutness’; somethingexhibitsintentionalityifandonlyifitisaboutsomething”(p.398).1
Inlightofthewidespreadacceptanceofsuchcharacterizationsofintentionality intermsofaboutnessandrelatednotions,Iwilltakeitasgiventhatsuchcharacterizationsatleast gesture towardthephenomenonofinterest.However,despite this,thecharacterizationofintentionalityintermsofaboutnessordirectedness wouldnotmakeagooddefinition,notevenagoodreference-fixingdefinition,of “intentionality.”Asadefinitionof“intentionality,”itistoofuzzyandmetaphorical togiveusafirmgriponourtarget.Itissimplynotclearwhatisbeingsaidwhenwe saythatamentalstateis“directedat”or“about”something,especiallyifthisthing neednotexist.Anexperienceofacupisnotliterallypointedinthedirectionofa cup(whichmaynotevenexist),inthewaythatafingeroranarrowmightpointto acup,andathoughtisnotliterallypointedinthedirectionofaproposition,which mightbeanabstractentityhavingnospatiallocationatall.Ifwetake“aboutness”
1 Foradditionalrepresentativeexamplesofthiswayofcharacterizingintentionality,seeJacob2003, Byrne2006,Kim1998,p.21,Searle2004,p.112,andO’Madagain2014.
and“directedness”talktosupplyadefinitionof“intentionality,”itissimplynotclear whatthisdefinitionsays.2
1.2TheOstensiveWayofFixingReference
Although“aboutness”and“directedness”talkdonotprovideuswithasatisfactory definitionof“intentionality,”theydogesturetowardthephenomenonofinterest.I wanttosuggestthatwhatisdoingtheworkwhenweuse“aboutness”and“directedness”talktofixonintentionalityisapriorgraspwehaveonthephenomenon. Mysuggestionfordefining“intentionality,”then,istolookpastourdescriptionsof thisphenomenonintermsofaboutnessandrelatednotionsandfocusinsteadon thephenomenonthusdescribed.Thisispossiblebecausewehaveaspecialaccess tothismentalfeatureindependentofanyfuzzyormetaphoricaldescriptions:We candirectlynoticeitthroughintrospection,atleastinsomecases.Thisallowsus toostensivelydefine“intentionality”asthisfeature,whateveritis,thatweatleast sometimesnoticeinourselvesandaretemptedtodescribeusingrepresentational termslike“aboutness”and“directedness.”
Inordertofleshoutthissuggestion,letusbeginbyconsideringsomecasesof mentalstatesthatwearetemptedtodescribeusingrepresentationaltermslike “aboutness”and“directedness.”Takeyourpresentperceptualexperiences:Youmight bevisuallyexperiencingsomemarksonapage,pensonyourdesk,orpartsofyour body.Likewise,youmightbeenjoyingauditoryexperiencesofvoices,music,or variousnoises.Theseexperienceshaveacertainfeature,afeaturewearetempted todescribeusingrepresentationaltermslike“aboutness,”“directedness,”“ofness,”or “sayingsomething.”Wemightdescribetheseexperiencesasbeing“of”or“about” thingsorwaysthingsareormightbe,oras“saying”thatthingsareaparticularway. Wemightsaytheyare“about”somemarksonapage,thatthey“say”thatthesemarks areinfrontofyou,andsoon.
Nowconsiderthethoughtsyouarecurrentlyhaving.Youmightbethinking aboutyourexperiences,desiringanothercupofcoffee,orjudgingthatIampointing outtheobvious.Likeperceptualexperiences,thesethoughtshaveafeaturethatitis temptingtodescribeusingrepresentationalterms.Wemightdescribethesethoughts asbeing“about”thingsoras“saying”thatthingsareacertainway.Wemightsaythat
2 Chisholm(1957a)criticizesBrentano’sdefinitionasbeingtoofuzzyandsuggestsinsteadalinguistic criterionofintentionality.Speaks(2010b)alsoarguesthatweshouldnot define “intentionality”interms ofaboutness;seealson.5.
theyare“about”ourexperiences,thatthey“say”thatIampointingouttheobvious, etc.
3
Theaboveexamplesshowthatwehavementalstatesthathaveacertainfeature thatweatleastsometimesintrospectivelynoticeandaretemptedtodescribe usingrepresentationalterms,suchas“about,”“of,”“represent,”“present,”and“saying something.” That feature,whateveritis,isintentionality.
Wecanputthingsmorepreciselyasfollows:Callthemundane,everydaycases suchasthosedescribedaboveour paradigmcases ofintentionality.Thesearethe casesthatwillformourinitialsampleofcasesofintentionalityforthepurposesof ourostensivedefinition.Thenwecanfixreferenceonourtargetasfollows:
Intentionality
Thefeaturethatinparadigmcaseswesometimesboth(i)notice introspectivelyinourselvesand(ii)aretemptedtodescribeusingrepresentationalterms,suchas“about,”“of,”“represent,”“present,”or“sayingsomething.”4
Itisimportanttoemphasizethatthefeaturepickedoutbymydefinitionis thefeatureofparadigmcasesthatweatleastsometimes both introspectively notice and aretemptedtodescriberepresentationally.Thisallowsthatthereare featuresofparadigmcasesthatwe either introspectivelynotice or aretemptedto describerepresentationally,butnotboth,andthatdonotqualifyasintentional.For example,thedefinitiondoesnotbyitselfruleouttheviewthatparadigmcaseshave introspectivelyaccessiblephenomenalfeaturesthataredistinctfromintentionality. Itisalsoimportanttoemphasizethat,althoughweareusingintrospectiontofix referenceonintentionality,theostensivedefinitiondoesnotruleoutthepossibility ofinstancesofintentionalitythatarenotintrospectivelyaccessible,oreveninstances ofintentionalitythatarenotmental.Suchcaseswouldnotbeparadigmcasesof intentionality,buttheywouldnonethelessbecasesofintentionalitysolongas theyhadtherelevantfeatureexemplifiedbyparadigmcases.Forexample,asfar asmydefinitionisconcerned,itcouldturnoutthatnonconsciousbeliefsand thenonconsciousstatespositedbycognitivescience,which,presumably,arenot introspectivelyaccessible,areinstancesofintentionality.Forthesamereasons,the ostensivedefinitiondoesnotruleoutthepossibilityofinstancesofintentionality thatwearenottemptedtodescriberepresentationally.Forexample,itdoesnotrule outthepossibilityofmoodsandafterimagesbeinginstancesofintentionality,even thoughwe(arguably)arenottemptedtodescribethemrepresentationally.
3 Itakethecategoryofthoughtstoincludeoccurrentbeliefs,occurrentdesires,andotheroccurrent “cognitive”statesbutnotstandingbeliefs,standingdesires,orotherstandingstates.See§1.4.2.
4 Definitionsofkeytermscanbefoundintheglossaryonp.249.
Theostensivedefinitionarguablybothdoesjusticetotheintuitionbehind thecharacterizationofintentionalityintermsof“aboutness”and“directedness” andisanimprovementoveradefinitionof“intentionality”intermsofthis characterization.IfIamright,“aboutness”talkaimstocharacterizeaphenomenon thatwehaveanantecedentgraspon.Myostensivedefinitionpicksoutprecisely thatphenomenon,soitdoesjusticetotheintuitionbehindcharacterizationsof intentionalityintermsof“aboutness”and“directedness.”Itoffersanimprovement overadefinitionof“intentionality”intermsofsuchcharacterizations,sinceitfixes firmlyonourtarget.Unlikeadefinitionof“intentionality”simplyasaboutnessor directedness,itavoidsbeingfuzzyormetaphorical,sinceitmerely mentions ourfuzzy andmetaphoricalrepresentationaltermsratherthan use them.(Ofcourse,itusesthe term“representationalterm,”butthisisatermpickingoutaclassoftermsratherthan arepresentationaltermitself.)5
Wecanusethisostensivedefinitionof“intentionality”todefinesomerelated notions: Intentionalproperties arewaysthingsareormightbewithrespecttotheir intentionality,orintentionalwaysthingsareormightbe,and intentionalstates are instantiationsofintentionalproperties.AsIamusingtheterms,intentionalstates arenotthesamethingas intentionalmentalstates,whicharementalstatesthat include,butmaynotbeexhaustedby,theinstantiationofintentionalproperties. Forexample,ajudgmentthatgrassisgreenmightinvolvetheinstantiationofthe intentionalpropertyofrepresentingthatgrassisgreentogetherwithaparticular non-intentional“judgment”component.So,itisanintentionalmentalstatebutnot anintentionalstate.6
Whatintentionalpropertiesandintentionalstates“say”orare“directedat”are theirintentionalcontents.Moreprecisely,wecanthinkofintentionalcontentas
5
Onemightobjectthat“aboutness”talkgesturesatreferenceratherthanattheostensivelydefined phenomenon(butseeCrane2013,pp.8–9,foraconvincingargumentagainstthis).Afterall,onemight argue,wesometimessaythatmentalstatesthatfailtorefer,likeathoughtthatSantaClausexists,are notreallyaboutanythingatall.
Now,wemightagreethat“aboutness”talkissometimesusedtopickoutreferencebutdisagreethat thismeansthat“aboutness”talk, whenusedtocharacterizeintentionality,gesturesatreference,since whatever“aboutness”talkissupposedtogestureatisnormallytakentoincludementalstatesinwhich thereisafailureofreference,suchasthethoughtthatSantaClausexists.Inanycase,if“aboutness” talkisnormallyusedtopickoutreference,thisonlyfurthersupportsmyclaimthatcharacterizationsof intentionalityintermsof“aboutness”wouldnotprovideanadequatedefinitionofintentionality.Speaks (2010b)makesasimilarpoint,arguingthatforsuchreasonsthe“characterizationofintentionalityas aboutnessisonlytruetoafirstapproximation”(p.398).
6 Theterm“intentionalstate”isoftenusedtomeanwhatImeanby“intentionalmentalstate.”Ideviate fromthisusagebecausemydiscussionfocusesoninstantiationsofintentionalproperties,soitisuseful formetoreservetheterm“intentionalstate”forthem.
