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Contents Acknowledgements vii
NoteontheContributors ix
Editor’sIntroduction1
1.AspectsofSpinoza’sTheoryofEssence:FormalEssence, Non-Existence,andTwoTypesofActuality11 MogensLærke
2.Wolff ’sCloseShavewithFatalism45 StephanLeuenberger
3.ModalAdventuresbetweenLeibnizandKant:Existence and(Temporal,Logical,Real)Possibilities64 OhadNachtomy
4.Kant’sMaterialConditionofRealPossibility94 JessicaLeech
5.Hegel’sExpressivistModalRealism117 ChristopherYeomans
6.RussellonModality136 ThomasBaldwin
7.ModalityandDegreesofTruth:AnAustro-PolishSideline inTwentieth-CenturyModalThought170 PeterSimons
8.Heideggeron ‘Possibility’ 186 MarkSinclair
9.DeReModalityintheLateTwentiethCentury:ThePrescientQuine217 JohnDivers
Acknowledgements MythanksareduetoJamesClarkewhoorganizedwithmethe2013BritishSociety fortheHistoryofPhilosophyannualconferenceattheUniversityofYork,andtothe thenPresidentoftheSociety,PaulinePhemister,whoofferedinsightfulguidance throughout.MythanksarealsoduetotheMindAssociationfortheawardofaMajor ConferenceGrant.
NoteontheContributors T HOMAS B ALDWIN isEmeritusProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofYorkand formereditorof Mind. Hisrecentworkincludes G.E.Moore:EarlyPhilosophical Writings , ‘G.E.MooreandtheCambridgeSchoolofAnalysis’ and ‘Truth:British IdealismanditsAnalyticCritics’
J OHN D IVERS ,ProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofLeeds,istheauthorof variousarticlesonmodality(in Mind,Noûs,PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch, etc.), PossibleWorlds (Routledge,2002)and NecessityAfterQuine (contractedtoOUP).
M OGENS L ÆRKE isSeniorResearcherattheCNRSinFrance,affiliatedattheENSde Lyon.Heistheauthorof LeibnizlecteurdeSpinoza (Paris,2008)and LesLumièresde Leibniz (Paris,2015),ofmorethan fiftyarticlesprincipallyonearlymodernphilosophy,andhasedited fivevolumesincluding PhilosophyandItsHistory (Oxford UniversityPress,2013).
J ESSICA L EECH isLecturerofPhilosophyatKing’sCollegeLondon.Shegainedher doctoratefromtheUniversitiesofGenevaandSheffield.Sheworksmainlyonthe philosophyofmodalityandKant’stheoreticalphilosophy.
STEPHAN LEUENBERGER isSeniorLecturerinPhilosophyattheUniversityofGlasgow. HegainedhisPhDatPrinceton,andreceivedtheOxfordStudiesinMetaphysics YoungerScholarPrize(2006)andtheLauenerPrize(2009).Hehaspublishedmainly onthetopicsofmodalityandsupervenience.
O HAD N ACHTOMY isAssociateProfessorandChairatBar-IlanUniversity.Heisthe authorof Possibility,Agency,andIndividualityinLeibniz’sMetaphysics (Springer, 2007);theeditor(withJustinSmith)of TheLifeSciencesinEarlyModernPhilosophy (OxfordUniversityPress,2014)and MachinesofNatureandCorporealSubstancesin Leibniz (Springer,2010);andhaspublishedsomefortyarticlesinthehistoryofearly modernphilosophyandthephilosophyofbiology.
P ETER S IMONS isEmeritusProfessorofPhilosophyatTrinityCollegeDublinandis HonoraryProfessorattheUniversityofSalzburg.Heistheauthoroftwobooks andovertwohundredarticles,andspecializesinmetaphysics,thehistoryoflogic, andcentralEuropean(PolishandAustrian)nineteenth-andtwentieth-century philosophy.
M ARK S INCLAIR isReaderinPhilosophyattheUniversityofRoehamptonand AssociateEditoratthe BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy.Hehaspublished
onthehistoryofmodernFrenchandGermanphilosophyin JournaloftheHistoryof Philosophy, HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly, ArchivfürGeschichtederPhilosophie, andthe JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas.
C HRISTOPHER Y EOMANS isProfessorofPhilosophyandHeadofDepartmentat PurdueUniversity.Heistheauthorof FreedomandReflection:HegelandtheLogic ofAgency (OxfordUniversityPress,2012)and TheExpansionofAutonomy:Hegel’ s PluralisticPhilosophyofAction (bothfromOxfordUniversityPress).
Editor’sIntroduction Thisvolumeoffersaselectionofessaysonmodalityandthemetaphysicsofmodality inthehistoryofmodernphilosophyfromtheseventeenthtothetwentiethcenturies. Theessaysweremainlyselectedfromcontributionstothe2013BritishSocietyforthe HistoryofPhilosophyannualconferencebearingthetitle ‘TheActualandthe Possible’,whichhadabroadremitconcerningmodalityandthemetaphysicsof modalitythroughoutthehistoryofphilosophy.Thenarrowerhistoricalfocusofthis volumearosefromapreponderanceofpapersonthehistoryofmodernphilosophy, whichseemedtoexpressaneedforapublishedworkthatwouldrevisitkey momentsinthehistoryofmodernmodaldoctrinesaswellasilluminatelesserknownmomentsofthathistory,andthiswiththeaimofcontextualising,and perhapsevenofofferingalternativestodominantpositionswithinthecontemporary philosophyofmodality.Hencethevolumecontainsnotonlynewscholarshipon theearly-moderndoctrinesofBaruchSpinoza,G.W.F.Leibniz,ChristianWolff andImmanuelKant,butalsoworkrelatingtolessfamiliarnineteenth-century thinkerssuchasAlexiusMeinongandJan Łukasiewicz,togetherwithessayson celebratednineteenth-andtwentieth-centurythinkerssuchasG.W.F.Hegel, MartinHeideggerandBertrandRussell,whosemodaldoctrineshavenotpreviously garneredmuchattention.Thevolumethuscoversavarietyoftraditions,andits historicalrangeextendstotheendofthetwentiethcentury,sinceitaddressesthe legacyofWillardVanOrmanQuine’scritiqueofmodalitywithinrecentanalytic philosophy.
Themodalnotionsarethoseofpossibilityandnecessity,togetherwiththerelated notionsofimpossibilityandcontingency,andthemetaphysicsofmodality,as commonlyunderstood,concernsthegroundsortruth-conditionsofstatements containingthesenotions.Suchstatementspervadebothourordinarytalkandour scientificdiscourse.Thattherecouldbemorecustomersinthecaféthanthere actuallyare,thatIcouldgettoworkinanumberofways,thatthelawsofnature cannotbebroken,thattheglassmightbreakifitfalls,thatunicornsdonotactually existbutcouldexist,areallassertionsthatseemtomeetwithcommonassent. Thetaskforphilosophy,however,istodeterminethecontentofsuchstatements, whethertheycanbetrueorfalselikethoseconcerningtheactualworld,andwhatitis thatcouldgroundtheirclaimstotruth.Intakingupthistask,thephilosopherhasto addressthefactthatwespeakmodallyaccordingtoavaryingscope:travellingfaster
thanthespeedoflight,forexample,maywellbemetaphysicallypossible possible inthewidestsense butitisnotphysicallyornomologicallypossible,i.e.not compatiblewiththelawsofnature.Thephilosopheralsohastoaddresshow modalstatementscanbe dere (‘Johnisnecessarilyhuman’),wherethemodalityis ascribedtothethingassuch,aswellas dedicto (‘Itisnecessarythat5+2=7’),where themodalityattachestothestatementasawhole.
Muchoftheworkonthemetaphysicsofsuchtruth-concerningor ‘alethic’ modalityinrecentdecades workwhichstandsattheforefrontoftherevivalof metaphysicswithinanalyticphilosophy hasfocusedonaparadigmof ‘possible worlds’ thathasaclearhistoricallineage.Forinlatermedievalphilosophy,asa wealthoftwentieth-centuryhistoricalscholarshiphasshown,1 atemporalor ‘statistical’ interpretationofmodaltermsderivingfromancientphilosophywasreplaced byadifferentparadigmthatwouldlaterbearticulatedintermsof ‘possibleworlds’ . Accordingtothe ‘statistical’ paradigm,modaltermswereinterpretedextensionally, withthenecessaryunderstoodasthatwhichisalwaysactual,theimpossibleasthat whichisneveractual,thepossibleasthatwhichisactualatsomepointintime,and thecontingentasthatwhichisactualbutwhichwillnotalwayshavebeenactual. Fromthisperspective,accordingtowhatArthurLovejoyfamouslynameda ‘principleofplenitude’ , 2 whatcanbe,willatonepointhavebeen andifitisnotatsome pointactual,thenitisnotpossible.UnderpressurefromtheideaofaChristianGod freelychoosingbetweenalternatehistoriesofacreatedworld,however,thistemporal groundingofmodalnotionsgavewaytoaparadigmadmittingunrealizedpossibilities andsimultaneousalternatepossibilities andthisparadigmreceiveditsgrandest developmentinLeibniz’snotionofpossibleworldsarrayedbeforetheunderstanding ofaGod,who,byvirtueofhisgoodness,actualizesonlythebestoneamongthem.
InterestinLeibniz’sconceptionofpossibilitywasrekindledinthemid-twentieth centurybyRudolfCarnap’sprojectofasemanticsforlanguageswithmodaloperatorsbymeansof ‘statedescriptions’,understoodasmaximalconsistentsetsof sentences;these,Carnapsuggested,couldbethoughtasakintoLeibniz’ s ‘possible worlds’.Severallogiciansinthe1950sandearly1960stookupinearnestthis Leibnizianapproachindevelopingamodeltheoreticalsemanticsformodallogic. ThemostprominentofthemwasSaulKripke,whopresentsasettheoreticalmodel structureforpropositionalmodallogicthatcanbeintuitivelyunderstoodascomprisingtheactualworld,thesetofallpossibleworlds,andtherelativepossibilities betweentheseworlds(whichwouldlaterbenamedthe ‘accessibilityrelation’).On thisbasis,apropositioncanbeunderstoodaspossibleifitistrueinatleastoneof
1 Forarecentexpressionofthisscholarship,seeSimoKnuuttila, ‘Modality’ in TheOxfordHandbookof MedievalPhilosophy,ed.J.Marenbon(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),312–41.
2 SeeArthurLovejoy, TheGreatChainofBeing (CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1936)and, forcriticalresponses,SimoKnuuttila(ed.), ReforgingtheGreatChainofBeing (Dordrecht:D.Reidel, 1980).
theseworlds,andasnecessaryifitistrueinallofthem.Aswellasclarifyingour ordinarymodaldiscourseandprovidingtruthmakers howevermerelytheoretical suchtruthmakersmayhavebeensupposedtobe formodalstatements,suchaset theoreticalstructureof ‘possibleworlds’ hastheimportantresultofshowinghow variouscombinationsofthepropertiesoftheaccessibilityrelation,namelyreflexivity, transitivity,andsymmetry,providesemanticsvalidatingtheaxiomsofthevarious systemsofmodallogicformulatedearlierinthetwentiethcentury.
Possibleworldstalkisapowerfulphilosophicaltool,anditwasnotlongbeforeone philosopher,DavidLewis,interpretedthistalkinthemostliteralfashion.According tohismodalrealism,iftalkingdonkeyscouldexist,thentheyreallyexistinanother world.Foreverypossibilityinthisworld,thereexistsanotherworldinwhichthat possibilityisreal;butthepossibleworldsinwhichtheyexist,thoughtheyaremuch likeouractualworld,arespatiallyunrelatedtoitandunobservable.Thoughcertainly strange,suchmodalrealismpermitsthereductionofaquantifiedmodallanguage toa first-ordernon-modallanguage,towell-understoodexistentialanduniversal quantification,andthus,forLewis,intermsofitseleganceandexplanatorypower,it isthebestavailabletheoryofpossibility.Ofcourse,avarietyoflessincredible surrogatesforthesereallyexistingpossibleworldshavebeenproposedinthe literature:notjustmaximalconsistentsetsofsentences,butpropositions,properties, pictures,andimaginative fictionshaveallbeenproposedasconstituting,asLewis putsit,Ersatzworlds.3 Given,however,thelackofconsensusonthemeritsofanyof theseoptions,orevenonwhetherthesortofreductivetheoryofmodalitythatLewis proposesisadesirablegoal,itisunderstandablethattheveryideathatmodal discoursehastruthconditionshasbeenchallenged.Attheoppositeendofthe spectrumtoaLewisianrealism,ananti-realistposition,accordingtowhichmodal talkisnotinanyobjectivesensetruth-apt,andismerelyanexpressiveprojectionof ourattitudes,couldwellsaveusfrommuchtoil,thathoweverhonest,mayultimately befruitless.4 Atthesametime,itisnotsurprisingthatmodalityhasrecentlybeen dethroned,asitwere,inanalyticphilosophywiththeclaimthatitisnotthemostbasic ontologicalcategory,thatinwhatthereismodality ‘doesnotgoallthewaydown’ , accordingtotheargumentthattheessenceofathingcannotbeaccountedforinterms of dere necessity.5 Itisnomoresurprisingthatthecontemporaryphilosophyof powershassoughttoaccountforthecontentofmodalclaimsbymeansofathisworldly,Aristotelianparadigm ofpotentialityastheultimate explanans inanymetaphysics
3 ForanexhaustivesurveyofthesealternativestoLewis’ s ‘genuinerealism’ ,see PossibleWorlds (London:Routledge,2002)byJohnDivers,whoveryhelpfullycommentedonadraftofthisintroduction, asdidtheanonymousreviewersofthemanuscript.
4 See,inparticular,SimonBlackburn, ‘MoralsandModals’ in EssaysinQuasi-Realism (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1993),52–74.
5 ThereferencehereistotheworkofKitFine,butseeJohnDiver’sanalysisofFine’spositioninhis contributiontothisvolume.
ofmodality.6 Withsuchnotionsofessenceandpotentiality,arenewedtasteformetaphysicsinanalyticphilosophyhasledfromLeibnizallthewaybacktoAristotle.
Itisagainstthisbackgroundthatthepresentvolumeattemptstore-assess modaldoctrinesinthemodernperiod,notonlywiththeaimoffurtherelucidating andsituatingLeibniz ’sthinkinginthecontextofEarlyModernphilosophy,butalso withthegoalofassessingalternateconceptionsofthemodalnotionsinlater centuries.Thevolumefocusesonthemetaphysicalmodalities incontrastto,say, epistemologicalordeontologicalmodalities andalthoughitsapproachisexploratory,open-mindedandeveneclectic,contributorstotheoriginalconferencewere encouragedtoreflectonhowmodaldoctrinesmightimpactontheideaofactuality. Actualityis,afterall,accordingtothephilosophicaltraditionatleast(asinKant,for example),oneofthemodalcategories,andaparticularaimofthevolumeisto addresshowtheinter-de finablenotionsofpossibilityandnecessitymightaffecthow weshouldunderstandbothactualityandtheontologicalnotionscloselyrelatedtoit, namelyexistenceandbeing.Chapters1,3,4,5and8alladdressthisbroadissuein onewayoranother,toagreaterorlessextent,andthisexplainstheorderoftheterms inthetitleofthevolume: TheActualandthePossible:ModalityandMetaphysicsin ModernPhilosophy
Inthe firstessay, ‘AspectsofSpinoza’sTheoryofEssence:FormalEssence,NonExistence,andTwoTypesofActuality ’,MogensLærkecriticizeswhathetakestobea recentwaveof ‘Platonizing’ interpretationsoftheDutchphilosopher.Accordingto theseinterpretations,Spinozabelongstoanessentialisttraditionholdingthatthe essencesofthingsexistoutsideoftimeandbeyondtheactualworld;whathenames essentiaformalis, formalessence,would,ontheseaccounts,besomethingdistinct from,oradistinctwayofbeing,to essentiaactualis,actualessence.SuchPlatonizing interpretationshavesignificantconsequencesforourunderstandingofpossibility andactualityinSpinoza’sphilosophy:formalessencescouldthusbeunderstoodas populatingarealmof possibilia,separatefromtheactualworld,andbeingor existencewouldthereforehavetobesaidindifferentwaysof possibilia andactually existentthings.Suchconsequencesarecontroversial,sinceSpinozaisotherwise committedtoanactualistdoctrinethatpossibilities,asmerelyafunctionofour ignorance,innowayexist;andwehavegoodreasonstosupposethatheiscommitted totheunivocityofbeing,accordingtowhichifthingsexist,theyexistinoneway only,withoutdegreesorgradation.InholdingthatSpinozaisindeedconsistently committedtothesedoctrines,LærkearguesthatSpinozadoesnotopposeformal essencetoactualessence,andthathecharacterizesessenceasactualonlytodescribe thepowerorstriving conatus constitutiveofessenceitself.Thisistosaythat Spinozaunderstandsactualityaspowerorstriving.Atthesametime,Lærkeargues,
6 See,forexample,JonathanD.Jacobs, ‘APowersTheoryofModality;or,HowILearnedtoStop WorryingandRejectPossibleWorlds’ , PhilosophicalStudies 151:227–48,andBarbaraVetter, Potentiality (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015).
theformalessencesofnon-existentthings,whichSpinozamysteriouslyclaimsare eternallycontainedinthedivinesubstance,shouldnotbeunderstoodasnon-actual orpossiblethings,butasthingsthataregraspedonlyquanon-existentthroughthe actuallyexisting ‘causeorreasonoftheirnon-existence’ .
StephanLeuenberger,in ‘Wolff ’sCloseShavewithFatalism’,addressesChristian Wolff ’smodalthinking,andaskswhetheritiscompatiblewithhisdenialoffatalism. Wolffhadbecomea causecélèbre throughoutEuropeafterFriedrichWilhelm Iunderstoodhimtobeadvancingafatalistdoctrineunderminingpersonalresponsibilityandconsequentlymorality,andorderedhimtoleavePrussiaonpainofdeath. LeuenbergerassessesWolff ’smodaldoctrinesintheirownterms,independentlyof Leibniz,anddiscoversafundamentaltension:Wolff ’ s Ontology definesphilosophy asthe ‘scienceofthepossiblesinsofarastheycanbe’,andhecertainlyclaimsthat whatispossibledoesnothavetoexist,buthisdefinitionoftheimpossibleasthat whichcontradictsatruesentencecommitshimtothedoctrinethateveryfalsityis impossible,andthustotheideathateverything,asitnowis,isnecessary.Wolff seemstohavebeenawareofthis,buthealsoseemstohavethoughtitpossibleto avoidfatalismbydistinguishinghypotheticalandabsolutenecessity:fatalismwould requirethatalltruthsareabsolutelynecessary,internallyoressentiallynecessary,but sometruthsaremerelyhypotheticallynecessary(orcontingent,asWolffalsoputsit), whichmeansnecessaryasaresultofotherthings.Thishardlyseemstoexonerate Wolff,sinceifasoldierhasdesertednotonaccountofhisownnaturebutdueto somethingexternal,thenwemightthinkthatheisevenlessresponsibleforthe desertion.Leuenbergerargues,however,thatWolff ’saccountoftheprincipleof contradiction,developedindependentlyofhisexplicitmodaldoctrines,mightjustbe enoughtogethimoffthehook.
WolffwasundoubtedlyimportantforKant’sreceptionofLeibniz’sviews,butin thethirdcontributiontothevolume,OhadNachtomyfocusesonLeibniz’sand Kant’saccountsofbothexistenceandpossibilityinordertotellsomeofthecomplex storyofwhatexactlyhaschangedbetweenthem.Leibnizdefinespossibilityas conceivabilitywithoutcontradictioninthedivinemind,andthusgivesstrong expressiontotheideathatmerepossibilitiesexistwithouteverbecomingactual,an ideawhichtranscendstheAristotelianstatisticalortemporalaccountofmodality, accordingtowhichtheactualexistsnow,thepossibleatsometime,andthenecessary atalltimes.Divineandself-consistentconceivability,asNachtomyshows,involvesa combinatorialandultimatelyactualistaccountofpossibility:therearepurelyactual ultimatesimpleconstituentsthatwhencombinedinconsistentwaysconstitute possibilities,andLeibnizidentifiestheseatomisticsimpleswithGod’sattributes.As forexistence,God’sisdistinctfromthatofhiscreatures:inhismodi fiedversionof Anselm’sontologicalproof,existenceistreatedasaperfectionandpredicate,whereas increatedthingsexistenceis,Leibnizholds,amatterofbeingcompatibleor compossiblewiththemostperfectseriesofthingsthatGod,byvirtueofhisgoodness, hasactualized.Kant’scritiqueoftheontologicalargument,accordingtotheclaim
thatexistenceisnotapredicateis,then,Leibnizianinspiritinsofarasitmerely extendshisviewthatexistenceisnotapredicateincreatedthingstothecreator himself.Moreover,Kant’ssoleprooffortheexistenceofGodinthe1763 Beweisgrund essaydrawsonLeibniz’sactualistconceptionofpossibility.Toputitvery briefly,thisproofstatesthatthemerepossibilityofsomething,ofanythingatall, requiressomethingactualandnecessary,namelyGod.
JessicaLeechaddressesthereflectiononpossibilityinthematureKant’scritical philosophy,anddrawsourattentiontoapassageofthe ‘IdealofPureReason’,inthe ‘TranscendentalDialectic’,whereKantseemstocriticizehisownearlierproofforthe existenceofGodinthe Beweisgrund essay.Inaskinghow ‘reasoncomestoregardall thepossibilityofthingsasderivedfromasinglepossibility,namelythatofthehighest reality’,however,Kantalsoseemstospeakofamaterialandnotjustformalcondition ofpossibility.Earlierinthe first Critique, inthechapterofthe ‘AnalyticofPrinciples’ entitled ‘ThePostulatesofEmpiricalThinkinginGeneral’,realpossibility as distinctfromlogicalpossibility wasdefinedaswhatagreeswiththeformalconditionsofexperience.ButintheDialectic,Kantsupplementsthisanalysiswiththeidea thatnothingcanbegiventousunlessitisgivenwithinasumtotalofempirical reality.Inthisway,Leechargues,Kantdevelopstheideathatrealpossibilityconcerns thecognition,whichinvolvessensibility,andnotjustthethoughtofanobject.
In ‘Hegel’sExpressivistModalRealism’ ChristopherYeomansilluminatesHegel’ s distinctionsbetweenlogical,realandabsolutemodality.Hegelthinksofreal modality indistinctiontothelogicalpossibilitygovernedbytheprincipleof contradiction inamaterialsenseasthemanifoldcircumstancesconditioninga presentactuality.Hegelenthusiasticallyendorsesthepositionthatrealpossibilityis butrealityoractuality:thepossibilityofaparticularfact,sayacarwinningtherace,is groundedinotheractualities,saythequalityoftheengineandtyres;andtherelation betweentheseactualitiescanbecharacterizedaccordingtoanideaofcausalnecessity.TheHegelianmodalnotionsthusarebynomeansexclusivelycharacteristicsof conceptsandjudgements,andarecharacteristicofeventsthemselves.FromHegel’ s perspectiveofabsolutemodality,however,ifweaddmoredetailtoanygivenmodal description,thenthisdoesnotsimplyaddmoredetailtoourknowledgeofthereal possibilitiesthatnecessarilycausethepresentactuality.Rather,asYeomansputsit, suchaddition ‘onlydrawstheactualandthepossibletogetherintothebondsof necessity,andinsodoingrendersthepossiblemoreaninternal feature oftheactual ratherthananexternal conditionon it’.Withthischangeofphilosophicalperspective fromtherealtotheabsolute,thesignificanceofthethreemodaltermshaschanged: ‘actualityisthewholepatternofvariationorcourseofdevelopmentratherthanthe merelyexistentstates;possibilitiesarethespecificcontentsofthatpatternor phenomenainthatcourse(i.e.whatwereformerlythoughttobeactualities)rather thanexternalconditions;andnecessityisthestructureofthatpatternortheforceof thatdevelopment’.Yeomansshowshowthisrealistconceptionofthemodalities asfundamentalaspectsoftheworldisafunctionofwhathetermsan ‘expressivist
realism’,accordingtowhichtheabsoluteactualitypositedbyHegelistheself-altering processofitsownmanifestation.
ThomasBaldwinoffersasynopticaccountofRussell’schangingviewsconcerning possibilityandnecessity.Anintuitionistviewoflogicalnecessity,accordingtowhich itisafundamental,indefinablepropertythatis ‘purelyandsimpleperceived’,swiftly giveswaytoscepticismconcerningwhethernecessityexistsatall.Itcannotbe explainedbyanalyticity,asRussellarguesin ‘NecessityandPossibility’,whichhe readtotheOxfordPhilosophicalSocietyin1905,sincesomepropositionsarefeltto benecessarywhentheyarenotanalytic; ‘bad doesnotmeanthesameas not-good, andthereforemerelogicwillneverprovethat good and bad areanymoreincompatiblethan round and blue’.Necessitydoesnothavethesameextensionasanalyticity,andRussellistemptedbytheideathatitisgroundedontheuniversaltruthof therelevantpropositionalfunction.Russellseemsinthiswaytoreturntoan Aristotelianstatisticalconceptionofmodality,accordingtowhichthenecessaryis thatwhichistrueatalltimes.BaldwinshowshowRussell’sthinkingmirrorsDavid Hume’sfamousscepticalconstrualofcausalnecessity:Humeattemptstoaccountfor causationintermsoftheconstantconjunctionofeventsandapsychologicalfeeling ofnecessity,and,similarly,Russellisledtowardsthepositionthatthe feeling of necessityisgroundedinthepropositionalfunction’sconstantlyanduniversallybeing true.Inhislaterwork,inthe ProblemsofPhilosophy andelsewhere,however,Russell oftensuggeststhatthedomainofquanti ficationofpropositionalfunctionsispossible worlds theidiomwasfamiliartohimfromhisearlybookonLeibniz.Yetheis clearlyreluctanttoadmitthatthesepossibleworldshaveanykindofnon-actual reality,andthus,asBaldwinshows,hiscommitmentspointtowardswhatincontemporarymodaltheorywouldbecalledaquasi-linguisticmodalersatzism.
In ‘ModalityandDegreesofTruth:AnAustro-PolishSidelineinTwentiethCenturyModalThought’,PeterSimonsexploreswhathetakestobeathird-way inconstruingmodalitythatrejectsbothlinguisticaccountsandthepoly-cosmismof possibleworldtheory.Simonsexaminestwoversionsofthisthird-wayadvancedby AustrianAlexiusMeinong whosetheoryofobjectsthatdonotexist,butwhichare nolessinbeing,occupiedRussellforsometime andthePolishlogicianJan Łukasiewiczrespectively.SomeofMeinong’snon-existentobjectsare incomplete, andthisallowshimin1915toaccountforobjectiveprobability(whichhenames possibility)withanideaofdegreesoftruth:theproposition ‘Mydrawofacardfrom thepacktomorrowwillbeaking’ isneithersimplywhollytruenorwhollyfalse,and thisregardlessofthedrawthatIwillactuallymaketomorrow,buthasadegreeof truth,adegreecorrespondingtotheproportionsofkingsinapackofcards,between 0and1.Thisscaleendsintruthratherthannecessity,butMeinongisnevertheless ledtotheideathatsomestatementsaretrueinsuchawaythattheirtruthiswritten intothemaspartoftheirverynature,andarethusnecessary. Łukasiewicz,the inventoroffuzzylogic,visitedMeinonginGrazin1908and1909,andin1913 publishedhisownworkonprobability,accordingtowhichsomepropositionsare
indefinite andhavetruthvaluesbetweenand0and1;andin1917hebegantoextend thisanalysisto definite propositionsaboutfuturecontingencies.Inconclusion,Simons showshow ŁukasiewiczandMeinong’sattemptstoprovidealogicalandontological basisforprobabilitytheoryhaveaprecedentintheworkofBernardBolzano.
Inmycontribution, ‘Heideggeron “Possibility”’,IexaminehowanideaofpossibilityiscrucialtoMartinHeidegger’sphilosophicalproject,andwhatitmeansfor himtoclaim,ininvertingAristotle’sdicta,thatpossibilityisnot ‘lower’ butrather ‘higher’ thanactuality,whichistosaynotlessbutmoreinbeingthanactuality.The mostprofoundsenseofthepossible,forHeidegger,isnotpossibilityasconstitutinga realmofpossibiliacontrastingwithactuality,anditisnotconceptualpossibility. Forthebeingofwhatwecall ‘actuallyexisting’ thingsisalreadyabeing-possible. Thestuffofdailylife doorhandles,chairs,and,ofcourse,Heidegger’sfamous hammer affordspossibilitiesforactioninagivensituation,butforallthatthese possibilitiesarerelativetotheagent,theyareunderstood,Heideggerargues,as belongingtothingspriortoanyactofjudgementortheoreticalcognition.Things are afunctionofhowwepragmatically,contextually,andpre-theoreticallyunderstandthem,andifbytheactualityofathingwemeanitsbeingpresentbeforethe eyesasanisolatedobject(thisis,loosely,whatHeideggertakes ‘actuality’ tomean), thenthingsarenot,atleastasweordinarilyandprimarilyencounterthem,actualat all.Heidegger’sclaimthatpossibilityissuperiortoactualityis,however,developed mostfullyinhisaccountofthebeingthatweare(Dasein inHeidegger ’sGerman),an accountbased,asIshow,onaninterpretationofAristotle’sde finitionofmovement asthe ‘actualityofthepossibleaspossible’.HeideggerisnotaloneamongtwentiethcenturyAristoteliansinreadingthisdefinitionofmovementasannouncinga modeofbeingwherepossibilityorpotentialityreallyshowsitselfandfullyexistsas thepossibilitythatitis;buthearguesthatmovementasamodeofbeingessentiallycharacterizing Dasein,initscareandstriving,cannotbereducedtotraditional notionsofactuality.Inthelatersectionsoftheessay,afterdetermininghow againstthisbackgroundHeidegger’sfamousanalysisofdeathasthe ‘possibilityof impossibility’ canbeunderstood,Iexplorehowhis(neo)-Aristotelianclaimsare modifiedinthe1930sbyareflectiononart-production.Heidegger’sthinking atthistimeinmanywaysturnsonarevisedinterpretationofAristotle’smodal metaphysics,andunderstandingthis,Icontend,iscrucialtoanyengagementwithhis laterwork.
Finally,in ‘DeReModalityintheLateTwentieth-Century:ThePrescientQuine ’ , JohnDiversbothclarifiesandinvitesgreaterappreciationofWillardVanOrman Quine’sscepticismconcerningderemodality.Onthebasisofhisdemonstration withhisfamousnumberofplanetsparadox ofthereferentialopacityofdere modalpredication,Quine,Diverscontends,neitherarguesthatderemodalpredicationisabsolutelyunintelligible,normakesanunwarrantedassumptionthat thecommitmentsnecessarytodefenditsintelligibilityinvolveunbearablecosts.
Thecommitmentsamountto:1)theideaofalanguage-independentmodalityand thustosomekindofmetaphysicaldoctrineofAristotelianessentialism;2)alogicof variablesandsingulartermsthatismorecomplicatedandweakerthantheorthodox approachinvolvedinclassical firstorderlogic;and3)theprincipleofthenecessityof identityasathesisofquanti fiedmodallogic.Quine ’spresumptionthatthecostof thesecommitmentscouldnotbebornewasnot,incontext,unwarrantedbecause, Diverscontends,hisdialecticalopponentswerethelogicalempiricistswhowould havetocountthemasunbearable.Diverssubsequentlyassesseshowthemodal philosophiesofSaulKripke,DavidLewis,andKitFinefareinrelationtoQuine’ s predictions.Kripkeenthusiasticallyacceptsallthreecommitments,whereasLewis andFinerefusethe ‘fundamentalist’ presumptionaboutderemodalpredicationon whichQuine ’spredictionsarebased.Quine,Diverscontends,wouldnothavebeen surprisedbytheirideasthatderemodalpredicationmightbedefendedasanoncanonicalorsecondaryaspectof ‘totaltheory’,andwouldhavebeensurprisedonly bytheextraordinarymetaphysicallengthstowhichbothphilosophersareprepared togoinprosecutingthisstrategy.
Earlydraftsofamajorityoftheessayswerepresentedatthe2013BritishSociety fortheHistoryofPhilosophyannualconference,buttwonewessayswerecommissionedsubsequentlyinordertoextendthephilosophicalandhistoricalrangeofthe volume.Avolumesuchasthiscannotpretendtoofferacompletesurvey butthe senseinwhichanysuchsurveycouldbecompleteisopentoquestion ofmodal metaphysicsinmodernphilosophy.Therearesomeimportantmodernphilosophers whodonotdirectlyfeaturewithinit,butthevolumeisintendedtoactasaspurto furtherworkinthehistoryofmodalmetaphysics.Giventhatthelastcollected volumeonmodalityinmodernphilosophy,theexcellent ModernModalities:Studies oftheHistoryofModalTheoriesfromMedievalNominalismtoLogicalPositivism editedbySimoKnuuttila,andfeaturingessaysonDescartes,Hobbes,Leibniz,Hegel, nineteenth-centuryFrenchandBritishphilosophy,FregeandLogicalPositivism is nearlythirtyyearsoldandrelativelyhardtocomeby,itwastimeforanewcollected volumeinthe field.ThepresentcollectioncomplementsKnuuttila’svolumenicely, andbynomeansrendersitobsolete.
Bibliography Blackburn,S., ‘MoralsandModals’ in EssaysinQuasi-Realism (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1993),52–74. Divers,J., PossibleWorlds (London:Routledge,2002).
Jacobs,J.D., ‘APowersTheoryofModality;or,HowILearnedtoStopWorryingandReject PossibleWorlds’ , PhilosophicalStudies 151:227–48. Knuuttila,S.(ed.), ReforgingtheGreatChainofBeing (Dordrecht:D.Reidel,1980).
Knuutila,S.(ed.), ModernModalities:StudiesoftheHistoryofModalTheoriesfromMedieval NominalismtoLogicalPositivism (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1988).
Knuuttila,S., ‘Modality’ in TheOxfordHandbookofMedievalPhilosophy,editedby J.Marenbon(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),312–41. Lovejoy,A., TheGreatChainofBeing (CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1936). Vetter,B., Potentiality (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015).
1 AspectsofSpinoza’sTheory ofEssence FormalEssence,Non-Existence, andTwoTypesofActuality MogensLærke Overthelastdecade,Spinozascholarshiphaswitnessedasubtlebutforcefulshift towardsPlatonizinginterpretations.1,2 BysuchinterpretationsIunderstandwhat AnthonyKenny,referringtoDescartes,hasdescribedas ‘Platonismaboutessences’ , 3 orinterpretationsthatascribetoessencesakindofbeingdifferentfromthekind ofbeingthatpertainstoexistences.AccordingtoValtteriViljanen,forexample, ‘Spinoza’sthoughtbelongsto andmayinfactbethehighpointof anessentialist traditionthatoriginateswithPlatoandfunctionsasasharedbackgroundforthe scholastics....’4 EmanuelaScribanosimilarlyarguesthat ‘inSpinoza’smetaphysics,the
1 IamgratefultoObertoMarrama,AndreaSangiacomo,TadSchmaltz,StevenNadler,JohnBrandau, JulieKlein,RaphaëleAndrault,OhadNachtomy,SeanWinkler,KarelD’huyvetters,andValtteriViljanen, whoallprovidedextensivecomments,criticisms,andcorrectionsthathelpedmeimprovethispaper substantially.
2 ForSpinoza’sworks,Ihaveusedthefollowingeditions: Opera,editedbyC.Gebhardt,Heidelberg: CarlWinterVerlag,1925,volsI–IV,and TheCollectedWorksofSpinoza,vol.I.,editedbyE.Curley (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1985).Iusethefollowingabbreviations:E= Ethics [roman numeralsI–V=Part;D=Definition(whenprecedingaP);A=Axiom;Exp.=Explication;P=Proposition; D=Demonstration(whenfollowingaP);C=Corollary;S=Scholium;e.g.EIP17Disthedemonstrationof proposition17inthe firstpartofthe Ethics].Foreaseofreferenceandsakeofuniformity,whendifferent, Ichangethenomenclatureinquotationsfromothersecondaryliteratureto fitthisformat.TIE= Tractatusde intellectusemendatione [Irefertothe§numbersestablishedbyBruder,alsoemployedbyCurley];CM= Cogitatametaphysica [followingbypartandchapternumber];KV= KorteVerhandelingvanGod,de MenschenDeszelfsWelstand [followedbypart,chapter,andsectionnumber;the§numbersusedby GerhardtandCurleyareusedfortheappendixes].Descartes:AT= OeuvresdeDescartes,editedby C.AdamandP.Tannery(Paris:Vrin/CNRS,1964–1976);CSM= ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes, trans.J.Cottinghametal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).
3 A.Kenny, ‘TheCartesianCircleandtheEternalTruths’ , TheJournalofPhilosophy 67:19(1970): 685–700,p.696.
4 V.Viljanen, Spinoza’sGeometryofPower (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011),p.15.
doubleaspectoftheexistenceof finitemodesreproducesthetraditionalPlatonictheory accordingtowhichtimeisanimitationinthesensibleworldofamoretruerealitythatis outsidetime.’5 APlatonizinginterpretationofSpinozaisthusaninterpretationthat allowsforanequivocationinSpinozaontheterm ‘existence’,or,asCharlesJarrettputs it,followingasuggestionalreadymadebyAlbertRivaudinhis1905monograph Les notionsd’essenceetd’existencedanslaphilosophiedeSpinoza,aninterpretationaccordingtowhich ‘Spinozaemployswhatmightbecalleda “dualnotion” ofexistence.’6
RecentdiscussionshavelargelyturnedonSpinoza’suseofthenotions essentia formalis and essentiaactualis.ForsomePlatonizingcommentators,formalessences andactualessencesareseparateessences.Forothers,actualessencesareactualized formalessences.Inbothcases,however,actualessencesarenothingbutactually existingessences,andformalessencesassuchdonotimplyactualexistence.7 Formal essenceisseeneitherasabeingdistinctfromactualessence,orasadifferentkindof beingofessencethantheactualone,inbothcasesgivingrisetoamulti-layer ontologywhere,foreachthing,thereis,ontheonehand,abeingofitsessence(or formalessence)and,ontheother,abeingofitsexistence(oractualessence.)One wayof fleshingoutthisdistinctionisthentomaintainthatformalessencesare eternalinaccordancewithSpinoza’snotionofeternityas ‘existenceitself,insofarasit isconceivedtofollownecessarilyfromthedefinitionaloneofaneternalthing’ and which ‘cannotbeexplainedbydurationortime’ (EID8).Actualessences,fortheir part,haveduration,or ‘determinateexistence’ asSpinozasometimestermsit (e.g.EP21D),i.e.theyenterandleaveactualexistence.Inthiscontext,non-actualized formalessencesareoftenassociatedwiththenotoriousnon-existentmodesthat SpinozadiscussesinEIIP8.OnthePlatonizingpicture,theideasthatwehaveof non-existentthings,ideasofformalessences,areideasaboutadifferentkindof existencethantheideaswehaveofactualizedessences,i.e.actuallyexistentthings. The firstideasarethenabouteternalformalessences;thesecondonesareaboutthe actualessencesofpresentlyexistingthings.Somecommentatorshavecomparedformal essencesandnon-existingmodeswith possibilia,thusmakingoftherealmofformal essencesinimportantrespectscomparabletoLeibniz’ s regiopossibilitatis 8 Others
5 E.Scribano, Guidaallaletturadell’EticadiSpinoza (Roma-Bari:EditoriLaterza,2008),p.45.Iam gratefultoObertoMarramawhotranslatedtherelevantpassagesfromItalianforme.
6 C.Jarrett, ‘Spinoza’sDistinctionbetweenEssenceandExistence’,in Iyyun:TheJerusalemPhilosophicalQuarterly 50(2001):245–52,p.247.ForRivaud,see Lesnotionsd’essenceetd’existencedansla philosophiedeSpinoza (Paris:FélixAlcan,1905).Foranevenolderstudygoingdownthesameroad,see L.Busse, ‘ÜberdieBedeutungderBegriffe “‘essentia” und “‘existentia” beiSpinoza’ , Vierteljahrschriftfür wissenschaftlichePhilosophie 10(1886):283–306,inparticularp.291.
7 SeeforexampleD.Garrett, ‘SpinozaontheEssenceoftheHumanBodyandthePartoftheMindthat isEternal,’ in CambridgeCompaniontoSpinoza’sEthics,editedbyO.Koistinen(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2009),286–7;T.M.Ward, ‘SpinozaontheEssencesofModes’ , BritishJournalforthe HistoryofPhilosophy 19:1(2011):19–46,p.35;V.Viljanen, ‘SpinozaonVirtueandEternity,’ in Essayson Spinoza’sEthicalTheory,editedbyM.J.KisnerandA.Youpa(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2014),264–5.
8 SeeA.Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,1988),pp.58–9;R.J.Delahunty, Spinoza (London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1985),pp.295–6;J.Bennett, AStudyofSpinoza’sEthics
havetriedtosituatetheformalessenceswithinSpinoza’sframeworkofmodes, inscribingthemindifferentwayswithinSpinoza’sdifficultdoctrineofinfinite modes.9 YetothershavegiventhePlatonizingtendencyanadditionalturnofthe screw,bymaintainingthatformalessencesarenotindividual,butgeneral.10 Butall thesedifferentreadingsagreeononepoint,namelythatSpinozaoperateswithseveral kindsofexistenceandthatadichotomyopposingformaltoactualessencescaptures thedifferencebetweenthem.
ThevariousPlatonizinginterpretationsdonotformaunifiedfront,butemerge fromverydifferentapproachesandinvariousdegreesofexplicitness.Theconvergencebetweenthemcouldseemtolendadditionalplausibilitytothebasicpointthey haveincommon.Inthefollowing,however,Iwanttoresistthatconclusion.The mainreasonformyresistanceismyconvictionthatSpinoza,asGillesDeleuze alreadypointedouthalfacenturyago,iscommittedtotheunivocityofbeing.11 In short,forSpinoza,thingseitherexistortheydon’t,thereisnoclassofbeingsin between,andexistenceisalwayssaidinthesamesenseofthethingsofwhichitis said.Ithinkthereareseveralwaysinwhichonecanarriveatthisconclusion.Hereis, briefly,oneofthem.ThecentraltenetofSpinoza’smetaphysicsistheideathatthere isauniquesubstance,GodorNature,ofwhichallotherthingsaremodes (EIP14C1–2;EIP25C;KVII,v,§10,etc.).Allthingsarenecessarily in God,ashe alsoputsit(EIP15).Moreover,substancedoesnotexistoverandabovetheproductionofmodesthatnecessarilyfollowsfromit(EIP16),insofarasitsessencejustis suchproductive,causallyeffectivepower(EIP34).AsSpinozamaintainsinEIP25S, ‘Godmustbecalledthecauseofallthingsinthesamesenseinwhichhemustbe calledthecauseofhimself.’12 This ‘samesenseclause ’ positstheexistenceofmodesas groundedinexactlythesamecausalprocessasthatinwhichsubstanceisitself grounded:Substanceproducestheexistenceofmodesasitproducestheexistence ofitself.Theexistenceattributedtomodesis theexactsameexistence astheone
(Indianapolis:Hackett,1984),pp.357–8;W.Matson, ‘Body,EssenceandMindEternityinSpinoza’,in Spinoza:IssuesandDirections,editedbyE.CurleyandP.-F.Moreau(Leiden:E.J.Brill,1990),pp.88–9. E.Yakirasuggeststhatweshoulddistinguishthelevelof ‘existence’ fromthatof ‘ontology’ andclaimsthat nonexistentmodesare ‘insomesense ...justpossibilities’ (‘IdeasofNonexistentModes:EthicsII Proposition8,itsCorollaryandScholium’,in SpinozaonKnowledgeandtheHumanMind,editedby Y.YovelandG.Segal,(Brill:Leiden,1994),pp.160and164).
9 Thereis,however,littleconsensusabout how formalessencesrelatetoinfinitemodes.ForMartin, Garrett,andWard,allformalessencesareinfinitemodes.ForScribanoandMignini,thetotalseriesof formalessencesconstitutesa mediate infinitemode.AccordingtoStevenNadler,inaninsightfulandnonPlatonizingreading,thetotalseriesofformalessencesconstitutesan immediate infinitemode.ForNadler, see ‘Spinoza’sMonismandtheRealityoftheFinite,’ in SpinozaonMonism,editedbyP.Goff(NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,2012),p.234.Fortheothers,seelaterinthischapterforreferences.
10 Seelaterinthischapter,onWard,Garret,andMartin.
11 SeeG.Deleuze, Spinozaetleproblèmedel’expression (Paris:Minuit,1968),pp.44–58.
12 Thisis,ofcourse,thedoctrinecommonlyknownasSpinoza’ s ‘monism’.Ihavehoweverargued elsewherethatthisisnotanappropriatedescriptionofSpinoza’sposition,onbothhistoricalanddoctrinal grounds.SeeM.Lærke, ‘Spinoza’sMonism?WhatMonism?’,in SpinozaonMonism,editedbyP.Goff (NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2012),244–61.
attributedtosubstance,butmodi fied.13 Consequently,existenceisalwayssaidinthe samesenseaboutthethingsofwhichitissaid,beitsubstanceormodes.AsSpinoza putsitinEIIP45S,weheretouchupon ‘theverynatureofexistence,whichis attributedtosingularthingsbecauseinfinitelymanythingsfollowfromthenecessity ofGod’snatureininfinitelymanymodes.’
WithinSpinoza’sontologicalframework,therefore,itishardtoseehowthere couldberoomfordistinguishingbetweenthebeingofessencesandthebeingof existencesastwodifferentontological ‘levels’ inhabitedbyontologicallydistinct beings,orbybeingsinontologicallydistinctstates,suchasPlatonizinginterpretationssuggest,sincethereisinSpinozaonlyonepossibleontologicallevel,namely thatofmodifiedsubstance, ‘beinginGod’ ,or ‘existenceitself ’ asSpinozacallsitin EID8.Thetheoryofthedivineattributeswilldonoworkinalleviatingthisproblem, sinceSpinoza’scommitmenttointer-attributeparallelism,orontologicalparallelism, requiresthatallattributesincludethesamemodes,orthatallattributesareinhabited bythesamethingsinthesameorder.14
ThisisthemostgeneralreasonformyreticencetowardsPlatonizingreadings.In itself,itisobviouslyinsufficienttodiscardthem.Afterall,therecouldverywellbea realtensioninSpinoza’smetaphysicsonthispoint.Or,asanotheroption,Spinoza’ s theoryofformalessencesmightjustbeproofthatmyinitialintuitionaboutthe univocityofbeinginSpinozaisinfactmistaken.Inthefollowing,Iwillhowever identifytherootofPlatonizingreadingsandestablishexactlywheretheygowrong andwhy.Iprincipallyarguethatthecentraloppositionbetweenformalessencesand actualessencesisafalsedichotomy.Spinozaneverintendedtojuxtaposethoseterms andtheusePlatonizingreadingshavemadeofthemreliesonamisconstrualwhich isinconsistentwithSpinoza’suseoftheterminology.Inreality,whencorrectly construed,Spinoza’sconceptionofessenceandexistence,offormalessences,existent andnon-existentmodes,actualessenceandactualexistence,allconvergetowardsa single,stronglyanti-Platonistconceptionaccordingtowhicheverythingthatisand thatcanbeconceivedisandisconceivedtobeononeandthesameontologicallevel, namelythatofmodifiedsubstance.
Inthefollowing,Ithusprovide,againstPlatonizingreadings,thebasicoutlineof analternative ‘aspectual’ readingofSpinoza’sdoctrineofformalessence,objective being,existenceandnon-existence,andactuality,thatconformstohisone-level ontology.Byanaspectualreading,Iunderstandareadingthattakesallthesedifferent qualificationstoalwaysexpressdifferentaspectsofoneandthesamethingrather thandifferententities.15 Iproceedinthefollowingmanner.First,Ipresentaseriesof
13 Onthispoint,seemy ‘SpinozaandtheCosmologicalArgumentAccordingtoLetter12’ , British JournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy 21:1(2013):57–77.
14 OnthevarietiesofparallelisminSpinoza,seenote42,thischapter.
15 Iamnottheonlyonetopresssuchan ‘aspectival’ readingofSpinoza’smetaphysics.JulieKlein,inan articleontheeternityofthemindofparticularrelevancetous,stronglyemphasizeshow ‘bothSpinozaand Gersonidesrelyonanaccountofperspectivalorconceptual,asopposedtoreal,difference’,pointingto
Platonizingreadings,indicatingforeachofthemwhereIthinktheyconflictwith centraltenetsofSpinoza’sphilosophy.Inthefollowingsection,Iturntomyown analysisofthevarioustermsinplay,takingmypointofdepartureinbasic,lexical analysesofSpinoza’suseoftherelevanttermsinthe Ethics,placingeachterminits propercontextwithinSpinoza’sdeductiveframework,whiledeterminingtheoften polemicalmotivationsthatleadhimtointroducethem.Inthefollowingsectionon formalessences,mymainobjectiveistoshowthat,inSpinoza’sconceptualuniverse, formalessenceisnotopposedtoactualessence,butrathertoobjectivebeing.Next, IturntoSpinoza’sconceptionsofexistenceandnon-existence,andhowtheyrelate toformalessence.ItismyaimheretoestablishthatSpinozaneverintended non-existentmodestobeconstruedasun-actualizedformalessences.Admittedly, Spinozaclearlyassertsthattheformalessencesofnon-existingthingsare ‘contained’ inthedivineattributes,inordertoassurethatouradequateideasofthingsthatcurrently donotexistcanbetrue.However,toavoidpositingtwokindsofexistence anactual existenceandanon-actualexistence ,Iarguethatnon-existingthingsarecontainedin theattributes qua non-existentthroughthoseotherexistentthingsthatcurrentlyarethe precisecauseorreasonoftheirnon-existence.Insection1.5,IestablishhowSpinoza’ s notionof ‘actualessence’,whichheidentifieswitha finitemode’ spower,or conatus, doesnotimplythatitispossibletoconceiveofanessencethatisnotactual.Spinoza simplyusesthequalification ‘actual’ tostressthefactthatessencesareneversomething merelypotential,butalwayspowers inactu.WhenSpinozaspeaksofformalessence andactualessence,heisnotreferringtotwoentitiesoreventothesameentityin distinctontologicalstates,buttotwoeternalaspectsofoneandthesameessence, namelyformandpower.Consequently,thingsthatdonotexistcannotbeconstruedas un-actualizedformalessences,anditismisleadingtospeakofthetransitioninto durationalexistenceofthingsasan ‘actualization’ oftheiressence.Inthepenultimate section,beforeconcluding,Idiscussthenotionofactualityinmoredetail.Ishow howSpinozausesthenotionofactuality intwodifferentwayswhenqualifying essencesandexistences,thusgivingrisetoanequivocationontheterm ‘actuality’ Spinoza’sconstantuseoftheadverb quatenus ‘tomarksuchshiftsinperspective.’ Suchshifts,indicating ‘differencesofrespect’,permitsoneto ‘avoidtheproliferationofrealentities’ andexpresshow ‘anactual thingcanbeexperiencedinirreduciblydifferentwayswithoutviolatingitsontologicalintegrity;respectival differenceholdstogetherwhatrealdifferencewoulddivide’ (seeJ.R.Klein, ‘“SomethingofitRemains” : SpinozaandGersonidesonIntellectualEternity’,in SpinozaandMedievalJewishPhilosophy,editedby S.Nadler(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014),307–29,p.319).Shespecificallyadoptsanotion of ‘aspectivaldifference’ todesignatethetwowaysofconceivingthingsas ‘actual’ thatSpinozaenvisagesin EVP29S(forsimilar, ‘aspectival’ formulations,seeNadler, ‘Spinoza’sMonismandtheRealityoftheFinite’ , in SpinozaonMonism,editedbyP.Goff(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2012),p.228).YitzhakMelamed alsoappealstoanotionof ‘aspects’ whenanalysinghowattributesrelatetosubstanceandwhenanalysing the ‘multifaceted’ natureofideasinSpinoza(see Spinoza’sMetaphysics:SubstanceandThought (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2013),pp.xix–xxiand148–56,and ‘TheBuildingBlocksofSpinoza’sMetaphysics:Substance,Attributes,andModes’,in OxfordHandbooktoSpinoza,ed.M.DellaRocca(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress[forthcoming]).
