Society in the Self
A Theory of Identity in Democracy
HUBERT J. M. HERMANS
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hermans, H. J. M., author.
Title: Society in the self : a theory of identity in democracy / Hubert J. M. Hermans.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identiiers: LCCN 2017038163 | ISBN 9780190687793 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Self—Social aspects. | Group identity. | Identity (Psychology) | Democracy. Classiication: LCC BF697.5.S65 H47 2018 | DDC 302.5/4—dc23 LC record available at htps://lccn.loc.gov/2017038163
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To my parents who, although they passed away a long time ago, are still living and guiding me in the intimate regions of my self and
To my peers at primary school who, by their bullying behavior, unwitingly stimulated me to explore alternative routes in my life
Learning in a democracy is a continuing dialogue, both between people and within the self, and a dialogue assumes diferent and even contrasting positions.
– he author
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction: he Democratic Organization of Self and Identity 1
1. he Dynamics of Society-in-the-Self 17
2. Positioning and Democracy in the Self 45
3. Positioning and Democracy in Teams and Organizations 105
4. he Positioning Brain 141
5. Social and Societal Over-Positioning: he Emergence of I-Prisons 203
6. Heterogenizing and Enriching the Self 255
7. Dialogue as Generative Form of Positioning 299
8. Dialogical Democracy in a Boundary-Crossing World: Practical Implications 353
Glossary 399 References 401 Index 417
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“Isn’t it time to stop this continuous writing of yours?” is a question oten asked me as an emeritus professor ater 40 years of working as a psychologist and social scientist at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. In my answer, I used to quote the Belgian novelist Hugo Claus who, in a television interview at the occasion of his 70th birthday, was confronted with the same question. He briely replied, “You can also ask me to stop breathing.” When I refer to this anecdote, people usually respond with a smile of understanding.
I want to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to a special circle of friends and colleagues who have greatly inspired me to develop the positioning theory outlined in this book or have given their valuable contributions during the process of writing.
I have been blessed to work with three commenters, Agnieszka Konopka, Annerieke Oosterwegel, and Peter Zomer, who have read all chapters in detail and given their extremely useful critical remarks. Moreover, ater each chapter they profoundly discussed with me the shortcomings of the initial texts and enriched me with numerous suggestions for improvement. Peter was very keen on conceptual clarity and consistency of the argument through all sections and chapters of the book. Annerieke had a sharp eye for the luency and “rhythm” of the text and helped me to link the present theory with other streams of thought. Agnieszka stimulated me to strive for a balance between reason and emotion and between verbal and nonverbal aspects of the theory. Usually, writing a lengthy book is the job of a hermit. However, thanks to the intense interest and unusual devotion of these dear colleagues, I had the feeling that they co-traveled with me through the emerging space of the book. heir (critical) way of understanding my texts deepened also my understanding of myself.
I also feel indebted to neuropsychologists Marc Lewis and Herman Kolk, two internationally recognized colleagues from the Radboud University, who were willing to check chapter 4 in which I have made an atempt to explore
what positioning theory can learn from recent developments in neuroscientiic research. heir comments have stimulated me to sharpen and reine some of the neurological concepts relevant to the exposition of the theory.
Apart from the commenters who have directly contributed to this book, I feel the need to express my gratitude to several colleagues and friends who have inspired me during the years preceding the writing of this book. Although the list could be long, I limit myself to a selected group of persons:
My late friend and colleague Harry Kempen, a cultural psychologist, with whom I published the irst article (American Psychologist, 1992) and book (Academic Press, 1993) on dialogical self theory, always impressed me with his unique capacity to think across the boundaries of (sub)disciplines, a git that helped me to ind unexpected linkages between previously unrelated phenomena. hroughout the years of our cooperation, we felt located in a ield of tension between two streams of thought: one European and philosophical and the other American and empirical. his area of ambiguity greatly motivated us to explore linkages between divergent or contradicting approaches.
During 25 years I cooperated, as a co-therapist, with Els Hermans-Jansen, with whom I developed the self-confrontation method, published in our book Self-Narratives (1995). Applying the method in her independent practice gave me the opportunity to witness the oten dramatic changes in the selforganization of clients at turning points in their lives. Each client opened for me a new universe of meaning and, at the same time, each new client was a threat to my theory! Els also gave me the opportunity to apply a new method in her practice, the Personal Position Repertoire (PPR) method, which stimulated the further development of dialogical self theory, from which the present positioning theory is an ofspring.
Jaan Valsiner coined the term “promoter sign” in 2004, which led me to introduce the notion of “promoter position” as one of the central concepts in the present theory. Moreover, Jaan stimulated me to launch the International Journal for Dialogical Science, to which he was willing to contribute as associate editor. In this context, I am also very grateful to Vincent Hevern, another co-editor who did the painstaking job of managing the journal. he contribution of Agnieszka Konopka was already mentioned. I feel the need to further express my gratitude for our stimulating cooperation in preparing and writing our book Dialogical Self heory (2010) and in giving many conference presentations and workshops together. She advised me to include the very useful spatial concept of I-prison in the theory. As a Buddhist, she taught me how to develop a “beginner’s mind,” a precious git that helps me to look at familiar people, objects, and even texts as if I see them for the irst time and retain an open perspective.
here are four Japanese colleagues who provided the opportunity to spread the work of my colleagues and me in their country: Masayoshi Morioka and Tatsuya Sato from Ritsumeikan University, Shinichi Mizokami from Kyoto University, and Reiko Nakama from Fukushima University. Masayoshi, Shinichi, and Reiko translated the irst book on the dialogical self (1993) in Japanese. Presently, Tatsuya and Masayoshi are inishing the Japanese translation of our 2010 book on the same subject.
I am very indebted to three editors of international journals who gave me, together with changing teams of researchers, space to publish a series of special issues on the dialogical self: Robert Neimeyer, editor of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology; Henk Stam, editor of heory & Psychology; and Jaan Valsiner, editor of Culture & Psychology. hey provided my collaborators and me with an ideal forum to spread our ideas.
here were several colleagues with whom I had the privilege to cooperate in organizing the biennial international conferences on the dialogical self: Michael Katzko in Nijmegen, he Netherlands (2000); Leni Verhofstadt in Ghent, Belgium (2002); (late) Katarzina Stemplewska and Piotr Oles in Warsaw, Poland (2004); Miguel Goncalves and Joao Salgado in Braga, Portugal (2006 and 2018); Alex Gillespie in Cambridge, UK (2008); Stavros Charalambides, Athens, Greece (2010); Bob Fecho, Athens, Georgia (2012); Frans Meijers, he Hague, he Netherlands (2014); Piotr Oles, Lublin, Poland (2016); and again Miguel Goncalves, Braga, Portugal (scheduled in 2018). I remember these inspiring events with the greatest pleasure and gratitude.
I also like to express great respect and gratitude to Dan McAdams who was willing to give several keynotes at our conferences and who made me aware not only of the close connection between narrative and dialogue but also of their differences. Ken Gergen, who also gave several keynotes at our conferences, shines for me as an inspiring and deep thinker on the meaning of “relational being” in our present society. he diferent views of Dan as a “unity thinker” and Ken as a “diversity thinker” created a fertile ield of tension that was highly valuable in developing the present theory.
I also want to thank Roos van Riet, an experienced drawer, who succeeded in translating particular social relationships and emotions into facial expressions and body postures as presented in one of the igures in chapter 2; Gerhard Frensel, who designed the circle igure that appears in diferent chapters as a pictorial representation of the essence of the theory; and Leiba Stuart for her inal check on the English language.
I want to express my great appreciation for three anonymous reviewers invited by Oxford University Press who have motivated me to revise parts of the book and add new ones. I am also impressed by the luent and stimulating cooperation
with the staf members of the Press who were my very helpful guides in the inal stage of the book.
Finally, I would like to thank my partner Josée Jeunhomme. Although hers is a very diferent ield, her interest and dedication made her a true companion during the writing of this book and the inevitable ups and downs that are part of such a process.
Introduction
he Democratic Organization of Self and Identity
he most violent element in society is ignorance.
—Emma Goldman
Rather than considering society as an external cause or context, this book deals with society as working in the internal domains of the self. In a similar vein, democracy is not only treated as an organizing principle of a modern society but also, and even primarily, as having its fertile source in the deeper layers of self and identity.
In addressing self and society in all their complexity and diversity, scientists have typically studied self as an entity or process in itself (e.g., self-consistency, self-enhancement, self-eicacy), with society considered as the external environment. hey do so on the (implicit) assumption that, although the self is continuously inluenced by society from the outside, it can be studied as a separate entity in itself. he problem of this self–society dualism is that it does not suiciently take into account the functioning of society within the self and the way the self acts upon this society from its own self-organization, as exempliied by phenomena, recently popping up in the social-scientiic literature, like self-sabotage, self-radicalization, self-cure, self-government, self-nationalization, and self-internationalization. As these phenomena suggest, the self contributes to and even shapes the society at large in and from its own internal workings. hebooktakesmatersevenonestepfurther.Itnotonlydealswiththesocietal organization of the self but also poses the question whether the self is democratically organized. To what extent do the diferent self-parts (e.g., roles, emotions, imagined others) receive freedom of expression? To what extent are they treated as equal or equivalent components of the self? In analogy to the tension between freedom and equality in a democratic society, the question is posed how the self, in its organizing capacity, responds to the apparent tension between freedom and equality of the components of the self. A signiicant implication of this view
is that diferences, oppositions, coalitions, conlicts, clashes, and power games exist not only between positions of participants of the society at large but also between the I-positions of the individual self.
I will show that the intimate self–society connection has far-reaching consequences for such divergent topics as self-leadership, cultural diversity in the self, the relationship between reason and emotion, self-empathy, cooperation and competition between self-parts, and the role of the self in prejudice, enemy image construction, and scapegoating. I complete the book with an extensive discussion of the necessity and potentials of generative internal and external dialogue in our boundary-crossing world and with practical guidelines for the selfgoverning individual living in a democratic society in which the tension between social power and dialogue is more intense than ever before.
he purpose of the book is to present an original theory on the “democratization of the self,” based on theoretical investigations, social-scientiic literature, neuroscience, and analysis of everyday life situations. he central thesis is that a democratic society is fostered by, and even in need of, a democratically organized self.
What Led to Writing his Book?
During my search for the dialogical potentials of the self, I came across an article that was somewhat disturbing to me and continued to function as an insoluble contradiction in my thinking for several decades. It was Anthony Greenwald’s (1980) landmark publication he Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History. Its centerpiece was the striking analogy between the organization of knowledge in the self and totalitarian information-control strategies as exposed in George Orwell’s (1949) 1984. In his portrayal of the self, Greenwald elaborated on three cognitive biases found in atribution research: egocentricity (perceiving one’s self as more central to events than it actually is), “benefectance” (perception of responsibility for desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and cognitive conservatism (the disposition to preserve existing knowledge structures together with a resistance to cognitive change). Orwell’s characterizations of thought control at the level of a totalitarian society could stand as a summary of cognitive biases at the level of an individual self.
Although I found that the analogy between the egocentric nature of the self and the highly centralized totalitarian state was convincingly argued, I was confused by the contradiction between the self-centered nature of the individual person as depicted by Greenwald and the highly valued ideal of democracy that is seen by many as one of the most cherished acquisitions of human civilization. How can self-centered citizens it with a democratic society that requires them
to decenter themselves as part of a larger community? Are self-centered individuals able to function in a democracy that invites them to be other-centered too? Are they able and willing to take responsibility not only for desired but also undesired outcomes? Are they able and willing to change their cognitive structures when confronted with nonconirming evidence or when they communicate with others who have diferent or contrasting views of life?
hese questions allowed me to consider the cultural limitations to which the self is exposed. he Western self is not only centralized and individualized to a strong degree but also bounded. his was eloquently expressed by cultural anthropologist Cliford Geertz (1979) who deined the Western conception of the self as “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background” (p. 59). he distinctive wholeness of the self was also discussed by Sampson (1985) who, from a social-constructionist point of view, depicts the Western ideal image of the self as an entity with razor-sharp boundaries between self and non-self, with the exclusion of the other as an intrinsic part of the self and as persistently involved in a pursuit of having the environment under perfect control. In a philosophical analysis, Dunne (1996) deines the modern sense of self as a “sovereign self” that is above all “its own ground” (p. 137) and traces it back to Descartes’ rational knower whose I or ego has “no acknowledged complicity in language, culture, or community” (p. 138) (see also Gergen’s [2009] criticism of the “bounded self” as a product of the Enlightenment; for elaboration see chapter 1 of this book).
We are faced with a problematic contradiction in the heritage of the Enlightenment. Driven by its ideals of freedom and equality, it has stimulated the process of emancipation by opening the closed boundaries between higher and lower social classes, by stimulating women to broaden their role repertoire beyond traditional constraints, and by extending sexual freedom and variation beyond masculine ideals and patriarchal social structures. he opening of the boundaries between classes, sexual identities, gender roles, age groups, and cultural identities has led to an amazing expansion of the possibilities for the development of the self. At the same time, however, the Enlightenment has had the efect of fostering the ideal of a self-contained individualism that has constrained the self to its own individualized autonomy and has put the heavy load of selfesteem, self-realization, and self-development on the shoulders of its own sovereignty. he Enlightenment has provided us with an increasing multiplicity of identity and associated possibilities for psychological growth and development, but, at the same time, this multiplicity has to be realized within the “golden bars” of a self that is imprisoned in its own egocentricity.
he Core Idea of Positioning heory: Self as a Democracy
he problematic contradiction between the egocentricity of a bounded self and the ideals and requirements of a democratically organized society instigated me to look for ways to overcome the separation between self and society, that is, the self considered as a purely inner reality with an essence in itself and a democratic society viewed as a surrounding structure in which diferent (bounded) selves are supposed to be capable and willing to cooperate and fulill their desires to their mutual beneit. My answer to this contradiction led to some questions that I posed to myself and served as searchlights during the years preceding the writing of this book: What would the self look like, when it would be considered as a democracy itself? How would the self function if considered as a micro-society in which its diferent parts would be organized in a democratic way? Would democracy be a viable metaphor for exploring the ways in which the self is positioning itself toward others and toward itself? Could this metaphor be proitable not only for the self but also for the society at large? Would the metaphor help to ind ways of overcoming the much-criticized self–society dichotomy and allow the construction of communication channels between self and society that would lead to their mutual beneit? In my search for answers to these questions, I developed a theoretical framework in which the self is proposed as an organized society of I-positions (e.g., I as professional, I as an immigrant, I as politically engaged), as intimately linked with the identity positions of individuals, groups, and cultures in the society at large. his “self-society” is organized in such a way that positions are allowed to communicate with each other, to express themselves from their own experiences and speciic point of view, and to contribute to the development of other positions in the self and to the positions of other people in the society at large. As I argue in this book, a democratic organization of the self adds value to both self and society in their interconnection.1
he Analogy Between Democracy in Society and in the Self
At the end of the previous century, Amartya Sen (1999), Nobel prize winner in economic sciences, was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what
1 he positioning theory proposed in this book is a step beyond dialogical self theory (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). he present conceptual framework is formulated and developed as a theory on the democratic functioning of the self.
he considered the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century. Pondering this thought-provoking question, he realized that many things of gravity had happened during that century. he European empires, mainly the British and French ones that had dominated so many parts of the world for a long time, came to an end. here were two world wars that led to the untimely death of many millions. here was the rise and fall of fascism and Nazism. Moreover, the century witnessed the rise and fall of communism (as in the former Soviet Union) or its radical transformation (as in China). here was also a shit from the economic dominance of the West to a new economic balance with countries of East and Southeast Asia playing increasingly inluential roles. Sen realized that the past hundred years were not lacking in important events. Nevertheless, relecting on the many developments that had occurred in that century, he did not, ultimately, experience any doubt in choosing one as the preeminent development of that period: the rise of democracy. He would expect that, in the distant future, when people look back at that century, they will accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the most acceptable form of governance (Sen, 1999).
In his further relections, Sen (1999) observes that throughout the nineteenth century, theorists of democracy found it natural to discuss whether or not a country was “it for democracy.” In the twentieth century, however, theorists started to recognize that the question itself was wrong: “A country does not have to be deemed it for democracy; rather, it has to become it through democracy” (p. 4, emphasis added). he author views this “becoming” as a momentous change, as the potential reach of democracy is extended to billions of people, with their very diferent histories and cultures and disparate levels of aluence. I ind this dynamic view of democracy particularly germane for the central thesis as proposed in the present book. Democracy in the self is not to be conceived as a personality trait with individuals rated as below or above an average, and they are not to be judged as iting to a democratic society or not. It is rather a process that becomes true in its active realization. As I try to demonstrate with the dynamic positioning model, democracy is actually a desirable process of self-democratization.
However, Sen (1999) is wondering: What exactly is democracy? It would be a mistake to identify democracy with majority rule. Certainly, democracy includes voting and respect for election results and legal entitlements, he continues, but it also needs the protection of liberties and freedoms, the guaranteeing of free discussion, and the uncensored distribution of news and comments. He considers political and civil rights, especially those guaranteeing open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, as central to the process of generating informed and considered choices. Along these lines, he perceives democracy as a practice which “enriches the lives of the citizens” (p. 10, emphasis added). In line
with this view, I make a strong case for the enrichment of the self as expressed by the emphasis on a broad bandwidth of open I-positions as a basis for dialogue, on balancing positive and negative emotions and feelings, on the importance of emodiversity (the health-promoting diferentiation within the domains of both positive emotions and negative emotions), and on the awareness and constructive use of shadow positions (chapters 6 and 8).
Sen (1999) distinguishes three diferent ways in which democracy enriches the lives of the citizens. First, “political reedom is a part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being” (p. 10, emphasis added). he positioning theory proposed in this book also emphasizes the freedom of any I-position to tell its own story and express itself from its own speciic point of view without being suppressed by any other position in the self. Democracy in the self resists a strongly hierarchical and rigid organization in which one or a few “dictatorial” I-positions reign the total space of the self, determining the values, purposes, and desires of the other positions from above. I-positions can be addressed by any other position and have the freedom to open or close themselves depending on their own intentions and the demands of the situation (chapter 2).
Second, Sen (1999) proposes that democracy has “an important instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political atention (including claims of economic needs)” (p. 10, emphasis added). In terms of the present theory, democracy in the self implies that social, political, economic, and spiritual I-positions receive atention from meta-positions that, as “leaders” in the self, have the task to take these claims into account in order to arrive at well-balanced decisions. he relation between meta-position and speciic I-positions in the self runs parallel with the same relation in teams and organizations in which leaders listen carefully to the speciic ideas, purposes, and stories of the members from the perspective of overarching and long-term meta-positions (chapter 3).
hird, in Sen’s (1999) view the practice of democracy “gives citizens an opportunity to learn rom one another, and helps society to form its values and priorities” (p. 10, emphasis added). Likewise, in a democratically organized self I-positionshavetheopportunitytolearnfromeachotherinagenerativedialogue that allows new and shared meanings to emerge on the interface of self and society (chapter 7). Moreover, the theory has made a strong case for positions in the self as adding value to each other as a result of this dialogue. In the macro-society diferent spheres of public life (e.g., education, science, health care) transport meaning to each other without any sphere (e.g., the economic one) becoming overly dominant (chapter 5). Similarly, in the micro-society of the self, diferent I-positions (e.g., I as a student, I as a scientist, I as a patient) are enriching each
other without allowing any position (e.g., I as consumer) to overpower the other ones. Although Sen, in his elaboration of the relationship between democracy and richness, does not explicitly refer to the connection between learning and dialogue, he is very explicit about the importance of dialogue for democracy in general: “In fact, the reach and efectiveness of open dialogue are oten underestimated in assessing social and political problems” (p. 10).
Positioning heory as Spatial and Relational
he positioning theory presented in this book is “spatial-relational” with change in the form of “repositioning” as its temporal dimension. When there is a position,therearealwaysoneormoreotherpositionstowhichitisoriented.Acrucial implication of this view is that between I-positions ields of tension are stretched that may function either as fertile soils for the emergence of new positions or, alternatively, as swamps in which one may get lost as a consequence of identity confusion or fragmentation. In the context of generative dialogue (chapter 7), I elaborate on the ield of tension as allowing space for the construction of “third positions” as bridging or reconciling two diferent or conlicting I-positions. he relevance of this ield is also illustrated by the concept of “atmosphere” and, more speciically, by an “atmosphere of trust” as a precondition to generative dialogue. Moreover, the ield provides a basis for the construction of a diversity of intercultural, transgender, transsexual, and interracial identities, which have the “civil right” in the self to inhabit and develop their own spaces, enabling them to escape the I-prisons of mutually exclusive options (e.g., belonging to one’s original or host culture, being man or woman, belonging to one or another sex, being black or white) (chapter 2; see also Hermans, Konopka, Oosterwegel, & Zomer, 2017). Even in those parts of the world where mixed identities are oicially and legally accepted, it is not evident that they have, as I-positions, suicient space in the self where they can feel accepted as equals. Even in tolerant societies such I-positions may be located in the danger zone of the self as caused by overt or hidden stereotyping, prejudices, and stigmatization (chapter 4). I propose that, in order to develop one’s I-positions and identities in the contemporary, increasingly interdependent world, one needs tolerance of uncertainty and the courage to enter one’s challenge zone (chapters 6 and 8).
I-positioning is a form of placing oneself vis-à-vis someone or something else who is addressed as “another I” in the metaphorical space of the extended self (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). herefore, I understand the democratic self as a dynamic multiplicity and diversity of I-positions (e.g., I as a professional, I as a father, I as supporting a political party) in the landscape of the mind. his mind is intrinsically connected with the minds of other people (e.g.,
my colleagues, my children, my opponent) who function as other I-positions in the extended domain of the self. Between these I-positions are ields of tension where processes of positioning, counter-positioning, and repositioning occur in the form of sign-mediated interchange, cooperation, and learning. In agreement with Mead (1934), the person knows oneself via “taking the role” of the other or, in our terms, via taking the position of the other as another I.
Self as Bureaucratic or Democratic Society?
I am certainly not the irst one to propose considering the self as a society. In his groundbreaking work he Society of Mind (1985), computer scientist Marvin Minsky did a bold atempt to explain how the mind works as a society of agentic parts. In the 1970s, computer scientists were far enough to devise robot programs that could see and move well enough to arrange children’s building blocks into simple towers and playhouses. To address the complicated management problems required by these tasks, Minsky (1986) developed a model in which the mind is considered to function as a hierarchically organized network of interconnected parts that together function as a “society.” he mind of the child playing with blocks was imagined to contain a host of smaller minds, called “agents.” At a high level of organization, an agent called Builder is in control of the situation. he specialty of Builder is making towers from blocks. However, building a tower is too complicated a job for any single, simple agent. herefore, Builder asks for help from several other agents that work at the next lower level of organization. Each of these agents, in turn, asks lower level agents for help. As agents in a bureaucratic organization, the diferent parts of the mind work together to make it function as an organized whole.
In Minsky’s (1986) model, only agents at the higher levels of the mind are able to become involved in dialogical relationships. In contrast, agents at the lower levels, although they are parts of a functioning whole, are oten not able to comprehend one another. Most pairs of agents cannot communicate with each other at all. With their own programs, they are simply doing their job without knowing anything about the performance of the other agents. hey can simply be put “on” and “of” in the service of the higher agents in the organization. Only at these higher levels, agents may be involved in direct communication. Elaborating on his block building example, Minsky describes that a conlict may arise between Builder and another agent such as Wrecker who is working at the same level and is only interested in breaking down what Builder has achieved. At this higher level, agents may agree or disagree as a result of their communication. he agencies responsible for Building and Wrecking may negotiate by ofering support for one another’s goals: “Please, Wrecker, wait a moment more
till Builder adds just one more block: it’s worth it for a louder crash!” (Minsky, 1986, p. 33).
here are, however, critical diferences between Minsky’s society of mind and the self as society as proposed in this book. First, in the present theory, the basic concept is not an “agent” but a “position.” Between two or more positions in communication a “space” is stretched that functions as a fertile soil for the production of new positions that are qualitatively diferent from the original ones. Second, while the mind in Minsky’s model is supposed to function as a strongly hierarchical bureaucracy, the self in the present theory is conceived of as a less hierarchical, more decentralized democratic organization. hird, inspired by James’s (1890) notion of the “extended self,” the other in the present theory is not simply outside the self but functions as the other-in-the-self in its extended domain. Finally, while in Minsky’s model society is taken as a metaphor for the inner functioning of the mind, the main concepts of the present theory contribute not only to understanding the internal operations of the self (chapter 2) but are also applicable to democratically functioning dyads, teams, and organizations (chapter 3) and to a democracy as a macro-process (chapter 8).
Toward a Bridging heory: At the Interface of Disciplines
he present theory has its historical roots in the American pragmatism in the line of William James and George Herbert Mead and in the Russian dialogical school in the tradition of Mikhail Bakhtin. he fertility and applicability of the theory are demonstrated by its links with recent developments in the literature from a diversity of (sub)disciplines. Among them are developmental psychology, social psychology, personality psychology, cultural psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, social constructionism, neuroscience, political science, philosophy, literary science, and history. he theory can be labeled as a “bridging theory.” What kind of theory is that? As we have explained earlier (Hermans & Gieser, 2012), a bridging theory is neither a grand theory pretending to ofer a comprehensive explanation of human behavior nor a mini-theory focused on a narrow segment of human functioning. It is also not a conceptual system that atempts to integrate two or more existing mini-theories in a synthesizing way. Rather, it is a theory in which a larger diversity of theories, research traditions, and practices meet, or will meet, in order to create new and unexpected linkages. he label “bridging theory” does not mean that there are bridges only, connecting existing insights or practices without providing an original perspective. Instead, it is a theoretical framework in itself with an own identity and speciic conceptual framework. However, this framework is open and lexible enough
to create a platform where diferent, separated and even contradictory conceptual systems research traditions and practices can get connected so that their views are broadened and linked with other approaches in service of their further development.
A bridging theory can be placed in the tradition of the New Science as represented by the Italian philosopher and historian Giambatista Vico (1744/1968). In vehement opposition to the thinking and ahistorical mind of his contemporary Descartes, he put a premium on the constructive role of imagination used by humans to make their history. For him imagination, not to be equaled with unrealistic fantasy, was not only a way of interpreting incomprehensible phenomena but also a force in shaping the physical and social environment. He realized that, since ancient times, progress has been the result of inventions. herefore, he assumed the existence of a creative force, which he labeled as ingenium. Using this force, humans are able to alter their world and make history. Endowed with ingenium, they have the capacity to move things into “new relationships” (Hora, 1966, p. 241). his is precisely what the purpose of a bridging theory is: it wants to cross the boundaries of (sub)disciplines and look for new relationships between existing theories, empirical indings, and practices and use these relationship in the service of “making” self and society. As Vico says, “verare et facere idem esse” (knowing and doing are the same) (Hora, 1966, p. 237). Positioning is not only a way of knowing self and other but also of shaping them.
In the course of this book, a diversity of theoretical approaches and a vast amount of empirical indings from very diferent disciplines and subdisciplines are presented. hese theories and indings are not to be understood as “proving” the existence of a democratic self. he presented theory is not to be seen as a representation of an existing reality. Rather, the theory serves as a construction that ofers a perspective on the relation between self and society from which existing reality is interpreted in a new and unusual way. In the context of this theory, trends in the literature, including a great deal of empirical work, are presented as arguments demonstrating that the democratization of the self is not only desirable but also realistic. he purpose is to create linkages between diferent research traditions in order to achieve a comprehensive theoretical construction with a broad picture view. At the same time, the theory aims to create bridges between theory and practice and to stimulate research. (For an overview of the main concepts of the theory, see the Glossary at the end of the book.)
Chapters of the Book
AsI demonstrateinchapter 1,theselfisnotonlysocialbutalsosocietal.Itis social inthesensethatmanyone-to-onerelationshipsbetweenpersonsintherealworld
have their analogue in the relationship of the self with itself (e.g., self-protection, self-abuse, self-praise, self-disgust, self-admiration). However, there is another set of more recent developments that shows up in the literature in the social sciences and beyond, suggesting that also societal forms of positioning have their analogue in the organization of the self (e.g., self-sabotage, self-radicalization, self-cure, self-government, self-nationalization, self-internationalization). As a result, the contemporary self is loaded with a decentralized density and heterogeneity of oten contradicting I-positions, which broaden the range of possibilities for the developing self and, at the same time, challenge the self’s capacity to realize an adaptive organization of these positions. Building on these observations, I introduce the concept of self-societalization, implying that the society at large personiies and individualizes itself via the self of the individual and, in turn, the self expresses itself as a highly dynamic and potentially creative microsociety that contributes to and transforms the society at large.
In chapter 2 the theory’s central concept, I-position, including its extension “we-position,” is described as a spatial-relational act of an embodied self. It exists only in the context of other positions (e.g., I position myself as competitive toward a rival and as tender-hearted toward the person I love). he act of I-positioning is placing oneself vis-à-vis someone else. As a spatial-relational process it is taking a stance toward someone, either physically or virtually, and it is a way of addressing the other via verbal or nonverbal communications. he advantage of the spatial concept of positioning is that it allows the existence of a highly dynamic ield of tension between positions as an area for the experience of ambiguity and contradiction. Between otherwise dichotomous categorizations (like “man” vs. “woman” or “black” vs. “white”), mixed and ambiguous positions may ind their place (like transgender or biracial identities). Each position has the possibility to speak with its own voice, to tell its own story, and to express meanings from its own speciic point of view.
However, when the self is populated by an increasing amount of diverse positions, as it is in a boundary-crossing and globalizing world, the self is at risk of becoming fragmented or ending up in a cacophony. herefore, some higherorder positions are needed to bring the necessary order in the self. Two positions are particularly signiicant as playing the role of “leaders in the self”: (a) a meta-position that provides a helicopter view and fulills, in close cooperation with more speciic lower-order positions and constantly fed by them, an executive function in the decision-making process and (b) a promoter position that has a considerable openness toward the future, provides a sense of direction, and has the potential to produce a diverse range of more specialized positions that are relevant to the further development of the self. hree additional concepts, indispensable to the theory, are discussed: power distance, emotional distance, and communication channels between positions.
he purpose of chapter 3 is to demonstrate that the central theoretical concepts presented in the previous chapter on the level of the self can also be usefully applied on the level of teams and organizations. In this way, the conceptual structure provides a basis for facilitating an open communication between the levels of self, team, and organization and contributes to overcoming the self-society dichotomy. At the team level, I present the example of democratic leadership in a successful soccer team. At the organizational level, I discuss the leadership problems of two merging organizations and in that context dwell on Isaacs’ (1999) dialogical model, which deals with the communication between diferent member positions that are opposites of each other and mutually complementing at the same time. Dialogical relationships between these positions are considered to facilitate the functioning of the team as a whole.
Inspired by the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations “We the Peoples” and its pretension to develop a “we-position,” I discuss some conspicuous aspects of the United Nations from the perspective of the present theory. Being aware of the astonishing complexity of this worldwide forum, I analyze some of its successes and failures. As it is well known, a democratically organized system has its apparent downsides. When participants are allowed to join a decision process and to talk from their own point of view, at least two problems should be taken into account: democracy is generally slow, and it is oten limited by a lack of knowledge of the participants involved. I propose the terms “lexible democracy” and “lexible democratic leadership” referring to moving up and down the power dimension as required in a rapidly changing and crisis-laden globalizing society.
Chapter 4 starts with the consideration that the self can only function in participative and cooperative ways if the workings of the brain are supportive to such a democratic organization of self and society. Building on recent literature on the hemispheric specialization of the brain (e.g., McGilchrist, 2009; Schore, 2012), I argue for considering the other not just as purely external reality but as “another I-position” in the extended self. Elaborating on brain research and social psychological literature (and warning against the risk of false dichotomies), I discuss the relationship between emotion and reason leading to the distinction between emotional and reasoning forms of positioning. Furthermore, conscious and nonconscious layers of the self are distinguished, allowing the diferentiation of conscious and nonconscious positioning. Finally, these inclusive opposites— self-with-other, reason-with-emotion, and conscious-with-nonconscious—are combined in an elaborated position model that addresses both the power distance and the emotional distance between basic I-positions.
he purpose of chapter 5 is to introduce the concept of “over-positioning,” which is not very diferent from the classic Greek notion hubris and derives from the assumption that any position runs the risk of arriving in an overdrive if it is
not balanced by efective counter-positions. In order to deepen the potentials of this concept, the main part of the chapter is devoted to a comparison of the functioning of the self in two societal systems, Soviet communism and present-day neo-liberal capitalism. he central thesis is that Soviet communist system placed the other (the community) above the self (the individual), whereas the capitalist society in its neo-liberal manifestation places the self above the other. As examples of communist over-positioning, I dwell on its typical housing policy with its restrictions on personal space and private initiative and on its totalitarian policy that had the efect of transforming critical positions into anti-positions in the case of the so-called “dissidents.” More extensively, I elaborate on the implications of an over-positioning economy and the phenomenon of consumerism that may inally lead to a point that the self is locked up in an I-prison. Finally, I examine the potentials of the self to respond to forms of over-positioning.
Actually, I see the contemporary self as located in a very dynamic ield of tension between homogenizing and heterogenizing trends that pull the self into opposite directions and challenge its organizing capacities to the utmost. Whereas homogeneity as resulting from over-positioning is the cornerstone of chapter 5, heterogeneity, as relecting the diversity and decentralized richness of the democratic self, is the main theme of chapter 6. I refer to literatures that show that happiness is not a simple dichotomy or scale between “happy” and “unhappy” but that there are qualitatively diferent forms of happiness and unhappiness suggesting that one may be happy in one position but not in another one. Of special importance to the afective richness of the self is the phenomenon of “emodiversity” as referring to the health-promoting diferentiation within the domains of both positive emotions and negative emotions. In addition, I emphasize the intrinsic value of negative emotions in response to traditions in psychology that propose the replacement of negative by positive emotions. Furthermore, I argue that the richness of the self is promoted by taking one’s shadow positions into account (e.g., acknowledging one’s role in scapegoating and enemy image construction) that are generally perceived as unacceptable and disowned parts of the self. Finally, I present some case studies demonstrating that shadows are not necessarily a disadvantage to self and other in all circumstances and that they can be combined with other, more acceptable, positions through the formation of constructive coalitions.
Chapter 7 is based on the assumption that generative dialogue is the highest form of communication and indispensable both for a democratic society and for a democratically organized self. he spatial and positional basis of dialogue is deepened by an extensive comparison of the views of two theorists who have given indelible contributions to the ield: Mikhail Bakhtin and David Bohm. I show that there are fundamental diferences in their conceptions with Bakhtin proposing a broad view implying that dialogue, including learning, is everywhere
