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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available Madawi Al-Rasheed.
Salman’s Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia. ISBN: 9780190901745
Printed in the USA on acid-free paper
In memory of Professor Peter Sluglett, our great colleague and friend
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ix
List of Contr ibutors xi
Introduction: The Dilemmas of a New Era Madawi Al-Rasheed 1
PART I STATE AND SOCIETY
1. Saudi Regime Stability and Challenges F. Gregory Gause III 31
2. Mystique of Monarchy: The Magic of Royal Succession in Saudi Arabia Madawi Al-Rasheed 45
3. Challenges to the Saudi Distributional State in the Age of Austerity Steffen Her tog 73
4. Beyond Sectarianism and Ideology: Regionalism and Collective Political Action in Saudi Arabia Sultan Alamer 97
5. From Hasm to Hazm: Saudi Feminism beyond Patriarchal Bargaining Nora Doaiji 117
PART II
SAUDI ARABIA AND TRANSNATIONAL SALAFIYYA
6. Producing Salafism: From Invented Tradition to State Agitprop Andrew Hammond 147
7. Transnational Religious Community and the Salafi Mission Michael Farquhar 165
8. Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic State: ‘Abdullah ibn Jibrin and Turki al-Bin‘ali Cole Bunzel 183
9. Par ricide in the Kingdom: Genealogy, Nationalism, and the Islamic State Challenge Nadav Samin 197
PART III
FOREIGN RELATIONS
10. Saudi Arabia and the Cold War Toby Matthiesen 217
11. King Salman and His Son: Winning the USA, Losing the Rest Madawi Al-Rasheed 235
12. China’s ‘Rise’ in the Gulf: A Saudi Perspective Naser al-Tamimi 251
Notes 273
Select Bibliography 335
Index 351
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book resulted from an international conference held at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore in December 2016. Both individuals and institutions made this conference a success. Special appreciation goes to the late Professor Peter Sluglett, acting director of the institute at the time, Michelle Teo, deputy director, and Professor Engseng Ho, who joined the institute during preparations for the conference. They were all encouraging and supportive. The conference took place at a time when many observers anticipated King Salman’s historic visit to South East Asia that took place early in 2017. They supported the timely idea of the conference and provided all necessary help. The Middle East Institute at NUS provided generous financial support without which the conference could not have taken place.
My colleagues Mohamed Ali Adraoui and Shuang Wen were appreciated for their chairing of panels and comments on presentations during the conference.
The organizational support of Sharifah Noor Huda Al-Junied, Zubaidah Abdul Jalil, Retna Devi, and Rommel Hernando is well appreciated. Finally two energetic, punctual, and enthusiastic National University of Singapore graduates added invaluable and much-appreciated insight into academic and social life at NUS. They also helped with preparing bibliographies for the introduction to this edited volume. Both Ismail Shogo and Anderson Yep were exemplary and dedicated interns who participated in the preparation for the conference.
Final preparation of this manuscript took place at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics, where I am currently a
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
visiting professor. Special gratitude is expressed to Professor Toby Dodge, the director of MEC. Both Sandra Sfeir and Ribale Sleiman Haidar are so supportive and deserve special thanks. Deputy director of MEC Robert Lowe has always been a great listener and adviser.
Finally, my greatest gratitude is for the contributors to this book who travelled to Singapore in the middle of very busy academic calendars, presented interesting papers, and produced the chapters in this volume on time. I thank them profusely for responding to my invitation and making the conference a great success.
As always, copy-editor Mary Starkey was meticulous in preparing the manuscript for publication. Her insight and familiarity with the topics discussed is unique. The support of Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. publishers is much appreciated.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Sultan Alamer is a Political Science doctoral student at George Washington University. His focus is on the Middle East region, and his research interests include identity-based politics, the political economy of resource-rich countries, and political violence. Alamer has coauthored three Arabic books on subjects that relate to political theory and nationalism. He also serves as a researcher for the Kuwaiti think tank the Gulf Center for Development Policies.
Cole Bunzel is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, where his work focuses on the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and the Jihadi Salafi movement in modern Islam. He is the author of From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (Brookings Institution, 2015) and The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States (Carnegie Endowment, 2016).
Nora Doaiji is a researcher and recent Master’s graduate in Middle East Studies from the George Washington University, and holds two Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science and Philosophy from the University of California, Irvine. She is currently a teaching assistant at the Elliott School of International Affairs. She has previously authored chapters in two Arabic books focusing on Arab nationalism.
Michael Farquhar is lecturer in Middle East Politics at the Department of Middle East Studies, King’s College London. He recently published Circuits of Faith (Stanford University Press, 2016), a study of Saudi state-funded efforts to extend Wahhabi influence abroad
from the mid-twentieth century. He is currently undertaking research on policing and social order in Egypt.
F. Gregory Gause III is Professor and holder of the John H. Lindsey ’44 Chair in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, as well as serving as head of the school’s International Affairs Department. His research focuses on the international politics of the Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. He has published three books, most recently The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Andrew Hammond is a doctoral candidate at St Antony’s College, Oxford, researching interactions between Turkish and Arabic-language ‘ulama’ and intellectuals in the early twentieth century, including their role in the development of the notion of Salafiyya. He worked for BBC Arabic radio and Reuters news agency in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and as a policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. He has published extensively on pan-Arab media and contemporary Islamist movements in Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. He is the author of several books including The Islamic Utopia:The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia (Pluto Press, 2012).
Steffen Hertog is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research interests include Gulf politics, Middle East political economy, political violence, and radicalization. His book Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and State in Saudi Arabia was published by Cornell University Press in 2011. He is the co-author, with Diego Gambetta, of Engineers of Jihad: the Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education (Princeton University Press, 2016).
Toby Matthiesen is Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of the Middle East at St Antony’s College, Oxford. Matthiesen was previously a Research Fellow at Pembroke College, Cambridge, and at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford University Press, 2013), and The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Madawi Al-Rasheed is Visiting Professor at the Middle East Centre, London School of Economics. In 2016 she was Visiting Professor at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. Al-Rasheed specializes in the history, politics, and society of Saudi Arabia. Her latest book, Muted Modernists:The Struggle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia, was published by Hurst & Co. and Oxford University Press in 2015.
Nadav Samin is Lecturer in Anthropology and Government at Dartmouth College. His book Of Sand or Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia was published in 2015 by Princeton University Press, and is forthcoming in Arabic translation with Jadawel. Samin received his Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University.
Naser al-Tamimi is an independent UK-based Middle East researcher and political analyst with particular research interests in energy politics, strategic studies of the Middle East, and Gulf–Asia relations. Al-Tamimi is the author of the book China–Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990–2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance? (Routledge, 2013). He has carried out extensive research on various aspects of Arab–China relations, Saudi Arabia in particular. In addition to his core research interests, Al-Tamimi has worked for numerous Arab newspapers, in the United Kingdom and a number of Arab countries. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Relations from Durham University.
INTRODUCTION
THE DILEMMAS OF A NEW ERA
Madawi Al-Rasheed
King Salman began his rule in 2015 with a series of unprecedented challenges. From leadership shuffles and falling oil prices to regional and international upheaval, he faced new dilemmas. This book focuses on this era and provides analysis of previous troublesome historical episodes and contemporary challenges. Although King Salman is old and looks frail, he has brought in several measures to deal with succession issues, the oil crisis, the Arab uprisings, regional rivalries with Iran and other troublesome Arab and Gulf neighbours, reached out to Asia to seek new opportunities, and finally mended relations with the USA under President Donald Trump. Whether his policies, viewed over a very short period—just over two years at the time of writing this introduction—have saved the kingdom from serious upheaval is yet to be seen, but no doubt that a new kingdom is emerging, rightly referred to in the title of this volume, Salman’s Legacy, as a result of his actions. However, Salman’s kingdom—or that of his son—may not be so drastically different from previous incarnations, as there are continuities and historical precedents to some but not all the decisions that Salman and
his young son Muhammad have made since 2015. This book is an attempt to provide historical depth and insights into the contemporary challenges that Salman’s kingdom has faced, and is likely to continue to face, in the near future.
Since its creation in 1932, the Saudi regime continues to divide opinions. Among analysts and scholars, speculations about its resilience or imminent collapse remain abundant. But so far it is managing to hold on to power amidst two contradictory narratives. At one end of the spectrum there is a narrative that highlights its resilience and ability to contain shock and challenges at different historical moments.1 In contrast, at the opposite end there is the story of the imminent collapse of the house of Saud, and even the fragmentation of the kingdom into smaller entities along sectarian and regional lines.2 But the truth about Saudi Arabia may actually lie between these two scenarios. The triumphalist tone of the first narrative needs to be assessed against the wishful thinking that underlies the second one. In between, observers map the consequences of the collapse, described as potentially cataclysmic.3
Based on new research that moves beyond the two diametrically opposed narratives, contributors in this volume engage with Saudi history, contemporary social, political, and economic challenges, and foreign relations. The rich and nuanced studies offer a balanced understanding of the country and sophisticated interpretations of its domestic, regional, and international choices that may appear to outsiders as shrouded in secrecy and speculation. Several contributors engage in diachronic analysis that uncovers the recent past but also identify continuities and discontinuities emerging from both leadership and societal changes. While the contributors may not agree with each other on all matters related to Saudi Arabia—in fact, a few are critical of each other’s work—they nevertheless engage in conversations that generate a better and balanced understanding of the country, its political dynamics, religious tradition, and new directions in its foreign policy. The value of an edited volume is enriched by the potential inherent both in the contrasting views of the contributors and in their criticisms of each other’s work in ways that enhance understanding of the subject.
Obser vers who draw attention to the challenges facing the kingdom rightly list numerous problems that may undermine future stability. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011 the kingdom is often
believed to face several domestic concerns that need to be immediately addressed. The rivalry between disgruntled princes, the demographic youth bulge, the new class of educated women, the terrorists, the radical Wahhabi preachers, the aspiring middle classes, the marginalized poor, the unemployment crisis, the repressed minorities, and more recently the dramatic fall in oil prices are often among the list of potential structural problems that the kingdom will have to deal with sooner or later.
In addition, the advent of the internet and new communication technology from Twitter to Facebook are believed to open new avenues of dissent and resistance. Monitoring Saudi users of the new social media allows commentators to map and assess opinions that circulate widely and reach all citizens inside and outside the country. The new voices that are now heard in the virtual sphere are unusual in a country with no experience of an open and free press. Tapping into the voices of dissent among both men and women, even though the most critical remain virtual, points to a changing public sphere where Saudis assess the performance of their leadership and dare to launch criticism of their shortcomings online. They request more rights and entitlements, from women’s driving campaigns to demands for better infrastructure in cities.
Since the Arab uprisings most virtual Saudi campaigns have focused on local demands for higher government salaries, and better welfare services such as health facilities, education, and housing.4 Other campaigns have had overtly regional political objectives—for example, criticizing Saudi intervention against the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in 2013, or the increase in subsidies to other monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan, or in 2017 the rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But the corruption of government officials and the confiscation of land by senior princes remain topics hotly debated in the virtual world among active Saudi citizens with YouTube clips spreading news about local demonstrations, sit-ins, and resistance. Since the Arab uprisings women’s rights issues, especially lifting the ban on women driving and abolishing the male guardian requirement, have attracted a lot of attention among local women, as well as in the international community.5 Those who predict trouble in the kingdom often point out that the combination of economic, political, and social
problems on the one hand and more active citizenry on the other is likely to produce serious internal upheaval in the future.
New Research on Saudi Arabia
Fortunately, recent scholarship on the kingdom is much richer and more nuanced than in the past. A plethora of new research in history, the humanities, and social sciences offers a complex prism through which Saudi Arabia can be understood. For instance, historians began to reflect on the Saudi past in novel ways that move beyond the cherished wisdom about the original eighteenth-century pact between the Al Saud and the Wahhabi tradition. Their analysis informs us about how the past is reproduced, shunned, or simply reconfigured in the present.6 From historical studies we learn about Arabian society, the formation of the three Saudi states, Wahhabiyya, and the transformations that took place with the discovery of oil. But there is more to Saudi history than the state, religion, and oil. Recently, several studies have explored local and regional historiography before and after the formation of the state, thus enriching our knowledge of the Arabian Peninsula in general.7 The ancient forgotten diversity of the country began to attract the attention of scholars fascinated by the religious and economic networks that tied Arabia in general to both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.8
For obvious reasons the so-called Saudi Islam, i.e. the Wahhabi tradition, has attracted the attention of many social scientists and Islamic studies specialists.9 Understanding the state pact with Wahhabiyya continues to generate controversial debates and polemics among academics.10 In the aftermath of 9/11 this attention led to serious academic scrutiny. The Wahhabi movement and its adherents suddenly became ‘suspect’ after decades of being considered a mere nuisance that allegedly set Saudi Arabia apart from the rest of the Muslim world. As Osama Bin Laden and fifteen of the hijackers who attacked the Twin Towers in New York were Saudis, Wahhabiyya, together with other Islamist trends in Saudi Arabia and beyond, became the focus of several valuable studies. In 2014 the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) put the books of the founder of Wahhabiyya, Muhamamd ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, on its school curriculum, thus confirming a dominant narrative about how Wahhabiyya inspires radical jihadi groups. With the consoli-
dation of the global jihadi movement, Wahhabiyya moved from being described as simply a literal, conservative, reformist, and puritanical interpretation of Islam to being a tradition that many observers accused of inspiring radicalization, sectarianism, and even terrorism. In the minds of many observers Wahhabiyya remains accused of galvanizing Muslims, precipitating a global terrorism crisis, and inciting generations of Muslim youth to commit atrocities across many continents.11 Today many see the tradition as the ideological incubator of ‘global jihad’ and sectarian violence across the Middle East and beyond. This familiar accusation has been countered by other narratives about Wahhabiyya that try to absolve it from any wrongdoing.12 The ideological affinity between Wahhabiyya and global jihad is complex, and can be elusive, but there is a persistent academic attempt to explore the underlying Saudi logic of spreading it across the globe. While much work has already been done on why the Saudi state was eager to export Wahhabiyya, i.e. focusing on the supply end, more research needs to be done on the demand for this tradition in local contexts spreading from Jakarta to Bosnia.
While many scholars continue to focus on the historical development of Wahhabiyya under the auspices of the Saudi state, others investigate Wahhabi transnational connections, educational outreach, charitable foundations, and religious institutions that propagate it around the world.13 Many scholars examine the rationale of the Wahhabi mission, its theology, and the clerics who spread it. Above all, the controversy surrounding the name Wahhabiyya and its recent association with Salafiyya is now the focus of nuanced academic research. If we imagine Wahhabiyya as a coherent tradition, we have to revise our perceptions as we learn about the fragmentation that sets its spokesmen against each other in fierce theological debates.
Political scientists focus on regime strategies and policies to maintain power. From repression to co-optation, new research maps the spectrum of Saudi regime strategies over several decades. With the rise of the Islamist opposition since the 1990s, scholars explore the diverse Islamist groups that at one point challenged the Saudi regime through petitions, demonstrations, and deadly violence.14 Since the 1920s the Saudi state has faced several challenges by armed groups, both to its domestic policies and its alliance with the West. The waves of contesta-
tion have led to serious confrontations with the leadership. From the Wahhabi tribal Ikhwan rebellion of 1927 to the current wave of ISIS terrorism, the regime has been confronted by home-grown groups committed to armed rebellion, or, more recently, terrorist attacks as ways to undermine and even overthrow it. Many of those groups question the regime’s Islamic credentials and believe that it has betrayed the eighteenth-century Wahhabi movement and its pact with the Al Saud. While an Islamist opposition in a state that claims to rule according to the law of God may appear contradictory, many studies have demonstrated the contentious relationship between the Saudi state and both the Wahhabis and the Islamists. Recent research focuses on regime strategies to maintain its power, pacify the population, and counter the threat of violent jihadis. Others analyse successive Saudi calls for political reform and capture the core demands and aspirations of many peaceful intellectuals, professionals, and activists. We now have a rich literature explaining factors contributing to regime stability, including, among other things, repression, oil revenues, dynastic rule, tribal tradition, loyal Wahhabi clerics, the redistributive economy, and foreign support. At the same time, we know more about how Saudis mobilize and contest regime strategies.
However, the spectacular violence of Islamist groups, for example the 1979 Mecca Mosque siege and al-Qaeda terrorism in 2003–8, meant that the Islamist opposition is over-studied at the expense of other dissident groups with no overt Islamist agenda. In the 1950s and 1960s, long before the Islamist challenge of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia, like other Arab countries, witnessed the mobilization of both leftists and nationalists. It is only recently that this phenomenon became the focus of serious and nuanced research.15 Both leftists and nationalists were part of the anti-imperial wave that swept the Arab world under the influence of Egyptian president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. It is no surprise that the Saudi oil fields with their international workers became the platform where activists and dissidents gathered and mobilized others. This era in Saudi history had almost been forgotten, but recently historians have begun to explore this episode of non-Islamist mobilization, thus adding great insight into how we interpret state–society relations over time. Others have explained the shift towards more Islamist agendas as a function of the intersection between local domestic state strategies, international pressure, and Cold War agendas.16
Another contentious aspect of Saudi politics, Shi‘a dissent, is now well documented and understood. Since the 1980s there have been several research papers and monographs explaining how the Shi‘a of the Eastern Province continue to challenge the state and demand recognition of their religious, civil, political, and human rights.17 Given the strategic and economic significance of the Eastern Province, where the majority of the Shi‘a live, it is not surprising that scholarship focused on this group. Moreover, the Wahhabi denunciation of the Shi‘a as heretics made it easier for them to be constructed as a minority that continues to experience marginalization and discrimination. Saudi–Shi‘a relations continue to be analysed within the sectarian prism. However, as we shall see in this volume, young Saudi scholars are beginning to challenge this sectarian narrative.18
Inter national-relations analysts map the contours and shifts, if any, in Saudi foreign policy with special attention paid to how they reflect domestic concerns or changing regional contexts and global power struggles. What is the future of the Saudi–US so-called special relationship? Why has Saudi Arabia intensified its outreach to Asia, both Muslim-majority countries and non-Muslim countries such as China and Japan? Can it succeed in opening new venues for greater economic and security integration with China? Can this evolve into greater military cooperation?
At the regional level, a plethora of studies explain the aggressive interventionist policies of the regime in places such as Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, and beyond.19 More recently the crisis with Qatar in 2014 and 2017 became the focus of recent speculations. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia since 1979, which intensified after the Arab uprisings, has also been hotly discussed in academic work, policy think tanks, and international media.20 These are among the questions that dominate the recent interest in Saudi foreign policy. Such questions get even more complicated as they become entangled with oil, the country’s main source of revenue.
With the sharp collapse of oil prices since 2014, political economists reflect on the future of the so-called social contract between rulers and ruled, the consequences of newly introduced cuts in subsidies, the gradual erosion of welfare services, and the imposition of new overt and hidden taxes on a society that has little experience of direct taxa-
tion.21 Their attention is focused on whether, after the restructuring of the Saudi economy, embedded in the new Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Programme,22 Saudis would eventually demand political representation, shaking the foundation of the absolute monarchy and the rentier state model, used to account for the Saudi redistributive economy and the perpetual loyalty of citizen to leadership. Speculation about the 2017 reversal of cuts in subsidies and welfare provision point to societal pressure and the desire of Muhammad ibn Salman to distance himself from an era of austerity. But when it comes to Saudi Arabia, there is more at stake than simply testing how far the rentier state model can be upheld to explain the resilience of the monarchy or the alleged acquiescence of the citizens. The country remains important not only for its oil but also for its role in the wider world. Many scholars have demonstrated that its stability may not only be a function of the regime’s redistributive powers.
There are those who dismiss any suggestion that the kingdom is currently facing life-threatening challenges that would eventually lead to destabilizing the monarchy, or even the disintegration of the kingdom. Many writers assure markets, foreign governments, and global audiences that it is business as usual in the kingdom. To substantiate the narrative about the resilience of the monarchy, observers highlight the dynamic nature of the Saudi political decision-making process, attributing the stability of the kingdom to the good vision and charisma of both the old and new leadership or to the stabilizing dynamics of dynastic rule.23 Recently, with the appointment of Muhammad ibn Salman as crown prince, analysis highlights the merits of the leadership’s credentials as it remains eager to maintain stability, prosperity, and survival in a tormented and volatile Arab region. The step was applauded in the Saudi press as the right leadership move. Veteran Western diplomats, retired ambassadors, and others remind their audiences of the banality of the narrative about the imminent collapse of the house of Saud. ‘We have heard it before’ is a common response among many Western diplomats when the fate of the house of Saud is discussed. As the ruling house did not fall under pressure from the Arab nationalists and leftists in the 1960s, or after the terrorism crisis in the aftermath of 9/11, it is unlikely that the regime is on the verge of collapse now, according to some commentators. While this may be
the public discourse, however, many observers privately express concern about the future of Muhammad ibn Salman and his policies.
In the wake of the smooth royal succession in 2015, the initial leadership shuffles a couple of months later, and the dramatic sacking of Muhammad ibn Nayif as crown prince and the promotion of Muhammad ibn Salman to the post, Saudi observers describe the regime as a careful, shrewd, and evolutionary force, always on a steady path to incremental reform. Some argue that those who forecast that Saudi Arabia is on the verge of a revolutionary upheaval are usually ignorant of the internal dynamics of state–society relations and the nature of a ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’ Saudi society. In this Orientalist narrative, the alleged ‘traditionalism’, ‘conservatism’, and ‘tribalism’ of Saudi society are held responsible for delaying urgent social and political reform and inhibiting revolutionary action at the national level. In this discourse, the repressive measures taken by the regime since the 1950s to stifle civil society, prohibit demonstrations, and curb political and civil rights are not considered fundamental in containing and repressing reformist impulses among a plethora of Saudi leftists, nationalists, and Islamists—not to mention the large amount of space given in this resilience narrative to the Wahhabi tradition, believed to maintain obedience and loyalty to rulers. Added to this is the sectarian outlook that deepens the divide between the Sunni majority and the small but active Shi‘a minority, thus delaying and obstructing the emergence of national solidarities across regional and sectarian divides.
It is ironic that the most threatening challenges to the regime did in fact originate from the so-called loyal Wahhabi tradition and its clerics. From the Sahwa shaykhs of the 1990s to the al-Qaeda operatives in the post-9/11 era, and the Islamic State since 2014, the challenge to the regime erupted from within the rank and file of the Wahhabi tradition among people who had been indoctrinated in its tenets. A possible explanation may point to the fragmentation of Wahhabiyya under state control or the radical trend that had always been part of its theology and doctrines that the Saudi state had not successfully suppressed or totally eliminated, even after institutionalizing the tradition in the 1970s.
The Saudi regime itself insists that the dangers facing the kingdom are mainly external. While the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
dates back to 1979, the regime has certainly amplified the Iranian threat recently. The ongoing Saudi–Iranian rivalry has prompted scholars to consider it as the new Middle East Cold War.24 The rivalry gathered momentum during the 2011 Arab uprisings, especially in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. The so-called Middle East Cold War became extremely heated, threatening even the annual Pilgrimage to Mecca and deepening the decline in oil prices. Iranians boycotted the Pilgrimage in 2016 and continued to accuse the Saudis of resisting lowering their oil production, thus contributing further to low oil prices, which proved to hurt not only all oil-producing countries but also Saudi Arabia itself.
After unsuccessful attempts to draw the USA into a military conflict with Iran since 2008, the Saudi regime shifted its own policy towards more military interventionism. The Saudi regime regards its 2011 military intervention in Bahrain and later in Yemen in 2015 as necessary measures to protect itself from Iranian expansion. In Yemen it went further than it had in Bahrain, when it acted in alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In Yemen, in addition to GCC support, the Saudis assembled an Arab and Muslim coalition of several countries, declared the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm, and began to launch regular military strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthis, immediately after the latter stormed Sana’a and forced the Yemeni president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, into exile in Riyadh. Many observers may forget that Saudi military intervention in Yemen has a long history, for example in 1962 and 2009. The 2015 war is an escalation of a previous historical pattern, although the rationale and objective of the current Saudi war may be different from previous military engagement.
Moreover, after the Arab uprisings, the kingdom intensified its own outreach to Muslim countries, from Morocco to Malaysia. Saudi Arabia invited Muslim countries to joint military exercises.25 These events became opportunities to demonstrate the solidarity of other Muslim nations and their support for the Saudis. These initiatives are also intended to isolate Iran in the Muslim world. It is in this context that Saudi Arabia projected itself as the defender of Sunni Muslims after decades of carrying the banner as defender of all Muslims. The panIslamic narrative of the regime, promoted since the reign of King
