Introduction:TheStupidTerrorist
Throughouthistory,militantgroupshaveengagedinviolencetooverturnthe politicalstatusquo.Somegroupshavebattledtoendpoverty,persecution, andforeignoccupation.Othershavefoughttoachieveanindependentstate, communistrevolution,orcaliphate.Whatnearlyallmilitantshaveincommonisthattheirgrievancesexceedtheircapabilitytoredressthem.Iftheir groupswerestronger,militantswouldn’tbe fightingthegovernment;with anyluck,theywouldbeleadingit.Thehistoryofmilitantgroupsisthusa storyaboutfailure.
Butnotalways.Thisbookofferswelcomenewsfortherebel.Itanalyzes hundredsofmilitantgroupswithavarietyofsocialscientificmethodsfrom anarrayofdisciplinaryperspectivestodiscernthedeterminantsofpolitical success.Themaintake-awayisthatmilitantleaderspossessasurprising amountofagencyovertheirpoliticaldestiny.Triumphispossible.It’sneither arbitrarilynorstructurallydetermined.Buttheyneedtoknowwhattodo. Peopleoftenmakethemistakeofwhat’scalled “leaderattributionerror.” They seesomethinggoingrightorwrongwithagroupandattributetheoutcometo theskilloftheleader.1 Thisisthe firstbooktoidentifyacohesivesetofactions toenablemilitantleaderstowin.Joinmeinexploringthesecretsoftheir success.Inthepagesbelow,you’lldiscoverthethreesimplerulesofsuccessful militantleaders.Itturnsoutthere’sasciencetovictoryinmilitanthistory. Butevenrebelsmustfollowrules.
LeadershipinSocialMovements
SincethepublicationofFrederickTaylor’s PrinciplesofScientificManagement at theturnofthetwentiethcentury,businessschoolsandconsultancy firms havestudiedcompaniesinsearchoftimelessleadershiprules.2 Thevery conceptcomesfrombusiness,withitslongstandingbeliefinthepowerof leaderstolifta firm’sperformance.3 Empiricalstudiesfromretailtoeducation
attesttothevalueofleadershiponallsortsofoutcomes.4 AHarvardBusiness Schoolstudyofforty-twoindustriesshowsthatonaveragetheeffectof theCEOaccountedforabout14percentofthedifferenceincorporateperformance,rangingfromabout2percentinthemeatprocessingindustryto 21percentintelecommunications.5
Butmybookisrevolutionary.Forstarters,the fieldofinternationalrelations paysshortshrifttotheroleofleaders.6 AsDanielBymanandKenPollackhave remarked, “Politicalscientistscontendthatindividualsultimatelydonot matter,oratleasttheycountforlittleinthemajoreventsthatshapeinternationalpolitics.”7 Thepoliticalpsychologist,RobertJervis,observedseveral yearsago, “Thestudyofleadershiphasfallenoutoffavorinpolitical science.”8 AccordingtoMichaelHorowitzandAllanStam,politicalscientists haveconsistently “ignoredtheroleofleaders” overthepastsixtyyears.9 As ElizabethSaundersnotes,internationalrelationstheorists “haverarelyincorporatedacentralroleforleaders.”10 Thelimitedworkininternationalaffairs focusesonspecificindividualswithoutformulatingageneralizabletheoryof whatsmartleadershipmeansorentailsacrosstimeandspace.11
Leadershipneglectisparticularlyrampantinthestudyofinternational socialmovements.ThesociologistsColinBarker,AlanJohnson,andMichael Lavaletteacknowledge, “Thereissomethingofablackboxinsocialmovement studiesinthatleadershiphasbeenunder-theorized. ”12 Theappliedsocial psychologist,BertKlandermans,agrees: “Leadershipanddecision-making aspectsofsocialmovementorganizations ... aremoreoftendebatedthan studiedempirically systematicstudiesofthewayinwhichmovementleaders functionarescarce.”13 SharonEricksonandBobCliffordplead, “Whateverthe reasonsforscholars’ relativeneglectofthesubject,webelievethatleadership meritsgreaterattention.”14 AldonMorrisandSuzanneStaggenborgalsoappeal that “socialmovementanalystsneedtoopenuptheblackboxofleadership anddeveloptheoriesandempiricalinvestigationsofhowleadershipaffectsthe emergence,dynamics,andoutcomesofsocialmovements.”15 Thisbookhelps to fillthatresearchlacuna.
Intheearly1970s,SaulAlinskypublished RulesforRadicals tohelpfuture communityorganizerswrestpowerfromthepoliticalelite.Inthisprimerfor the “have-nots,” thefounderofmoderncommunityorganizingsharedtargetedlessonshehadlearnedovertheyearsforsuccessfulprotest.16 Butwhat aboutwhenprotestersconcludethatprotestingisn’tenough?Historically, manysocialmovementshaveescalatedtoviolenceafternonviolencefailed. Inthelate-nineteenthcentury,theleaderoftheIrishNationalInvincibles declared: “Therecomesanhourwhenprotestnolongersuffices.Afterphilosophy,theremustbeaction.Thestronghand finisheswhattheideahas planned.”17 MichaelCollinswasconvincedthat “IrishIndependencewould neverbeattainedbyconstitutionalmeans” andthat “whenyou’reupagainst
abullyyou’vegottokickhimintheguts.”18 Inhismemoire,Irgunleader MenachemBegindescribedtheZionistgroup’spredicamentafternonviolence failedtoprotecttheYishuv: “Whatusewasthereinwritingmemoranda? Whatvalueinspeeches?No,therewasnootherway.Ifwedidnot fightwe shouldbedestroyed.”19 Whenaskedwhytheyadoptedviolenceinthe1950s, AlgeriannationalistscomplainedthattheFrenchhadjustshruggedofftheir futilestrikesandboycotts.20 InherautobiographyofhertimeintheAmerican WeatherUnderground,SusanSternexplainedwhytheradicalleft-winggroup escalatedtoviolence: “Astheyearshavepassed,I’veseenmyeffortsfailwith thousandsofothersintheCivilRightsandanti-warmovements.Thetimehas comenotmerelytoprotestbutto fightforwhatwebelievein.”21 Theleader oftheTamilTigerssharedasimilarrationaleforwhyhisgroupembraced violence: “TheTamilpeoplehavebeenexpressingtheirgrievances formore thanthreedecades.Theirvoiceswentunheardlikecriesinthewilderness.”22 TheAfricanNationalCongressreleasedasimilarstatementinJuly1963about whyitrampedupitsanti-apartheidtactics: “Itcannowtrulybesaidthatvery little,ifany,scopeexistsforthesmashingofwhitesupremacyotherthanby meansofmassrevolutionaction,themaincontentofwhichisarmedresistanceleadingtovictorybymilitarymeans.”23 AccountsoftheSyrianrebels suggestthatmany “pickedupweaponsasalastresort.”24 Accordingtothe PalestinianintellectualZaidAbu-Amr, “Asitbecameevidentthatthepeace negotiationswerenotyieldinganytangibleresults Hamaswasemboldened andbecamemoreaggressiveinitsoppositiontothePLOanditstacticsagainst Israel.”25 Forthisreason,somescholarsexpectviolencewhenevermass-based movementsofnonviolentreformarepoliticallyunprofitable.26 Likeitornot, manyradicalswillbecomerebels.Andtherearerulesforthem,too.
TheRiseandFallofIslamicState
IslamicState(ISIS)maycometomindwhenyouthinkofasavvy,successful militantgroup.Cladinblackrobes,ISISleaderIbrahimAwadIbrahimal-Badri al-Samarraia.k.a.AbuBakral-BaghdadiascendedthepulpitoftheGreat al-NurimosqueintheIraqicityofMosulonJuly5,2014proclaimingthe emergenceofanewcaliphate.InhisFridaysermon,theself-proclaimedcaliph announcedtothe umma thathisfoot-soldiershadjustcapturedswathesof landinIraqandSyria,effectivelycreatinganIslamicState. “Asforyour mujahedeenbrothers,” heintoned, “Allahhasbestoweduponthemthe graceofvictoryandconquest Heguidedthemandstrengthenedthemto achievethisgoal.”27 Byyear’send,ISISwouldcontrolone-thirdofIraqand one-thirdofSyria landmassroughlyequaltothesizeofGreatBritain wheretheterroristsruledoverninemillionpeople.28 TheIslamicStatewas
bolsteredbythelargestinfluxofinternationaljihadisinhistory.Over40,000 foreign fightersfrom110countriesheadedtoSyriaandIraq,morethanfour timesthenumberofmujahedeenwhohadtraveledtoAfghanistantobattle theRedArmyinthe1980s.29 Thisrecruitmentratewas “unprecedented,” as theheadoftheNationalCounterterrorismCentertestifiedinearly2015.30 ISIS’ reachwashardlylimitedtothecaliphate.Withvaryingdegreesof organizationalinvolvement,scoresofISISattacksindozensofcountries terrorizedtheworld. 31 By2016,Baghdadihadacceptedthe bayat orallegianceofforty-threeterroristgroupaffi liatesfromBokoHaraminNigeriato AbuSayyafinthePhilippines.NotonlydidISIShaveterritoryand fi ghters, butcash.Billedas “theworld ’srichestterroristgroup,” IslamicStaterakedin overabilliondollarsayearfromoilsales,taxes,looting,antiquitysmuggling, andhostage-taking.32
TheinternationalmediawasquicktocrownIslamicStateleadersasterrorist masterminds. TheGuardian crediteditsapparentfeatsto “highlyintelligent leaderscallingtheshots.”33 Inastoryentitled “MilitarySkillandTerrorist TechniqueFuelSuccessofISIS,” the NewYorkTimes gushedthatthegroup’s “battlefieldsuccesses” wereduetothe “pedigreeofitsleadership.” Thestory concluded, “Theseguysknowtheterrorismbusinessinsideandout.”34 The FinancialTimes claimedthat “ISISischillinglysmart.”35 So,too,didthe WashingtonPost,whichdescribedISISas “wildlysuccessful” withits “calculated madness.”36 Vox likewiseextolledISISasa “calculating,strategicorganization.”37 TheLosAngelesTimes wentevenfurther,exaltingISISleadersforhaving evidently “perfectedtheiroperations.”38 Theword “sophisticated” wasbandied aboutfrom TheWallStreetJournal to ForeignPolicy tocharacterizethe “evil genius” ofBaghdadiandhislieutenants.39 Ifevertherewasasmart,strategic militantgroup,IslamicStatewasapparentlyit.
Thisconventionalwisdominthemediawasfueledbythinktankpundits, whosaidISISleaderswereastuteinthreemainways.40 First,ISISleadersare smarttorecognizethestrategicutilityofbrutalizingciviliansnotonlyinits strongholdofIraqandSyria,butinindiscriminatemassacresthroughoutthe world.Ina Politico articleentitled “HowISISOut-TerrorizedBinLaden,” Will McCantsoftheBrookingsInstituteexplains: “TheIslamicState’sbrutality ... hasbeenremarkablysuccessfulatrecruiting fighters,capturingland,subduing itssubjects,andcreatingastate.Why?Becauseviolenceandgorework.”41 The ISISleadershipmaybeimmoral,butit’scleverenoughtoappreciatethat “brutalitywouldbeawinningpoliticalstrategy” since “thisterrifyingapproach tostatebuildinghasanimpressivetrackrecord.”42 McCantsdevelopedthis argumentintoamajorbook,whichstresseshowISIS’ unmitigatedsavagery andgoreare “theveryqualitiesthatmadetheIslamicStatesosuccessful.”43 Massacringthepopulationisallegedlyabetterwaytogaincompliancethan winningoveritsheartsandminds.Asheputsit,ISIS “doesn’tbelieveahearts
andmindsstrategyiseffective,andforthepastfewyearsithasbeenproven right.”44 HisBrookingshallmate,ShadiHamid,sharedthisassessmentwith NationalPublicRadio thatindiscriminate “violenceactuallydoeswork.”45 For Hamid,thelate2015massshootingattheBataclantheaterinPariswasa “smart move,” aswasblowinguptheRussianpassengerjetovertheSinaibecausesuch seeminglywantonactsofdepravityareallpartofthewinning “methodtoISIS’s madness.”46 Hamidwaxeseloquentaboutthestrategiclogicofkillingcivilians inhisbook: “Instillingterrorintheheartsofyouropponentsunderminestheir morale,makingthemmorelikelytostanddown, flee,orsurrender” and “the willingnesstoinflictterribleviolencehasadeterrenteffect,raisingthecostsfor anyonewhosomuchasthinksofchallengingthegroup.”47 EchoingMcCants, HamidassertsthatISIShasproventhat “capturingandholdinglargeswathesof territoryispossible” even “withoutthebenefitofwidespreadpopularsupport.”48 IntheirbestselleronISIS,MichaelWeissandHassanHassanrepeat that “thegroup’snotoriousbrutalityhelpedit.”49 Incountlessmediainterviews andop-eds,theyarguethatthegrislyhead-choppingandcage-burningof haplessvictimsfollowsa “brutallogic” andindeedshowcases “thegeniusof ISIS.”50 Clearly,punditshavebeenimpressedwiththeISISleadership’sstrategy ofsanctioningunbridledbarbarism.Thoughsickenedbytheindiscriminate bloodshedliketherestofus,theyclaimeditnonethelessworked.
Second,punditsaccredittheISISleadership’sstrategyofempoweringoperativesallovertheworldtomaximizethebloodletting,largelybydecentralizing theorganization.UnlikemorehierarchicalgroupssuchasAlQaeda,which placeagreaterpremiumoneducating,disciplining,andvettingmembers,the ISISleadershiptakesahands-offapproach,beckoningfanaticsacrosstheglobe tobutcherciviliansoftheirchoosinginthegroup’sname.Accordingto ClintWattsoftheForeignPolicyResearchInstitute,ISIS’ achievementsstem fromthefactthattheleadershave “empowereditsnetworkedforeign fighters toplanandperpetrateattacksatwill.”51 ThekeytoISISgainsisthatthe leadershiprecognizesthebenefitsof “diffuseoperationalcontrol,” which grantsextremistseverywhere “theautonomytoplotandplanlocally.”52 FawazGergeslikewiseproclaimedthat “thestrategiclogicoftheIslamic State” isbasedondelegatingtacticaldecision-makingtoextremistsacross theglobe.Thisgreenlighttoslayanyoneontheirwish-list “enablesISISto reapallofthebenefitsofanattack,whileincurringnoneofthecosts.”53 Peter BergenoftheNewAmericaFoundationalsoattributedtheapparentsuccess ofthegrouptoitsdiffusestructure. “WhatempowersISIS,” hewrotefor CNN.Com,isthatit “acceptsallcomers,” encouragingrisk-acceptantlunatics totraveltothecaliphate,strikelocally,ordevelopregionalaffiliatesunderthe blackbanner.54 “ThebrillianceoftheISISsystem,” expandedterrorismcommentatorMalcomNance, “isthatitsrecruitmentsystemisalmostpassive.” Theself-describedcaliphinviteseverynutcasetotheglobalmassacre;
“Baghdadiwelcomesthemall.”55 Theleaderscouldneverhaveinflictedso muchcarnageontheirown.Buttheywereallegedlystrategicenoughto expandthebloodbathbydecentralizingISISoperationsandrecruitment.
Third,punditslaudtheISISleadership’spublicrelationsstrategyofbroadcastingthegroup’smisdeedsoversocialmediaplatformslikeFacebook, YouTube,andTwitter,therebycapturingtheevilingraphicdetail.ISIShas usedsocialmediatoshowcasemanyaspectsofthegroup,butnonemore assiduouslythanitsinnovativesentencingtechniques frombeheadings withaknifetodecapitationthroughexplosivedetonationcordtodeathby dragging,drowning,immolation,burial,mashing,mutilation,stoning,roofchucking,andsquashing,sometimeswithatank.56 PhillipSmythofthe WashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicyaffirmsthatISISsucceededby developing “theperfectsociopathicimage.”57 ColinClarkeofRANDand CharlieWinteroftheInternationalCentrefortheStudyofRadicalisation proclaimthatthe “quality” ofISISpropaganda “trulyhasbeenunmatched” inhumanhistory.58 Inastorycalled “HowtheIslamicState’sMassivePR CampaignSecureditsRise,” ananti-RussiathinktankknownasBellingcat explainedthattheir “Publicrelationsprogramsareperhapssinglehandedly responsiblefortheirsuccessinbothrecruitingforeigners,andevenseizing controlofsizeableswathsoflandinIraqandSyria.”59 WeissandHassanadd thatISIS’ secretsaucehasbeenits “slickpropagandamachine,” especiallyits “peerlessabilitytoproducesleek,hour-longpropagandaandrecruitment films.”60 TheAlQaedainSyriaspecialistCharlesListeroftheMiddleEast InstitutealsoattributesISISsuccesstoits “slickpropagandamediareleases,” as these “jihadistsinparticularprovedespeciallyadeptatmanagingtheiruseof socialmediaandtheproductionofqualitativelysuperiorvideoandimagery output.”61 Thesepunditsareingoodcompanywiththisnarrative;asearchfor theterms “slick,”“video,” and “ISIS” onGoogleyieldedover5millionhitsin November2014alone.62 Theinternationalmediahaspromotedthisgroupthink. “WheretheIslamicStateinnovatedthemost,” the NewYorkTimes gushed, “wasincarryingoutincreasinglygruesomeviolenceexplicitlyto filmit tointimidateenemiesandtodrawrecruitswitheye-catchingdisplays onsocialmedia ... Thosetechniqueshaveprovedsoeffective.”63 Business Insider raved, “It’swell-knownthatISIShasbeenverysuccessful” becauseof itsgruesomeonlinepropaganda.64 Wired magazinewentsofarastosaythat “IslamicStatehasbeensingularlysuccessful” becauseofitsuniqueabilityto “inspiredread” and “cultivatethiskindofimage.”65 Advertisinggrotesque atrocitiesagainstinnocentpeopleisapparentlyterrificformilitantgroupsand ISISdoesitbest.
Andyet,somethingunexpectedhappened.TheISIScaliphatediedas quicklyasithadappeared.Punditshadbeentoobusyglorifyingitsstrategy torealizethegroupwaslosing.Indeed,ISISwasfailingbyitsownstandards.
In2015,ISISterritoryshrankby40percentinIraqand20percentinSyria.66 ISISlostanotherquarterofitsterritorythefollowingyear.67 Byearly2017,ISIS hadcededtwo-thirdsofitsland.68 Byspringtime,ISIScontrolledlessthan 7percentofIraqandwasbeingdefeatedinSyriabytheSyrianArabArmy,its Shiamilitiapartners,AmericanandRussiaairpower,Kurdishwarriors,anda smatteringofothermilitants.69 InhisMay2017Pentagonpressconference, DefenseSecretaryJamesMattisnotedthat “ISIShadlost55,000squarekilometersandregainednoneofit.”70 TheleadingArabdailyconceded, “ISISis batteredandinretreat,anditsalleged ‘caliphate’ isnearlydestroyedonthe ground.”71 TheGuardian acknowledgedlaterthatsummer “thecrumblingof theISIScaliphate,” as “black flagsarenolonger flying.”72 Evenitserstwhile capitalsinMosulandRaqqawerefallingfast.FormerDefenseSecretary,Robert Gates,waspreparedtocallitthen ISIShad “lost” initscoregoalofestablishingacaliphate.73 Tellingly,thatJuneISISblewuptheal-Nurimosque thevery sitewherethecaliphatehadbeendeclared.74 IraqiPrimeMinister,Haider al-Abadi,describedtheISISown-goalas “anofficialannouncementoftheir defeat.”75 Laterthatmonth,fromtheruinsofal-Nuri,theIraqimilitaryspokesmanfacednoISISoppositionwhenhedeclared “their fi ctitiousstatehas fallen.”76 AntonyJ.Blinken,theDeputySecretaryofStateunderObama, noted: “Itscorenarrative buildinganactualstate isintatters.”77 Asthe grouplostland,itsrevenuesalsoshrankuntilitcouldnolongerpay fi ghters, whichspurreddefectionsanddissuadedrecruitsfromjoiningthelosing team.AirForceMajorGeneralPeterGerstencapturedthesorrystateof IslamicState: “We’reseeingafractureintheirmorale;we’reseeing theirinabilitytopay;we’reseeingtheinabilityto fi ght;we’rewatching themtrytoleaveDaeshineverysingleway,” usinganArabicacronymfor IslamicState.78
ButnowherewastheISIScollapseclearerthaninitsonce-vauntedpropagandamessaging.ISISspokesman,AbuMohammadal-Adnani,hadgonefrom encouragingMuslimstoperform Hijrah oremigrationtothecaliphateto tellingjihadi-wannabeestostayhome.79 Adnaniwasadeadmanbythe summerof2016,aswouldsoonbetheguyinchargeofproducingtheISIS snuffvideos,AbuMohammedal-Furqan,andthenhisreplacement,Abu Bashiral-Maslawi.Thecontentofthevideosbecamealmostlaughable.ISIS wasreducedtobroadcastingpicturesofaone-leggedsuicidebomberinneed ofacane,whilebeggingmembersoftheapocalypticgrouptostopscurrying awayfromthebattlefield.80 ASyrianoppositionactivisttoldthe Associated Press inJune2017: “Thepropagandaoftheorganizationhasbecomezeroto befrank.Itindicatestheircollapseandthatthegroupisretreating.”81 Even thesympathizersorso-called “fan-boys” inpro-ISISchatroomsconcededthe caliphateprojectwasacompletebust.82 Asonejournalistputit, “Defeatis hardtosell.”83 Baghdadiwasreportedlyseenlooking “thinandstooped.”84
AlthoughISIS’ raisond’êtreofacaliphatewentupinsmoke,therewasaclear winner itsarchenemies.TheSalafi jihadistsrepeatedlysaidtheIslamicState wasintendedtocurbtheinfluenceofIrananditsShiaproxies,especially Hezbollah.ButinsteadofbecomingtheseatofahardlineSunnistate,Iraq andSyriawereturnedintoShia-country.85 ThesociologistWilliamGamson observes, “Thereisnomoreticklishissue ... thandecidingwhatconstitutes success.”86 Thepoliticalscientist,JamesDeNardo,remarksthatwecannotever besurewhetherterroristsgetwhattheywant;atbest,wecanevaluatewhether theygotwhattheyclaimedtowant.87 TheIslamicStateprojectface-plantedby thisstandard.Theywere “evillosers” asPresidentTrumplikestosay.
Thisreversaloffortunewasactuallyquitepredictable.Fromthemoment Baghdadideclaredacaliphatein2014,Igavehundredsofmediainterviews fromthe AssociatedPress tothe BBC pointingoutthebasicanalyticalproblem theverybehaviorslaudedasstrategichavehistoricallydoomedmilitant groups;ISIS,Ialwayssaid,wouldbenoexception.88 Withalittlehistorical contextandmethodstraining,itwasobviousthatBaghdadiwasnomastermindandneitherwerehisfellowstrategists.Theywere,asyou’llsee, supremelystupidterrorists.PresidentBarackObamagotblastedinthemedia forsayingearlyonthatISISwasthe “JVteam” (i.e.,JuniorVarsity)ofterrorists. Actually,hewasright atleastwhenitcametotheircluelessnessabout devisingawinninglong-termstrategy.
TheRulesforRebels
Smartmilitantleadersdothreesimplethingsforvictory:
1.Theyrecognizethatnotallviolenceisequalforachievingtheirstated politicalgoals.Infact,smartleadersgraspthatsomeattacksshouldbe carefullyavoidedbecausetheyhurtthecause.Myresearchisthe firstto empiricallyshowthatthere’svariationinthepoliticalutilityofmilitant groupviolencedependingonthetarget.Comparedtomoreselective violenceagainstmilitaryandothergovernmenttargets,indiscriminate violenceagainstciviliantargetslowersthelikelihoodofpoliticalsuccess. So,the firstthingsmartmilitantsdoisrecognizethatcivilianattacksarea recipeforpoliticalfailure.Youmightsaythatthe firstruleforrebelsisto notuseterrorismatall.There’snoconsensusoverthedefinitionof terrorism.89 Butmostscholarsdefineitasattacksagainstciviliantargets inparticular.90 Astheterrorismscholar,LouiseRichardson,remarks, “Thedefiningcharacteristicofterrorismisthedeliberatetargetingof civilians.”91 ThelegalscholarAlanDershowitzalsonotes, “Thedeliberatekillingofinnocentciviliansisacentralelementinmostdefinitionsof
terrorism.”92 TheeconomistsWalterEndersandToddSandleragree, “Virtuallyalldefinitionsconsiderterroristattacksagainstciviliansasterrorism.”93 Whentalkingaboutterrorism,wemeanattacksonciviliantargets likeschools,markets,movietheaters,mosques,rockconcerts,soccergames, synagogues,commercialairplanes,cruise-ships,churches,businesses,and apartmentbuildingsunlessoccupiedbymilitarypersonnel.We’renot talkingaboutblowingthetreadsoffatank.Whatmattersfortherebel, though,isn’thowwedefineterrorism,butthathelearnsthefollyof harmingcivilians.Inthisbook,thatmeansopposingterrorism.
2.Thesecondruleistoactivelyrestrainlower-levelmembersfromcommittingit.Itdoesn’tmatterwhethertherebelunderstandsthefutilityof terrorismifhismemberscontinuetodoitanyway.Thekeyisforhimto takeastandagainstterrorismandbuildtheorganizationsolower-level membersabide.Centralizingtheorganizationisinvaluableforeducating fightersaboutwhichtargetstoavoid,discipliningwaywardoperatives forharmingcivilians,andvettingoutmemberswhoseemproneto underminingthecausewithterrorism.
3.Andthethirdruleforrebelsistodistancetheorganizationfromterrorismwheneversubordinates flouttheirtargetingguidelinesbyattacking civilians.LikeCEOs,smartmilitantleadersknowhowtobrandtheir organizationformaximumappealwhenmemberspubliclyshameit.In practice,thismeansdisavowingterrorisminallsortsofscientifically provenwaystoprojectamoderateimageofthegroupevenwhenmembersactotherwise.Insum,smartrebelslearnthattacticalmoderation pays,restrainlower-levelmemberssotheycomply,andmitigatethe reputationalcostsevenwhentheydon’t.
Asyou’llsee,theserulesforrebelsarebasedoninsightsfromnumerous academicdisciplines(e.g.,communication,criminology,economics,history, management,marketing,politicalscience,psychology,sociology)andmethodologicalapproaches(e.g., fieldresearch,qualitativecasesstudies,content analysis,networkanalysis,regressionanalysis,surveyexperiments).Although thisbookappliestheselessonstohundredsofmilitantgroupsthroughout theworld,onegroupgetsmoreattentionthananyother IslamicState.ISIS getsmoreinkbecauseofitsintrinsicimportanceasamilitantgroup.Thisis theworstgrouptheworldhaseverknownintermsofitsciviliancarnage, geographicreach,andglobalterror.Conveniently,thesecharacteristicsalso mirrortherulesforrebels,soit’sidealforillustratingtofuturegenerations whatnottodo.
Ironically,theverybehaviorsdescribedasstrategicdidmoretodestroy thecaliphatethancreateit.Forstarters,ISISdidn’tacquireitsstronghold fromterrorism.PatrickSkinner,theformerCIAcounterterrorismcaseofficer,
pointsoutthatISIS’ territorialgainsinIraqandSyria “werenotterrorist successes.”94 AsthehistorianWalterLaqueurexplains,ISISsetupshopin areas “sparselypopulatedornotpopulatedatall theseregionswereakind ofnoman’slandinwhichgovernmentforceshadlostcontrol,buthadnot beenreplacedbyanyotherauthority.” Theso-calledcaliphatewas “morelike apowervacuumthananewstate.”95 EvenindenselypopulatedMosul,ISIS juststormedintothemilitaryvoid.AlthoughtheU.S.hadsuppliedbillionsof dollarstotheIraqimilitaryovertheyears,itwaswoefullyunprepared weaponssystemshadfallenintodisrepair,theofficercorpswasswollenwith politicalhacks,thousandsof “ghostsoldiers” shortonammowereonthe books,butneverevenshowedupto fight.96 AsBrianFishmanobserves, “ISIS didnotactually fightitswayintoMosul ... thearmycollapsed.”97 Moretothe point,Mosulresidentsadmittheyweren’tterrorizedorcoercedintosupportingthegroup.Onthecontrary,they “initiallywelcomedtheIslamicState” becausetheythoughtitwouldofferprotection.98 Thesupportoflocalsdissipated,however,themomentthegroupterrorizedthem.Thisindiscriminate ruthlessnessensuredISISwasreviledineverytown,ostracizedevenbyother Salafistgroups,grosslyout-mannedineverybattlefromTikrittoRaqqa,and unabletoholdontoitsown fighters,whoincreasinglydefectedduelargelyto thewantonkilling.99 ThemoreterrorismISISinflicted,thelessterritoryit controlled.100 ThedecentralizationofISIS’ violenceallovertheworldunitedit againstthegroup.Madeupofoversixty-fivecountries,theanti-ISIScoalition hadnotroublegainingparticipantspreciselybecausethedepravedgroup threatenedcitizenseverywhere,turningevenerstwhilefriendslikeQatar, SaudiArabia,andTurkeyintoenemies.Thisanti-ISIScoalitionwasneither automaticnorinevitable.TheturningpointcameinAugust2015,whenISIS madethefatefuldecisiontobeheadtheAmericanjournalist,JamesFoley,and thenboastaboutitoversocialmedia.ISISsaidinthevideothatthebeheading wasintendedtodetertheU.S.fromgoingafterthegroup.101 ISISleaders launchedhundredsofTweet-stormsthreateningtoattacktheU.S.ifitintervenedmilitarilyagainstthe fledglingcaliphate.102 Yetthevideogalvanized Obamatoassemblethelargestcounterterrorismcoalitioneverassembledto pummelthegroup.ISISpaidasteep,albeitpredictablepriceforbreaching therulesforrebels.Baghdadiwasastupidterroristnotwithstandingthethink tankconsensus.
BookLayout
Thethreerulesforrebelsaredevelopedsequentiallyinthisbook.Inthe first part,Idevelopthe firstruleforrebels.Specifically,Ipresentevidencefroma hostofmethodologicalapproaches fieldresearch,casestudies,regression
analysis,andexperiments thatcertainkindsofattacksaremoreeffective thanothers.Thesechaptershighlightthatmilitantgroupsarefarmorelikely toachievetheirpoliticaldemandswhenviolenceisdirectedagainstmilitary targetsratherthancivilianones.Thisoriginal findinggoingbacktomydays intheWestBankduringtheSecondIntifada fliesinthefaceofwhatIcallthe StrategicModelofTerrorism.103 Asitsnamesuggests,thisschoolofthought, prominentinpoliticalscience,assumesthatgroupsturntoterrorismbecause itoffersthebestchancetoattaintheirpoliticalgoals.Infact,myresearch revealsthatcivilianattacksbackfirebyloweringtheprospectsofgovernment concessions nottomentionorganizationalsurvival.Leadersmaynotinitiallygrasptheriskofterrorism,butsmartoneslearnitovertime.Learningto winbysparingciviliansisthe firstandforemostruleformilitantleaders. Withoutinternalizingthisrule,theycan’tbeexpectedtofollowtheother onesandprevail.
Thesecondpartofthebookspellsoutthesecondruleforrebels.Inthese chapters,Ishowhowsmartleaderspreventtheir fightersfromharming civilians,boostingthelikelihoodofvictory.Somepoliticalscientists,like JeremyWeinsteinandStathisKalyvas,agreethatcivilianattacksareselfdefeatingformilitantgroupsatleastincivilwars.Butthesescholarswrite outtheroleoftheleaderbyattributingindiscriminateviolencetostructural conditionssuchastheavailabilityofresourcesratherthantodecisionsfromthe top.104 Irestoreagencytoleadersbydisclosinghowsmartonesmaintain operationalcontrolunderanystructuralcondition,effectivelyrestrictingtheir membersfromsabotagingthecausewithterrorism.Thephysicalscientist,Brian Jackson,definesoperationalcontrolas “Theabilitytocontrolorinfluencethe activitiesandoperationsbeingcarriedoutinpursuitoftheorganization’s strategicgoals.”105 Restraininglower-levelmembersoftheorganizationistricky becausethey’relesslikelytorecognizethepoliticalcostsofterrorismoreven careaboutthem.Butleadersaren’tpassiveobserversofmilitantgroupbehavior; rather,theywieldconsiderableinfluenceoverthetacticalchoicesoftheir subordinatesandhencethelikelihoodofvictory.Leaderscandramatically reducetheuseofterrorismintheirrankssimplybytellingthemnotdoitand thenbuildingtheorganizationsotheycomply.Aswe’llsee,acentralizedgroup iscriticalforinstillingtacticalrestraintbyhelpingtheleadertocommunicate whichtargetstoavoid,punishtargetingviolationsagainstcivilians,andvetout wannabe-membersinclinedtocommitthem.Whereasthe firstpartofthebook showsthatsmartleadersrecognizethevalueofcivilianrestraint,thesecond partshowshowtoachieveitbygettingmemberstocomplywithit.
Thethirdpartofthisbookexplainshowsmartleadersrespondwhenthey don’t.Followingthe firsttworulesforrebelssubstantiallyreducesterrorismin theirranks.Butitdoesn’teliminateitentirely.Evenleaderswhofollowboth ruleswilloccasionallyfaceapublicrelations fiasco.Luckilyforrebels,there’sa
considerablebodyofacademicresearchonhoworganizationscanrestore theirimagewhenmembersengageinface-threateningbehaviorsthatrisk tarnishingit.Drawingfromthe fieldsofcommunication,marketing,and psychology,Ishowhowsmartmilitantleadersadoptthesameprovencrisis managementstrategiesasCEOstomaximizetheappealoftheorganization whenmemberspubliclyshameit.Brandingisessentialforallorganizations, butespeciallymilitantgroupswhosefatedependsongarneringinternational andlocalsupport.Forthemilitantleader,thekeytodevelopingawinning brandisbydistancingtheorganizationfromterrorismwhenoperativesperpetrateit.Inpractice,whenoperativeskillcivilians,thismeansengagingin scientifically-baseddenialstrategiestodemonstrategoodwill.Thesethree rulesforrebels learning,restraining,andbrandingtowin arethesecrets forvictory.LongbeforeISISinvertedthisplaybook,successfulmilitantleaders werefollowingit.
Notes
1.Nye2008,3. 2.Taylor1914.
3.Barker2001,66.
4.JonesandOlken2005,835;Halletal.1986,5.
5.Wassermanetal.2001.
6.Forexceptions,seeBarber1992;Horowitzetal.2015;Saunders2011.
7.BymanandPollack2001,108.
8.Jervis2013,154.
9.Horowitzetal.2015,xii.
10.Saunders2011,3–4.
11.HorowitzandStam2014,528.
12.Barkeretal.2001,1.
13.Barker,Johnson,andLavalette2001,3.
14.NepstadandClifford2006,1.
15.MorrisandStaggenborg2004,190. 16.Alinsky1971. 17.Tynan1894,488. 18.Boot2013,250.
19.Begin1978,43.
20.SharpandFinkelstein1973,544. 21.Stern2007,130–1. 22.Richardson2007,50.
23.Turok2003,277. 24.Lister2016,xiii.
25.Abū ‘Amr1994,75. 26.Lichbach1998,59.
27.Baghdadi,5July,2014.
28.Johnson2016.
29.Callimachi,March29,2016;Fishman2016.
30.CrawfordandKoran,February11,2015.
31.Listeretal.,February13,2017.
32.Heißneretal.2017.
33.Chulov,September7,2016.
34.HubbardandSchmitt,August27,2014.
35.Gardner,18February,2015.
36.McCoy,June13,2014;McCoyAugust12,2014.
37.Fisher,November23,2015.
38.Williams,November22,2015.
39.See,forexample,AndrewsandSchwartz,22August2014;Brannen,21August 2014.
40.Tobeclear,analyststoutedIslamicState’sbehaviorasstrategic.Innowaydidthey approveofthegroup’sbehavior.Alloftheanalystsreferencedinthisbookareon thesamecounterterrorismteamasIam.Mydisagreementwiththemisnot normative.Itisstrictlyanalyticalintermsofwhichmilitantgroupbehaviors facilitatepoliticalsuccess.
41.McCants,August19,2015.
42.Ibid.
43.McCants2015,126.
44.Ibid.151,159.
45. “InRecruitmentEfforts,” November16,2014.
46. “WhyU.S.GovernorsShouldn’t,” November17,2015;Hamid,November24, 2015.
47.Hamid2016,221.
48.Ibid.232.
49.WeissandHassan2015,229.
50.Hassan,February7,2015.
51.Watts,November23,2015.
52.Watts,April4,2016.
53.GergesAugust14,2016.
54.Bergen,November5,2015.
55.Nance2016,210–11.
56.Ibid.256.
57.Gebeily,June26,2014.
58.ClarkeandWinter,August17,2017.
59.Goldsmith,February11,2015.
60.WeissandHassan2015,xv,171.
61.Lister2016,240,4.
62.SternandBerger2015,120.
63.BarnardandMacFarquharnov,November20,2015.
64.EngelNovember28,2015.
65. “WhyISISIsWinningtheSocialMediaWar,” April,2016.
