INTRODUCTION
Physical Security Principles ismeanttoservethreepurposes.First,theauthors, reviewers,andother contributorshopethatsecurityprofessionalsworldwidewill find ittobeavaluabledeskreferenceonaspectsofthepracticeofphysical security. Second,thebookmaybeanappropriatetextfor collegeandCTE(career andtechnical education) coursesrelatedtophysical security.Third,itisagreatreferenceasit containsthebreadthanddepthnecessaryfor everyoneinterestedinobtaininga certificationinphysical security.
Our intentthroughoutistopresent,discuss,andcontrastprinciplesandpracticesina complementaryfashionanddemonstratetheir interrelatednessineveryorganizationand everysettingonaglobal scale.Theobjectivefor thesecurityprofessional istoleverage longstanding,widelyacceptedconceptsandtailor themtotheparticular situationat handtobestmeettheidentifiedprotectionobjectives.All thismustbedonewithinthe constraintsofcost,time,space,culture,regulation,andoperational needs.Itisa challengeindeed,andthisbookismeantasaresourcetohelplaythegroundworkfor successful physical securityprojectsineverysituation.
Althoughphysical securityisonlyoneelementofacomprehensiveprotectionstrategy,it isgenerallythefirstthingthatcomestomindfor mostpeople.Itisadisciplinethathas alwaysexistedandmostprobablyalwayswill.AsBobMcCrie,CPP,writesin The Handbook of Security byProfessor MartinGill:1
From the earliest known evidence, security became necessary for human existence A fundamental strategy was to use physical implementation wherever possible to protect from external incursions Often,geographic locationcouldbe significantfor protection While geographyeasedthe vulnerability for some communities, others required additional means of protection An encompassing wall or physicalbarriers for protection [were often employed] Posts,thick enclosures,heavy doors with stout closures, animals and traps all served to protect [communities] Thus, a variety of physical and animate securityresources emerged
References
Chapter 3.PLANNING ANDCONDUCTING PHYSICALSECURITY ASSESSMENTS
3.1 General RiskAssessmentModelsandConsiderations
3.2 QualitativeandQuantitativeMethods
3.2.1 Assets
3.2.2 EvaluatingThreats
3.2.3 Vulnerabilities
3.2.4 RiskAnalysis
3.2.5 RiskMitigation
3.2.6 LeveragingOutsideExpertise
3.3 Physical SecurityAssessments
3.3.1 FramingtheSecuritySurveyandPuttingItinContext
3.3.2 ApproachestoPhysical SecurityAssessments
3.4 General Guidelines AreastoAssess
3.4.1 Typical AreasandItemstoAssess
3.4.2 Tests
3.5 ApplyingAssessmentResults
3.6 AutomatedAssessmentTools
References
Chapter 4.MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTSINPHYSICAL SECURITYMETRICS
4.1 UnderstandingMetrics
4.1.1 BenefitsofaSecurityMetricsProgram
4.1.2 DesigningaMetricsProgram
4.2 Physical SecurityMetrics
4.2.1 Physical SecuritySystemsMetrics
4.2.2 Physical SecurityPersonnel Metrics
4.2.3 Physical SecurityComplianceMetricsinthePublicSector
4.2.4 PresentingAggregateStatusfor Physical SecurityMetrics
4.3 Additional RecommendedMetrics
4.4 ApplicationofMetricsThroughoutThisBook
References
DESIGNPRINCIPLESANDPRACTICES
Chapter 5.BASICDESIGNCONCEPTS
5.1 DesignPrinciples
5.1.1 PointVersusAreaSecurity
5.1.2 ConflictAvoidance
5.1.3 Balance
5.1.4 Additional DesignElements
5.2 ExamplesofDesignPractices: GoodandNotSoGood
References
Chapter 6.INFLUENCING FACTORSINPHYSICALSECURITYDESIGN
6.1 CharacteristicsoftheAssetsunder Protection
6.2 CharacteristicsoftheBuildingor Facility
6.2.1 OwnershipandOccupancy
6.2.2 PurposeoftheFacility
6.2.3 Access
6.3 CharacteristicsoftheSurroundings
6.4 CharacteristicsoftheLocation
6.5 Additional InfluencingFactors
6.5.1 SelectingMitigationOptionsBasedonInfluencingFactors
References
Chapter 7.SECURITYARCHITECTUREANDENGINEERING
7.1 DesignOverview
7.2 CodesandRegulations
7.3 ProjectRequirements
10.2.3 AccessControl,Surveillance,andTerritorial Reinforcement
10.3 CPTEDApplicationsinVariousSettings
10.3.1 Commercial OfficeBuildings
10.3.2 Industrial BuildingsandFacilities
10.3.3 ParkingFacilities
10.3.4 Schools
10.3.5 AutomatedTeller Machines(ATMS)
10.3.6 U.S.Federal Buildings
10.4 IntegrationofCPTEDandTraditional Security
10.5 OneExampleofaCPTEDSurveyTemplate
References
Chapter 11.ELECTRONICSECURITYSYSTEMS
11.1 AccessControl Systems
11.1.1 Personnel AccessControl
11.1.2 Locks
11.2 ContrabandDetection
11.2.1 Metal Detectors
11.2.2 PackageSearch
11.2.3 ExplosivesDetection
11.2.4 Chemical andBiological AgentDetection
11.3 Physical IntrusionDetectionSystems
11.3.1 PerformanceCharacteristics
11.3.2 Standards
11.3.3 Exterior Sensors
11.3.4 Interior Sensors
11.4 VideoSurveillance
11.4.1 Functional Requirements
11.4.2 TheoryofVisual Security
11.4.3 UsesofVideoSubsystemsinSecurity
11.4.4 AnalogSystemComponents
11.4.5 Digital SystemComponents
11.4.6 SystemDesign
11.4.7 EquipmentSelection
14.1 SystemDesignPrinciples
14.2 Initial Phases
14.3 DesignPhases
14.3.1 DevelopmentofDesignCriteria
14.3.2 BasisofDesign
14.3.3 Conceptual Design
14.3.4 DesignandDocumentation
14.3.5 Specifications
14.3.6 Drawings
14.3.7 DesignCoordination
14.4 Contracting
14.4.1 Initial Budget
14.4.2 EstimationConsiderations
14.4.3 TypesofCostEstimates
14.4.4 Life-CycleCost
14.4.5 SampleEstimate
14.5 TheRoleofConsultants
14.6 VideoSystems
14.6.1 TheFirstEvolution: AnalogtoDigital
14.6.2 TheSecondEvolution: StandardResolutiontoMegapixel
14.6.3 ProcessedVideo,VideoAnalytics,andIntelligentVideo
14.6.4 VideoSystemsIntegration
14.7 MergingLegacySystems
14.7.1 AccessControl Systems
14.7.2 LegacyVideoSystems
14.7.3 LegacyIntercomSystems
14.7.4 SecurityNetworksandLegacyIntegration
14.8 Procurement
14.8.1 ProcurementForms
14.8.2 ProcurementProcess
Chapter 15.PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION
15.1 SitePreparation
15.2 Contractor Coordination
7-2 Castel Nuovo,Naples,Italy
7-3 HämeCastle,Hämeenlinna,Finland
7-4 ConsiderationsinNew ConstructionversusRetrofit/Renovation
7-5 BlastPressureEffectsonaStructure
7-6 EffectsofBuildingShapeonAir BlastLoadingPressureEffectsonaStructure
7-7 SecurityZones
7-8 EffectsofProgressiveCollapseonKhobar Towers
7-9 PerformanceConditionsfor Window SystemResponse
7-10 ProtectingIntakesfor HVACSystems
8-1 SurveyResponsesonSecurityInvolvementinNonsecurityRisks
9-1 Typical ChainLinkSecurityFenceInstallation
9-2 Typical SizesofWireandMesh
9-3 DecorativeFencinginConcertwithaMasonryWall andLandscaping
9-4 DecorativeFencingwithTopBarbs
9-5 LayoutofCableFencingUsedinConjunctionwithPlanting
9-6 Cross-SectionView ofTypical Bollard
9-7 Cross-SectionView ofaRetractableBollard
9-8 DecorativeSecurityFencingwithSupportingBollardsSpaced1.5-3ft.(0.5to 0.9m) Apart
9-9 Barrier ProtectionRatings
9-10 WedgeBarriers
9-11 InstallationofaRisingWedgeBarrier
9-12 Typical RotatingEdgeBarrier
9-13 CustomSecurityPlanter BarriersInstalledinanUrbanProfessional Area
9-14 Planter BarriersInstalledinaSportsArenaSettingwithLogos
9-15 CutawayofaPlanter withanInterior Highway-TypeBarrier
9-16 JerseyBarriers
9-17 EquivalentPre-1972andCurrentClassificationLabelsfor Fire-ResistantSafes
9-18 SummaryofULDesignationsandLabelsfor Fire-ResistantContainers
9-19 LightingStraightDown
9-20 AppropriateOverlapVersusCoverageGapfor Pole-MountedOutdoor Lighting
9-21 Natural andVisual LightLevels
9-22 ReflectanceMeasurements
9-23 Color Temperature
9-24 Color RenditionIndexfor VariousLampTypes
9-25 LampStartingandRestrikeTimes
9-26 Guidelinesfor MinimumLightingLevels
10-1 Tool for EvaluatingCPTED3-DFactors
10-2 SignagetoClarifyProcedures 10-3 Typical Elevator Lobby
10-4 BermandTreeLinefor Perimeter Control andPrivacy
AccessandHours
LayoutstoAvoid
BistaticMicrowaveSensors
GlassBreakSensor
CONCEPTSINSECURITY RISKMANAGEMENT
Whether inthepublicor privatesector,andwhether dealingwithtraditional or cyber security(or both),assetsprotectionisincreasinglybasedontheprincipleofrisk management.2 Theterm risk management hasbeenincommonuseinother fields(such asinsurance,business,researchanddevelopment,andengineering) for manyyears. However ithasmorerecentlybeenappliedinsecuritymanagementandassets protection.Theconceptisaperfectfitsincesecurity’sprimaryobjectiveistomanage risksbybalancingthecostofprotectionmeasures(includingphysical security) with their benefit.Tomanageriskeffectively,asecurityprofessional wouldeliminateor reducethetotal number ofincidentsleadingtoloss.Agoal ofriskmanagementisto managelosseffectivelyattheleastcost.Infact,manyprofessionalsbelievethat“riskis themostsignificantfactor thatdrivesthedeploymentofsecurity”(Vellani,2007,p. 234).
1.1 TAKINGASTRATEGIC RISKMANAGEMENTAPPROACH
Toooftenorganizationleaderslooktothequickfixtosatisfytheir security needs.Theybuyapopular securitysystemor areconvincedbyasales representativethataparticular productor serviceistheall-encompassing answer totheir protectionneeds.Theyareconvincedthattheir critical assetsare thencompletelysafewithoutever askingwhatthoseassetsareor whattypesof threatstheyface.Vellani (2010,p.3) observes:
[T]oo often recommendations...are presented with little or no thought as to why certain procedures or security equipment should be used.... Often, a security measure is deployed because other companies are doingit...[or] without[a] complete understandingof the problem.
physical securitydecisions.Securityprofessionalsandplannersmust incorporatetheprotectionofintangibleassetsintotheir facilityandsecurity systemsdesigns.
1.2.2 ACOMPREHENSIVEVIEWOFTHETHREAT
Enterprisesfaceawidevarietyofthreats,whichfall intothreecategories: intentional,natural,andinadvertent.Acomprehensive,andhencemore meaningful,threatandvulnerabilityanalysis,whichisthefirststep,will consider all threecategories.SinceSeptember 11,2001,itiscommontofocus heavily(sometimesalmostexclusively) ontheterroristthreatwhenconducting corporateor organizational riskanalyses.However,terrorismisonlyoneaspect ofonecategoryofthreats(intentional).Thetendencytofocusononethreatisnot new.Inthemid-1980s,for example,therewasanoveremphasisonthetheftof advancedtechnology.Atother times,thesecuritycommunityhasfocusedtoo heavilyonwhite-collar crime,cyberattacks,natural disasters,or other calamities.
Physical securityplanningshouldadoptan all hazards perspective inother words,abalancedapproachthatlooksatthebigpictureandidentifiesthatinthe contextofrisk,ahazardisacontributingfactor toaperil.Sometypesofthreats aremoreprevalentatcertaintimesandincertainplaces.Long-termassets protectionstrategies,however,mustbebasedonarealistic,full scopeand balancedthreatassessment.AccordingtoWinkler (1997,p.37):
Accurate assessment of the level of threat against your organization is critical to the success of your security plan Threat is an essential factor in your risk reduction formula, and you must consider it carefully If you don’t, you’ll simply be flying blind when it comes to prioritizing countermeasures
1.2.3 LOOKING
