1 SpeechActs
TheContemporaryTheoreticalLandscape
DanielW.Harris,DanielFogal,andMattMoss
Speech-acttheorywasbornofacentralinsight:languageisamediumformanykinds ofaction,butitssuperficialuniformitytendstomaskthisfact.1 Consider(1): (1)Heshouldbeherebynow.
Thepointofuttering(1)couldbetoassertthatsomeoneshouldbeherebynow, tocommandsomeoneelsetogethim,toassignblameforhislateness,tothreaten, toactoutaroleinaplay,tolodgeaformalcomplaint,andsoon.Withoutaclear understandingoftheseandotherkindsofspeechacts,wewouldhavenohope ofunderstandinghowhumansuselanguage.Norwouldwehavemuchhopeof understandingthemanyactivitiesinwhichspeechplaysacentralrole.Thisiswhy speech-acttheoryhasbecomeessentialtosomanyareaswithinphilosophyandthe cognitiveandsocialsciences.
Unlesswesayotherwise,wewilluse‘speechact’toreferto illocutionary acts.Thisis acategoryfirstsingledoutbyJ.L.Austin(1962;1970).Thereisnotheory-neutralway ofsayingwhatmakesforanillocutionaryact,butitisrelativelyuncontroversialthat paradigmcasesincludeasserting,requesting,commanding,questioning,promising, testifyingincourt,pronouncingmarriage,placingsomeoneunderarrest,andsoon. Insinglingoutillocutionaryactsfortheoreticalattention,Austindistinguishedthem from locutionary acts,whicharemereutterancesofmeaningfulexpressions,and perlocutionary acts,whichareactsofproducingeffectsthatarecausallydownstream fromillocutionaryacts.Twoutterancesof(1)maybeutterancesoftheverysame sentencewiththeverysamesemanticproperties.Yet,ononeoccasion,theutterance mayconstituteacomplaint,onanother,amereobservation.Thisraisesthecentral questionofspeech-acttheory:whatmakesitthecasethatanutteranceconstitutesan illocutionaryactofagivenkind?Answerstothisquestion—i.e.,theoriesofspeech
1 WefindearlyarticulationsofthisinsightinAustin’sdiscussionofthedescriptivefallacy(1962,1–3), inGrice’stheoriesofspeakermeaningandimplicature(1957,1961,1975),inearlyversionsofmetaethical expressivism(Ayer,1936;Hare,1952;Stevenson,1937),andinvariousguisesintheworkofWittgenstein— mostpoetically,perhaps,inhiscomparisonoflinguisticexpressionstoacollectionofhandleswhose functionsareheterogeneous,butthat“all[look]moreorlessalike.(Thisstandstoreason,sincetheyareall supposedtobehandled.)”(Wittgenstein,1953,§12).
danielw.harris,danielfogal,&mattmoss
acts—haveproliferated.Ourmaingoalinthispaperistoclarifythelogicalspaceinto whichthesedifferenttheoriesfit.
Webegin,in§1.1,bydividingtheoriesofspeechactsintofivefamilies,each distinguishedfromtheothersbyitsaccountofthekeyingredientsinillocutionary acts.Arespeechactsfundamentallyamatterofconventionorintention?Orshould weinsteadthinkofthemintermsofthepsychologicalstatestheyexpress,interms oftheeffectsthatitistheirfunctiontoproduce,orintermsofthenormsthat governthem?In§1.2,wetakeupthehighlyinfluentialideathatspeechactscanbe understoodintermsoftheireffectsonaconversation’scontextor“score”.Partofwhy thisideahasbeensousefulisthatitallowsspeech-acttheoristsfromthefivefamilies toengageatalevelofabstractionthatelidestheirfoundationaldisagreements.In §1.3,weinvestigatesomeofthemotivationsforthetraditionaldistinctionbetween propositionalcontentandillocutionaryforce,andsomeofthewaysinwhichthis distinctionhasbeenunderminedbyrecentwork.In§1.4,wesurveysomeofthe waysinwhichspeech-acttheoryhasbeenappliedtoissuesoutsidesemanticsand pragmatics,narrowlyconstrued.
1.1WhatMakesforaSpeechAct?TheFiveFamilies
1.1.1Convention
OneofthetwotheoriesofspeechactstobearticulatedinpostwarOxfordisconventionalism,whichoriginatesintheworkofJ.L.Austin(1962;1963;1970).According toAustin,anillocutionaryactisa“conventionalprocedure”whoseperformanceis amatterofbehavinginaccordancewithacollectionof“felicityconditions”,which arethemselvesamatteroflocalizedsocialconventions.Violatingsomeofthese felicityconditions,asinmakingapromisethatonedoesn’tintendtofulfill,results inaninfelicitousact—i.e.,aperformancethatisnormativelydefectiveinsomeway. Violatingotherfelicityconditions,asonewoulddoinattemptingtopronouncea couplemarriedwithoutpossessingtherequiredstatusofanofficiant,resultsina “misfire”—i.e.,nonperformance,afailedattempttoperformtheact.Inillustrating histheory,Austinfocusesonhighlyritualizedexamplesofillocutionaryacts,suchas officiatingamarriageceremony,christeningaship,andwillingproperty(1962,5)— actswhoseperformanceisimpossibleoutsidethecontextofestablishedcustoms, socialinstitutions,orlegalframeworks.Nonetheless,hisconventionalistanalysisis intendedtoapplytoallillocutionaryacts.Toperformanillocutionaryact,according toAustin,requiresfirstbeinginacontextinwhichtheconventionisineffect,and thenactinginaccordancewithit.
Althoughconventionalismmakessenseofritualizedandinstitutionalizedacts likemarriage,itstruggleswiththeillocutionaryactsthatmakeupourbasiccommunicativerepertoire,includingasserting,askingquestions,andmakingrequests. Unlikemarriage,asserting,asking,andrequestingneedn’tbeperformedrelativetothe “jurisdiction”ofanyparticularsetofinstitutionsorconventions:itispossibletoassert andaskquestionsacrossinternationalborders,butnottomarryortestifyincourt,for example.Andwhereasthenatureofmarriagevarieswidelybetweensocieties,sothat marriageis,atbest,alooseclusterconcept,asserting,asking,andrequestingseemto
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bepartofhumans’cross-culturaltoolkitforsocialinteraction(evenifthemeansof performingthemvarybetweenlanguages).Itisalsostrikingthateveryknownhuman languageincludesclause-typeswhosefunctionistoperformassertion-like,questionlike,andrequest-likeacts(Zanuttinietal.,2012),suggestingthattheirpresencein ourillocutionaryrepertoireisnotitselfamatterofconvention.Andwhereasthere aresocietiesinwhichmarriageceremonieslastyearsandinvolvecomplexexchanges ofproperty,itisdifficulttoimagineritualsofthiskindbeingnecessaryto,say, askwhattheweatherislike.Itisthereforetemptingtorecognizeacategoryof communicative illocutionaryactsthatfunctioninadifferent,andlessconventional, waythantheessentiallyconventionalillocutionaryactsonwhichAustinfocused (BachandHarnish,1979,chs.6–7).
Considerationslikethesehaveledmostcontemporaryconventionaliststohold thattheconventionsthatdefineactslikeasserting,questioning,andrequestingare linguistic conventions,ratherthansocialconventionsofthekindemphasizedby Austin.Toassert p,onthisview,istoproduceanutterancethatconformstothe linguisticconventionsforasserting p inthelanguagebeingused; mutatismutandis forasking,requesting,andsoon.Aviewofthiskindseemstobewidelyassumed, thoughithaslessoftenbeenexplicitlydefended.Aninfluentialdefenseoflinguistic conventionalism—albeitaversionthatincorporateselementsfromvariouscompetingviewstobedescribedbelow—canbefoundinSearle’s1969book, SpeechActs.The mostnotablerecentdefensecanbefoundinErnieLeporeandMatthewStone’s2015 book, ImaginationandConvention,whichtacklesmanyofthestandardobjections thathavebeenraisedagainstSearleandotherearlierconventionalists.
Linguisticconventionalismfacesavarietyofseriouschallenges.2 Onemajorchallengeistoaccountforsemanticunderdetermination—thefactthatthespeechact oneperformsisrarely,ifever,fullydeterminedbythelinguisticmeaningsofthe expressionsoneusestoperformit.Consider(2):
(2)Canyoulendmeahandtomorrow?
Inuttering(2),forexample,aspeakermayberequestingtheaddressee’shelp,or merelyaskingwhetheritwillbeavailable.Thecontentof(2)willvarydependingon whotheaddresseeis,theflavorofthemodal‘can’,andwhetherthespeakerisusing ‘lendmeahand’withitsidiomaticsenseor(inthemacabrecase)withitsunidiomatic, fullycompositionalsense.Thelinguisticconventionsgoverning(2)wouldseemtobe neutralbetweentheseforcesandcontents;ifso,somethingotherthanconventions willhavetodotheworkofdeterminingparticularanswersonparticularoccasions. Analogouspointscanbemadeaboutawiderangeoflinguisticexpressions,andall (ornearlyall)natural-languagesentences,evenwhentheyarebeingusedtoperform directandliteralspeechacts.Manyhavethereforegiventhespeaker’sintentions aroletoplayindeterminingwhatissaidwithanutterance.3 Whenindirectand
2 Forsomeobjectionstoconventionalism,seeBachandHarnish(1979);Davidson(1979a);Harris (2016);Starr(2014);Strawson(1964);Unnsteinsson(2016).
3 Bach(1987,1992);Carston(2002);Heim(2008);Kaplan(1989);King(2013,2014);Michaelson (2013);Neale(2004,2005,2007);Schiffer(1981,2003);SperberandWilson(1995).
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nonliteralspeechactsareconsidered,thecaseagainstconventionalismseemseven morepressing(BachandHarnish,1979).
LeporeandStonemixtwostrategiesforrespondingtotheseworries.First,they arguethatmanyallegedinstancesofillocutionaryacts,includingthoseinvolving metaphor,insinuation,andmanycasesofindirectspeech,shouldnotbeconsidered illocutionaryactsatall,sincetherecanbenowell-definedconditionsforsuccessfully communicatingbymeansofthem.Thereisnoclearproposition p suchthatcommunicationwouldsucceedifoneweretotakeRomeotobeasserting p inuttering ‘Julietisthesun’,forexample,andmanycasesofindirectspeechseemtofacethesame issue.4 Ineffect,LeporeandStoneholdthatthesephenomenaarebetterunderstood asperlocutionaryactsratherthanasillocutionaryacts:thespeaker’sgoalisnotto communicateaspecificcontent,butmerelytocauseanopen-endedchainofthoughts intheaddressee.LeporeandStone’ssecondstrategyistodrawonrecentworkin dynamicsemantics,discourserepresentationtheory,anddiscoursecoherencetheory inordertoarguethatmanypurportedinstancesofsemanticunderspecificationand indirectspeechactuallyarisefromcomplexbutconvention-governedinteractions betweenutterancesanddiscoursecontexts.Duetothehitherto-unappreciatedcomplexityofcontextsandlinguisticconventions,LeporeandStoneargue,manymore speechactsturnouttobeamenabletoconventionalisttreatmentthanhadpreviously beenthought.Theircontributiontothisvolume,whichwewill?discussin§1.2, appliesthisstrategytoindirectspeechacts.
1.1.2Intention
Theotherclassicaltheoryofspeechactsisintentionalism,whichPaulGricebeganto developinparalleltoAustin’sviewswhiletheywerebothatOxfordinthe1940s.The centralclaimofintentionalismisthatperformingacommunicativeillocutionaryact isamatterofproducinganutterancewithaspecialsortofintention,normallycalled a‘communicativeintention’,a‘meaningintention’,oran‘m-intention’.Thenatureof communicativeintentionsisamatterofdebate,butthecrucialideaisthatperforming acommunicativeactisamatterofproducinganutteranceintendingboth(a)forone’s addresseetohaveaspecifiedresponse,and(b)forone’saddresseetorecognizethat thisresponseisintended.
Onevirtueofthisviewisthatitcorrectlypredictsathree-waydistinctionamong thesuccessconditionsforspeechacts.Tosucceedin performing anillocutionaryact requiresmerelyproducinganutterancewithacommunicativeintention;nothing onthepartoftheaddresseeisrequired.Tosucceedin communicating viaone’sact requiresthattheaddresseerecognizewhatkindofresponseoneistryingtoproduce. Actually producing thisresponse,ontheotherhand,constitutesafurtherkindof perlocutionarysuccess.Accordingtoasimpleintentionalistaccountofassertion,for example,asserting p requiresutteringsomethingwithacommunicativeintentionfor one’saddresseetobelieve p.Communicationhappenswhentheaddresseerecognizes thatthisiswhatoneintends.Actuallyconvincingthemof p isanothermatter.
4 LeporeandStone(2015).Itisworthnoting,however,thatthisissuearisesformostliteralanddirect speechactsaswell(Buchanan,2010;Harris,2016).Thisargument’sprototypeisgiveninLeporeandStone (2010),whichisinfluencedbyDavidson(1979b).
speechacts:thecontemporarytheoreticallandscape
Differentkindsofcommunicativeactaredistinguished,onthisview,bythe differentkindsofresponsesthattheyareintendedtohave.Todirectsomeoneto φ —to requestorcommandthatthey φ ,forexample—istocommunicativelyintendforthem torespondby φ ing(orbyforminganintentionto φ ).Questions,accordingtomost intentionalists,compriseasub-categoryofdirectiveswhoseaimisfortheaddresseeto respondbyanswering.Althoughintentionalistshavetypicallyfocusedonthesethree categories,otherkindsofcommunicativelyintendedresponsesareeasytothinkof, andGriceconsideredsomeothers.
MostofthispictureisalreadyvisibleinGrice’searlyworkonspeakermeaning (1957;1968;1969),thoughGriceavoidsmostofthevocabularyofspeechacts,which heseemstohaveregardedasproprietarytoAustin’scompetitorview.Laterintentionalists,includingStrawson(1964),Schiffer(1972,ch.4),andBachandHarnish (1979),showhowtotranslateGrice’sideasintothestandardterminologyofspeechacttheory,constructdetailedtaxonomiesofillocutionaryactsbycarvingupthe differentkindsofresponsesatwhichthey’reaimed,andextendGrice’sviewsinsome otherways.
NointentionalistclaimsthatthisviewappliestoallofwhatAustincalledillocutionaryacts.Onecan’tgetmarriedortestifyincourtjustbyspeakingwithcertain intentions,forexample;variousculturalorinstitutionalbackgroundconditionsmust alsoobtain.Intentionaliststypicallyarguethat,unliketheseconstitutivelyconventionalacts,communicativeillocutionaryactsneedn’tbeperformedrelativetoany particularculturalorinstitutionalbackground(BachandHarnish,1979,chs.6–7). Allthatisrequiredtoperformanassertionorarequest,ortosuccessfullyinterpret one,onthisview,isthatonebeacreaturewithanadvancedcapacitytorepresent otheragents’mentalstates.5 Itisthereforeopentointentionaliststoholdthatthe categoriesofspeechactsinwhichthey’reinterestedarenaturalkinds—definedin termsofcognitiveendowmentssharedbynearlyallhumans—unlikethelocalized andcontingentsocialkindsonwhichAustinfocused.Partlyforthisreason,intentionalismhasbeenaninfluentialviewamonganthropologists,cognitiveethologists, andcognitivescientistswhostudythepsychologicalunderpinningsandevolutionary originsoflanguageandcommunication.6
Aninfluentialkindofobjectiontointentionalismaccusesitofbeingtoounconstrained,inpartbecauseitminimizestheroleoflinguisticconventioninlimiting whichspeechactscanbeperformed.Asimpleworryofthiskindstemsfromthe accusationofHumptyDumptyism:itseemstofollowfromintentionalism,asjust
5 Theideathatcommunicationrequiresadvancedmindreadingcapacitiesisanempiricalprediction thatsomehavesoughttofalsify.Forexample,thefactthatthree-year-oldscanuselanguagebutroutinely failexplicitfalse-belieftaskswaswidelythoughttoposeapotentialcounterexample(e.g.,Breheny,2006) untilnewexperimentalmethodssuggestedthatinfantsdetectothers’goalsandfalsebeliefsmuchearlier (Carey,2009;Carruthers,2006;OnishiandBaillargeon,2005;Tomasello,2008).Someautisticadultspose asimilarproblem,andasimilardialectichasemerged(forasummary,seeGoldman,2012).Ontheother hand,someaccountsofboththephylogeneticandontogeneticdevelopmentofhumanlanguageholdthat advancedmindreadingcapacitiesplayacrucialrole(Bloom,2000;Hacquard,2014;Scott-Phillips,2014; Tomasello,2008).Theseviewssitnicelywithintentionalism.
6 Csibra(2010);Moore(2015,2017);Scott-Phillips(2014);Sperber(2000);SperberandWilson(1995); Tomasello(2008).
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stated,thatanyutterancecanbeusedtoperformanykindofspeechact,solongasthe speakerhastherequisiteintentions.But,accordingtothecritics,wecan’tsayanything wechoosewithanywordsweplease;theconventionsgoverningtheexpressionswe useplacestrictconstraintsonwhatwecanusethemtomean(see,e.g.,Searle,1965; 1969).Intentionaliststypicallyrespondtothislineofthoughtbypointingoutthat,at leastifwearerational,whatweintendisconstrainedbywhatwebelieve.Youcan’t rationallyintendtoeatanentireherdofcattletodaybecausethepossibilityofdoing soisruledoutbyyourbeliefs.Likewise,ifyouthinkitisimpossibletocommunicate theentirecontentofthePentagonPaperswithawinkofaneye,youcan’trationally formacommunicativeintentiontodoso.Onthisview,one’sappreciationoflinguistic conventionsconstrainswhichspeechactsonecanperformbyconstrainingwhatone canrationallyintendtogetacrossbyspeaking.7
Ofcourse,itdoesfollowfromintentionalismthatspeakerscansometimesperform speechactsthatbearnoconventionalrelationshiptotheexpressionstheyutter.Given theexistenceofindirectandnonliteralspeechacts,mostintentionaliststakethistobe awelcomeconsequenceoftheirview.Thecounterintuitivecorollaryisthatitisalso possibleforaspeakertoperformspeechactsthatbearnoconventionalrelationship totheexpressionstheyutter,eveniftheydon’tintendtospeakindirectlyornonliterally,providedthattheyaresufficientlydelusionalorirrational.Ifaspeakercomes tomistakenlybelievethat‘it’swarminhere’is,accordingtolocalconventions,agood waytoassertthatit’scoldinhere,thentheycanindeeddoso.Thebestresponse availabletotheintentionalistmaybethat,althoughitisindeedunintuitivetosaythat suchspeakersareperformingthepredictedassertions,that is whatahearerwould havetointerpretthemasdoinginorderforcommunicationtotakeplace.And, indeed,ifthehearerisawareofthespeaker’sdelusion,thismayverywellhappen. Supposingthatanillocutionaryactisthatwhichmustbecorrectlyinterpretedinorder forcommunicationtosucceed,intentionalismseemstomaketherightpredictionsin suchcases.
Afinalnoteworthyconsequenceofintentionalismisthatthatcommunicativeillocutionaryactsturnoutnottobeessentiallylinguisticinnatureorform.Gricemakesit clearthatby‘utterance’hemeansanyobservablebehavior,linguisticorotherwise,that canserveasavehicleforspeakermeaning.Thisincludeslinguisticutterances,butalso variousotherkindsofbehaviors,asseveralofhisoriginalcasestudiesdemonstrate. ConsiderGrice’sexampleofdrawinga“pictureofMr.Y[displayingunduefamiliarity toMrs.X]andshow[ing]ittoMr.X”inordertomean“thatMr.Yhadbeenunduly familiar”(1989,218).Thereisnoconventionatworkhere,butmerelyalooseiconic relationshipbetweenthepictureanditssubjectmatter,whichthe“speaker”exploits inordertoguideMr.Xtoacorrecthypothesisabouttheircommunicativeintention. Butforanintentionalist,thespeakerhereisperformingessentiallythesamekindof communicativeactastheywouldhaveiftheyhadsaid,‘Mr.Yhasbeenundulyfamiliar withMrs.X’.Whatdistinguishesthetwocasesismerelythekindofevidencethat thespeakeroffersoftheircommunicativeintentions.Semantics,onthisview,canbe thoughtofasthestudyofasystembywhichlanguageusersencoderichlystructured,
7 OnthisresponsetoHumpty-Dumptyworries,seeDonnellan(1968);Grice(1969);Neale(2004).
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butmerelypartialevidenceoftheircommunicativeintentions(Neale,2004,2005; Schiffer,2003;SperberandWilson,1995).Thisviewhasinterestingconsequences forthenatureofassertion,amongotheracts.Foralthoughwecancontinuetouse ‘assertion’todenotecommunicativeactsperformedwithlanguage,thiswouldmake thecategorysomewhattheoreticallyuninteresting.If‘assertion’picksoutanatural kind,thenitisakindthatbringstogetherbothlinguisticandnonlinguisticactsthat areunitedbythesortsofintentionswithwhichthey’reperformed.
1.1.3Function
Thefamilyofviewswe’llcall‘functionalism’iseasiesttounderstandasanalternative tointentionalism.Bothperspectivesmaintainthataspeechactischaracterizedby theeffectthatitistheact’spurposetohave.Butwhereasintentionaliststhinkthata communicativeact’spurposederivesfromtheintentionwithwhichitwasperformed, functionaliststhinkthataspeechactatleastsometimeshasapurposethatderives fromsomeother,lessagentialsource.Forexample,Millikan(1998)arguesthat,inat leastsomecases,thepropertiesofaspeechactareamatterofits properfunction,and thatagivenkindofspeechactacquiresitsproperfunctionthroughaprocessakinto naturalselection.Millikanholdsthatcausingbeliefistheproperfunctionofcertain assertions.Assertionswillhavethisfunctionbecauseprioriterationshavecaused similarbeliefs,and,crucially,thesepastsuccesseshaveplayedacrucialcausalrole intheirreproduction.Millikanarguesthatthesefunctionsattachtogrammatically individuatedutterance-types,suchasclausetypes:
Thus,aproperfunctionoftheimperativemoodistoinducetheactiondescribed,andaproper functionoftheindicativemoodistoinducebeliefinthepropositionexpressed.(2005,157)
Millikan’sviewiscomplicatedbythefactthatshealsobaseshertheoryofconvention aroundthenotionofproperfunction.Hertheorycouldthereforebecategorized asacompromisebetweenintentionalismandaversionofconventionalism:what definesaspeechactisitspurpose,whichmayderivefromeithertheintentionorthe convention(i.e.,properfunction)behindit,orperhapssomecomplexcombinationof thetwo.However,sinceMillikanleavesopenthepossibilitythatanact-type’sproper functionmayhavebeenselectedfornotjustduringthelanguage-learningprocess butalsoduringbiologicalevolution—itmaybe,forexample,thatthefunctionsof certaingrammaticalfeaturesareinnateanduniversaltohumans—herversionof conventionalismdiffersfrommostoftheothersonthemarket.
BuildingonMillikan’sinfluence,arelatedversionoffunctionalismaboutcommunicativeactshasdevelopedaroundthestudyofsignalinggamesinthetheory ofreplicatordynamics.8 AsinbothGrice’sandMillikan’stheories,thisviewtakes communicationtobeawayofinfluencingothers’thoughtsoractions.Wecan thinkofeachinstanceofpotentialcommunicationasasignalinggameinwhicha senderperformsanactionandareceiverrespondsinsomeway.Bymakingminimal assumptionsaboutagents’sharedinterestsandcapacitiestoreplicatebehaviorsthat
8 Replicatordynamicsisthestudyofevolutionaryprocessesusingthetheoryofiteratedgames.Foran overviewofapplicationstocommunication,seeHarms(2004a)andSkyrms(2010).
havetendedtoservethoseinterestsinthepast,onecanshow,bymeansofprecise game-theoreticmodels,thattheywillreachequilibriainwhichsendersreliably produceadvantageousresponsesinreceivers.Thiscanbeseenasatheoryoflinguistic convention,andasatheoryofhowdifferentkindsofillocutionaryacts,which functiontoreliablyproducedifferentkindsofeffectsinaddressees,couldentera population’srepertoire.However,asinMillikan’stheory,replicator-dynamicmodels abstractawayfromquestionsaboutwhetherthekindofreplicationinquestionisa kindoflearningorakindofbiologicalevolution.Forthisreason,suchmodelshave becomeimportanttoolsinthestudyofanimalcommunication(see,e.g.,Bradbury andVehrencamp,2011,ch.1).
Thefactthatfunctionalistmodelsofcommunicationhavebeenappliedtoorganismsvaryinginsophisticationfrombacteriatohumansgivesrisetointeresting questions.Forexample:whataretheconditionsinwhichsignalswithdifferentkinds ofillocutionaryforcecanbesaidtoexistinsignalingsystemsofthiskind?Millikan (1984;2005)arguesthatsimpleorganismsandtheirsignalingsystems(aswellas,e.g., thehumanautonomicnervoussystem)shouldbeunderstoodintermsof“pushmi–pullyurepresentations”,which“atthesametimetellwhatthecaseiswithsomepartof theworldanddirectwhattodoaboutit”(2005,87).Similarly,Harms(2004b)argues thatonlyakindof“primitivemeaning”,withnodifferentiationbetweenassertoric anddirectiveforce,canemergeinpopulationsofpsychologicallyunsophisticated organisms.9
Arebacteriacommunicationandhumancommunicationreallysosimilarthat theycanbemodeledinthesameway?Therearesomeconcretereasonstothink not.Inordertohaveacertaincommunicativefunction,asignal-typemusthave ahistoryofdifferentialreproduction.Buthumansoftencommunicatewithnovel signaltypes.Mostlinguisticutterances,whichinvolvesentencesneverbeforeuttered, giveusonekindofexample.Itmaybethatthisproblemcanbesolvedbyshowing howsentences’properfunctionsaredeterminedcompositionallyfromtheproper functionsoftheirsub-sententialparts.10 However,nonlinguisticcommunicativeacts, indirectspeechacts,andspeechactsperformedwithcontext-sensitivevocabulary seemtobeimprovisationalanddependentonhumans’richcognitivecapacitiesin waysthatresistthistreatment.Intherightcontext,itispossibletouseasentenceto implicatesomethingthatithasneverbeenusedtoimplicatebefore,forexample,and agradableadjective(e.g.‘tall’)canbeusedincontexttoliterallyanddirectlyexpress anovelproperty(tall,bythestandardsofthemarathonrunnersinthisrace).This suggeststhathumancommunicationisthoroughlyinfusedwithgreaterflexibility thanfunctionalistmodelscanaccountfor.
Inpractice,manytheoristshavethereforesoughttocombinefunctionalistand intentionalistmodels,withtheformeraccountingforanimalcommunicationand
9 Criteriafordistinguishingassertoricanddirectiveforceiniteratedsignalingmodelsareproposedby BlumeandBoard(2013);Franke(2012);Huttegger(2007);Zollman(2011).MurrayandStarr(thisvolume) useworkinthefunctionalisttraditiontodrawfine-graineddistinctionsbetweenkindsofillocutionary force.
10 ThisiswhatMillikansuggestsinherdiscussionof“semanticmappingfunctions”(Millikan,2005, ch.3).
speechacts:thecontemporarytheoreticallandscape perhapssomesimplecasesofhumancommunication,andthelatteraccountingfor flexibleandcognitivelydemandinginstancesofhumancommunication.11
1.1.4Expression
We’llusethelabel‘expressionism’foranotherfamilyofviewsthathaveoftenbeen advocatedaslessintellectuallydemandingalternativestointentionalism.12 Theories ofthiskindarebasedontheideathatperformingaspeechactisfundamentallya matterofexpressingastateofmind,andthatdifferentkindsofillocutionaryacts expressstatesofdifferentkinds.Expressionismisacloserelativeofintentionalism, sinceitgroundsthepropertiesofillocutionaryactsinfactsaboutspeakers’mental states.Whereasintentionalistscategorizespeechactsintermsofthepsychological responsestheyareintendedto produce inaddressees,however,expressionistscategorizespeechactsintermsofthedifferentkindsofstatesinthespeaker’smindthatthey express.So,forexample,whereasasimpleintentionalismwillsaythataspeechactis anassertionbecauseitisperformedwiththeintentionofgettingthe addressee toform abelief,asimpleexpressionismwillsaythatanactcountsasanassertionbecauseit isanexpressionofthe speaker’s belief.
Severalargumentsforpreferringexpressionismoverintentionalismrestonthe premisethatintentionalismover-intellectualizestheperformanceofspeechactsby requiringspeakerstohavecomplex,higher-orderthoughts.Somehavedoubted thatsuchcomplexcognitivestatesarenecessaryforlanguageuse,orthattheyare presentinmanyhumanlanguageusers.Othershavearguedthatintentionalism’srich psychologicalcommitmentsobscureimportantpointsofcontactbetweenspeechacts andcloselyrelatedcategoriesofcommunicativeaction.Green(2007b)arguesthat expressionismmakesbettersenseofthecontinuitiesbetweenillocutionaryacts,on onehand,andbehaviorsthatareexpressiveofthoughtinlesscontrolledorvoluntary ways,ontheother.Inasimilarvein,Bar-On(2013)arguesthatexpressionismdoes betterthanintentionalismatexplainingthecontinuitiesbetweenhumancommunicationandthekindsoflesscognitivelysophisticatedcommunicationemployedby ournon-humanancestors.13
Thecrucialingredientinanyversionofexpressionismistherelationof expressing astateofmind.Differentversionsofexpressionismcashoutthisrelationindifferent ways.Someaccountsoftheexpressingrelationareepistemic.AccordingtoDavis’s account(1992;2003),toexpressathoughtistodosomethinginorderto indicate i.e.,togivestrongbutdefeasibleevidence—thatonehasthethought.Pagin(2011) articulatesanalternativeepistemicrelationbetweenassertionsandthoughtcontents thathecalls‘primafacieinformativeness’.Green(2007b)combinesexpressionism
11 E.g.,Green(2007b);Millikan(1998);Scott-Phillips(2014).
12 Notethattheterm‘expressionism’shouldnotbeconfusedwith‘expressivism’.Althoughsomeversions ofexpressivismassumethatspeechactsareindividuatedbythekindsofmentalstatestheyexpress,so that,forexample,moralclaimsaredistinguishedfromfactualassertionsbythefactthattheyexpressnoncognitivestatesofmindratherthanbeliefs,otherversionsofexpressivismhavebeenconstructedtofitwith othertheoriesofillocutionaryacts.We’llsaymoreaboutthisin§§1.2–1.3.
13 ForarejoindertoBar-On’slineofthought,seeScott-Phillips(2014,§2.7),whoarguesthathuman communicationisdiscontinuouswithallknownnon-humancommunicationpreciselybecauseoftherole playedbycommunicativeintentions.
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withintentionalisminholdingthatperformingaspeechactisamatterofintentionally andovertlymakingone’sthoughtsmanifest,butarguesthatitisalsopossibleto expressmentalstatesinwaysthatdon’tpresupposeintentionalcontrol.Otherexpressionistaccountshavebeenspelledoutintermsofrelationsthatarecausalratherthan epistemicinnature(Rosenthal,1986;Turri,2011),includingsomewhohaveappealed totheideathatitistheproperfunctionofcertainbehaviorstoexpresscertain kindsofthoughts,thusblurringthelinesbetweenfunctionalismandexpressionism (Bar-On,2013;Green,2007b).Moreoften,theideathatitistheroleofspeechto “expressthought”hasbeenpresentedasaplatitudeorasapretheoreticdatum,without aseriousattempttoelucidatethenotionofexpressinginvolved(e.g.Devitt,2006,§8.2; Fodoretal.,1974).
Oneadditionalchallengeforexpressionismistofindadifferentkindofthought toindividuateeachtheoreticallyinterestingkindofspeechact.Itisacommonplace amongexpressioniststhatassertionsexpressbeliefs(or,alternatively,knowledge; seeTurri,2011).Butwhataboutotherkindsofspeechacts?Onemethodological tacticforansweringthisquestionrevolvesaroundMoore’sparadox.Assertionsof sentencesoftheform p,butIdon’t[believe/know]thatp ,suchas(3)and(4),are alwaysinfelicitousinsomeway,althoughtheircontentsareneithercontradictorynor necessarilyfalse.
(3)Ihavetwohands,butIdon’tbelievethatIhavetwohands.
(4)I’mdoingphilosophy,butIdon’tknowthatIamdoingphilosophy.
Somehavearguedthatinfelicityofthiskindarisesbecause,forexample,someonewho uses(3)literallywouldbeexpressingabeliefthattheyhavetwohands(withthefirst conjunct)whilealsoreportingthattheylackthisbelief(withthesecondconjunct).14
So,althoughthecontentofaMoore-paradoxicalassertionisnotcontradictory,there isclearlysomethingirrationalaboutperformingsuchanassertion.Thesubsequent lineofthoughtisthatwemaybeabletousevariationsonMoore’sparadoxtodiagnose thementalstatesexpressedbyotherkindsofspeechacts.Forexample,Condoravdi andLauer(2012)arguethatsentencesoftheform φ ,butIdon’twantyouto φ ,such as(5),areMoore-paradoxical.
(5)Takethetrain,butIdon’twantyoutotakeit.
Partlyonthebasisofthisevidence,CondoravdiandLauerconcludethatthespeech actswecanonicallyperformwithimperativesareexpressionsof“effectivepreference”, whichtheytaketobeaspeciesofdesire.
Expressionismissometimespreferredtointentionalismonthegroundsthat,by removingtheaddresseefromthepicture,itcanaccountforspeechactsthatlackan addressee(e.g.Davis,1992,239).However,thisfeaturecanalsobeabug.Removing theaddresseefromthepictureisproblematicbecauseasingleutterancesometimes
14 E.g.Black(1952);DeRose(1991,2002);Green(2007a);Rosenthal(1986);Slote(1979);Turri(2011); Unger(1975);Williamson(2000).TheoriginsofthiswayofthinkingaboutMoore’sparadoxcanbefoundin thelateworkofWittgenstein(e.g.1953,§§87ff.).Ofcourse,proponentsofeachoftheotherfamiliesofviews aboutspeechactshaveproposedalternativeaccountsofMoore’sparadoxaswell,andsoitiscontroversial whetherMoore’sparadoxgivesanysupporttoexpressionismassuch.
seemstobeusedtoperformtwodistinctspeechactswithdistinctaddressees.Touse aslightlysillyexample,imagineaharriedWallStreettradershouting,‘Sell!’while holdingaphonetoeachsideofhisface—oneconnectinghimtostockbrokerA, whohandleshisApplestock,andtheotherconnectinghimtostockbrokerB,who handleshisGooglestock.Aplausibledescriptionofwhatisgoingonherewouldbe thatthetraderistellingAtosellhisApplestockandtellingBtosellhisGoogle stock—twodistinctdirectives,aimedatdifferentaddressees,performedbymeans ofasingleutterance.Althoughthiscaseissomewhatartificial,avarietyofrealworldanaloguesarepossible.Egan(2009)considersdistributedreadingsofmultipleaddresseeassertionsanddirectivesinwhichadifferentcontentisexpressedrelativeto eachaddressee,forexample.Itisquiteplausiblethatasimilarphenomenonisatwork whenapoliticalsatiristmanagestocomeacrossasendorsingapolicytoaright-wing audiencewhilesimultaneouslymockingthataudienceandtheproposaltoaleft-wing audience.Thesamesortofphenomenonisfrequentlyexhibitedbypoliticiansand otherpublicfigureswhentheyemploydogwhistles—speechactsthatcommunicate aliteralmeaningtothepublicwhilealsocommunicatingsomemorecontroversial messagetoasubsetofthepublicwhoareintheknow.
Themostobviousaccountsoftheseandotherhighlynuancedcommunicative phenomenadrawontheresourcesofintentionalism:onecanperformtwospeechacts addressedtotwoaudienceswithasingleutterancebecauseonecancommunicatively intendtoaffecttwoaddresseesindifferentwaysatthesametime.JenniferSaul(this volume)givesroughlythiskindofaccountofwhatshecalls‘overtdogwhistles’.In asimilarvein,ElisabethCamp(thisvolume)arguesthatinsinuationisaspeechact thatismadepossiblebycommunicators’highlynuancedappreciationofoneanother’s beliefs,intentions,andcommitments.Anyversionofexpressionismorfunctionalism thatwishestoavoidappealingtointentionalistresourceswillhavetosaywhatis goingoninsuchcases.Inpractice,manyexpressionistsandfunctionalists do appeal tospeakers’intentions,ifonlytoexplainwhatmakessuchcasessomuchmore sophisticatedthanrun-of-the-millspeech(Green,2007b;Millikan,1998).
1.1.5Norm
Afinalfamilyoftheoriesholdsthatspeechactsarefundamentally normative phenomena.Aninfluentialversionofthisideaholdsthattheactofassertingisconstitutively normative—thatatleastpartofwhatmakesanactanassertionisthattheactis governedbyaspecialnorm.Althoughnormativeaccountsofassertionhavebeen aroundfordecades(Dummett,1973;Unger,1975),theviewhasrecentlybeen revivedandinfluentiallydefendedbyTimothyWilliamson(2000),whoarguesthat theknowledgenormistheconstitutivenormofassertion.
(1)theknowledgenorm
Onemust:assert p onlyifoneknowsthat p.(Williamson,2000,243) Itisimportanttoseparateouttwoclaimshere.First,itisrelativelyuncontroversial thatassertionisgovernedbysomeepistemicnormorother.Wesubjectspeakers towarrantedcriticismforsayingthingsthattheydon’tbelieve,thataren’ttrue,for whichtheylackevidence,orthattheydon’tknow.ItistemptingtothinkthatMooreparadoxicalclaimsoftheform p,butIdon’t[believe/know/haveevidence]that p
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arenotmerelyinfelicitous,butnormativelydefective—apointthatWilliamsonuses todefendtheknowledgenorm.Muchofthedebateaboutnormsofassertionhas revolvedaroundwhetherthenormofassertionshouldbeformulatedintermsof knowledge,belief,truth,justification,orsomeothernotion.15
Asecond,muchmorecontroversialclaimisthatbeingsubjecttoanepistemic normofthiskindiswhat makes anactanassertion—i.e.,thatthereisa constitutive normofassertion.FewofWilliamson’sargumentsseemtobearonthisissue, andfewothersintheliteratureonknowledgenormshavetakenitupeither.But, forthepurposeofunderstandingthenatureofspeechacts,thisisthecrucialissue. Afterall:anintentionalist,conventionalist,functionalist,orexpressionistcouldagree thatassertionisgovernedbyanepistemicnorm,butarguethatthisfollowsfrom theirparticularaccountofassertiontogetherwithbroaderfactsaboutthenorms governingsocialinteractionmoregenerally.Certainnormativeconsequencesfollow fromSearle’s(1969)accountsofvariousspeechacts,forexample,butheholdsthat thisisaconsequenceoftheconventionsgoverningspeechacts’sincerityconditions. Likewise,anintentionalistmightarguethatassertionisgovernedbyanepistemic normbecauseitisgovernedbythemaximofquality,whichisjustonemanifestationof Grice’scooperativeprinciple,whichgovernsallcooperativeactivities.Onthisview, argumentsovertheformulationoftheknowledgenormmightbestbeunderstood asargumentsoverwhichformulationofthemaximofqualityfollowsfromthe cooperativeprinciple.16
Asecondworryabouttheideathatassertionisconstitutedbyanepistemicnorm isthatitishardtoseehowsuchanaccountwouldextendtootherspeechacts.How, forexample,wouldwefillinthegapsin(2)–(4)inordertogiveconstitutiveaccounts ofquestioning,requesting,andadvising?
(2)Onemust:asksomeonewhether q onlyif
(3)Onemust:requestthatsomeone ψ onlyif
(4)Onemust:advisesomeoneto ψ onlyif
Noattempthasbeenmadetoanswerthesequestions,ortosaywhatwouldcountasa generaltheoryofspeechactsinthespiritofanepistemic-normaccountofassertion. However,theideathatweshouldtreatassertionastheoreticallydisjointfromother speechactsisbizarre.AsMcGlynnputsthepoint,knowledge-normaccountsof assertionthreatentorepeatthemistakethatspeech-acttheorywasfoundedinorder toaddress,sincetheyignore“theworrythatmanyphilosophershadfetishizedthe
15 ProponentsofsomeversionoftheknowledgenormincludeAdler(2002);Benton(2011,2012a,b); DeRose(2002);Engel(2008);Hawthorne(2004);Reynolds(2002);Schaffer(2008);Stanley(2005);Turri (2010,2015);Unger(1975);Williamson(1996,2000).Othershaveargued,instead,thatknowledgeis governedbynormsofknowledge-transmissibility(García-Carpintero,2004;Hinchman,2013;Pelling, 2013),belief(Bach,2008),rationalbelief(Douven,2006,2009),reasonablebelief(Lackey,2007),supportive reasons(McKinnon,2015),justification(Kvanvig,2009,2011),evidence-responsiveness(Maitraand Weatherson,2010),epistemiccertainty(Stanley,2008),andtruth(MacFarlane,2014;Weiner,2005).For overviewsofthisliterature,seeWeiner(2005)andPagin(2016,§6.2).
16 TheideaofreducingthenormofassertiontoaGriceanmaximhasbeensuggestedbyCappelen (2011);Goldberg(2013);Montgomery(2014);Sosa(2009).Benton(2016)arguesthatthissortofreduction fails.Ball(2014)arguesthatthenormativepropertiesofspeechactsfollowfromtheirnaturalisticproperties bygivinganaccountthatdrawsonbothGrice’sandMillikan’sideasaboutspeechacts.
speechactofassertion,andignoredalltherest”(2014,82).Thispresumablyplaysa roleinexplainingwhyinterestinepistemic-normaccountshasbeenstrongeramong epistemologiststhanamongphilosophersoflanguageorlinguists.
Adifferentkindofnormativeaccountisbuiltaroundtheideathatperforminga speechactis,fundamentally,amatterofdoingsomethingthatgivesrisetocertain rights(orentitlements)andobligations(orcommitments).Aninfluentialdefenseof thisideaisduetoBrandom(1983;1994;2000),whoarguesthattoassert p istodo somethingthatentitlesparticipantsintheconversationtomakeacharacteristicrange of p-relatedinferencesandresponses,andthatcommitsthespeakertojustify p and relatedclaimsgoingforward.17 MacFarlane(2011;2014)defendsasimilaraccount, onwhichasserting p isunderstoodintermsofapubliccommitmentto p’struthas assessedinthecontextofutteranceaswellasacommitmenttoretract p shouldit cometolightthat p isnottruerelativetoanewcontextofassessment.18
AlthoughBrandomandMacFarlaneignorespeechactsotherthanassertion,Kukla andLance(2009)andLanceandKukla(2013)havedevelopedarelated,normative treatmentofarangeofotherillocutionaryacts,andseveralauthorshaveargued thatnormativelyrichaccountsofspeechactscanhelpustounderstandspeechacts ofurgentsocialconcern.Kukla(2014)drawsonanaccountofthiskindinorder toarguethataspeaker’ssocialstatuscancontravenetheirintentions,alteringtheir act’sillocutionaryforce—forexample,bydemotingitfromacommandtoarequest. LynnTirrellhasusedanormativepragmaticframeworktounderstandthehate speechthattypifiesthebuilduptoactsofgenocide(2012).Inaseriesofpapers, MaryKateMcGowanhasarguedthatawiderangeofspeechacts,includingregular communicativeactsbutalsopornographyandhatespeech,shouldbeunderstoodas having“covertexercitiveforce”:theychangewhatispermissibleinanorm-governed socialactivitygoingforward(2003;2004;2009a;2009b;2012;thisvolume).
Howshouldweunderstandtheclaimthatspeechactsofagivenkindenact norms?Thiscouldbeafundamentalfactaboutthespeechact—partofwhatmakes itthekindofspeechactitis.Brandom,MacFarlane,andKuklaandLanceclearly wishtobeunderstoodinthisway,andsotheirtheoriesmustbeunderstoodas competingwiththeotheraccountsofspeechactsoutlinedhere.Adeflationary alternativewouldbetoconcedethatthespeechactsinquestionsometimes,normally, orevenalwayshavetheeffectofenactingnormativefacts,buttoholdthatthisisa mereconsequenceofsomenot-essentially-normativeaccountofthespeechactitself, togetherwithfactsaboutthewidernormativesceneinwhichspeechactsaresituated. Promising,forexample,wouldseemtobeanorm-enactingspeechactifanyis,sincea felicitouspromiseischaracterizedbythecreationofwhatisoftencalleda“promissory obligation”—thespeaker’sobligationtokeepthepromise.Theoriesthattakespeech actstobefundamentallynormenactingwouldseemtohaveaheadstartonexplaining thisphenomenon.However,therearealternativeoptions.InSearle’s(1969,ch.3)
17 Brandomsaysthathistheoryofassertion“islargelyafootnotetoSellars’[1956]seminaldiscussion of endorsement”(1983,fn.14).Sellarscanalsobeseenasamajorinfluenceonfunctionalisttheories. ForandiscussionofSellars’differinginfluencesonMillikanandBrandom,seeMillikan(2005,ch.4).
18 Krifka(2014)alsoendorsesacommitment-theoreticaccount,ofillocutionaryforce,butwithout fleshingoutthefoundationaldetails.
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influentialaccountofpromising,whichservesasthetemplateforhisaccountofother illocutionaryacts,enactingnewcommitmentsisindeedpartofwhatitistomakea promise.However,forSearle,thisoutcomeofpromisesis,liketherestofhistheoryof speechacts,ultimatelyamatteroflinguisticconvention.Likewise,anintentionalist,a functionalist,oranexpressionistcouldholdthatpromissoryobligationresultsfrom theexpectationsthattendtoresultfromsuccessfullycoordinatingone’sintentions withothers—aviewthatcanbemadetofitwitharangeofnormativetheories(see, e.g.,Norcross,2011;Scanlon,1990;1998,ch.7).Likewise,thecommitmentsengenderedbyassertionmightbeunderstoodasconsequencesofintentionalismplus Grice’scooperativeprinciple:roughly,asserting p commitsonetojustify p,andto retract p shoulditsfalsitycometolight,becauseitwouldbeuncooperativetointend forone’sactionstoproduceabeliefin p ifonedidnotundertakecommitmentsofthis kind.19
1.2DiscourseContextandConversationalScore
Muchrecentworkonspeechacts,includingmostoftheworkcollectedinthisvolume, isbasedontheideathatconversationsareorganizedaround contexts.Inthetechnical senseatissuehere,contextsaresharedandevolvingrepresentationsofthestateofplay inaconversationthatbothshapethequalitiesofspeechactsandareinturnshapedby them.20 FollowingLewis(1979),ithasbecomecommontodiscusscontextthrough themetaphorof“conversationalscore”.Justastheactivitiesinabaseballgameare dictatedbythecurrentstateofitsscore—thecurrentinningandnumberofruns,outs, balls,strikes,etc.—aconversation’sscoredictateshowcontext-sensitiveexpressions canbeusedandinterpreted.Andjustasplaysinabaseballgamefunctiontochange oneormoreelementsofthescore,movesinalanguagegame—i.e.,speechacts— functiontochangethestateofthecontext.
1.2.1ScoreandtheFiveFamilies
Score-theoreticaccountsofspeechactsaresometimestreatedasanalternativeto thefivefamiliesoftheorydiscussedin§1.1.Infact,however,talkofcontextand conversationalscorehasbeenvariouslyinterpretedsoastobecompatiblewith theoriesofallfivekinds.Asaresult,manydebatesincontemporarysemanticsand pragmaticsappeartobeframedintermsofsharedassumptionsaboutconversational score,butthisframingoftenmasksfoundationaldisagreements.
Accordingtooneinfluentialview,originatingwithStalnaker(1978),thecontext ofaconversationreducestothesharedpropositionalattitudesofitsparticipants. Toperformaspeechactistodosomethingwithanintentionofchangingthese sharedattitudes.Thisamountstoaversionofintentionalismthatsubstitutesshared, publicmentalstatesfortheprivateonesthatGricetooktobethetargetsofspeech
19 Severalauthorshavedefendedsimilarlinesofthoughtaimedatshowingthatthenormativityof bothspeechacts(and,insomecases,alsothoughts)isnotamongtheirfundamentalfeatures(Ball,2014; Boghossian,2003;Glüer,2001;GlüerandWikforss,2009;Wikforss,2001).
20 Contexts,thusconceived,havetraveledundervariousaliases:“commonground”and“context set”(Stalnaker,1978,2014),“discoursecontext”(Stalnaker,1998),“scoreboard”(Lewis,1979),“files” (Heim,1982,§3.1.4),“conversationalrecord”(Thomason,1990),“informationstructure”(Roberts,2012), “informationstate”(Veltman,1996),“conversationalstate”(Starr,2010,ms),andsoon.
acts.21 Inhercontributiontothisvolume,CraigeRobertsarticulatesadetailedtheory ofthiskindthataccountsforassertions,questions,anddirectives.Robertsfollows Stalnakerintakingassertionstobeaimedataddingtheircontenttothecommon ground—thesetofpropositionsthattheparticipantsinaconversationcommonly acceptforthepurposesoftheconversation.Questionsanddirectivesaimtoalter othercomponentsofthecontext,eachofwhichreflectsparticipants’publiclyshared goals.Adirective’saimistoaddtotheaddressee’s domaingoals—theperhapsextraconversationalgoalstowhosesatisfactionparticipantsarepubliclycommitted.The aimofaquestionistomakeitthenew questionunderdiscussion (QUD)—thequestion thatitiscurrentlytheparticipants’conversationalaimtoanswer.Roberts’version ofintentionalismresemblesGrice’s,exceptthattherolesheassignstobeliefsand intentionsare,forher,playedbytheinterlocutors’sharedinformationandgoals. Atthislevelofabstraction,RobertsagreeswithPortner(2004;2007;2012),who arguesthatassertionsareproposalstochangethecommonground,questionsare proposalstochangetheQUD,anddirectivesareproposalstochangetheTo-DoList, whichhethinksofasthe“publicandinteractional”counterparttoagents’desiresor intentions,justascommongroundisthepublicandinteractionalcounterparttotheir beliefs(2004,242).
It’seasytoseethatafunctionalistaboutspeechactscanadoptasimilarapproach bypositingthesamecomponentsofcontext,groundedinthesamewayinagents’ propositionalattitudes.Thedifferencewouldbethatwhatmakesitthecasethatan utteranceofacertainkindisaspeechactofacertainkindisthat,inatleastsome cases,utterancesofthatkindhavetheproperfunctionofchangingthecontextina givenway.
Eachoftheforegoingviewspresupposespsychologismaboutcontext—theview thatfactsaboutcontextaresomehowgroundedinfactsaboutthementallivesof theparticipantsinaconversation.Butthereareseveralalternativeconceptionsof themetaphysicsofconversationalscore.Forexample,Brandomarguesthatspeech acts“alterthedeonticscore,theychangewhatcommitmentsandentitlementsitis appropriatetoattribute,notonlytotheoneproducingthespeechact,butalsoto thosetowhomitisaddressed”(Brandom,1994,142).22 Onthisview,factsabout scorearedeeplynormative,andmayfloatfreeofparticipants’opinionsaboutwhat thescoreis.Intheircontributionstothisvolume,bothMcGowanandCampargue thatatleastsomecomponentsofthescoremustbeobjectivelynormativeinthissense. McGowan’sreasonisthatanobjectivenotionofscoreisneededtomakesenseof covertexercitives—speechactsthatchangepermissibilityfactsinwaysthatmaygo unacknowledgedbytheparticipantsinaconversation.Camparguesthatanormative
21 AlthoughStalnakeroftenframeshisviewasaversionofintentionalism—includinginhispiecefor thisvolume—hesometimesinsteadreferstospeechactsas“proposals”tochangethecontextwithout furthercashingoutthistalkofproposalsintermsofthespeaker’sintentions.Andinatleastoneplace, heexpressesdoubtaboutwhethereverysuchproposaltochangethecontextmustbeintendedtochange thecontextinthewayproposed(1999,87).
22 ForalucidcomparisonofBrandom’sviewstothoseoforthodoxdynamicsemanticists,seeNickel (2013).
