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MindtheBody MindtheBody AnExplorationofBodily Self-Awareness FrédériquedeVignemont GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©FrédériquedeVignemont2018
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PartI.BodySnatchers PartII.Body-Builder 4.BodilySpace67
4.1.AreBodilySensationsSpatial?
4.1.1.TheLocalSignTheory
4.1.2.Free-FloatingBodilySensations
5.1.ARepresentationalistApproach
5.1.1.TheBodyMap
5.1.2.BodilyLocationandEgocentricLocation
5.2.TheRubberBandHypothesis
5.3.WhereCanOneFeelBodilySensations?
5.3.1.BodilyIllusionsinNon-BodilyShapedObjects
6.2.1.TheBindingModelofMultimodality
6.4.TheMoreMultimodality,theLessImmunity?
6.4.1.TheMultimodalBindingParameter
6.4.3.TheSortalHypothesis
6.4.4.ANonconceptualAssumptionofUnity
7.MyBodyAmongOtherBodies125
7.1.TheBodyasaCommonCurrency
7.1.1.BodilyMirroringinAction
7.1.2.VicariousBodilySensations
7.2.TwoModelsofInterpersonalRepresentations
7.2.1.TheAssociationistModel
7.2.2.TheRedeploymentModel
7.3.TheChallengeofImpersonalContent
7.3.1.BeyondImpersonalContent
7.3.2.A “Whose” System?
7.4.Conclusion
8.TaxonomiesofBodyRepresentations140
8.1.HowManyBodyRepresentations?
8.2.DeficitsinBodySchemaandBodyImage
8.2.1.PointingtoWhat?
8.2.2.PersonalNeglect:aDeficitofBodyImage?
8.2.3.PeripheralDeafferentation:the “MissingBody Schema”?
8.2.4.AConstantInteraction
8.3.APracticalPhotographoftheBody
8.3.1.KnowledgeofBodilyAffordances
8.3.2.BodilyPushmi-PullyuRepresentations
8.4.IstheBodyMapHot?
8.4.1.ThePracticalHypothesis
8.4.2.BodyMereology
8.5.Conclusion
PartIII.Bodyguard 9.TheBodyguardHypothesis167
9.1.AnAgentiveMarkfortheSenseofBodilyOwnership? 168
9.1.1.TheBodyUnderControl 168
9.1.2.TheBodyThatOnePlansOne’sActionsWith 170
9.1.3.TheDualityofHotBodyMaps 173
9.2.ADualModelofPeripersonalSpace 177
9.2.1.ABody-CentredSpace 177
9.2.2.WorkingSpaceandProtectiveSpace 179
9.3.FixingtheBoundariesoftheBodytoProtect 182
9.3.1.TheAffectiveMarkofBodilyDisownership 182
9.3.2.SpatialandAffectiveRequirements 185
9.4.Conclusion 188
10.1.WhatItIsLiketoFeelMyBodyasMyOwn
10.1.2.TheNarcissisticQualityofBodilyExperiences
10.1.3.AMatterofDegrees?
10.2.TheBodyinDanger
10.2.1.JudgementofMusclesandJudgementsofReasons
10.2.2.FearlessandPainlessBodies
10.2.3.TooMuchPain?
Appendix1.BodilyIllusions207
A.1.TheRubberHandIllusionandSomeofItsManyVersions
A.1.1.TheRubberHandIllusion(RHI)
A.1.2.TheFakeFingerIllusion
A.1.3.TheMirrorIllusion
A.1.4.TheToolOwnershipIllusion
A.1.5.TheEnfacementIllusion
A.1.7.TheSupernumeraryHandIllusion
A.1.8.TheSomaticVersionoftheRHI
A.1.9.TheMovingRHI
A.2.Full-BodyIllusionsandSomeofItsManyVersions
A.2.1.TheFull-BodyIllusion
A.2.2.TheOut-of-BodyIllusion
A.2.3.TheBody-SwappingIllusion
A.3.OtherBodilyIllusions
A.3.1.TheNumbnessIllusion
A.3.2.TheDisownershipIllusion
A.3.3.TheJapaneseIllusion
A.3.4.TheThermalGrillIllusion
A.3.5.TheCutaneousRabbitIllusion
A.3.6.TheParchmentSkinIllusion
A.3.7.TheMarble-HandIllusion
A.3.8.TheDentistIllusion
A.3.9.ThePinocchioIllusion
Appendix2.NeurologicalandPsychiatricBodilyDisorders212
Acknowledgements IfeelfewpeoplehavebeenasluckyasIhavebeeninmyphilosophical career.ThroughtheyearsIhavehadthechancetomeetincrediblysharp andcreativephilosophersandpsychologistswhohavetaughtmeallthat Iknow.Notonlyweretheywonderfulteachersbuttheyhavealsobecome preciousfriends.Thismanuscriptistheoutcomeofourdiscussions.Iam extremelygratefultothemall.Inparticular,Iwouldliketothankthose withoutwhomIwouldnotbewhereIam,especiallyNedBlock,Denis Forest,UtaFrith,AlvinGoldman,PatrickHaggard,andPierreJacob. IwouldalsoliketothankthosewithwhomIhavespenthoursarguing, debating,andlaughing,especiallyAdrianAlsmith,TimBayne,Jérôme Dokic,AlessandroFarnè,OlivierMassin,MyrtoMylopoulos,Elisabeth Pacherie,andHongYuWong.Therearealsoallthosewhosework hasinspiredmeandwhosefeedbackhasplayedakeyroleinthis book,especiallyYochaiAtaria,MalikaAuvray,ElenaAzanon,David Bain,JoséLuisBermúdez,AnnaBerti,AlexandreBillon,OlafBlanke, LucillaCardinali,MarcelloConstantini,AbrahamSapienCordoba,Henrik Ehrsson,ShaunGallagher,FrancescaGarbarini,AdrienneGouzien,Marie Guillot,NickHolmes,GiandomenicoIannetti,MarcJeannerod,Marjolein Kammers,ColinKlein,UriahKriegel,JérémieLafraire,TimLane,Matt Longo,ChristopheLopez,AsifaMajid,TamarMakin,AlisaMandrigin, TonyMarcel,MikeMartin,ThomasMetzinger,AlejandroMujillo, MatthewNudds,KevinO’Regan,ChrisPeacocke,VictorPitron,Daniele Romano,DavidRosenthal,AndreaSerino,CarlotaSerrahima,Tania Singer,andManosTsakiris.Finally,therearethosewhohavebeenso importanttomealongthewaythattheydonotneedtobenamed.
ListofFigures 2.1.Abriefoverviewofthedebate48
3.1.Seeingone’sbody60
8.1.Computationalmodelofembodiedaction156
9.1.Peripersonalspace178
10.1.Thebodyguardhypothesis206
ListofTables 1.1.Asenseofdisownershipforone’sbody19
4.1.Dissociationsbetweenbodilyexperiencesandbodily know-how81
7.1.Interpersonalbodyrepresentations131
8.1.Evaluatingthedistincttypesofbodyrepresentation143
8.2.Neuropsychologicaldissociationsandtheirinterpretations144
8.3.Effectoftooluseontheestimatedsizeofone’ sarm (Cardinalietal.,2011)151
9.1.Adualmodelofperipersonalspace181
9.2.Anaffectivemarkofthesenseofbodilyownership184
A.1.Therubberhandillusion207
Introduction Nowthereiseveryreasonforexpectingittobea highlyunusual relation.Forwearetalkingabouttheepistemologicallinkbetweena manandinallprobabilityhimselfquamaterialobject!andinany casetheoneobjectintheuniversethatishisownbody.Isnotthat likelytobeunusual?
(O’Shaughnessy,1980,vol.1,p.138)
Therelationshipbetweenthebodyandtheselfraisesanumberofmajor issuesinphilosophy.First,onemayaskwhatthebodyisfortheself. Istheselfembodiedorpurelymental?Doesthebodyguaranteepersonal identity?Onemayalsoaskwhichbodyhasthisrelationtotheself.One assumesthatthereisonlyonespecificbodythatbelongstothesubject butwhichoneandhowdoesoneindividuateit?Onemayfurtherinquire abouttheethicalandlegalimplicationsofone’srelationtothebody. Whatproprietaryrightsdoesonehavetowardsone’sbody?Whatisits moralstatusanddoesitvarywhetheritisthelivingbodyorthebody afterdeath?Someofthesequestionshavebeenatthecoreofphilosophicaldebatesforcenturies,othershavebecomecrucialonlymorerecently withtheuseofhumanpartsforbiomedicalresearch.Althoughtheyare fascinating,Iwillleavethemasidehereandstartwiththemostbasicway oneencountersthe “unusual” relationbetweenthebodyandtheself, namelywiththephilosophicalexplorationof bodilyawareness.
Considerthefollowingbasicexample:Itouchthetablewithmyhand. Mytactilesensationincludessensationsofresistance,texture,andtemperature,aswellasthesensationofthelocationatwhichIfeelthe pressuretooccur,namelythehand.Iamalsoawarethatthehandon whichIfeeltouchis mine.Thistypeofself-awarenessisknownasthe senseofbodilyownership,forwantofabettername.Itmightseem indeedthatIdonot “ own ” mybody;Ionlyownmylaptop,my flat,and
mybooks.Ihaveamoreprivilegedrelationwithmybodythanwithany otherobjects,onemightevensayarelationofidentity.Thefactisthat numerousotherlanguages althoughnotEnglish usedifferentsuffixes toindicatethepossessionofalienable(e.g.my flat)andinalienable entities(e.g.myhand)(Kemmerer,2014).Buttherelationthatwe havewithourbodycannotbecharacterizedonlybythefactthatitis inalienable.IndeedIcanalsoqualifymyrelationtomysoninthesame way.Wethusneedtogobeyondinourdescriptionandaskwhatit actuallymeanstoexperienceone’sbodyasone’sown.Althoughintrospectivelyfamiliar,itishardtopinpointexactlythenatureofthespecific relationshipthatonehasuniquelywiththebodythatoneexperiencesas one ’sown.Whereasthesenseofagencyhasbeensystematically explored,takingonboardpuzzlingdisordersaswellascomputational modelsofactioncontrol(Bayne,2008;JeannerodandPacherie, 2004;Synofziketal.,2008;RoesslerandEilan,2003),thesenseof bodilyownershiphasbeenlargelyneglectedinphilosophy.Yetthese lasttwentyyearshaveseenanexplosionofexperimentalworkonbody representations,whichshouldhelpusshapeandrefineourtheoryof bodilyawareness.
TheMindintheBody Nowadays,itisoftenassumedthatifyouareinterestedinthebody,you mustbeaproponentofembodiedcognition.Embodiedtheoristsindeed trytoelevatetheimportanceofthebodyinexplainingcognitiveactivities. Theystudythemindnotinisolation,asifitwereadisembodiedcomputationaldeviceorabraininavat,butinitsmutualinteractionswiththe bodyandtheworld.Theyclaimthatthebodyhasacrucialsignificancein howandwhattheorganismthinksandfeels.AccordingtoGallagher (2005)in HowtheBodyShapestheMind,embodimentaffectsnotonly perception,emotion,andactionbutalsohighermentalprocesses: nothingabouthumanexperienceremainsuntouchedbyhumanembodiment: fromthebasicperceptualandemotionalprocessesthatarealreadyatworkin infancy,toasophisticatedinteractionwithotherpeople;fromtheacquisitionand creativeuseoflanguage,tohighercognitivefacultiesinvolvingjudgmentand metaphor;fromtheexerciseoffreewillinintentionalactiontothecreationof culturalartefactsthatprovideforfurtherhumanaffordances. (Gallagher,2005,p.247)
Giventhissurgeofinterestinembodiedcognitionfromphilosophers andcognitivescientists,itwouldseemlegitimatethattheyfocuspartof theirinterestonthebodyitselfandthatoneshouldbeableto findsome answersaboutthewayweexperienceourbodyinthisgrowingprogrammeofresearch.Butalthoughembodiedtheoristscriticizeclassical cognitivismforitsneglectofthebody,onemaywonderwhetherthey doabetterjobinaccommodatingthebodythantheirrivals.Eventhe so-calledembodiedapproachtakesthebodyforgrantedandrarely explicitlyinvestigatesit.
Thefactthatthereareonlyafewdescriptionsofbodilyexperiencesin embodiedtheoriesisunderstandableifthenotionofembodiment a notiontoooftenleftunde fined referstothephysicalbodyininteractionwithitsenvironment.Andindeedsomeembodiedtheoristsare primarilyinterestedinwhatwecandowiththebody,insteadofhowwe experienceit(Chemero,2009;Gallagher,2008;ThelenandSmith,1994; TurveyandCarello,1995;vanGelder,1995).Theygiveaprimacyto action.Hence,whatmattersforthemisthephysicalbodyinsofarasit allowsa fluentadaptivecouplingwiththeenvironment.Thebodyisonly conceivedofasthenecessaryintermediarybetweenthemindandthe worldandthereisactuallynoneedtomentallyrepresentit(Kinsbourne, 1995,2002).ModifyinganexpressioncoinedbyBrooks(1991),theymay saythatthebodyis “itsownbestmodel”.AsMerleau-Ponty(1945) notes,thebodyhasafeaturepossessedbynootherobjectintheworld:it neverleavesus.Whythenwouldweneedaninternalrepresentationof itwhenwecouldsimplyretrievetherelevantinformationaboutitasand whenweneedit?Ifbiologicalsystemsonlyknowwhattheyneedtoin ordertogettheirjobdone(Clark,1989),isthebodyreallysomething thatthebrainneedsto “know”?
Itmaybetruethatclassicalcognitivismhasfailedtorealizethe significanceofbodiesincognitiveprocesses.Yetthisneglectshould notnecessarilyleadtoaradicalchangeofparadigmandcomplete rejectionofthenotionofmentalrepresentation(Clark,2008;Shapiro, 2010),especiallymentalrepresentationofthebody.Considertherecent discoveryofmirrorneuronsandthesubsequentembodiedapproachto socialcognition(GoldmanandVignemont,2009;GalleseandSinigaglia, 2011).Ithasbeenshownthatthesameneuralresourcesareinvolved bothwhenoneexecutesanactionandwhenoneseesanotherindividual performingthesameaction(GrezesandDecety,2001).Ithasbeen
arguedthatthistypeofmirrorsystemplaysaroleintheunderstanding ofotherpeople’sactions.Ishallcomebacktothesemirrorsystemsin Chapter7,butitisworthnotingherethatoneunderstandstheotherin virtueof representing themovementinthemotorsystem,andnotin virtueofperformingthesamemovement.Contrarytowhatsomeradical embodiedproponentsmaybelieve,mentalrepresentationscanbebotha moreusefulandamoreparsimonioussolutionthanrepetitiveinteractions.Thisissoifoneacceptsthatrepresentationscanbehighly dynamic,nonconceptual,andevenaction-orientated.Cognitioncan thenbesaidtobeembodiedbecauseitisaffectedbythewaythebody isrepresentedinthemind.Butifthethesisofembodiedcognitionisthat bodilyrepresentationsplayanessentialroleformostofourcognitive abilities,thenitisofextremeimportancetounderstandhowthebody isrepresented.
Toconclude,thebodyhascomebackbyasidedoorwithembodied cognition,butwhathasembodiedcognitiontoldusaboutthebody? Proponentsofembodiedcognitionoftendisagreeonthedegreeandthe natureoftheinvolvementofthebodyinthemind.Ihaveproposedhere twointerpretationsofthenotionofembodiment,oneofwhichappeals tophysicalbodilyactivitiesandtheothertomentalrepresentationsof thebody.Tolimitoneselftotheformerwouldreducethescopeofthe embodiedapproach,missingthepotentiallyimportantroleofbodily representationforcognition.Thisviewmaydispleasemanyembodied theorists(forexample,deBruinandGallagher,2012).Theymayconsider thatpositingbodyrepresentationsactuallyunderminestheexplanatory roleofthebody.Oneconsequenceofthisviewisindeedthatthecognitive abilitiesofabrain-in-a-vatcouldbeembodied:onewouldendupwith somementalrepresentations(ofthebody)affectingothermentalrepresentationsintheclosed-loopofthemind.Thequestioniswhetherthisisa realproblem.Idoubtit.Butitmeansthatinordertoknowwhatrole bodilyrepresentationscanplayinourmentallife,one firstneedsto investigatehowwerepresentourbody.Theembodiedapproachclaims toreturnthemindtothebody.Here,Ishallreturnthebodytothemind.
TheBodyintheMind Letusleaveasidewhatthebodycanorcannotdoforcognitionand focusonwhatitfeelsliketohaveabody.Ourownbodymayseemtobe
theobjectthatweknowthebestforweconstantlyreceivea flowof informationaboutitthroughwhatIcallbodilysenses.Theseinclude five informationalchannelsthatprovidedirectinternalaccesstoourown body. Touch ismediatedbycutaneousmechanoreceptors.Itcarries informationabouttheexternalworld(e.g.shapeofthetouchedobject), butalsoaboutthebody(e.g.pressureonthespecificpartoftheskin) (Katz,1925). Proprioception providesinformationaboutthepositionand movementofthebody.Itincludesmusclespindles,whicharesensitive tomusclestretch,Golgitendonorgans,whicharesensitivetotendon tension,andjointreceptors,whicharesensitivetojointposition. Nociception respondstodangerouslyintensemechanical,mechanothermal, thermal,andchemicalstimuli.Accordingtothedominanttheory,noxioussignalsareinhibited,enhanced,ordistortedbyvariousfactorsviaa gatingmechanismatthelevelofthespinalcordthatcontrolsthesignals fromtheperipherytobrainstructuresandviaacentralgatingmechanism(MelzackandWall,1983). Interoception providesinformationabout thephysiologicalconditionofthebodyinordertomaintainoptimal homeostasis(Sherrington,1906).Interoceptivesignalsarisewithinfour systems:cardiovascular,respiratory,gastrointestinal,andurogenital.The vestibularsystem intheinnerearprovidesinformationaboutthebalance ofthebody.Itincludesthreeroughlyorthogonalsemicircularcanals, whicharesensitivetomotionaccelerationasourheadmovesinspace, andtwootolithorgans,whicharesensitivetothepullofgravity.
Yet,despiteallthesesourcesofinformation,thephenomenologyof bodilyawarenessseemssurprisinglylimited.Itappearsaslessluxuriant anddetailedthanthephenomenologyofvisualawareness,whichcanbe analysedasfullof fine-grainedcolourshadesandwell-individuated 3Dshapesthatmovearound.Itseemsat firstsightreducibletothe “feelingofthesameoldbodyalwaysthere” ortoamere “feelingof warmthandintimacy” (James,1890,p.242).Forinstance,whiletyping onalaptop,wedonotvividlyexperienceour fingersonthekeyboardand ourbodyseemsonlytobeatthebackgroundofourawareness.Our conscious fieldisprimarilyoccupiedbythecontentofwhatweare typing,andmoregenerally,bytheexternalworldratherthanbythe bodilymediumthatallowsustoperceiveitandtomovethroughit (Gurwitsch,1985).Weusethebody,butwerarelyreflectuponit.
Nonetheless,whenourbodybecomeslessfamiliar,wecangraspthe manywaysourbodycanappeartous.Onemightbelievethatwecould
notbewrongaboutourbodybecausewehaveaprivilegedaccesstoit throughbodilysensesthatputusindirectcontactwithit,butthereare somanybodilyillusionsanditisalmostimpossibletoprovidean exhaustivelistofthem(seeAppendix1forapartialattempt).Itcan takenomorethangoingtothedentisttoexperienceoneofthem:after dentalsurgery,yourmouthoftenfeelsbigger,althoughitlooksnormal. Thisisasurprisingsideeffectofanaesthesia(GandeviaandPhegan, 1999;Turkeretal.2005).ThePinocchioillusionisalsoquitestriking (Lackner,1988).Ifthetendonsofyourarmmusclesarevibratedata certainfrequency,youexperienceillusoryarmmovements.Youfeel,for instance,yourarmmovingawayfromyouifyourbicepstendonis vibrated,andifyousimultaneouslygraspyournose,youexperience yournoseaselongatingbyasmuchas30cm.ThePinocchioillusion resultsfromasensorimotorconflictbetweenerroneousproprioceptive information(i.e.yourarmmovingawayfromyou)andaccuratetactile information(i.e.contactofyournoseandyour fingers).Butitmaybe theexperienceofphantomlimbsinamputeesthatbestbringsthe phenomenologyofbodilyawarenessintothelimelight.Whereasour bodygenerallystaysatthemarginofconsciousness,phantomlimbsare atitsforeground.Apatient,forexample,reported: “I,saysoneman, Ishouldsay,Iammoresureofthelegwhichain’tthanoftheonethat are,IguessIshouldbeaboutcorrect” (Mitchell,1871,p.566).By analysingphantomlimbs,wemaythusshedlightonwhatitisliketo havea “real” body.
Manyamputeesexperiencefromtheinsidethecontinuouspresenceof theirlostlimbs.Theyfeeltheirshapeandsize,theyfeelthematspecific locationsandinspecificpostures,theyfeelsensationsinthem,sensations ofcoldandheat,forinstance,andtoooftensensationsofpain,andin somecases,theyfeelthemmovinganddirectlyobeyingtheirwill. Finally,theyfeelthatthephantomlimbispartoftheirbody.These variousaspectsofbodilyawarenessarefamiliartous,eventhoughnot alwaysvividinourconsciousness.Whatarelesser-knownarethe followingpuzzlingresults,whichraisefundamentalquestionsabout bodilyawareness.
Amelicpatientsandsupernumeraryphantomlimbs:Someindividuals arebornwithmissinglimb(s)andyettheycanexperiencerealistic phantomlimbs,althoughtheyhavenevermovedthemorseenthem
(Melzack,1990).Bycontrast,otherpatientsexperiencethepresence ofphantomlimbsalthoughtheydonotmissanylimbandthey canfeel,forinstance,asiftheyhadthreearmsandthreelegs (Staubetal.,2006).
Howdowebuilduptherepresentationofourbody?Weconstantly receivea flowofinformationthroughexternalperceptionandthrough internalperception,thelatterbeingactiveallthetime.However,ifamelic patientscanexperiencephantomlimbs,theremustbeafurtherbasis uponwhichtherepresentationsofthebodyarebuilt.Isthereakindof innatetemplateofthehumananatomy(e.g.twoarms,twolegs)?But howissuchananatomicaltemplatecompatiblewiththeexperienceof supernumeraryphantomlimbs?Istherenolimittothemalleability ofourbodyrepresentations?
Referredsensations:Iftheexaminerpourscoldwateronthepatient’ s face,thepatientfeelsthesensationofcoldbothonherfaceandonher phantomhand(RamachandranandHirstein,1998).
Accordingtooneofthedominantmodels,phantomsensationsresult fromthecorticalreorganizationthatfollowsamputation:inputsfrom thefaceinvade,sotospeak,thenon-existenthandareaintheprimary somatosensorycortex(Ponsetal.,1991).1 Hence,whenthefaceis touched,onecanexperiencesensationsinone’sphantomhand.Should onesaythatamputees mislocalize theirsensations?Andshouldone comparetheirphantomsensationswithreferredsensationssuchasa painfromaheartattackthatisfeltinthearm?Thecrucialquestionhere istounderstandhowoneascribesbodilysensationstotherightpartof thebody.Doestherepresentationofbodilyspacefollowthesamerules astherepresentationofexternalspace?ThepainthatIfeelinmyhandis notfeltinthecookiejarbecausemyhandisinthecookiejar(Coburn, 1966).Whynot?
Seeingthephantom:Amirrorisplacedverticallysothatthemirror reflectionoftheintacthandis “superimposed” onthefeltpositionof thephantomhand.Patientshavethentheillusoryvisualexperienceof theirphantomhandthroughthe ‘mirrorbox’,althoughwhatthey
1 Forcriticaldiscussion,seeMezueandMakin(2017)andMedinaandCoslett(2016).
actuallyseeistheircontralateralhand.Seeingasiftheirphantomhand weretouchedinducestactilesensationsandseeingasifitweremoving inducestheillusionofphantommovements,evenifthephantom handhasbeenparalyzedfortenyears(RamachandranandRogersRamachandran,1996).
WhenIclosemyeyes,Iamstillawareofmybody:Ifeelit fromtheinside thankstovariousbodilysenses.Thephilosophicaltraditionhasprimarilyfocusedonsuchanexperientialmodeinordertohighlighthowthe awarenessofourownbodydiffersfromtheperceptionofotherphysical objectsandofotherpeople’sbodies,allbeingaccessiblethroughexternal senses(Merleau-Ponty,1945;Bermúdez,1998).However,thedichotomy betweentheawarenessofthebodyfromtheinsideandfromtheoutside maynotbeasclear-cut.Theawarenessofthebodyfromtheinsidecan indeedbeinfluencedbyitsawarenessfromtheoutside.Butistheroleof visionmerelyanecdotalordoesitrevealthefundamentalmultimodal natureofbodilyawareness?
Therubberphantom:Iftheexaminersimultaneouslystrokesthe patient’sstumpandavisiblerubberhandlocatedinthecontinuity ofthestump,thepatientstartsfeelingasiftherubberhandwerepart ofherbody,asifitwereherphantomhand(Ehrssonetal.,2008). Asimilarillusionofownership,knownastherubberhandillusion, canbedoneinhealthyindividuals(BotvinickandCohen,1998).The participantsalreadyhavetwohands,andyettheyreportthatitseems tothemasiftherubberhandwerepartoftheirbody.
Someamputeeswearprostheses.Someofthemconceiveoftheirprosthesesasmeretools,likeglassesthattheycanputonandtakeoff.Others regardthemasintrinsicpartsoftheirbodylikeanyotherbiologicalbody part.Whatisthedifference?Towhatextentcanweembodyexternal objects?Whatgroundstheexperienceoftherubberhandorofthe prosthesisasone’sown?Intherubberhandillusion,itresultsfrom multisensoryinteraction.Butdoescontroloverprosthesescontributeas well?Andwhataretheconsequencesofexperiencingownership, whetheritistowardsarubberhandortowardsone’sownhand?Is thereanythingbeyonda “feelingofwarmthandintimacy”?
Mentalamputation:Aftersensoryormotorloss,orafterbrainlesion, onecanfeelasifapartofone’sbodywerenolongerone’sown.For
instance,insomatoparaphrenia,patientsdenythattheirhandistheir own,despitestillexperiencingbodilysensationsinit.Theirfeelingof confidencecannotbeshakenandtheycanevenattributetheso-called “alien” handtoanotherperson.Inanothersyndromecharacterizedby asenseofbodilydisownershipknownasxenomelia(orBodyIntegrity Identitydisorder),patientsevenwishtheir “alien” limbtobecutoff. Theexperienceofan “alien” handrevealswhatitisliketofeeldisembodied.Inasense,itismorestartlingthantheexperienceofaphantom limb.Asthesayinggoes,youonlyappreciatewhatyou’vehadwhenitis gone.Disownershipsyndromesgoagainstallourcertaintiesaboutour ownbody.ItisnolongerJames’ s “sameoldbody” thatthosepatients experience.Itforcesustochallengetheassumptionthathavingabody andexperiencingitasone’sownalwaysgohandinhand.Whatmakes thesepatientsexperiencetheirlimbsasalien?Whatismissing?By contrastwithpatientswithphantomlimbs,patientswithsomatoparaphreniacanseetheir “alien” handandtheyacknowledgethatitis continuousandcontiguouswiththerestoftheirbodythattheyexperienceastheirown.Yetthisdoesnotsufficeforthemtofeelthatitispart oftheirbody(seeAppendix3foradetaileddescription).Theycanalso feelwhenitistouchedandpinpricked.Butagain,thisdoesnotseemto besufficienttoelicittheexperiencethattheyaretouchedon theirown hand.Thisissodespitethebiologicalfactthattheyreceivetactilesignals onlyfromtheirownbodyandthereshouldbenodoubtthatitistheir ownhandthatistouched.Arethesepatientsmerelyirrational?Isit becausetheycannolongercontroltheirhand?Oristhereafundamental differencebetweentheirbodilyexperiencesandours?
GeneralOutline Theaimof MindtheBody istoprovideacomprehensivetreatmentof bodilyawarenessanditsunderlyingbodyrepresentations,combining philosophicalanalysiswithrecentexperimentalresultsfromcognitive science.Todoso,Ishalldrawonresearchinphilosophy,psychology, psychopathology,andcognitiveneuroscience.Inrecentyears,therehas indeedbeenarenewedinterestinbodyrepresentationswithincognitive science,revealingthatthereisavastunexplored fieldbeyondaconstant blurryfuzzybodilyfeeling.Inparticular,newbodilyillusions,suchasthe
rubberhandillusion,haveraisedawiderangeofquestionsaboutthe underlyingmechanismsofthesenseofbodilyownership.Drawingon thedataderivedfromthestudyofbodilydisruptionsandbodilyillusions (seeAppendices1and2foratentativeglossary),Ishallprovidean accountofthesensory,motor,andaffectiveunderpinningsofbodily awareness.Iwillstartwiththepuzzlesthatanytheoryofthesenseof bodilyownershipfaces(PartI),whichrequireabetterunderstandingof bodilyexperiencesandbodilyrepresentations(PartII),beforeonemight beabletosolvethem(PartIII).Theobjectiveof MindtheBody isthusto provideforthe firsttimeasystematicconceptualframeworkaimedat promotingtheintegrationofphilosophicalandscientificinsightson bodilyawareness.
PARTI BodySnatchers “Merely youaremyownnose. ”
TheNoseregardedthemajorandcontracteditsbrowsalittle.
“Mydearsir,youspeakinerror” wasitsreply. “Iamjustmyself myselfseparately.”
Gogol(1835)
Weareawareofourbodilyposture,ofourtemperature,ofourphysiological balance,ofthepressureexertedonourskin,andsoforth.Insofarasthese propertiesaredetectedbyarangeofinnersensoryreceptors,onemay conceiveofbodilyawarenessonthemodelofperceptualawareness. However,thereareotherfeaturesofthebodythatareofahigherlevel andthatcannotbedirectlyextractedatthesensorylevel.Theycharacterizewhatmaybedescribedasthefundamentalstateofthebody,thatis theenduringrelationofthebodywiththeworldandwiththeself.We areawarethatthebodyishereintheexternalworld,thatitbelongstous, andthatithastwoarmsandtwolegsthatcandosomethingsbutnot others.Low-levelbodilyproperties fluctuateallthetime:youfeelcold andthenyoudonot;youarethirsty,youdrink,youfeelbetteruntilnext time,andsoforth.Bycontrast,thefundamentalcoreofbodilyawareness isrelativelypermanent,andthusrarelyattheforefrontofconsciousness: itdoesnotattractattentionbecauseitnormallydoesnotchange.One mayevenask:doweactuallyever feel thebodythatway,ordowemerely know thosefundamentalfacts?Andwhatistheoriginofsuchawareness? Agoodstartingpointistocomparetheawarenessofourownbody withtheawarenessofotherbodies.Throughvision,audition,touch,
