Lyingand Insincerity
AndreasStokke
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©AndreasStokke2018
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2018
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018931635
ISBN978–0–19–882596–8
Printedandboundby
CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
PartI.Language
4.5.ExploitingIncompleteness
4.6.TheNeedforaDiscourse-SensitiveAccount
4.7.SayingandAsserting
5.2.DefaultingtotheBigQuestion
5.3.CommittingtoMisleadingAnswers
5.4.LyingviaIncompleteness
5.5.MisleadingviaIndeterminateMinimalContent
5.6.IncompletePredicates
5.7.IncompleteQuestions
5.8.Lincoln’sLettertoAshley
5.9.MisleadingwithPresuppositions
5.10.Athanasius,Nathan,andtheHenchman
5.11.PresuppositionsofInterrogativesandImperatives
5.12.ImplicitQuestionsandProsodicFocus
5.13.MultipleQuestions
PartII.Attitudes
6.BullshittingandIndifferenceTowardTruth
6.1.FrankfurtonIndifferenceTowardTruth
6.2.TwoWaysofCaringaboutTruth
6.3.BullshittingandGriceanQuality
6.4.BullshittingandQuestionsunderDiscussion
6.5.Indifference,MinimalContent, andWhatisSaid
6.6.IndifferenceandCaringaboutTruth
6.7.EvasionandChangingtheTopic
6.8.BoostingInquirybyLyingandBullshitting
7.BullshittingandLying
7.1.RealLyingandLyingtoDiscreditOthers
7.3.MostLyingisNotBullshitting
7.4.AgnosticBullshitting
8.InsincerityandtheOpacityoftheSelf
8.1.OpacityandDeepvs.ShallowInsincerity
8.2.SearleonExpressionandInsincerity
8.3.AssertionandSelf-Deception
8.4.Higher-OrderBeliefsandMentalAssent
9.4.InsincerityandQuestionsunderDiscussion
9.5.SpeakingagainstOne’sIntentions
10.CommunicatingAttitudes:BeyondtheDeclarativeRealm
10.1.Interrogatives,Exclamatives,Imperatives,andBeyond
10.5.InsinuatingDisclosureandSurreptitiousProbing
10.7.ShallowNon-DeclarativeInsincerity
10.8.IndirectSpeechActs
10.9.Phonetic,Phatic,andRheticActs
10.10.CommunicativeActs
10.11.UtterancesasCommunicativeActs
10.12.WhyYouCan’tLiewithNon-Declaratives
10.13.QuestionsunderDiscussion,To-DoLists,andWidening
Preface
Istartedthinkingaboutlyinganditsrelationtodeceptionin2010,whileI wasworkingasapostdoctoralresearchfellowattheCentrefortheStudy ofMindinNature(CSMN)attheUniversityofOslo.Iwroteapaper respondingtoworkbyDonFallisonthetopic,andlaterIorganized aworkshopheldinApril2011attheCSMNonthosethemeswith participationbyDonFallis,JennySaul,LizCamp,RoySorensen,and myself.AlthoughIhadnopremonitionofthisatthetime,thisearlywork wastoprovethestartforalong-termprojectofthinkingaboutinsincerity inspeech.
WhenstartingtoworkontheseissuesinOsloin2010–11,Iwasgreatly encouragedby,amongmanyothers,HermanCappelen,NickAllott,Olav Gjelsvik,TimothyChan,andTorfinnHuvenes,allofwhomprovidedme withthoughtsandideasofimmensevalue.Manycentralstrandsinthis bookstemfromtheseearlyconversations.Iamverygratefultoallofthose whohelpedthisprojectgetunderway.
Laterin2011HermanCappelenandPatrickGreenoughproposedthat IorganizeaworkshopatArchéattheUniversityofStAndrews,cofundedbyArchéandtheCSMN,oninsincerityandlying.Theevent tookplaceinNovember2011withparticipationbyDonFallis,James Mahon,KatherineHawley,andmyself.Thiswasanotherearlyeventthat greatlyhelpedtoprovidemomentumformythinkingaboutinsincerity inspeech.IoweadebttoHermanandPatrickforinitiatingthiseventand totheparticipantsattheworkshopwhogavemevaluablefeedback.
Havingwrittenthetwopapersforthesetwoevents,“LyingandAsserting”and“Insincerity,”Ibegantothinkaboutengaginginalarger-scale investigationofinsincerityinlanguage.AlongsideotherprojectsIbegan toworkonpapersoninsincerityandtestimony,andontruthfulnessin communicationfromaGriceanperspective.AtthesametimeIstarted workontwoco-authoredpapers,“Bullshitting,Lying,andIndifference towardTruth”withDonFallisand“WhatisSaid?”withAndersSchoubye. ThecollaborationonthesetopicswithDonandAnders,andthemany discussionswehavehad,havebeenofgreatvaluetomythinkingin thisarea.IoweaspecialdebttoDonforinnumerableexchanges,and
forreadingandcommentingonmanydraftsofearlierworkoverthe years.
In2013EliotMichaelsonandIbegantodeveloptheideaforacollectionofessaysonlying.Wewerefortunateinconvincinganesteemed groupofphilosopherstocontribute.Aspreparationforthecollectionwe heldtwoworkshopsforthecontributorstointeract:oneattheCSMN inMay2015andanotheratKing’sCollegeLondon(co-hostedbythe InstituteofPhilosophy)inNovemberofthesameyear.Boththeseevents wereinspiring,andprovidedagreatdealofusefulfeedbackfrom,among others,AndrewReisner,JamesMahon,JessicaPepp,JonasÅkerman,Paul Faulkner,andRachelSterken.
Thelistofsourcesofvaluableinputforthisprojectisendless.Some deserveexplicitrecognitionforideasandhelpinotherways,inaddition tothosealreadymentioned.Inparticular,AnandiHattiangadi,Andrew Peet,BenCaplan,BrunoJacinto,DavidKonstan,DilipNinan,DerekBall, EphraimGlick,ErichRast,FrançoisRecanati,GunnarBjörnsson,Ishani Maitra,JedLewinsohn,JustinSnedegar,JenniferLackey,JessicaBrown, JoshDever,KalleGrill,LarryHorn,LineIngerslev,MattBenton,Mikkel Gerken,NatHansen,OleHjortland,PålAntonsen,PärSundström,Ralf Bader,RenaudGagné,SalvadorMascarenhas,andSebastianBecker.
Theideasinthisbookhavegrownoutofearlierwork,butitalso containsmuchnewmaterial.TheintroductionandChapter1arenew. Chapters2and3arebasedonpartsof“LyingandAsserting,” Journal ofPhilosophy110(1),2013,33–60and“Lying,Sincerity,andQuality,” forthcominginJ.Meibauer(ed.), TheOxfordHandbookofLying,Oxford UniversityPress.Bothchaptersalsocontainnewmaterial.Chapters4and 5arebasedon“LyingandMisleadinginDiscourse,” PhilosophicalReview 125(1),2016,83–134,butalsocontainnewmaterial.Chapters6and7are basedonpartsof“Bullshitting,Lying,andIndifferencetowardInquiry” (co-authoredwithDonFallis), Ergo4(10),2017,277–309,andonpartsof “Bullshitting,”forthcominginJ.Meibauer(ed.), TheOxfordHandbookof Lying,OxfordUniversityPress,butalsocontainnewmaterial.Chapter8 isbasedonpartsof“Insincerity,” Noûs48(3),2014,496–520.Chapters9 and10aremostlynew,butsomepartsarebasedon“Insincerity.”
ForfinancialsupportIgratefullyacknowledgeRiksbankensJubileumsfondandtheSwedishCollegiumforAdvancedStudy.
AndreasStokke,Uppsala,August2017
weknowtotellmanyliesthatsoundliketruth, butweknowtosingreality,whenwewill.
Hesiod, Theogony 27–28(trans.M.L.West)
0.1.SincereandInsincereSpeech
Humancooperationanddevelopmentareunderwrittenbyapractice ofinformationsharing.Givenourlimitedlifespanandpointofview, wearedependentoninformationacquiredfromothers.Ourlimitations concernboththeworldandthemindsofothers.Noonecaninvestigate everycorneroftheuniverse,orevenoftheirownneighborhood,and wecannotalwaystellwhatsomeoneisthinkingjustbylookingattheir face.Wedependonotherstoshareinformationwithusbothaboutthe worldandtheirthoughts.Byfar,mostoftheinformationweacquirefrom othersweacquirefromtestimony.Languageisourbesttoolforsharing information.Thissystemofusinglanguagetoovercomeourcognitive limitationsreliesfundamentallyonsincerity.Inthemostordinarycase A tells B somethingthat A believes,whereby B comestobelieveit,too. Thereisanalignmentofmindandspeechinthekindofsinceritythat sustainsthepracticeofinformationexchange.
Thesetruismsrevealsomeimportantfeaturesofthewayweuselanguagetoinformeachother.Initsmostgeneralformthepracticeisone ofinquiry,thepursuitoftruth.Manyoftheactivitieswevaluethemost aregenerallyengagedininquiry.Science,philosophy,history,criminal investigations,journalism,andevenordinaryconversationsabouteverydaymattersalltypicallyaimatdiscoveringandsharingtruths.
Yetitisafurthertruismthatwesometimesdisruptthecommunal projectofinquiry.Wesometimesmisinformeachother,wedeceive,we lie,wemislead,wemisrepresenttheworldandourselves,wekeepsecrets. Wesometimeshavereasonsforbypassingthegoalsoftruthfulexchange. Thereisnoone,oratleastveryfew,whohaveneverliedorspoken insincerelyinsomeway.
Thesamelimitationsonknowingtheworldandthemindsofothers thatforceustorelyonthesincerityofourinformantsmakeitpossible forotherstoinstillfalsebeliefsinus.Languageallowsustocommunicate ourthoughtstoothers.Butlanguagealsoallowsustospeakfalsely. Mirroringsincereuseoflanguage,insincerespeechinvolvesinteraction ofmindandlanguage.Theparadigmatickindofinsincerespeechis lying.Instandardcasesoflying A tells B somethingthat A believesto befalse,whereby B isdeceivedintobelievingit.Whenweuselanguage insincerelymindandspeecharemisaligned.Thespeakersaysonething andbelievesanother,andtheheareristrickedintobelievingsomething thatcorrespondsneithertothefactsnortothemindofthespeaker.
Insincerityanddeceptionareattheheartofourcultureandbeginat itsbeginnings.InArchaicGreekthoughttheorderofZeusisnotonly predicatedonviolencebutisalsoestablishedthroughthepowerofduplicityandguile.DeceptionallowedZeustoovercomehisfather,Kronos. Histriumphwassealedinpartbyhisincorporationofhisfirstspouse, Metis,herselftheembodimentofcunningandtrickery.Toforestallher bearingachildthatwouldoverthrowhim,ZeustrickedMetiswithlies andswallowedherwhileshewasalreadypregnant.Throughlyingand deception,ZeusthusbecamethesolegenitorofAthena,thegoddessof wisdom,towhomMetisgavebirthinsidehim.
Inthe Iliad Achilles,thequintessentialplain-spokenhero,tells Odysseus,“asIdetestthedoorwaysofDeath,Idetesttheman,whohides onethinginthedepthsofhisheart,andspeaksforthanother.”(Iliad 9.312–13,translatedbyR.Lattimore)ButOdysseusisthearchetypalliar anddeceiver.Odysseus,himselfbothstronglyassociatedwithMetisand favouredbyAthena,oftenusesdeceptiontoachievehisgoals.When hefinallyarriveshomeafterhislongjourney,Odysseusdeceiveshis wife,Penelope,andkeepshisidentitysecretfromherashetestsherand plotshisrevengeagainsthersuitors.Homertellsusthat,ashespeaksto Penelope,Odysseus“knewhowtosaymanyfalsethingsthatwerelike truesayings.”(Odyssey 19.203,translatedbyR.Lattimore)YetPenelope
isascunningasOdysseusandeventuallytrickshimintorevealing hisidentity.
Insincerespeechencompassesmanyotherformsofdiscoursethan simpleformsoflyingtodeceiveothers.Wehavevariouswaysofdeceiving eachotherwithlanguagewhileavoidingoutrightlying.Weareskilfulinnavigatingthelandscapebetweenlyingandmerelymisleading. Weexploitthedifferencebetweenoutrightsayingwhatwedonotbelieve andconveyingdisbelievedinformationinotherways.Weengagein differentkindsofindifferentspeechincludingso-calledbullshitting.We feignattitudesandemotionswedonothavebyusingnon-declarativelanguagesuchasquestions,imperatives,orexclamations.Andwesometimes speakinsincerelywithoutaimingtodeceiveanyone.
Forbetterorworse,insincerityisascentraltoourlivesassincerity.The spectrumofinsincerespeechrangesfromtriflingliesaboutone’sfeelings aboutafriend’snewhaircuttoliesaboutthemostseriousmattersin privateandpubliclife.Eventhoughsincerityisdemandedbyourmutual dependenceoninformationacquiredfromothers,insincereformsof communicationplayafundamentalroleinourinteractions.
Itiscommonplacetothinkthatliesareoften(perhapsevenalways) harmfulatleasttosomeextent.Indeed,sometimeslyinghascatastrophic consequences.Butweshouldrecognizethatarguablymostliesaretoldin ordertobenefitsomeone.Usually,tobesure,theintendedbeneficiary istheliarherself,aswhensomeoneliesaboutthemselvesinorderto impresstheirlisteners.Butselfishmotivesarenottheonlyoneswehave forinsincerity.Thestockexampleoflyingtoamurdererwhocomes toone’sdoorandasksforthewhereaboutsofherintendedvictimisa clearexampleofanon-selfish,altruisticlie.Liescanpreventdisasters, sometimesofenormousmagnitudes.
Formsofinsincerespeechalsoserveothervaluablepurposes.Even themoststaunchenemyoflyingwillsometimesfeelcompelledtolie tobepoliteorkind,ortoavoidembarrassment.Sometimesthingsneedto beconveyedindirectlyforvariousreasons.Mostpeoplewillchooseto misleadwhileavoidinglying,inmanysituations.Misrepresentingthe factscanservevaluablepurposes.Sometimeswemanagetoconveythings bybeinginsincerethatwecouldnothaveconveyedinthesamesituation byspeakingtruthfully.Aliecanimplicatesomethingtrue,whichcould nothavebeenassertedoutright,perhapsbecauseitwouldbeimproperto doso,orforotherreasons.
Thisbookisaboutthewaysinwhichweuselanguagetodeliberately disrupttheprojectofinquiry,thecommunalprojectofdiscoveringthe truth.Itislessconcernedwithexaminingthemanyandimportant reasonswemighthaveforspeakinginsincerelythanitisconcernedwith anexaminationofthenatureofinsincerespeechitself.Thismeansthatthe discussioninthisbookconsciouslyavoids,amongothertopics,thelongstandingandimportantphilosophicaldebateconcerningthemorality oflyingandinsincerity.1 Thereasonforthisissimplyaconsideration concerningthelengthandfocusofthework.
Thecontentsofthebookaredividedintotwoparts.PartI(Chapters 1–5)isconcernedwiththelanguageofinsincerity,PartII(Chapters6–10) withtheattitudesinvolvedininsincerespeech.Sinceinsincerespeech livesattheintersectionbetweenlanguageandattitudes,thetwoparts ofthebookareinterrelatedandthemesfromeachinteractwiththoseof theother.2
0.2.InsincerityandDeception
Liesaretypicallyameansofdeception.Whenachildtellsherparents thatshehasdoneherhomework,eventhoughsheknowsthatshehas not,sheisrelatingdisbelievedinformationwiththeaimofmakingher parentsbelieveit.Manyhaveconcludedthat,quitegenerally,tolieisto saysomethingonebelievestobefalsewiththeintentionofdeceiving one’saudience.Chapter1ofthisbookisconcernedwithdefendingthe opposingviewthat,althoughlyingisoftenaimedatdeceivingitsvictims, lyingisnotalwaysameansofdeception.
Theobservationthatliesarenotingeneraldeceptiveisnotjustthe trivialonethatliessometimesfailtodeceivebecausetheyarenotbelieved. So-calledbald-facedliesareliesthataretoldwithoutanyintentionsof deceivingsomeoneelse.Thiscanhappeninsituationswherealieistold thateveryonealreadyknowstobefalse.Anunfaithfulspousemight
1 Forasmallsampleoftheliteratureonthispost1900,see,e.g.Ross(2002[1930]),Paton (1954),Isenberg(1964),Bok(1978),Kupfer(1982),Korsgaard(1986),MacIntyre(1995), Williams(2002),Mahon(2006),(2009),Faulkner(2007),Wood(2008),Carson(2010), (inpress),Saul(2012),Shiffrin(2014),Stokke(2017b).SeealsoMichaelsonandStokke (inpress)forahistoricaloverview.
2 Referencesto,anddiscussionof,workonthetopicsmentionedintheIntroductionare giveninthesubsequentchaptersofthebook.
tellherpartnerthatsheisnothavinganaffair,eventhoughsheknows thatherpartnerknowsthatsheis.And,aswewillseeinPartI,thereare manysituationsinwhichwelieeventhoughwecannotbedescribedas intendingtodeceiveanyone.
Onesuggestionindefenseofthetraditionalviewoflyingisthatbaldfacedliesdoinvolvedeceptionalbeitnotofthestandardkindwhereby theliaraimstocauseherlistenertocometobelievesomethingfalse. However,asIargueinChapter1,eventhoughtherearemanywaysof deceivingsomeonebeyondcausingthemtohavefalsebeliefs,onecanlie withoutengaginginanyoftheseformsofdeception.
Therecognitionthatlyingcannotbeunderstoodgenerallyasaspecies ofdeceptionpromptsthequestforanalternativewayofunderstanding insincerespeech.Indeed,asIargueinChapter3,notonlylyingbutother formsofinsincerespeecharenotalwaysaimedatdeception.Onecan saysomethingtrueandtherebyimplicatesomethingonebelievestobe falsewithoutaimingtodeceiveanyonebydoingso.Onceitisunderstood thatinsincerespeechisnotsimplyameansofdeception,weneedto lookcloseratinsincereuseoflanguage,first,intermsofthewaysof communicatingitinvolves,andsecond,intermsoftheattitudesbehindit. Thesetwoaspectsofinsincerespeecharereflectedinthetwopartsof thisbook.
Thelandscapeofinsincerespeechiswiderthantheparadigmaticcase oflyinginwhichtheliarassertssomethingshebelievestobefalse. Ontheonehand,wespeakinsincerelyinmanywaysotherthanoutright assertion.Ontheotherhand,wecanbeinsincereinotherwaysthanby communicatingwhatwebelievetobefalse.PartIexploresthebreadth ofinsincerityasalinguisticphenomenon.PartIIisdevotedtoexamining thewaysinwhichinsincerespeechisbroaderthanstandardlyinginterms oftheattitudesoftheinsincerespeaker.
0.3.AssertionandWhatisSaid
PartIoffersanaccountoflyingintermsofassertionthatdoesnotmake intentionstodeceiveanecessaryconditiononlying.Instead,ontheview Idefend,alieisaninsincereassertion.Youliewhenyouassertsomething youbelievetobefalse.Oneconsequenceofthisviewisthattherecanbe truelies.Thatis,ifoneassertssomethingonebelievestobefalse,oneis
notexoneratedfromlyingifitturnsoutthatwhatoneassertedwasin facttrue.Alieneednotbefalse,althoughitneedstobedisbelieved.
Themainchallengeforaviewoflyingasinsincereassertionistospell outwhatitistoassertsomethinginawaythatisbroadenoughtocapture thenatureoflyingandnarrowenoughsoasnottoobscurethedistinction betweenlyingandotherkindsofinsincerespeech.ThebulkofPartI isdedicatedtoprovidingsuchadetailedwayofunderstandinglyingin termsofassertion.
Iarguethatthenotionofassertioninvolvedinthischaracterizationof lyingshouldbeunderstoodassayingsomethingandtherebyproposing thatitbecomepartofthebackgroundinformationthatistakenfor grantedforthepurposeoftheconversation.Conversationalbackground informationofthekindatissuehereisstandardlycalled“common ground”information.Thismeansthatmyaccountoflying,andofinsincerespeechmoregenerally,turnsontwocentralcomponents.Oneisthe notionofthecommongroundofadiscourse.Theotheristhenotionof sayingsomething,orwhatissaidbyanutteranceinagivencontext.
Afterconsidering,andrejecting,analternativeunderstandingoflying intermsofGriceanmaximsinChapter2,adetailedpictureofthenotion ofcommongroundinformation,andofitsfunctionindiscourse,is presentedinChapter3.Somethingiscommongroundamongagroup ofdiscourseparticipantswhenitiscommonlybelievedtobeacceptedfor thepurposeoftheconversation.Sincesomethingcanbecommonground eventhoughitisknown,orbelieved,tobefalse,onecanassertsomething eventhougheveryoneknowsorbelievesittobefalse,andhenceonecan liewithoutintendingtodeceive.Assertionsdonotnecessarilyaimat beingbelieved.
Chapters4and5arededicatedtoprovidinganaccountofwhatissaid andassertion.Thiswayofunderstandingthesenotionsisfoundedonan understandingofdiscourseasorientedtowardinquiry.Thefundamental aimofadiscourseistoincrementallyaccumulatetrueinformationwith theultimategoalofreachingastateofinformationthatadequatelyand fullycharacterizeswhattheworldislike,orhowthingsare.
Yetouraimsinconversationareusuallymuchmoremodest.Weare typicallyengagedinpiecemealstepstowardreachingthetruthabout aparticulartopicofconversation.Suchatopicofconversation,or subinquiry,canberepresentedasaso-calledquestionunderdiscussion. Wemightbeinterestedinquestionssuchas Whatistheweatherlike?,
Didyoulikethemovie?, Wherewereyoulastnight?,or IsSmithguiltyof embezzlingfundsfromhisfirm?
OnecentralaimofPartIistoargueforanotionofwhatissaid thatissensitivetoquestionsunderdiscussion,whilebeingconstrained bylinguisticmeaninginaparticularway.Roughly,whatissaidbya declarativesentencerelativetoaquestionistheanswertothequestion thatiseitherentailedbyorentailsthelinguisticmeaningofthesentence. Thisunderstandingofwhatissaidhastheconsequencethatoneandthe samedeclarativesentencecanbeusedtosayandassertdifferentthings dependingonwhichquestionitisaddressing.Ifasked,“Whatdidyou doyesterdayafteryouhadleftyourmother’sapartment?”responding with“Iwenttothemovies,”isawayofassertingthatyouwenttothe moviesyesterdayafteryouhadleftyourmother’sapartment.Yetthesame utterancecanbeusedtoassertsomethingdifferentwhenrespondingto anotherquestion,suchas Whydidn’tyoucomestraighthomefromwork lastnight?
Sincesayingsomethingisrequiredformakinganassertion,andmakinganassertionisrequiredforlying,assertionandlyingarelikewise sensitivetohowthediscourseisstructuredintermsofwhichquestionis underdiscussion.Utteringoneandthesamedeclarativesentencemight bealierelativetoonequestionunderdiscussionandnotalierelative toanother.Indeedutteringoneandthesamedeclarativesentencemight bealierelativetoonequestionunderdiscussionwhilebeingmerely misleadingrelativetoanother.
0.4.LyingandMisleading
Achiefreasonforcharacterizinglyingintermsofassertionistosetoff lyingfromnon-linguisticformsofdeceptionandinsincerity.Wearing disguises,fakingemotions,pointinginthewrongdirection,feigning laughter,sheddingcrocodiletears—theseareallwaysofleadingothers awayfromthefacts.Thesekindsofbehaviorarecommonplaceandyet complex.Butsuchdeceptivemaneuversarenotlies,althoughtheymay beaccompaniedbyliesiftheyinvolveputtingintowordssomethingone believestobefalse.Ifyouputonafakemoustache,youmaydeceive someoneintothinkingyouhaveamoustache,butyouhavenotliedto themunlessyoutellthemthatyouhaveamoustache.Forthisreason, atleast,allreasonabletheoriesoflyingagreethatyouhavenotliedunless
youhavemadewhatisvariouslycalledastatement,sayingsomething,or anassertion.
Thereisanother,perhapsmoresignificant,reasonforemphasizing thatlyingnecessarilyinvolveslinguisticcommunication,andinparticular,involvesthekindofdirectorexplicitformofcommunication associatedwithassertion.Wewanttodistinguishutterancesthatare outrightliesfromutterancesthataredeceptiveormisleadingbutnot lies.Thedistinctionbetweenlyingandmerelymisleadingisimportant tous.Itisreflectedinourlawcodes,inmuchmoralthinking,andin manysystemsofreligiousbeliefsandpractices.Youcanbeconvicted ofperjuryifyoulie,butyoumaynotbeifyousaysomethingtruethat isneverthelessmisleading.Vastamountsofeffort,time,andresources havebeenputintodecidingwhethercertainstatementsbypoliticians, religiousauthorities,andcourtroomwitnesseswere bonafide liesor merelymisleading.Evenoutsideofficialorformaldiscourse,mostof usprefermisleadingsomeonewhileavoidinglyingoutrightinmany situations.
Theclassiccontrastbetweenlyingandmerelymisleadingisthecontrastbetweenassertingdisbelievedinformationandconversationally implicatingsuchinformationbyassertingsomethingbelievedtobetrue. Ifyouareasked,“Areyougoingtotheparty?”youarelyingifyouanswer, “No,”whileyouareplanningtogo.Yetifyouanswer,“Ihavetowork,” youarenotlyingifyoudohavetowork,evenifyouarestillplanningto gototheparty.Yet,inthelattercase,youareclearlybeingmisleading.
Sinceassertionandlyingarerelativizedtoquestionsunderdiscussion, onmyaccount,sotooisthedistinctionbetweenlyingandmerelymisleading.Thissensitivitytodiscoursestructure,orthetopicofconversation,opensupavastspaceformisleadingbeyondtheclassiccontrast betweenassertionandconversationalimplicature.Wewillseethatthere aremultiplewaysofmisleadingrelativetoquestionsunderdiscussion byexploitingdifferentkindsoflinguisticphenomenaincludingcontextsensitivity,incompleteness,presuppositions,andprosodicfocus.
Definingaformalnotionofcontextualquestion-entailmentallowsus tobepreciseaboutwhenitispossibletomisleadwithrespecttoaquestion underdiscussionwhileavoidingoutrightlying.Inacontextwherea completeanswertoonequestionimpliesapartialanswertoanother question,onemaycontributeananswertoonequestionthatonebelieves
tobetrueandtherebyimplyananswerthatonebelievestobefalseto anotherquestion.
0.5.IndifferentSpeech
InPartIIofthebookIturntoconsideringtheattitudesthatmaylie behindinsincerespeech.Insinceritycantaketheformofmanyother attitudesinandtowardspeechthanthecommunicationofdisbelieved information.Oneofthesewaysinvolvesindifferencetowardwhatone says.Whenlying,peoplesaythingstheybelievetobefalse.Butpeople alsosometimessaythingswithoutreallycaringaboutthem.Chapter6 opensPartIIbydiscussingthewaysinwhichwesometimesspeakwhile beingindifferenttowardwhatwesay.
Awell-knownformofcarelessspeechisthekindexhibitedbyspeakers whosaythingswithoutcaringwhetherwhattheysayistrueorfalse. Thiskindofspeechhasbeencalled“bullshitting.”Chapter6arguesthat indifferencetowardtruthinspeechisamoredifferentiatedphenomenon thanthiskindofindifferencetowardthetruth-valueofwhatonesays. Sometimespeoplesaythingstheycareverymuchabout,buttheyneverthelessspeakwithindifferenceinanothersense.
Indifferencetowardone’sspeechsometimestaketheformofindifferencenottowardtheparticularthingsonesaysbutindifferencetoward theprojectofinquiry,asmanifestedinspecificsubinquiries,orquestionsunderdiscussion.Insomesituations,peoplearerequiredtosay thingstheybelievetobetrue,buttheymaydosonotwiththeaimof contributingtotheresolutionofaquestionunderdiscussion.Inother situationspeopleevadeonequestionunderdiscussionbyaddressing,or introducing,anotherone.Indoingsotheymaybedisregardingthetruth aboutthefirstquestionwhilebeingconcernedwithbeingtruthfulabout thesecondquestion.
Sinceonecanmakestatementsthatonebelievestobefalsewhileat thesametimenotcaringaboutmakingcontributionstoquestionsunder discussion,onecanspeakwithindifferencewhilelying.Bullshittingand lyingarecompatiblecategories.Yetwewillseethatmostlyingisdistinct frombullshitting.Mostliarsarenotindifferenttowardwhattheysay. Chapter7distinguishesdifferentkindsoflyingandshowsthatliars usuallycareaboutcontributingtoquestionsunderdiscussion.
0.6.OpacityandShallowness
Afurthercomplexityofinsincerespeechstemsfromthecommonly acceptedideathatourownattitudesarenotalwaystransparenttoourselves.Onemaybeinaparticularstateofmindandnotbeawareofit, andonecanbemistakenaboutwhichstateofmindoneisin.Theselfis opaque.Sinceinsincereuseoflanguageinvolvesaninteractionbetween mindandspeech,thephenomenoniscomplicatedbytherecognitionof theopacityoftheself.
Chapters8and9areconcernedwiththisdimensionofinsincere speech.Broadlytwoapproachestoinsincerespeechcanbetakeninlight oftherecognitionthatourattitudesarenotalwaystransparentto ourselves.Onadeepconceptionofinsincerity,whetheronespeaks insincerelyornotmaydependonattitudesthatoneisunawareofor mistakenabout.Onashallowconception,bycontrast,insincerityin speechdependsonthespeaker’sconsciousattitudes.
Thisbookdefendsashallowconceptionofinsincerityinthissense. Someonewhoassertssomethingtheyconsciouslybelievetobefalseis insincere,onthisview,eveniftheyharboranunconsciousbelief,hope,or desirethattheirassertionistrue.Forexample,ifsomeoneisself-deceived, theymayhavefalsebeliefsaboutwhattheybelieve.Youmightbelievethat youbelievethatwomenarejustasgoodcandidatesforajob,whileyoudo notinfactbelievethattheyare.Onashallowviewofinsincerity,whether ornotyouspeakinsincerelydependsonyourconsciousstateofmind. Hence,youwouldnotbeinsincere,onthisview,ifyouweretoassertthat womenarejustasgoodcandidatesasmen.Youmaybelackinginother qualities,andyoumightbeblameworthyforvariousreasons,butyour utteranceisnotinsincereifitcorrespondstowhatyouconsciouslytake yourselftobelieve.Similarly,someonemayconsciouslyintendtodeceive anotherbylying,evenifherunderlying,unconsciousmotivationsare praiseworthyandtruthful.Onashallowconception,suchanutteranceis insincereinvirtueofthespeaker’sconsciousintentiontolieanddeceive.
Yetevenpeople’sbeliefsaboutwhattheybelievemaynotbewhat makestheirspeechinsincereornot.Instead,ontheviewIdefendin PartII,whatisrelevantforinsincerityinspeechiswhataspeakermentally assentsto.Mentalassentisaconsciousattitudeofaffirmingaproposition thathasbeentakenunderconsideration.Thisattitudeofmentalassentis distinctfromwhatonebelievesaboutone’sbeliefs.Onemightmentally
assenttoapropositionevenifonebelievesonedoesnotbelieveit,or ifonedoesnotbelieveonebelievesit.Ifonebelievesthediagnosisof anincompetenttherapistthatonedoesnotbelievethatonehashada goodchildhood,onemightneverthelessbeinclinedtomentallyassentto havinghadagoodchildhood,sincethatiswhatonefindsoneselfjudging aboutthematterwhenconsciouslyconsideringthequestion.Asserting thatonehasagoodchildhood,insuchastate,isnotinsincereeventhough whatonesaysconflictswithwhatonetakesoneselftobelieve.
Atthesametimepeopledonotalwaysactivelygothroughaprocess ofassentingtowhattheyintendtosaybeforetheysayit.Wesometimes thinkwhilewespeak.Suchspontaneouswaysofspeakingneednotbe insincere.Weoftenspeaksimultaneouslywithassentingtowhatwesay. Conversely,ourspontaneitysometimesleadsustospeakagainstourown intentions.Imightresolvetotellthetruthaboutaparticularmatterand yetfindmyselfembellishingonmystory,evenlying,whenconfronted withmyaudience.
Thebroadestcharacterizationofinsincerespeechisanegativeone.To speakinsincerely,inthemostgeneralterms,istolackcertainconscious attitudestowardwhatoneiscommunicating.Inparticular,onegeneral traitofdifferentkindsofinsincerespeechistheabsenceofconscious intentionstocontributeananswertoaquestionunderdiscussionthat oneassentstowhileatthesametimeavoidingcontributinginformation onedoesnotassentto.Thisgeneralcharacterization,offeredinChapter9, isbroadenoughtocapturevariouswaysoflying,misleadingwhileavoidinglying,bullshitting,aswellasinsincereexploitationofpresuppositions andotherlinguisticphenomena.Weshouldnotbesurprisedbythe generalityresultingfromsuchabird’s-eyeviewoftheexpansivelandscape ofinsincerespeech.AswewillseethroughoutbothPartsIandII,more particularphenomenalendthemselvestomorenarrowcharacterizations.
0.7.CommunicatingAttitudes
Thefinalchapterofthebookexploresthewayinwhichweusevarious linguisticformsotherthansimpleutterancesofdeclarativesentencesto communicateourattitudesinlanguage.Beyondthedeclarativesentence form,naturallanguagesincorporateexclamative(“Howniceheis!”), imperative(“Benice!”),andinterrogative(“Ishenice?”)sentenceforms,
aswellasnon-sententialexclamationslike“Thanks!”or“Sh!”Allthese formsareused,amongmanyotherthings,tocommunicateattitudes. Innormalcircumstancesutterancesofsuchnon-declarativeformsresult initbecomingcommongroundthatthespeakerhasacertainattitude.For example,uttering“IsJoenice?”usuallyresultsinitbecomingcommon groundthatthespeakerwantstoknowwhetherJoeisnice.Similarly,an utteranceof“Thanksfordoingthedishes!”usuallyresultsinitbecoming commonground,roughly,thatthespeakerisgratefultotheaddresseefor doingthedishes.
Asinthedeclarativerealm,insincerityinthenon-declarativerealmis seentodependonthespeaker’sconsciousattitudes.Asimpleviewisthata non-declarativeutteranceisinsincerewhenthespeakerlackstheattitude itcommunicates.Analogouslytothecomplicationsarisingfordeclarative utterances,recognitionoftheopacityofourattitudeslikewiserenders thissimpleviewofnon-declarativeutterancesinadequate.Someonewho asksaquestiontherebycommunicatesthatshewantstoknowtheanswer. Shemightatthesametimeconsciouslythinkshedoesnotcareaboutthe answer,whileunconsciouslyshereallywantstoknowtheanswer.Inthis situationdeepviewsofinsinceritywilltendtodeemtheutteranceasnot insincere.Bycontrast,ontheshallowconceptionofinsincerityIfavor, suchanutteranceisinsincerebecauseofitsconflictwiththespeaker’s consciousstateofmind.Correspondingly,ifsomeoneusesanimperative utterancetoordersomeonetodosomethingtheyconsciouslywantthem todowhileunconsciouslynotwantingthemtodoit,theutterancewill notbeseenasinsincereonashallowviewofthekindIdefend.
Thesamedialecticsappliestonon-sententialutterancesofexclamations.Anutteranceof“Thanks!”isinsincerewhenthespeakerlacksa consciousattitudeofgratitude,evenifsheharborsunconsciousfeelings ofgratitudetowardthesamething.Anutteranceof“Sh!”isinsincereif thespeakerdoesnotconsciouslywanttheaddresseetobequiet,evenif sheunconsciouslydoesnotwanttheaddresseetobequiet.
Accountingfornon-sententialexclamationsprovidesausefulway ofapproachingtheissueofwhenanactisacommunicativeact.In particular,themereproductionofanotherwisemeaninglesssound, aswhenscreaminguponbeinghurt,maybeacommunicativeact,as whenonedeliberatelycriesouttoattracthelp.Onemayalsouttera soundthatoneknowstobemeaningfuleventhoughonedoesnotknow whichmeaningithasbutstilltherebyperformacommunicativeact.
Forexample,someoneusingaphraseinaforeignlanguagewithout knowingitsmeaningmighttherebytrytocommunicatetosomeone thattheyspeakthatlanguage.Andonecanproducesoundsofwhich oneknowsthemeaningbutwithoutcommunicatinganything,aswhen utteringasentencetotestamicrophone.
Bypayingattentiontothesedifferencesitcanbeseenthatonlycommunicativeactscanbeevaluatedasinsincereornot.Ifoneuttersasentenceinone’ssleep,eveninalanguagethatonefullyunderstands, oneisnotinsincereifwhatitwouldotherwisecommunicatedoesnot correspondtoone’swakingattitudes.
Eventhoughnon-declarativeutterancescanbeinsincere,theycannot beusedtotelllies.Non-declarativeformscannotbeusedtomakeassertions,althoughtheymaybeusedtoimplicateorcommunicatethingsin otherways.Chapter10sketchesaviewofnon-declarativelinguisticforms accordingtowhichtheircompositionalmeaningsarenotofthekindthat canbeusedtosaythingsinthestrictsenseofPartIbywhichwhatissaid byanutteranceistheanswertoarelevantquestionunderdiscussionthat standsinanentailmentrelationtoitscompositionalcontent.
