LandUsePolicy
journalhomepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol
LandfinancedependenceandurbanlandmarketizationinChina:The perspectiveofstrategicchoiceoflocalgovernmentsonlandtransfer XinFana,b,SainanQiuc,YukunSund,*
a SchoolofEconomics,RenminUniversityofChina,Beijing,100872,China
b CenterforChinaPublicSectorEconomyResearch,JilinUniversity,Changchun,130012,China
c SchoolofEconomics,JilinUniversity,Changchun,130012,China
d SchoolofPublicFinanceandTaxation,ZhongnanUniversityofEconomicsandLaw,Wuhan,430073,China
ARTICLEINFO
Keywords: Urbanlandmarketization
Landfinancedependence Industrialland Commercialland Residentialland
ABSTRACT
Inthecontextoftax-sharingsystem,theissueofusingprofitsfromlandtransferstocoverlocalgovernment deficitshasattractedwidespreadattention.However,researchonhowlocalgovernmentscontingentlychoose differenttypesofurbanlandtransfermethodsandthetransfervolumesremainslimited.Thispaperutilizes China’stransferoflandparcelsdatafrom2007to2016tocalculatethemarketizationlevelofdifferenttypesof urbanland,andinvestigatesthedrivingforcesofurbanlandmarketizationinChina,payingspecialattentionto landfinancedependenceandurbanlandmarketization.Wefindthaturbanlandmarketizationlevelisincreasing.Amongdifferenturbanlandtypes,residentiallandhasthehighestmarketizationlevel,whileindustrial landhasseenthelargestincreaseinmarketization.Theresultsofaspatiallagmodelalsoshowthatwhenlocal governmentsincreasetheleveloflandmarketization,governmentsinneighboringregionsreactcorrespondingly.Judgingfromthestatusquoofeconomicdevelopmentinmostcities,localgovernmentsusuallytackle financialdeficitsbyvigorouslypromotingurbanlandmarketization,buttheytendtoprioritizeresidentialand commerciallandtransfersfortheirowninterestsgiventhedegreeoflandfinancedependence.Thisstudy broadensourunderstandingoftheheterogeneousnatureoflandmarketizationandtheroleoflocalgovernment behaviorintheurbanlandmarketinChina.
1.Introduction
UnderChina'scurrentfiscalandtaxsystems,thelocalgovernment deficitandthepoliticalpromotionsystemareprimarydrivingforcesfor landfinance.Ontheonehand,thereformofChina’stax-sharingsystem hasdecentralizedtheresponsibilityoffinancinglocalgovernment programs.Forexample,firmsthatoriginallypaidtaxestolocalgovernmentsarenowtaxedbythecentralgovernment,indicatingaplunge inlocalgovernmentrevenue:inthefirstyearunderthereform,the ratiooflocalgovernmentfiscalrevenuetothenationalfiscalrevenue droppedfrom78%to44.3%.Asthereformofthetax-sharingsystem continues,theaimofeconomicgrowthcausesincreasingpressureon localgovernments(Taoetal.,2010; Zhang,2006).Thefiscaldeficitof
thelocalgovernmentrosefrom1.47trillionyuanin2007to7.31 trillionyuanin2016,anincreaseofnearly400%(Fig.1).Changesin deficitsincreasethedemandforgovernmentrevenueatthelocallevel (Panetal.,2015).Amongallfeasibleapproaches,landtransferfees havebecometheprimarysourceofextra-budgetaryincometocoverthe fiscaldeficitresultingfromdecreasesinfundingfromthecentralgovernment(LichtenbergandDing,2009; Lin,2007; LinandYi,2011; Fu, 2015),withamountincreasingfrom1.22trillionyuanto3.65trillion yuanduringtheperiodfrom2007to2016;althoughtheirproportion hasfluctuatedgreatly,landtransferfeeshaveprovidedupto36%of localgovernmentrevenue.1
Onetheotherhand,aslocaleconomicgrowthandgovernment revenuearethetwobasiccriteriaonwhetherthelocalgovernment
⁎ Correspondingauthorat:182NanhuAvenue,EastLakeHigh-techDevelopmentZone,Wuhan,430073,China. E-mailaddress: syk1208@gmail.com (Y.Sun).
1 Landtransferfeesareconsideredasinformalfiscalrevenue.Before2006,landtransferfeeswerelistedasnon-budgetincome;sincethepromulgationofthe ManagementMeasuresontheRevenueandExpenditureoftheTransferofState-ownedLandUseRightsin2006,theyhavebeenincludedinoneofthegovernmental fundsandarefreelycontrolledbythelocalgovernmentandrequirenosubmissiontothecentralgovernment.Itshouldbenotedthatland-relatedtaxrevenuemay alsoconstitutealargesegmentofthelocalgovernmentrevenue.However,theland-relatedtaxrevenueisincludedinthetotalbudgetofthelocalgovernment, combinedwithothertaxesandcannotbecompletelycontrolledbylocalgovernment.Therefore,localgovernmentsdonothavesufficientincentivestopursuelandrelatedtaxrevenues(Liuetal.,2016).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.105023
Received31December2019;Receivedinrevisedform23June2020;Accepted14August2020
Availableonline02September2020
0264-8377/©2020ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
Fig.1. Landtransferfees,localgovernmentfiscaldeficitandtheratiooflandtransferfeestolocalgovernmentrevenue.
officialcanreceivepromotion,landfinancehasbeenapopulartoolof governmentsbecauseintheshorttermitcreatesanimpressiveaccomplishmentforboththejurisdictionanditsofficials(Oi,1995; Chen, 2004; Maskinetal.,2000; Chenetal.,2005).Inaddition,empirical studieshaveshownthatforeveryonepercentagepointincreasein China'sregionaleconomicgrowthrate,theprobabilityofpromotionfor provincialofficialsincreasesby15percentagepoints(LiandZhou, 2005).
Thecontinuedaccelerationofindustrializationandurbanization hasincreasedthedemandforurbanland(Liu,2018).Underthepublic landownershipsysteminChina,theprimarylandtransfermarketis monopolizedbylocalgovernments,whichcanselectivelyimplement landmanagementpoliciesauthorizedbythecentralgovernment (O’BrienandLi,1999; Ran,2013; Liuetal.,2014)aswellasmakeselfinterestorientedlandtransferdecisionsthataffectlandmarketization. AsChinacontinuesmarketizationreform,theroleofmarketmechanismsintheallocationoflandresourcesisbecomingmoreimportant. Becauselocalgovernmentscannotcreatemoreland,itseffectiveuse willbenefitChina'seconomicgrowthandurbandevelopment(Mo, 2018; Halleuxetal.,2012).
Differentfrommarket-orientedlandallocationsystemsindeveloped countries(Alonso,1964),China'surbanlandallocationsystemisboth market-orientedandgovernment-monitored(Haila,2007; XuandYeh, 2009).Duringtheplannedeconomyperiod,thegovernmentmadethe urbanlandinChinaavailableatnocost.Aftertheeconomicreformand theopeningupofthecountry,China'surbanlandavailablefordevelopmentgraduallychangedfromfreeallocationtopaidtransfer.Inthe 1990s,theinitiallandtransfermethodinChinawasprimarilybasedon closed-doornegotiationsbetweengovernmentofficialsandlandusers (xieyi),2 asystemthatincentivizedrenteduseandotherproblemsassociatedwitheconomicinefficiency(Caietal.,2013)aswellasledto inefficientusesandwasteoflandresources.Comparedwithcommercialandresidentialland,thetransferofindustriallandismorecomplex andchaotic.BecauseofChina'sregionaleconomiccompetition,local governmentshavesuccessivelytransferredindustriallandbyattracting investorswithlow,zeroorevennegative(consideringsubsidiesfor infrastructuresupport)landprices.Toachieveefficientuseofland resourcesandtobeinlinewiththereformoftheeconomicsystem,the centralgovernmentbegantovigorouslypromotelandmarketreforms. Fromthebeginningofthe21stcentury,China'slandmarketization processhasaccelerated;sincetheMinistryofLandandResourcesofthe
2 Thereisonlyoneassigneeintheclosed-doornegotiation,andtheland transferpriceisdeterminedbythegovernmentandthetransfereeinprivate.It isnotaformalmarket-basedtransfermethod.
People'sRepublicofChinaexplicitlypromotedlandmarketreformin 2002,3 China'surbanlandmarketizationlevelhasshownasteadyupwardtrend(Liuetal.,2016).
LookingbackonthedevelopmentofChina'slandmarketization,it hasbeenagradualprocesspushedforwardbythecentralgovernment fromtoptobottom.However,thedegreeofimplementationofland marketizationrequirementsvarysignificantlyamonglocalgovernments,providingarichbasisforthedifferentialanalysis,whichisthe focusofthispaper.AsChina’seconomyhasdeveloped,localgovernmentsnowfacegreaterfinancialpressure.Theymustdecideonhowto effectivelyrelievethispressureusingbothgovernmentinterventionand themarketpowerinvarioustypesoflandmarket(Yangetal.,2015; WangandHui,2017);however,therelationshipbetweentheland transferbehaviordominatedbylocalgovernmentsandurbanland marketizationisdynamic.Asanimportantsourceoffinancialrevenue forlocalgovernments,localgovernments’dependenceonlandtransfer revenuenotonlyhasapositiveimpactonlandprices(Zhangetal., 2016),especiallyonthepricesofcommercialandresidentialland(Pan etal.,2015),butalsoincreasestheamountoflandtransfers(Shuetal., 2018).Suchgrowthinlandtransfershasacleardrivingeffectonthe developmentofthelandmarket,subsequentlyacceleratingthereform oflandmarketization.However,ourdataalsodemonstratethatin economicallyunderdevelopedregions,thefiscaldeficithasinhibited thelevelofurbanlandmarketization(Liuetal.,2016),inotherwords, thedependenceonlandfinancecausedbylocalgovernmentfiscal pressurehasinhibitedthelevelofurbanlandmarketization.Withthe abovediscussioninmind,sofarscholarshavenotreachedaconsensus ontherelationshipbetweenlandfinanceandurbanlandmarketization. Ifweconsiderthedifferencesinthelandstrategiesofthelocalgovernments,theirrelationshipwillbecomemoreunclear.
3 In2002,theMinistryofLandandResourcesoftheP.R.Cissuedthe RegulationsontheTransferofState-ownedLandUseRightsbyPublicTrending, AuctioningandListingofQuotation,statingthat“Allkindsofcommercial, tourism,entertainment,andcommercialhousingmustbesoldbypublic trending(zhaobiao),auctioning(paimai),andlistingofquotation(guapai) (MLRC,2002 MinistryofLandandResourcesofChina,2002).”InAugust2006, theNoticeoftheStateCouncilonStrengtheningRelevantIssuesConcerning LandRegulationandControlclearlystated:“Industriallandmustbesoldby meansofpublictrending,auctioningandlistingofquotation,andtheselling pricemustnotbelowerthanthepublishedminimumpricestandard.”InMarch 2007,thePropertyRightfurtherstipulatedthat:“Managementlandforindustrial,commercial,tourism,entertainmentandcommercialhousing,and thosewithmorethantwointentionallanduseinthesamelandshallbeauctionedutilizingpublicbidding,publictenderingandauctioning(Ministryof LandandResourcesofChina,2007).”
Usingamulti-scale,multi-mechanismframeworktoanalyzethe strategicchoicesoflocalgovernmentsinthefaceofcentralpolicy,this researchaimstoimproveourunderstandingofChina'sindustrial, commercial,andresidentiallandmarketreforms.Weusedetailed Chineselandtransferinformationfrom2007to2016andapplya spatiallagmodeltoexaminetherelationshipbetweenlandfinance dependenceandurbanlandmarketization,payingspecialattentionto theheterogeneityoftheseeffectsamongdifferenttypesofland.
Thispapercontributestotheexistingliteratureintwoaspects.First, itappearstobethefirstpapertouseauniqueandcomprehensive databaseofurbanlandtransactionstomeasurethegeneralurbanland marketizationandthemarketizationlevelofdifferenttypesofland. Existingresearchprimarilyusesmacro-datafromtheChinaLandand ResourcesStatisticalYearbookincalculatinglandmarketization(Liu andLin,2014; Liuetal.,2016; Wuetal.,2015).However,since2008 thegovernmenthasnotreleasedthesub-itemdataof“publictendering, auctioningandlistingofquotation,”solandmarketizationcannotbe accuratelymeasured.Second,consideringthespatialspillovereffectsof landmarketization(Brueckner,2003)andthecontingencychoicesof localgovernmentsfordifferenttypesoflandtransfer,weuseaspatial econometricsmodeltoinvestigatetherelationshipbetweenlandfinancedependenceandmarketizationofdifferenttypesoflandtoprovideempiricalevidenceonthehypothesisthatpolicychoicesoflocal governmentsvaryfordifferenttypesoflandtransfer(Kongetal., 2018).
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows:InSection 2,we measurethelevelofurbanlandmarketizationandthedegreeofland financedependencewhileconductingacorrespondingtrendanalysis basedontheanalysisoftheinternalmechanismoflandfinancedependenceandurbanlandmarketization.Weintroducerelevantvariablesanddatasourcesandconstructaspatialeconometricsmodelin Section 3.Section 4 considerstheimpactoflandfinancedependenceof localgovernmentsontheoverallanddifferenttypesofurbanland marketizationandSection 5 concludeswithadiscussiononimplicationsofthisstudyandsuggestionsforfutureresearch.
2.Theevolutionoflandfinancedependenceandurbanland marketization
2.1.Urbanlandmarketizationfromtheperspectiveofthestrategicchoiceof thelocalgovernmentinChina
In1994,Chinaactivelybegantoimplementthetax-sharingsystem, dividingthetaxsystemintothecentraltax,localtax,andcentral-local sharedtaxandclassifyingallconsumptiontaxesand75%ofvalueaddedtax(VAT)ascentralfiscalrevenue;thereformoftheincometax sharingsystemintroducedin2002changedthecorporateincometax andthepersonalincometaxfromlocaltaxtocentral-localsharedtax, thusreducingtheincometaxreceivedbylocalgovernmentsby40% since2003.ThechangefromabusinesstaxtoaVATfullyimplemented in2016,furtherreducedthelocalgovernment'sfinancialresourcesby reducingboththeVATandthedoubletaxation.Theimplementationof thetax-sharingsystemincreasedtheshareofcentralgovernmentrevenue,shiftedthepublicexpenditureresponsibilitytothelocalgovernmentsatthesametime(Wuetal.,2015).Localgovernmentrevenue rosefrom2.38trillionyuanto8.72trillionyuan,andfiscalexpenditure rosefrom3.83trillionyuanto16.04trillionyuanfrom2007to2016, theincreaseinfiscalexpenditurewassignificantlygreaterthanthe increaseinfiscalrevenue.Amongthe283prefecture-levelcitiesstudied,onlySuzhou,HangzhouandWuxihavesustainedfiscalsurpluses. Landtransferfeesiscontrolledbylocalgovernmentinsteadofthe centralgovernment(GuoandShi,2018).Therefore,localgovernments withlargefiscaldeficitsrequestbothtransferpaymentsfromthecentralgovernmentandlandfeestocoverdeficits,withthelatterbeingthe mostcommonwayforlocalgovernmentsinChinatoincreasetheir fiscalrevenue(Ding,2003).4 Forregionswithsmallfiscaldeficitsor
evenfiscalsurpluses,themotivationtomakeupforthefiscaldeficitsis weaker,butthesecitiesareconcentratedineconomicallydeveloped areassuchasthesoutheastcoast.Duetothepressureofofficials’promotioncompetitionandtheperformanceevaluationbysuperiorgovernments,localgovernmentsareofteninastateofrivalryandinteractionwitheachother,especiallyinregionsthataregeographically adjacentorhavesimilareconomicdevelopmentlevels.Theselocal governmentsnotonlyhavetoensuretheeconomicgrowthrate,but alsohavetoseekhigherrankingsovertheir“peers”.Consequently,they haveastrongincentivetopursuelandfinance(Oi,1995; Chen,2004; Maskinetal.,2000; Chenetal.,2005).
Chinahasformedathree-levelstructureforitslandmarket,namely theagriculturallandacquisitionmarket,theprimarylandmarket,and thesecondarylandmarket.Theprimarylandmarketismonopolizedby localgovernments,whichcanselectivelyimplementthelandmanagementpoliciesestablishedbythecentralgovernment(O’BrienandLi, 1999; Ran,2013)ordeveloplandtransferdecisionsfortheirowninterests.Bothapproachesdirectlyaffecturbanlandmarketization.To addressfinancialpressureandachievelong-termeconomicgrowthin theregion,localgovernmentshavegraduallyimplementedadevelopmentroutinethatreliesonthesaleoflandtoobtainextra-budgetary income.Landfinancehasbecometypicaloflocalgovernmentsundera decentralizationpolicy.
Chinahasexperiencedrapidurbanizationatanunprecedentedrate sincethe1978reformandtheopeningoftheeconomy(Baietal., 2014).Withthecontinuedaccelerationofindustrializationandurbanization,thedemandforurbanlandinChinahasincreasedrapidly.But thelandresourcesoflocalgovernmentsarelimited.Tomaximizetheir interests,localgovernmentsimplementlandtransferstrategiesbased onvariousdegreesoflandfinancedependence.
Localgovernmentsadoptdifferentmethodsoflandtransferand requiredifferentlandtransferincome.Atthebeginningofthemarketorientedreformofurbanlandtransfers,theonlymarket-basedmethod forlandtransfersstipulatedingovernmentdocumentswas“public tenderingandauctioning.”5 In2002,theMinistryofLandandResourcesintroducedthe“listingofquotation”transfermethod.6 Althoughthecentralgovernmentclearlystipulatedthatindustrial,commercialandresidentiallandmustbesoldthroughmarket-based methodssuchas“publictendering,auctioning,orlistingofquotation”, itiseasyforlocalgovernmentstointerveneinthe“listingofquotation” toobtainprofitsincorruption(Xuetal.,2009).Therefore,thegovernmentismoreinclinedtotransferlandthrough“listingofquotation”.
4 Transferpaymentsaredividedintogeneraltransferpaymentsandspecial transferpayments.Localgovernmentsneedtousespecialtransferpaymentsfor thepurposesspecifiedbythecentralgovernment.Specialtransferpayments stillaccountforalargeproportion.Ontheonehand,thespecialtransferpaymentdoesnotformthedisposablefinancialresourcesofthelocalgovernment; ontheotherhand,toomanylocalspecialfundpackagesrequiredinspecial transferpayments(suchasthetransferpaymentforagriculture,education, scienceandtechnology,etc.requiresthecorrespondinginfrastructureofthe localgovernment)increasetheburdenoflocalfinances,forcingmanyplacesto crowdoutnormalfiscalexpendituresandalsoaffectedtheoverallbalanceof localfiscalbudgets.
5 Auctioningreferstothattheassignorfirstsetsthefloorprice,bidderstake turnstoquoteprices,andthebidderwiththehighestpriceobtainsthelanduse right.Publictenderingreferstobiddingfortherighttouseapieceoflandina writtenbiddingwithinaprescribedperiod.Unlikethepublicpricesystemof auctions,biddersinvolvedinpublictenderingdonotknowoneanother’sbids, andthelanduserightlenderchoosesthehighestpricetotransferland.
6 Thelistingofquotationisequivalenttoatwo-stageauction.Thebiddersin thefirststagepubliclyofferpricesinasequence.Iftherearetwoormore biddersafterthefirststage,theyaretransferredtotheliveauction,whichisthe sameastheauction.Unlikeauctions,wheretherearemorethanthreebidders, thereisnorequirementforthenumberofbidderstobelisted,aslongasthe bidder'sbidisnotlowerthanthelistedbaseprice,thetransactioncanbe completed.
Aslocalgovernmentsstillhaveconsiderablemonopolypoweranda strongwillingnesstointerveneinthemarketinthetransferofindustrial land,theuseofvariousstrategiestotransferthistypeoflandatlow pricesthrough“listingofquotation”toattractcorporateinvestment stillexiststoday(Taoetal.,2010).Asaresult,thetransferpriceof industriallandissignificantlylowerthanthepriceofcommercialand residentialland,andlowerthanthemarketprice.
Localgovernmentsmakestrategicchoicesonthelandtransfertypes andonthelandtransferincome.Sellingcommercialandresidential landthrough“publictendering,auctioning,orlistingofquotation”may quicklyalleviatefinancialpressurebyobtaininglandtransferfees. Sinceindustrialzoningiscorrelatedwithlong-termemployment,populationgrowth,andincreasedbusinesstaxrevenuestreams,thereis anincentiveforlocalofficialstoofferindustriallandatalowprice (Wang,2014; Wassmer,2002; LangerandKorzhenevych,2018).Asa generalrule,localgovernmentsareincentivizedtoengageinamixed strategy,offeringdifferenttypesoflandatdifferentprices.
Thedatashowthattoeasefinancialpressure,localgovernments tendtousemorelandforcommercialandresidentialpurposes,selling itthroughthehighlymarket-oriented“publictendering,auctioning,or listingofquotation”option(Li,2014). HanandKung(2015) examined therelationshipbetweenfiscalrevenue,thelandtransferareaandthe salesincomefromcommercialandresidentialland,findingintheir samplethatevery1%decreaseinfiscalrevenueretainedbylocal governmentswastheresultofanincreaseof6.4%–11.0%inthe transferareaofcommercialandresidentialland.Suchincrementin transferareacauseslandtransferrevenuetoincreaseby10.0%–16.3 %.Inotherwords,inregionswherelandfinancedependenceishigher, localgovernmentstendtosellcommercialandresidentiallandina highlymarketablewaytocompensateforfiscaldeficitsquickly;however,itisdifficulttoprojectthelong-termeconomicdevelopment.The oppositeistrueforareaswithlowerlandfinancedependence.Dueto differencesintheeconomicdevelopmentstagesandtheadvantageous featuresofthelandresourcesincities,thestrategicchoicesoflocal governmentswiththesamelandfinancedependencearealsodifferent, indicatingheterogeneousimpactsoflandfinancedependenceonurban landmarketization.
2.2.Measurementoflandfinancialdependenceandurbanland marketization
Facedwiththepressureoffiscaldeficits,localgovernmentsurgently needtoincreaserevenuestocompensateforthem.Asaneffectiveway ofrapidlyincreasingrevenues,landtransfersareprevalentacross China.Fromtheperspectiveoftheincomesourcesoflocalgovernments,landtransferincomeprimarilyincludeslandtransferfeesand land-relatedtaxes.However,thecomplexityoflocaltaxsystemsand thedelayedstreamoflandtaxationcomplicatethemeasurementofthe truetaxrevenuebenefitoflandtransfers.Landtransferfeesareoneof themosteffectivewaystoaddresslocalgovernmentdeficitsastheyare thelargestandmosteasilycontrolledcomponentoffiscalrevenue(Shu etal.,2018).Bycontrast,land-relatedtaxrevenuestreams,whileimportant,arelesseasilyattributedtoaparticularlandtransfer.Inthis studyweusethelandtransferfeetomeasurelandfinancedependence (Mo,2018; Luetal.,2019),whichiscalculatedas
= + lfd ltf ltfgbr (1)
where lfd representslandfinancedependence, ltf representstheland transferfee,and gbr representsthelocalgovernment’sintra-budgetary revenue.Ascalculated,landfinancedependencefluctuates,butthe overalltrenddeclinedduringthe2007–2016sampleperiod(Fig.2).On average,thefinancialdependenceofthelocalgovernmentonlandin 2016was0.2695,around0.0692lessthantheaverageannualland financedependence.Thetrendoflandfinancedependenceiscoincident withsuchfactorsastax-sharingreformandeconomicfluctuations.
Duetothedifferencesinnaturalenvironment,populationdensity andeconomicdevelopmentlevel,therearelargegeographicdifferences inlandusepolicies(Wangetal.,2018b).Thisalsoleadstoalarge spatialdifferenceinChina’slandfinancedependence.Observingthe degreeoflandfinancedependenceofvariouscitiesin2016,itcanbe foundthatcitiesineasterndevelopedregionssuchasNanjing, Changzhou,Jinan,andJiaxinghaveahigherdegreeoflandfinance dependence,respectively0.6063,0.5944,0.5265,and0.5163,much higherthantheaveragevaluein2016(0.2695).ThelandfinancedependenceofLongnaninthewesternregionisthelowest,only0.0086. Thedevelopedregionsintheeasthavelessfinancialpressureand weakerlandresourceendowment,butthelandfinancedependenceis thehighest;theunderdevelopedregionssuchasthewesternandcentral regionshavegreaterfinancialpressuresandstrongerlandresource endowment,buttheirlandfinancedependenceisrelativelyweak.The easternregionsaredenselypopulatedwithlimitedlandarea,resulting inscarcelandresources,butbecauseoftheirbettereconomicand technologicalconditions,thedegreeoflanduseandlandpricesare relativelyhigh(Wangetal.,2018a).
Althoughtheaveragefiscaldeficitsbetween2007and2016inthe easternregionwas8.75billionyuan,whichwasmuchsmallerthan 10.63billionyuaninthecentralregionand10.54billionyuaninthe westernregion,landsalesrevenueintheeastwas13.84billionyuan, higherthanthatinthecentralregion(6.55billionyuan)andthe westernregion(5.21billionyuan).Forthecentralandwesternregions, themarketmechanismhasaweakroleinregionaldevelopment,the abundantlandresourcesarenoteffectivelyusedandthelandtransfer revenueisrelativelysmall.Despitetheheavyfinancialpressure,the centralgovernment'stransferpaymentsaremainlyinclinedtowardsthe centralandwesternregions,solandfinancedependenceisrelatively low.
InChina,therurallandmarketandtheurbanlandmarketaredivided,withthemarket-orientedtransactionssuchas“publictendering, auctioningorlistingofquotation”primarilytargetingurbanland,while thesecondarymarketoflandisclosetoacompletelycompetitive market.Therefore,weusetheleveloflandmarketizationintheprimarymarketasthemeasurementofurbanlandmarketization.The mostcommonmethodsforlandmarketizationarethedirectcalculation method(WangandTan,2020; Yuanetal.,2019)andtheweighting method(LiuandLin,2014; Liuetal.,2016; Wuetal.,2015).Thedirect calculationmethoddirectlymeasurestheleveloflandmarketization usingindicatorssuchastheprice,area,andnumberoflandtransfers; theweightingmethod,althoughbasedonthedirectcalculation method,givesdifferentpriceweightstothoseobtainedthroughcloseddoornegotiation,publictendering,auctioning,andlistingofquotation. Comparedwiththedirectcalculationmethod,theweightingmethod notonlyconsidersthelandtransfermethodbutalsotakesintoaccount thedeviationbetweentheactualsupplypriceofthelandandthe marketizationstandardandthustheweightingmethodcanbeconsideredasamorecomprehensivemeasurementtheleveloflandmarketization.
Weusetheweightingmethodinthisstudytomeasurethemarketizationleveloftheoverallandthedifferenttypesoflandusing variousadministrativelandtransectiondatainChina.Specifically,this paperusesthedetailedinformationonmorethan1.673millionland transfersinChinabetween2007and2016,7 includinglandsupply, projectlocation,area,landuse,landsupplymethod,transactionprice,
7 ChinaLandWebsite: www.landchina.com.In2006,the“Regulationsonthe TransferofState-ownedLandUseRightsforPublicTendering,Auctioningand ListingofQuotation”clearlyrequirethatthemunicipalandcounty-levelgovernmentlandauthoritiesmustpublishtheresultsofthetransferofthevarious landonthe“ResultsPublicity”columnoftheChinaLandWebsite.Theintroductionofthisspecificationprovidedabasisforustousemicro-datato measureurbanlandmarketization.
Fig.2. ThetrendofurbanlandmarketizationandlandfinancedependenceinChinesecities.
andthedateofsigningthecontract,amongothers.Wecompiledthe dataforthecitiesbasedonthe2007jurisdictioncodes.8 Considering thatdifferentlandtransfermethodshavedifferentlevelsofmarketization,accordingtotheanalysisofChina'slandmarkettransactions between2007and2016,theaveragepriceoflandtransferredbyauctionisthehighest,soitisusedasthemarket-basedbenchmarkprice, andthepriceweightissetto1.
Thepriceweightsofothertransfermethodsaredeterminedbythe relativevalueoftheaveragepriceofthelandtransferredthrough publictendering,listingofquotationandclosed-doornegotiation comparewiththeaveragepriceofthelandtransferredthroughauction. Accordingtothiscalculation,thepublictendering,listingofquotation, andclosed-doornegotiationpriceweightsare0.94,0.62,and0.3,respectively.Finally,thepriceweightdataandthetransferareaofeach transfermethodarecalculatedusingFormula(2)toobtainthemarketizationleveloftheoverallandthedifferenttypesofland.Taking intoaccountthetrendsinthelandmarketandthemarketizationofsubtypeland,thelandmarketizationlevelofindustrialland,commercial land,andresidentialland,iscalculatedasfollows:
degreegrewdramaticallyin2008,increasingbyapproximately13 percentagepointsfrom0.4471in2007to0.5733in2008.After2008, themarketizationlevelofindustriallandshowedasteadyupward trend,increasingto0.6248in2016.Fromtheperspectiveoftime,the trendandamplitudeoftheoverallandthedifferenttypesofland marketizationlevelsarecloselyrelatedtothemarket-orientedreform processofdifferenttypesofland.
Toexplorethespatialpatternofurbanlandmarketization,wealso analyzetheoverallanddifferenttypesoflandmarketizationincitiesof differentlocations(see Figs.3–6).Forthetimeframeinvestigatedhere, theregionswithahigherleveloflandmarketizationareprimarily concentratedinkeycitiesinthesoutheasterncoastalareasandthe capitalsofprovinces,atrendconsistentwiththeeconomicdevelopmentandpopulationdistributionofthecountry.Themarketization levelofcommercialandresidentiallandexhibitssimilarurbandistribution.However,inlandcitiesgraduallybecomeregionswithahigh levelofmarketizationofindustrialland,perhapsbecauseofhigher laborcostsandfewerlandresourcesinthecoastalareas.
where lmitn isthemarketizationlevelincity i, year t andtype n; Qi isthe landareaofthecity i soldinthelandmarketbypublictendering, auctioning,listingofquotationandclosed-doornegotiation;and Wi is city i’spriceweightofthelandsoldbypublictendering,auctioning, listingofquotationandclosed-doornegotiation.
Fig.2 showsthemarketizationleveloftheoverallandthedifferent typesoflandinChinafrom2007to2016.TheoveralllandmarketizationinChinashowedanupwardtrendduringthisperiod.More specifically,totallandmarketizationgrewdramaticallyin2008,increasingfrom0.5324in2007to0.6035in2008,anincreaseofnearly7 percentagepoints.After2008,theoveralllandmarketizationlevelincreasedsteadily,reachingto0.6303in2016.Residentiallandexhibits thehighestlevelofmarketization,withlittlefluctuationduringthe periodfrom2007to2016whenthemarketizationlevelofresidential landincreasedbyonly1percentagepoint.In2007,themarketization levelofcommerciallandwas0.612,reaching0.6372in2016.Industriallandexhibitsthelowestlevelofmarketization,althoughthe
8 Sincethelanddataofthefarmer'scorpsandthecorpsarelistedseparately intheChinaLandandResourcesStatisticalYearbook,theyarenotcountedin theprefecture-levelcities.Therefore,thedataofthefarmer'scorpsandthe corpsareexcluded.Inthe283prefecture-levelcitiesbasedon2007,Sanyaand Lhasaweremissingdataduringthesampleperiod,andChaohuwasmerged withHefeiin2011.Therefore,SanyaandLhasawereexcluded,andthedataof ChaohuwasmergedwiththeHefeiforcalculation.
From2007to2016,theconstructionlandareapercapitafor33 prefecture-levelcitiesshowednegativegrowth,andmostofthesecities wereconcentratedincoastalareas.Thecoastalregionsalesthecommercialandresidentiallandathighprices,andtheurbanlandmarketizationlevelhasreachedahighlevel.Sincetheconstructionlandin coastalareasshiftedfromtheincrementalphasetothestockphase,the amountoflandthatcanbesoldbylocalgovernmentisrelativelylimited,sothemarketizationofvarioustypesoflandslowlyimprovedand thelocalgovernmentsneededtofindotherlocalrevenuesources.Areas withlowlandresourcestendedtobemoreeconomicallydeveloped withfewercentraltransferpayments.Thesegovernments’intra-budgetaryrevenuesatthistimeprimarilycamefromindirecttaxesthough landtransfers(e.g.businesstax,corporateincometax,etc.)createdby theconstructionandrealestateindustriesduetourbanexpansion,and anincreaseindirecttaxesthoughlandtransfer(e.g.stamptax,land appreciationtax,farmlandoccupationtax,housepropertytaxand urbanlandusetax,etc.)(Lianetal.,2019).Theseaccountsfor35.18% and11.01%oflocalgovernmentrevenueduringtheperiodof 2007–2016.Atthistime,theadjustmentandoptimizationofthe structureofurbanlandbecameparticularlyimportant.
3.Methodsanddata
Thelandtransferstrategyoflocalgovernmentscanbeaffectedby theactionsoflocalgovernmentsinotherregions.Thiscompetitive strategicinteractionbetweenlocalgovernmentswillhaveaspatial spillovereffectinurbanlandmarketization.Toaddressthisissue,we usethespatiallagmodeltoinvestigateiftheleveloflandmarketization isaffectedbyspatialspillovereffects.Accordingtothespatial
Fig.3. ThechangeofurbanlandmarketizationinChina,2007and2016.
Fig.4. ThechangeofmarketizationlevelofindustriallandinChina,2007and2016.
Fig.5. ThechangeofmarketizationlevelofcommerciallandinChina,2007and2016.
autocorrelationtest,theurbanlandmarketizationforeachyearandthe Moran’sIofthemarketizationlevelofdifferenttypesoflandareall significantatthe1%level,indicatingthaturbanlandmarketization hasapositivespatialspillovereffectandthespatialeconometrics modelismorereasonable.Thep-valueoftheLMerroris0.005,andthe p-valueofLMlagis0.001,indicatingthatbothpassthesignificance test;thep-valueoftheR-LMerroris0.191,meaningthatthesignificancetestisnotpassed;thep-valueofR-LMlagis0.025,passingthe significancetestatthe1%level;therefore,weusethespatiallagmodel (SLM).
Duetothetimelagoflocalgovernment'slandfinancedependence onitstransferbehavior,wechooselandfinancedependencewithone
periodlagastheexplanatoryvariable.9 Weusethefollowingmodel:
9 Onemayconcernwiththepossiblereversalcausalityrelationshipbetween landfinancedependenceandurbanlandmarketization.Theoretically,greater landfinancialdependencewillcausehigherurbanlandmarketization,witha viewtoalleviatethelocalgovernment'sdependenceonlandfinanceinthe futurebyincreasinglandsalesprices.Iftheempiricalresultsalsosupportthis theoreticalanalysis,thereversalcausalityissuetendstoweakenourestimation ofthecoefficientsconcerned,ratherthancreateafakerelationship.Thatisto say,ourestimatesofboththecausesandeffectsoftheurbanlandmarketization providesalowerboundonthetruerelationship(WangandHui,2017).Hence, lagginglandfinancialdependencebyoneyearcanalsoalleviatethepotential endogeneityissue.
4.Empiricalanalysis
where lmitn representsthemarketizationlevelofcity i intheyear t andtype n; lfd islandfinancedependence; i,j representsprefecturelevelcity, ij , N =280; wij isaspatialweightingmatrixprocessedby rowstandardization10 isthespatialweightcoefficientmeasuringthe degreeofinfluenceofthelandmarketizationlevelinneighboringregionsonthemarketizationleveloflocalland; isthecoefficientofland financedependence; Xit isthevectorofcontrolvariables; istheregressioncoefficientsofavectorofcontrolvariables; c istheconstant term;and ε isarandomdisturbanceterm.Totestwhetherthereisa nonlinearrelationshipbetweenlandfinancedependenceandurban landmarketizationlevel,weintroduceaquadratictermoflandfinance dependence,inthemodel:
Thecontrolvariablesofthisstudyincludetheaverageincome(ai), thelandresourceendowment(lrd),andthetrafficaccessibility(ta). Averageincomeismeasuredbytheaveragewageofurbanemployees. Existingresearchrevealsthattheincomelevelofemployeeswillaffect thecity’sdemandforlandandthedevelopmentofthelandmarket(Wu andHeerink,2016).Whiletheleveloflandmarketizationisrelatedto thelandresourceendowment,theincreasinglyprominentcontradiction betweenpeopleandlandshiftstheattentionoflocalgovernmentsto theeffectiveuseofland(LinandHo,2003).Inthispaper,thepercapita constructionlandareaisusedasthecontrolvariablereflectingthe regionallandresourceendowment.Asmanystudieshavehighlighted theroleoftrafficaccessibilityindrivinglandusechange(Verburg etal.,2004; Borzacchielloetal.,2010),thispaperusesthepercapita roadareatorepresenttrafficaccessibility.Inaddition,thecollinearity testisusedinthisstudytopreventmulti-variablecollinearitybetween thecontrolvariables.Theresultsshowthatthevarianceinflationfactor (VIF)ofallcontrolvariablesislessthan1.5,indicatingnosignificant collinearityinthemodel(Belsleyetal.,2005).
Dataforthesevariablescomefromthe2007–2016ChinaCity StatisticalYearbook,theChinaLandandResourcesStatistical Yearbook,theChinaLandMarketWebsiteandstatisticalyearbooksor newsreleasesfromthevariousprovincesandcitiesinChina.The outputvalueofthepercapitawageisadjustedbasedon2007price levelstoeliminateanypotentialimpactofinflationontheresults.The studysamplesetincludes2800sampleobservationsfrom280prefecture-levelcitiesinChinafrom2007to2016.Thestatisticaldescriptionofeachvariableisshownin Table1.
10 Thisstudyusedthegeographicallyadjacentspatialweightingmatrixfor analysis;ifthetworegionsaregeographicallyadjacent,thevalueis“1”; otherwisethevalueis“0”.
4.1.Impactoflandfinancedependenceonurbanlandmarketization
Table2 showstheimpactofthelandfinancedependenceoflocal governmentsonurbanlandmarketizationunderdifferentcircumstances.Specifically,Models1and2showtheinfluenceoflandfinance dependenceonurbanlandmarketizationwithouttakingthespatial spillovereffectintoconsideration,whileModels3and4showtheinfluenceoflandfinancedependenceonurbanlandmarketizationwhile includingthespatialspillovereffectinthemodel.Tofurtherverifythe robustnessofourmodels,weaddtheratioofthelandarea,indicatedby publictendering,auctioningandlistingofquotation,tothetotalland transferareabysubstitutingtheexplainedvariable.Models5and6 showtheeffectofthelocalgovernment’slandfinancedependenceon urbanlandmarketizationunderthedifferentexplainedvariable.From theempiricalresults,thecoefficientsignificanceanddirectionofthe coreexplanatoryvariablesarebasicallyconsistent,andthemodelhas strongrobustness.11
Theresultsindicateaspatialagglomerationeffectintheurbanland marketization.BasedonModels3and4,thecoefficientofρissignificantlypositiveatthe1%level,indicatingapositivespatialagglomerationeffect.Thecoefficientvaluesofρare0.3489and0.3472, respectively,indicatingthattheurbanlandmarketizationlevelin neighboringregionswillhavea34.89%or34.72%increaseassociated witha100%increaseinthelocalurbanlandmarketizationlevel. Underthedualpressureofeconomicgrowthandgovernmentdeficits, adjacentmunicipalgovernmentsoftenselecttheamountandpriceof landtransfertoattractinvestment.Thismodelsuggeststhaturbanland marketizationinoneregionwillincreasetherateofurbanlandmarketizationingeographicallyadjacentregions.
AlthoughaninvertedU-shapeisfoundintherelationshipbetween thedegreeoflandfinancedependenceandurbanlandmarketization, urbanlandmarketizationstillcanbeconsideredtohavefacilitated economicdevelopmentinmostcities.AsseeninModels1and3,the coefficientsoflandfinancedependencearebothsignificantlypositive atthe1%level,indicatingthattheincreaseoflandfinancedependence issignificantlyassociatedwithhigherlevelsofurbanlandmarketization.InModel4,thecoefficientofthelineartermoflandfinance dependenceissignificantlypositive,andthecoefficientofthequadratic termissignificantlynegative,indicatingthatlandfinancedependence andthelandmarketizationhaveaninvertedU-shapedrelationship,
11 Regardingtheheterogeneityoftheimpactoflandfinancedependenceon urbanlandmarketization,wehavealsofoundmixedeffectsundertimeand spacedifferencesandfiscalpressuredifferences.Duetospacelimitations,we willnotlistthemonebyone.Ifnecessary,itcanbeobtainedfromtheauthor.
Fig.6. ThechangeofmarketizationlevelofresidentiallandinChina,2007and2016.
Table1
Summarystatistics.
VariablesDefinition
lm Urbanlandmarketizationlevel
lmi Marketizationlevelofindustrialland
lme Marketizationlevelofcommercialland
lmr Marketizationlevelofresidentialland
lfdt-1 Landfinancedependencelaggedbyoneyear
ai Theaveragewageofemployedpersonsinurbanunits(10thousandyuan/perperson)28002.24910.51040.2214.577
lrd Percapitaconstructionlandarea (squarekilometers/10thousandpeople)
ta Percapitaroadarea (squaremeters/perperson)
Table2
Regressionresultsofthefullsample.
Note:Thetorzvaluesareinparenthesis.***,**,and*representsignificantlevelsof1%,5%,and10%respectively.
withtheinflectionpointat0.5735.Duringthisperiod,thelandfinance dependenceinmostcitiesinChinadidnotreachthisinflectionpoint, suggestingthatlandfinancedependencehasplayedaroleinpromoting theurbanlandmarketizationlevelduringthesampleperiod(Fig.7).12
Theinclusionofthespatialmatrixinthemodelconfirmsthatthe magnitudeoftheeffectoflandfinancedependenceonurbanland marketizationreliesonthepresenceofgeographicallyadjacentland. ComparingModels1and3,wemaydiscoverthattheeffectofland financedependenceonurbanlandmarketizationis0.0342and0.0296, respectively,indicatingthatifspatialspillovereffectisnotconsidered, ourcoefficientestimatesonthelandfinancedependencevariablewill bepositivelybiased.
Inaddition,inmodel4,amongotherrelevantfactors,averageincomeisassociatedwithhigherlevelsofurbanlandmarketization,indicatingthathigheraverageincomewillnotonlyincreasethedemand forresidentiallandbutalsoaffectthedemandforcommerciallandand improvetheurbanlandmarketizationlevel.Higherlandresourceendowmentisassociatedwithlowerlevelsofurbanlandmarketization. Areaswithpoorlandresourcesrequiremoreefficientmeansofallocatinglandresourcesandhencegovernmentsmayactivelycultivate anddevelopthelandmarket,whilerentinglandandwastinglandresourcesareseenmorefrequentlyinareaswithabundantlandresources. Ourresultisconsistentwiththeabovehypothesis.Thecoefficientof
12 Fromthecorrelationanalysis,thelandfinancedependenceofChina’s147 prefecture-levelcitiesstillprimarilyplaysapositiveroleinpromotingland marketization.Duetospacelimitations,thecoefficientsarenotlistedhere. Theyare,however,availableuponrequest.Inthefollowingresearch,weonly examinethelinearrelationshipbetweenlandfinancedependenceandurban landmarketization.
trafficaccessibilityissignificantlypositiveatthe5%level,indicating thattransportationaccessibilitywillacceleratetheconcentrationof factorsandincreasethelevelofurbanlandmarketization.
4.2.Analysisoftheinfluenceoflandfinancedependenceonthe marketizationlevelofdifferenttypesofland
Facedwiththeincreasingfiscaldeficit,localgovernmentsoftenuse theirowndiscretioninselectingthetypesoflandtotransfer.Asshown in Table3,allρvaluesarepositiveandsignificantatthe1%level, indicatingthatthemarketizationlevelofdifferenttypesoflandin prefecture-levelcitiesinChinaexhibitsasignificantspatialagglomerationeffect,whichisconsistentacrosstheentiresample.Compared withthemodelwithoutconsideringthespatialspillovereffect,the contributionrateoflandfinancedependencetourbanlandmarketizationdecreasedwhenconsideringthespatialspillovereffect,indicatingthattheeffectoflandfinancedependenceondifferenttypesof landmarketizationlevelmaybeoverestimatedwithoutconsideringthe spatialspillovereffect.
AscanbeseeninModel2,Model4andModel6in Table3,the coefficientsofdegreeoflandfinancedependenceareallsignificantand positive,indicatingthatlandfiscaldependenceonlandtransfersincreasesthelevelofmarketizationofalltypesofland.Theacceleration effectoflandfinancedependenceonthemarketizationlevelofindustriallandis,however,lessthanthatofcommercialandresidential land.Asaresultoffiscaldecentralization,localgovernmentspreferto reducetheproportionofindustriallandtransferredbyclosed-door negotiationsbutincreasethepriceofindustriallandbyincreasingthe amountofindustriallandtransferredby“publictendering,auctioning andlistingofquotation”.Accordingtothedata,oftheindustrialland
Table3
Fig.7. Therelationshipbetweenlandfinancialdependenceandurbanlandmarketizationin280prefecture-levelcities.
Regressionresultsforthemolecularterms.
Note:Thetorzvaluesareinparenthesis.***,**,and*representsignificantlevelsof1%,5%,and10%respectively.
transferredfrom2007to2016,theproportiontransferredbycloseddoornegotiationsdecreasedfrom67.62%to3.43%,improvingthe marketizationlevelofindustrialland.However,basedonthegoalof attractinginvestmentandlong-termregionaleconomicgrowth,the sellingpriceof“publictendering,auctioningandlistingofquotation” ofindustriallandwaslowerthanthatforcommercialandresidential land.
Duringtheperiodfrom2007to2016,theaveragesellingpricesfor industriallandforthepublictendering,auctioning,andlistingof quotationmethodswere3.3938millionyuanperhectare,2.6916millionyuanperhectareand2.1733millionyuanperhectare,respectively,whiletheaveragepricesforcommerciallandwere31.8554
millionyuanperhectare,35.0659millionyuanperhectareand 17.2209millionyuanperhectare,respectively.Forresidentialland,the priceswere39.6336millionyuanperhectare,26.854millionyuanper hectareand18.7586millionyuanperhectare,respectively,reflecting thatthelocalgovernmentsdifferintheircontingencyselectionsofthe typesoftransferredland.
5.Conclusions
Theimplementationofthetax-sharingreformin1994improvedthe centralgovernment’smacro-controlcapabilities,butduetothemismatchofthelocalgovernment’sfinancialpower,responsibilities,and
financialresources,thescaleofthelocalfiscaldeficitcontinuedto expand.Datashowthatthescaleoflocalgovernmentfiscaldeficitsin 2016wasashighas7.31trillionyuan,andthefiscaldeficitof99.65% citiescontinuedtoexpand.Thisisalsoanimportantreasonwhythe centralgovernmenthasfurtherincreasedtransferpaymentsanddeepenedtaxreforminrecentyears.Facingthewideningfiscaldeficits, Chinahasactivelypromotedthereformofurbanlandmarketization (Xieetal.,2002; Lin,2007),withthelocalgovernmentalsoplayingan importantroleinthisprocess(Lietal.,2015).Thereformofurbanland marketizationisnotonlybeneficialtolocaleconomicdevelopmentbut alsoanimportantapproachforalleviatingthefinancialpressureof localgovernments.Therefore,wemustfocusonthesocio-economic effectsofurbanlandmarketizationaswellasincludetheimportantrole playedbygovernmentactionsandinstitutionsinthereformofurban landmarketization(WeiandLin,2002; Liuetal.,2014; Lietal.,2015). However,comparedwiththepolicyresearchonthereformoftheurban landmarketization,thenatureanddynamicsoftheurbanlandmarket havereceivedlittleresearchattention(Yuanetal.,2019).
Thispaperanalyzesthespatiotemporaldynamicsofoveralland individualtypesoflandmarketizationinChinafrom2007to2016 using1.673millionpiecesoflandtransferdata.Duringthisperiod, China'surbanlandmarketizationsawrapidgrowth,withanaverage annualgrowthrateof1.89%.Theaverageannualgrowthratesofindustrial,commercialandresidentiallandwere3.79%,0.67%and0.05 %,respectively.Thelandmarketizationlevelofresidentiallandwasthe highest,whilethelandmarketizationofindustriallandwasthelowest, atrendconsistentwitheconomicdevelopmentandpolicyorientation. Atthesametime,areaswithhigherlevelsofurbanlandmarketization wereprimarilyconcentratedinkeycities,suchasthoselocatedinthe southeastcoastalareaandthecapitalsofprovinces.Thedistributionof landmarketizationlevelingeneralisthereforeconsistentwithregional economicdevelopmentlevelsandpopulationdistribution.Theurban distributioncharacteristicsofthemarketizationlevelofcommercial landandresidentiallandaresimilar,butinlandcitiesbegantohave industriallandmarketizationlevel.Thistrendimpliesthatgovernments shouldadapttolocalconditionsandimplementlandmarketreform, especiallyindustriallandmarketreformbasedonthelocation.
Theempiricalresultsusingthespatiallagmodelshowthattheland transferstrategiesadoptedbylocalgovernmentsarespatiallyinterdependent.Theincreasinglycloserelationshipbetweenurbanland marketizationandregionaldevelopmentmaysuggestthatChina's urbanlandmarketisbecomingmoremature(Liuetal.,2016)andthe strategicchoiceistheresultofregionalcompetitionbroughtaboutby decentralization.Atthecurrentstageofdevelopment,landfinance dependenceisassociatedwithhigherlevelsofurbanlandmarketization,arelationshipthatisfoundinmostcities.However,ifthefinancialpressureonthelocalgovernmentexceedsatolerablerange,it willcausenegativeeffects.Thisrelationshipexplainswhythecentral andlocalgovernmentshavefocusedonlanduseefficiencyinrecent years.Undoubtedly,duetothedifferencesinthenatureofthevarious typesofland,localgovernmentsoftenchoosethelandtype,method andamounttobetransferredbasedoncontingency,andthecontributionrateofcommercialandresidentiallandissignificantlyhigher thanthatofindustrialland.Althoughlocalgovernmentshaveincreased theproportionof“publictrending,auctioning,andlistingofquotation” inindustriallandtransfers,theirpricesarestillrelativelylowcompared tocommercialandresidentialland.Inaddition,regionalcompetition leadstouncoordinatedregionaldevelopment(Heetal.,2014),leading totheheterogeneousimpactoflandfinancedependenceonurbanland marketization.Atthistime,a“regionalcoordinateddevelopment strategy”seemsparticularlyimportant.
Thisresearchhelpsustounderstandtheroleoflocalgovernmentin themarketizationofurbanlandinChinainthecontextoffiscaldecentralization.However,itisonlyaninitialstudyintheareaofland marketization.Therearemanyissuesthatmeritfurtherexploration. First,weexpectasystematictheoreticalexplanationofhowtheactions
oflocalgovernmentsaffectlandmarketization.Althoughwehave providedtheoreticalexplanationsregardingthechoiceofdifferent typesoflandtransferredbylocalgovernmentsbasedonthecontingencyoffinancialpressure,amoresystematicdiscussionisstill neededtoenrichourunderstandingofhowthebehavioroflocalgovernmentsaffectsurbanlandmarketization.Second,furtherresearch mayexplorehowlocalgovernmentscontingentlychoosedifferent types,methodsandamountsoflandtransferbyfullyconsideringfactorssuchasgeographicallocationandthepromotionofofficials. Finally,becauselocalgovernmentshavenotdiscloseddetaileddataon extra-budgetaryincome,transferpayment,andland-relatedtaxesatthe prefecture-levelcitylevel,furtherresearchisneedtoexplorewhether localgovernmentswithscarcelandresourceshaveotherlocalsources ofincomeavailableforthemwithouttheactualtransferoflandparcels.
CRediTauthorshipcontributionstatement
XinFan: Conceptualization,Methodology,Software,Visualization. SainanQiu: Datacuration,Writing-originaldraft. YukunSun: Investigation,Validation,Writing-review&editing.
DeclarationofCompetingInterest
Theauthorsreportnodeclarationsofinterest.
Acknowledgements
Wethanktheeditorforthevaluablecommentsandsuggestions. ThisresearchwasfundedbytheNationalNaturalScienceFoundation ofChina(71703053),theChinaPostdoctoralScienceFoundation (2018T110171,2017M620080),andtheInternationalInnovationTeam ProjectofPhilosophyandSocialSciencesofJilinUniversity (2019GJTD03),andsupportedbytheFundamentalResearchFundsfor theCentralUniversities(2722020JCG020).
AppendixA.Supplementarydata
Supplementarymaterialrelatedtothisarticlecanbefound,inthe onlineversion,atdoi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020. 105023
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