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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Petter Nesser
Title: Islamist Terrorism in Europe / Petter Nesser. Description: Oxford [UK]; New York: Oxford University Press, [2018]
ISBN 9780190909123 (print)
ISBN 9780190934705 (updf)
ISBN 9780190934927 (epub)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a debt of gratitude to many people for helping bring this book to fruition. First and foremost I thank my colleague, mentor and good friend Brynjar Lia. He introduced me to jihadism studies to begin with and advised me to explore Islamist terrorism in Europe long before the phenomenon was considered a major security challenge in the public eye. Brynjar supervised my doctoral thesis on which this book is based, and I have benefitted enormously from his vast knowledge of the Middle East, Islamism and terrorism. He is my role model academically and in so many ways beyond that.
My doctoral thesis was completed while working for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), and its terrorism research project (TERRA). I thank my employer, the FFI, for facilitating the PhD thesis and the book project and for valuing academic publishing. This is not something to be taken for granted in the think tank realm, and I am grateful and proud to be at such an enlightened institution.
I thank former heads of the FFI Analysis Department Ragnvald Solstrand and Jan Erik Torp, as well as the current head of the Analysis Department Espen Skjelland and manager of the terrorism research project Espen BergKnutsen, for backing me. I thank the rest of the crew at the security policy division for their support and for providing an inspiring and friendly research environment.
I further thank my colleague and friend Thomas Hegghammer for invaluable help in transforming the thesis into a book. It has truly been a privilege to be able to tap into his extensive experience in authorship and jihadism studies.
I thank former colleagues Hanna Rogan and Tine Gade for annotated translations of French and Spanish sources and Jane Chanaa for copyediting my doctoral thesis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My colleague Anne Stenersen deserves a special thank you. Anne and I co-authored an article on the modus operandi of jihadism in Europe, which forms the basis for Chapter Two of this book.
A number of people have contributed, directly and indirectly, to making this book happen. Many are scholars in Middle East studies or terrorism research from around the world, with whom I have cooperated on various occasions and regard as colleagues and friends. These scholars have generously shared sources with me and offered advice on the facts presented, as well as methodological issues. I have also been in contact with several expert journalists in the field, who kindly shared sources and insights with me in relation to the events which the book covers.
In alphabetical order I highlight Cheryl Benard, Laila Bokhari, Peter Bergen, Tore Bjørgo, Jeffrey Checkel, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Martha Crenshaw, Hans Davidsen, Rohan Gunaratna, Ellen Haugestad, Bruce Hoffman, Stéphane Lacroix, William McCants, Roel Meijer, Yassin Musharbash, Sean O’Neill, Peter Neumann, Tore Nyhamar, Rafaello Pantucci, Rudolph Peters, Tom Quiggin, Magnus Ranstorp, Fernando Reinares, Anders Romarheim, Martin Rudner, Ronald Sandee, Alex Schmid, Morten Skjoldager, Guido Steinberg, Michael Taarnby, Truls Tønnessen, Dominique Thomas, Joas Wagemakers and Lawrence Wright.
I would also like to thank security officials who shared knowledge with me on the condition of anonymity. They deserve praise for the hard work they do to keep us safe.
I thank my editor Michael Dwyer for supporting me and believing in the book. I am also truly grateful to the book’s peer reviewers for setting the bar so high, something that improved the end result tenfold. Further I would like to thank my copyeditor Tim Page for his brilliant work towards the end of the project. He captured the style I was aiming for, and his careful attention to details uncovered some embarrassing errors at the last minute.
Last I thank my beloved family for always being there for me.
Flaws and inaccuracies that slipped through the thorough reviews are my responsibility alone.
x
CONVENTIONS
Transliteration
This study uses the transliterations most commonly found in the sources when addressing Arabic names. This makes it easier for readers to search online for additional sources. When addressing Arabic words and expressions that do not frequently appear in Western sources, I use a simplified transliteration omitting the letter ‘ﻉ’ (ayn), the letter ‘ﺃ’ (hamza), and the letter and female de-nominator ‘ﺓ’ (tamarbuta) leaving the belonging vocals. The letter ‘ﯼ’ (i.e. a long i) is transliterated ‘iyy’ in the middle of a word, and simply “i” at the end of words. Long vowels and double letter ‘ ’ (shadda) are omitted leaving only the attached vocal. The letter ‘ﻍ’ (ghayn) is transliterated ‘gh’, the letter ‘ﺥ’ (kha) is transliterated ‘kh’. The letter ‘ﻅ’ (dha) is transliterated ‘z’, and the letter ‘ﻁ’ (tha) ‘th’. French transliterations from Arabic have become standard when addressing North African names. When French transliterations of names or expressions have appeared in the sources I have used this standard.
Names and biographies
This study contains much biographical material. All biographies have been retrieved from media sources and judicial papers. For research ethical reasons, information about people who have not been prosecuted is kept to a minimum, especially in connection with pending investigations and trials. This does not apply to well-known members of al-Qaida and likeminded groups, who have evaded prosecution and continue to be active. When people operate under aliases, as clandestine terrorists often do, I use the most common one when addressing them. I do not name family members of suspects and convicts unless they have been prosecuted. Because age is generally considered a
significant factor in relation to political violence, I indicate the age of people addressed in the case studies. I use age at the approximate time of a crime as standard reference.
Endnotes
Most sources are available online, apart from books, judicial papers and interviews. I also have copies of all Internet sources referenced on file. Because of space limitations I have kept references to a minimum, and as simple and short as possible. This means that access dates and URLs have been omitted in the published version. Exceptions from this rule have been made for certain primary sources and blog posts referenced. Some of the interviewees for the book have been anonymized.
ABBREVIATIONS
AQI Al-Qaida in Iraq
AQAP Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
QAP Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (pre-2009)
AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
Tawhid Al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad
AI Ansar al-Islam
GIA Armed Islamic Group
GSPC Salafi Group for Call and Combat
MIA Armed Islamic Movement
PET Danish Police Security Service
EIJ Egyptian Islamic Jihad
EDL English Defence League
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HuA Harakat-ul-Ansar
HUJI Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
HuM Harakat-ul-Mujahidin
IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
IG Egyptian Islamic Group
IJU Islamic Jihad Union
LIDD Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad
IMK Islamic Movement of Kurdistan
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
AIS Islamic Salvation Army
FIS Islamic Salvation Front
ISIS/IS Islamic State
JAN Jabhat al-Nusra
ABBREVIATIONS
JeM Jaysh-e-Mohammed
LeT Laskhar-e-Taiba
FAI Lebanese Fatah al-Islam
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
MAK Maktab al-Khidamat
MICG Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
NWFP North West Frontier Province
FLN Pan-Arab National Liberation Front
TNSM Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi
TTP Tehrik Taliban Pakistan
TIFG Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement
PROLOGUE
Islamist Terrorism in Europe presents the historical background for today’s jihadi terrorist threat to Europe, which is dominated by the “Islamic State” (IS). The book traces the chain of events, from the early 1990s until the present day, which led jihadism to become the main terrorist threat in the region.
As I was writing the conclusion for the first edition in January 2015, alQaida terrorists raided the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, killing staff and a policeman who arrived at the scene. When the book was first released in November 2015, IS terrorists massacred concertgoers at the Bataclan concert hall in the same city, in the deadliest attacks by militant Islamists in Europe since the 2004 Madrid bombings. This paperback edition comes at a time when jihadi attack activity has reached unprecedented levels in the region. As I argue in the epilogue, there has been an “IS-effect” on European jihadism.
The main features of this “IS-effect” are threefold. First, European jihadi networks have grown rapidly in scope and strength since the outbreak of the Arab Spring and particularly since the war in Syria in 2011. Second, there has been a steep rise in the number of terrorist plots. Third, more plots than ever go under the radar of security services and result in deadly attacks.
The high number of plots and executed attacks across Europe has spurred heated debates on the causes of the threat, and how best to deal with them.
In these debates, IS’s terrorism in Europe tends to be portrayed as a new phenomenon and different from that of al-Qaida. It is often alleged that IS pursues different objectives, attracts different people, and recruits differently from al-Qaida. A typical argument is that al-Qaida’s strategic goal was to push European States to cut ties with the US, whereas IS merely seeks to cause chaos in the region through acts of random violence.
Another widespread notion is that European IS terrorists are not as religiously motivated as those belonging to al-Qaida, and are instead driven by personal grievances and failings. Another common misperception is that most IS terrorists in Europe are “lone wolves”, who act on their own without interacting with organized networks. “Lone wolves” are in fact very rare in European jihadism. I find it problematic that sweeping generalizations are being drawn from insufficient data related to recent attacks.
If one instead looks at the historical evolution of European jihadism over time, and draws a comparison between al-Qaida and IS, one will find they are surprisingly similar. The differences between the groups are nearly negligible in Europe. The “IS-effect” in Europe is mainly one of scope; the core dynamics of the threat have not changed.
Many terrorists operating for IS in Europe until recently belonged to alQaida-networks. IS, by and large, wants to achieve the same goals as al-Qaida by attacking European countries. The two organizations recruit in the same way and use transnational networks to do so, and they attract the same kinds of people. Recruits come from various backgrounds and join networks for different reasons, but once they are inside, they become indoctrinated with an extremist form of Islam, and act accordingly.
When debating what causes the escalating threat, many have pointed to flawed integration and social discontent among Muslims in the countries being targeted. Others have argued that the increased threat is a direct consequence of increased immigration.
In reality, such factors have limited impact on the emergence of jihadi terrorist cells in Europe, on variation in the threat level, and on which countries become targeted. This has been the case both historically and presently.
The jihadi terrorist threat in Europe is a transnational phenomenon, and to obtain a nuanced and realistic understanding of how terrorist cells emerge, we need to pay attention to the threat’s historical roots, and the interplay between “homegrown” extremists inside Europe and jihadi groups in conflict zones. The central element in this interplay is a particular kind of terrorist I refer to as an “entrepreneur”—someone who builds and guides terrorist cells. These terrorists play a crucial role in making the threat more streamlined, more ideological, and more shaped by events outside of Europe than many are aware of.
This book will not settle any of the highly politicized debates on jihadi terrorism in Europe. It is my hope, however, that the detailed empirical approach and the analytical tools presented can inform the debates surrounding this subject, and bring about a clearer understanding of the threat’s roots and drivers.
European jihadism is a complex phenomenon. After more than ten years of research on the topic I have become aware of how problematic it is to make generalizations. I am convinced that we need to move beyond the search for one-factor explanations (for example ideology vs socio-economic factors), and rather to disaggregate the problem into smaller components and look at the interplay between them, with a view to breaking the cycles that bring about terrorist violence. I concretize how this might be done throughout the book and in the epilogue. Meanwhile, although this book is rather dystopian in its conclusions, I hope that the reader will find it rewarding to engage with the various case studies presented, and reflect on how they resonate with ongoing debates, be it in the public sphere or in academia.
January 2018
INTRODUCTION
This book recounts the history of jihadi terrorism in Europe from the Air France hijack in 1994 to the raid on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in 2015. It examines a range of terrorist plots throughout the region over a twenty-year period in which individual terrorist cells launched, or sought to launch, a number of deadly attacks. The book aims to explain why these terrorist plots happened when they did and where they did, and to shed light on what goes on inside European jihadi networks more generally. It seeks to demonstrate how jihadi terrorism in Europe emerged through an intricate interplay between foreign and European factors, between top-down and bottom-up processes of radicalization, and between social and ideological motivations. The book questions the tendency to view transnational jihadism either as a strategic threat or a social movement and discards the notion that explanations for jihadism in Europe can be reduced to a single or just a few factors.
While the book stresses the complexity involved in the emergence of terrorist cells, it also emphasizes the interaction between the cells and the transnational networks emanating from the 1980s Afghan jihad. It highlights how this interaction is facilitated by certain types of terrorist who are referred to as “entrepreneurs” because they build cells and provide them with a rationale and purpose. Entrepreneurs are often the leaders of terrorist cells, but they can also be radical preachers or fulfill other functions in extremist networks surrounding operational cells. The entrepreneurs come from diverse backgrounds, but are generally committed, charismatic activists with a talent for manipulating people. They tend to be veterans in the field of jihad who have spent time in conflict zones. In Europe, jihadi entrepreneurs bring together frustrated “misfits” and “drifters,” introduce them to a sub-culture where they can find community and identity, and translate far-flung grievances into a militant
worldview and violent activism. In the context of terrorist cells, entrepreneurs provide a link between the cell and armed groups in conflict zones. Consequently, the jihadi threat to Europe is more organized than is commonly assumed. It is largely determined by the ability of al-Qaida or similar groups to groom entrepreneurs within Europe. The notion of entrepreneurs helps answer the question as to why terrorist cells commonly composed of youths who seem to be non-political and non-ideological commit terrorism in accordance with al-Qaida’s ideas. The case studies presented here suggest that the militancy of a determined few count most in the emergence of jihadi terrorism in Europe.
The sig nificance of ideological leader-types does not contradict the idea that social dynamics and grievances matter in radicalization, however. Social factors and ideology are indeed working together in shaping the jihadi threat to Europe. The book identifies overall changes in the terrorist threat and the actor landscape. In the 1990s, jihadi attacks in Europe were linked to the Algerian Civil War and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In the early 2000s, al-Qaida emerged with a global jihad offensive in European countries mainly aimed at Jewish and the American targets, but following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 jihadi attacks in Europe increasingly aimed to deter and avenge European contributions to the War on Terror after 9/11.
Europe came to play a central role in the mobilization of transnational jihadism and experienced high levels of jihadi terrorism simply because the region has hosted many militants involved in armed conflicts around the world. The region emerged as an ideological center and recruitment ground for al-Qaida and likeminded groups in the 1990s. Jihadis have organized support networks in European countries for numerous groups in multiple conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Algeria, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria. These networks have raised funds, spread propaganda, recruited fighters and given birth to terrorist cells. Thousands of Islamists living in Europe have traveled to conflict zones as foreign fighters, and no other region in the West is home to as many jihad veterans as Europe. This connection between Europe-based extremism and the conflict zones of the Muslim world plays a vital role in the emergence of terrorist cells in Europe today.
Jihadi terrorism in Europe is a paradox on many levels. First, Europe has never received a great deal of attention in jihadi ideology and Europeans are not the main enemy of al-Qaida. Secondly, Europe has been valuable for jihadis as a sanctuary from which they can support armed groups in Muslim countries. According to strategic logic, the region should thus feel safe from
attacks. Finally, and as is discussed extensively in this book, jihadi ideology forbids Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries from harming those who provide protection. Although these inconsistencies make the terrorist threat in Europe all the more intriguing and challenging to understand, explanations are to be found in the interplay between local European extremists, armed groups abroad and jihad ideology.
Existing research
Despite the growing threat jihadi terrorism poses to European security, the academic literature on this topic is scarce. Only a handful of books have covered the phenomenon from a European perspective.1 These have mainly concentrated on patterns in homegrown radicalization, focusing on a limited number of cases primarily in the period after 9/11. In contrast to the current book, which is actor-focused, previous studies have offered a more policyoriented approach. The existing body of academic literature on jihadism in Europe has tended to focus on extremism in the wider sense of the term, as well as stressing societal European explanations such as immigration policies and failed integration.
While failed integration is clearly a factor in individual radicalization, it does not explain why, when and where jihadis attacks occur in Europe. This study aims to identify how factors such as failed integration interplay with many other factors, such as extremist group dynamics and the strategies of foreign terrorist groups, in shaping the terrorist threat inside Europe. Although very few books explore jihadism in Europe from a regional perspective, there are a growing number of articles and reports dealing with different dimensions of the regional terrorist threat, such as recruitment and modus operandi.2 These studies, including my own work, provide lessons for the analyses presented here and are cited where relevant. There is also a growing body of empirical literature focusing on specific countries, which provides valuable in-depth knowledge of local networks and plots, and is used as sources in this study.3
Two competing explanations have dominated the debate on the jihadi threat to the West: Bruce Hoffman’s “leader-led jihad” perspective and Marc Sageman’s “leaderless jihad” perspective. Although there is a growing consensus as to the need for new and more fine-grained models, Sageman and Hoffman’s opposing theories are useful starting points for this study. Hoffman’s “top-down” model portrays the threat to the West as al-Qaida-led
to a large extent, and surmises that attacks in Western countries happen according to al-Qaida’s strategic aims.4 Attacks in Europe are designed to create fissures among counter-terrorism allies and to deter European countries from interfering in conflicts in which al-Qaida has interests. Here, organizations and ideology are the main driving forces behind attacks. Organizations recruit, indoctrinate and train people, providing them with terrorist tasks.
Sageman’s “bottom-up” model portrays the threat to the West as initiated by an Internet-based social movement composed of second-generation immigrants and converts, and formed inside Western countries.5 This movement is inspired by al-Qaida but is largely detached from its networks and the armed struggles of Muslim countries. Radical youths join jihad mostly for social reasons, such as knowing someone on the inside, and they also hold social grievances. The main reasons they turn to violence are not ideology or strategy. They become attracted to militancy because they are frustrated with their lives and feel discriminated against, and hence they become involved in jihadism as a way to rebel against their parents and society, and to gain identity, respect, recognition and the moral high ground. According to the “the bottom-up” model, people join jihad out of ulterior motives, not ideology, and organizations are merely a backdrop and enabler for terrorist violence.
Leader-led jihad might explain certain aspects of high-profile incidents in Europe. There is little doubt that al-Qaida was involved in the plans to bomb the Christmas market in Strasbourg in 2000 and in the plots against US embassies and military installations in France, Belgium and Italy in 2001–2. Al-Qaida was also involved in several plots to use poisons as weapons in the UK and France before 2003, the bombings of the London Underground in 2005 and a plot to bomb transatlantic airliners taking off from Heathrow in 2006, as well as in several plans to strike individuals and institutions involved in the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad after 2005. However, although al-Qaida recruited, trained and provided direction to people involved in these terrorist acts, the exact nature and level of the organization’s control, and the extent to which the plots reflected al-Qaida’s strategy, were not clear. Additionally, there were aspects of these and other plots, such as the ways in which the terrorists joined jihadism, which were more consistent with a leaderless jihad. There were few traces of al-Qaida in the 2004 murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Moroccan in Amsterdam, for example. There was also little to suggest any al-Qaida involvement in the plots of the Danish terrorist cells uncovered in 2005 and 2006 (the Glostrup and Vollsmose cells), and several plots by single-actor terrorists after 2008 (e.g.
the shooting of American soldiers at Frankfurt airport by the Kosovar Arid Uka in 2011). Social grievances, social networks and social media were key elements in leading these groups and individuals to turn to violence.
Although the leader-led vs leaderless perspectives capture dimensions of most plots in Europe, they also lead to reductionism and confirmation bias. The threat to the West is either organization-driven, top-down and foreign, or social-movement driven, bottom-up and local (homegrown). In reality, such dichotomies rarely capture the whole picture. Second, cultivating one of the perspectives may lead to an overemphasis on aspects of terrorism cases confirming the chosen model. Leaderless jihad may go too far in interpreting the involvement of young criminals as a sign that ideology does not play an important role. The leader-led model, conversely, may go too far in interpreting al-Qaida’s involvement as a sign of strategic sophistication. The everchanging nature of transnational jihadism is bound to render parsimonious models swiftly outdated. The fast-paced shifts in relations among jihadi movements in today’s Middle East are a case in point, as new actors emerge which could represent new approaches to jihad in the West.
In other words, the leader-led/leaderless distinction is not necessarily the most useful approach. The perspectives apply to different stages in the processes leading to terrorism, Sageman’s mainly to how individuals join networks, and Hoffman’s to how terrorist cells are used strategically—the former too early and the latter too late to capture fully what goes on inside cells. To arrive at a nuanced understanding it is necessary to establish a more complete picture of the cells’ internal dynamics, and how the behavior of cells is affected by the context as well as individual members.
Terminology
This book examines jihadi terrorist cells and plots in Europe. “Terrorist plot” refers to planned, prepared and executed attacks. Although “terrorist” is a contested concept, there is no reason to problematize it here. The essence of terrorism is the use of violent attacks to spread fear with the intention of sending a political message.6 With this in mind, there is little ambiguity concerning the cases addressed in this book, which mostly involve plans to conduct bombings or shootings against non-combatants inside peaceful European societies. “Terrorist cell” refers to a secretive group composed of two or more people who cooperate in efforts to stage terrorist attacks. However, many of the terrorist plots addressed in this book were undertaken by individuals who
will be referred to as “single-actor terrorists.” A further distinction is made between “solo-terrorists,” who attack by themselves but have links to and receive support and direction from networks, and “lone wolves” who operate completely on their own and only draw inspiration from organized terrorists. Further, “cell” refers primarily to perpetrators and “plot” mainly to their actions. The term “jihadi” refers to individuals, groups, networks and ideologies emanating from the Arab-based foreign fighter movement of the 1980s Afghan jihad.7 The “Afghan-Arab movement” emerged as a particular strand of militant Islamism. It led to the internationalization of post-colonial Islamist insurgencies against Arab regimes and gave rise to the idea of global jihad, and the tactic of targeting the United States and Israel to achieve the strategic aim of defeating Arab dictatorships.
Ideologically, al-Qaida and likeminded movements are referred to as “Salafi-jihadis.” Simply put, this means they combine revolutionary Islam originating from Egypt with fundamentalist Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia (Salafism or Wahhabism).8 The salafi dimension has implications for jihadi terrorism in Europe in that acts of jihadi violence must find justification and precedent in the traditions, or hadith, of the Prophet Muhammad. For example, a verdict by a recognized Salafi scholar on the individual duty of Muslims to kill people who insult the Prophet contributed to a higher proportion of attacks against people and institutions accused of doing so. It should be emphasized that the dependence of jihadis (Salafi) on religious justification by no means contradicts strategic thinking. On the contrary, the movement has a strong tradition of producing strategic texts and evaluating the fruitfulness of its means of struggle.9 In jihadi thought, religious tenets and strategy go hand-in-hand as the militants consider it a religious duty to mimic the warfare strategies and tactics pursued by the first Muslims.
I further distinguish between “extremists,” who support violence but do not generally take part themselves, and “militants” who engage in violence. “Militant” is used as a synonym for “jihadi.” Although lines are blurred between non-violent and violent extremism, movements in Europe such as Hizb utTahrir and al-Muhajiroun are generally dubbed “extremist,” whereas al-Qaida and likeminded actors are referred to as “jihadis” and “militants.” The process through which people become extremists is referred to as “radicalization.” I will return to the process of radicalization when discussing various components of terrorist cells and the different pathways involved in joining a cell. Another word that needs further explanation is “homegrown.” In terrorism research, “homegrown” usually denotes the idea that terrorists have been born
