Hume,Passion, andAction
ElizabethS.Radcliffe
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ForRick, andinmemoryofmyparents, HerbandFrancesSchmidt
6.5ModeratingthePassionswiththePassions
6.6LimitstoSelf-RegulationofthePassions
6.7ThePracticalRoleofStrengthofConviction
7.Conclusion:ThePassionsinHume’
7.1TheUnderstanding,thePassions,andMoralsasaSystem
7.2ThePassionsinRelationtoTragedyandReligion
7.3ThePassionsasanAntidotetoReligiousMoralizing
7.4TheSignatureRoleofthePassions
Appendix : ThePassionsandReasoninSeventeenthandEighteenth-CenturyPhilosophy
A.1Seventeenth-CenturyTheoriesofPassion,Reason,andAction
Acknowledgments
Thecontentsofthisbookhaveevolvedoververymanyyears.I firstconceivedof writingabookonHume’stheoryofmoralitybackin1996–97,withthesupportofan NEHFellowship.Iproducedsomearticlesthatyear,buttheydidnotconstitutea book.Iwasfortunatelyabletobeginagainwithyetanothersuchfellowshipinthe calendaryearof2006.Inthemeantime,myfocusbecameHume’stheoryofmotivation;andIdiscoveredmygreatestinterestwasinHume’stheoryofthepassionsand theirrelationtoaction.Here,atlast,istheresult.
Iambeholdentomanyscholarswhoseprofessionalworkhashadanimpactonmy thinking.IamgratefultoNicholasSturgeon,whoseteaching firstinspiredmetotake upstudyofHumeandtheBritishMoralistsmanyyearsagoingraduateschool.His BritishEmpiricistscoursewasoneofthebestofmylife.Workonthepassionsbythe lateRachelKyddandthelateAnnetteBaier,pluspublicationsbyRachelCohon, JamesHarris,JaneMcIntyre,andJackieTaylorhavebeenveryinfluentialonthe contoursofmydiscussionhere.ThewritingsofDonGarrett,PeterKail,andDavid Owenhavealsobeenimportantinvariousways.ThelateDavidFateNortonwasan encouragingpresenceduringmanyyearsofmycareer.
IamimmenselyindebtedtoRachelCohonforhermanydetailedandinsightful commentsonthemanuscript,andtotwootheranonymousreviewersforOxford UniversityPress,whosefeedbackwasinvaluable.Iamalsogratefultoparticipants anddiscussantsatvariousconferenceswhereIpresentedpapersonwhichpartsof chaptersarebased.TheseincludemanyInternationalHumeSocietyConferences goingallthewaybackto1992.Othermorerecentvenues,withappreciationtothe organizers,include:theNewPhilosophicalVoicesonHumeConferenceatthe UniversityofSanFrancisco(2007),organizedbyJacquelineTaylor;theHume SocietyGroupMeetingatthePacificDivisionPhilosophicalAssociationMeeting, SanFrancisco(2007),organizedbyKathleenWallace;theDepartmentofPhilosophy atVanderbiltUniversity(2009),organizedbyJeffreyTlumak;abooks-in-progress workshopattheUniversityofToronto(2009),organizedbyDonaldAinslie,who alsogenerouslyprovidedfunding;theDavidHumeandContemporaryPhilosophy ConferenceinMoscow(2011),organizedbyIlyaKasavin;theDepartmentofPhilosophyattheCollegeofCharleston(2011),organizedbyDeborahBoyle;the HarvardHistoryofPhilosophyWorkshop(2014),organizedbyJeffMcDonough; theVirginiaPhilosophicalAssociationMeeting(2015),organizedbyNathaniel Goldberg;theIowaPhilosophicalSocietyMeeting(2015),organizedbyAnnemarie ButlerandPatrickConnolly;andtheEasternDivisionMeetingoftheAmerican PhilosophicalAssociation(2017),organizedbyJohnCarriero.
Iamgratefulforthereinforcementofmyworkovertheyearsfromvarious philosophicalfriends.ManyaremembersoftheHumeSociety,withoutwhom scholarlylifewouldbelessproductiveandmoresolitary.SomeofthemIhave alreadynamed;othersinclude:RobertAudi,DonaldBaxter,CharlotteBrown, RichardDees,KaránnDurland,LorneFalkenstein,AaronGarrett,MichaelGill, LorenzoGreco,LiviaGuimarães,TomE.Hill,HarukoInoue,TomHolden,Mike Karlsson,LaurenKopajtic,EugenioLecaldano,WillemLemmens,TitoMagri,Alison McIntyre,MiriamMcCormick,TedMorris,KatiePaxman,TerencePenelhum, DarioPerinetti,GeraldPostema,WadeRobison,AmySchmitter,LisaShapiro,Rob Shaver,NealSinhababu,CorlissSwain,SaulTraiger,AlessioVaccari,RicoVitz,and MargaretWatkins.IespeciallythankGeoffreySayre-McCord,whoinvitedmeto spendtimeintheinvigoratingatmosphereoftheUNC-ChapelHillPhilosophy Departmentintheearlyyearsofmycareer;KennethWinkler,whowasabrilliant philosophicalcolleague(andco-editor)inyearsgoneby;andAngelaCoventry,who hasbeenasourceofmuchenthusiasmsinceweworkedtogetherasHumeSociety officerssomeyearsago.IapologizetothosewhomImayhaveforgotten;it’shardto rememberalltowhomgratitudeisdue.
ThankstomycolleaguesatSantaClaraUniversityfortheirwarmsupport, especiallyBillPrior,whosefriendshipIwillalwaysvalue.Iappreciatemycurrent colleaguesandstudents,whoprovideafriendlyandstimulatingworkenvironmentat theCollegeofWilliam&Mary.Friendsandfamilyhave,overtheyears,beenasource ofunderstandingandgoodcheer,especially:ClaudiaLowder,PatriciaRohr,Corina Vaida,FrankandDorisTillman,DavidandLindaSchmidt,BarbaraandKevin Urban,andKayandDonMcCarty.ThankyoutoDanaRadcliffeforhisencouragementintheinitialyearsofmycareer,andtoStephenTramel,forinspiringmetobea philosopher.
For financialsponsorship,IamindebtedtotheNationalEndowmentforthe Humanities;SantaClaraUniversity;theCollegeofWilliam&Mary;andJoseph Plumeri,agenerouspatronofWilliam&Maryfacultyendeavors.IalsothankPeter MomtchiloffatOxfordUniversityPress,whogavemethelatitudetodothisbookin myowngoodtime.
Iwanttoacknowledgethefollowingjournalsorvolumesinwhichsomeofthe materialorideasinthisbookappearedpreviously: JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy, CanadianJournalofPhilosophy, HumeStudies, ResPhilosophica, HumeReadings (EdizionidiStoriaeLetteratura),and ThinkingabouttheEmotions:APhilosophical History (OxfordUniversityPress).
Finally,thisbookisdedicatedtoRickMcCarty,whokeepsthehouseholdgoing whenI’mtoobusytocope(whichismuchofthetime),andwhohasformanyyears talkedwithmeaboutmyideasastheywereevolving.Hisadvicehasimprovedthe argumentstremendously.Healsoreadtheentiremanuscriptandworkedon footnoteandbibliographyformatting.Iowehimmore,andlovehimmore,than Icaneversay.
Introduction
Hume’stheoryofthepassionsisintegraltohisphilosophicalsystem.Thisisactually acontroversialclaim,sinceitiseasytodismissHume’snarrativeofthepassionsas chieflyaprojectoftaxonomyandanatomy.Somereadersregardtheaccountasyet anothermechanisticanalysisinthemannerofseventeenth-centuryscience,alongsidetheofferingsofMalebranche,Hobbes,andSpinoza.¹Contemporaryphilosophersinactiontheory,however,regardHume’saccountofthemotivating passionsashighlyinfluentialincurrentdiscussions,citingitascrucialinspiration forthemainnaturalistlineonmotivationandaction.ProponentsoftheHumean TheoryofMotivation,orthebelief-desiremodel,whichsaysthatbothabeliefanda desirearenecessarytoconstituteamotive,appealtoHume’sargumentsasthe classicalrationalefortheirtheory.SinceatleastthispartofHume’stheoryofthe passionshasbeenimmenselyeffective,andsinceitiswisetojudgeaprojectbyits fruits,weshouldsurelyrejecttheclaimthatHume’snarrativeismerelyaschemeof classifyingaffections!So,whilethisbookhasasitsfocusHume’stheoryofthe passionsinrelationtoaction,itisalsodesignedtooffervindicationofthetheory’ s importancebothtoHume’sstudyofhumannatureandtoourownthinkingon motivation,action,andevaluation.
MyaiminstudyingHume’stheoryofpassionandactionistodefendaninterpretationofhisviewsonreasonandmotivationthatisconsistentwithotherthesesin hisphilosophy,loyaltothetext,andhistoricallysituated.Twoargumentsformthe coreofHume’sthinkingonthismatter.Oneishisargumentonthe “Inertnessof Reason” directedatearlymodernrationalists,inwhichhemaintains,onthebasisof reason ’sfunctions,thatitnever,onitsown,providesamotivetoaction.Theotheris the “MotivationArgument” fortheoriginofmorality,inwhichHumereasonsthat becausemoraldistinctionshaveaneffectonpassionsandactions(they “motivate”), theycannotbederivedfromaprinciple,reason,whichhasnosucheffect.Bothhave beensubjecttomultiplereadingsbycommentators,anddiscussionoftheseargumentscanbefoundinCHAPTER 2andCHAPTER 5.
Hume’ s firstbook, ATreatiseofHumanNature (1739–40),waswritteninthree books.The first, “OftheUnderstanding,” containshisepistemology;thesecond, “Of
¹Forcontraryviews,seeBuckle(2012)andTaylor(2015a).
thePassions,” ishisaccountofouremotionallife,andthethird, “OfMorals,” concernsmoralpsychologyandvirtue.Readersregard AnEnquiryConcerning HumanUnderstanding (1748, “the first Enquiry”)asHume’smorepopularpresentationoftheideasfrom Treatise Book1. AnEnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesof Morals (1751, “thesecond Enquiry”)isamoreaccessibleversionofthecontentsof Book3,perhapswithsomemodifications(seebelow).Hume’sbrief Dissertationon thePassions (1757)isaneditedversionofBook2ofthe Treatise,butmany commentatorshavefounditunappealingasaguidetothepassions,sinceitignores manyoftheinterestingtopicsofBook2,includingthepsychologyofsympathyand therelationofpassiontoaction.²Ireferenceit,especiallyinCHAPTER 2,asverification ofsomeoftheviewsIattributetoHume.
Inthisproject,ImovefairlyfreelyamongHume’stexts,eventhoughthereare somedifferencesinviewsexpressedbetweenhisearlierandlaterworks.Themain differencesrelevanttothisdiscussionarethosebetweenHume’ s Treatise andthe second Enquiry.InEPM,Humeseemstocharacterizemoralsentimentsdifferently, movingfromasympathy-basedaccountofmoralsentimentsinthe Treatise ,toan accountwherebyauniversally-possessed “sentimentofhumanity” isthefeelingby whichwemakemoraldiscernments.Inthe Treatise,Humedescribesusassympatheticallypartakingofothers ’ pleasuresandpains,whichallowsustohaveasenseof howagentsaffectthepeoplearoundthem.Ourmoraljudgmentsdependonthose sympatheticfeelingswhenwemoderatethembytakingupageneralorcommon pointofview,whichdivestsusofpersonalprejudicesandallowsmoralspectators withinacommunitytoachieveanagreementintheirmoraljudgments.Thatprocess isreplacedinEPMbythesimpleraccount,referencingtheuniversalsentimentof humanity,whichisbothindicativeofmoralityandcanmotivateusinaccordwithits demands(seeTaylor2008).InEPM,Humeofferstheargumentsconcerningthe impotenceofreasoninthecontextofdiscussing “theofficesofreasonandoftaste” (EPM,App.1.21),sotheargumentsarenotasexplicitastheyareinthe Treatise ,and heretainsargumentsformoralsentimentalism,basedondirectlyeliminatingreason asthepossiblesourceofourmoraldistinctions.
TraditionallyHume’sInertnessofReasonargumenthasbeenunderstoodasan argumentfortheconclusionthatbeliefs,theproductsofreason,donotactasmotives ontheirown(withoutpassionordesire).TheMotivationArgumenthasthenbeen readasanargumentfortheconclusionthatmoraldistinctionsarenotmattersof belief,butofsentiment,whichhassometimesledtointerpretationsofHumeasa moralnon-cognitivist.Recentscholars,however,havedefendedareadingofHume onwhichbeliefonitsownmayverywellbeamotivetoactioninsomerespect,even
²SeeKempSmith(1941:535);Passmore(1968:128–30);Selby-Bigge(1975:xxi);Immerwahr(1994: 225–40);Baier(2008b:245).Baierdescribesthe DissertationonthePassions asamutilationofthe Treatise Book2.
thoughreasonisnot.³Iftheyarecorrectaboutthis,thenHumedoesnotactually providethesupportforcontemporaryHumeanism,aspastreadershavethought.
Inthisstudy,Iargueagainstrecentcommentatorsandinfavorofthetraditional reading.IamconvincedthatHumedid not regardthepowerorimpotenceofreason asdistinctfromwhatitsresults,beliefsorenlivenedideas,cando.Atthesametime, Icontendthattheimpotenceofbeliefs(ontheirown)doesnotimply,onHume’ s view,thatwhenwemakemoraldistinctions,likethatbetweenvirtueandvice,moral goodandevil,etc.,wecannothavemoralbeliefs.Itisimportanttounderstandthat Hume’sthesisthatmoraldistinctionsaresentimentally-basedisathesisaboutthe originofideasofmorality,partandparcelofhisgeneralempiricistprogram,which saysthatallmeaningfulideasmustbegininexperience.Thatmoralconceptsmust startinexperiencesthataresentiments,ratherthansensations,doesnotpreclude thatthoseconceptsarecognitions,orsoIargue.Additionally,Icloselyexamine Hume’stheoryofmotivationaldynamics,theeffectsofconflictingpassionsonour psychologicalwell-being,andthesortsofcontrolwemightexercisetoregulateour passions,whichcannotbecontrolledbyreasonalone.Myconclusionisthatthereare someways,giventheprinciplesofHume’smotivationalpsychology,thatwecanuse onepassiontomoderateanother,buttherearelimitstothisendeavor,givenhuman natureandindividualemotionalconstitution.
0.1HistoricalContext
Ashasbeenemphasized,Hume’stheoryofmotivationandactionhasbeenhighly influentialincontemporarydiscussionsofmoralandmotivationalpsychology.Many currentphilosophersprofesstoalignthemselveswiththenaturalisticmodelof motivationdefendedbyHume,whichclearlyseparatesconativestatesfromcognitive states.However,present-daycriticshaveoftendiscussedHume’stheoryofmotivation(andhisviewsonpracticalreason)asthoughtheywereexplicitlyinopposition toKantorcurrentKantianthinking.⁴ Thisisunderstandable,giventhatpresent-day philosopherstypicallyaffiliatethemselveswithatraditionalviewthey findmost persuasive,andthreecenturieslater,we finditinstructivetopitfollowersofHume againstfollowersofKant.However,whileKantadmitstobeingstimulatedby Hume’sanalysisofcausalthinkingtoformulatehisowntheoryofcausationin response,KantwasnotfamiliarwithBook2ofHume’ s TreatiseofHumanNature , “OfthePassions,” whereHumeoffershisrenownedviewsonmotivation.Consequently,tointerpretHume’sownviewsonreason,passion,andmotivationinthe contextofadisputewithKantianthinkingcanbeatleastmisleading(althoughIhave donethesamemyself).TounderstandthegenuinecontextandmeaningofHume’ s remarks,weobviouslyneedtoturnourattentionbacktoHume’spredecessors.
³SeeCohon(2008b),Kail(2007a),Owen(2016),Pigden(2009),Sandis(2012),andStroud(1977).
⁴ Forinstance,seeBlackburn(2000),Wiggins(1995),andRadcliffe(1997).
Oneofthepredominantthemesofphilosophyinthelateseventeenthandearly eighteenthcenturieswastherelationbetweenreasonandpassionandtheir respectiveeffectsonmotivationandaction.TheentrenchedviewfromAristotle onwards,supersededgraduallyinlatercenturies,wasthatthepassionswere passivepowersofthesensitivepartofthetripartitesoul,thepartthatreactsto sensibleobjectsactingonthebody(seeJames1997:40 – 2).Theearlymoderns offeredalternativeperspectivesthattriedtoaddresstherelationbetweenmindand bodyandprovideamoreuni fi edaccountofthemindthanthatfoundinAncient andScholasticthought,whilealsoemphasizingtheactivityofthepassionsthemselves.Sincethepassionsin fl uenceaction,ontheprevailingseventeenth-and eighteenth-centuryview,theycouldbeusefulwhencontrolled,butharmfulor misleadingwhennot. ⁵ Thus,onepersistentrefrainintheworkofphilosophers priortoandaroundHume ’stimewasthegovernanceofthepassions,whetherthe internalauthorityofreasoncoulddirectthepassions,orwhetheranexternal authoritywasnecessary.
Amongthephilosopherswhowerepreoccupiedwiththistopicandwithwhose workHumewasacquaintedareDescartes,Malebranche,Leibniz,andClarke(see Norton2000: I12,n.8),inadditiontoHobbes,Locke,Mandeville,andShaftesbury, nottomentionHume’scontemporaries,ButlerandHutcheson.⁶ Humeisreputedby sometobeinfluencedbySpinoza’stheoryofthepassions,too.⁷ Severalother seventeenth-andeighteenth-centurythinkerswerewritingontheoversightofthe passionsaswell,amongthemFrenchphilosophersJean-FrançoisSenault,Nicolas Coeffeteau,andMarinCureaudeLaChambre,plusEnglishtheoristsWilliam Ayloffe,FrancisBragge(VicarofHitchin),WalterCharleton(M.D.),HenryGrove (EnglishPresbyter),andEdwardReynolds.Allofthesethinkerscontributedtosome degreetotheintellectualbackgroundcontextualizingHume’sargumentsconcerning therespectiverolesofreasonandpassioninmotivation.
Hume’sargumentsonthistopic,then,areresponsestoprominentthesespropagatedbytheseearlymodernphilosophers,writers,andclergy.Below,insummary, aresomeoftheirtheses,towhichHumeisreacting:
⁵ SeeMcIntyre(2006a:200–4);Harris(2013:270–1).ThearticlesbyMcIntyreandHarris,alongwith workbySusanJames,havebeeninvaluabletomythinkingandresearch.
⁶ AnnetteBaierwrites, “AgreatwealthofintellectualinfluencescometogetherinHume:Theophrastus, Epicurus,Cicero,Lucretius,Hobbes,Locke,Malebranche,Berkeley,Shaftesbury,Hutcheson,Butler” (Baier 1993:250).
⁷ BaiercontendsthatthecircumstantialevidencethatHumereadSpinozais “overwhelming:” HeclearlyreadMalebrancheandLeibniz,andtheyreadSpinoza.HewasafriendofPierre Desmaixeaux,aknownSpinozist.AsHume’scorrespondencedocuments,andasPaul Russellhasemphasized,theyoungHumefrequentedSpinozistmeetingplacesinLondon (suchastheRainbowCoffeehouse,LancasterCourt,wherehestayedwhilearrangingfor thepublicationofthe Treatise),andsurelyknewAnthonyCollins,aswellasknowingof Clarke’sdisputeswithhimandwithBentleyandJohnToland.(1993:238)
(1)Manypassions,leftunregulated,leadtothepursuitofunsuitableobjects. Generallyunderlyingthisperspectiveisateleologicalviewoftheuniverse, withcertainobjectspropertoourendeavorsorinclinations.Onsomeviews, Godhasinstilledinusadesireforgenuinegoodandanaversiontogenuine evil,butthepassionscanderailourpursuits.
(2)Reasoncanovercometheperniciousinfluenceofthepassionsandtakecontrol ofthemandofouractions.Onsomeviews(likeSenault’s),reasonmustbe supplementedbythegraceofGod.
(3)Thepassionsarenotself-regulating:itisharmfulforustodependonone passion’sopposinganotherinanattempttothwartthelatter’seffects.(Notall agreewiththis,butSenault,Bragge,andClarkedo.)
(4)Passionsrepresentgoodandevil,whicharetheirobjects.Thismeansthat passionsarecognitions.
(5)Onsomeversionsofhowthepassionsareregulated,forinstance,Reynolds’ s, reasonoffersasuitableobjectforthemtoseizeuponorpursue.Onother versions,suchasDescartes’s,thepassionsmisrepresentobjectsasgoodoras worthyofpursuit,andreasonofferstheproperrepresentationofthoseobjects.
(6)Reasonandpassionsare “advisors” tothewill.Thus,reasonandpassioncan beopposedtooneanotheroverthedirectionofouractions.
Hume,ofcourse,rejectsteleology,forwhichhesubstitutesamechanisticaccountof thepassionsandtheirrelationtoaction.Hearguesthatsomerationalistswrongly characterizethepassionsasrepresentationsandthattheymisunderstandthefunctionsofreason.Hemaintainsthatthepassionsinfactcanbemoderated only byother passions(whentheycanbemoderatedatall).Hisargumentsfortheseclaimsarethe subjectsofthesubsequentchapters.
Asurveyoftheoriesonthepassionsandactionbytheseventeenth-and eighteenth-centuryphilosophersandtheologiansfurtherrevealsthatfew,ifany,of thesemajorthinkersexplicitlyheldtheviewthatreasoninanyofitsfunctions motivatesactionwithoutanaffectivestate.IprovidesuchasurveyintheAPPENDIX, “ThePassionsandReasoninSeventeenth-andEighteenth-CenturyPhilosophy,” whichofferssupportformanyoftheclaimsIammakingnow.Forthoseinterestedin thehistoryofthepassions,Iofferitasvaluablebackgroundtothisdiscussionof Hume’stheoryofmotivation.HereIpresentsomegeneralreflectionsonearlymodernperspectivesontherelationbetweenreasonandpassion.
Aprominentthemeintheerawasthatthepassionscouldmisleadus,ormislead thewill,andclashwiththeguidancethatreasongivestothepassions.So,we findin DescartesandMalebranchethethesisthatthepassionscanmisrepresentordistort ournotionsofthegoodandthattheirphysiologicalmanifestationscanbedisruptive toourrationalvolitionstoaction.Spinozadepictsreasonasamotivating,but affectivefaculty;so,hesetsupanoppositionbetweenreasonandpassion,butthe conflictisactuallybetweenaffects.Hedepictsknowledgeofgoodandevil,presumably
representations,asemotions,orrationalaffections,whichcanbeopposedtothe passionswehaveforapparentgoodsthatleadustotransientpleasures.Hobbesand Lockeargueforthenecessityofdesiretoaction,withreasonofferinginformationon themeanstorelievetheuneasinessthatdesireinvolves.
Cudworthfoundsmoralityinimmutabletruthsknowninthewaythatgeometry is,butarguesthat “speculativeintellectionwithoutinclination ” cannotmotivate(see Passmore,1951:53).Healsoemphasizestheimportancetohappinessofpossessing certaininternalconativestates.Clarkearguesthatunderstandingdemonstrative truthsofmoralityontheirowndoesnotproduceactionandthatpassionsand appetitesareneededto “stir” peopleup(1724:144).Passionsrequiretheoversightof reason,however,topreventusfrompursuingoutrageousthingsandengagingin unreasonableaction.Yet,onClarke ’sview,wehavethefreewilltoactagainstour bestjudgment.IntegraltobothShaftesbury’sandHutcheson’smotivationalpsychologiesarepassionsandaffectionsthatneedtoberegulatedbyreflectionandother stabilizinginfluencesinordertoproducethebestlivesforagents.ForHutcheson, reasonsforactiononlymakesenseinlightofaffectionatestates.
WhenHumewritesabouttheoriginofsomeofthemotivatingpassions,⁸ hewrites thattheimpressionswhicharisedirectlyfromgoodandevilare “thepassionsof desireandaversion,griefandjoy,hopeandfear,alongwithvolition.” Thenheadds, “Themindbyan original instincttendstouniteitselfwiththegood,andtoavoidthe eviltho’ theybeconceiv’dmerelyinideaandbeconsider’dastoexistinanyfuture periodoftime” (T2.3.9.2).TheroleinstinctplaysinanempiricisttheorylikeHume’ s istakenupbytheGod-instilleddirectiontowardthegoodinphilosopherslike ReynoldsandMalebranche,andbythepropensitytoself-preservationinSpinoza. Theseinnatepropensitiesproducevariousmotivatingpassionsinlightofour discerningvariousgoodsbyexperience.Obviously,Humedoesnotacceptthe metaphysicsoftheserationalists,butthestructureofhistheoryofmotivationisin somerevealingrespectssimilartotheirs.InMalebranche,forinstance,thepropensitiesareinplace,directingactionstothegoaloftheuniversalgood,andactionis causedupontheformationofbeliefsaboutparticulargoodsandtheproductionof thepassionsthatmovethebody.Hume,however,isclearlyanopponentofmanyof thethesesthattherationalistthinkersprofessed,severalofwhichIlistedearlier,and acentraldisagreementbetweenHumeandmanyoftherationalistsisoverthe rationalists’ characterizationofpassionsasrepresentations.Ithinkhisargument onthismatterismoreimportanttohisprojectthanmanycommentatorshave thought(andIdiscussthisissueinCHAPTER 4).Why,however,doesHumeso conspicuouslyhighlightthethesisthatreasonalonecannotmotivateactionwhen nooneprofessestodefendthecontrary?Hisargumentforthisconclusionisalsoone
⁸ Iamreferringtothedirectpassionsthatarenotnaturalinstincts.Seethediscussionofthedirect passionsinCHAPTER 1.
ofthemostprominently-featuredargumentsincontemporarytreatmentsofhis motivationalpsychology.ItakeupthisquestioninCHAPTER 2.
0.2ASketchofHume’sCharacterization ofReasonandPassion
HereIpresentthecoreofmyinterpretation,inbrief,withoutsupportingarguments, whichwillbeaddedinsubsequentchapters.Hume firstdefendshistheoryof motivationat Treatise 2.3.3,inthesectionentitled, “Oftheinfluencingmotivesof thewill.” Someofthethemesinandrelatedtothissectionarerepeatedinmodified formsinthe EnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals andinthe Dissertationon thePassions.At Treatise 2.3.3,Humehasjustconcludedhisdiscussionoffreewill, whereherejectsthetraditionaldoctrinethathashumanresponsibilityopposedto causalityornecessitationofactions.Humearguesthatuncausedactionswouldbe chanceeventsandattributabletonoone.Inorderforactionstohavemeritor demeritatallandforactorstobeheldresponsibleforthem,theiractionsmustbe causedbyenduringprinciplesofcharacter.Humeexplainstheuseof “will” inhis discussioninthefollowingway: “bythe will,Imeannothingbut theinternal impressionwefeelandareconsciousof,whenweknowinglygiverisetoanynew motionofourbody,ornewperceptionofourmind. ” Thisimpression,hemaintains,is notfurtherdefinableordescribable,buthemakesitclearthatthisimpressionisan immediateeffectofpleasureorpain,asarethepassionsofdesireandaversion,grief andjoy,andhopeandfear(T2.3.1.1).Theselatteraredirectpassions,onHume’ s scheme,becausetheyarisedirectlyfromthefeelingsofpleasureorpain,orfrom ideasofthesourcesofthepleasuresandpains,withnointermediaryimpressionsor ideas(T2.1.1.4).Hume’spointseemstobethattheinternalimpressionthatwe identifywithwilling,althoughtheresultofpleasureorpain,requiresnopleasureor painbeyondthatinvolvedinthepassionthatcausestheaction.⁹ Thus,justasHobbes suggested,thewillisnothingoverandabovetheexperienceofaninternalchange, justpriortotheoccurrenceofaction.¹⁰ Itissafetosaythatthewillasafacultyof choicedropsoutofHume’stheoryofaction; “will” issimplyawayofreferringtothe feelingwehaveofbringingforwardaperceptionorofinitiatingabodilymovement.
⁹ Hume’sdescriptionmakesitsoundasthoughthewillisitselfadirectpassion.Butimpressionsfor Humeareoftwosorts:impressionsofsensationandimpressionsofreflection.Impressionsofreflectionare thepassions,andtheyarisefromreflectingonourexperiencedpleasuresandpains.Myideaofthefeeling ofpleasureIgetfromthewarmthofthe fireplacegivesmedesireorhopeformoreofthatpleasure.Butthe impressionwefeeluponourmovingthebodyorinitiatingthought,Hume’ s “will,” isnottheconsequence ofsuchreflection.Itsimplyoccurswhenapassionmovesus.Ontheotherhand,thewillisnotasensation either,sincesensationsaredefinedasimpressionsarisingfromunknowncauses,whichpresumablysignals Hume’sdoubtabouttheexistenceofexternalobjectsthataresaidtocauseoursensations(T1.1.1.2).
¹⁰ Hobbesdefineswillas “thelastAppetite,orAversion,immediatelyadhaeringtotheaction,ortothe omissionthereof.... ” This,hesays,is “theAct,(notthefaculty),of Willing” (Hobbes1651:Chapter6,44).
TherealquestionHumeisintentonansweringin “Oftheinfluencingmotivesofthe will” iswhatarethecausesofouractions,priortothatfeeling?
Onthistopic,Humemakesthefollowingpoints.(1)Theprevailingviewin philosophyisthatourpassionsareoftenopposedtoourreasoninprovidingmotives toactions,andthatpeoplearevirtuouswhentheyconformtheiractionstothe dictatesofreason.Reasoniseternal,invariable,anddivinelyoriginated,accordingto thisview,whilepassionsarevariableanddeceptive.(2)Thisacceptedviewof motivationandmoralityismistakenontwocounts,because(a)Reasoncannever beamotivetoanyactionofthewill,and(b)Reasoncanneveropposepassionin directingthewill.Hence,personscannotbetoldtoregulatetheiractionsaccordingto thedictatesofreasonandtoopposeotherforces(sincetheycannotberequiredtodo whatisimpossible namely,tobemovedbyreason).
Hume’sargumentsturnonseveralkeythesesthatwillbediscussedindetaillater, butIwanttokeepinmindherehischaracterizationsofreasonandpassion, respectively,onwhichtheargumentisbased.Reason,hewrites,servestorevealto usconceptualconnectionsinnecessarytruthsortoderiveinductiveconclusions abouttheworld.AlargepartofBookIofthe Treatise concernsinduction,orcausal reasoning,andthereHumesaysthat “allreasoningsfromcausesoreffectsterminate inconclusions,concerningmattersoffact;thatis,concerningtheexistenceofobjects oroftheirqualities” (T1.3.7.2).Theseconclusionsare,fromtheperspectiveofthe investigator,beliefs;sotheproductsofreasonarebeliefs,andbeliefsareenlivened ideas,asopposedtoimpressions.Impressionsaretheforcefulandlivelyperceptions thatweinitiallyexperience(sensationsandpassionsoremotions),whileideasarethe faintercopiesoftheimpressions,whichHumesaystheideas “exactlyrepresent” (T1.1.1.7).Ourbeliefsabouttheworldpurporttocopyourinitialexperiencesandto representtousthewaytheworldis.InBook3ofthe Treatise,Humedefinesreason as “thediscoveryoftruthorfalshood” anddefinestruthandfalsehoodasan agreementordisagreementofourideasto “relationsofideas” (necessarytruths)or tomattersoffact,followingthedivisionoftypesoftruthsinBook1.Passions,onthe otherhand,makenoreferencetoanythingbeyondthemselves;theyare “original factsandrealities” (T3.1.1.9).Inotherwords,passionsarenotcopiesofprevious experiencesandsocontainnocontentthatportraystheworldinonewayoranother. Sincepassionsdonotrepresentsomethingtobethecase,asreasondoes,passions cannotcontradictreason.(Thisis,ofcourse,acontroversialview.)
AlsocrucialtoHume’sargumentishispointthatreasonalonedoesnotgenerate impulsestoaction.Thismeansthatweareunmotivated(i.e.,wefeelnopushorpull atall)whenweengagereason,including(whatsomecall)theuseofrational intuition,theuseofdemonstration,andtheuseofprobabilisticandinductive reasoning.IwanttointerpretHume,contentiously,tomeanthatneitherthecomprehensionofdemonstrativetruthsnortheformationoffactualbeliefsthrough reason,withnocontributionfromthepassions,canpromptaction.Thisisbecause beliefsdonotgiveusendstopursueandsocannotofferdirection.Sincebeliefs,the
productsofreason,producenoimpulsestoactionontheirown,theycannotmoveus withoutthepassions.Hence,Humearguesthatreasoncannotopposepassionfor directionofthewill.Reasonworkswithourideas,copiedfromourimpressions,to determinewhichofourideasrepresentstheirobjectsaccurately.Sinceonlyan impulsecanopposeanimpulse,individualpassions,whichprovokeus,cannotbe opposedtoindividualbeliefs(orideas),whichrepresentbutdonotprovokeus.To saythatpassioncannotopposereasonistoimplicatethecapacityoffeelingand thecapacityofreason.However,itisonlybecausetheir products cannotbeopposed, Icontend,thatwearejustifiedinsayingthecapacitiescannotbeopposed.¹¹In holdingthis,IdisagreewithmanycontemporaryinterpretationsofHume,inwhich productsofreasonaremotivationallydifferentfromreasonorthereasoningthat producesthem.TheseinterpretationsofHumeallowthatbeliefsmotivateontheir own,eventhoughreasoncannot.
0.3MethodofInterpretationandPreview oftheArguments
MymethodindefendingmyinterpretationofHumefollowsacoherentiststrategy. MyattemptistopresentareadingofHume’stheoryofthepassions,motivation,and actionthatmakesbestsenseofhisclaims(intherelevantcontexts)intermsof developingacoherentandconsistenttheoreticalpicture.SinceHume’sthesesdonot alwaysseementirelyconsistent,thismethodrequiresthatoccasionallyclaimsbe interpretedinwaysthatdonotseemlikethemostobviousreadingat firstglance. (Humemayhavechangedhismindaboutsomeissues,orhemayjustbeinconsistent attimes,orhemaybeconsistentandtheattempttoreadhisclaimsintheless obviouswayiswhathereallyintended.)Allpartiestothediscussionoverhowtobest understandHumemustusethesameapproachandfacethequandaryaboutwhat claimstotakeatfacevalue.Partofthisapproach,ofcourse,aimsasfaraspossibleto preservesimplicityforHume’stheory,toattributetohimclaimsthatareinthemselvesplausibleordefensible,andtoascribeaviewthatmakesbestsenseofthe complexobservationsofhumannaturethathetenders.IbelieveIsucceedinoffering awaytoreadHumeonwhateachofreason,passion,motive,andbeliefisand thatconstitutesacoherentandproductivepictureofhistheoryofmotivation.Itgives himacredible(and,Ithink)correctviewoftherespectiverolesofreasonandpassion inmotivation.
¹¹WemightalsobearinmindHume’spositiveviewofmotivation: “Whenwehavetheprospectofpain orpleasureofanyobject,wefeelaconsequentemotionofaversionorpropensity,andarecarry’dtoavoid orembracewhatwillgiveusthisuneasinessorsatisfaction” (T2.2.3.3).Theseaversionsorpropensitiesare thedirectpassionslikedesire,aversion,grief,joy,fear,anddespair.And,althoughHumedoesnotmakeit explicit,heiscommittedtothethesisthatonealwaysactsonone’sstrongestpassion.Thisisanimportant componentofHume’sTheoryofMotivationthathasreceivedlittleattention,andIwilllaterexplainin CHAPTER 6whyIthinkitisaviewofmuchsignificancetohismotivationalpsychology.
CHAPTER 1setsthestagefortheanalysisofHume’sargumentsconcerningthe practicalimpotencyofreasonanditsinabilitytoopposepassion.ThereIaskthe questionwhichpassionscountasmotives,forHume,andwhy.Humediscusses theindirectpassionsinParts1and2inBook2ofthe Treatise,andexplicitlysaysthat prideandhumility,loveandhatred,thefourindirectpassionsheanalyzesindepth, arenotmotivestoaction.HeintroducesmotivationalissuesinPart3, “Ofthewill anddirectpassions,” whichsuggeststhatheconsidersallandonlydirectpassionsas motives.Ishowthatthisreadingisfalse.Afterconsideringhisdistinctionbetween naturalinstincts,directpassions,andindirectpassions,Iconfirmthatsomepassions ineachofthesecategoriesaremotivating.IalsoaddsupporttoJohnBricke’sthesis thatmotives,forHume,arepassionsthatincludedesiresaspartoftheirdescriptions thatis,they are desiresofsomesort(Bricke1996:36–7).
CHAPTER 2isanin-depthdiscussionofHume’ s “InertnessofReasonArgument” thatreasonaloneisnotamotiveordoesnotproducemotives.First,Iconsiderwhy heplacesgreatemphasisonthisargument,giventhatfew,ifany,ofhispredecessors actuallyprofessedthatreasoncouldmotivatepeoplewithoutpassion.Ientertaintwo suggestions.OneisthatHumeseestherationalistviewofmorality,whenstrippedof teleology,ascommittedtotheideathatreasoncanmotivateonitsown.Theotheris thathethought(perhapsmistakenly)thatanytheorythathasreasonandpassion practicallyopposed,asmanyrationalistsdid,iscommittedtothethesisthatreason alonemotivates.Second,IargueagainsttheviewthatHume’saccountofreasonand motivationequivocatesbetweentwosensesofreason.Third,Ialsoargueagainstthe commentatorswhodefendaninterpretationofHume’sargumentontheinertnessof reasonthatallowsthatbeliefs,productsofreason,canmotivate,evenifreason cannot.OnmyreadingofHume’sInertnessofReasonArgument,hemustidentify reasonwithbeliefs.Forifhethinksbeliefsmotivate,thefollowingresults:(1)his thesisthatreasondoesnotoriginatemotives,butdoescontributesomethingto motivation,willdependontheequivocationIearlierdisposedof;(2)wehaveno explanationofhowactionsresultfromcompetingmotives;and(3)heundermines hisdictumthatanactiveprinciplecannotbefoundedonaninactiveone.Finally, IofferpositivetextualevidenceformyreadingofHume.
InC HAPTER 3,IpresentacloseexaminationofHume ’ saccountofbelief.This chapterextendsmyargumentfromCHAPTER 2,sinceHume ’scharacterizationof beliefiscrucialinthedebateoverwhetherHumeanbeliefscouldqualifyasmotives. SomecommentatorsallegethatHumehaddoubtsabouthisaccountofbeliefinthe Treatise ,madecorrectionstoitintheAppendix,anddevelopedthecorrectedview inthe fi rst Enquiry .AtleastthreereadingsofHume ’stheoryofbeliefhavebeen defended:(1)beliefasavivaciousidea;( 2)beliefasasentiment;and(3)beliefasa dispositiontobehavioralmanifestations.Thesevariedreadingshaveimplications forthepowerofbelieftooriginateaction.Iargue,basedonthefullcontextof Hume ’sremarks,thatHume ’snotionofbeliefasanidea(eithervivacious,orwitha particular,distinctivesentimentalaspect)isnotunderminedbythehesitationshe
expresses.So,beliefsarenotintrinsicallymotivatingstates.Ialsoconsidertowhat degreethe “directionof fi t ” mannerofdistinguishingbeliefsanddesiresincontemporaryphilosophyisrootedinHume ’sowntheory.Onthispopularcontemporaryview,beliefsaimto fi ttheworld,anddesiresaimto fi ttheworldto themselves.IthenreplytosomecriticismsthatimplyHumewasconfusedabout reason ’sobjects.
AfterarguingfortheInertnessofReasonthesis,Humemovestothesecondstepin hiscasefortheconclusionthatreasondoesnotgovernpassionandaction.Accordingly,hearguesthatreasonandpassioncannotbeopposedtooneanotheroverthe directionofthewill.ThisthesisisthesubjectofCHAPTER 4,anddependsonhis defendingtwoclaims:(1)becausereasongeneratesnoimpulsestoaction,itcannot opposetheimpulsesofthepassions;and(2)becausepassionsdonotrepresent anything,theycannotopposereasonbyofferingcontraryrepresentationsofobjects. Thecharacterizationofthepassionsas “originalexistences” thatdonotmake referencetoanythingisaprominentthemeinHumeandhasbeensubjectto muchcritique.Somereadershavearguedthatthepassionsareobviouslyintentional andmakereferencetotheirobjects;theyalsothinkHumeisinconsistentsincehe depictspassions,forexample,inhisaccountoftheindirectpassions,ashaving objectsandsubjects.IdefendHume’sconceptionofpassionandshowhowhis accountcanbereadconsistently.Then,IdiscussinwhatsenseorsensesHume cancountenancereasonablenessinaction.
Hume’sthesisthatreasonisnotmotivating(theconclusionoftheInertnessof ReasonArgument)servesasthesecondpremiseinhiscrucialargumentfrom motivationagainstmoralrationalism.CHAPTER 5examinesvariouswaystointerpret the firstpremiseinHume’ s “MotivationArgument,” namely,theclaimthat “morals excitepassionsandproduceorpreventactions.” Thisclaimisperplexing,giventhat Hume’sTheoryofMotivationcharacterizespassions,whichareconsideredvirtuesor vices,asmotives;yet,thethesisthat “morality” ismotivatingisnotaboutvirtuesand vices.Itisactuallyaboutourrecognitionofmoraldistinctionsandhowtheycan influenceuswhenwelacktheappropriatenaturalvirtue.Iarguethat,inorderto makehisargumentvalid,Hume’sthesismustbeconsideredassomeformofmoral internalism.Iexplainvariousformsofinternalismandthenexaminetwopossible internalistreadingsofthesecondpremise,bothofwhichmakeHume’sargument valid.Themostnaturalreadingdoesnot,however,givesupporttotheultimate conclusionHumewantstoreachafterconcludingthatmoralitycannotbederived fromreason namely,thatourmoraldistinctionscomefromasensibility.What appearstobealessnaturalreadingis,whenplacedinthecontextofHume’sgeneral theoryofmotivationsetoutinpreviouschapters,thebestreading.ItgivesHumea validargumentandsupportshisultimatepositionaboutthesourceofmoral distinctions.
Ithenconsider,inthesamechapter,whetherHume’smoralsentimentalismis compatiblewithmoralcognitivism,theviewthatwhenwemakemoralutterances,
wemakeproperty-attributionsandsaysomethingtruth-evaluable.Philosophers havedefendedtheviewthatmoralinternalismandthebelief-desiretheoryof motivationaretogetherincompatiblewithmoralcognitivism.HereIarguethat Hume’ssentimentalismisananswertothequestionhowourideasofmorality originate,whichbothimpliesthatwehavesuchideasandleavesopenthepossibility thatmotivationcanbearesultoftheimpressionsuponwhichourideasarebased. Moraldistinctions(oranydistinctions,forthatmatter)cannotbeproducedfrom ideaswealreadypossess,sincetheywouldhavetobegeneratedbydemonstrationor byprobabilisticreasoning,neitherofwhichoriginatesideas.So,theyoriginatein impressions notinsensations,butinsentiments althoughtheirgenesisiscomplicatedbythefactthattheyfallundergeneraltermsandaretechnicallyabstractions. HereIapplyHume’saccountofhowwedevelopideasthatgeneraltermscoverto explaintheoriginoftheconceptsofvirtue,vice,moralgood,moralevil,andsoon. Afterwehaveacquiredtheseconcepts,wecanapplythemtocharacterswehavenot experienced,byinference,givendescriptionsofthosepersons’ traits.Thus,wecan acquiremoralbeliefsbyreasoning.ThereisnothinginHume’saccountofmoral motivationthatprohibitsusfromhavingmoralbeliefs;moraldistinctionsare dependentonimpressionsofapprovalsanddisapprovalsthat,whendirectedtoward theself,canprovidemotivestoaction.
AfterestablishingthatHumedoesdefendaversionofthebelief-desire(orbeliefpassion)theoryofmotivation,ItakeadetailedlookinCHAPTER 6atthepsychological principlesinHume’stheorythatexplainhowactionresultsfrompassionsandbelief. Hume’snaturalisticapproachcommitshimtothethesisthatwealwaysactonthe strongestdesire,otherthingsbeingequal.Sincethisthesisisatruism,itdoesnot explainanything,butHume’spsychologyofactionisactuallymuchmorenuanced andinterestingthanthisclaimreveals.Astudyofthephenomenaofconflicting passionsinHume’stheoryrevealsthatseveralpsychologicalprinciplescanexplain howsuchpassionsaffecteachother,oftenmakingthedominantpassioneven stronger.Furthermore,Hume’sdistinctionbetweenviolentpassionsandcausally strongones,essentialtohistheoryofmotivationandtoavirtuethathecalls “strengthofmind,” introducesnumerousquestionsaboutourabilitytomoderate internalemotionalupheaval.Thepersonwithstrengthofmind,themotivational prevalenceofcalmpassions,suchasconcernforlong-termgood,overviolentones, suchasintensely-feltinterestinshort-termgood,islikelyto findgenuinehappiness. IinvestigateHume’scharacterizationofthisvirtueandwhetheranyonewhois deficientinitmightdevelopit,drawingontheprinciplesIextractfromHume’ s discussionofpassionatedynamics.Inotherwords,Iexploretowhatdegreeselfmoderationofthepassionsispossible.Contrarytomanyofthewritersnotedinthis Introduction,whothoughtusingthepassionstoregulateoneanotherwasineffective orevendangerous,Humethinksitispossible,withincertainlimitations.
IntheCONCLUSION,IshowhowHume’stheoryofthepassionsispivotalinmany respectstohisphilosophicalsystem.Thetheoryclearlyservesasananalysisofthat
partofhumannatureconnectingperceptionandcognitionwithmoralityandaction. MydiscussionaddressesseveralwaysinwhichHume’streatmentofthepassionshas beenthoughttomakeamajorcontributiontohisgeneralphilosophicalviews:(1)as asolutiontotheskepticalproblemoftheselfthatemergesfromBook1ofthe Treatise;(2)asamediumforhisaccountofmoralityandmoralsentiment;(3)asa phenomenonthatmakessociabilityandpsychologicalwell-beingpossible;(4)asan instrumenttoexplainthepsychologicalaspectsofreligiousbelief;(5)asameansto explainparadoxicalemotionssuchasaestheticappreciationoftragedy;and(6)asa naturalisticalternativetoreligiousperspectivesonhumanactionandmorality. ImaintainthatHume’spsychologyofthepassionsservesallofthesepurposes andcanonlydosobecausethesignaturefeatureofthepassionsistheirrolein initiatingaction.
