The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue
CHRISTIAN B.
MILLER
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Miller, Christian B., author.
Title: Honesty : the philosophy and psychology of a neglected virtue / Christian B. Miller.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020057889 (print) | LCCN 2020057890 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197567494 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197567517 (epub)
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020057889 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020057890
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197567494.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
To Lillian Joyous Miller
For all the joy and laughter you bring to our lives
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HONESTY
INTERLUDE
II.
EMPIRICAL DATA
Preface: A Neglected Virtue
If you ask people today to name some of the virtues, honesty will often show up on their list. It is a perfectly familiar virtue. It is also widely accepted as a virtue. Unlike some other character traits, such as chastity or humility, there is little controversy about whether honesty is a moral excellence that is worth cultivating.1 It seems clear enough, too, that honesty is a tremendously important virtue. Parents want to develop it in their children. Close relationships typically depend upon it. Employers value it in their employees.
Yet, despite these observations, philosophers have—stunningly, in my view—almost completely omitted the virtue of honesty from their professional writing. This is one of the only books to discuss the virtue of honesty in detail since at least the 1970s.2 Furthermore, at the time I was writing these words, there had been almost no articles in mainstream journals in analytic philosophy on the virtue of honesty in at
1 As Linda Zagzebski (1996: 158) writes, “honesty is on all accounts a moral virtue.” Similarly Tara Smith (2006: 75) claims that honesty “is probably the single most widely endorsed virtue by people of divergent views on many other aspects of morality’s substantive instruction.” And Howard Curzer (2012: 195) remarks, “Honesty is on everyone’s list of virtues.”
2 Sissela Bok’s 1978 book, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life is the book most comparable to this one that I am aware of, but it was focused narrowly on lying, which is only one kind of dishonest behavior. Tom Carson’s 2010 book, Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice has just one chapter on honesty as a virtue. He also notes that “philosophers have written very little about the concept of honesty and the idea of honesty as a virtue” (257). See also Michaelson and Stokke (2018), which is an edited volume focused more narrowly on lying with little discussion of the virtue of honesty, as well as chapter 5 of Karen Stohr’s (2012) On Manners. Also noteworthy is Bernard Williams’s 2002 book, Truth and Truthfulness, and Andreas Stokke’s 2018 book, Lying and Insincerity. Interestingly, Bok herself was making the same observation back in 1978 about the lack of work in this area: “The striking fact is that, though no moral choices are more common or more troubling than those which have to do with deception in its many guises, they have received extraordinarily little contemporary analysis. The major works of moral philosophy of this century, so illuminating in other respects, are silent on this subject” (xix).
least fifty years.3 Edited volumes and monographs have snippets of discussion here and there,4 but even the leading collections on the virtues and vices tend to omit honesty and dishonesty altogether.5 To make matters worse, major Western philosophers such as Aristotle have had little to say about honesty.6
What explains this neglect, especially when there has been a huge resurgence of interest in virtue and virtue ethics dating back at least to the 1970s? I do not have a good answer to this question.7 In the case of the virtue of modesty, for instance, Julia Driver wrote an important and controversial article, which helped to launch a small research industry on this virtue.8 However, until just recently, no one has taken that first step with respect to honesty, which might in turn spark responses and refinements.9
It could be that philosophers have felt that there just is not much of philosophical interest to say about honesty. Or perhaps they have tended to assume that, at the end of the day, honesty is not really a distinct virtue in its own right and can be reduced to other virtues, like justice and truthfulness. Or what is most likely the case is that since no one is saying much about honesty, philosophers haven’t formed many assumptions about it one way or the other. Their attention has been elsewhere, and it has simply been overlooked.
3 The closest journal article in the neighborhood might be Louis Guenin’s 2005 paper, “Intellectual Honesty.” Martin (1993) has some discussion of honesty, although much of its focus is on love. In her 2003 paper, Tara Smith spends two paragraphs on what the virtue of honesty is and devotes the rest of the paper to why honesty is valuable. Also relevant is Carr (2014), although it did not appear in a philosophy journal. Slowly our team here at Wake Forest University has been trying to change this trend. See, for instance, important papers by two of my former postdoctoral fellows (Wilson 2018; Roberts and West 2020), as well as not so important papers by Miller (2015, 2017a, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and the papers in our edited volume on honesty, integrity, and truth seeking (Miller and West 2020).
4 For an exception, see Baier (1990).
5 See, e.g., Timpe and Boyd (2014).
6 The closest Aristotle gets is the virtue that pertains to truthfully talking about oneself (1127a114–1127b33), although he does at one point note in passing that there are other issues pertaining to being truthful, and that on his view they should fall under the heading of justice (1127a33–1127b1). For related discussion, see Carson (2010: 257–258) and especially Curzer (2012: chapter 10).
7 For Bok’s speculations, see her 1978: xx, 10–12.
8 See Driver (1989).
9 For my attempt, see Miller (2017a).
While I do not have a good explanation for the neglected study of honesty in philosophy, this book intends to do something about it.
Overview of the Book
For the past decade, my interest in the topic of character has combined more conceptual work in philosophy with the results of empirical studies in psychology. This book will be no exception. Part I is on the conceptual side and will offer a new account of the virtue of honesty. In the process it will take up themes such as the scope of the virtue, the motivational dimension of honesty, the role of practical wisdom, and what the corresponding vices are to honesty.
Chapter 7 will serve as a bridge chapter or interlude between the conceptual and the empirical parts of the book. Its focus is on taxonomy, and it will raise several conceptual issues about how to categorize people’s character in this moral domain. But it will also draw on empirical work being done in positive psychology with the Values-inAction classification.
Part II turns to questions about whether most people as a matter of fact do have the virtue of honesty and, if not, what their character looks like instead. Here I dive into the latest research literature on stealing, promise-breaking, lying, and cheating. The last chapter in this section tries to put all the pieces together by offering an explanatory account of the data, followed by a moral assessment of how good most people would turn out to be if the explanatory account is correct.
The book ends with an afterword on how to close what I have called the “character gap.”10 In this case it is the gap between how our character should be (deeply honest) and how it tends to actually be. I suggest, at least in a preliminary way, that the ideas offered in the book can provide some guidance as we start to think about strategies for becoming better.
Let me be up front about two topics I will not be exploring in the book, especially since some readers might be expecting a discussion
10 Miller (2017d).
of them. The first topic is the definition of lying. There is a small but growing literature on how exactly to define lying, given that the traditional definition, which dates back at least to Augustine, has been widely rejected.11 This literature has quickly become complex and technical, and for my purposes I do not need to delve into it. My focus will be on uncontroversial cases of lying.
Second, I do not consider whether lying is ever morally permissible. Here too we find a long-standing view which in recent years has faced steadfast resistance. While there are a few defenders of the strict position that lying is always morally wrong,12 most ethicists today allow for exceptions, say in emergency rescue cases where a family of Jews can be protected from the Nazis. Although my own sympathies rest with the majority, I will try as much as possible to remain neutral on this debate.
Intended Audience
My most recent book, The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, was a trade book written for a nonacademic audience and did not presuppose any background in philosophy or psychology. In this book, I have returned to more academic writing, although down the road I hope to use the ideas here in a book for a wider audience. But for now, this is a book aimed mainly at academics in philosophy, psychology, and religion, as well as others who are interested in the virtue of honesty. It will use some of the machinery of contemporary analytic philosophy, but hopefully the writing will be accessible to graduate students and undergraduate majors in these fields. Many of the chapters should also be accessible to a well-informed nonacademic audience.
11 For reviews, see Fallis (2010) and Mahon (2016).
12 See in particular Griffiths (2004) and Tollefsen (2014). See also Finnis (1980), Murphy (1996), Garcia (1998), and Pruss (1999).
Credits for Previous Work
I am grateful to the following publishers for permission to use ideas or excerpts from my previous work:
Reproduced courtesy of Oxford University Press through PLSclear are portions of chapters 4 and 10 from Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and portions of “The Mixed Trait Model of Character Traits and the Moral Domains of Resource Distribution and Theft,” in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology, ed. Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 164–191.
Reprinted courtesy of the MIT Press are portions of “Honesty,” in Moral Psychology, Volume 5: Virtue and Character, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 237–273, and “Honesty Revisited: More Conceptual and Empirical Reflections,” in Moral Psychology, Volume 5: Virtue and Character, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian B. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 295–307.
Reprinted courtesy of Palgrave Macmillan and SpringerNature are portions of “Categorizing Character: Moving beyond the Aristotelian Framework,” in Varieties of Virtue Ethics, ed. David Carr (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 143–162.
Reprinted courtesy of the Belgrade Philosophical Annual are portions of “The Virtue of Honesty, Nazis at the Door, and Huck Finn Cases,” Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32 (2019): 51–66.
Reprinted courtesy of the Portuguese Journal of Philosophy are portions of “Honesty and Dishonesty: Unpacking Two Character Traits Neglected by Philosophers,” Portuguese Journal of Philosophy 76 (2020): 343–362.
Reprinted courtesy of Routledge Press are portions of “Flirting with Skepticism about Practical Wisdom.” Practical Wisdom: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge: forthcoming).
Reprinted courtesy of Copyright Clearance Center and Springer are portions of, “Motivation and the Virtue of Honesty: Some Conceptual Requirements and Empirical Results,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2020): 355–371.
Acknowledgments
The central ideas in this book were first developed for a conference on character that we organized at Wake Forest University, whose papers were subsequently published by MIT Press as Moral Psychology, volume 5. I am grateful for all the support of my coeditor of that volume, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, as well as his very helpful feedback. The next big step was the opportunity to be on leave for an academic year to expand the discussion from a paper to a book manuscript. Thanks so much to the Wake Forest University Reynolds leave program and the Thomas J. Lynch Fund for so generously supporting me during this year. Win-Chiat Lee and Ralph Kennedy were my department chairs during the writing of this book, and I couldn’t have asked for better. They are extraordinary.
Work on this book has spanned two major grant projects I have been fortunate to be a part of at Wake Forest: the Beacon Project, funded by the Templeton Religion Trust, and the Honesty Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation. Naturally the opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of either Templeton foundation. Special thanks to Chris Stewart, John Churchill, Alex Arnold, Sarah Clement, Michael Murray, and Richard Bollinger.
Peter Ohlin at Oxford University Press has once again been a joy to work with, and I am very appreciative of his support of my work. Many thanks as well to Meridith Murray for preparing the index so carefully. The two reviewers for Oxford, one of whom subsequently identified himself as Paul Bloomfield, sent along tremendously helpful comments that substantially improved the book. I am greatly in their debt. The same is true of the Honesty Project reading group, which workshopped the conceptual chapters and caught a number of problems. Thanks so much for helpful comments to Emily Austin, William Fleeson, R. Michael Furr, Eranda Jayawickreme, Kathleen Stimely, Gregory Robson, Logan Martin, Cameron Silverglate, and
Michael Lamb. For additional written comments I am very grateful to Alexander Jech, Robert Hartman, Matt King, Charles Starkey, Tim Pawl, Jing Hu, Andrew Cullison, Matthew Benton, Emily McTernan, Eva Kort, Daniel Lapsley, Robert Audi, Ryan West, Adam Pelser, Alan Wilson, Jess Kingsford, Sarah Schnitker, Alex Pruss, Jonathan Robinson, Jason Baehr, Ronald Green, Chad Bochan, Jada Strabbing, Bella DePaulo, and the students in my Virtue and Character course. My mother once again did an amazing job with her editing suggestions and saved me from many writing mistakes.
Many thanks to the following for the opportunity to share some of my ideas in these pages: Baylor University, Tulane University, Wake Forest University Eudaimonia Institute, Macquarie University, University of Sydney, Jubilee Center for Character and Virtue, ARETAI conference at the European University of Rome, Society for Psychology and Philosophy, Wake Forest University Beacon Project Final Conference, Coastal Carolina University, Fordham Epistemology and Ethics Workshop, University of Notre Dame, Vanderbilt University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Wake Forest University Library Lecture Series, “Is There Anything Like Moral Character & Virtue?” Conference in Gdańsk, Wake Forest University Philosophy Department, Honesty Project State of Research Conference, and the Developing Character Project Final Conference. I am especially grateful to Wake Forest University and our Department of Philosophy for the opportunity to discuss honesty as part of the A. C. Reid Chair Inaugural Lecture.
My greatest source of support and encouragement has always been my family—my parents, Bill and Joyous Miller; my mother-in-law, Eileen Smith; my children, Jackson, William, and Lillian; and most of all my wife, Jessie Lee Miller. Thank you, as always, from the bottom of my heart.
PART I THE PHILOSOPHY OF HONESTY
1 Preliminaries to Developing an Account of Honesty
Part I of this book is a conceptual exploration of the virtue of honesty. It does not draw on any empirical data, but instead tries to gain some clarity about what is involved in being an honest person. The preliminary account is outlined in chapter 2. Before we get there, though, it is important to do some stage setting. That is the job of this chapter.
In section 1.1, I make sure the focus is on the virtue of honesty, as opposed to honest actions. Section 1.2 then turns to the scope of the virtue, or the kinds of behaviors to which it applies. Section 1.3 wraps up the chapter by outlining four desiderata which I think any promising account of honesty should attempt to satisfy.1
1.1. Framing the Virtue of Honesty
Let us begin by distinguishing the virtue of honesty from some related notions. Suppose you hear someone say, “Smith did the honest thing in telling the truth on the stand in the courtroom.” The speaker is offering an assessment of Smith’s behavior in the courtroom. But even if that assessment is correct, it is not the same thing as ascribing to Smith the virtue of honesty, for at least two reasons.
First, honesty can give rise to honest actions. But it can also be true of someone that she is an honest person, without her exhibiting any honest behavior for an extended period of time. Nor does she count as an honest person simply because of her earlier track record of honest behavior. Rather, because of facts internal to who she is psychologically,
1 For an earlier version of the ideas in this chapter, see Miller (2017a).
her psychological makeup and character, it is true of her that she is honest. I will return to this point in a moment.
Second, it is possible to perform an action which we might call ‘honest,’ yet not be an honest person. Smith, for instance, might not be honest at all, and only tells the truth on the stand of fear of being punished for lying. So honesty and honest actions are pretty clearly distinct concepts.
More closely connected to honesty is the concept of acting from honesty. If Smith does the honest thing, and he is acting from honesty, then that does entail that he is an honest person (you cannot act from honesty without having honesty in your character!). But here too, the honest action is distinct from, and metaphysically dependent upon, the virtue of honesty. The latter is what explains the performance of the former.2
These same points carry over to mental activities as well. Consider someone saying this: “Jones carried out a thorough and honest assessment of the evidence in the case.” This claim has to do with Jones’s mental life, and specifically with how she thought about the evidence and came to form an overall judgment. That judgment itself, though, is not the virtue of honesty either. If Jones is an honest person, then her virtue could have shaped this particular judgment. Again, though, the virtue is prior to the judgment itself. Furthermore, as with Smith, it is possible that Jones might have formed the judgment on this one occasion without being an honest person in general.
So what would be some examples involving the virtue of honesty, strictly speaking? I have in mind statements like these:
1. “Roberts is an honest person.”
2. “I have spent enough time with him to know that he is really dishonest and you don’t want to be his friend.”
2 For more on virtues, virtuous actions, and acting from virtue, see Hurka (2006), Crisp (2015: 268–269), and Battaly (2015: 111). It is also true that there can be causal dependency in the other direction as well, if the performance of honest actions helps to develop and strengthen one’s possession of the virtue of honesty.
3. “Her honest character really stands out in her application; we should definitely hire her.”
Now the focus is on the traits of character of these individuals. Thus for Roberts to have the virtue of honesty, he has to have some stable tendency or disposition of the honest sort.
This should be a familiar picture of how character traits work from the philosophy literature.3 Roberts’s honesty can give rise to honest thoughts about, say, the fact that exaggerating a charity donation on his taxes is cheating, and consequently how cheating on his taxes would be wrong. These thoughts in turn can lead him to act in honest ways, in this case by reporting the correct figures on his taxes. The honest disposition itself is distinct, though, from these thoughts and actions. It plays a causal role in giving rise to them, and in turn is part of the causal explanation for them.
Furthermore, thoughts stemming from an honest disposition would not be activated all the time in every situation—exceptions might include sleeping, watching TV, or looking at one’s phone out of boredom. Rather, only certain situations Roberts is in which are relevant to this trait—such as parties or classrooms—activate his honest disposition. Trying to accurately predict when this will happen depends on a number of specific features of his psychology, such as what he notices, how he interprets events in his surroundings, what else is going on in his mind at the time, and so forth. Once activated, though, his honest disposition can play an active role in his psychology. Using the philosophical jargon, Roberts’s honest thoughts can go from being merely dispositional thoughts, to being occurrent thoughts.
These occurrent thoughts, it should be noted, need not be conscious. Roberts may not even recognize them in the moment if they are functioning subconsciously. Presumably most of the time we have a variety of subconscious occurrent beliefs and desires which are
3 I have discussed this picture at great length in Miller (2013: chapter 1) and (2014: chapter 1). There I consider the metaphysical nature of character traits, their role in causing and explaining behavior, and their irreducibility to mere patterns of behavior. Since the discussion there applies straightforwardly to the case of honesty, I have not taken the space here to repeat it.
causally influencing us to act in different ways without our realizing it. Thoughts arising from the virtue of honesty would not be an exception. Tying these observations together, here is a helpful starting point for thinking about the virtue of honesty:
(H) The virtue of honesty is a psychological disposition that, when triggered in conditions relevant to honesty, can reliably cause the formation of thoughts and feelings of an honest kind, which in many cases can subsequently give rise to honest actions.
Naturally the honest thoughts and feelings won’t always translate into honest actions. Sometimes the environment will not cooperate, say if one is prevented from speaking or acting. Sometimes other, more important considerations come into play, say in cases where lying or cheating could prevent a terrorist attack. But other things being equal, the triggering of an honest disposition gives rise to occurrent thoughts, which in turn give rise to intentional action.
So far so good. Yet while (H) might be helpful in shedding some light on honesty qua character trait, it doesn’t shed much light on honesty. Why not? Because we could say the very same thing about many other virtues too. Consider compassion, for instance:
(C) The virtue of compassion is a psychological disposition that, when triggered in conditions relevant to compassion, can reliably cause the formation of thoughts and feelings of a compassionate kind, which in many cases can subsequently give rise to compassionate actions.
Virtues in general are causal dispositions that typically give rise to their own relevant thoughts and actions. Same with the vices as well.
So the work of this section has been to provide some helpful background about character traits, which will frame what follows in the book. Let us now turn to some of the distinctive features which set honesty apart from the other virtues, starting with its scope.
1.2. The Scope of Honesty
What comes to mind when thinking about exemplars of honesty? An honest person is truthful in her words, accurately representing to others the way she sees the world. She presents the facts, offering what is needed to properly address the matter at hand. But there’s more. An honest person can be trusted around other people’s property. She respects what they own. The same can be said about following the rules. When they are fair and she participates voluntarily, she can be counted upon to do what the rules say and, for instance, play a game the way it is meant to be played. What about promises? An honest person makes them sincerely, fully intending to keep them if the circumstances allow, and when the time comes, she honors the promise provided there are no outweighing considerations that have arisen in the meantime.
As we can see, the scope of honesty is wide. It pertains to a variety of different kinds of behaviors, some of which might seem to have only a loose connection with each other. To explore this in more detail, I will switch from a positive to a negative characterization and examine what kinds of behavior honesty prevents. Stated another way, these are the kinds of behaviors which, if routinely performed, call into question whether someone is in fact honest.
Here are five kinds of behavior that I take to be incompatible with the virtue of honesty: Lying Misleading Stealing Cheating Promise-breaking
This list is meant to capture the central ways in which we can fail to be honest, but it is not intended to be exhaustive. I will consider some additional possibilities at the end of this section. First, though, let’s explore each of these five in more detail.
Lying. It seems clear enough that someone who reliably tells unjustified lies is not someone we would tend to call honest, especially if they are more than just everyday or white lies.
What is involved in lying? The short answer is that there is little agreement among philosophers about how to characterize lying rigorously. On what can be considered the traditional account:
I tell a lie to you if and only if:
(i) I say something to you that I believe is false.
(ii) I intend to deceive you by saying it to you.4
The deception involved here can be understood broadly. We naturally think of getting the other person to believe the proposition in question, such as when the student wants his teacher to believe that the dog ate his homework. But it can include more than that. For instance, it could have the effect of getting the teacher to believe that the student believes this claim about the homework.5
This account does a fine job with most cases. It counts as lies most of the actions we believe are lies, and rightly excludes most of the actions we do not think are lies. When a con man makes the false statement, “I am a police officer” in a serious way to take advantage of a vulnerable person, this is an example of the former. When an actor performing on stage says, “I am a police officer” as part of his role as a police officer, it is an example of the latter.
But if what we are searching for is an account that gets the cases exactly right, then there is an emerging consensus today that the traditional account doesn’t quite work.6 Consider, for instance, this much discussed example from Tom Carson:
4 For a helpful review of different subtle variations in formulating the traditional account, see Saul (2012: 3–8) and Fallis (2018: 26 fn. 2).
5 See Bok (1978: 20–21) and especially Krstić (2019: 643).
6 See Fallis (2010, 2018), Carson (2010: chapter 1), Stokke (2013, 2018, 2019), and Krstić (2019). For doubts about whether even Augustine held the traditional view, see Griffiths (2004: 27–30). And Aquinas famously did not (MacIntyre 1994: 316).
One way to argue that the traditional account is insufficient is to require that the belief in question be false, and not just believed to be false. Tom Carson (2010: 16; see also Barber 2020: 144) has made this argument, but like many philosophers working in this area (e.g., Saul 2012: 5; Lackey 2013: 239 fn. 9; Stokke 2018: 32–36), I find this additional requirement implausible and will not consider it further here.
Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as a witness in court, I am asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit the crime. I make the false statement . . . for fear of being harmed or killed by him. However, I do not intend that my false statements deceive anyone. (I hope that no one believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.) . . . [In addition] suppose that I know that the crime and my presence at the scene of the crime were recorded on a video camera so that there is almost no chance that the jury will believe that I believe what I am saying.7
A ‘bald-faced’ lie like this one is still a lie. But there is no intention to deceive on the part of the speaker. Right from the outset, each party to the conversation believes that the claim in question is false (and believes this about each other’s beliefs too, and so forth). So the traditional account is in need of revision, or so at least according to this line of criticism.8
A number of alternative accounts have been proposed to try to improve on condition (ii) by making use of resources such as assertion, intending to represent oneself as believing, warranting the truth, common ground, narrow plausibility, and communication.9 Some have even given up on the hope of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for lying, opting instead for a prototype account.10 Fortunately for our purposes we do not have to enter into this difficult and increasingly technical discussion. Even if we cannot precisely draw a conceptual fence around the concept of lying, it is clear that (i) we know most lies when we see them, and that (ii) honesty pertains to lying. All the cases used in this book will be clear cases of lying.11
Of course, there is a further and much better known debate about lying, which has to do with whether it is morally justifiable in
7 Carson (2010: 20). For modifications to this example to try to handle criticisms, see Krstić (2019).
8 For much more, see Krstić (2019). For a helpful review of different kinds of counterexamples to the traditional account, as well as a defense of a view roughly in the neighborhood of that account, see Lackey (2013). For a defense of the traditional view against bald-faced lie cases, see Maitra (2018).
9 For helpful overviews, see Fallis (2010), Carson (2010), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013, 2018), and Krstić (2019). For some resistance, see Tollefsen (2014: 22–25).
10 See Fallis (2010: 13).
11 Furthermore, as Don Fallis (2010: 4, emphasis his) has helpfully pointed out:
