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It is our sincere intention that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) AIChE, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers’ officers and directors, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.
5.1.1
5.2
5.2.2
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.4
5.5.3
5.5.4
5.6
6.3
6.3.1
6.4
6.4.1
6.5
6.5.1
6.6
6.7.4
6.8
12.2.3
12.2.4
12.2.5
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1.Comparisonof RBPS, Original CCPS PSM Elements, and Responsible Care® Code Practices.......................................................38
Table 2.1. Example Consequence Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix52
Table 2.2. Example Frequency Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix...52
Table 2.3. Example Risk Ranking/Response Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix....................................................................................................52
Table 2.4. Example Semi-Quantitative Risk Matrix ...........53
Table 3.1 Ammonia AEGLs and ERPGs (ppm) .......................................65
Table 3.2 Probit Value vs Percent Affected ...........................................66
Table 8.2. Example MOC Form Approval Section ...............................144
Table 9.1. Example Consequence Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix .............................................................................................................153
Table 9.2. Example Frequency Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix.153
Table 9.3. Example Risk Ranking/Response Categories – Qualitative Risk Matrix..................................................................................................153
Table 9.4 Example of EHS impact categories and magnitudes used in hazard evaluations for use with Figure 9.2. ........................................154
Table 9.5 Example initiating cause frequency scale (order-of-magnitude basis) for use with Figure 9.2..............................................................155
Figure 2.3. Example of risk graph modeled on IEC 615 11 ...............................................................................................................54
Figure 2.4. Framework for the tolerability of Risk ............58
Figure 10.8. BP’s group societal risk profile .............................................................................................................185
Figure 10.9. Schematic of emergency relief effluent treatment system that included a scrubber and flare tower in series .....187
Figure 10.10. Individual risk contours for bromine storage tank system ...............................................................................190
Figure 10.11. Individual risk contours for bromine cylinder system ..............................................................................191
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AEGL Ambient Air Exposure Guidelines
AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers
AIT Auto Ignition Temperature
API American Petroleum Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BMS Burner Management System
CCA Cause Consequence Analysis
CEI Chemical Exposure Index (Dow Chemical)
CFR Code of Federal Registry
CMA Chemical Manufacturers Association
CSB US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CCR Continuous Catalyst Regeneration
COO Conduct of Operations
CPI Chemical Process Industries
DCU Delayed Coker Unit
DDT Deflagration to Detonation Transition
DIERS Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems
ERS Emergency Relief System
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
EPA US Environmental Protection Agency
FCCU Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit
F&EI Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical)
FMEA Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
HTHA High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HSE Health & Safety Executive (UK)
I&E Instrument and Electrical
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
ISD Inherently Safer Design
IPL Independent Protection Layer
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISOM Isomerization Unit
ITPM Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance
LFL Lower Flammable Limit
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
LOTO Lock Out Tag Out
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAIT Maximum Auto Ignition Temperature
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
MCC Motor Control Center
MEC Minimum Explosible Concentration
MIE Minimum Ignition Energy
MOC Management of Change
MOOC Management of Organizational Change
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDT Non- Destructive Testing
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPV Net Present Value
OCM Organizational Change Management
OIMS Operational Integrity Management System (ExxonMobil)
OSHA US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
PLC Programmable Logic Controllers
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PRD Pressure Relief Device
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
PSB Process Safety Beacon
PSE
PSI
PSI
Process Safety Event
Process Safety Information
Process Safety Incident
PSM Process Safety Management
PSO Process Safety Officer
PSSR Pre-Startup Safety Review
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis
RBPS Risk Based Process Safety
RAGAGEP Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice
RMP Risk Management Plan
SACHE Safety and Chemical Engineering Education
SCAI Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks
SHE Safety, Health and Environmental
SHIB Safety Hazard Information Bulletin
SIS Safety Instrumented Systems
SME Subject Matter Expert
TQ
Threshold Quantity
UFL Upper Flammable Limit
UK United Kingdom
US United States
UST Underground Storage Tank
GLOSSARY
Acute Toxicity
Asset integrity
Atmospheric Storage Tank
Boiling-LiquidExpandingVapor Explosion (BLEVE)
The adverse (acute) effects resulting from a single dose or exposure to a substance. Importance: Ordinarily used to denote effects in experimental animals.
A PSM program element involving work activities that help ensure that equipment is properly designed, installed in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for purpose over its life cycle. Also see asset integrity and reliability.
A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pressure and 0.5 psig (3.45kPa gage).
A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.
Bow Tie Diagram
Checklist Analysis
A diagram for visualizing the types of preventive and mitigative barriers which can be used to manage risk. These barriers are drawn with the threats on the left, the unwanted event at the center, and the consequences on the right, representing the flow of the hazardous materials or energies through its barriers to its destination. The hazards or threats can be proactively addressed on the left with specific barriers (safeguards, layers of protection) to help prevent a hazardous event from occurring; barriers reacting to the event to help reduce the event’s consequences are shown on the right.
A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more pre-prepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
Combustible Dust
Conduct of Operations (COO)
Consequence
Consequence Analysis
Dispersion Models
Domino Effects
Any finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or smaller in diameter (material passing through a U.S. No. 40 standard sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard when dispersed and ignited in air or other gaseous oxidizer.
The embodiment of an organization’s values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.
The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.
The analysis of the expected effects of incident outcome cases, independent of frequency or probability.
Mathematical models that characterize the transport of toxic/flammable materials released to the air and/or the water.
The triggering of secondary events, such as toxic releases, by a primary event, such as an explosion, such that the result is an increase in consequences or area of an effect zone. Generally only considered when a significant escalation of the original incident results.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
Event Tree Analysis
A system of guidelines for airborne concentrations of toxic materials prepared by the AIHA. For example, ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.
A method used for modeling the propagation of an initiating event through the sequence of possible incident outcomes. The event is represented graphically by a tree with branches from the initiating cause through the success or failure of independent protection layers.
Explosion
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
F-N Curve
Flammable Liquids
Frequency
Frequency Modeling
Hazard
Hazard Analysis
A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.
A hazard identification technique in which all known failure modes of components or features of a system are considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.
A method used to analyze graphically the failure logic of a given event, to identify various failure scenarios (called cut-sets), and to support the probabilistic estimation of the frequency of the event.
A plot of cumulative frequency versus consequences (often expressed as number of fatalities).
Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below 100 F (37.8 C), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100 F (37.8 C), as determined by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73 F (22.8 C) and boiling points below 100 F (37.8 C). Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73 F (22.8 C) and boiling points at or above 100 F (37.8 C). Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73 F (22.8 C), but below 100 F (37.8 C). (NFPA 30).
Number of occurrences of an event per unit time (e.g., 1 event in 1000 yr. = 1 x 10-3 events/yr.).
Development of numerical estimates of the likelihood of an event occurring.
An inherent chemical or physical characteristic that has the potential for causing damage to people, property, or the environment.
The identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and usually the estimation of the consequences.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Hazard Identification
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)
Hot Work
Impact
Inertion
Incident
A systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards
The inventorying of material, system, process and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences through the occurrence of an incident.
A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance.
Any operation that uses flames or can produce sparks (e.g., welding).
A measure of the ultimate loss and harm of a loss event. Impact may be expressed in terms of numbers of injuries and/or fatalities, extent of environmental damage and/or magnitude of losses such as property damage, material loss, lost production, market share loss, and recovery costs.
A technique by which a combustible mixture is rendered non-ignitable by addition of an inert gas or a noncombustible dust.
An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage to the environment, or asset/business losses. Such events include fires, explosions, releases of toxic or otherwise harmful substances, and so forth.
Independent Protection Layer (IPL)
Individual Risk
A device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to the undesired consequence without being adversely affected by the initiating event or the action of any other protection layer associated with the scenario. A protection layer meets the requirements of being an IPL when it is designed and managed to achieve the following seven core attributes: Independent; Functional; Integrity; Reliable; Validated, Maintained and Audited; Access Security; and Management of Change
The risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. This includes the nature of the injury to the individual, the likelihood of the injury occurring, and the time period over which the injury might occur.
Inherent Safety
Inherently Safer Design
Interlock
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations used in the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is permanent and inseparable from the process. Inherently safer technology (IST) is also used interchangeably with inherent safety in the book.
A way of thinking about the design of chemical processes and plants that focuses on the elimination or reduction of hazards, rather than on their management and control.
A protective response which is initiated by an outof-limit process condition. Instrument which will not allow one part of a process to function unless another part is functioning. A device such as a switch that prevents a piece of equipment from operating when a hazard exists. To join two parts together in such a way that they remain rigidly attached to each other solely by physical interference. A device to prove the physical state of a required condition and to furnish that proof to the primary safety control circuit.
An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (cause-consequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the initiating event frequency, independent protection layer failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for determining where additional risk reduction or more detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified elsewhere, typically using a scenariobased hazard evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.
