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FIGHTINGFORPEACEINSOMALIA FightingforPeace inSomalia AHistoryandAnalysisoftheAfrican UnionMission(AMISOM),2007–2017
PAULD.WILLIAMS GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©PaulD.Williams2018
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Acknowledgements ThisbookhasbeennearlyelevenyearsinthemakingandIhaveincurredmany debtsofgratitudealongtheway.Iampleasedtoacknowledgethemhere.
Firstandforemost,thisbookwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe numerousindividualswhotooktimeoutoftheirbusyschedulestohelpme understanddifferentaspectsofAMISOM’sactivitiesandanswermymany questions.Someofthemdidthismanytimesoverandalsosubsequentlyspent considerableadditionaltimecommentingonmoreofmydraftpublications thanIcouldreasonablyexpect.Manyofthemworked(orarestillworking)in incrediblydifficultjobsundertestingandsometimesdeadlycircumstances tryingtobuildamoresecure,democratic,andprosperousSomalia,whetheras citizensorjournalists,inNGOsoringovernments,orforinternational organizationsincludingtheAfricanUnion(AU),UnitedNations(UN),and EuropeanUnion.Sincemostofthemwereservingofficials,andasagreedat thetime,theywillremainanonymous.Butthisbookisfarbetterthanitwould havebeenwithoutyourconstructiveengagementandIamtrulygrateful.
IoweaparticulardebtofthankstotheAfricanUnion.Thisbookcouldnot havebeencompletedwithouttheAUgrantingmyrequesttomeetitspersonnelandaccessdocumentationandothermaterial.Inplaces,myworkiscritical ofaspectsoftheAU’spolicies,butIgratefullyacknowledgetheconstructive supportthatIreceivedformorethanadecadefromnumerousAUofficials. Theyhavemyrespectandadmiration.
WhileinSomalia,thanksareespeciallyduetotheAU–UNInformation SupportTeamforprovidingaccommodation, flights,security,andfacilitating accessforinterviews.Theytoowerealwayssupportiveofmyresearch,even whenIcriticizedelementsoftheirwork.IalsowanttothankvariousBancroft GlobalDevelopmentpersonnelfortheirhospitalityandtakingthetimeto discusstheiroperationsinSomaliawithme.
AspecialnoteofthanksisalsoduetoDrTimothyRaineyandtheteamat theUSDepartmentofState’sAfricaContingencyOperationsTraining andAssistance(ACOTA)programmeforgrantingmefullaccesstotheir unclassifieddocumentationrelatedtoAMISOM.Thiswasimmenselyhelpful incompletingthisbookandsheddingimportantlightonthecomplex challengesthatACOTAconfrontedandtheimportanttrainingandcapacitybuildingworkthattheirpersonnelprovidedtoAMISOManditscontributing countries.
For financialassistancethatfacilitatedmyresearchandtravel,Iwouldonce againliketothankMichaelBrown,theformerDeanoftheElliottSchoolof InternationalAffairs,forawardingmeseveralSOARgrants.Iamalsograteful
totheElliottSchoolforgrantingmesabbaticalleaveduringacademicyear 2014–15.DuringthatperiodIwasawardedafellowshiptoworkonthisbook attheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars.Iamverygrateful totheWilsonCenterstaffandespeciallytheAfricaProgramteamforprovidingsuchawelcomingandconducivesettingforscholarship.Thanksare alsoduetoKatharinaKrauseandDanMorgan-Russell,researchassistants thattheWilsonCenterarrangedtohelpmeduringmyfellowship.Ialso receivedhelpfulresearchassistancefromElliottSchoolstudentJianyiNie during2014.
Acknowledgementisalsoduetoseveraljournalsandinstitutionsthat publishedearlierversionsofsomeofmyargumentsaboutAMISOM,including ‘IntotheMogadishuMaelstrom:TheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia’ , InternationalPeacekeeping,16:4(2009),pp.514–30; ‘FightingforPeacein Somalia:AMISOM’sSevenStrategicChallenges’ , JournalofInternational Peacekeeping,17:3–4(2013),pp.222–47; ‘TheAfricanUnionMissionin SomaliaandCivilianProtectionChallenges’ , Stability:InternationalJournal ofSecurity&Development,2:2(2013),p.39.DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ sta.bz; ‘StabilisingSomalia:TheAfricanUnionMissionandtheNextStage intheWaragainstAl-Shabaab’ , RUSIJournal,159:2(2014),pp.52–60; B.E.BrutonandP.D.Williams, Counter-InsurgencyinSomalia:Lessons LearnedfromtheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia,2007–2013 (Tampa,FL: UnitedStatesJointSpecialOperationsUniversity,2014); ‘AfterWestgate: Challengesandopportunitiesinthewaragainstal-Shabaab’ , International Affairs,90:4(2014),pp.907–23;P.D.WilliamswithA.Hashi, ExitStrategy ChallengesfortheAUMissioninSomalia (Mogadishu:HeritageInstitutefor PolicyStudies,February2016); ‘AMISOMUnderReview’ , RUSIJournal,161:1 (2016),pp.40–9;W.LotzeandP.D.Williams, TheSurgetoStabilize:Lessons fortheUNfromtheAU’sExperienceinSomalia (NewYork:International PeaceInstitutereport,May2016); TheBattleatElAdde:TheKenyaDefence Forces,al-Shabaab,andUnansweredQuestions (NewYork:International PeaceInstitute,July2016); UNSupporttoRegionalPeaceOperations:Lessons fromUNSOA (NewYork:InternationalPeaceInstitute,February2017); ‘JoiningAMISOM:WhysixAfricanstatescontributedtroopstotheAfrican UnionMissioninSomalia’ , JournalofEasternAfricanStudies,12:1(2018), pp.172–92; ‘StrategicCommunicationsforPeaceOperations:TheAfrican Union’sInformationWaragainstal-Shabaab’ , Stability:InternatioanlJournal ofSecurity&Development ,7(1)(2018),p.3.DOIhttp://doi.org/10.5334/ sta.606.andmy chapteronAMISOMinJ.M.OkekeandP.D.Williams (eds.), ProtectingCiviliansinAfricanUnionPeaceSupportOperations:Key CasesandLessonsLearned (SouthAfrica:ACCORD,2017).Ioweanespecially largedebttomyco-authorsonsomeofthesepublications,namely,Arthur Boutellis,BronwynBruton,KatharinaColeman,SolomonDersso,Abdirashid Hashi,WalterLotze,andJideOkeke.Ilearnedagreatdealintheprocessand
amgratefulfortheirexpertiseandfriendship.Ialsowanttorecognizeother friendsandcolleagueswhohavegivenupconsiderableamountsoftheirtime tohelpmecompletethisbook,eitherthroughconversationsorcommenting ondraftpapers.ThankyouAlexBellamy,EricBerman,CedricdeConing, JonathanFisher,LinnéaGelot,MarcoJowell,RobynKriel,JairVanDerLijn, TyMcCormick,FrankReidy,ColinRobinson,TimoSmit,ThierryTardy,Tres Thomas,andNinaWilén.IamalsogratefultoThongNguyenoftheInternationalPeaceInstitutefordrawingseveralofthe figuresthatappearin thisbook.
My finaldebtofgratitudeistomyfamily.Neitherofmyparents,Caroleand DavidWilliams,livedtoseethisbook’scompletion,butIwouldn’tbewhere Iamtodaywithouttheloveandsupporttheygaveme.Imissyou.Onceagain, myincrediblewife,ArielaBlätter,hasenabledmetodowhatIdoandIcould notdoitwithouther.Iloveyou.Finally,Iwanttothankmywonderful daughterZoëforbringingussuchjoy.Thistimearound,agedfour,shevoiced aclearopinionaboutmywork.Flickingthroughapileofbooksonmyoffice floor,shedeclared, ‘Daddy,yourbooksaretooseriousanddon’thaveenough pictures!’ You’rerightZoë,andsoonI’llexplainwhy.
Ofcourse,Ialoneamresponsibleforanyremainingerrors.
WashingtonDC October2017
PDW
1.Genesis:October2004toMarch200721
2.Entry:March2007toJanuary200948
3.Stalemate:January2009toAugust201077
4.Offensive:September2010toOctober2011101
5.Expansion:October2011toSeptember2012126
6.Consolidation:September2012toDecember2013155
ListofFigures,Tables,andBox Figures
I.1.AMISOMAuthorizedandDeployedStrength,2007–173
I.2.AMISOM’sOrganizationalStructure,20126
I.3.AMISOM’sSectorBoundaries:2012(left)and2014(right)9
4.1.MogadishuIncidentReview(April2010toApril2011)112
4.2.AMISOMandUrbanWarfare115
7.1.Major Al-Shabaab AttacksonAMISOM’sForwardOperating Bases,2015–17196
7.2.ComparingAMISOMandSNASectorsandSomalia’sInterim PoliticalEntities(2016)205
8.1.UNSOA/Stotalbudgetrequirements,UN fiscalyears2009/10–2017/18216
8.2.ContributionstoTrustFundforAMISOMandtheSomaliNational Army(upto2015)223
13.1.MonthlyAllowancesforUniformedPersonnelinAMISOM andUNPeacekeepingOperations,2007–2017(US$)323
Tables
I.1.AMISOMTCCsarmysize,defencespending(US$),andcontribution3
4.1.AMISOM’sproposedforcecomposition(2010)103
4.2.IEDincidentsinSomalia,2007–14109
5.1. Al-Shabaab’sDispersalofForces,November2011151
6.1.AUandUNmandatesforAMISOMcompared(2013)161
7.1.OperationalchallengesfacingAMISOM,April2015187
8.1.CompaniesoperatinginAMISOMbasecamp,September2012217
8.2.ComparingUNSOAresourcestoselectUNpeacekeepingoperations222
8.3.DistancesbetweenSomalicities(kilometres)228
9.1.EstimatedsizeoftheSomaliArmedForces,1963–2017242
9.2.Distributionof10,900SNAconductingjointoperationswith AMISOM(2015)245
12.1.AMISOMbudgetsummary,2011and2013–16(US$)314
13.1.Summaryofpotentialmodesofexitforpeaceoperations327
13.2.ModesofexitinmajorforeignmilitaryoperationsinSomalia, 1992–2015328
A.1.EstimatesofcumulativeAMISOMfatalities358
Box
10.1.ExamplesofAUandAMISOMmeasurestomitigate civilianharm275
ListofAbbreviations ACOTAAfricaContingencyOperationsTrainingandAssistance(US)
AFRICOMUSAfricaCommand
AMISAUMissioninSudan
AMISECAUMissionforSupporttotheElectionsintheComoros
AMISOMAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia
APCArmouredPersonnelCarrier
APFAfricanPeaceFacility(EU)
ARPCTAlliancefortheRestorationofPeaceandCounterterrorism
ARSAlliancefortheRe-LiberationofSomalia
ASWJ AhluSunnaWalJamaa
AUAfricanUnion
BNDFBurundiNationalDefenceForce
BOIBoardofInquiry
C-IEDCounter-ImprovisedExplosiveDevice
CARCentralAfricanRepublic
CCTARCCiviliancasualtytrackinganalysisandresponsecell
CIAUSCentralIntelligenceAgency
CIMICCivil–MilitaryCoordination
CONOPSConceptofOperations
DDRDisarmament,Demobilization,andReintegration
DFSUNDepartmentofFieldSupport
DPKOUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations
DRCDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo
EARFEastAfricanResponseForce(US)
EASFEasternAfricaStandbyForce
EDDExplosiveDetectingDog
ENDFEthiopiaNationalDefenceForce
EODExplosiveordnancedisposal
EPRDFEthiopianPeoples’ RevolutionaryDemocraticFront
EUEuropeanUnion
FAD ForcesArméesdeDjiboutiennes
FGSFederalGovernmentofSomalia
FOBForwardOperatingBase
FPUFormedPoliceUnit
HRDDPHumanRightsDueDiligencePolicy(UN)
IDPInternallyDisplacedPerson
IEDImprovisedExplosiveDevice
IGADIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment
IGASOMIGADPeaceSupportMissiontoSomalia
IHLInternationalhumanitarianlaw
IMATTInternationalMilitaryAdvisoryandTrainingTeam
IPOIndividualPoliceOfficer
IRAInterimRegionalAdministration
ISFInternationalStabilizationForce
ISRIntelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance
ISTInformationSupportTeam
ISTARIntelligence,surveillance,targetacquisition,reconnaissance
JCMJointCoordinationMechanism
KDFKenyanDefenceForce
MIAMogadishuInternationalAirport
MOCCMilitaryOperationsCoordinationCommittee
MONUSCOUNStabilizationMissionintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo
MRAPMineResistantAmbushProtected
MSRMainSupplyRoute
NATONorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NGONon-GovernmentalOrganization
NSCNationalSecurityCouncil
NSSPNationalSecurityandStabilizationPlan(Somalia)
OCHAOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UN)
PIUPublicInformationUnit
POCProtectionofCivilians
PSCPeaceandSecurityCounciloftheAfricanUnion
PSODPeaceSupportOperationsDivision(AU)
QIPQuickImpactProject
QRFQuickReactionForce
RPGRocket-propelledgrenade
ROERulesofEngagement
RSLAFRepublicofSierraLeoneArmedForces
SCICSupremeCouncilofIslamicCourts
SEASexualexploitationandabuse
SNASomaliNationalArmy
SNPSomaliNationalPolice
SNSFSomaliNationalSecurityForces
SPFSomaliPoliceForce
SRCCSpecialRepresentativeoftheChairpersonoftheAUCommission
SRSGSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-General
SSRSecuritysectorreform
TCCTroop-ContributingCountry
TFGTransitionalFederalGovernment
TFITransitionalFederalInstitutions
TNGTransitionalNationalGovernment
UAVUnmannedaerialvehicle
UPDFUgandaPeople’sDefenceForce
UNUnitedNations
UNAMIDAfricanUnion–UnitedNationsMissioninDarfur
UNMASUNMineActionService
UNMEEUNMissioninEthiopiaandEritrea
UNMISUNMissioninSudan
UNMISSUNMissioninSouthSudan
UNOCIUNOperationinCôted’Ivoire
UNPOSUNPoliticalOfficeforSomalia
UNSOAUNSupportOfficeforAMISOM
UNSOMUNAssistanceMissioninSomalia
UNSOSUNSupportOfficeinSomalia
USCUnitedSomaliCongress
Wad Madani Gedaref
Kurmuk
Mendi Gidami
Kigille
Gambela
Akobo
Towot Pibor Post
Dembi Dolo
Jinja Tororo
Kisumu
Kericho
Shinyanga Musoma
HORN OF AFRICA Metema
Bure
Debre Mark'os
Nek'emte Gimbi Guba
Agaro Gore
Jima
Shewa Gimira Yeki
Gonder
Sek'ot'a
Fiche Debre Birhan
Addis Ababa
Hagere Hiywet Boor Mojo Nazret
Hosa'ina Awasa
Yirga 'Alem Sodo
Abaya Hayk
Goha Galadi
Sogata Arba Minch'
Todenyang Kapoeta
Lokwa Kangole
Lodwar
Kibre Menguist
(Sanaa)'
Werder Shilabo
Gaalkacyo War Galoh
Ch'amo Hayk
Ch'amo Hayk
Garadase Banya Murle
Lake Turkana (Lake Rudolf)
Filtu Negele
Mega Moyale Kusa
North Horr Loiyangalani Lokichar
Nyahururu
Takaba El Wak Buna
Garbahaarrey
Beledweyne Ferfer
Xuddur Dolo Bay
Hobyo Dhuusamarreeb
Buulobarde Ceeldheere
Baardheere
Wajir Kismaayo Laisamis
Bilis Qooqaani
Arusha Tilka
Machakos
Namanga Mwanza
Maralal Kakamega Eldoret Nanyuki Nyeri Embu Nakuru Moshi Mombasa Kilifi Malindi Moroto
Voi
Lamu Garsen
Baraawe Bu'aale
Buur Gaabo
Tanga
Asayita
DJIBOUTI GULF OF ADEN Caluula Breeda
Bandar Murcaayo
Gees Gwardafuy
Nazret Dire Dawa Jijiga Dikhil Harer
Silil
Saylac
Raas Maskan
AWDAL
Baki
Togwajaale
ETHIOPIA Imi Megalo
KENYA
Dolo Bay
Hargele
Wajir
Boorama GEDO
El Beru Hagia Baardheere
JUBA DHEXE
Afmadow Luuq
Bilis Qooqaani
JUBA HOOSE
Garsen Lamu
Boosaaso (Bender Cassim)
Raas Surud
Bullaxaar
WOQOOYI GALBEED
Hargeysa
Degeh Bur Gode
Butyaalo
Jaceel
Bargaal
Isole Giuba
Buur Gaabo
Raas Kaambooni
Karin Xiis Maydh Laasqoray
Berbera
Raas Khansiir
Burco (Burao)
Kiridh Oodweyne
TOGDHEER
Dahot
Ceerigaabo (Erigavo)
Der Darro Eyl
Buuhoodle
Qandala Hurdiyo
Iskushuban
Karkaar Mountains
Qardho
Garadag Eyl
Dudo
Raas Binna
Raas Xaafuun
Xaafuun
Bandarbeyla Xudun
Taxeex
Laascaanood
Gori Rit
Werder
Shilabo K'ebri Dahar
Ferfer
BAKOOL HIRAAN
Garbahaarrey Baydhabo (Baidoa)
Buurhakaba Diinsoor
Bu'aale
Jilib
Djibouti BAY
Haaway
Jamaame
GALGUDUUD MUDUG NUGAAL SOOL
Beledweyne (Oddur) Xuddur
Tayeeglow Buulobarde
Wanlaweyn
Qoryooley
SHABELLE HOOSE
Baraawe
Kismaayo (Chisimayu)
Garoowe Gaalkacyo (Galcaio)
Raas Gabbac
Xamure Beyra Berdaale
Seemade
War Galoh Mirsaale Baxdo Mereer-Gur
Dhuusamarreeb (Dusa Marreb)
Ceel Buur Derri
SHABELLE DHEXE
Cadale Mahadday Weym
Jawhar (Giohar)
Balcad Afgooye
Hobyo
Ceeldheere Ceel Huur
Xarardheere
Garacad
Hilalaya
Muqdisho (Mogadishu)
Marka (Merca)
National
Regional
Town, village Airport
International
Regional
Undetermined boundary
Main road
Track
Railroad
ToAfgooyeTown and(4km) K50(24Km)
ToBalcad Town (around30Km) Legend
DAYNILE
Dayniile
Creation Date:
Projection/Datum:
Web Resources:
E-mail: Nominal Scale at A4 paper size: 15/02/2010 Geographic/WGS 84 http://ochaonline.un.org/somalia peterson1@un.org
kms
Map data source(s): IDP Settlements: OCHA, Metria and UNHCR All Admin. layers: UNDP Somalia (1998)
DHARKENLEY
Mogadishu North / Ceel Maan
HEL EL WAA
YAAAAQSH ID KARAAARAAN
Bakara Market K-4 junction
WADAAG
XAMAR WEYNE
XAMAR JAABJAB
Vil a Somal a Villa Somalia New seaport
Mogadogadishu
Introduction ‘Eachmorningthelionwakesupandknowsthathemustrunfasterthan theantelopeorhewillstarve.Theantelopewakesupandknowsthathe mustrunfasterthanthelioninordertosurvive.Sowhetheryouarealion oranantelope,whenthemorningarrives,you’dbetterberunning.’
ThisversionofamotivationalAfricanfablewasdisplayedintheforce headquartersoftheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM)inJanuary 2013.DeployedtoMogadishuinMarch2007,AMISOM’speacekeepershave been ‘running’ formorethantenyears.Theyweretaskedwithstabilizingthe countrythathadbecometheworld’sparadigmaticexampleof ‘statefailure’ , warlordism,andcorruptionformorethantwentyyears.¹Inpracticalterms, thismeantAMISOM’spersonnelhadto fightforpeaceinSomalianotjust keepit.Theirprincipalopponentwasthe Harakatal-Shabaabal-Mujahideen (hereafter, al-Shabaab/‘theyouth’),anadaptableanddeadlyorganizationthat triedtodestroythesuccessivesetsofSomaliauthoritiesthatAMISOMwas mandatedtoprotect.
ThestoryofAMISOM’sstruggleinwhatbecamethedeadliestpeace operationinmodernhistoryisremarkableinitsownrightformanyreasons thatwillbediscussedinthisbook.Butitisalsoimportantbecauseitprovides insightsintohowtoaddresssomeofthemostdifficultchallengesfacing contemporarypeaceoperationsinothercountries:How,forinstance,cana peaceoperationhelpstabilizeacountrywithoutafunctionalcentralgovernmentorapeaceprocess?Howcanapeaceoperationcombatatransnational, partlycriminalorganizationthatreliesonasymmetricandterrortacticsbut alsohasdeeprootsinsignificantsegmentsofthelocalpopulation?Howcan multipleinternationalorganizationsandstatespartnereffectivelytodefeat suchafoe?Howcanapeaceoperationsucceedwhenthereisahugegap
¹Duringthisperiod,Somaliaconsistentlyrankedatorverynearthebottomofgovernance andcorruptionindicessuchastheWorldBank’ s GovernanceMatters database,http://info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home;theFundforPeace’sFailed/FragileStatesIndex,http:// fundforpeace.org/fsi/;andTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionsIndex,www. transparency.org.
betweenitscapabilitiesanditsmandatedtasks?Andhowshouldanalystsand practitionersalikesetexpectationsforsuchmissionsandevaluatesuccessand failure?UnderstandingthecaseofSomaliaoverthelastdecadecanshed importantlightontheseandotherquestionsatatimewhenmoreorganizationsthaneverbeforeareconductingmilitaryoperationsdesignedtobring peacetovariouswar-tornterritories,perhapsmostnotablyinAfghanistan, Iraq,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC),Mali,CentralAfricanRepublic (CAR),theLakeChadBasin,centralAfrica,andtheSahel.
InitiallycomprisingjustonebattlegroupofUgandansoldierswhowere airliftedintoMogadishuon6March2007,AMISOMwasthe fifthpeacesupport operationauthorizedbytheAfricanUnion(AU),followingearliermissionsin Burundi,Sudan,andtheComoros.Itwasremarkableinseveralrespects.First,it wouldbecometheAU’slargestpeaceoperationbyaconsiderablemargin. Indeed,bymid-2017,AMISOMwasthelargestdeploymentofuniformed peacekeepersintheworld.Second,itbecamethelongestrunningmission underAUcommandandcontrol,outlastingthenearestcontender theAU MissioninSudan byoversevenyears.Unsurprisingly,therefore,AMISOM alsobecametheAU’smostexpensiveoperation,atitspeakcostingapproximatelyUS$1billionperyear.AstheonlyAU-ledpeaceoperationlaunched between2007and2012,AMISOMalsobecameakeybarometerforthebroader debatesabouthowmuchprogresswasbeingmadetowardsbuildingtheAfrican PeaceandSecurityArchitecture.And,sadly,AMISOMbecametheAU’sdeadliestmission,althoughasdiscussedbelowtheprecisenumberoffatalitiesand woundedwasnotmadepublic.AMISOMwasalsounusualinadoctrinalsense. Althoughitwasoftenreferredtoasapeacekeepingoperation,includingattimes onthemission’sownwebsite,AMISOM’smandatedtaskswentwellbeyondthe realmofpeacekeeping,includingVIPprotection,war-fighting,counterinsurgency,stabilization,andstate-buildingaswellassupportingelectoralprocesses andfacilitatinghumanitarianassistance.
Thisbookhastwocentralaims,whicharereflectedinitstwoparts.First,it aimstoprovideadetailedanalysisofAMISOM’sevolutionfromitsgenesisin anearlier,failedregionalinitiativein2005uptomid-2017.Duringthattime, AMISOMevolvedgeographically,politically,andmilitarily.Geographically, themissionstartedoutinthehighlyunusualpositionofhavingitsmilitary componentdeployedinonecountry,Somalia,butitsciviliancomponent, includingtheheadofmission,deployedinanothercountry,Kenya.Inside Somalia,AMISOMgraduallyevolvedfromoccupyingjustahandfulofstrategic locationsinMogadishutocoveringanareaofoperationsthatencompassedthe wholeofsouth-centralSomalia,aregionroughlythesizeofIraq.Politically, havinginitiallyconcludedthatAMISOM’speacekeepersshouldnotbedrawn fromSomalia’sneighbouringcountries,theAUandUNSecurityCouncil reversedthisdecision,andfrom2012Somalia’sneighboursbecameanincreasinglyimportantpartofthemission’smilitarycomponent(seeTableI.1).
TableI.1. AMISOMTCCsarmysize,defencespending(US$),andcontribution
CountryJoined AMISOM Army Size DefenceSpending (deploymentyear) AMISOMContribution (est.maximum)
Uganda 200745,000232m6,200
Burundi 200735,00078m5,400
Djibouti 20118,000Unknown(2010)12m1,800
Kenya 201220,000942m4,300
SierraLeone 201310,50014m850
Ethiopia 2014135,000375m4,400
Source:IISS, TheMilitaryBalance (London:Taylor&Francis,2007,2008,2010,2011,2012,2013, 2014,2015).
Fig.I.1. AMISOMAuthorizedandDeployedStrength,2007–17
Source:CompiledbyauthorfromofficialAUandUNsourcesandinterviews.
Militarily,AMISOM’sinitialauthorizedstrengthwas8,000,aratioofapproximatelyonepeacekeeperforevery1,125Somalis.Thiswassubsequentlyincreasedto12,000uniformedpersonnelinDecember2010,17,731inFebruary 2012,andinNovember2013atemporary ‘ surge ’ raisedthatnumberto22,126, whichwasstillinoperationbylate2017.However,asillustratedinFigureI.1, AMISOM’sdeployedstrengthincreasedirregularly.²Startingwithapproximately1,600Ugandantroops,ittookAMISOMoverthreeandahalfyearsto
²In2007,onlytenofAMISOM’suniformedpersonnelwerewomen.By1November2017, AMISOM’smilitarycomponenthad741women,whilewomenrepresented20percentofits policecomponent.SeeAMISOMSRCC’sTweetathttps://twitter.com/AmbFMadeira/status/ 925729141659521026
reachitsinitialauthorizedstrength.Themissionsubsequentlyenlargedintwo significantburstsin2012andearly2014.
Thebook’ssecondaimistounderstandhowAMISOManditskeypartners triedtoovercomethemajorchallengesconfrontingthemission,andwhat lessonsshouldbelearnedfromtheirexperiences.Aswillbecomeclear,the focusofmyanalysisisnottheinternationalandregionalpoliticaldebatesthat tookplaceaboutAMISOM,principallybetweenthemembersoftheAU’ s PeaceandSecurityCouncilinAddisAbaba,theIntergovernmentalAuthority onDevelopment(IGAD)inDjibouti,theUNSecurityCouncilinNewYork,or theEuropeanUnion(EU)inBrussels.Instead,myfocusontheoperational levelisinkeepingwiththeprimarypurposeofpeaceoperations,toinfluence outcomesonthegroundintheirhostcountry,andhowAMISOM’spersonnel andtheirpartnerswentabouttheirjobs.Thisbookthereforeoffersacritical politicalanalysisofwhatIconsidertobethesixmostimportantoperational challengesthatconfrontedAMISOMbetween2007and2017,namely,logistics,securitysectorreform,civilianprotection,strategiccommunications, stabilization,anddevelopingasuccessfulexitstrategy.Eachoftheseissues playedanimportantpartinshapingAMISOM’sactivities.Theyarealso salientformosttwenty-first-centurypeaceoperationsandhencelessons fromAMISOM’sexperiencesmaywellhavewiderapplicabilitybeyondSomalia. Withthesepointsinmind,therestofthisintroductorychapterdoes fourthings.First,itexplainswhatIwillrefertoasthe ‘AMISOMmodel’ , thatis,howthemissionwasorganizedandfunctioned.Second,itnoteshow AMISOMservesasanimportantcasestudyforseveralbroaderdebatesabout contemporarypeaceoperations.Third,itbrieflyoutlinessomeofmyprincipal argumentsaboutthemission.Finally,itsummarizesthesourcesutilized duringtheresearchforthisbook.
THEAMISOM ‘ MODEL ’ IusethephrasetheAMISOM ‘model’ asshorthandtodescribehowthe missionwasorganizedacrossthethreedimensionsofpoliticalauthority, financing,andoperations.³Inbrief,theAMISOMmodelbecameextremely
³ReferencestoAMISOMasapotentialmodelforrespondingtoothercrisesstartedappearingafterlate2011whenthemissionforced al-Shabaab towithdrawitsmainforcesfrom Mogadishuandbegantobeviewedasarelativesuccess.See,forexample,MattFreearand CedricdeConing, ‘LessonsfromtheAfricanUnionMissionforSomalia(AMISOM)forPeace OperationsinMali’ , Stability,2:2(2013),http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.bj/76; CeciliaHullWiklund, TheRoleoftheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia (Sweden:FOI,June 2013);and ‘Letterdated20January2013fromtheSecretary-GeneraladdressedtothePresident oftheSecurityCouncil’,(S/2013/37,21January2013).
complicatedbecauseitrequiredsignificantcoordinationandcooperation betweenatleastthreeinternationalorganizationsandanarrayofbilateral partners.Specifically,formostofitsduration,AMISOMrequiredtheAUto providethetroops,theEUtopaythem(andprovideotherformsofsupport), theUNtoprovidelogisticssupport,andkeybilateralpartners,notablythe UnitedStatesandUnitedKingdom,toprovideequipment,training,andother formsofsecurityassistancetothetroop-contributingcountries(TCCs).
Asaconsequence,whileAMISOM’sactivitieswereprincipallyconductedin Somalia,inordertounderstandhowthemissionwasorganizedandmadekey decisions,theanalysismustalsoexplorepoliticalprocessesinAddisAbaba, NewYork,Nairobi,andBrussels,aswellasinthecapitalcitiesofeachofits majorcontributingcountriesandexternalpartners.Itmustalsotakeaccount oftheactivitiesofthemission’sprincipalopponent, al-Shabaab,whichalso operatedbeyondSomalia.
PoliticalAuthority AMISOMdrewitsauthorityfromboththeAUPeaceandSecurityCounciland theUNSecurityCouncil.AttheUN,themissionwasauthorizedbySecurity Councilresolutionstohelpmaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurityand respondtotheparticularthreatposedby al-Shabaab militants.TheseresolutionsalsodefinedthedetailsofAMISOM’smandateandspecifiedthenatureof UNsupportitcouldreceive.AttheAU,itwasthePeaceandSecurityCouncil thatinitiallymandatedAMISOM.Operationalauthorityoverthemissionwas subsequentlyvestedintheChairpersonoftheAUCommission,whodelegated responsibilityforallpeaceoperationstotheCommissionerforPeaceand Security,withresponsibilityfortheday-to-daystrategiccoordinationissues fallingtotheCommission’sPeaceSupportOperationsDivision(PSOD). UnlikethecaseofDarfur,wheretheAUCommissionestablishedtheIntegratedTaskForcetooverseeitspeaceoperationthere,nodedicatedequivalent structurewascreatedforAMISOM,althoughseveraladhocmechanismswere establishedfrom2012atthebehestofAMISOM’sTCCsandsomeofits externalpartners.WiththeapprovaloftheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncil, theCommissionChairpersonappointedaSpecialRepresentative(SRCC)as headofthemissionwhoexercisedauthorityoverAMISOM’smilitary,police, andciviliancomponents.TheSRCCreportedtotheChairpersonthroughthe CommissionerforPeaceandSecurity.AMISOM’sseniorleadershipappointmentsarelistedinAppendixB,whileanindicativesnapshotofthemission’ s internalorganizationfrom2012isprovidedinFigureI.2.From1995untilJune 2013,theUNalsooperatedaspecialpoliticalmissioninSomalia,theUN PoliticalOfficeforSomalia(UNPOS),whichsubsequentlytransitionedintoa largerUNAssistanceMission(UNSOM).Bothoftheseinteractedwithand
