Introduction
AnnaBergqvistandRobertCowan
Evaluationisubiquitous.Itisn’tanexaggerationtosaythatweassessactions, character,events,andobjectsas good, bad, cruel, kind, beautiful, ugly,etc.,almost everydayofourlives.Aparadigmofevaluationisevaluativejudgement.Forexample, Jenmakesthejudgementthatthenorth-westScottishHighlandsare beautiful,while Philjudgesthattheriseofreligiousintoleranceisa bad thing.Indeed,ifweareliberal abouthowweclassifythe ‘evaluative’¹suchthatitincludesthe deontic rightness, wrongness, obligation, blameworthiness,etc. thenthepervasivenessofevaluative judgementisevenmorestriking.
Sofar,souncontroversial.Amorecontentioussetofissuesarisewhenweconsider whetherevaluativejudgementsareexpressionsofcognitiveornon-cognitivestates, whethertheydeploydistinctivelyevaluativeconcepts,whethertheyareevertrue, orcanbeepistemicallyjustified, etc.Note,however,thatrecentdevelopmentsin metaethics,inparticulartheemergenceofversionsofQuasi-Realism,²somewhat complicatedebatesaboutthesequestions.³Forexample,ifweadoptadeflationary viewoftruth,thenevenNon-Cognitivistscanagreethatsomeevaluativejudgements aretrue.Giventhis,assumingthatevaluationscanbetrue,etc.,isperhapsnotas controversialasitmight firstseem.Inwhatfollowswewillspeakasifevaluative judgementscanindeedbetrueandepistemicallyjustified.
Historically,ithasbeenthoughtthatadistinctivekindofevaluationis perceptual or experiential.Further,somehavealsobelievedthatthissortofevaluationcanbeveridical, andcanplaysignificantroles,e.g.epistemic.⁴ Toillustrate:inaesthetics,manyphilosophershaveclaimedthatadequateaestheticjudgementmustbegroundedinthe appreciator’ s first-handexperienceoftheitemjudged.Thus,FrankSibleyassertsthat wehavetoreadthepoem,hearthemusic,orseethepicture(notmerelyhaveitdescribedin non-meritandevendeterminatetermsifthatwerepossible)andthen judge or decide whether anaestheticmerittermappliestoitornot.⁵
¹Wewon’tattempttoprovidesomesetofnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforwhatgetstocountas ‘evaluative’.Sufficetosaythatweareassumingabroadnotion.
²Seee.g.Blackburn(2006).³Seee.g.Drier(2004).
⁴ Note,thataswasthecasewithvaluejudgements,notionsofveridicality,etc.,canpresumablybe understoodinadeflationarysensetoo.
⁵ Sibley(2001),99.
Thisclaimisoftentreatedasatruismaboutaestheticdiscourse.⁶ Further,some philosophers⁷ havealsomadeapositiveclaimaboutwhatcriticaldebateinvolves: thatitspurposeistobringone’saudiencetoseetheobjectinacertainway.Somealso thinkthatcriticismdoesnotdependforitsplausibilityongeneralaestheticcriteria,if thatmeansdeductivereasoningfromgeneralaestheticclaims,fornosuchclaimsare available.⁸ Inanycase,thepointofcriticaldiscussionisnottheformationofbelief, buttheengenderingofperception.Relatedtothis,withinthetraditionfromHume throughtoSibleyinanalyticaesthetics,acquiredsensibilitiesoftaste(andsimilar conditionssuchasasenseofhumour)areseenascognitivelynecessaryinthe appreciationofaestheticmeritqualities.⁹ Thisissuggestiveofanimportantrolefor experienceinthenormativestandingofaestheticbeliefs.
Inethics,Aristotleandmodern-dayVirtueEthicistssuchasJohnMcDowell¹⁰ characterizepracticalwisdomintermsofaperceptualability.Alongsomewhat similarlines,otherphilosophers¹¹haveemphasizedtheimportanceofethical ‘vision’ asamatterofseeingthings aright,particularlywithrespecttoitsabilitytoleadusto reviseourpreconceptionsaboutparticularobjects,persons,andevents.AsIris Murdochputsit,goodnessis arefinedandhonestperceptionofwhatisreallythecase,apatientandjustdiscernmentand explorationofwhatconfrontsone,whichistheresultnotsimplyofopeningone’seyesbutofa certainperfectlyfamiliarkindofmoraldiscipline.¹²
Elsewhere,MoralSenseTheoristslikeFrancesHutcheson¹³seemedtothinkthatan affectiveexperienceofmoral(dis)approbationconstitutedourprimaryawarenessof moralqualities.
Contemporarily,therehasbeencontinuedandrenewedinterestintheconnection betweentheevaluativeandtheperceptual.Weherenote fiveexamples.
Firstly,inaestheticstherehasbeengrowingdiscussionoftheidea introducedby RichardWollheim¹⁴—thatthephenomenonofSeeing-In,whichisoftenclaimedto betypicalofpictorialexperience,marksoutasuigeneriskindofperception.¹⁵ Second,arelativelysubstantialliteratureontheexistenceandnatureofethical perceptionhassprungupoverthelastdecade.¹⁶ Muchofthishasbeeninformed byrecentworkinthephilosophyandepistemologyofperception.Specifically,(and thisisourthirdexample)ithasbeeninfluencedbytheemergenceofHigh-Level views¹⁷ aboutthecontentsofperceptualexperience,i.e.,roughly,viewswhichallow
⁶ ButseeLivingston(2003).
⁷ Seee.g.Hampshire(1967);Sibley(1959/2001),(1965/2001),and(1983/2001);Strawson(1966).
⁸ Seee.g.Bergqvist(2010);Isenberg(1967);Mothersill(1984).
⁹ Forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint,seee.g.Hopkins(2006)and(2011).
¹⁰ McDowell(1998).
¹¹Seee.g.Blum(1994);DePaul(1993);McNaughton(1988);Murdoch(1970);Sherman(1989).
¹²Murdoch(1997),330.Forin-depthanalysisoftheimplicationsofMurdoch’saccountofmoral perceptionforthepossibilityobjectivityinethics,seeBergqvist,Ch.13inthisvolume.Foritsimportance tothehistoryofmoralphilosophyinthetwenty-firstcentury,seeBergqvist(2015).
¹³Seee.g.Hutcheson(1728/1991).¹⁴ Seee.g.Wollheim(1980).
¹⁵ Seee.g.Lopes(1996)and(2005);Hopkins(1998);Pettersson(2011).
¹
⁶ Seee.g.Audi(2013)and(2015);McBrayer(2010a);Väyrynen(2008a);Werner(2016).
¹⁷ Seee.g.Bayne(2009);S.Siegel(2010a).
thatwecanperceive(inthecanonicalmodalities)complexpropertiessuchasnatural kindsandothercategoricalproperties.Interestinethicalperceptionhasalsobeen informedbyrecentworkontheviewthatperceptioninthecanonicalsensory modalitiesisCognitivelyPenetrable,i.e.,roughly,perceptionissusceptibletonontrivialinfluencefromcognitivestateslikebeliefsanddesires(moreonthislater).¹⁸ Fourth,therehasbeenmuchrecentinterestinthedevelopmentorfurtherrefinement ofperceptualviewsofdesires,¹⁹ emotions,²⁰ andpains²¹accordingtowhichtheyare experiencesofvalue.Fifthly,and finally,therehasbeensomerecentwork²²onthe connectionbetweentheexistenceofevaluativeperceptionandviewsinvaluetheory, e.g.,whetherperceptualtheoriesoftheemotionsarecompatiblewithparticularkinds ofSentimentalismaboutvalueconceptsandproperties.
Despitethishistoryandrecentdevelopments,therehasonlybeenlimitedinteractionbetweenphilosophersworkingonthesevarioustopics.Thisvolumeaimsto remedythisbybringingtogetherphilosophersinaesthetics,epistemology,ethics, philosophyofmind,andvaluetheory,tocontributeinnovelwaystodebatesabout whatwecall ‘EvaluativePerception’.Speci fically,theycontributetoansweringthe followingquestions:
QuestionsaboutExistenceandNature:Arethereperceptualexperiencesof values?Ifso,whatistheirnature?Areexperiencesofvaluessuigeneris?Arevalues necessaryforcertainkindsofexperience?
QuestionsaboutEpistemology:Canevaluativeexperienceseverjustifyevaluative judgements?Areexperiencesofvaluesnecessaryforcertainkindsofjustified evaluativejudgements?
QuestionsaboutValueTheory:Istheexistenceofevaluativeexperiencesupportedorunderminedbyparticularviewsinvaluetheory?Areparticularviewsin valuetheorysupportedorunderminedbytheexistenceofvalueexperience?
Inthefollowingthreesectionsweprovideanintroductiontosomeofthemaintopics ofdiscussion,andtothevolumepapers.
Beforedoingso,thereadershouldnotethefollowing.Asshallbecomeclear,the fifteenpapersinthisvolumeareallconcernedwithansweringoneormoreofthese questions,andoftencross-cutdifferentareas,e.g.,epistemologyandvaluetheory. Forthatreason,itissomewhatartificialtodividethemintodiscretesubgroups. However,toaidthereaderinseeingtheconnectionsbetweenthepapers,andto contributetothethematicunityofthevolume,wehaveplacedthepapersintothree subgroups.The firstisprimarilyconcernedwiththe ExistenceandNatureofEvaluativePerception.HerewehaveplacedcontributionsbyDustinStokes,Heather Logue,RobertAudi,PaulNoordhof,PekkaVäyrynen,MikaelPettersson,andAnya Farennikova.Thesecondgroupismostlyaddressedtoquestionsabout Evaluative PerceptionandEpistemology.HerewehavecontributionsfromSarahMcGrath,Jack C.Lyons,MichaelMilona,andRobertCowan.Finally,thethirdsubgroupisfocused
¹⁸ Seee.g.FirestoneandScholl(2014);Macpherson(2012);S.Siegel(2012).
¹⁹ Seee.g.Oddie(2005).²⁰ Seee.g.Döring(2003).²¹Seee.g.Bain(2013).
²²Seee.g.Brady(2013);Cowan(2016);Tappolet(2011).
ontheconnectionsbetween EvaluativePerceptionandValueTheory.Herecanbe foundthecontributionsbyGrahamOddie,AnnaBergqvist,JamesLenman,and KathleenStock.
1.ExistenceandNatureofEvaluativePerception
Manyofthepapersinthevolumeareconcernedwiththeexistenceandnatureof EvaluativePerception.Aswearecharacterizingit,thisinvolvestheexperiential representation²³ofvalueproperties,i.e.,therearesomeperceptualexperienceswith evaluativecontent.
Beforeclarifyingthisanddifferentkindsofevaluativeperceptualexperience,the phenomenonshouldbedistinguishedfromtwoothers.
Firstly,thereiswhatwecall ‘DeRePerceptionofValues’.²⁴ Thatis,weperceive objects,persons,events,statesofaffairsthatasamatteroffactinstantiateevaluative properties,e.g., moralrightness, beauty.EveryonebutthevalueErrorTheoristcan assenttotheclaimthatthereisDeRePerceptionofValues.Forourpurposes,the crucialdifferencebetweenthisandEvaluativePerceptionisthattheDeRePerceptionofsomeFbyasubjectiscompatiblewiththesubjectnothavingaperceptual ‘experience’ ofF,i.e.,anexperiencewithevaluativecontent.
Second,thereiswhatwecall ‘EvaluativeSeeing-That’.Thisinvolvesmakingan evaluativejudgementinresponsetoaperceptualexperience(oftenitisassumedthat theevaluativejudgementhassomepositiveepistemicstatus,e.g.,constitutesknowledge).OnewayinwhichsomerestrictthenotionofEvaluativeSeeing-Thatisby insistingthatitmustbebothpsychologicallyandepistemicallynon-inferential,i.e., therelevantjudgementsmustn’tbetheresultof,norbeepistemicallydependent upon,inference.²⁵ Giventhisrestriction,thereisscopeforphilosophicaldebateasto whetherallputativeinstancesofEvaluativeSeeing-Thatinvolvesomesortofinferentialepistemicdependence(formorediscussionseeSection2ofthisIntroduction). Forourpurposes,theimportantdifferencebetweenthisandEvaluativePerceptionis thatEvaluativeSeeing-Thatisconsistentwiththeperceptualexperienceonlyrepresentingnon-evaluativeproperties,e.g.,thepropertiesuponwhichtheevaluative propertysupervenesorisconsequential.
NowtoclarifyEvaluativePerception.Althoughthereisanimportantdistinction betweennon-factiveperceptualexperience,andperceptionwhichisfactive,wewill mainlyfocusontheformerandforeaseofexpressionsimplyrefertoitas ‘Evaluative Perception’.IfthereisEvaluativePerception,inthiscentralsense,thensubjectscan haveperceptualexperiencesthatrepresenttheinstantiationofevaluativeproperties
²³Incharacterizingthingsthisway,weareusingthelanguageofanIntentionalistorRepresentational theoryofperception.OnaRelationalviewofperception,bycontrast,veridicalexperiencesdonothave representationalcontent,butinsteadinvolvetheobtainingofaperceptualrelationbetweentheperceiver andworldlyobjects,suchthattherelevantobjectscanbesaidtoliterallyconstituteone’sexperience.See e.g.M.G.F.Martin(2006).Forbrevitywewillspeakofperceptualrepresentation(partlybecausemostof thepapersinthevolumeassumeit)buttheRelationalviewoughttobekeptinmind.
²⁴ Or ‘non-epistemicseeing’.SeeDretske(1969),esp.ch.2.SeealsoDretske(1993).
²
⁵ OnemightgofurtherandprovideapositivecharacterizationoftheaetiologyofSeeing-That, e.g.,theyhavetheirsourceinmodularperceptualsystems;seeJackLyons(Ch.9inthisvolume).
ofthesortdescribedabove,i.e.,someperceptualexperiencesareaccurateonlyifthey representevaluativeproperties.Laterwewillintroducesomeotherphenomena which,althoughtheydon’tfallunderthiscategory,areworthwhileconsidering alongsidediscussionofEvaluativePerceptionproper.
ThereareatleastthreedifferentkindsofEvaluativePerceptionthatareworth distinguishing.
The firstoftheseiswhatwecall ‘CanonicalEvaluativePerception’.Thisinvolvesa commitmenttotherepresentationofevaluativepropertiesinoneormoreofthe five canonicalsensorymodalities.Someversionofthisviewisdefendedorendorsedin thisvolumebyRobertAudi(atleastononeinterpretation),PaulNoordhof,and DustinStokes.
ThesecondkindofEvaluativePerceptioniswhatwerefertoas ‘Affective EvaluativePerception’.Thisinvolvestherepresentationofevaluativepropertiesin anaffectiveorconativestate,suchasdesire,emotion,orpain.Oneachoftheseviews, therelevantmentalstateapparentlysharesimportantfeatureswithordinaryperceptualexperience,e.g.,theyhavephenomenalcharacter,representationalcontent,can berecalcitranttodoxasticchanges,exemplifysomecovariancewiththesubject’ s environment,andcanplayanon-inferentialepistemicrole.Thepointofinterestfor ourpurposesisthatifsuchexperiencescouldhaveanevaluativecontent and proponentsallseemtothinkthattheycan,e.g.,Oddie²⁶ conceivesofdesiresas experiencesof goodness ,Döring²⁷ thinksthatmoralemotionssuchasguiltrepresent moral properties,Bain²⁸ thinksthatpainexperiencesrepresentbodilydamageas bad forthesubject thentherecouldbeperceptualexperienceswithevaluativecontent, albeit ‘non-traditional’ ones.Versionsofthisviewarediscussedordefendedby RobertCowan,GrahamOddie,MichaelMilona,andPaulNoordhofinthisvolume.
ThethirdkindofEvaluativePerceptioniswhatwecall ‘SuiGenerisEvaluative Perception’.Thisinvolvestherepresentationofevaluativepropertiesinasuigeneris kindofexperience(by ‘suigeneris’ wesimplymeanthatitdoesn’treducetofamiliar sensoryoraffectivephenomena).Oneexampleofthis,whichisdiscussedor defendedinthisvolumebyRobertAudi,MichaelMilona,andPekkaVäyrynen,is theviewthatEvaluativePerceptionsare ‘integrated’ experiences,whicharean amalgamofsensory,emotional,andimaginativecomponents.Thisisdistinctfrom, e.g.,CanonicalEvaluativePerceptioninpartbecausethesensorycomponentofan integratedexperienceneednothaveanevaluativecontent.AnotherexampleofSui GenerisEvaluativePerception,whichisdiscussedbyJackLyonsinthisvolume,isthe viewthat,althoughevaluativepropertiesaren’trepresentedinsensoryexperience proper,theycanberepresentedinperceptualseemingstates.Roughly,theseare propositionalnon-doxasticstatesthatarethecausalupshotofsensoryexperienceor asensorysystem.²⁹
Duetospaceconstraints,ourdiscussionwillbefocusedontheprospectsfor CanonicalEvaluativePerception.However,thiswillstillallowustomakeextensive
²⁶ Oddie(2005)andCh.12inthisvolume.²⁷ Döring(2003).²⁸ Bain(2013).
²⁹ Forextensivediscussionofseemings,seeC.Tucker(2013).
referencetootherkindsofEvaluativePerceptioninthissectionandthroughoutthe Introduction.
Itis firstworthnotingthatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionrunscountertothe mainstreamviewaccordingtowhichcanonicalperceptualexperience,e.g.,vision, onlyrepresentswhatarecalled ‘Low-Level’ propertiessuchascolour,shape,and motion.IfthereisCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionthen ‘High-Level’ properties,e.g., aestheticandethical,mustalsoberepresentedinperceptualexperience.
WhywouldanyonethinkthatthereisCanonicalEvaluativePerception?Onekind ofevidence alreadynotedinthisIntroductionandhighlightedinchaptersbyAudi, Logue,Noordhof,Stokes,Väyrynen isthatweoftenuseperceptuallanguagewhen talkingabouttheevaluative.Forexample,itwouldnotbeunusualtohearsomeone say ‘theBotticellilooksincrediblecloseup’ ,or, ‘Icouldhearherdemeaningtone’ . However,thissortofevidenceisquiteweak.Evenifweacceptthatsuchcasesare psychologically(orperhapsevenepistemically)non-inferential,thisdoesn’tclearly supportthetruthofCanonicalEvaluativePerception,asopposedtosomeotherkind ofEvaluativePerception.Indeed,itdoesn’tobviouslysupportanykindofEvaluative Perception,ifsuchcasescanbeexplainedascasesofEvaluativeSeeing-Thatonthe basisofnon-evaluativeperceptualexperience.
Amorepromisingstrategyisperhapstoappealtowhathavecometobeknownas ‘ContrastArguments’.Thissortofargumenthasbeenpresentedbysomephilosophersofperception,notablyTimBayne³⁰ andSusannaSiegel,³¹insupportofthe High-Level(or ‘rich’ or ‘liberal’)viewofperception,withafocusonnaturalkind properties,e.g.,beingapinetree,andcausalrelations.Veryroughly,Contrast Argumentsinvolveconceivingoftwoexperienceswithverysimilaroridentical low-levelcontent,butwherethereisplausiblyadifferenceinthephenomenology betweenthem,e.g.,thecontrastbetweentheexperiencesoflookingatpinetrees beforeandthenafteracquiringafamiliaritywithwhattheircharacteristiclookis. ThecrucialmoveinContrastArgumentsistosaythatthebestexplanationofthe phenomenologicaldifferenceisadifferenceintherepresentationalcontentsof perceptionasopposedto,e.g.,attentionaldifferences.
Putverysimply:
P1:Thereisaphenomenologicaldifferencebetweentargetexperienceseande*.
P2:Thebestexplanationofthephenomenologicaldifferencebetweentarget experienceseande*requirespositingsomehigh-levelcontent,c,inexperience.
C:(Probably)someexperienceshavesomehigh-level,c,content.
MostarewillingtoacceptP1.ThusthecentraltaskforproponentsofContrast Argumentsistoshowthatpositinghigh-levelperceptionisindeedthebestexplanationoftherelevantcases.
Isthiskindofargumentmoreorlesspromisingintheevaluativecase?Inthis volumeDustinStokesprovidesaContrastArgumentinfavouroftheconclusionthat atleastsomeaestheticproperties,e.g.,gracefulness,arerepresentedincanonical experience.Interestinglyhethinksthatthissortofargumentismorepromisingin
SeeBayne(2009).³¹SeeS.Siegel(2010a).
theaestheticcasethanforotherhigh-levelpropertiessuchasnaturalkinds.Stokes arguesthatthereisnowaytoaccountforthephenomenologyofaestheticcases withoutadmittingperceptualrepresentationofsomeorganizationalgestalt,e.g.,an organizationalgestalttypicalofimpressionistworks.Crucially,toexperienceorganizationalaestheticgestaltsjustistoexperiencetherelevantaestheticproperties. Interestingly,thisfeatureislackingincasesofnaturalkindorevencolourproperties (asimilarviewisdefendedinBergqvist ’sdiscussionofvaluetheoryinthisvolume). Againstthiskindofoptimismandthegenerallineofthought,HeatherLoguein Chapter2castsdoubtonaestheticContrastArguments.Shethinksthatthereis anotherplausibleexplanation(whichisjustasparsimoniousaspositingCanonical EvaluativePerception)forthedifferenceinphenomenology:appealtoemotional states(AffectiveEvaluativePerception).Notably,thisalternativeexplanationmaybe absentinthecaseofotherhigh-levelpropertieslikenaturalkinds.Loguealso considersandrejectsargumentsinfavourofCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionof aestheticpropertieswhichappealtotheputative ‘observationality’ ofsomeaesthetic properties roughly,foranaestheticproperty,F,inidealviewingconditions,if somethingvisuallyappearstobeF,itisF ortotheirallegedly ‘ superficial’ metaphysicalnature.Regardingthelatter,Loguedrawsattentiontotheideathataestheticpropertiesareplausiblyresponse-dependent(afeaturethatmightcomplicate Stokes’sargument).
InChapter5PekkaVäyrynenconsidersaContrastArgumentformoralperception,³²but findsthatthephenomenologicaldifferencecanbeexplainedjustaswellby amodelwhichpositsthatanon-perceptualmoralrepresentationresultsfrom ‘ an implicithabitualinferenceorsomeothertypeoftransitioninthoughtwhichcanbe reliablypromptedbythenon-moralperceptualinputsjointlywiththerelevant backgroundmoralbeliefs’.³³Therepresentationsinvolvedmaybeaffectiveinnature (henceVäyrynenmaybeinterpretedascountenancingtheexistenceofAffective EvaluativePerceptionorSuiGenerisEvaluativePerception).Further,hethinksthat thisalternativemodelpossessestheoreticalvirtuesofsimplicityandunitythatgiveit anadvantage.PositingCanonicalMoralPerceptionaddsnoexplanatorypower. ThusP2ofamoralContrastArgumentshouldberejected.³⁴
AnotherkindofargumentthatcouldbeofferedinfavourofCanonicalEvaluative Perceptionisepistemological:
P1:Therecouldbeacertainkindofjustifiedbelief,J,onlyiftherewere CanonicalEvaluativePerception.
P2:ThereisjustifiedbeliefJ.
C:ThereisCanonicalEvaluativePerception.
P1claimsthatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisanecessaryconditionfora particularkindofepistemicjustification(asimilarargumentcouldbeconstructed
³²NotethatWerner(2016)presentsacontrastargumentinfavourofmoralperception.
³³PekkaVäyrynen(Ch.5inthisvolume).
³⁴ VäyrynenthinksthatwhetheraContrastArgumentislikelytosucceeddependsonthepropertiesin question,andhisviewisthatitisagooddeallesspromisinginthemoralcaseascomparedwithotherhighlevelproperties(asLogueargueswithregardtoaestheticproperties).
forknowledgeandotherpositiveepistemicproperties).Wewillpostponediscussion ofthisideauntilSection2oftheIntroduction.FornownotethatLoguediscussesand rejectsthissortofepistemicargumentinherchapter.³⁵
EvenifoneissomewhatsympathetictoargumentsinfavourofCanonicalEvaluativePerception,thereremains,interalia,thequestionofhowvaluepropertiescould berepresentedinexperience.Forexample,itmightseemhighlyimplausiblethat valuepropertiesarerepresentedinasimilarwaytothatinwhichlow-levelproperties likecoloursandshapesarerepresentedinvision.Thispointisnotonlynotedby opponentsofCanonicalEvaluativePerception seeJackLyons’spaperinthis volume butalsobyproponentsoftheview,suchasAudiandNoordhof(bothin thisvolume).Whetherornotthisisfatalfortheviewdependsuponwhetherwe allowthattherearedifferentkindsofrepresentationinperceptualexperience.For example,Audidistinguishes,interalia,betweenwhathecallsthe ‘perceptual’ , associatedwith ‘cartographic ’ , ‘pictorial’ and ‘basic’ representation(thesortallegedly involvedintherepresentationofcoloursandshapes),andthe ‘perceptible’,which involvesnon-cartographic,non-pictorial,andnon-basicrepresentation.Crucially, heseemstothinkthatsomeperception(inthecanonicalmodalities)isofthe perceptible.Noordhofalsodistinguishesbetween ‘ sensory ’ and ‘ non-sensory ’ representationincanonicalperception.³⁶ Ifweadmitthattherecanbedifferentkindsof perceptualrepresentation,thenCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionmaybeagooddeal moreplausible.
OnethingthatmakesitdifficulttodeterminewhethertherereallyisCanonical EvaluativePerceptionisthatitishardtoseehowwecansatisfactorilyresolve disputesbetweenthosewho,likeAudiandNoordhof,thinkthatthereissomething likenon-sensoryrepresentation,andthose,likeLyons,whothinkthatwhatisbeing referredtoasnon-sensoryperceptualrepresentationisactuallysomethingpostperceptual,e.g.,aperceptualseemingstatewhichhasphenomenalcharacter(though perhapsitis bland character)andconceptualcontent.Note,however,thatNoordhof providesargumentsinfavourofadmittingnon-sensoryrepresentation(onewhich appealstothephenomenologyofchickensexersandspeechperception,theother whichappealstoepistemicconsiderations),aswellasreasonsfordoubtingthe existenceofperceptualseemingsinhischapter.Also,inthiscontextitisworth notingHeatherLogue ’sviewthattheremaynotbeafactofthematterregardingthe questionofwhetheraestheticpropertiesarerepresentedincanonicalperceptual experience.
Evenifoneallowsthattherecanbenon-cartographicornon-sensoryperceptual representation,e.g.,perhapsthisiswhatallhigh-levelrepresentationinvolves,some stillmightthinkthattherearespecificproblemsforCanonical Evaluative Perception.
³⁵ RobertAudi(Ch.3inthisvolume)alsosuggeststhefollowingsortofargumentformoralperception: if thereisperceptionofemotion,e.g.,anger,thenthereislittlereasontodoubttheexistenceofmoral perception.Ofcourse,onemightdoubtthattheantecedentistrue,andinanycasemightdoubtthetruthof theconditional.AsPekkaVäyrynenargues,admissionofperceptualcontentsshouldproceedonacase-bycasebasis.
³⁶ AlthoughsomeaspectsofNoordhof ’sdistinctionappeartobesimilartoAudi’s,Noordhofplaces emphasisondiscriminabilityofpropertiesinorderto fleshoutthedifference.
Inhischapter,Noordhofthinksthattheremaybesomeresistancetotheideaof CanonicalEvaluativePerceptionevenamongthosewhocountenancenon-sensory representationbecauseofthecommonthoughtthatvaluepropertiesareinsomeway response-dependent(alsohighlightedbyLogue).³⁷ Inordertoaddressthis,Noordhof presentsanaccountofintrinsicresponse-dependentrepresentation i.e.,representationofapropertythathasnothingtodowiththerepresentationstandingin relationtosomethingindependentlycharacterizedintheworld.Heillustratesthis withreferencetotheperceptionofbadnessinpainandmoralperception.
SupposethataplausibleargumentcanbemadeforthinkingthatthereisCanonicalEvaluativePerception.Tosupportthis,proponentswillneedtoidentifypsychologicalmechanismsbywhichthiscouldtakeplace.Thisis,ofcourse,anempirical matterthatcan’tplausiblybesettledfromthearmchair.
Onecandidatemodelthathasreceivedattentionintherecentliteratureonmoral perceptionisthatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptioncouldbebroughtaboutbya processofCognitivePenetration.³ ⁸ Roughly,CognitivePenetrationofsensory experienceispossibleifandonlyifit’spossiblefortwosubjectstohaveexperiences whichdifferincontentand/orphenomenalcharacter,wherethisdifferenceisthe resultofacausalprocessthattracesmoreorlessdirectlytostatesinthesubjects’ cognitivesystem,andwherewehold fixedtheperceptualstimuli,theconditionofthe subjects’ sensoryorgans,theenvironmentalconditions,andtheattentionalfocusof thesubjects.³⁹
Potentialcognitivepenetratorsincludemoods,beliefs,desires,emotions,and charactertraits.Suchamodelmighthelptoexplainhowtherecanbeexpertise withrespecttovalues,e.g.,inaesthetics.Whattheexperthas,andthenovicelacks,is asetofbackgroundcommitmentsthatcognitivelypenetratetheirsensoryexperience suchthatitcomestohaveanevaluativecontent.
AlthoughthereisgrowingevidencefortheCognitivePenetrabilitythesis,⁴⁰ itis stillhighlycontroversial.ItisthereforeworthnotingthatadoptingtheCognitive PenetrabilitymodelrequiresproponentsofCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionto undertakesubstantialempiricalcommitmentsregardingthecapacitiesofordinary perceptionanditsrelationtocognition.Inthisvolume,Bergqvist,Cowan,Lyons, Pettersson,Stokes,andVäyrynendiscussCognitivePenetration.
AnothermodelappealstoPerceptualLearning,whichinvolvesarepeatedassociativeprocessthattakesplacewithintheperceptualsystem.Forexample,after repeatedexposuretoaparticularkindofartwork(andtop-downprocessingwithin thevisualsystem)perhapsone’svisualsystemmaycometoencodeinformation aboutaestheticproperties.StokesdiscussesthispossibilityinChapter1inthis volume.Ifwethinkthatthereissuchathingasaestheticexpertise,onemight thinkthatonefeaturethatdistinguishestheexpertfromthenoviceisthatthey havebeenrepeatedlyexposedtoartworks.Note,however,thatasimilarsortof
³⁷ Noordhofalsothinksthatthereisalackof ‘phenomenalpresence’ inthecaseofaestheticandmoral representation,thoughnotinthecaseoftherepresentationofbadnessinpainexperience.
³⁸ Cowan(2015b).³⁹ Seee.g.Vance(2014).
⁴⁰ Seee.g.BrunerandGoodman(1947);DelkandFillenbaum(1965);Hansenetal.(2006).Seealso D.Stokes(2013).
repeatedexposuremaybelesscommoninthemoralcase(althoughthismightbe overstatingthings).
A finalmodelforCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisthatourperceptualsystems arehard-wiredforevaluativerepresentation(inthewaythatrepresentationof coloursandshapesseemstobe).Onemightthinkthatanecessaryconditionfor perceptualhard-wiringisthatpossessingtherelevantrepresentationalpowerswillbe ofusetosubjectswhopossesstheminalmostanyenvironmentinwhichtheymight beplaced.⁴¹Noticethat,whileitisnotimplausiblethatmoralpropertiesmeetthe necessarycondition,itisperhapsagooddeallesssoforkindproperties,e.g.,beinga pinetree,andaestheticproperties.
InChapter3inthisvolume,RobertAudimaybeinterpretedasdefendingasortof hard-wiredviewaboutEvaluativePerception;however,itisnotentirelyclear whetherheiswillingtocountenancethisforCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionor onlyforakindofSuiGenerisEvaluativePerception(integratedexperiences).Finally, itisworthnotingthatinthecaseofAffectiveEvaluativePerception regarding emotionandpaininparticular philosophersseemtobemoresanguineaboutthe claimthatevaluativerepresentationishard-wired.
Althoughthemajorityofthepapersinthevolumeareengagedindebatesabout EvaluativePerception(aswehavedefinedit),twoofthevolumepapers thoseby MikaelPetterssonandAnyaFarennikova discussdistinctkindsofphenomena whichwethinkareusefullygroupedwiththeseotherpapers.
Firstly,thereisthephenomenonofSeeing-In,typicalofpictorialrepresentation, which asnotedearlier somehavethoughtmarksoutadistinctiveformofperception.Forinstance,itisoftensaidthatanimportantpartofourexperienceof pictures,suchaslookingataweddingphotographinthefamilyalbum,isthatwesee itssubjectmatter ‘in’ itssurface,inawaythatisdifferentfromwatchingtheworld (itspictorialcontent)face-to-face.
InChapter6inthisvolume,MikaelPette rssonproblematizesextantaccounts resemblance⁴ ²and recognitional ⁴³ ofSeeing-Inbyconsideringhowtheyfarewith respecttothephenomenonofseeing emptyspace inpictures.Althoughseeing emptyspaceinapicture(andseeing-inmoregenerally)isn ’taformofEvaluative Perception(aswehavede fi nedit),theallegeddistinctivenessofthisformof perception,anditsapparentsigni fi canceforaesthetics,e.g.,theaestheticappreciationofsomepictureswilldependonourexperienceofemptyspaceorvoidinthe picture,makeinclusionofdiscussionofthistopicinthiscollectionimportant. Petterssonrejectscognitiveaccountsofseeingemptyspaceinpictures(whatwe earlierreferredtoasSeeing-That)andgoesontosketchan imagination theory, whichaccordingtoonemodelinvolvesthecognitivepenetrationofperceptual experiencebyimagination.
Thesecondphenomenonisthatofperceptualexperienceswhich,thoughnot themselvesEvaluativePerceptions,areneverthelessallegedlycausallydependentfor theiroccurrenceuponsubjectshavingcertainsortsofevaluativecommitments.For example,perhapspossessingcertainaestheticbeliefsmakesonemoreperceptually
⁴¹Seee.g.Macpherson(2012). ⁴²SeeHopkins(1998). ⁴³SeeCurrie(1995).
attentivetoparticularlow-levelfeaturesofartworks,e.g.,colourandshapearrays, evenifsuchexperiencesdon’trepresenttheinstantiationofevaluativeproperties.In addition,wemightinclude affordances,asarelatedkindofevaluativeperceptual experiencethatrepresentsnotanevaluativepropertyassuchbutratherfeaturesofthe perceivedlivedenvironmentthatbearintimatelyonactioninreasonableperceptual agents suchasgivingupone’sseatonthebusuponseeingavisiblytiredperson.⁴⁴ RatherthananEvaluativePerception,theseareperhapsbettercalled ‘Value-Enabled Perceptions’ .
InChapter7inthisvolume,AnyaFarennikovaarguesthatperceptualexperiences of absences,e.g.,seeingthatPierreisnotinthecafé,ornoticingtheabsenceofaring onsomeone ’sfourth finger,aredependentuponthesubject’sdesiresorvalues. Roughly,theideaisthatdesiringandvaluingmoregenerallycanmakeoneperceptuallysensitivetotheexistenceoftheabsenceofcertainthingsinone’senvironment. Withoutthosevalues,onewouldn’trecognizewhatisn’tthere.Thus,Farennikova thinksthatone’sdesires enable theperceptionofabsences:theyarevalue-driven experiences.
2.EpistemologyandEvaluativePerception
AswasnotedinSection1,onekindofargumentthatissometimesofferedinfavour ofCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisepistemological.Whatisperhapsthecrucial premiseinthatargumentclaimsthatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisnecessary fortheexistenceofsomekindofjusti fi edevaluativebelieforknowledge.One candidatemightbetheexistenceofjusti fi edevaluativebeliefsaboutconcrete particularcases,e.g.,John ’sjudgementthatthehoodlumswerewrongtoset fi re tothecat , orLucy ’sbeliefthattheleadballerina ’smovementsinthe fi nalactwere graceful. Inthisvolumethereareseveralpapersthatargueagainstthissortofview.In Chapter2,LogueatonestagesuggeststhatanInferentialistpicturecouldperhaps accommodatejustifiedbeliefsinaestheticcases,e.g.,Lucy’sjustifiedbeliefaboutthe gracefulnessoftheballerinamightbetheresultofherjustifiedbackgroundbeliefthat featuresF,G,Hareusuallysufficientformovementstobegraceful,andthebeliefor perceptualregisteringthattheballerinapossessesthosefeatures.
InChapter8,SarahMcGrath focusingprimarilyonmoralperceptualknowledge arguesatlengthagainstversionsofInferentialism(albeitfocusedonmoralcases): deductive,inductive,andabductive.Thesemodelsallegedlyfailtoadequatelyexplain moralknowledgeinparticularcases.Shealsoconsidersandrejectsamoresophisticated InferentialistmodelfoundintheworkofKieranSetiya,⁴⁵ accordingtowhichthe relevantmoral ‘perceptual’ knowledgeisactuallyinferredfromnon-moralevidence. However,McGrathdoesn ’ tthinkthatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisnecessary forjustifi edbelieforknowledgeintherelevantcases.Instead,shearguesthatnoninferentialEvaluativeSeeing-Thatissuffi cient.Interestingly,McGratharguesthat suchnon-inferential ‘ perceptual ’ judgementsaboutparticularconcretecases as
⁴⁴ ThisexampleisfromBengson(2016). ⁴⁵ Setiya(2012).
opposedtojudgementsabouthypotheticalcaseswhichareimplicitlygeneral ⁴⁶— can playanimportantandhithertounrecognizedroleintheprocessofarrivingat re fl ectiveequilibrium.
JackLyons,inChapter9,alsoargues fromanepistemologicalReliabilist perspective thatthesortofjustificationthatonemighthavethoughtcouldonly begainedbyCanonicalEvaluativePerception,canalsobedeliveredbySuiGeneris EvaluativePerception(perceptualseemings),orwhathecalls ‘valueintuitions ’,i.e., cognitiveseemingswithevaluativecontent.
Finally,amoreextremeversionoftheviewthatCanonicalEvaluativePerception playssomeepistemicallyessentialrolewouldclaimthatitisrequiredforthe existenceofanyjustified(substantive)evaluativebelief.InChapter10,Michael Milonaarguesagainstthis,⁴⁷ concludingthatforanysubstantivejustificationgained fromCanonicalEvaluativePerception,subjectscouldgainsimilarjustificationby imaginativelyconsideringtherelevantcasesandhavingsomesortofaffective,e.g., emotional,responsetoit.Indeed,Milonagoesfurtherandclaimsthatthequestionof whetherthereisCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisnotimportant atall fordebates aboutevaluativeepistemology(butrecallMcGrath’spointabouttheepistemicsignificanceofperceptualevaluativejudgements).Note,however,thatMilonaseemsto thinkthatAffectiveEvaluativePerception desiresoremotions isanecessary conditionforjustifiedsubstantiveevaluativebeliefs.We’llreturntothisviewshortly.
EvenifCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisn’tnecessaryforevaluativejustification (andthusepistemologicalargumentsforitsexistencearelikelyunsound),wecanask whetheritcouldbesufficientforjustifiedevaluativebeliefs.Further,ifitturnsout thatCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionweresufficientforbasicornon-inferential justificationthenitcouldstillhaveepistemologicalsignificance,i.e.,itcouldbea sourceofregress-stoppingjustification.Isit?
Ononeviewofnon-inferentialexperientialjustification,inorderforanexperience toimmediatelyjustifyabeliefthatp,thisrequiresthattheexperiencehasdistinctively presentational contentwithrespecttop.Beingpresentedwithpismeantto differinimportantrespectsfromrepresentingp(contrastseeingaredballwith simplythinkingaboutone).InChapter4,Noordhofclaimsthatmoralperception lackspresentationalcharacterinawaythatothersortsofEvaluativePerceptions,e.g., painexperiences,donot.Hesuggeststhatthisimpactsontheformer’scapacityto conferjustification.Ontheotherhand,Audi(Chapter3)hasnoproblemwiththe ideathatmoralperceptionscouldbepresentational.Oneexplanationforthedifferenceinviewsisthattherearecompetingviewsofwhatpresentationalcontentis.⁴⁸ Whichisthecorrectviewarguablyneedstobesettledonindependentgrounds.
Ifonethinksthatnon-inferentialepistemicjusti fi cationorknowledgerequire reliability ,thenoneneedstogiveanaccountofhowCanonicalEvaluative Perceptioncouldbereliable.RobertAudi ’ sconsideredview inthemoral case isthatthishassomethingtodowiththepossessionofmoralconcepts.
⁴⁶ SeeKagan(2001).
⁴⁷ NotethatMichaelMilona(Ch.10)interpretsAudi’sIntegrationmodelasaformofCanonical EvaluativePerception.Others,e.g.Väyrynen(Ch.5inthisvolume),donot.
⁴⁸ Foraparticularconception,seeChudnoff(2013).
However,onemightwonderhowconceptpossessioncouldmakeonereliablein thisway,andwhetherthisrenderstherelevantknowledge/justifiedbeliefnonempirical.Analternativeviewisthatreliabilitywilldependuponthebackground beliefsorvaluecommitmentsthatonehas.However,onemightworry as VäyrynendoesinChapter5 thatthisintroducesanepistemicdependencethat isantitheticaltonon-inferentialjustification.Inthiscontextitisworthnoting Lyons’sargument(Chapter9)againsttheviewthatcausalcognitiveinfluence (penetration)onsomementalitemshouldleadustopositanepistemicdependencerelation.Instead,whatmattersiswhetherthecognitiveinfluenceissuchthat thementalitemcanbesaidtobe based upontheinfluencingcognition.Soeven ifCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionisbroughtaboutbycognitivepenetrationby backgroundbeliefs,ifthisdoesn’tinvolvebasingthenthiswouldbeconsistent withCanonicalEvaluativePerceptionsbeingsourcesofimmediatejustificationor knowledge(solongastheyarereliable).
Aswasnotedearlier,MichaelMilonasuggeststhatAffectiveEvaluativePerceptionscouldbesourcesofimmediatejustificationforevaluativebeliefs(indeed,he appearstosuggestthattheymaybenecessaryforsuchjustification).However,one mightwonderwhetheremotions,e.g.,couldbesourcesofimmediatejustification,if theyarealwaysgroundedin ‘cognitivebases’ , ⁴⁹ e.g.,beliefs,perceptions,imaginative episodesconcerningnon-evaluativeobjectsandevents.Forexample,David’sguiltis baseduponhisbeliefthatheliedtohispartner.Onemightthinkthatforhisguiltto justifyanevaluativebelief,e.g.,thathehasdonesomethingwrong,hisbeliefabout havingliedmustbejustified.Butthenitlookslikehisemotionisn’tasourceof immediatejustification.Further,thissortofbasing/epistemicdependencemight makeusdoubtthatemotionsreallyareAffectiveEvaluativePerceptions(similar pointscouldbemadeaboutdesires).InChapter11,RobertCowanarguesthatevenif allemotionshavecognitivebases,andevenifthisentailsanepistemicdependenceof theemotionuponthecognitivebase,thisiscompatiblewithemotionsplayingan epistemicallyfundamentalrolewithrespecttoevaluativepropositions.
3.ValueTheoryandEvaluativePerception
IfwedefineEvaluativePerceptionintermsofanon-factiverepresentationalstate, thenitmightseemasthoughtherearelittleornoconnectionsbetweenitsexistence andquestionsinvaluetheoryabout,e.g.,themetaphysicsofvalues.
However,that’sabitquick(seealsoNoordhof(Chapter4)andStokes(Chapter1)). Toillustrate,considerasimpleSentimentalistviewofvalueproperties(asimilarview couldbedevelopedaboutconcepts),accordingtowhichXpossessesvalueproperty, F,iffXelicitsemotionalresponse,E,fromallwhoconsiderX.Onewaytounderstand thisviewwouldbeasa reductive analysisofvalueproperties,i.e.,theright-handside hasexplanatorypriority.However,ifemotionalresponseshaveevaluativecontent, e.g.,guiltrepresentswrongness,thatmightproblematizeareductiveversionofthis view(sincetheright-handsidewillmakereferencetovalueproperties,albeitthe
⁴⁹ SeeDeonnaandTeroni(2012),5.
representationofsuchproperties).Thismightpushusinthedirectionofsomeother kindofaccount,e.g.,ano-priorityview.
Evenifonehasdoubtsaboutthepreviouslineofthought,ifweassumethatatleast someEvaluativePerceptionsareveridical,andthattheycanplaysomeepistemic role,e.g.,justifyevaluativebeliefs,thentherearearguablyclearerconnections betweentheexistenceofEvaluativePerceptionandValueTheory.Forexample,it hasrecentlybeenargued ⁵⁰ thataviewaccordingtowhichemotionsareAffective EvaluativePerceptions,whichcannon-inferentiallyjustifyevaluativebeliefs,⁵¹is incompatiblewithNeo-Sentimentalismaboutvalueconcepts accordingtowhich Xpossessesvalueproperty,F,iffXmeritsorjustifiesanemotionalresponsefrom thosewhocontemplateX,E,e.g.,XisadmirableiffXmeritsadmiration.Thisis becausethecombinationwouldappeartohavethecounter-intuitiveconsequence thatemotionscanconferjustificationforthemselves. ⁵²
InChapter12GrahamOddiedefendstheviewthatdesiresareAffectiveEvaluative Perceptions,i.e.,theyareexperiencesofthe goodness ofthingsthatcanconferprima faciejustificationforevaluativebeliefsabout goodness.However,Oddiearguesthatif wethink statesofaffairs aretheprimarybearersofvalue,thentheviewthatdesires arevalueperceptionsfacesanisomorphismproblem.Ontheonehand,ifthereis AffectiveEvaluativePerceptionthenitmightseemthatitoughttobereflectiveofthe evaluativefacts.Certainly,itseemsthatourevaluativebeliefsoughttobethisway. Butontheotherhand,itseemsthatatleastsomekindsofvalueexperience in particulardesireandemotionexperiences arelegitimatelyperspectival,e.g.,it seemslegitimateformetopreferthatmymotherbesavedratherthansomeone else’sinascenariowhereonlyonecanbesaved.Aftersuggestingasomewhat metaphoricalwayofaddressingthis(whichappeals,interalia,tovaluedistance), Oddiesuggeststhattheisomorphismproblemcanbedealtwithifweadopttheview that properties/statesofbeing,e.g., beinghappy,aretheprimarybearersofvalueand objectsofdesire.ThisisbecauseOddiethinksproperties,inparticular, ‘local’ properties(apropertythatcanbebornebyonethingwithouteverythingpossessing it),havetheirown ‘built-in’ perspective.
InChapter13,AnnaBergqvistalsoconsiderstheperspectivalnatureofevaluative perception.OnBergqvist ’sreadingofIrisMurdoch,moralperceptioninvolves notonlybeingattunedtoone ’senvironmentthankstocognitivepenetration throughtheconceptsthatwedeploy,butalsotheclaimthatone ’sconceptionsof theseconceptsdecisivelyin fl uencewhatwesee.Bergqvistarguesthatwecan nonethelessmakegoodontherobustrealistclaimthatthesalientconceptsofan individual’slife-worldcanberevelatoryofvaluewithoutappealeithertoPlatonism orvalueconstitutivism.Bergqvistdistinguishestworeadingsontheconceptof ‘ nonperspectivalvalue’—anepistemicreadingandanon-epistemicone andarguesthat commitmenttothethesisthatvalueisinsomesensealwaysvalueforusdoesnotas suchruleoutvalue’sbeingnon-perspectivalinthesenseofexistingindependently ofanyactualworldviewsorperspectivesinthenon-epistemicsense.Bergqvist
⁵⁰ SeeBrady(2013). ⁵¹Defendedbye.g.Döring(2003);Pelser(2014).
⁵²ButseeCowan(2016)foraresponse.
considersthepossibleobjectionastohowtoaccountforthenotionofstructure andunityofmoralthoughtifwefollowthroughonMurdoch’ssuggestionandtake thecentraltargetnotionofworldviewtobeanunrulyholisticadmixtureofevaluative andnon-evaluativeconcepts:arethereanylimitsastowhatmightplausiblybecounted as ‘valueforus’?Inherestimation,whatisneededisaseparateargumentthatspeaks tothepracticalityofthickmoralconceptsasaction-guidingconcepts,andthenotion ofaction-orientedperceptionmoregenerally.
BycontrastwithBergqvist ’sperspective-neutralviewaboutthenatureofvalue,in Chapter14JamesLenmanexploresthetopicofEvaluativePerceptionwithinthe contextofabroadlyExpressivist(orQuasi-Realist)metaethicalframework.Accordingtothismetaethicalview,ourreasonsforaction(includingmoralreasons)emerge outofarelativelystablenetworkofdesire-likeattitudesandcommitments,arrivedat viasomeprocessofreflectionanddeliberation.Despiteasortofultimatedependence ofreasonsondesire,itcanapparentlystillmakesensetospeak fromwithinour webofcommitments ofdesire-independentmoralreasonsandmoraltruth.With thisviewonthetable,LenmanrejectstheideathatCanonicalMoralPerceptiontakes place:thissortofpositionwouldonlyseemtomakesenseifweassumedsomesortof naturalistrealism.Eventhen,Lenmanthinksthattherealepistemicworkwouldbe donebymoraltheorizingabouttherelationbetweennaturalandmoralproperties, notsensoryperception.Instead,heaffordsalimitedroletoAffectiveEvaluative Perception(emotionsanddesire)indisclosingvaluetous,wherethelatterprocessis understoodmoreasself-interpretationratherthansomesortofperceptual-like engagementwithanexternalevaluativereality.However,itisclearthatLenmanis morefavourabletoapictureofethicalthoughtasreflectiveandinterpretative,rather thanimmediateandperceptual.
Finally,inChapter15,KathleenStockappealstoakindofperceptioninorderto illuminateaparticularkindofpracticewithevaluativeandnormativesignificance: objectifying behaviour,i.e.,treatingpeoplelikeobjects.Specificallyshearguesthata mediatingrolebetweenobjectifyingimages(e.g.,thosefoundinpornography)and objectifyingbehaviourisplayedbyadistinctivekindofperception:whatshecalls ‘mind-insensitiveseeing-as ’.Thisamountstoamodeofperceivingpeopleonapar withlookingatmindlessinanimateobjects,andinvolvesasortofgestaltwhichcan comeinvarioustypes,e.g., seeing-asbody, seeing-asfungible .Positingthisphenomenonexplainssomeimportantkindsofobjectifyingbehaviours,e.g.,theattentional andcognitivehabitstowardsmembersofobjectifiedgroups.Althoughthesortsof experiencesthatStockappealstomaynotthemselveshaveanevaluativecontent (strictlyspeaking),theymaybesaidtobeevaluativeperceptionsinabroadersense, duetothemorallysignificantwaytheyinvolvepresentingtheirintentionalobjects (persons).EvenifitwereobjectedthatthephenomenathatStockpointstoisnota classofEvaluativePerception,onesignificantfeatureisworthnoting.TheexperiencesthatStockdescribeswouldthemselvesseemtobetheappropriate object of evaluation,whetherornottheyrepresentvalueproperties,i.e.,theynevertheless constitute MorallyEvaluablePerceptions
