TableofContents
1.FundamentalSourcesofGrowth:Institutions,Culture,andIdeas6
3.WhatBlackDeathwastoWesternEurope,Communismwasto
4.Poland’sTransitionSuccessStory
4.3.Poland’sEconomicPerformanceSince1989
4.4.UniquenessofPoland’sSuccess
4.5.Poland’sInclusiveGrowth
4.6.DriversofInclusiveGrowth
4.7.EvolutionofWell-Being,QualityofLife,andHappiness
4.8.FailuresofthePolishTransition
5.DriversofPoland’sSuccessfulTransition159
5.1. ‘ShockTherapy’ VersusGradualism
5.2. ‘ShockTherapy’ inPolandafter1989
5.3.Criticismof ‘ShockTherapy’
5.4. ‘ShockTherapy’ or ‘ShockFailure’?
5.5.Afterthe ‘ShockTherapy’:PolicyCorrectionsandFurtherReforms
5.6.WhatMadePolandMoreSuccessfulThanitsPost-CommunistPeers?
5.7.BenefitsofDelayedPrivatization
5.8.CouldPolandHaveGrownFaster?
5.9.ConclusionsandLessonsLearned
6.FundamentalSourcesofPoland’sGrowth:TheRoleofInstitutions205
6.1.WhichInstitutionsDrovePoland’sTransition?
6.2.Poland’sInstitutionalQualityintheLong-TermPerspective
6.3.TheImpactofInstitutionsonGrowthinPoland
6.4.TheRoleoftheEUAccessioninInstitution-Building
6.6.DriversofGoodPoliticalandEconomicInstitutions
7.TheRoleofCulture,Ideas,andLeadership241
7.1.ImpactofCultureonInstitutionsandGrowthinTransitionEconomies
7.2.DifferencesinCultureBetweenCEEandtheWest
7.3.CultureandEconomicPerformanceinPoland
7.4.EvolutionofCultureSince1989
7.5.TheRoleofLeadership
7.6.IdeasandIdeology
7.7.Conclusions
8.WillPoland’sSuccessContinue?Projections,Scenarios,andRisks267
8.1.Poland’sGrowthProspects
8.2.UpsideRiskstotheGrowthScenarios
8.3.DownsideRisks
8.4.EconomicLiteratureandtheDriversofEconomicGrowth
8.5.TheImportanceofRankings
ListofFigures
1.1.Fundamentalandproximatesourcesofeconomicperformance. 8
1.2.Thequalityofinstitutionsandeconomicdevelopment. 10
1.3.Institutionsandeconomicconvergenceduring2000–2015. 11
1.4.Politicalandeconomicinstitutionsandeconomicperformance. 15
1.5.Lowincomeinequalityanddemocracyaskeycharacteristicsof inclusivesocieties,2015. 16
1.6.AcemogluandRobinson’sinstitutionalframeworkofdevelopment. 17
1.7.Theextendedinstitutionalframeworkofdevelopment. 20
1.8.Femaleshareofthelaborforce,inpercentoftotal,2010–2016. 33
2.1.PopulationandGDPpercapitaintheverylongrun. 45
2.2.Poland’sbordersin1600. 47
2.3.GDPpercapitainPolandrelativetoWesternEurope,1400–1938, WesternEurope=100. 49
2.4.Structureoftherevenueofroyaltreasuryin1584duringthereign ofKingStephenBathory. 58
2.5.Revenueofthecentraltreasury,insilver,1700and1788,France=100.59
2.6.LocationofprintingpressesinEuropebetween1470and1500. 61
2.7. ‘APolishNobleman’ (1637)and ‘ManwithaSheetofMusic’ (1633)byRembrandtvanRijn. 77
2.8.LiteracyratesinEurope,1475–1750. 77
3.1.GrossinvestmentinEastern,Southern,andWesternEurope, 1950–1989,aspercentofGDP. 86
3.2.StructureofGDPgrowthinPoland,Czechoslovakia,andHungary, 1950–1989. 89
3.3.GDPgrowthrates1950–1989relativeto1950levelofGDPpercapita.90
3.4.Poland’schangingbordersbetween1000AD and1945. 91
3.5.GDPpercapitaforPoland,Spain,Portugal,Greece,andIreland, 1950–1990,in1990US$GKPPS. 94
3.6.GDPpercapitainPolandandtheglobalpeers,1950–1990,in1990 US$GKPPS. 95
3.7.HumanDevelopmentIndexin1990forPolandandglobalpeers.96
3.8.GDPpercapitainPoland1913–1938andregionalpeers,France=100.100
3.9.Universityenrolment,aspercentofthetotalpopulationof universityage,1935–1970.103
3.10.Changesinagriculturalemployment,1950–1970,inpercentof totalemployment.104
3.11.Shareofthetop1percentoftherichestPolesintotalincome, 1920–1995.105
3.12.Women’slabourparticipationrateacrosscountries,1980and1990.106
3.13.Participationinculture,inpercentoftotalpopulation,1990 and2009.107
4.1.EuropeanUnionvs.theUS:GDPgrowthvs.GDPgrowthper capita,1990–2015average.116
4.2.ChangesinincomeforallAmericansandthebottom50percentof Americans,1962–2014.117
4.3.Changesinmedianincomesforselectedcountries,1980=100.118
4.4.Labourproductivityperhourworkedin2015,in1990US$ (convertedatGearyKhamisPPPs),US=1.119
4.5.GDPgrowthpercapitaversusincreaseintotaldomesticcreditfor privatesectorforFranceandtheUS,2015,1990=1.121
4.6.Totalnaturalresourcesrents(percentofGDP)versusGDPpercapita growth,1995–2015.122
4.7.Incomeandlifesatisfaction:crosscountryandwithincountry comparisons.124
4.8.ShortagesincommunistPoland:1982couponsfor flour,sugar, cigarettes,alcohol,chocolate,fat,washingpowder,andwheatproducts.126
4.9.ChangesinrealGDPpercapita,1989=100.127
4.10.ChangesinGDPpercapita,PPP,1990–2015,EU-15=100.128
4.11.Poland’sincomerelativetoWesternEurope,1400–2017,PPP.129
4.12.Toptenmiddle/high-incomecountriesinaveragegrowthinGDP percapitaduring1995–2015.130
4.13.Timeneededtocrossthehigh-incomethresholdafterreachingthe uppermiddle-incomethreshold,inyears.131
4.14.GrowthvolatilityinPolandandamongpeers,2000–2014.132
4.15.DurationofgrowthspurtsandchangeinGDPformiddle-income andhigh-incomecountries.132
4.16.Changesinproductivityperhour,1995–2015,1995=100.133
4.17.HoursworkedinOECDcountries,2000and2015.134
4.18.PublicdebtinpercentofGDP,1995and2015.135
4.19.Privatetotaldebt,inpercentofGDP,1992and2016.136
4.20.Exportsofgood,servicesandprimaryincomein2016,incurrentUS$, 1989ortheearliestavailableyear=1.136
4.21.Growthofdomesticvalueaddedembodiedingrossexports, 1995–2009(CAGR).137
4.22.FinaldemandforPolishvalueaddedembodiedingrossexportsby destination(percent),2009.138
4.23.Percentageofpopulationwithahighergrowthinincomethan theG-7average,bydeciles,1989–2016.139
4.24.PolandversusRussia:cumulativeincomegrowthsince1989by incomedecile,1989–2016.140
4.25.Changeinmedianhouseholddisposableincome,adjustedforprice differencesbetweencountries(PPP),1999–2015.141
4.26.GinicoefficientforPolandandEuropeanandglobalpeers,1990 and2015.141
4.27.Giniofwealthinequality.142
4.28.PovertyinPolandandamongpeers,shareofpopulationwithincome oflessthan$3.1aday,1990and2013.142
4.29.Grossenrolmentratio,tertiary,bothsexes(percent)andshareof labourwithuniversitydegree,1989and2015.143
4.30.OECDPISA2015scoreandspendingperpupil.144
4.31.Agapincognitiveskillsbetweenrichandpoorstudentsinthe EuropeanUnion.145
4.32.EmploymentratesinPolandfordifferentages,2005and2014.145
4.33.Well-beinginPolandversustheOECDaverage,2015.147
4.34.SocialProgressIndexversuslevelofincome,PPP,2016.148
4.35.Energyintensitycalculatedinconstantpricesof2010(Btuper USdollar).149
4.36.EconomicandGHGemissionsinPoland,2005–2014.149
4.37.Lifeexpectancyatbirth,2015.151
4.38.Infantmortalityrate,2015.151
4.39.LifesatisfactioninPoland,1992–2015.152
4.40.LifesatisfactionandGDPpercapitainpost-communistcountries, 2015–2016.153
4.41.WagesandproductivityinPolandandGermany,2000–2015.155
4.42.TemporaryemploymentinOECDcountries,2014.156
5.1.Theshareoftenpost-communistnewEUmemberstatesandUkraine inglobalGDP,1989and2016,PPP.163
5.2.Changesinincomesintransitioneconomiesandselectedemerging markets,bydecilesofpopulation,1989–2015.163
5.3.Speedofreformsandtimingofeconomicrecovery.171
5.4.PrivatesectorshareinGDPandemployment,1989–1995. 182
5.5.Optimalsizeofthe financialsectorversusgrowth. 185
5.6.ExportopennessofPolandanditspeers,percentofexportsinGDP, 1990and2015. 186
5.7.Indexofstructuralreformindicators,1989–2012. 187
5.8.GDPgrowth(leftchart)andchangesinGDPpercapita(PPP) inPolandandHungary,1989–2020. 188
5.9.GDPpercapitain1990PPPversusaverageGDPpercapitagrowth 1990–2016. 190
5.10.Changeintertiaryeducationattainmentrates,2000–2014, percentagepoints. 191
5.11.TheeducationalstructureofPolishworkers,1992–2014. 192
5.12.AbsorptionrateofEUfunds,2007–2016. 193
5.13.EBRDIndexofLargeScalePrivatization,1995and2000. 195
5.14.ActualandoptimalpolicyGDPgrowthscenarioinPoland,1990–2015.200
5.15.Poland’salternativegrowthscenarios,1989–2015,GDPpercapitain 2015US$PPP. 200
5.16.PolandversusUkraine,actualandalternativegrowthscenarios, 1989–2015,GDPin1989=100. 201
6.1.ChangesinPoland’sinstitutionsversusupper-middle-incomeand high-incomepeers,1996–2015. 209
6.2.Changesinthestrengthoftheruleoflaw,selectedcountries,1996–2015.210
6.3.PerceptionsofcorruptionversusGDPpercapita,2016. 211
6.4.Statetaxrevenueduring1500–2015asaproxyforthequalityof institutions,Poland,France,Germany,andtheNetherlands, UnitedKingdom=100. 212
6.5.EBRDIndexofInstitutionalReformin1995. 214
6.6.EBRDIndexofInstitutionalReform,1995and2012. 215
7.1.CorrelationbetweenindividualismandGDPpercapitain2016. 244
7.2.Impactofreligiononpoliticalandeconomicinstitutionsintransition economies. 246
7.3.ReligiousdivideofEuropein1054AD 247
7.4.CulturaldifferencesbetweenEasternandWesternEuropeandtheUSA, 1990–2005. 249
7.5.Polandontheglobalculturemap,2015. 250
7.6.Attitudestowardsmarketeconomy,plannedeconomy,democracy, andauthoritarianisminPoland,transitioneconomies,andWestern Europe,2010and2016.255
7.7.Adults’ functionalliteracyinPolandandOECDcountries,2015,byage.257
7.8.Differenceineducationalattainmentbetweenoldandnewgeneration inOECDcountries,2015.258
7.9.Whatexplainslifesuccess?PolishattitudesversusWesternEurope, byincomelevel.258
8.1.ProjectedpotentialGDPgrowthpercapitainPoland,EU-28,andthe eurozone,2020–2060.268
8.2.Poland’sprojectedGDPpercapitarelativetotheeurozone, 2020–2060,PPP,eurozone=100.269
8.3.ProjectedGDPpercapitainPolanduntil2060,eurozone=100.270
8.4.Poland:agestructurein2004andprojectionsfor2050.275
8.5.ThreegrowthscenariosforPoland,eurozonelevelofincome=100, 2020–2060.277
8.6.ProjectedGDPpercapitaincomeforPolandbasedonthethreegrowth scenarios,2020–2060,inUSDPPP.278
8.7.GlobalCompetitivenessReport2004andGDPgrowthpercapita 2005–2016.283
8.8.Poland’spositionintheWorldBank’sDoingBusinessranking,2009–2017.283
9.1.GDPpercapitainCEEversusWesternEurope,WesternEurope=100, 1870–2015.287
9.2.Poland’sspeedofconvergencewithGermany:GDPgrowthrate during1995–2022.289
9.3.SavingratesinPolandandregionalandglobalpeers,2000–2011.294
9.4.Percentagesofunpleasant,disagreeable,repetitive,andcognitivejobs, 1870–2009,inpercentofUSworkers.301
9.5.LevelofurbanizationandGDPpercapitainEurope,2015.307
9.6.ChangeintheurbanizationratioandGDPpercapitainEurope, 2000–2015.307
9.7.Theimplementationframeworkofthe ‘WarsawConsensus’.312
