Acknowledgments
andideaswithme.Engagingwiththeirquestionsandsuggestionshasbeena rewardingintellectualexperience.Iwillkeeptheirgenerosityinmindand hopetopassitontoothers.
Finally,Iwishtothankagreatcollectionoffamily,friends,andmentors backhomewhoseencouragementandhelphavebeencriticalovertheyears: NadjaAlthaus,DanielEltinger,BenGotthardt,ClemensHäusler,Ingrid Lang,HeidiLanz,MartinaLanz,AlfredMarkwica,GertiMarkwica,Chris Munteanu,ManuelSchlosser,UtaSpellenberg,BarbaraStrohal,andMaren Strohal.FortheirloveandunstintingsupportIamgratefultomyfamilyin LeonbergandOxford.
1.1ThreeActionModels
2.1FiveKeyEmotionsinCoerciveDiplomacy
3.1InferringtheFiveKeyEmotions
3.2TheRelevanceoftheFiveKeyEmotionsinDecision-Making
4.1NikitaKhrushchev’sMajorDecisionsintheCubanMissileCrisis,1962128
4.2RelevanceoftheFiveKeyEmotionsinNikitaKhrushchev’ s Decision-MakingintheCubanMissileCrisis,1962
5.1SaddamHussein’sMajorDecisionsintheGulfConflict,1990–1
5.2RelevanceoftheFiveKeyEmotionsinSaddamHussein’ s Decision-MakingintheGulfConflict,1990–1
ListofAbbreviations
AFPAgenceFrance-Presse
APAssociatedPress
AVPRFForeignPolicyArchiveoftheRussianFederation
BCE beforethecommonera
CCCentralCommittee
CIAUSCentralIntelligenceAgency
CPCzCzechoslovakCommunistParty
CPSUCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion
CRRCConflictRecordsResearchCenter
CWIHPColdWarInternationalHistoryProject
DCIUSDirectorofCentralIntelligence
DDIUSDeputyDirectorofCentralIntelligence
DEFCONUSDefenseCondition
FBIUSFederalBureauofInvestigation
FBISUSForeignBroadcastInformationService
fMRIfunctionalMagneticResonanceImaging
FRUSForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates
GHWBLGeorgeH.W.BushPresidentialLibrary
INAIraqiNewsAgency
IRInternationalRelations
IRBMintermediate-rangeballisticmissile
JFKJohnF.Kennedy
JFKLJohnF.KennedyPresidentialLibrary
KCLMAKing’sCollegeLondonMilitaryArchives
KGBKomitetGosudarstvennoyBezopasnosti(CommitteeonStateSecurity)
NARAUSNationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration
NATONorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NSCUSNationalSecurityCouncil
NSFNationalSecurityFiles
OASOrganizationofAmericanStates
OPECOrganizationofthePetroleumExportingCountries
PLOPalestineLiberationOrganization
xiv
ListofAbbreviations
RCCIraq’sRevolutionaryCommandCouncil
RFKRobertF.Kennedy
RGANIRussianStateArchiveofContemporaryHistory
UNUnitedNations
UPIUnitedPressInternational
USUnitedStatesofAmerica
USSRUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics
WMDweaponsofmassdestruction
Introduction
Incoercivediplomacy,statesthreatentheuseofmilitaryforcetogetactorsto changetheirbehavior.Itisastrategythatseeksto “persuade” targetsto complyratherthan “bludgeon” themintodoingso,accordingtoAlexander George.1 Thisformofforcefulpersuasionhaslongbeenapopularinstrument ininternationalrelations,becauseitholdsthepromiseofachievingan opponent’sacquiescencewithoutincurringthecostinbloodandtreasureof militaryintervention.Thelargemajorityofcoercivethreatsareissuedby powerfulstatesagainstconsiderablyweakertargets.2 Itwouldseemintuitive thatacoercer’smilitarysuperiorityrenderscoercivediplomacyparticularly effective.3 InthewordsofthewartheoristCarlvonClausewitz, “whenone forceisagreatdealstrongerthantheother,anestimatemaybeenough.There willbeno fighting:theweakersidewillyieldatonce.”4 Thehistoricalrecord,
1 SeeAlexanderL.George, ForcefulPersuasion:CoerciveDiplomacyasanAlternativetoWar (Washington,DC:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,1991),5,emphasisomitted.Seealso AlexanderL.George,DavidK.Hall,andWilliamE.Simons, TheLimitsofCoerciveDiplomacy: Laos,Cuba,Vietnam (Boston:Little,Brown,1971).Fordefinitionsoftherelatednotionsof “compellence” and “strategiccoercion,” seeThomasC.Schelling, ArmsandInfluence (NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress,1966),71–2,andLawrenceFreedman, “StrategicCoercion,” inLawrence Freedman,ed., StrategicCoercion:ConceptsandCases (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998), 15–18,respectively.Thisstudyfocusesontheuseof coercive threats,whichseektomodifya target’spastorongoingbehavior,ratherthanon deterrent threats,whichtrytodissuadeatarget frominitiatingacertainactioninthefuture.Inpractice,however,thesetwoapproachesoften intersectandblend.SeeLawrenceFreedman, Deterrence (Cambridge,UK:PolityPress,2004),111.
2 Majorpowerstargetedminoronesin85percentofcoercivethreatepisodesinthetwentieth century.SeeToddS.Sechser, “MilitarizedCompellentThreats,1918–2001,” ConflictManagementandPeaceScience 28:4(2011),387.
3 Therolesof “ coercer ” and “target” frequentlydonotremainstableinpractice.Targetsmay turnintocoercers,coercerscantransformintotargets,ortheymaybebothatthesametime. Somereadersmayassociatethesetermswithconnotationsofdominanceandpassivity,respectively.Theactualactorsinquestioncanviewthemselvesandtheotherpartyquitedifferently, however.Onoccasion,itmaynotevenbecleartothemwhichofthemisacoercerortarget.This studythususesthesewordsastechnicalterms.SeeRobertJervis, HowStatesmenThink:The PsychologyofInternationalPolitics (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2017),91.
4 CarlvonClausewitz, OnWar,translatedbyMichaelHowardandPeterParet,abridgedwith anIntroductionandNotesbyBeatriceHeuser(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),39. Foracontemporaryexpressionofthisview,seeBranislavL.Slantchev, “FeigningWeakness,”
however,raisesstrongdoubtsaboutthisassumption.Takingintoaccount casesfromthepasttwocenturies,quantitativestudiesputthestrategy’ s successrateatonly17to36percent.5 Whentargetsrefusedtoaccede,coercers generallyresortedtowar.
Numerousprominentexamplesbearoutthecuriousfailureofmilitarymight toaffordsuccessincoercivediplomacy.Asearlyasinthe fifthcentury BCE, ThucydidesrecountedhowtheinhabitantsofthesmallislandofMelosin theAegeanSearebuffedimperialAthens’ calltogiveuptheirneutralityin thePeloponnesianWar,onlytobesubduedandenslaved.6 In200 BCE,the MacedonianswerecrushedattheBattleofCynoscephalaeaftertheyrepudiated theRomanemperor’sdemandtoleavetheGreekcitiesinpeace.7 Themight oftheBritish fleetfailedtopersuadeTsarNicholasItowithdrawhistroops fromtheDanubianprincipalitiesofMoldaviaandWallachia,resultingin theoutbreakoftheCrimeanWarin1853andtheRussianempire’ s dramaticdefeat.8 Inthepasttwodecades,thesoleremainingsuperpower alsohadtolearnhowintransigentmuchweakeractorscanbe.Serbianleader SlobodanMilošević,forexample,ignoredUSappealstoendhiscampaignof ethniccleansingagainstKosovoAlbaniansin1999,triggeringtheresort toforcebytheUnitedStates.9 TheTalibaninAfghanistanrejected theGeorgeW.Bushadministration’sdemandafterSeptember11,2001,to turntheal-Qaedaleadershipoverfortrial,andwerethenattackedbyUSand
InternationalOrganization 64:3(2010),360: “Thestrongeranactoris,theworsetheexpected waroutcomefortheadversary,andthemorethatadversaryshouldbepreparedtoconcedein ordertoavoidit.”
5 PeterViggoJakobsen’sreviewof36casesofUSandEuropeancoercivediplomacyfrom 1990to2008showsthatcoercersachievedtheirgoalinjust17percentofcases.BarryBlechman andStephenKaplan findthatof28instancesthattheyidentifyasUScompellencebetween1946 and1974,successwasachievedinonly18percentafter3years.Examining67compellence episodesfrom1823to1973,WalterPetersenputsthesuccessrateat24percent.PhilHaun identifies19casesofUScoercivediplomacyfrom1964to2011and findsthat32percentofthem workedout.ToddSechser’sinvestigationof163coercivethreatepisodesbystateswhosemilitary expenditureswerehigherthanthoseofthetargetfrom1918to2001computesasuccessrateof 36percent.SeePeterViggoJakobsen, “CoerciveDiplomacy,” inAlanCollins,ed., Contemporary SecurityStudies,2ndedn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),296;BarryBlechmanand StephenKaplan, ForcewithoutWar:USArmedForcesasaPoliticalInstrument (Washington, DC:BrookingsInstitution,1978),89,91–2;WalterPetersen, “DeterrenceandCompellence: ACriticalAssessmentofConventionalWisdom,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 30:3(1986), 283;PhilHaun, Coercion,Survival,andWar:WhyWeakStatesResisttheUnitedStates (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2015),6;Sechser, “MilitarizedCompellentThreats, 1918–2001,” 389–90.
6 SeeThucydides, ThePeloponnesianWar,trans.MartinHammond(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2009),307.
7 SeeF.W.Walbank, PhilipVofMacedon (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2014[1940]),132–3,137.
8 SeeOrlandoFiges, TheCrimeanWar:AHistory (NewYork:MetropolitanBooks,2010),143–5.
9 SeeDavidL.Phillips, LiberatingKosovo:CoerciveDiplomacyandU.S.Intervention (Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2012),107.
alliedforces.10 WhenColonelMuammaral-Qaddafi ofLibyarefusedto terminatehisassaultoftherebel-heldcityofBenghazi,hewasconfronted withairstrikesfromtheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).11
Inallofthesecases,thecoercersenjoyedmilitarysuperiority.Thetargets, however,defiedtheirdemands andpaiddearlyforit.Thispuzzlingbehavior inspiresthecentralquestionofthepresentbook:Whyandunderwhat conditionsdopoliticalleadersrejectcoercivethreatsfromstrongeropponents, andwhendotheyyield?Theexistingliteraturehasmostlyusedrationalistor constructivistactionmodelstoexplaintargets’ decision-making.Astandard rationalchoiceapproachsuggeststhatactorsfollowa “logicofconsequences” : Theygiveintocoercivethreatsonlyifacquiescenceentailslowercostsor morebenefitsthanresistance.12 Aconstructivistperspectivepositsthattarget leadersadheretoa “logicofappropriateness”:Theyarelikelytoaccept(reject) acoercer ’sdemandsifcomplianceis(not)inlinewiththeirnormsabout properconductgiventheiridentities.13
Mostrationalistsandconstructiviststakeacognitivistperspective.Their analysesconcentrateonpeople’sthoughtsandbeliefs,andtheytreatchoice behaviorasaconsciousandreflectiveprocess.Agentsareassumedtomake theirdecisionsonthebasisofcalculationanddeliberation.Cumulative researchinneurology,however,indicatesthatmerelyabout2percentof thebrain’sactivitiesoperateatthelevelofconsciousreflection.Theremaining 98percentaretakenupbyunconsciousappraisalsandaffect.14 Humanchoice isthusstronglyshapedbyautomaticprocessing.Moreover,neuroscientists havefoundthatreflectivedeliberationtendstobeprecededbyemotion.15
10 SeeMarthaCrenshaw, “CoerciveDiplomacyandtheResponsetoTerrorism,” inRobert J.ArtandPatrickM.Cronin,eds, TheUnitedStatesandCoerciveDiplomacy (Washington,DC: USInstituteofPeacePress,2003),335–7.
11 SeeChristopherS.Chivvis, TopplingQaddafi:LibyaandtheLimitsofLiberalIntervention (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014),67.
12 See,forexample,RobertA.Pape, BombingtoWin:AirPowerandCoercioninWar (Ithaca: CornellUniversityPress,1996),16;Schelling, ArmsandInfluence,150;ToddS.Sechser, “WinningwithoutaFight:Power,Reputation,andCompellentThreatsinInternationalCrises,” PhDdissertation(Stanford:StanfordUniversity,2007);BranislavL.Slantchev, MilitaryThreats: TheCostsofCoercionandthePriceofPeace (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2011).Forthestandardcomparativeaccountonthelogicsofconsequencesandappropriateness, seeJamesMarchandJohanOlsen, “TheInstitutionalDynamicsofInternationalPolitical Orders,” InternationalOrganization 52:4(1998),943–69.
13 SeeRichardNedLebow, Coercion,Cooperation,andEthicsinInternationalRelations (NewYork:Routledge,2007),18,125,229;DavidL.Rousseau, IdentifyingThreatsandThreateningIdentities:TheSocialConstructionofRealismandLiberalism (Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press,2006);LeonardJ.Schoppa, “TheSocialContextinCoerciveInternationalBargaining,” InternationalOrganization 53:2(1999),307–42.
14 SeeDavidD.Franks, “EmotionsandNeurosociology,” inJanE.StetsandJonathan H.Turner,eds, HandbookoftheSociologyofEmotions,vol.2(NewYork:Springer,2014),267.
15 SeeJosephLeDoux, TheEmotionalBrain:TheMysteriousUnderpinningsofEmotionalLife (NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1996),53,128;ElizabethA.Phelps, “EmotionandCognition: InsightsfromStudiesoftheHumanAmygdala,” AnnualReviewofPsychology 57(2006),43–4.
“Wegenerallyfeel before wethinkand,whatisevenmoresurprising,weoften act before wethink,” asJaniceGrossSteinpointsout.16 Emotionstendtobe ontologicallypriortoconsciousreflectionandshapeourlivesinprofound ways.Theyinformuswhatwelikeandwhatweloathe,whatisgoodandbad forus,andwhetherwedorightorwrong.Theygivemeaningtoourrelationshipswithothers,andtheygeneratephysiologicalimpulsestoact.17 Thisdoes notmeanthatemotionsarerestrictedtotherealmoftheunconscious,of course.Humansmaybecomecognizantoftheiremotions,andtheycantryto regulatethem.Theyexperienceemotionsatdifferentlevelsofconscious awarenessandwithvaryingdegreesofintentionalcontrol.18
Thebasicargumentofthepresentbookisthatemotionsplayasignificant roleinforeignpolicydecision-makingingeneralandintargetleaders’ responsestocoercivediplomacyinparticular.Theyshapechoicebehaviorin powerfulandpredictableways.Ifwewishtounderstandunderwhatconditionsactorsacceptorrejectacoercer’sdemands,weneedtotaketheir emotionalexperienceintoconsideration.Thatexperience,however,isoutside thescopeofstandardrationalistandconstructivistmodels.
Whatis “emotion”?Thisstudyconceivesofemotionasatransient,partly biologicallybased,partlyculturallyconditionedresponsetoastimulus,which givesrisetoacoordinatedprocessincludingappraisals,feelings,bodilyreactions,andexpressivebehavior,allofwhichprepareindividualstodealwiththe stimulus.Peoplecanexperienceemotionsatdifferentdegreesofintensity rangingfromsubtlesensationstoextremearousal.19 Theterm “feeling” refers tothedirect,subjective,andtypicallyconsciousexperienceofemotion.20
16 JaniceGrossStein, “Fear,Greed,andFinancialDecision-Making,” inJamesW.Davis,ed., Psychology,StrategyandConflict:PerceptionsofInsecurityinInternationalRelations (NewYork: Routledge,2013),88,emphasisinoriginal.
17 SeeE.J.Horberg,MichaelW.Kraus,andDacherKeltner, “PrideDisplaysCommunicate Self-InterestandSupportforMeritocracy,” JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology 105:1 (2013),24;DavidMatsumotoandLindaJuang, CultureandPsychology,3rdedn(Belmont: Wadsworth,2004),258.
18 SeeAndrewA.G.Ross, MixedEmotions:BeyondFearandHatredinInternationalConflict (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2014),20.
19 SeeCarrollE.Izard, “TheManyMeanings/AspectsofEmotion:Definitions,Functions, Activation,andRegulation,” EmotionReview 2:4(2010),367;RichardS.Lazarus, “From PsychologicalStresstotheEmotions:AHistoryofChangingOutlooks,” AnnualReviewof Psychology 44(1993),16;DavidMatsumoto,ed., TheCambridgeDictionaryofPsychology (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),179;DavidMatsumotoandLindaJuang, CultureandPsychology,5thedn(Belmont:Wadsworth,2013),207.Foranaccountofthegenesis ofthisdefinition,seeChapter2ofthepresentstudy.
20 SeeGéradlineCoppinandDavidSander, “TheoreticalApproachestoEmotionandIts Measurement,” inHerbertL.Meiselman,ed., EmotionMeasurement (Amsterdam:Elsevier, 2016),15;AntonioR.Damasio, “WilliamJamesandtheModernNeurobiologyofEmotion,” inDylanEvansandPierreCruse,eds, Emotion,Evolution,andRationality (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2004),5;ChristopherL.Heavey,RussellT.Hurlburt,andNoelleL.Lefforge, “TowardaPhenomenologyofFeelings,” Emotion 12:4(2012),769.
Comparedtotherelativelyshort-livedcharacterofemotionsandfeelings, “moods” aremoredurable.Whereasemotionsaretriggeredbysomethingor someone,moodsarenotnecessarilyrelatedtoaspecificstimulus.21 Finally, thepresentbooktreats “affect” asanumbrellatermthatencompassesallof thesephenomena.22
Howdowebesttheorizetheroleofemotionindecision-making?One optionwouldbetointegrateitintorationalchoicetheory.Afewscholarshave triedtodosoandassertthatemotionsenterintoutilitycalculationsas independentvariables.23 Ihavedecidedtoavoidsuchanapproachbecause thelogicofconsequencesisnotabletoaccountforthesocialnatureof emotions.Althoughemotionsarefeltbyindividuals,anthropologistsand psychologistshaveshownthattheycannotbeisolatedfromthesocialenvironmentinwhichtheyarise.Theyareinextricablyintertwinedwithpeople’ s culturalideasandpractices.Abetterwaytoconceptualizetheinfluenceof emotionsonchoicebehaviormightthusbetoincorporatethemintothelogic ofappropriateness.Inthepastfewyears,severalconstructivistshaveproduced valuablestudiesabouthownormsandidentitiesshapeemotionsand howemotions,inturn,helptoconstitutethesesocialconstructs.24 Ihave
21 SeeDacherKeltnerandJenniferS.Lerner, “Emotion,” inSusanT.Fiske,DanielT.Gilbert, andGardnerLindzey,eds, HandbookofSocialPsychology,5thedn,vol.1(Hoboken:Wiley, 2010),318;GerbenA.VanKleef,AstridC.Homan,andArikCheshin, “EmotionalInfluenceat Work:TakeItEASI,” OrganizationalPsychologyReview 2:4(2012),312.
22 SeeJenniferS.Lerneretal., “EmotionandDecisionMaking,” AnnualReviewofPsychology 66(2015),801;VanKleef,Homan,andCheshin, “EmotionalInfluenceatWork,” 312.Agrowing numberofInternationalRelationsscholarsusetheterm “affect” notasanumbrellatermbut drawonaffecttheorytodenoteitasan “innerstate” andnon-consciousbodilyaction.Foran overviewofaffecttheory,seeMelissaGreggandGregoryJ.Seigworth,eds, TheAffectTheory Reader (Durham:DukeUniversityPress,2010).ForInternationalRelationsscholarship employingthisnotionofaffect,seeLindaÅhällandThomasGregory, “Security,Emotions, Affect,” CriticalStudiesonSecurity 1:1(2013),117–20;JaniceBiallyMattern, “OnBeing Convinced:AnEmotionalEpistemologyofInternationalRelations,” InternationalTheory 6:3 (2014),589–94;MarcusHolmes, “BelievingThisandAlievingThat:TheorizingAffectand IntuitionsinInternationalPolitics,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 59:4(2015),707.
23 See,forexample,GaryS.Becker, AccountingforTastes (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press,1996),231–7;LisaJ.CarlsonandRaymondDacey, “TheUseofFearandAngertoAlter CrisisInitiation,” ConflictManagementandPeaceScience 31:2(2014),168–92;RobertH.Frank, PassionswithinReason:TheStrategicRoleoftheEmotions (NewYork:Norton,1988);Jack Hirshleifer, “TheAffectionsandthePassions:TheirEconomicLogic,” RationalityandSociety 5:2 (1993),185–202;RogerD.Petersen, “Identity,Rationality,andEmotionintheProcessesofState DisintegrationandReconstruction,” inKanchanChandra,ed., ConstructivistTheoriesofEthnic Politics (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),388,397,403–17,421.Foradifferentapproach,see RogerD.Petersen, UnderstandingEthnicViolence:Fear,Hatred,andResentmentinTwentiethCenturyEasternEurope (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).
24 See,forexample,Jean-MarcCoicaud, “ExploringtheNexusofEmotions/Passions,Values andRightsinInternationalAffairs,” inYohanAriffin,Jean-MarcCoicaud,andVesselinPopovski, eds, EmotionsinInternationalPolitics:BeyondMainstreamInternationalRelations (Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016),137–67;ToddH.Hall, “SympatheticStates:Explaining theRussianandChineseResponses[to]September11,” PoliticalScienceQuarterly 127:3(2012), 369–400;EmmaHutchison, AffectiveCommunitiesinWorldPolitics:CollectiveEmotionsafter
neverthelessdecidedagainstfollowingtheirexample,becausethelogicof appropriatenesshasdifficultycapturingtheembodied,dynamic,andtosome extentinvoluntarynatureofemotion.Constructivismistraditionallygeared towardtheorizingself-reflectivebehaviorandideationalforcesinsociallife.25 Its constitutiveformofexplanationis “static” andatemporal,asAlexanderWendt pointsout.26 Thisiswhyitcannotaccommodatethe fluentandever-changing natureofaffectiveexperience.
Isubmitthattograspnotonlythesocialbutalsothephysiologicaland dynamiccharacterofemotionindecision-making,itisnecessarytodevelop anadditionalactionmodelattheindividuallevelofanalysis.Drawingon researchinpsychologyandsociology,thisbookintroducesthelogicofaffect, oremotionalchoicetheory,intothe fieldofInternationalRelations(IR).27 The theoryservesasameanstoorganize,explain,andpredictthewaysinwhich emotionsshapedecision-making.28 Itisappliedtotwosignificantepisodesof coercivediplomacy:SovietPremierNikitaKhrushchev’schoicebehaviorin
Trauma (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016);EmmaHutchisonandRoland Bleiker, “EmotionalReconciliation:ReconstitutingIdentityandCommunityafterTrauma,” EuropeanJournalofSocialTheory 11:3(2008),385–403;K.M.Fierke, PoliticalSelf-Sacrifice: Agency,Body,andEmotioninInternationalRelations (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversity Press,2013);SimonKoschut, “Emotional(Security)Communities:TheSignificanceofEmotion NormsinInter-AlliedConflictManagement,” ReviewofInternationalStudies 40:3(2014), 533–58;SimonKoschut, “ThePowerof(Emotion)Words:OntheImportanceofEmotionsfor SocialConstructivistDiscourseAnalysisinIR,” JournalofInternationalRelationsandDevelopment (2017),<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0086-0>;Ross, MixedEmotions
25 Forsimilarcritiques,seeErikRingmar, “HowtheWorldStageMakesItsSubjects:An EmbodiedCritiqueofConstructivistIRTheory,” JournalofInternationalRelationsandDevelopment 19:1(2016),101–25;AndrewA.G.Ross, “CominginfromtheCold:Constructivismand Emotions,” EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations 12:2(2006),200,209;TySolomon, “Embodiment,Emotions,andMaterialisminInternationalRelations,” inLindaÅhälland ThomasGregory,eds, Emotions,PoliticsandWar (NewYork:Routledge,2015),58–9.Even constructivistswhorejecttheviewthatsocialrealityismadeupof “ideasallthewaydown” have generallylockedmaterialmattersupinanundertheorized “rumpmaterialism.” Fortheclassic example,seeAlexanderWendt, SocialTheoryofInternationalPolitics (Cambridge,UK:Cambridge UniversityPress,1999),109–13,130–4.
26 SeeAlexanderWendt, “OnConstitutionandCausationinInternationalRelations,” Review ofInternationalStudies 24:5(1998),105.Likewise,anotherexpert,PetriYlikoski,notesthat “constitutiondoesnottaketime.” Itdoes “notmakesensetotalkabout processes inthecaseof constitution,” becausetherelationbetweenpropertiesandtheircomponentpartsis “synchronous. ” SeePetriYlikoski, “CausalandConstitutiveExplanationCompared,” Erkenntnis 78:2 (2013),282,myemphasis.
27 Forstylisticreasons,thisbookusesthetermslogicofaffectandemotionalchoicetheory interchangeably. “InternationalRelations” willbecapitalizedwhenreferringtothedisciplineand lower-casedwhenreferringtothesubjectmatter.
28 Somespecialistsareskepticalabouttheideaofdevelopinganemotion-basedparadigm. See,forexample,EmmaHutchisonandRolandBleiker, “TheorizingEmotionsinWorld Politics,” InternationalTheory 6:3(2014),509;ReinhardWolf, “EmotionenindeninternationalenBeziehungen:DasBeispielRessentiments,” inKarl-RudolfKorte,ed., Emotionenund Politik:Begründungen,KonzeptionenundPraxisfeldereinerpolitikwissenschaftlichenEmotionsforschung (Baden-Baden:Nomos,2015),194–5.
theCubanmissilecrisisin1962andIraqiPresidentSaddamHussein’ s decision-makingduringtheGulfconflictin1990–1.29
Thelogicofaffectisnotanoxymoron.Aftertwodecadesofresearch, neuroscientistsandpsychologistshaveshatteredtheorthodoxviewthat “passions” standinoppositiontorationality.Theirworksuggeststhatthe capacitytofeelisaprerequisiteforreasonedjudgmentandrationalbehavior. Moreover,theyhavefoundthateachdiscreteemotion,suchasfear,anger,or sadness,hasalogicofitsown.Theyareassociatedwithspecific “appraisal tendencies” and “actiontendencies” thatguidejudgmentandchoiceselection insystematicways.Anemotion’sappraisaltendenciesinfluencewhatandhow wethink,whileitsactiontendenciesaffectwhatwewantanddo.30 Peoplewho areangry,forexample,tendtomakeoptimisticriskestimatesandfeel impulsestoconfrontthesourceofangerwiththeaimofremovingit.31 In short,whenactors “follow” thelogicofaffect,theyperceive,think,anddecide onthebasisofemotionsandtheirappraisalandactiontendencies.
Emotionalchoicetheorypositsthattargetleaders’ decision-makingis shapedbythedynamicinterplaybetweentheiremotions,norms,andidentities.Thecoreofthetheoryconsistsofaseriesofpropositionsabouthow theappraisalandactiontendenciesof fivekeyemotions namelyfear,anger, hope,pride,andhumiliation tendtoinfluencetargetleaders’ choice behavior.Thepropositionsspecifytheaffectiveconditionsunderwhich theseactorsarelikelytoacceptorrejectacoercer’sdemands.32 Theavailable psychologicalscholarshipindicatesthatthegeneraloutlinesofthe fivekey emotions’ appraisalandactiontendenciestendtobesimilaracrosstheglobe. Theinfluencesoftheseemotionsondecision-makingcanthusbeanalyzed
29 JaniceGrossSteinprovidesaclassicdefinitionof “crisis” as “athreattobasicvaluesthat simultaneouslycreatesasenseofurgencyanduncertaintyamongpolicymakers.” SeeJanice GrossStein, “CrisisManagement:LookingBacktoLookForward,” PoliticalPsychology 29:4 (2008),554.JuttaWeldesremindsusthatcrisesarenotontologicallygiven.Theyarealways constructedbysomeone.SeeJuttaWeldes, “TheCulturalProductionofCrises:U.S.Identityand theMissilesinCuba,” inJuttaWeldesetal.,eds, CulturesofInsecurity:States,Communitiesand theProductionofDanger (Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1999),35–62.Seealso JackHolland, “ConstructingCrisesandArticulatingAffectafter9/11,” inÅhällandGregory, eds, Emotions,PoliticsandWar,167–81.
30 SeeJenniferS.LernerandDacherKeltner, “BeyondValence:TowardaModelofEmotionSpecificInfluencesonJudgementandChoice,” CognitionandEmotion 14:4(2000),477;Jennifer S.LernerandDacherKeltner, “Fear,Anger,andRisk,” JournalofPersonalityandSocial Psychology 81:1(2001),146–59;GeorgeLoewensteinandJenniferS.Lerner, “TheRoleofAffect inDecisionMaking,” inRichardJ.Davidson,KlausR.Scherer,andH.HillGoldsmith,eds, HandbookofAffectiveSciences (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),621.
31 SeeMarijaSpanovicetal., “FearandAngerasPredictorsofMotivationforIntergroup Aggression:EvidencefromSerbiaandRepublikaSrpska,” GroupProcesses&IntergroupRelations 13:6(2010),726;MichalReifenTagar,ChristopherM.Federico,andEranHalperin, “ThePositive EffectofNegativeEmotionsinProtractedConflict:TheCaseofAnger,” JournalofExperimental SocialPsychology 47:1(2011),157–8.
32 Forasummaryofthesepropositions,seethesectionon “TheLogicofAffect,” thischapter.
systematicallybythelogicofaffect.Atthesametime,however,affective experienceandexpressionvarynotonlyfromonesocialgrouptothenext butalsobetweenindividuals.Thisiswhythisbooksituatesemotionsinthe contextofdecision-makers’ personaldispositionsaswell.
Whydoesthismatter?TheUnitedNations(UN)SecurityCouncilhasthe responsibilitytomaintainandrestoreinternationalpeace,andtoprotect populationsfromcrimesagainsthumanityifnationalauthoritiesfailtodoso.33 Whenitwishestoreininaggressors,coercivediplomacyrepresentsapromisinginstrumentbecauseitavoidsthecostsandrisksassociatedwithmilitary intervention.34 Explainingfailuresandsuccessesofthisthreat-basedstrategy is,therefore,animportanttask.Themoreweknowaboutitsstrengthsand risks,thebetterweareabletoimproveit.Besidesrefiningourunderstanding ofcoercivediplomacyasatoolininternationalsecurity,thisbookcontributes tothreethrivingandpartlyinterrelatedbodiesofIRscholarship: first,the recentrenaissanceinthestudyofleadersandtheirroleinforeignrelations;35 second,thenewupsurgeofresearchintodiplomacyanddiplomaticencounters;36 and finally,theburgeoningliteratureonaffectandemotionsinworld politics,37 whichrepresentsthebeginningofaveritableaffectiverevolutionin
33 SeeUnitedNations, YearbookoftheUnitedNations2007,vol.61(NewYork:United Nations,2011),1543;JenniferM.Welsh, “TheSecurityCouncilandHumanitarianIntervention,” inVaughanLoweetal.,eds, TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilandWar:TheEvolution ofThoughtandPracticesince1945 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),558.
34 SeeAlexanderL.George, “CoerciveDiplomacy:DefinitionandCharacteristics,” inAlexander L.GeorgeandWilliamE.Simons,eds, TheLimitsofCoerciveDiplomacy (Boulder:WestviewPress, 1994),9;RobertJervis, “ForceinOurTimes,” InternationalRelations 25:4(2011),403.Foran accountdeeplyskepticalofcoercivediplomacy’sefficacy,seeSumitGangulyandMichaelR.Kraig, “The2001–2002Indo-PakistaniCrisis:ExposingtheLimitsofCoerciveDiplomacy,” Security Studies 14:2(2005),290–324.
35 See,forexample,YaelS.Aronoff, ThePoliticalPsychologyofIsraeliPrimeMinisters:When Hard-LinersOptforPeace (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014);JeffD.Colgan, “DomesticRevolutionaryLeadersandInternationalConflict,” WorldPolitics 65:4(2013), 656–90;SarahE.Croco, “TheDecider’sDilemma:LeaderCulpability,WarOutcomes,and DomesticPunishment,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 105:3(2011),457–77;Matthew FuhrmannandMichaelC.Horowitz, “WhenLeadersMatter:RebelExperienceandNuclear Proliferation,” JournalofPolitics 77:1(2015),72–87;MichaelC.Horowitz,AllanC.Stam,and CaliM.Ellis, WhyLeadersFight (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015);Rose McDermott, PresidentialLeadership,Illness,andDecisionMaking (Cambridge,UK:Cambridge UniversityPress,2007);ElizabethN.Saunders, LeadersatWar:HowPresidentsShapeMilitary Interventions (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2011).
36 See,forinstance,IverB.Neumann, AtHomewiththeDiplomats:InsideaEuropeanForeign Ministry (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2012);IverB.Neumann, DiplomaticSites:ACritical Enquiry (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013);BrianC.Rathbun, Diplomacy’sValue:Creating Securityin1920sEuropeandtheContemporaryMiddleEast (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 2014);OleJacobSending,VincentPouliot,andIverB.Neumann,eds, Diplomacyandthe MakingofWorldPolitics (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015).
37 Forarecentreview,seeJean-MarcCoicaud, “EmotionsandPassionsintheDisciplineof InternationalRelations,” JapaneseJournalofPoliticalScience 15:3(2014),485–513.Foran updatedandmorefocusedoverview,seeChapter2.
InternationalRelations.Allthreeresearchareasarecombinedinfruitful recentworkabouttheroleofaffectandemotionsinleaders’ diplomacyand foreignpolicy.38
TheremainderofthisIntroductionisdividedinto fivesections:The first sectionoutlinestheexistingexplanationsforcoercivediplomacy’slowsuccess rate;thesecondsectionprovidesasummaryofthelogicofaffectincludingits mainpropositions.Thethirdsectionexplainstheselectionofthecasestudies, andthefourthsectionjustifiesthestudy’sfocusonpoliticalleaders.The final sectiongivesanoverviewofthechaptersthatfollow.
EXISTINGEXPLANATIONSOFCOERCIVE DIPLOMACYOUTCOMES
Whatpromptsdecision-makerstodefythreatsfrommorepowerfulcoercers,and whendotheygivein?Attheriskofsimplification,theanswersofferedinthe existingliteraturecanbesortedintothreegroups:broadlyrationalistaccounts, explanationsdrawingoncognitivepsychology,andapproachesinspiredby constructivisttheorizing.39 Thissectionwillsummarizeeachoftheminturn. Rationalchoiceconceivesofagentsas homooeconomicus autonomousbeings whocarefullycollect,process,andevaluateinformationabouttheconsequences ofalternativecoursesofaction.Oncetheyhaverank-orderedtheirpreferences, theystrategicallyselecttheoptionthatenablesthemtoreachtheiraimsas efficientlyaspossible.40 The “thin” versionofthislogicofconsequencesassumes thatactorspursuestableandorderedpreferencesbutdoesnotspecifythecontent
38 See,forexample,ToddH.HallandKerenYarhi-Milo, “ThePersonalTouch:Leaders’ Impressions,CostlySignaling,andAssessmentsofSincerityinInternationalAffairs,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 56:3(2012),560–73;MarcusHolmesandKerenYarhi-Milo, “The PsychologicalLogicofPeaceSummits:HowEmpathyShapesOutcomesofDiplomaticNegotiations,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 61:1(2017),107–22;JacquesE.C.Hymans, ThePsychologyofNuclearProliferation:Identity,Emotions,andForeignPolicy (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);JonathanMercer, “EmotionandStrategyintheKorean War,” InternationalOrganization 67:2(2013),221–52;BrentE.Sasley, “AffectiveAttachments andForeignPolicy:Israelandthe1993OsloAccords,” EuropeanJournalofInternational Relations 16:4(2010),687–709.
39 Somescholarshipbridgesthesegroups.AlexanderGeorge’ s “abstractmodel” ofcoercive diplomacy,forexample,assumes “purerationality” onthepartofatarget,buthepointsoutthat thisassumptionneedstoberelaxedandcomplementedwithinsightsfromcognitivepsychology. SeeAlexanderL.George, “TheoryandPractice,” inGeorgeandSimons,eds, TheLimitsof CoerciveDiplomacy,13–14,19.
40 SeeJonElster, ReasonandRationality (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),16; RobertO.Keohane, AfterHegemony:CooperationandDiscordintheWorldPoliticalEconomy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),27.
ofthesepreferences.41 Inpractice,however,rationalistscholarsofinternational relationsgenerallyadheretoa “thick” orstandardversionofthemodelinwhich actorsareexpectedtostriveforsecurity,power,orwealth.42
Politicalscientistsinfluencedbytherationalistparadigmhaveidentified threeprimaryreasonswhytargetsmayrejectcoercivethreatsofforce,even whenthecoercerenjoysmilitarysuperiority.First,theymayresistbecause theydoubtthatthecoercerwillcarryoutitsthreat.43 Suchdoubtislikely reinforcedifcoercerslacksufficientdomesticorinternationalsupportfortheir demandsofatarget.44 Moreover,ifagovernmentpracticescoercivediplomacytogetherwithacoalitionofstatesratherthanonitsown,anydivisions betweenthecoalitionmemberstendtoundercutthecredibilityofthethreatin theeyesofatarget.45 Thischallengehasledrationaliststodevisesignaling strategiestohelpcoercersmaketheirwarningscredible.Mostofthemclaim thatthreatsconveyedinprivatediplomaticcommunicationsdonotcount much,becausetargetsarelikelytodismissthemasbluff.Consequently,they recommendreplacingsuch “cheaptalk” with “costly” signals.46 Forexample,
41 SeeJohnFerejohn, “RationalityandInterpretation:ParliamentaryElectionsinEarlyStuart England,” inKristenRenwickMonroe,ed., TheEconomicApproachtoPolitics:ACritical ReassessmentoftheTheoryofRationalAction (NewYork:HarperCollins,1991),282;Alex MintzandKarlDeRouen,Jr., UnderstandingForeignPolicyDecisionMaking (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,2010),59.
42 See,forexample,StephenKrasner, StructuralConflict:TheThirdWorldagainstGlobal Liberalism (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985),3;CharlesS.Glaser, RationalTheory ofInternationalPolitics:TheLogicofCompetitionandCooperation (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,2010),4–5.
43 See,forexample,RobertJ.Art, “CoerciveDiplomacy:WhatDoWeKnow?,” inArtand Cronin,eds, TheUnitedStatesandCoerciveDiplomacy,365,372;AlexanderL.Georgeand WilliamE.Simons, “FindingsandConclusions,” inGeorgeandSimons,eds, TheLimitsof CoerciveDiplomacy,272;PeterViggoJakobsen, “PushingtheLimitsofMilitaryCoercion Theory,” InternationalStudiesPerspectives 12:2(2011),165.
44 SeeArt, “CoerciveDiplomacy,” 371;GraemeA.M.Davies, “CoerciveDiplomacyMeets DiversionaryIncentives:TheImpactofUSandIranianDomesticPoliticsduringtheBushand ObamaPresidencies,” ForeignPolicyAnalysis 8:3(2012),313–31;GeorgeandSimons, “Findings andConclusions,” 273,284;PeterViggoJakobsen, WesternUseofCoerciveDiplomacyafterthe ColdWar:AChallengeforTheoryandPractice (London:Macmillan,1998),41–2.
45 SeeDanielBymanandMatthewWaxman, DynamicsofCoercion:AmericanForeignPolicy andtheLimitsofMilitaryMight (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),Chap.6; ThomasJ.Christensen, WorsethanAMonolith:AlliancePoliticsandProblemsofCoercive DiplomacyinAsia (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010),4;ScottWolford, “Showing Restraint,SignalingResolve:Coalitions,Cooperation,andCrisisBargaining,” AmericanJournal ofPoliticalScience 58:1(2014),144–56.
46 SeeRobertJervis, TheLogicofImagesinInternationalRelations (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,1970),82;Schelling, ArmsandInfluence,150.Forrecentworkontheefficacyof secretthreats,seeMatthewA.Baum, “GoingPrivate:PublicOpinion,PresidentialRhetoric,and theDomesticPoliticsofAudienceCostsinU.S.ForeignPolicyCrises,” JournalofConflict Resolution 48:5(2004),603–31;ShuheiKurizaki, “EfficientSecrecy:PublicversusPrivateThreats inCrisisDiplomacy,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 101:3(2007),543–58;Kristopher W.Ramsay, “CheapTalkDiplomacy,VoluntaryNegotiations,andVariableBargaining Power,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 55:4(2011),1003–23.
coercersaresupposedto “tietheirhands” byissuingpublicthreatsthat puttheirreputationontheline.Atargetwouldthenallegedlyreachthe conclusionthatthecoercerswillstandontheirposition,becausetheirdomesticaudienceswouldpunishthemfornotfollowingthroughontheircommitment.47 Rationalistsalsoadvisecoercerstounderlinetheseriousnessoftheir threatbycombiningitwithsome financiallyandpoliticallyexpensiveactions. Thesemayincludemobilizingtroops,conductingmilitaryexercises,orelevatingalertlevels.48
Second,targetsmaybelievethatthecoercerwillexecuteitsthreat,butthey neverthelessrefusetobackdownbecausetheydoubtthecoercer’slong-term resolve,i.e.,itsdeterminationtoprevailinapotentiallylongandcostlyarmed conflict.49 Severalscholarsmaintainthattargets’ perceptionsofacoercer’ s resolvearetypicallyinfluencedbythe “balanceofinterests” betweenacoercer andatarget.Iftheinterestsatstakearemoreimportanttothetarget,itwillbe moremotivatedand,hence,resolvedtodefendthoseinterestsandtoreject coercivethreats.Ifthereexistsanasymmetryofmotivationfavoringthe coercer,ontheotherhand,coercivediplomacyismorelikelytosucceed.50
Furthermore,someexpertsstressthatthemagnitudeofacoercer’sdemands playsasignificantrole.AlexanderGeorgeadvisedthatacoercercantryto reduceatarget’sresolveandmotivationbydemandingonlywhatisessential tosafeguardthecoercer’sownvitalinterestsandbyavoidingdemandsthat involveatarget’svitalinterests.Ifacoercerformulatesexpansivedemands, suchasregimechangeorothermajorinfringementsonatarget’ssovereignty, thisislikelytoincreasethetarget’sdeterminationtoresist.51
47 SeeJamesFearon, “DomesticPoliticalAudiencesandtheEscalationofInternational Disputes,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 88:3(1994),577,579,586.Forcritiquesof “audiencecosts” theory,seeJackSnyderandEricaD.Borghard, “TheCostofEmptyThreats:APenny, NotaPound,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 105:3(2011),437–56;MarcTrachtenberg, “AudienceCosts:AnHistoricalAnalysis,” SecurityStudies 21:1(2012),3–42.
48 SeeJamesFearon, “SignalingForeignPolicyInterests:TyingHandsversusSinkingCosts,” JournalofConflictResolution 41:1(1997),68–9.
49 SeeJervis, “ForceinOurTimes,” 408;DiannePfundsteinChamberlain, CheapThreats: WhytheUnitedStatesStrugglestoCoerceWeakStates (Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversity Press,2016),11,13.
50 SeeArt, “CoerciveDiplomacy,” 371,373;George, “TheoryandPractice,” 15;Georgeand Simons, “FindingsandConclusions,” 281;Jervis, “ForceinOurTimes,” 409;JackS.Levy, “DeterrenceandCoerciveDiplomacy:TheContributionsofAlexanderGeorge,” PoliticalPsychology 29:4(2008),540;BarryPosen, “MilitaryResponsestoRefugeeDisasters,” International Security 21:1(1996),72–111;Stein, “CrisisManagement,” 558.
51 SeeGeorge, “TheoryandPractice,” 15;GeorgeandSimons, “FindingsandConclusions,” 281.Onthesignificanceofthemagnitudeofdemands,seealsoMichaelA.AllenandBenjamin O.Fordham, “FromMelostoBaghdad:ExplainingResistancetoMilitarizedChallengesfrom MorePowerfulStates,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 55:4(2011),1043;BarryM.Blechman andTamaraCofmanWittes, “DefiningMoment:TheThreatandUseofForceinAmerican ForeignPolicy,” PoliticalScienceQuarterly 114:1(1999),6–8,10–11;Haun, Coercion,Survival, andWar,3,8,32–4.
Third,targetsmay findacoercivethreatcrediblebutconcludethatits executionwouldweighlessheavilythanthereputationalcoststheywould incurathomeorabroadforaccedingtothethreat.Thesecostsmayinclude damagetothetargetleadership’sauthorityintheeyesofdomesticconstituents orencouragementofotherstatestotryandpracticeforcefulpersuasionvis-à-vis suchaseemingpushover.52 ToddSechserarguesthatatargetismorelikelyto acquiesceifcoercersanticipateitsreputationalcostsandoffsetsthemwithside payments.53 Thisaccordswithagrowingbodyofscholarshipsuggestingthat coercersshouldcomplementtheirthreatswithpositiveincentivesinorderto increasethechancesthatatargetwillcomply.54
ThisbroadlyrationalistapproachtocoercivediplomacyhasbeenchallengedbyanumberofIRexpertsschooledincognitivepsychology.They criticizethatrationalchoicemodelsgenerallytreatthreatsandsignalsas objectivefactsthatwillbeperceivedandjudgedthesamewaybyallcoercers andtargets.55 InthewordsofRobertJervis, “itisallwellandgoodtotalkabout credibility,punishment,andrewardintheabstract,butastheyworkoutinthe realworldtheydependonwhatthetargetsvalue,believe,andthinkaboutthe state’sbehavior.”56 Thesethoughtprocessestendtobeinfluencedanddistortedbycognitiveschemata,heuristics,andframingeffects,amongothers. Schemataarepre-existingbeliefsthatshapehowpeopleinterpretnewinformation.Iftargetactorsareconfrontedwithsignalsfromacoercerthatarenot consistentwiththesebeliefs,theyarelikelytodiscount,misperceive,or reinterpretthesignals.Onlywhentheyareconfrontedwithoverwhelming
52 SeeArt, “CoerciveDiplomacy,” 366;ToddS.Sechser, “Goliath’sCurse:CoerciveThreats andAsymmetricPower,” InternationalOrganization 64:4(2010),628,638.
53 SeeSechser, “Goliath’sCurse,” 627–8,640.SeealsoRobertJ.Art, “Introduction,” inArt andCronin,eds, TheUnitedStatesandCoerciveDiplomacy,7;JamesW.Davis,Jr., Threatsand Promises:ThePursuitofInternationalInfluence (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 2000),5;George, ForcefulPersuasion,5;StevenGreffeniusandJungilGill, “PureCoercionvs. Carrot-and-StickOffersinCrisisBargaining,” JournalofPeaceResearch 2:1(1992),39,51.
54 SeeArt, “CoerciveDiplomacy,” 388–9,397,399;MiroslavNincic, “GettingWhatYou Want:PositiveInducementsinInternationalRelations,” InternationalSecurity 35:1(2010), 138–83.
55 SeeGeorge, “TheoryandPractice,” 15,19–20;RichardK.Herrmann, “Perceptionsand ImageTheoryinInternationalRelations,” inLeonieHuddy,DavidO.Sears,andJackS.Levy, eds, TheOxfordHandbookofPoliticalPsychology,2ndedn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2013),335;RobertJervis, “SignalingandPerception:DrawingInferencesandProjecting Images,” inKristenRenwickMonroe,ed., PoliticalPsychology (Mahwah:Erlbaum,2002),301; RobertJervis,RichardNedLebow,andJaniceGrossStein, PsychologyandDeterrence (Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1985);RichardNedLebowandJaniceGrossStein, WeAllLost theColdWar (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994);JaniceGrossSteinandDavid A.Welch, “RationalandPsychologicalApproachestotheStudyofInternationalConflict: ComparativeStrengthsandWeaknesses,” inNehemiaGevaandAlexMintz,eds, Decisionmaking onWarandPeace:TheCognitive-RationalDebate (Boulder:LynneRienner,1997),53.
56 Jervis, HowStatesmenThink,10,110.SeealsoRobertJervis, PerceptionandMisperception inInternationalPolitics (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976).
discrepantinformationdotheyputasidetheirschemata.57 Heuristicsreferto cognitiveshortcutsthatdecision-makersrelyontoprocessinformation.58 For example,scholarshavefoundthatpeoplehaveaheuristictendencytojudge temporallydistantthreatsaslesslikelytomaterializethanshort-termthreats. Longtimehorizonsincreasetheirconfidencethattheywillbeabletomanage thesethreats.59 Finally,framingeffectscomeintoplaywhenactorsfacethe decisionofwhethertoacceptorrejectacoercer’sdemand.Drawingon prospecttheory,scholarshavefoundthattargetleaderswhoframecompliance asacertainlossaremorelikelytoriskaconfrontationwithacoercertotryand safeguardwhattheyalreadyhave,evenifthatconfrontationisboundtoresult inlargerlosses.60
Scholarsinspiredbyconstructivisttheorizinglikewisepointtooverwhelmingevidencethathumanbeingssystematicallyviolatethepreceptsofstandard rationalchoice.ExperimentssuchastheUltimatumGame,forinstance, documentthatpeopleacrosstheworldarepreparedtoforgomaterialgains iftheybelievethatthesegainswouldbebasedonaninappropriatedistribution mechanism.Insuchcases,decision-makingisshapednotbymaterialcost–benefitcalculationsbutbynormsaboutproperconduct.61 Constructivists stressthatthesenormstendtovaryfromoneculturetothenext.Theirlogic ofappropriatenessconceptualizesagentsas homosociologicus socialbeings whoareembeddedincommunitiesandwhodeveloptheiridentitiesin
57 SeeRobertJervis, “UnderstandingBeliefs,” PoliticalPsychology 27:5(2006),654;Jervis, HowStatesmenThink,207–8;JaniceGrossStein, “Calculation,Miscalculation,andConventionalDeterrence,II:TheViewfromJerusalem, ” inJervis,Lebow,andStein,eds, Psychologyand Deterrence,60–88;JaniceGrossStein, “PoliticalLearningandPoliticalPsychology:AQuestion ofNorms,” inMonroe,ed., PoliticalPsychology,110;DavidA.Welch, PainfulChoices:ATheory ofForeignPolicyChange (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005),37.
58 SeeJaniceGrossStein, “ForeignPolicyDecisionMaking:Rational,Psychological,and NeurologicalModels,” inSteveSmith,AmeliaHadfield,andTimDunne,eds, ForeignPolicy: Theories,Actors,Cases,3rdedn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),137.
59 SeeRonaldR.KrebsandAaronRapport, “InternationalRelationsandthePsychologyof TimeHorizons,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 56:3(2012),530–43.
60 SeeDavis, ThreatsandPromises,34–8;MarkL.Haas, “ProspectTheoryandtheCuban MissileCrisis,” InternationalStudiesQuarterly 45:2(2001),241–70;Levy, “Deterrenceand CoerciveDiplomacy,” 541;GarySchaub,Jr., “Deterrence,Compellence,andProspectTheory,” PoliticalPsychology 25:3(2004),389–411.
61 SeeCristinaBicchieri, TheGrammarofSociety:TheNatureandDynamicsofSocial Norms (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),100,102,112;WernerGüth,Rolf Schmittberger,andBerndSchwarze, “AnExperimentalAnalysisofUltimatumBargaining,” JournalofEconomicBehaviorandOrganization 3:4(1982),367–88;JosephHenrich, “DoesCulture MatterinEconomicBehavior?UltimatumGameBargainingamongtheMachiguengaofthe PeruvianAmazon,” AmericanEconomicReview 90:4(2000),973–9;JosephHenrichandNatalie Smith, “ComparativeExperimentalEvidencefromMachiguenga,Mapuche,Huinca,andAmerican Populations,” inJosephHenrichetal.,eds, FoundationsofHumanSociality:EconomicExperimentsandEthnographicEvidencefromFifteenSmall-ScaleSocieties (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2004),134.
