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Table of Contents

Cover Series Page

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication Page

Notes on Contributors

Introduction to the Second Edition

Introduction to the First Edition

Content

Physicalism

The Place of Consciousness in Nature

Conclusion

References

PART I: MENTAL CONTENT

IS THERE A VIABLE NOTION OF NARROW MENTAL CONTENT?

CHAPTER ONE: Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions

1. Background

2. Doubting Definitions

3. Paderewski Variations

4. DeRe and De Dicto

5. Attitude Attributions, Neologisms, and Generalizations

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWO: There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content

1. Narrow and Broad Content

2. Narrow Narrow Content

3. Epistemic Narrow Content16

4. Thoroughly Narrow Content

5. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes IS EXTERNALISM ABOUT MENTAL CONTENT COMPATIBLE WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS?

CHAPTER THREE: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent

1. Anti‐individualism

2. The McKinsey Problem

3. Types of Response to the McKinsey Problem

4. Anti‐individualism Does Not Imply (2)

5. Reconsideration of McKinsey’s Position

6. Problems for McKinsey

7. Unproblematic Privileged Access to the World?

8. Conclusion

Acknowledgment

References

Notes

CHAPTER FOUR: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent

1. The Reductio Argument for Incompatibilism

2. The Proper Response to the Reductio

3. Why Semantic Externalism (SE) Is True

4. The Retreat to MSE Is Unmotivated

CHAPTER EIGHT: Are There Different Kinds of Content?

1. What Is Conceptual Structure?

2. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Cognitive Maps

3. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Visual Perception

4. Syntax and Semantics

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART II: PHYSICALISM IS NON‐REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM VIABLE?

CHAPTER NINE: Everybody Has Got It

References

Notes

CHAPTER TEN: The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism

1. An Epistemological Detour

2. The Independent Case for Theoreticity

3. Totting up the Prospects: Sensory Qualia

4. Totting Up the Prospects: The Propositional Attitudes

5. Is There a Residual Case for Propositional Attitudes in Humans?

References

Notes SHOULD PHYSICALISTS BE A PRIORI PHYSICALISTS?

CHAPTER ELEVEN: A Priori Physicalism

1. Physicalism and the Mind–Brain Identity Theory

2. The Disagreement between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalism

3. De Re versus De Dicto Versions of the Debate

4. The Epistemological Argument from Zombies for A Priori Physicalism

5. The Semantic Argument for A Priori Physicalism

6. Some (Substantial) Tidying Up

7. The Analogy with Shapes and the Relevance of Functionalism

8. De Re A Posteriori Physicalism and the Problem of Distancing De Re A Posteriori Physicalism from Dual Attribute Theories

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWELVE: On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism

1. Common Ground

2. Disputed Territory

Acknowledgments

References

Notes IS THERE AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION?

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Causation and Mental Causation

6. How to Implement the Role of Emergence

7. More than Merely Nomological Supervenience

8. Analytic Necessitarianism

9. An Ontology of Powers

10. Necessitarianism with Strong Necessity

11. Other Roles for Ontological Emergence

12. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes ARE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS AND INTENTIONAL CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES IDENTICAL?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: New Troubles for the Qualia Freak

1. Against Phenomenal Dualism

2. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Intrinsic Properties

3. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Nonrepresentational Properties

4. Phenomenal Externalism

5. Lolita, XP1, and Bodily Sensations

6. An Alternative Proposal and Some Final Thoughts on Qualia

Acknowledgments

References

References

Notes

IS AWARENESS OF OUR MENTAL ACTS A KIND OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS?

CHAPTER NINETEEN: All Consciousness Is Perceptual

1. Perceptual Consciousness

2. Action

3. Thinking

4. Why Peacocke’s View Isn’t PC

5. Conclusion

References

CHAPTER TWENTY: Mental Action andSelf‐Awareness (I)

1. The Distinctive Features of Action‐Awareness

2. The Nature and Range of Mental Actions

3. The Principal Hypothesis and Its Consequences

4. The Principal Hypothesis: Attractions and Possibilities

5. Describing and Explaining Schizophrenic Experience

6. The First Person in Action Self‐Ascriptions

7. Concluding Remarks: Rational Agency and Action‐Awareness

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART IV: PERCEPTION AND MENTAL CAPACITIES

SHOULD PERCEPTION BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION, DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE WORLD, OR A HYBRID VIEW?

3. The Hallucination Question and Perceptual Particularity

4. Particularism and Attributionalism

5. The Commitments of Capacities‐First

Philosophy

6. Perceptual Capacities

7. Ways of Perceiving, Perceptual Capacities, and Modes of Presentations

References

Notes

IS PERCEPTION GENERAL, PARTICULAR, OR A HYBRID?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FOUR: Perceiving Particulars

1. Introduction

2. Two Arguments for Existentialism

3. Two Objections to Existentialism

4. Perceptual Awareness of Particulars

5. Visual Objects

Acknowledgment

References

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FIVE: Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content

1. Background

2. Alleged Benefits of Abstract Content

3. Alleged Benefits of Particular Content

4. The Pluralist View: The Best of Both Theories

5. Conclusion References

Notes

HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND COGNITION?

2. Natural Kinds for Psychology

3. Moderate Pluralism about Pain

4. The Eliminativist Alternative

5. Concluding Thoughts

References

Notes

DO WE NEED IMAGINATION OVER AND ABOVE IMAGERY AND SUPPOSITION?

CHAPTER THIRTY: Against Imagination

1. How Not to Explain the Mind

2. Varieties of Skepticism about Imagination

3. Mental Imagery

4. Mental Imagery and Imagination

5. Sensory Imagination / Propositional Imagination / Supposition

6. Mental Imagery in Propositional Attitudes

7. Between Sensory Imagination and Supposition

8. Conclusion: Imagistic versus Linguistic Cognition

References

Notes

CHAPTER THIRTY‐ONE: Why We Need Imagination

1. What Imagination Is

2. The Challenges from Supposition and Conception

3. The Challenge from Belief

4. The Reductionist Challenge

5. Concluding Remarks

References

Notes

Index

List of Illustrations

Chapter 10

FIGURE 10.1 THE HURVICH–JAMESON NEURAL NETWORK MODEL (HURVICH, 1981).

FIGURE 10.2 THREE OPPONENT‐PROCESS NEURONS.

Chapter 14

FIGURE 14.1 KIM’S FAVORITE DIAGRAM.

Chapter 21

FIGURE 21.1 THREE‐DIMENSIONAL EBBINGHAUS ILLUSION.

Chapter 22

FIGURE 22.1 COINCIDENTAL VARIATION.

Chapter 26

FIGURE 26.1 THE RAT‐MAN.

FIGURE 26.2

FIGURE 26.3

FIGURES 26.4A (LEFT) AND 4B (RIGHT)

Chapter 27

FIGURE 27.1 IF A AND B ARE QUICKLY ALTERNATED, ONE SEES APPARENT MOTION, USU...

FIGURE 27.2 THE LIKELIHOOD OF SEEING HORIZONTAL (RATHER THAN VERTICAL MOTION...

FIGURE 27.3 A CLOCKWISE ORIENTED BAR CAN BE SEEN TO ROTATE TO A COUNTERCLOCK...

FIGURE 27.4 IF CUED TO C, SUBJECTS ARE FASTER TO DETECT TARGETS AT S THAN AT...

FIGURE 27.5 A VISUO‐SPATIAL NEGLECT PATIENT WAS ASKED TO COPY THE TOP PICTUR...

FIGURE 27.6 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN A BASIC MULTIPLE OBJECT TRACKING EXPERIMEN...

FIGURE 27.7 ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECT OF DIVISIVE NORMALIZATION. THE CENTER...

FIGURE 27.8 VERSION OF THE OBJECT‐SPECIFIC PREVIEW BENEFIT THAT SHOWS THAT O...

FIGURE 27.9 VERSION OF THE OBJECT‐SPECIFIC PREVIEW BENEFIT.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy

In teaching and research, philosophy makes progress through argumentation and debate. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy provides a forum for students and their teachers to follow and participate in the debates that animate philosophy today in the western world. Each volume presents pairs of opposing viewpoints on contested themes and topics in the central subfields of philosophy. Each volume is edited and introduced by an expert in the field, and also includes an index, bibliography, and suggestions for further reading. The opposing essays, commissioned especially for the volumes in the series, are thorough but accessible presentations of opposing points of view.

1. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

2. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

edited by Christopher Hitchcock

3. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa

4. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

5. Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art

edited by Matthew Kieran

6. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory

edited by James Dreier

7. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science

edited by Robert Stainton

8. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen

9. Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy

edited by Laurence Thomas

10. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics

edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman

11. Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy

edited by Thomas Christiano and John Christman

12. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology

edited by Francisco J. Ayala and Robert Arp

13. Contemporary Debates in Bioethics

edited by Arthur L. Caplan and Robert Arp

14. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition

edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa

15. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Second Edition

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

17. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition

edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen

This edition first published 2023

© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Edition History

Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 2007)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

The right of Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen to be identified as the author(s) of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.

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Notes on Contributors

Louise Antony is Professor Emerita at the University of Massachusetts, and Regular Visiting Professor at Rutgers University. In her research she attempts to develop naturalistic accounts of meaning, knowledge, and agency that square with our scientific understanding of the mind. She is the author of numerous articles in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and feminist theory, and has co‐edited two collections of original essays, Chomsky and His Critics (with Norbert Hornstein) and A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (with Charlotte Witt).

Ned Block is Silver Professor at New York University in the Department of Philosophy with secondary appointments in psychology and the Center for Neural Science. He works in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, with a focus on philosophy of perception.

David Braddon‐Mitchell is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He has published papers in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics in Noûs, the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Erkenntnis, Synthese, and various others. He is author, with Frank Jackson, of The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.

Anthony Brueckner (1953–2014) taught at Yale and University of California, Santa Barbara. He wrote influential papers on topics in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. He also wrote two books: Essays on Skepticism (Oxford, 2010) and Debating Self Knowledge (Cambridge, 2012, co‐authored with Gary Ebbs).

Paul M. Churchland is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Matter and Consciousness, and Neurophilosophy at Work. His research lies at the intersection of cognitive neuroscience, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.

Jonathan Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of