Blunder
Britain’sWarinIraq
PATRICKPORTER
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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ForJane,Mum,Dad,Em,Pat,Gus,andMolly
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Acknowledgements
Forthewritingofthisbook,Iaminthedebtofmanypeople.
MygreatthankstoDominicByattatOxfordUniversityPressfortakingthis projecton,forhiscareandgoodcheer.
Whilewriting,closefriendshelpkeepthe flameburning.Thankstomyold friendRobertSaunders,forhisfriendlyear,incisiveadvice,andencouraging wordevenwhilehewaswritingahistoryofhisown.GratitudealsotoDavid Blagden,comradeandcolleague,forthelaughter,thought,andconversation. Eversincewe firstmet,HuwBennetthasbeenasharpinterlocutoronIraq, andmuchelsebesides.MarkMeredith’spartwasmoreofacameo,buthis darkhumourbeguiledthewearyhours.
Thebookbearsthefootprintsofmanyothers:RogerHutton;Marc MulhollandandVictoriaLill;PaulNewton;KoriSchake;TarakBarkawiand JenniferLuff;EmmaAshford;ChrisPreble;LawrenceFreedman;JohnBew; NedLebow;JonathanGolub;MartinRobson;SergioCatignani;JasonReifler; HewStrachan;MichaelClarke;MalcolmChalmers;AndreaBerger;Annaand NicovonderGolz;AdrianGregory;NickStargardt;RobDover;NigelBiggar; RyanGrauer;DavidEdelstein;TobyDodge;ColinGray;ChristopherLayne; BarryPosen;JoshShifrinson;StephenWalt;JohnMearsheimer;Matthew Kroenig;AndrewMonaghan;JacquesHymans;JamesEllisonandPaulDomjan.Forthechancetoworkwithstrategicmindsandpractitioners,Iamalso gratefultotheJointCommandandStaffCollegeandtheStrategyandSecurity InstituteattheUniversityofExeter.
MythankstoJohnGayandthestaffatthe NationalInterest forpublishing earlierpiecesonwhichthisdraws;totheOxfordStrategicStudiesGroupand theRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteforinvitingmetorehearsetheargument; toMickCox,JohnIkenberry,andDanDeudneyfordebatingthematteratthe InternationalStudiesAssociationConference;andtomystudents,whohad lesschoiceinthematter.
Myfamilyarethebedrockforeverything:BrianandMurielPorter,Emily, Pat,Gus,andMolly.FormywifeJane,gratitudeisbeyondtelling.
Lastly,tothosewhosufferedinthiscampaign,andinalltragicexpeditions.
PatrickPorter
Oxford 25April,2018(AnzacDay)
Preface
LESTWEFORGET
Thisbookexplainsadecisionforwar.Britain’sparticipationintheinvasionof Iraqinthespringof2003wasamomentouschoice. ‘OperationTelic’ wasthe country’ s firstmilitary-strategicfailuresincethewithdrawalfromAdenand SouthArabiain1967,¹itslargestscalecombatsinceKoreain1950,itsmost failedoutcomesinceSuezin1956,anditsmost polarizing campaignsincethe SouthAfricanwarof1899.IraqwasahingeeventinBritishpoliticallifeinthe firstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury.Itisneverfarfromauditsofhow Britain’spubliclifelostitsway.Britainhaswagedpreventivewarsbefore, ‘first strikes’ todestroydistantperceivedthreats.Yettheseanticipatorycampaigns aredistantmemorieswithinverydifferentconflicts:theinvasionofIranin 1941duringWorldWarII,topreventAxisdisruptionofoilsuppliestothe SovietUnion,andthebombardmentoftheDano-Norwegian fleetatCopenhagenin1807todenyittoNapoleonBonaparte.Thissmallerwarwasbornof greatambition.Asamovetotopplearegime,reconstituteastate,changea region,influenceasuperpowerandinterruptahypotheticaldanger,asawar intendedtobebothprecautionaryandrevolutionary,itwasalandmark.Itis alsopartofthepresent.Atthemomentofwriting,asetofresultingcrises straddlingIraqanditsneighboursdrawsmultiplestatesintocollision.The warsenergizedbythewarhavenoendinsight.Withalargearchiveof documentsandtestimoniesnowunearthed,wecanbetteraskwhathappened andwhy,anddiscernitswarnings.Thebattleoverthewar’ smemorycontinues. ‘Allwarsarefoughttwice,the firsttimeonthebattlefield,thesecond timeinmemory.’²
Lookingback,areckoningwiththecampaignisnoteasy.Peoplekilled, died,andsufferedforit,fordisappointingresults.Toquestionthewaristo doubtthevalueofsacrifice.Andtheveryprocessoflearningfromhistoryisa fraughtandlosingstruggle.Ourspecieshastriedtoeducateitselfthrough history,yethasfailedoftentopreventsimilardisasters.Fromtheconfusionof historicalanalogies,errorcan flow.Againandagain,themythologizedmemory
¹Unlessstatedotherwise,allprimarydocumentscitedaredrawnfromthe ‘Chilcot’ Iraq Inquiry.AsGeraintHughesobserves, ‘Iraqnophobia:TheDangersofForgettingOperationTelic’ RUSIJournal 157:6(2012),pp.5460,p.54.
²VietThanhNguyen, NothingEverDies:VietnamandtheMemoryofWar (Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress,2016),p.4.IamgratefultoDrNatalieSambhiforalertingmetothis reference.
x Preface
ofNaziGermanyandMunichhasmovedmodernpolicymakerstoidentify adversariesasAdolfHitler,tocastthemselvesasWinstonChurchill,andto assumedecisivequickvictory.Majorpowersretainapropensityforselfinflictedwounds.Theyinflatethreatsandchoosewarsthataremorecostly anddifficultthantheyrealize.Wehavebeenherebefore.StudiesoftheUnited States’ conflictinVietnam(1961–75)didnotarrestGeorgeW.Bush’sdrive forwarin2003.FiveyearsbeforeIraq,FredrikLogevallwroteamagisterial accountofLyndonJohnson’sfatefuldecisionformajorescalationinVietnam in1965.Hefearedthat ‘somethingverymuchlikeitcouldhappenagain’ if permissiveconditionsarose,that ‘soldierswillagainbeaskedtokillandbe killed,andtheircompatriotswillagaindetermine,afterward,thattherewasno goodreasonwhy.’³Soitwent.Butwehavetotry.
InMarch2003,BritainjoinedacoalitionledbytheUnitedStatestoinvade IraqandoverthrowSaddamHussein’styrannicalBa’athregime.Thoughnot themostpowerfulstateinthecoalition,Britainwascentraltothewar’ s articulationandrationale.TheinvadersoverthrewIraq’sregimeinthree weeks.ThiscameaftertwelveyearsoffrustratedattemptstocoerceBaghdad intoverifiabledisarmament,tocontainit’sruler’saggressionandshield thepeopleshepreyedupon,andtoinducetheruler’sdownfall.They struckpartlyinthenameofcounter-proliferation,todestroyanarsenalof WMD(WeaponsofMassDestruction)thatturnedouttobenon-existent. Theystruckpartlytodisruptaperceivedgatheringthreat,apotentialunionof terrorism,destructiveweaponstechnology,and ‘roguestates’.AndasIargue, thesewereintenselyideologicaldays.Atitscore,thewarwasoneofideas, largeandreal.Iraqwasonefrontinthe ‘GlobalWaronTerror’,declared afterthe9/11terroristattacks,todestroy ‘terrorism’ itselfbyspreadinga liberatingalternative.Theinvasionwassupposedtohelpspreadfreemarkets anddemocracy.ItwassupposedtospearheadtheemancipationoftheGreater MiddleEast,tocorrecttheconditionsthatspawnedsecuritythreats.Itwas meanttoacceleratetheresolutionoftheArab–Israelconflictandthebirthof aPalestinianstate.Itwassupposedtoplantawealthy,democratic,and compliantstateintheheartoftheMiddleEast.AndinLondon,itwas intendedtostrengthenandconfirmBritishinfluenceovertheAmerican superpower,totameWashingtonandtieitintoaninternationalsystemthat itmightabandon. ‘OperationalTelic’ wasawarofmanydreams.Warmakers articulatedthosedreamswithdisastrouseloquence.
‘Telic’ drawsfromtheGreek telos, meaning ‘direction’ or ‘ purpose ’.Itisthe unintendedconsequences,however,thattheworldmustlivewith.ThetopplingofSaddambreddisorder,anddisorderledtobloodletting.Itkilledand
³FedrikLogevall, ChoosingWar:TheLostChanceforPeaceandtheEscalationofWarin Vietnam (UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1998),pp.41213.
maimedhundredsofthousands.Itdisplacedmillionswho fledthecountry.It costbillionsofpoundsandtrillionsofUSdollarsmorethanwasexpected.It precipitatedsectarianwarfareandtheinfluxofSunniIslamists.Bydestroying aregimethathadgivenupitschemicalandbiologicalweaponsandabandoneditsnuclearandballisticmissileprogramme,thewarstruckablow againstthecauseofdisarmament notforthelasttime byimplicitlydemonstratingtootherhostilestatesthevalueofnucleardeterrence.Itupended aroughbalanceofpowerintheregion,empoweringIran.Iraqwasnotthe onlygeneratingeventbehindtoday’sturmoilintheMiddleEast.Butit helpeddrivebothsectarianstrifeandageopoliticalcoldwarbetweenIran andSaudiArabia.Asanefforttoprojectandincreasepower,thewarinstead consumedit.
Worsethanacrime,thewarwasablunder.Theblunderledtodefeat.In March2017,theunveilingofamemorialinWhitehalltothewarsintheGulf andAfghanistanunderscoredatragicfailure.Onephotographercaptureda lonelyformerPrimeMinisterTonyBlairsittingAztec-facedamongchattering royals,officers,anddignitaries.Thecarefullycraftedliturgymentioned ‘duty’ and ‘service’,butnevervictory.Thishasthetasteofashes.Ifnotdefeat and some findthenotioncrude thecampaign’sresultwasatleastabarely acceptablestalemate.InAugust2007,withthecityofBasraimplodingaround Britain’soverstretchedforcesinsouthernIraq,withdwindlingdomestic supportanddemandforthebolsteringofembattledpositionsinAfghanistan, Britain’sMI6stationchiefquietlynegotiatedadealwithaseniorleaderofthe Iranian-backed Jayshal-Mahdi (JAM)paramilitaryforce,the ‘MahdiArmy’ thatwasbesiegingBritishbases.ThemilitiaagreedtostoptargetingtheBritish militaryinexchangeforthereleaseofdetaineesfromBritishcustody.British troopswerepermittedtowithdrawfromBasraPalacetotherefugeofthe airportwithoutthelossoflife,awithdrawalthemilitiagraciouslypoliceden route.⁴ UKministersframedthispullbackasanefficienthandovertoIraqi statesecurityforcesandtheculminationofaneffectiveoperation.Butas PrimeMinisterWinstonChurchillwarnedtheHouseofCommonsafterthe DunkirkevacuationinMay1940,itwouldbewrongtoassignthisdeliverance ‘theattributesofavictory’ . ⁵ Whenanarmychargedtooverseethecreationof anewstatemustretreattosafepassageunderthecoverofnight,andonlywith thepermissionofaprivateforce,obtainedwithbribes,thatishumiliation. Basra’sShiamilitiasubsequentlybroughtthewhiptouncoveredwomen, intellectuals,andmerchants,andarevivedblackmarket.Thesedividends ofBritain’sfailedstewardshipwereonlyreversedlaterbyajointIraqi–US
⁴ FrankLedwidge, LosingSmallWars:BritishMilitaryFailureinthe9/11Wars (Yale:Yale UniversityPress,2017),p.51.
⁵ Hansard 4June1940,vol.361,cc.78798.
offensiveofMarch2008,launchedwithBritainsidelined.Britain’smission wassupposedtodemocratizethestate,emancipatewomen,anduniteIraqis aboveconfessionandethnicity,andaffirmtheUK’sstrategicvaluetoWashington. Theresultswereperverse.Likeotherconflictswagedforwildlyunrealisticaims infarperipheries,itexposedthedeadlinessofgoodintentionsandthelimits ofWesternpower.
Thisbookwasconceivedinthesummerof2016,abitterseasoninBritish politics.IworriedthatIraqwouldbepartforgotten,andpartmisremembered.Ifhumansarecreaturesofmemory,theyarealsotemptedto forget.IfearedthatupheavalssincetheIraqWar likeBritain’swithdrawal fromtheEuropeanUnion wouldovershadowit.Thelongandpainstaking inquest,the ‘Chilcot’ IraqInquiry,publisheditsreportinanhourwhenthe Brexitfalloutwasall-consuming.GrantedtwodaysofparliamentarydiscussionovertheInquiryReport,only fiftyMPsoutof650tookpartindiscussion ondayone,fallingattimesto fifteenortwenty.Somedecision-makers welcomedthediversion.Twoforeignministerswhooncepressedthecase formilitaryaction,JackStrawandColinPowell,wishedthemattergone.In leakedcorrespondence,StrawallegedlywrotethatBrexithada ‘silverlining’ , reducing ‘mediumtermattentiononChilcot’,whichhas ‘fadedaltogether’ . ⁶ PowellnotedgladlythatChilcotbarelyregisteredinWashington.Othersalso callforaprocessofforgetting.Inmakingthecaseformilitaryadventures today,thosewhocarrythe flameofwarlikeidealismtalkofIraqasa ‘shadow’⁷ thatwemustescape,or ‘ moveon’⁸ from,lestitsmemoryarrestBritain’ s inclinationtowardsheroicinternationalismandmorallychargedmilitary action.TolingeroverIraqmightinduce ‘isolationism’,somewarn,asthough aconcernforprudentwaravoidanceistantamounttocancellingtrade,aid,or alliances.⁹ On29March2006,agroupofBritishwriters,journalists,and scholarsissuedthe ‘EustonManifesto’,insistingthat
theproperconcernofgenuineliberalsandmembersoftheLeftshouldhavebeen thebattletoputinplaceinIraqademocraticpoliticalorderandtorebuildthe country’sinfrastructure,tocreateafterdecadesofthemostbrutaloppressiona lifeforIraqiswhichthoselivingindemocraticcountriestakeforgrantedrather thanpickingthroughtherubbleoftheargumentsoverintervention.¹⁰
⁶ ChristopherHope, ‘JackStrawboastedofhowthe “silverlining” fromBrexitmeantChilcot criticism “faded” away ’ , TheDailyTelegraph,14September2016.
⁷ FabianSociety, OutwardtotheWorld:HowtheLeft’sForeignPolicycanFacetheFuture (London:FabianSociety,2015),pp.x,1; ‘BritishForeignPolicymustemergefromtheshadow ofIraq,arguesHilaryBenn’ , TheGuardian,21December2015.
⁸ DavidBatty, ‘DavidMiliband:TimetoMoveonFromIraq’ , TheGuardian,22May2010.
⁹ JoeCox&TomTugendhat, TheCostofDoingNothing:ThePriceofInactioninthefaceof Atrocities (London:PolicyExchange,2017),p.13.
¹
⁰ [myitalics] TheEustonManifesto:ForaRenewalofProgressivePolitics athttp:// eustonmanifesto.org/theeustonmanifesto/,accessed28October2016.
‘Rubble’ , ‘shadow’ , ‘ moveon’—thisistheeuphemisticlanguageofamnesia.To encouragetheforgettingofIraq’smemorywouldnotonlybreachcivicdutyto commemoratethedead.Itwoulddoadisservicetothelivingandunborn, especiallygiventhatthewar’sconsequencesarestillwithus.TheEustongroup wishedtoseparatetheissuesofwhethertointerveneandthecommitmenttoIraqi liberation,butthetwoquestionsareinseparablylinked.Thedifficultiesofremakingastateafterbreakingit,andtheviolencethiscanunleash,pointsbacktothe originalquestionofwhethertobreakittobeginwith.Partof ‘ properconcern ’ for anyconscientiouscitizenispreciselytoargueoverintervention,andargueagain. Whetherornottotakeuparmsistheultimatepoliticalquestion.Itwillnotleave alonecountriesthatpossessthecapabilitytoprojectpower.Wethereforemust pickthroughthe ‘rubble’ ofthepast.Therubblecontainsfragmentsofhistory, andhistoryistheonlyguidewehave.Wearenotentitledto ‘closure’
Forthewarisstillwithus.Ourchoiceiswhethertoconfrontit,orwishitaway. Thewar’snotoriety,thegapbetweenpromisesandreality,setsthetermsand vocabularyofdebatethroughwhichwecontesttheuseofforce: ‘regimechange’ and ‘exitstrategy’ , ‘forty-fiveminutes’ and ‘mushroomcloud’ , ‘shockandawe’ and ‘warofchoice’ , ‘missionaccomplished’ and ‘poodle’.Aswellaslanguage,the seductiveideasthatpoweredtheinvasionoutlivedtheretireddecision-makers, andarestillwithus.Underlatergovernments,theideasthatdrovetheventure inflictedfurthermischief,fromthechaoswroughtbyinterventioninLibyato WesternsponsorshipofanIslamist-infectedrebellioninSyria,toanescalating crisistriggeredbythreatsofpreventivewaragainstNorthKorea.Expectations thattheendoftheBlairerameantthecurtailingofadventuresin ‘regimechange’ provednaïve.ThenextgovernmentwouldassistarevolutioninTripolianda failedoneinDamascus,withresultsthatwerenotuniformlyexcellent.Asbefore, thereigningideology,oftransforming ‘ungovernedspace’ throughbenevolent force,couldreturn.Thismakestheinquesturgent.
Ialsowrotethisbookfromfearthatthewar’smemorywouldbereduced, turnedmerelyinto ‘Blair’ swar ’,orintoatacticalexerciseabouthowtowage ambitiousexpeditionarywarsbetter, ‘nexttime’.Indeed,acounter-narrativehas nowformed,interpretingtheIraqWarasalessonintheneedtobemore determinedtoprojectmilitarypower,notless.Some finderrornotprimarily inthewar’slaunching,butitsending.TheypinfailureonWesternabandonment andprematurewithdrawal,treatingthestateofIraqastheWest’stolose.Onthe othersideofthedivide,critics fixatetoomuchononeactor,PrimeMinisterTony Blair,andthe ‘Blairites’,isolatingculpabilityandexoneratingothers.Thiswas Britain’swar,notjustBlair’s.Itwascarriedbyassumptionswidelysharedand whichoutlivethewarmakers,itheldaquietmajorityofsupportinthecountry,it wasendorsedbyafreevoteintheHouseofCommons,andbyadecisivemargin. Theglibcatch-cry ‘NotinMyName’ hasnoplaceinaresponsibledemocracy.¹¹
¹¹AsRobertSaundersargues, ‘WhyTutuisWrong’ , TheGladstoneDiaries,4September 2012,http://gladstonediaries.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/whytutuiswrong.html?q=tutu.
MyattempttointerpretIraqdoesnotspringfrompersonalinvolvement. Iraqisaspersonalasitgetsforthosewhoweredirectlyaffected.Formany others,itwasapuzzlingandseeminglyfarawayevent.Thestateencouraged citizenstosupportitbutmostlyaspassiveconsumersofevents.Forsomeof us,Iraqseemeddesperatelyimportant,asitwouldbeconsequentialover timeandspace.Asastudentofinternationalsecurity,Iraqwas the de fi ning politicaleventofmylifetimeafterthefalloftheBerlinWall.Workingon theacademicstaffattheBritishDefenceAcademy,thedailyimplosionof Iraqintheautumnof2006,bombings,kidnappings,andrampantcriminality,wasasoberingrebuketotheambitionsofthewarparty.Thatpeople IknewwhowererotatinginandoutofIraqlentaddedpathostotheissue. Ultimately,Iraqwasthedecisivepointinmyownpoliticalthinking,towardsan aversiontoutopiasandawarinessoftheimplicitdangerofmilitarisminliberal foreignpolicy.
Giventhisbackground,Icannotpretendtoapersonaldetachment.Even witharcanesubjectmatter,purevalue-freeobjectivityisimpossible.Dispassionisallthemoredifficultwithsuchawrenchinghistory.Yettheobstaclesto objectivitydonotlicensehistorianstotellstorieswithoutworryingwhether theyaretrue.Subjectivityshouldberesisted,notindulged.Iattemptto counterbalanceanysubjectivityinmyaccountbyreconstructingthestrongest possiblecasefortheinvasion,bothwithandwithouthindsightknowledge.In ordertograspwhatdrovethedecision,Itrytoperformadoubleact, attemptingtoempathizewiththosewhorolledtheirondice,whileretaining enoughdistancetoexerciseaclear-eyedjudgement.
Thisbooktakesahammertothewar’srationaleandthedogmatismand muddledthinkingatitsheart.Atthesametime,itisofferedasareproachto theanti-warmovement.Oppositiontothewarwasabroadchurch.Itsranks includedthehonourableandtheconscientious.Thoseatitscommanding heights,though,didnotproperlyconfrontthedilemmasbeforethem,and theirpopularslogan ‘notinmyname’ suggesteddisengagementratherthan engagementwiththequestion.AsBrendanO’ Neillobserved, ‘ Protesting warstodayseemstobeawaytocleanseone’ sprivateconscienceratherthan effectingpublicchange acaseofoptingoutinsteadofgettingstuckin andhavingthehardarguments.’ ¹²IanMcEwan’ snovel Saturday,setonthe dayofthemassprotest,capturedthepoint.AshischaracterHenryPerowne observes, ‘ Allthishappinessondisplayissuspect…Iftheythink andthey couldberight thatcontinuedtortureandsummaryexecutions,ethnic cleansingandoccasionalgenocidearepreferabletoaninvasion,theyshould besombreintheirview.’ Perowneputshis fi ngeronthewar ’ scentral dilemma: ‘ ThepriceofremovingSaddamiswar,thepriceofnowaris
¹²BrendanO’Neill, ‘WhatKindofAntiWarMovementIsThis?’ , ChristianScienceMonitor, 13December2002.
leavinghiminplace.’ ¹³Thisbookarguesforwhyleavinghiminplacewas the ‘ lesserevil ’ .
Atthehandsofsomecritics,theIraqWarbecameacanvasontowhichthey projectedtheirdiscontentwiththeNewLabourprojectandmodernlife generally,overstatingthesuddenrupturethatBlair’swarinflictedonaonce greenandpleasantland.PeterOborne,forinstance,claimsthat:
TheBritishpeopleusedtotrusttheBritishState.Thistrustisthemagni fi centlegacyofWorldWarTwo,whenweunitedincommonsacri fi ceto confrontfascism.Eversincethen,wehaveregardedourstateasultimately decentandbenign.Wehaveunderstoodthatcivilservantsowedtheirloyalty tothestate(symbolicallyexpressedastheMonarch)ratherthanpolitical partiesorsectionalinterests.Itwasa lsounderstoodthattherewasasecret statewhichwasunaccountablethroughnormaldemocraticmeans.Thiswas toleratedbecausewefeltthatBritishintelligenceofficers… weredecent, patrioticpeople.ThistrustinthestatewasshatteredbytheIraqWar,and itsgruesomeaftermath.Wehavelearntt hatcivilservants,spies,andpoli ticianscouldnotbetrustedtoactwithintegrityanddecencyandinthe nationalinterest.¹ ⁴
Oborne’spictureofaonce-trustingcountrylosingitsfaithbecauseofasingle militarycampaignisstrikinglyahistorical.Earlierhistorycontainedcrisesof confidenceovertheintegrityofthestate,fromabusesofpowerinNorthern IrelandtotheBrixtonandPollTaxriotstoindustrialunrest,tolongdeclines inpoliticalparticipation,tothegeneralcrisis-riddendecadeofthe1970s. Oborne’sexplanation,thatsuddenlyagangofbadpeopletookoverthe country,andthatspies,officials,andelectedleadersin2003wereoblivious toanyconceptofthenationalinterestinasuddenfallfromtheirpredecessors’ patriotism,ispantomimic.Obornehimself,whoadmitsearlierbrandingthe Majorgovernmentofthe1990sas ‘rotten’ ,reflectsabroadertendencyto romanticizethepastandvillainizethepresent.¹⁵ Thistellsuslittleaboutwhy theIraqWarwasactuallyfought,andwhatweshouldlearn.
Aboveall,thebookisaself-reproach.Myresponsetothewarwasfraught and flawed.Opposedat first,Ibecameasupporterastheviolenceintensified inIraq.IwashopefulaboutthepossibilitiesgivenlifebythefallofSaddam, mindfulofthefascisticnatureofal-QaedaandtheBa’athinsurgents,and repelledbythetoxicanti-Americanismand ‘anyonebutWashington’ spiritso endemicinsectionsoftheanti-warmovement.Ibelievedthoseinthefamily ofhawkishidealism,theneoconservativesandliberalhawks,wererightonthe
¹³IanMcKewan, Saturday (London:RandomHouse,2005),pp.6970.
¹⁴ PeterOborne, NottheChilcotReport (London:HeadofZeus,2016),pp.1789.
¹⁵ PeterOborne, ‘It’sTimetoGiveJohnMajortheCreditWeSoCruellyDeniedHim’ , The DailyTelegraph,4April2012.
mainpoint,thattheWestshouldnothavetochoosebetweentyrannyand chaosintheMiddleEast indeed,thatWestern-sponsoredtyrannyhadfed theIslamistbeastandunleashedchaos.Thehijackerson9/11werenotAfghan butGulfmen,productsofoppressiveorders theocratic,orkleptocratic that hadspawnedWahhabifanaticismandwinkedattheIslamistgroupswho hadunilaterallydeclaredwaronusall.Giventhoseroots,9/11andits aftermathwarrantedanambitiousprojecttotransformtheArab-Islamic world.IwasmovedbytheeloquenceofthehawkishidealistsPaulBerman, ChristopherHitchens,FouadAjami,andNormanGeras.Thiswaspoor judgement.Itwasbornofanattractiontotheeleganceofideasovertheir practicalutility,anoverestimationofWesternpower,adisregardforthe wildnessofwaranditsunintendedconsequences,anahistoricalattachment toMunich-Churchill-Hitleranalogiesastheuniversalguidetosecurityproblems,andablindnesstothehistoricdeadlinessofgoodintentions.Evenifa revisionoftheWest’srelationshipwiththeMiddleEastisinorder,an ideologicalcrusadetoreordertheregionatourconvenienceisnokindof answer.Itshouldnothavetakenadisastertograsptheserealities.Aswewill see,someinthe ‘warparty’ maintainthatthechanceofliberatingIraqandthe regionwas ‘worth’ thevasthumanpriceinflicted.SuchclaimsaretooreminiscentofBolshevik ‘eggsandomelettes’ rationalizations,whichalsofailed. Othersarguethatvictorywasathand,onlytobesquanderedbyfeckless defeatists,anargumenttooreminiscentofWeimar-eraalibisforanother disastrouspreventivewar.
Beforewebeginthediagnosis,twofurtherpointsofjustificationareneeded. Inthecourseofpreparingthesearguments,apersistentaccusationarosethat thisisanexercisein ‘hindsight’,andimplicitly,thatourpositionof ‘looking back’ shouldlimitcriticism.Thisisawidespreadbutdefectiveviewofour relationshipwiththepast.Firstly,giventhecurrentlackoftime-travelcapability,itisdifficulttoexamineandjudgethepastfromanyothervantage point.Secondly,criticismsofthedoctrinesthatledtowararenotpurely hindsightcreations.TheargumentsImakeherewereanticipatedandmadeat thetimebyconcernedobserversandparticipants.Mostimportantly,weare tryingtolearnsomethingfromthepast,toguidedecisionstocome,alwaysa difficultexercise.Thatisanexercisebothinempathyandcriticism.To abandonthattaskistotellstorieswithnopurpose.
Conversely,thereisanothercommonresponse,regardingtheinquestinto Iraqasawasteoftimeandresources,becausethefollyofthedecisionwas ‘obvious’.ThefactthattheIraqInquiry,launchedin2009,tooksevenyearsto completeandissueitsreport,andfollowedthreeotherinquiries,¹⁶ inducesa
¹⁶ SeeRichardAldrich, ‘WhitehallandtheIraqWar:TheUK’sfourintelligenceenquiries’ IrishStudiesonInternationalAffairs 16:1(2005),pp.116.
widespread ‘Chilcotfatigue’,thedismissaloftheinquestasawasteoftime,¹⁷ andthedesiretoreduceIraqintoasadstorythatneedsconsigningtohistory. Thatattitudecertainlyisbornofahindsightdistortion.Iftheimprudenceof theIraqWarseemsstrategicallyandmorallyobvioustoday,itdidn’tseemso tomanyatthetime.Morethanmostcrises,theIraqWarpresentedachoiceof agonies.Toopposetheinvasionwaseffectivelytoargueforcontinuedmanagementofthestatusquo,whichwasabloodyone.Morepeoplefavoured invasionthantheycaretoremember.Peoplerememberopposingit,buta pluralityofBritonssupporteditatthetime,albeitmostlyinmutedform, accordingtotwenty-onepollscarriedoutbyYouGovbetweenMarchand December2003.¹⁸ The Economist thatlaterjudgedit ‘obvious’ thatoccupying Iraqmadeinternationalterrorismworse,thatreportedthe ‘damning’ conclusionthatanadaptedstrategyofinspectionsandcontainmentcouldhave succeeded,isthesamejournalthatinFebruary2003calledforSaddamtobe disarmedbyforceifnecessary,becausealternativestrategieshadfailed.¹⁹ Iraqistooaredividedontheissue,andtheymostborethebruntofwar’ s negativeconsequences.²⁰ Manyresentwhathappenedtothecountryinthe wakeofSaddam’sfall,yetaregladhefell,andthequestionofAmerica’ s withdrawaldividesthemonlargelysectarianlines.²¹Evidently,forthose involved,thequestionisacomplexone.Internationally,therewasnoglobal consensusatthetime.Opinionwasconflictedand fluid.ThecoalitionassembledbytheUnitedStates,thatlentdiplomaticandmaterialsupport,waslarger thantheonethatfoughttheKoreanWar.Ithadthesupportofhalfthe memberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion.ItsranksnumberedSouthKorea, Poland,Japan,Australia,Italy,Spain,Georgia,andtheCzechRepublic,and afterthe firstphase,NewZealandtroops,Germanmoney,andCanadian trainers.Mongoliansoldiersalsocame,descendantsofGhenghisKhanthe
¹⁷ DeborahOrr, ‘TheChilcotInquiryisaWasteofTime’ , TheGuardian,4February2010; DanielLarison, ‘RememberingsomeobvioustruthsabouttheIraqWar,’ AmericanConservative, 6July2016;SimonJenkins, ‘TheChilcotReportmerelyprovestheBritishlovehindsight,’ The Guardian,8July2016.
¹⁸ WillDahlgreen, ‘MemoriesofIraq:Didweeversupportthewar?’ , YouGov,3June2015,at https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/06/03/rememberingiraq/.
¹⁹‘WhyWarwouldbejustified’ , TheEconomist,20February2003; ‘StatingtheObvious’ The Economist,28September2006; ‘Iraq’sGrimLessons’ TheEconomist,6July2016.
²⁰ ThemostcomprehensivesurveyonIraqiopinion,theZogbyPollof2011,reflecteda largelynegativebutstill ‘mixed’ picture:30percentofthosequestionedbelievedthatIraqwas betteroffatpresentthanbeforetheoverthrowofSaddamHussein,42percentthoughtitwas worse,23percentthoughtthatIraqwasthesame,and6percentwerenotsure.IraqiKurds largelyendorsedtheremovaloftheregime,unsurprisingly.Iraqisaredividedonwhetherthereis nowgreaterpoliticalfreedomsinceregimechange(33percentpositive,48percentnegative; 16percentnone);regardingwomen’srights,thepicturewasalsoconflicted(26percentpositive, 37percentnegative,26percentnoimpact).ZogbyResearchServices, Iraq:TheWar,Its ConsequencesandtheFuture (1820November,2011).
²¹SeeMarkKukis, VoicesfromIraq:APeople’sHistory20032009 (NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,2011).
sackerofBaghdad,whothistimeaimed ‘torebuildIraq’.²²Evenifweaccept thedubiouspropositionthatwecanevaluatethewisdomofdecisionsby ‘countingheads’,therewasn’toverwhelminginternationaloppositionthat criticsimply.IfmanythoughtdifferentlyaboutIraqthen,andwarnings wentunheeded,thatisamatterofimportanthistoricalinquiry.
ThehistoryofBritain’sIraqWarisstillbeingwritten.Farfromanexhaustiveaccountofthewholeepisode,thisbookisaboutthemostfundamental decision:whethertotakepart.Iexplainthedecision,critiqueit,andoffera broadercaution,rootedinrealism,againstwarlikeidealism,toguidemore prudentdecision-makinginfuture.Itisnotanaccountofhowthecampaign wasrescued.Rather,itaskshowBritaingotitselfintoacampaignthatneeded rescuinginthe firstplace.
²²JamesBrooke, ‘TheStruggleforIraq:Allies,MongoliansReturntoBaghdad,Thistimeas Peacekeepers’ , TheNewYorkTimes,25September2003.
HE’SGOTEM.LET’SGETHIM.
TheSun,25September2002
Iammoreafraidofourownblundersthanourenemies’ designs. Thucydides,TheHistoryofthePeloponnesianWar1.144
Introduction
BadideascausedBritain’swarinIraq,ideasthatweredogmaticallyheld. ManyrememberIraqasamisadventureofbadfaithandbotchedmanagement,of ‘dodgydossiers’ anddeceit.Theseareevergreensubjects.Buttheyare nottheparamountissue.Mischiefsandfalsehoodscanfacilitatewar.They werenotitsdrivingforce.Fromitsinceptionasaproposalastheshadows lengthenedin2001totheinvasion fifteenmonthslater,Britain’sIraqventure wasawarofideas,realconceptsaboutthepursuitofsecurityinadangerous world.Thoseideaswereoccasionedbyconditions,asenseofbothpowerand vulnerability.Visionsofworldorderanddemocracy,andcorollaryfearsof roguestateswithdeadlyarsenals,werenotretrospectiveface-saving fictions. Theydrovethepushforactionfromtheoutset.PrimeMinisterTonyBlairwas thechiefprotagonistandembodimentofideasthatwerewidelyshared.He andhiscounsellors,congregatinginhisDowningStreet ‘den’,regardedIraqas thecentralfrontinanepochalstruggleagainstanew,apocalypticbarbarism. Britain’ s ‘deciders’ arerememberedasdeftpropagandists,butwereidealistsat thecore.Theirendeavourwasunderpinnedbypowerfulanddoubt-proofed assumptions,assincerelyassumedastheywererarelyexamined.Thedecision tosettleaccountswithIraqafteralongstand-off,totoppleitsregimein Baghdad,wasagenuineefforttoforestallahypotheticalbutterrifyingdanger, thecomingtogetherofdictatorship,terrorism,andweaponstechnology,to reordertheworldwiththeantidoteofliberaldemocracy.ItwasalsoaBritish efforttoplaytutortotheUnitedStates.Britishofficialswerefrightenedofthe superpowerthatwaswoundedandinflamedbythe9/11terroristattacks.They aimedtopreventAmericabecomingarunawaytrain.Blairrangravepolitical riskstoturnhisAtlanticambitionintopolicy.Ajournalistwhotailedthe primeministeraffirmedtheintensityofhisbeliefsandthestrainofthehour. Theonce-cherubicpremierofCoolBritanniawasthinfacedanddarkeyed, enduring ‘sleeplessnightsandanxiousdays’.¹Astheparliamentaryvote loomed,withoutalegitimizingmandatefromtheUnitedNationsSecurity
¹PeterStothard, 30Days:AMonthattheHeartofBlair’sWar (London:HarperCollins, 2003),p.7.
Council,BlairaskedhisCabinetSecretarytoreadyhisresignationpapers. JoiningWashington’swarwasnotanactofgeopoliticalcynicism.Itwasmore dangerous,arealideologicalcrusade.AsBlairsaidprivatelyandpublicly, ‘It’ s worsethanyouthink.Iactuallybelieveindoingthis’.²
Iarguethatthreebadideasdrovethewar.TheseideasIrefertoas ‘warlike idealism’,astheyblendedapessimisticaccountoftheinternationalsecurity environment,onethatdemandedboldanddecisiveaction,withanoptimistic accountofwhatwell-intentionedforcecouldachieve.Allthreeideaswarrant interrogation.The firstis ‘regimechange’,adoctrineasmuchasapractice, thatstateshavelittlechoicebuttopursuesecuritybybreakingandremaking states,possiblyinpreventivewars,by fixingthepoliticalinteriorofthosestates withtheexpansionofdemocraticandcapitalistinstitutions,byreorderingwholeregions,andbyexterminatingratherthancontainingthreats.In launchingthisbidtoreordertheworld,policymakershadinternalizedrevolutionaryambitionsthatweremoreradicalthantheyrealized.Theylostsight ofthepossibilitythattheircurewasworsethanthedisease.Behavingas insurgents,breakingstatesandcreatingnewpowerimbalances,theybelieved themselvestobeguardiansbringingorderintochaos.Second,thereisthe doctrineof ‘roguestates’,theassumptionthatdefiant ‘outrider’ statesare undeterrable,suicidallyaggressiveactorsthatwecannotlivewith,whose neutralizationandremovalissovitalthatitwarrantsriskypreventiveaction, andwhomakeanystrategiesofrestraintaninvitationtoaggression.Third, thereisthe ‘bloodprice’ fallacy,thatBritaincansecureexceptionalinfluence inWashingtonbycommittingsignificantup-frontcosts,andwithground forcesinAmerica’ s ‘9/11wars’ .
AsIargue,theexplanationthatBritain’sIraqWarcamefrombadideasthat werewidelyheldbetter fitstheevidencethanalternativeexplanations.These alternativeexplanationsarguevariouslythatBritaingotintothewarby accidentasaresultofadiplomaticprocessthatlockeditin,orthatitwasa warofopportunismmaskedbyrhetoricofdemocraticliberation,orthatitwas agoodideathatwaspoorlyexecuted,thatitwastheresultofAmerican pressure,orthatitwassimply ‘Blair’ swar ’ andthattheBritishpeoplewere hisvictims.Thesealternativehistoriesstruggletosurviveinterrogation.From themanythingswrittenaboutIraq,wecannowassemblearangeofcompetingexplanations,explicitandimplicit,andweighthem.
Thisbookisaworkof ‘internationalhistory’,orthehistoricalstudyof internationalpolitics.Itexplainsanhistoricaleventanditssignificanceforthe future.Itfocusesonthedecisionforwar,andthatdecision’sconsequences.It doessomethodologicallywiththeinspirationoftwominds,thephilosopher
²A.Campbell&B.Hagerty, TheAlastairCampbellDiaries.Volume4.TheBurdenofPower: CountdowntoIraq (London:Hutchinson,2012),p.279;JackieAshley&EwanMacAskill, ‘Historywillbemyjudge’ , TheGuardian,1March2003.
KarlPopperandthehistorianMarcTrachtenberg.Trachtenbergarguesthat thehistorianmustalsobeatheorist.If ‘theory’ isasetofassumptionsthatmap theworld,thehistorianshouldexamineevidenceconsciouslywithapriorset ofquestionsinmind,andthenattempttoadjustbothuntiltheyalignand reconcile.³WhydidBritainjointhewar,whenithaddiscretionnotto,and wasalreadycommittedtoanotherone?Whydiditbelievesucharelatively weakadversaryposedsuchasecurityproblem?Why,giventhelatitudeof choice,diddecision-makersthinkthematterwasobviousandthattherewas littlerealchoiceinthematter?Whydidthedecision-makersexpectsuch decisiveandbenignresults,oralternatively,whydidtheythinktheriskswere worththetrouble?Whyweretheyabletosucceedincarryingopinion?These questionsarisefromassumptionsthatIwilldefend.Inansweringthese questions,IborrowfromPopper.LikeTrachtenberg,Popperassumesthat theoryguidesobservation,andthatobservationpresupposestheory.⁴ Inthat tradition,weapproachanissuelikethecausesofBritain’swarinIraqasa contestbetweencompetinghypotheses.Ifeveraconflictattracteddivergent explanationsaboutmotive,influence,andcausation,itwasthisone.ImportanthereisPopper’ssocial-scientificprincipleoffalsification.Wecannothope foracomplete,to-scaleexplanationthatispositively ‘provable’.Wecan, though,getclosertoapartialrenderingorapproximationbyidentifying anddismissing ‘disprovable’ hypotheses,weighingcompetingexplanations, and,byeliminatinginadequateaccounts,identifytheexplanationthatcomes closesttotheevidencewehave,intermsofplausibilityandconsistency.To testmyexplanation,Ipitagainstitseveralcompetinghypotheses,todemonstratehowmyargumentbetter fits,andpredicts,therationales,behaviour,and chronologyofthetime.Asoneofthe firsthistorieswritten ‘post-Chilcot’,this isonlya firstfoothold,topreparethegroundforhistoriestocome.
Deployingthelargenumberofprimarydocumentsandretrospectivetestimoniesofparticipants,Ireconstructtheassumptionsunderlyingdecisions, thepolicy ‘world’ thatparticipantsinhabited2001–3,aworldthatlater disappointmentshavemadehardertoimagine.Ipresentanaccountofhow governanceovertheissue ‘worked’.Asthiswasawarconceivedprimarilyin Washington,andBritain’spreparationsgrewfrominteractionswithitssenior ally,thisisalsounavoidablyatransatlanticstory.
Britain’sIraqWarhasalreadyattractedalargeliterature.Eversincethe withdrawalofinternationaltroops,civilianandmilitaryofficialsaswellasthe commentariathavere-foughttheIraqWarasecondtimeinmemory.Ithas drawninjournalistic,academic,and ‘ grey ’ literature.Muchofitispartisan
³MarcTrachtenberg, TheCraftofInternationalHistory:AGuidetoMethod (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,2006),pp.51140.
⁴ KarlPopper, TheLogicofScientificDiscovery (London:Hutchinson,1959); Conjecturesand Refutations:TheGrowthofScientificKnowledge (London:Routledge,1963).
