JustWords OnSpeechandHiddenHarm
MaryKateMcGowan
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ToMike,Shea,andNora whohealme
Acknowledgments
Thisbookhasbeenalongtimecoming.Ibeganthinkingaboutthese issueswhenpreparingtoteachaPhilosophyofLanguagecourseforthe firsttimewhenIstartedteachingatWellesleyCollegeinthefallof1998. IwantedtomakethetechnicalissuescomealiveforstudentssoIread RaeLangton’ s “SpeechActsandUnspeakableActs.” Igothooked. IthankRaeforherbeautifulworkandforpavingtheway.Ialsothank DavidLewisforhisbeautifulwork,hisencouragementofthisuseofhis scorekeepingframework,andhisdecency.
Althoughitisjustacollectionofwords,ithastakenmeaverylong timeto figureoutwhichwordsandwhichordertoputthemin.They havebeenre-arrangedmanytimes.Themanuscripthasundergone severalcompleteoverhauls.Eachtime,Ibenefitedfromthecarefuland thoughtfulfeedbackofabrilliantandpatientWellesleystudent.Theyare SaraHelmers,BiankaTakaoka,andEdiliaFoster.Iamextremelygrateful tothemfortheirsuggestions.Forhelpcompilingtheindex,Ithankthe brilliantandintrepidAudreyPowers.
ThisprojecthasbeensupportedbytheSuzyNewhouseCenterforthe HumanitiesatWellesleyCollegeandtheAmericanCouncilofLearned Societies.Thesesourcesofsupportwerenotjust financial;theyalso helpedtomotivateme.Inthewinterof2014,theNewhouseCenter alsosponsoredaday-longseminaronthemanuscript.Asaresult,this bookhasbenefitedfromthoughtfulsuggestionsfromCarolDougherty, BiankaTakaoka,CatherineElgin,SallyHaslanger,ElisabethCamp, LynneTirrell,LuvellAnderson,CatherineWearing,andMarionSmiley. IamextremelythankfultotheNewhouseCenterandalloftheparticipantsforthetime,consideration,andfeedback.Thecurrentversionis greatlyimprovedinbothclarityanddetail,thankstotheirprobing questions.
Thematerialinthisbookhasbeenpresentedtomanydifferent audiences.Theyinclude:PanelonFeministApplicationsofSpeechAct Theoryforthe2001IndependentActivitiesPeriodatM.I.T.,the2001 SocietyforPhilosophyintheContemporaryWorld2001AnnualConference,BrynMawrCollege,BostonAreaReadingGroupinEthicsat
BostonUniversity,TheFellowshipofWomen:TheWorkoftheAAUW EducationFoundationAnnualMeeting,theWorkshoponGenderand PhilosophyatM.I.T.,BrandeisUniversity,WellesleyClubofHouston, UniversityofMassachusetts,Boston,TheLanguageandLawRoundtable attheCenterfortheStudyofMindinNatureattheUniversityofOslo, PHIL252atWashingtonandLeeUniversity,thephilosophydepartment atWashingtonandLeeUniversity,2010EasternDivisionMeetingof theAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,MinnesotaWellesleyAlumna Association,thephilosophydepartmentatGeorgetownUniversity,2012 CentralDivisionMeetingoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation, PHIL24.S40atM.I.T.,PHIL248atHarvardUniversity,thephilosophy departmentattheUniversityofOklahoma,2012WorldCongressMeetingoftheInternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,U.S.Embassiesin Aberbaijan,Armenia,andGeorgia(sponsoredbytheU.S.Departmentof StatethroughtheVirtualStudentForeignServiceProgram),Feminist PhilosophyandPornographyConferenceatHumboldtUniversity,2014 SouthernSocietyforPhilosophyandPsychologyMeeting,2015WintersessionfortheFreedomProjectatWellesleyCollege,thephilosophy departmentattheUniversityofConnecticut,PhilosophyandLawSeminarattheUniversityofChicagoLawSchool,WorkshoponGlobal ExpressiveRightsandtheInternetattheGenderResearchInstituteat DartmouthCollege,thephilosophydepartmentattheUniversityof Missouri,MinoritiesandPhilosophytalkatYaleUniversity,2016LanguageandLawSeminaratDartmouthCollege,the2016Wintersession fortheFreedomProjectatWellesleyCollege,PHIL9840classatthe UniversityofMissouri,PHIL473classatAmherstCollege,Forryand MickenLectureSeriesatAmherstCollege,RepubliquedesSavoirsSeminaronFreeSpeechattheEcoleNormaleSuperieure,VoicingDissent WorkshopattheHumanitiesInstituteattheUniversityofConnecticut, FreeSpeechanditsDiscontentsWorkshopattheCenterforHuman ValuesatPrincetonUniversity,2018EasternDivisionMeetingofthe AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,the2018Wintersessionfor theFreedomProjectatWellesleyCollege,WellesleyNeighbors,andthe EthicsProgramatAgnesScottCollege.Ithankeachoftheseentitiesand audiencesforhelpingtoimprovethisprojectthroughtheircritical engagement.Allremainingdefectsare,ofcourse,onme.
Manyhavehelpedinvariousways.Fortheirfeedback,engagement, and/orsupport,Ithank:LuvellAnderson,RobertBrooks,SusanBrison,
HelenadeBres,CatherineZ.Elgin,EdiliaFoster,DeirdreGalway,Helen AnnPatriciaSheaMcGowanGardner,CorinneGartner,KatherineGelber,SandyGoldberg,DavidMiguelGray,MitchellGreen,JackGreichen, MaureenGreichen,DanielHarris,SallyHaslanger,HepCatII,Claire Horisk,RobinJeshion,CaseyJohnson,RaeLangton,DavidLewis,Steffi Lewis,Shen-YiLiao,CatharineMacKinnon,JamesMahon,IshaniMaitra, ErichMatthes,AlisonMcIntyre,PaulMcGowan,SusanMcGowan,Tim McGowan,RachelMcKinnon,MariMikkola,MatthewMoss,Mihaela Popa,HilaryPutnam,RuthAnnaPutnam,NikkiRamsoomair,Frederick Schauer,JessicaShlasko,RobertMarkSimpson,MarionSmiley,Sarah Sorial,JasonStanley,LindseyStewart,NatalieStoljar,TanyaSullivan, AstaSveinsdottir,BiankaTakaoka,LynneTirrell,WhitneyTully,Julie Walsh,CatherineWearing,CarolineWest,andClaudiaYau.
Ithankmyeditor,PeterMomtchiloff,andthereviewersforOxford UniversityPress.
Ialsobenefitedfromseveralotherlayersofprofessionalsupport.My homedepartment,atWellesleyCollege,isatrulycollegialenvironment andIamdailygratefultoworkinit.Wellesleystudentsaresosmart, motivated,politicallyengaged,andthoughtful;teachingthemkeeps philosophyfun.Iamalsofortunatetobeataninstitutionthatvalues feministscholarship.Thisoughttobetrueeverywherebutitisnot.Last, IcountmyselfluckytobeintheBostonareawherethereisacriticalmass ofscholarsworkingonsocialissueswithphilosophicaltools.Inparticular,IthankSallyHaslangerandM.I.T. ’sWorkshoponGenderand Philosophy.Beingapartofthisgroupmadethisprojectpossible.
Finally,Ithankmyentireextendedfamily.Ithankeverysinglesibling, cousin,aunt,uncle,parent,grandparent,andevenancestor.Thezaniness attractedmetotherigorofphilosophyandkeptmegrounded.Ithank thatspotofturnipsinSpunkaneandtheshellfishinFahaWest.Lastbut certainlynotleast,IthankMike,Shea,andNora;theyinspireand rechargeme.Icouldnothavedonethiswithoutthem.
Introduction
Anemployeebragsabouthissexualconquesttoaco-workerwhiletheyareon breakintheemployeelounge.
Thisoffhandremarkoppresses.Moreover,itdoessoevenwhenthe speakerdoesnotintendtodosoandevenwhenthespeakerisutterly unawareofdoingso.Whatwordsdoisnotasimplefunctionofeither speakerintentionorspeakerawareness.Thisremarkcanoppressevenin caseswherethespeakerhasnospecialauthority.Ordinarypeopleunder ordinarycircumstancescanunwittinglyoppressotherswiththeireverydaycomments.Thepowertoverballyoppresscomesfromthesocial context;itneednotresideinthespeaker.
AwhitemanspewsracistvitriolattheonlyAfricanAmericanpassengerona publicbus.
IntheUnitedStates,thisutteranceistreatedastheexpressionofa politicalviewpointanditisthushighlyprotectedpoliticalspeech.It shouldnotbe.Evenwithintheheightenedfreespeechcommitmentsof theUnitedStates,therearesufficientgroundsforregulatingthisutteranceandotherslikeit.Furthermore,thereasonsforregulatingitare exactlythesamereasonsthatjustifytheregulationofotheruncontroversiallyregulablecategoriesofspeech.Racistspeechinpublicplacesis harmfulenoughtowarrantlegalintervention.
Aworkerhangsasexuallyexplicitposterinhispersonallockeratwork.
Thisactioncansubordinateandthisissoevenifthepersonwhohangs theposterdoesnothaveanycommunicativeintentionswhatsoever whendoingso.Itcansubordinateevenifthatpersondoesnot mean anythingatallbyhangingtheposter.Asubordinatingactionneednotbe acommunicativeone.
JustWords:OnSpeechandHiddenHarm arguesforthesesurprising resultsanditdoessobyidentifyingapreviouslyoverlookedmannerin whichspeechisharmful.Althoughthepotentialharmfulnessofspeechis nowwidelyrecognized,weneverthelessneedtobeasclearaspossible aboutwhattheharmsareandhowthespeechinquestionbringsthose harmsabout.Clarityonthesetwopointsisimportantforsocial,political, moral,andjurisprudentialreasons.
Thisbookidentifiesapreviouslyoverlookedmechanismbywhich ordinaryspeechbyordinaryspeakersunderordinarycircumstances enactsharmfulnormsandthusconstitutes,ratherthanmerelycauses, harm.Harmconstitutionisatechnicalnotion;itisadistinctwayof causingharm.Harmisconstitutedwhentheharmisbroughtaboutvia adherencetonormsenacted.
Standardexamplesofutterancesthatconstituteharminvolveauthoritativespeech.Suppose,forexample,thattheC.E.O.ofacompanyenacts anewhiringpolicybydeclaringthatwomenarenolongereligiblefor employment.Supposefurtherthattheemployeesadheretothispolicyso adiscriminatoryhiringpracticeensues.Becausetheharmofdiscriminationisbroughtaboutviaadherencetothehiringpolicy(whichisa norm)enactedbytheC.E.O. ’sutterance,theC.E.O.’sutteranceconstitutesratherthanmerelycausestheharmofdiscrimination.
Inthisbook,Iarguethatthereisanotherwayforspeechtoenact normsandthustoenactharmfulnormsbutthisotherwaydoes not requireanexerciseofspeakerauthority.Infact,ordinaryutterances routinelyenactnormswithoutthespeakerhavingorexercisinganyspecial authority.Becauseourutterances(andouractionsmoregenerally)are contributionstonorm-governedsocialpractices,theyenactnormsin thosepractices.Moreover,sometimestheenactednormsareharmful and,whentheyare,harmisconstituted,ratherthanmerelycaused.
Thismechanismofnorm-enactmentisubiquitousbutoverlooked;itis subtleandobscured.Thecovertnatureofthisphenomenonthusconcealstheharmconstitutedandmasksourcomplicityinit.Drawing attentiontothismechanismthereforeidentifiesfurtherharmsand highlightsourroleinbringingthoseharmsabout.
Thevastmajorityofscholars(inlaw,politicaltheory,feminism,philosophy)whoworkontheharmfulnessofspeechfocusexclusivelyontheharms caused.Thefewscholarswhofocusonaconstitutiveconnectionbetween speechandharmtreatnorm-enactingspeechasanexerciseofspeaker
authoritysothatonlyauthoritativespeakersareabletoverballyenact harmfulnormsandthusverballyconstituteharm. JustWords:OnSpeech andHiddenHarm demonstratesthatnon-authoritativespeakerscanand doverballyconstituteharm.Infact,wedosounwittinglyandoften.
Thatharmisconstitutedratherthanmerelycausedisimportantfor manyreasons.First,bringingfurtherinstancesofverbalharmconstitution tolightshowsthatspeechismoreharmfulthanwethought.Moreover,the clearerweareontheconnectionbetweenspeechanditsassociatedharms, thebetterpositionedwearetoprevent,minimize,orredressthoseharms.
Thisdifferencebetweencausingharmandconstitutingitalsomatters tothelaw.Inanyjurisdictionembracingafreespeechprinciple,the harmfulnessofspeechistheonlylegitimatejustificationforitsregulation.Thetypeofharm,theamountofharm,andthe connection between thespeechandharmallmatterwhenassessingwhethersomecategoryof speechisharmfulenoughtowarrantitsregulation.Becausespeechthat constitutesharmisdistinctintheeyesofthelaw,identifyingadditional instancesofitopensuppotentialjustificationsforfurtherspeechregulation.
Furthermore,identifyingthissubtlemechanismofnormenactment showshowthespeci ficeverydayactionsofordinaryindividualscontributetobroadersocialstructures.Sincethosestructuresjustarecollections ofnormsandpractices,enactingnormsactually extends thesestructures. Italsobringsthemtobearinthemicrocontextofutteranceandpersonal interaction.Wearethusnotmerepassivecogs;weareactiveperpetuatorsandextendersofsocialstructuresandpractices.
Finally,highlightingtherolethatspeechplaysinextendingand enliveningunjustsocialstructuresshowsthatspeechisnomeresymptomofthesocialproblem;itisacrucialmechanismthroughwhichthese unjusthierarchiesareenactedandperpetuated.
Overviewandhighlights
The firsthalfof JustWords:OnSpeechandHiddenHarm arguesforthis previouslyoverlookedmechanismofnorm-enactment.TheinvestigationbeginsinthekinematicsofconversationwhereIarguethatconversationalcontributionsroutinelyenactnormsfortheconversationto whichtheycontribute.Then,Iarguethatthephenomenongeneralizes. Iarguethatmovesinothernorm-governedactivities(andnotjust conversationalmoves)enactnormsforthoseactivitiestoo.
Thesecondhalfofthebookappliesthisinsighttoaseriesofexamples: sexistremarks(Chapter5),actionsinvolvingpornography(Chapter6), andracistutterancesinpublicspaces(Chapter7).Theseexamplesdemonstratethatspeechcanconstituteavarietyofdifferentharms.Itcan oppress,subordinate,silence,anddiscriminate.Thesetypesofharmare characterizedandinstancesofspeechthatconstitutethemareexplored.
Somesurprisingresultsaregenerated.Anoffhandsexistremarkcan oppressevenwhenthespeakerhasnointentionofdoingso,evenwhen thespeakerhasnospecialauthorityfordoingso,andevenwhenthe remarkisnotevenaddressedtothepersonoppressedbyit.Becausethe remarkisacontributiontobroadersocialpractices,ittapsintonormativefeaturesofthoselargersocialstructures.Theoppressivepower comesfromthosestructuresbuttheyarebroughttobearonthat microenvironmentbythatsingleremarkbythatindividual.
Otherresultsareprovocativeandwillnodoubtbecontroversial.In Chapter7,forexample,Iarguethattherearesuf ficientgroundstojustify thelegalactionabilityofracistutterancesinpublicplaces.Inparticular, Iarguethatraciststatementsbyamerepassengeronabuscanconstitute ahostileandthusdiscriminatoryenvironment.Sinceapublicbusisa publicaccommodation,equalaccessandprotectionunderlawrequirea changetocurrentU.S.freespeechlawandpractice.
Otherresultsareexplanatory.Onemightwonderhowspeechcanbe reallyharmfulwhenaspeakerhasneithertheintentionnortheawareness ofharming.Aclaimthatanutteranceortypeofspeechisharmfulmight seemtorequirepositingeitheramalevolentspeakeroranoversensitive audiencemember.Suchfalsedilemmasplagueourpublicdiscussions aboutsocialissues.Oncewesee,however,thatlanguageuseroutinely functionsinsociallyimportantbutbarelyconsciousways,weareableto recognizeunintendedbutrealconnectionsbetweenspeechandharm.
Theterrain
Thisbookcontributestowhatmightbecalledthelinguisticapproach togroup-basedinjustice.¹Onthisview,speechplaysacentralrolein enactingandperpetuatingunjustsocialhierarchies.Althoughmostnow
¹Othersinclude:MacKinnon1993andLangton2009.Thetitleofthisbookisalsoanod toMacKinnon1993.
recognizethatspeechcanbeharmful,manyneverthelessregardspeech asplayingaratherminorroleinbringingaboutthevariousharms associatedwithgroup-basedinjustice.Onthisview,thingslikeracist hatespeechareameresymptomorsideeffectofracism;theyplaynoreal roleinestablishingorperpetuatingracistideologiesorpractices.Racist utterancesandtheirtolerationareanindicatorofracismbuttheyarenot constitutiveofit.²Asweshallsee,though,thisviewoverlooksthefact thatspeechroutinely(andcovertly)enactsnormsandnormsprescribe whocandowhat.Speechisthusparamountinsignaling,enacting,and maintainingunfairdistributionsofsocialpoweranditdoessoalong grouplines.
Ofcourse,thatspeechplaysacentralroleingroup-basedsocial injusticedoesnotmeanthatspeechisthe only thingthatmatters.³Plenty ofotherthings(e.g.poverty,violence,andincarcerationratestoname justafew)arealsourgent.Rather,thecentralclaimofthelinguistic approachisthatspeechis one ofthethingsthatcruciallymatter.Ithasan enormouspowertoshapeandreshapethesocialworldandwecannot affordtooverlookthat.
JustWords:OnSpeechandHiddenHarm engagesmultipleaudiences, literatures,andsubfieldsofphilosophysimultaneously.The firsthalfof thebookisprimarilyphilosophyoflanguageandpragmaticsofconversation.Therelevantbackgroundisofferedforthosereadersnotalready familiarwithit.Thesecondhalfofthebookinvolvessocialandpolitical philosophy,feministphilosophy,andphilosophyoflaw.Again,the requisitebackgroundisofferedfortheuninitiated.
Thisisabookinphilosophy.Sincetheissuesaddressedaresocomplex andmulti-faceted,thereareinevitablypiecesofthepuzzlethatare notphilosophicalinnature.Asaresult,someissues evensomevery importantissues arelefttoexpertsoutsideofphilosophy.Although Irelyontheexistenceandnormativeforceofsocialnorms,forexample, Idonotidentifytheprecisecontentofthosenorms.Thisisanempirical
²Infact,thisistheofficialpositionoftheAmericanCivilLibertiesUniononcampus speechcodes.https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus.
³Somearguethatattentiononspeechismisplacedanddistractsfromthe real problems, likepoverty,violence, defacto segregation,anddiscrimination.See,forexample,Gates 1993.
matterforotherstosettle.⁴ AlthoughIarguethatthereissuf ficient theoreticaljustification,intermsofharmprevention,fortreatingcertain sortsofpublicracistutterancesaslegallyactionable,Ileaveittoothersto determineexactlyhowtoregulatesuchutterances.Thisisamatterbest lefttothosewithexpertiseinlawandthecriminaljusticesystem.Even withinphilosophy(broadlyunderstood),somerelevantandimportant detailsarehereleftopenforothersto fillinandIamexplicitaboutthis whenitishelpfultothereadertobeso.
Potentialapplicationsofthemechanismidentifiedherearewideopen. Inthisbook,thesneakymechanismofnorm-enactmentisappliedto expressionsofsexualbravado,actionsinvolvingpornography,andracist utterances.Othershaveappliedtheframework(relyingonpreviously publishedwork)totopicsnotexploredhere:seditionlaw,⁵ racial figleaves,⁶ actsofslurring,⁷ politicaldogwhistles,⁸ theresponsibilityofoverhearers,⁹ definingaregulableclassofhatespeech,¹⁰ issuesindisabilitystudies,¹¹and eventhebasisforempiricalworkinsocio-drama.¹²Elsewhere,Ihave appliedittomicroaggressions.¹³Clearly,potentialapplicationsofthe frameworkarenotexhaustedbythoseexplicitlydevelopedinthisbook. Itismyhopethatthedetails,extensions,andclarificationsdevelopedhere bothfacilitatethesefurtherapplicationsanddispelmisunderstandingsin theextantliterature.
Chaptersummaries
Chapter1presentstherequiredbackgroundinthephilosophyoflanguageanditclari fiesthenatureofenactment,harmconstitution,and socialnorms.
Chapter2arguesthatconversationalcontributionsroutinelyenact normsfortheconversationtowhichtheycontribute.Suchconversational exercitivesinvolveanimportantbutoverlookedmechanismofverbalnorm enactment.
⁴ Inearlierwork,Iwaslessclearaboutthisrelianceonempiricalmatters.Forthis criticism,seeSchauer2014.
⁵ SeeSorial2010and2015. ⁶ SeeSaul2017.
⁷ SeeBianchi2014;Lenehan2014;Popa-WyattandWyatt2017;Soon, “OnSlurring,” unpublishedmanuscript;Cousens2014.
⁸ SeeSaul2018. ⁹ SeeAyalaandVasilyeva2016.
¹
⁰ SeeGelber2017.¹¹SeeAas2016.
¹²SeeCodatos,Testoni,andRonzani2012.¹³Seemy2018a;2018b.
Chapter3exploresdifferencesbetweenconversationalexercitivesand standardexercitives.Althoughbothenactnorms,standardexercitivesdo soviaanexerciseofspeakerauthoritybutconversationalexercitives workdifferently.Othersimilaritiesanddifferencesarealsoexplored.
Chapter4arguesthatthephenomenonofconversationalexercitives generalizes.Itisnotjustverbalcontributionstoconversationsthatenact norms;verbalcontributionstoothernorm-governedactivitiesalsodoso. Suchcovertexercitivesarepresentedandexplored.
Chapter5appliesourunderstandingofcovertexercitivestoanexample ofsexistspeech.Anoffhandsexistremarkisshowntobeoppressiveeven thoughthespeakerdoesnotintendtooppress,thespeakerdoesnothave anyparticularauthority,andtheremarkisnotaimedatthepersons oppressedbyit.
Chapter6usestheframeworkofcovertexercitivestoexplorethe potentialharmsofactionsinvolvingcertaintypesofpornography.The natureofpornography,thecrucialroleofcontext,andtheharmsofboth subordinationandsilencingarediscussed.
Chapter7appliesthephenomenonofcovertexercitivestofreespeech issues.Thephilosophicalfoundationsofafreespeechprincipleare presentedanddifferentsortsofargumentsforspeechregulationare discussed.Itisshownthatbecauseracistspeechinpublicplacesenacts discriminatorynorms,thereisaharmpreventionjustificationforits legalactionability.
Finally,intheConclusion,weexplorehowthesneakymechanismof normenactmentidentifiedinthisbookcanenactpositive(ratherthan harmful)norms.Justasourspeechactscanenactharmfulnormsby tappingintopernicioussocialpractices,sotoocantheyenactmore egalitariannormsbytappingintodifferentandmorejustsocialpractices. Thishighlightswaysinwhichevenrelativelypowerlessindividualscan bringaboutpositive,evenifhighlylocalized,socialchange.
1 Preliminaries
1.1Introduction
Beforewecandelveintothemainargumentsofthisbook,somepreliminariesarerequired.First,therequisitebackgroundinthephilosophyof languageispresented.Then,somecomplexitiesaboutenactingaremade explicit.Finally,thedistinctionbetweencausingandconstitutingharm isclarified.Becausethismaterialispresentedinordertobeaswidely accessibleaspossible,someselectivityandsimpli ficationareinvolved.
1.2Languageuse
Hereisacertainnaïveandoutdatedpictureofhowlanguageworks. Whenaspeakerwantstocommunicatesomepropositionorclaimp,the speakersayssomethingthat(literally)meansp.Aheareraccessespby simplydecodingtheliteralmeaningofwhatthespeakeractuallysays.¹In thispicture,communicationisjustamatterofcodinganddecodingthe contentofwhatthespeakerwantstocommunicate.Thispictureoflanguage useishighlyintuitive.Afterall,weuselanguagetocommunicatewhatwe meanandwesay(orwrite)thingsthathavemeaning,soitmakessensethat whatwesay(orwrite)shouldmatchthemeaningweintendtoconvey.
Asintuitiveasthispicturemaybe,ithasbeeneffectivelyrefutedand abandoned.Itcannotdealwithawidevarietyoffamiliarlinguisticphenomena.Asamatteroffact,werarelysaywhatwemean.Instead,wesay somethingelsethatenablesthehearerto figureoutwhatwemean.²
¹HereandthroughoutthebookIusetheterm ‘hearer’ torefertothosepersons interpretinganoccasionoflanguageuse,therebyincludingpersonsunabletohear. AlthoughIacknowledgeandregrettheableistassumptions,Iherereluctantlyabideby prevailingpractice.
²See,forexample,Grice1989:26–31.
Toseeanexampleofthis,considerthefollowing.SupposethatPaul andMattaretalkingabouthowstrangelyPeterhasbeenbehavinglately andPaulsays, “Anyonewholosesawifeandmotherinthesameday wouldhaveatoughtimeofit.” MatttakesPaultobetellinghimthat Peterlosthiswifeandmominthesamedayandthattheselossesexplain whyPeterisbehavingsostrangelylately.Althoughthisispreciselywhat PaulintendstocommunicatetoMatt,itisnotwhatPaulactuallysays. WhatPaulactuallysaysisageneralclaimaboutpeoplewholoseawife andmotherinthesameday;itisnotaclaimaboutPeteratall.Despite this,MattisabletoinferPaul’sintendedmeaning(thatclaimabout Peter)fromtheconventionalmeaningofwhatPaulactuallysaysalong withfactsaboutthecontextandthecooperativenatureofconversation. ThepointforusnowisthatwhatPaulmeansandwhatPaulsaysare distinct.Asonecanseethen,communicationisnotamerematterof decodingthemeaningofthelanguageused.
Thatweoftenmeansomethingdifferentfromwhatwesaydrawsour attentiontoanimportantdistinctionbetweenconventionalmeaning,on theonehand,andspeakermeaning,ontheother.WhatPaulmeansby whathesays(hisspeakermeaning)isclearlydistinctfromtheconventionalmeaningofwhatheactuallysays.Ironyprovidesanotherillustrationofthiscontrast.SupposethatmybelovedhusbandMikeentersthe room,tripsonanottomanandthenlandsonmydinnerplateand,as Iwipepastasaucefrommyface,Isay: “Mikeyousurearegraceful!”³ WhatImeanhere(amongotherthings)isthatMikeisextremelyclumsy. Whatmywordsactuallymean(thatis,theconventional,asopposedto thespeaker,meaningofmyutterance)isthatMikesureisgraceful. Again,speakermeaning,orwhatthespeakermeansbywhatshesays, isdistinctfromtheconventionalmeaningofthewordsactuallyused.⁴
³Thisexampleis fictional.IthankAlbertMichaelBoothforsuggestingthatImakethis explicit.
⁴ Asweshallseeinfurtherdetaillaterinthissection,speakermeaningissometimesused inanarrowsensetoreferonlytothecontentthespeakerintendstocommunicate.Ahearer might,forexample,correctlyidentifythecontentofmyorderwhilemistakingthatorderfor ameresuggestion.Insuchacase,speakermeaninginthenarrowsenseisrecognizedbut speakermeaninginthebroadsenseisnot.Unlessotherwiseindicated,Ishallusespeaker meaninginthebroadsense.Therearecontroversiesregardingthecorrectaccountof speakermeaning.Grice’s(1989)accounthasbeenveryinfluentialbutithasalsobeen (widely)criticizedforbeingtooaudience-based(orfocusedoncommunicationasopposed toexpression).ForanexampleofthissortofcriticismofGrice’saccount,seeDavis1992.
Anotherimportantdistinctionconcernsthedifferencebetweensentencesorsentence-types(thatis,punctuatedstringsofwords)and utterances(fullycontextualizedusesofwordsonparticularoccasions). Considerthesentence, ‘Shewenthome.’ Therearemanyinstancesof thatsentence-type; ‘Shewenthome’ iswrittenorsaidinmanydifferent placesandcontexts.Moreover,whatthatsentencemeans(evenconventionally)clearlyvariesfromusetouse.Ononeoccasion,itmightmean thatSheilawentto13ElmStreet.OnanotheritmightmeanthatJeanne wentbacktotheMiddleEastand,onyetanother,itmightmeanthat Lorilefttheparty.Forthisreason,manydenythatsentences(qua sentence-types)arethebearersofmeaning.Onthisview,asentence independentofacontextofusefailstohaveadeterminatemeaning. Whatbearsmeaningareparticularusesofsentencesonparticular occasions.Inwhatfollows,Iwillnotbeconcernedwithsentencesor sentence-types.Rather,Ishallfocusonsentence-usesonparticular occasionsandIwilloftenrefertothemas ‘utterances’
Asmentionedabove,thedecodingpictureoflanguagehasbeen rejected.Languagetheoristsnowagreethatlanguageuseishighlyinferential.Infact,evendirectliterallanguageuseinvolvescomplexinferentialreasoning.Suppose,forexample,thatIsay, ‘Peteristall’ andImean whatIsay.Iamnotbeingironicorinsinuatingthatsomethingelseis trueofPeterbecauseheistall.Evenhere,however,hearersmustmake rathercomplexinferencestocorrectlyinterpretmyutterance.For starters,theyneedto figureoutwhichPeterIamtalkingabout.Furthermore,theyalsoneedto figureoutwhatconstitutesbeingtallforsomeone likePeter.Ifheisaprofessionalbasketballplayer,forexample,then sayingthatheistallprobablymeansthatheisoversevenfeet.If, however,Peterisapreschooler,thenitmeansnosuchthing.⁵
Finally,itishelpfultothinkoflanguageuseintermsofsolvinga certainsortofcoordinationproblem.Coordinationproblemsaresituationsinvolvingmorethanoneagent,wherewhatoneoughttodo dependsonwhatothersdecidetodoandwherethereisasharedgoal. Suppose,forexample,thatmyhusbandandIgetseparatedwhileweare
⁵ Thereisconsiderablecontroversyintheliteratureregardingtheroleofcontextin fixingtheconventionalmeaningof(orthepropositionexpressedby)thesentenceuttered. Forasamplingofpositions,seeStanley2000;Carston2002;LeporeandCappellen2005; andMacFarlane2009.
leavingaconcert.Inthissituation,wehaveacommongoal;weeach wantto findtheother.Itdoesn’treallymatterwherewemeetsolongas wedomeetsomewhere.Ourdecisionsarealsomutuallydependent.That is,whereIshouldgodependsonwherehedecidestogoandviceversa. Asonecansee,thisisacoordinationproblem.Inthiscase,Idecideto walktothecarbecauseI figurethatMikewilldothesame.I figurethat he’lldothesamebecauseI figurethathe’ll figurethatI’llwalktothecar. Weroutinelyfacesuchdecisionsituationsandweoftenmanageto successfullysolvethem.
Howdoeslanguageuseinvolvethesolutiontoacoordinationproblem?Well,thecommongoalissuccessfulcommunicationandwhat participantsoughttododependsonwhatotherparticipantsdo.In particular,speakerssaywhattheythinkwillenablehearersto figure outwhattheymean(appealingtotheconventionalmeaningofwhatis said,alongwithcommonknowledgeandcontext).Hearersinterpretthe speakerintermsofwhatthehearerthinksthespeakermeans.Both speakersandhearersmustcoordinateinthiswayinordertosuccessfully communicate.⁶
Insumthen,Iworkwithinaconceptionoflanguageuseaccordingto whichouruseoflanguageishighlyinferential,context-sensitive,and focusedonthecommunicationoflinguisticintentions.Thisisabroadly Griceanframework. ⁷ Thereare,ofcourse,alternativeframeworks. Habermas’stheoryofcommunicationandRobertBrandom ’sinferential rolesemanticsmightservemypurposesjustaswell.Althoughthereare multipleandimportantsimilaritiesbetweentheseframeworksandthe
⁶ SeeLewis(1969)2002andSperberandWilson1986.
⁷ ThereisanimportantdivisiontodaywithintheGriceanframework,betweenGriceans andrelevancetheoristsbuttheyarebothGriceaninthisbroadsense.Theybothregard languageuseashighlyinferentialandcontext-sensitive.Theybothviewlanguageuseas involvingthesolutionofacommunicationcoordinationproblem.Andbothareprimarily concernedwiththeinterpretationend(thatis,withexplaininghowhearersmanageto figureoutwhataspeakermeansandwhatthespeakermeanstodowithherwords).The maindifferencebetweenthemconcernswhattheyusetodotheexplaining.WhileGriceans appealtothecooperativenatureofconversationandtoGrice’sfourmaxims(ofquality, quantity,relevance,andmanner),relevancetheoristsappealonlytorelevanceintheir specialtechnicalsense(ofmaximizingcognitiveeffectwhileminimizingcognitiveeffort). SeeGrice1989andSperberandWilson1986.
aspectsoflanguageusestressedhere,thesealternativeframeworksare notexploredinanygreatdetailinthisbook.⁸
1.3Speechacts
Hereisanothernaïveandoutdatedviewofhowlanguagefunctions: Languageuseismerelyinthebusinessofexpressingclaims.Inhis How toDoThingswithWords,J.L.Austindrewourphilosophicalattentionto theinadequacyofthisviewbyhighlightingarangeofotherfunctionsof languageuse.⁹ Austindemonstratesthat,inadditiontomakingtrueor falseclaimsabouttheworld,speechcanconstituteaction.Promises,bets, andapologiesareallactionsthatcanbeperformedbysayingcertain wordsundercertaincircumstances.¹⁰
Austinalsodistinguishedamongstthreedifferentforcesofspeech. First,the locutionary forceofanutteranceisitssense(meaning)and reference(thingsreferredto).WhenItellJohn, “OfficerJonesisusinghis radargunonRt.24,” myutterancehaslocutionaryforce. ‘OfficerJones’ referstoOfficerJones, ‘radargun’ referstoradarguns, ‘Rt.24’ refersto Rt.24andthesentenceexpressestheclaimthatOfficerJonesisusinghis radargunonRt.24.MyutterancehaslocutionaryforcesinceIuttered wordsthathavemeaningandreference.¹¹Locution fixesthe(conventional)content.Itresolvesambiguitiesand fixesindexicals.¹²Theremay bemanypeopleintheuniversecalled ‘OfficerJones’ butthisparticular useofthisexpressionreferstoaparticularperson.
Itisimportanttonoticethatlocutionconcernscontentandisnotthe sameasassertion.Assertion,bycontrast,concernsthe speaker’scommitmenttothetruthof thatcontent.Toseethisdifferencemoreclearly,note thatwhenIsaid, ‘Mike,yousurearegraceful’ Iexpressedtheclaimthat MikesureisgracefulbutIdidnotcommitto(thetruthortheprobable truthof)theclaimthatMikesureisgraceful.Isaidsomethingwitha
⁸ SeeHabermas1984.Forworkwithinthatframework,seeGelber2002.Thereisalso Brandom’sinferentialrolesemantics.SeeBrandom1994.Forworkwithinthatframework, seeKuklaandLance2009andTirrell2012.
⁹ SeeAustin1975.¹⁰ SeealsoGreen2017a.
¹¹Thisissometimescalledarheticact.SeeAustin1975:93.Neitherthemeaningnorthe extension(referent)needstobefullydeterminate.
¹²Therearecontroversiesregardinghowthiscontentis fixed.Specifically,thereare controversiesovertheroleofcontextin fixingcontent.Foradditionalinformation,seenote5.
particularcontent(andtherebyperformedalocutionaryact)butIdid nottherebyassert(orcommitto)thatcontent.Asonecanseethen, locutionisconceptuallydistinctfromassertion.
Second,the illocutionary forceofanutteranceistheactionconstituted bytheutteranceinvirtueoftheutterancefunctioningasspeech. Althoughthephysicalproductionofspeech(whetherwritten,verbal, orsigned)isanaction,itisnotanillocutionaryact.Theillocutionaryact isperformedbymeansofthelocutionaryactofexpressingcontent. WhenIsaid, “OfficerJonesisusinghisradargunonRt.24” Ithereby asserted(andthuscommittedmyselftothetruthof)theclaimthatOfficer JonesisusinghisradargunonRt.24.Inadditiontoasserting,other illocutionaryactsincludeordering(e.g. “Iorderyoutoshutthedoor”) andpromising(e.g. “Yes,Father,IpromisetogotoMasseachweek”).
Thirdand finally,the perlocutionary forceofanutteranceisacertain sortofcausaleffectontheaudience.Inorderforacausaleffecttobea perlocutionaryeffect,itmustbebroughtaboutbymeansofthelinguistic functioningoftheutterance.¹³Inotherwords,non-linguisticcausal effectsofspeech(suchasashrillvoicebreakingglassoraloud announcementwakingsomeone)arenotperlocutionaryeffectssince thesecausaleffectsarenotbroughtaboutbymeansofthehearer ’ s recognitionoftheconventionalmeaningofthewordsuttered.Perlocutionaryeffectsarethusasubsetofcausaleffects.Typically,thereisa particularperlocutionaryeffectthatthespeakerhopestobringabout viaherutterance.WhenIsaidthatOfficerJonesisusinghisradargun onRt.24,IaimedtowarnJohnthatheshoulddrivewithinthespeed limit;IaimedtocausehimtobelievethatOfficerJoneswouldcatchhim ifhedidnot.
Ofcourse,anutterancemightnotbringaboutitsintendedperlocutionaryeffect.JohnmightthinkthatIammistakenorhemightnot realizethatIaimtowarnratherthanmerelytoinformhim.Whenthis happens,theutteranceinquestionhasfailedtobringaboutitsintended (perlocutionary)effectandtheutteranceisthusunsuccessfulinan
¹³Whencharacterizingperlocution,manyrepeatpartofwhatAustinsaidaboutit:the perlocutionaryactistheactperformed by sayingsomethingwhereastheillocutionaryactis theactperformed in sayingsomething.SeeAustin1975:91–103.Noticethatthisisnot reallyacharacterizationofperlocution;itisatesttodistinguishbetweenperlocutionand illocution.Theoristsdisagreeabouthowusefulthiscriterionis.
importantrespect.Besideswarning,otherperlocutionaryeffectsinclude convincing,alarming,persuading,scaring,amusing,andinspiring.
Thesedistinctions(amongstlocutionary,perlocutionary,andillocutionaryforce)showhowcomplexandmulti-facetedutterancesreallyare. Italsoilluminatesavarietyofwaysthatcommunicationcanfail.Considerthefollowing.SupposethatIsaytomyson, “Mommywantsyouto cleanyourroomnow, ” andhetakesitasasuggestionasopposedtothe orderthatitwasintendedtobe.Now,thereisasenseinwhichmyson recognizesmymeaning.Hecorrectlyidentifiesthemeaningandthe referentsofthewordsIutter.Inthiscase,communicationsucceedsat thelocutionarylevel.Understandingmeaninginthisnarrow(strictly locutionary)sense,hegotitright.Thatsaid,thereisanimportantsense inwhichmysonfailstorecognizemymeaning.Afterall,hemistakesmy orderforameresuggestion.Speakermeaningissometimesusedina narrowsensetoincludeonlythe(intended)locutionarycontent.In thebroadsense,however,speakermeaningalsoincludestheintended perlocutionaryandillocutionaryacts.¹⁴ IfIsaysomethingwiththe perlocutionaryintentiontoamuseyoubutyoudonotrealizethis,then youhavemissedpartofmyspeakermeaninginthisbroadsense(even ifyoucorrectlyidentifythelocutionarycontentofmyutterance). Inwhatfollows,Ishallusespeakermeaninginthebroadsenseunless otherwiseindicated.
One finalpointbeforeweproceed.Thewaymostphilosophers(linguistsandpsychologists)talkaboutspeechactsisreallyquitebroad.On thisconception,speechactsarecommunicativeorexpressiveactsthatdo notneedtoinvolvetheuseofwords.¹⁵ Wavingtogreetafriendisa speechact.Noddinginconsentisaspeechact.Rollingone’seyesto expressdisdainisaspeechact.AccordingtoClark,evenachessmoveisa speechact.¹⁶ Visualimagescanalsobespeechacts.Drawingalineacross someone ’sfaceonaposterisaspeechact.AlthoughIhereworkwiththis broaderconceptionofaspeechact,Iamneverthelessusuallyinterested inutterancesthatdoinvolvetheuseofwords.
¹⁴ Seenote4.
¹⁵ RodBertolet(1994),however,workswithamuchnarrowerconceptionofaspeech act.Heassumesthatwordsmustbeused.
¹⁶ SeeClark1996.
1.4Felicityconditions
Differentillocutionaryactshavedifferentconditionsofsuccess. Althoughonecannotbequeathmoneyonedoesnothave,forexample, onecanbetmoneyoneiswithout.Similarly,althoughittakesaspecial kindofauthoritytoorderorcommandsomeone,ingeneralnospecial authorityisrequiredtorequest,suggest,orassert.Thatsaid,mostspeech actsaremaximallyfelicitousonlywhenthespeakerhastheappropriate standingtoperformthatspeechact.Itwouldbeoddtoaskatotal strangertocleanyourgasgrilleforyou.Itseemsthatonemusthave theappropriatesortofrelationship(orstanding)withsomeoneinorder tofelicitouslymakesucharequest.Ishallhavemoretosayaboutspeaker authorityandstandinginSection3.4.
Aspeechactcanbeinfelicitousornon-idealeventhoughitconstitutes (orperforms)theintendedillocutionaryact.SupposeIsaytoJohn, “I apologizeforusingyournailgunwithoutyourpermission,” butIactually usedDan’snailgun,notJohn’s.Althoughmyapologyisnon-idealbecause itisofferedtothewrongperson,itisstilltruethatIapologized(toJohn). (Austinsometimescalledsuchinfelicitousillocutionsabuses.¹⁷)Asonecan seethen,notallinfelicitiesorimperfectionsarefatalones.
Anillocutionwithafataldefect,ontheotherhand,fails,andthe illocutionaryactattemptedisnotperformed.(Austincallssuchfailed illocutionsmisfires.¹⁸)SupposethatItrytoverballyenacthigherspeed limitsinordertoavoidpayinga fineforspeeding.TryasImight,my utterancewillmisfire;Iwillfailtoenactnewspeedlimitsexactlybecause IdonothavetheauthoritytodosoandnoonethinksthatIdo.
Inwhatfollows,Ishallsometimesleaveitopenwhetheraparticular infelicityisfatalornot.Whiletheprecisestatusofsomeofthesefelicity conditionsisabitcontroversial,certainconditionsappeartobeespeciallyimportantforanyspeechact.
Consider,forinstance,speakerintention.WhenRebeccasaidto Simon, “Ipromisetosharemybagofcandywithyou,” sheintended thatherutterancecountastheundertakingofanobligationonherpart (toshareherbagofcandywithSimon).Noticethatthis illocutionary intention(topromise)isdistinctfromthe sincerity condition(thatshe intendtokeepthatpromiseandactuallysharethebagofcandywith
¹⁷ SeeAustin1975:16.¹⁸ SeeAustin1975:16.
Simon).Afterall,Rebeccamightwellintendthatherwordsbeapromise withoutalsointendingtokeepthatpromise.Noticefurtherthatthe failureofthissincerityconditiondoesnotdisqualifyherutterance frombeingapromise(thatis,fromconstitutingtheillocutionaryactof promising).Ifitdid,insincerepromiseswouldbeimpossible.Sowould insincereassertions!If,however,Rebeccadoesnotintendforherwords toundertakeanobligationatall,thenitisunclearwhetherherutterance isapromise.¹⁹ Attheveryleast,itseemsthatthespeakeroughtto actuallyintendtoperformtheillocutionaryactinquestion;thisspeaker illocutionaryintentionconditionappearstobeanespeciallyimportant felicityconditionforanyspeechact.
Hearerrecognitionalsoseemstobeanimportantconditionformost speechacts.Speakersoughttohavereasonableexpectationsregarding whatthehearersarelikelytobeabletorecognize.Althoughtherearea varietyofdifferentkindsofhearerrecognition,thehearer’srecognition ofthespeaker’sintended illocutionary actseemstobeespeciallyimportant.Supposethat,intendingtowarnherson(aboutthepossibilityofhis slippingonice),Claudiasays, “Hayden,it’sgettingcoldandtheplaygroundisgettingslippery.Let’sgetinsidebeforeyoufallandcrackyour head.” SupposefurtherthatHaydendoesnotrecognizeherintentionto warnhim.Insuchacase,whetherhegoesinsideornot,thereisafailure ofthehearer’srecognitionofthespeaker’sintendedillocutionaryact. Some,forexampleAustin,wouldmaintainthattheutterancefailsto havetheintendedillocutionaryforce(ofawarning)exactlybecausethe speaker’sillocutionaryintentionwentunrecognized.²⁰ Onemight insteadmaintainthatthesuccessofourspeechactsshouldnotdepend onhearerrecognitioninthisway.²¹Afterall,whyshouldClaudiabe unabletowarnhersonjustbecauseheisoccasionallydenseregarding herillocutionaryintentions?IaminclinedtosaythatClaudiaperforms
¹⁹ Notethatthereisadifferencebetweennotintendingtopromiseandnotintendingto undertakeanobligationatall.Ichosethelatterinordertoexcludepossiblecasesof illocutionaryimplication.Supposethatverbalcontractsarejustlikepromisesexceptthat theobligationsenactedarestronger.Itmaybethatapersonmayintendtoenactaverbal contract(andnotintendtopromise)butbyenactingthatcontractonetherebyautomaticallyalsopromises.Foranexplorationofthesesortsofpossibilities,seeSearleand Vanderveken1985.
²⁰ SeeAustin1975:22,116,139.
²¹See,forexample,Strawson1964.Forapresentationofthispositionwithinfeminist debates,seeJacobson1995.
theillocutionaryactofwarningbutshefailstocommunicatethat warningtoherson(exactlybecausehefailstorecognizeherintention todoso).²²Despitethiscontroversyregardingthepreciseroleofuptake (thatis,thehearer’srecognitionofthespeaker’sintendedillocutionary act),itdoesseemtobeanespeciallyimportantfelicityconditionformost speechacts.Thatis,wheneverthatconditionfails,theutterancein questionisatleastinfelicitouseveniftheutteranceneverthelessmanages toconstitutetheintendedillocutionaryact.
Finally,thereseemstobeanimportantdifference(evenifitisonlya matterofdegree)betweenformal,ceremonial,institutionalizedspeech acts,ontheonehand,andmoreordinaryspeechactsontheother.
Consider firstanexampleoftheformer.Aspeaker,duringaformal ship-namingceremony,crashesabottleofchampagneagainstthehull andsays, “IherebynamethisshipTheWanderer. ” Thisutterance succeedsinnamingtheshipbecauseseveralconditionsaremet.There isaconventionoperativeaccordingtowhichshipscanbenamedbya speakersayingcertainwordsundercertaincircumstances.Moreover, thereisanexplicitproceduretobefollowedinordertoinvokethis conventionandthisprocedureiscompletelyandcorrectlyfollowedin thiscase.Thisincludesthefactthatthisspeakerhasbeenformally designatedastheonlypersonlicensedtonamethisshipinthisway.²³
Considernowanexampleofalessceremonial(ormoreordinary)sortof speechact.ImakeapromisetomydaughterNorabysaying, “Ipromiseto bringyoutothemoviesnextweek.” Thereisasenseinwhichthereisa conventionaccordingtowhichonecanundertakeanobligationsimplyby sayingcertainwordsundertherightcircumstancesandthereis(aperhaps thinsenseinwhichthereis)anassociatedprocedurefordoingsoandIam theonlypersonlicensedtopromiseonmybehalf.Despiteallthis,it neverthelessseemsfairtosaythatwhatisdoingtherealworkinthis caseisthecommunicationofspeakerintention.Ordinaryspeechactsseem lessdependentonconvention(andassociatedprocedures)andmore dependentonthecommunicationofintention.²⁴ Formalspeechacts,by
²²Seemy2009a.
²³TheseconditionsfollowAustin’s(1975:14–15)analysisofspeechacts.
²⁴ Thereiscontroversyregardingtheroleofconventioninspeechacts.Austin(1975) andSearle(1969)requirethataspeechactconformwiththeassociatedconvention. Strawson(1964)deniesthatthisisnecessaryandstressestheimportanceofthecommunicationofintention.Forordinaryspeechacts,IsidewithStrawson.
