OxfordStudies inPhilosophy ofLanguage
Volume1
EDITEDBY ErnieLeporeandDavidSosa
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©theseveralcontributors2019
Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2019
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018955391
ISBN978–0–19–883656–8
PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby ClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A.
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
Preface vii
ListofContributors ix
1.TheSubtleLivesofDescriptiveNames1 ImogenDickie
2.SourcesofContext-Dependence:TheCaseofKnowledge Ascriptions35 MichaelGlanzberg
3.WordsbyConvention73 GailLeckieandJ.R.G.Williams
4.ConditionalAcceptance99 OfraMagidor
5.Frege’ s Begriffsschrift TheoryofIdentityVindicated122 UlrichPardeyandKaiF.Wehmeier
6.Truth148 IanRumfitt
7.SubordinatingSpeechandSpeakingUp178 GillianRussell
8.Context-FreeSemantics208 PaoloSantorio
9.SemanticExplanations240 ZoltánGendlerSzabó
Index 277
Preface
Withthisinauguralissue, OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofLanguage joins thedistinguishedfamilyof OxfordStudies series,asaregularshowcase forleadingresearchinitsarea.Philosophyoflanguagehasbeenamain focusofphilosophicalresearchsinceatleastFrege’sseminalcontributionsattheturnofthetwentiethcentury.Sincethat “linguisticturn,” importantworkinphilosophyhasoftenbeenrelatedinsomesignificant waytophilosophyoflanguage.Thisserieshopestoofferaregular snapshotofstate-of-the-artcontributionsinthisimportant field.Tobe publishedbiennially,andintendedtobeaforumforpapersbysomeof thebestscholarsfromaroundtheworld,bothseniorandjunior,each issuewillincludeanassortmentofoutstandingpapersinphilosophyof language,broadlyconstrued.
This firstissueofourseriesisagoodinstanceoftheform:itincludes ninenewpapersbyadistinguishedrangeofphilosophers.Together,the papersprovideaperspectiveonthestateofthesub-discipline.Twoofthe papersinvestigatebasicnotionsinthearea,truthandreference:Imogen Dickie’ s “TheSubtleLivesofDescriptiveNames” andIanRumfitt’ s “Truth. ” Dickie’streatmentofreferencederivesfromareconsideration ofdescriptivenamesandarejectionoftheideathatthereferentofsucha nameisthesatisfieroftheassociateddescription.Rumfittseeksto recaptureaconceptionoftruthduetoP.F.Strawsononwhichthekey insightisthat “onewhomakesastatementorassertionmakesatrue statementifandonlyifthingsareas,inmakingthestatement,hestates themtobe.”
“WordsbyConvention, ” byGailLeckieandRobbieWilliams,and “SemanticExplanations,” byZoltanSzabo,canbothbeseenasinvestigationsinmetasemantics.Theformerisconcernedwiththepriority, relativetoreductiveprojectsinmetasemantics,ofourcategorizationof wordsintotypes;thelatterwiththequestionofwhethersemantic theoriesaremerely “descriptive” orwhethersuchtheoriescanoffer moresubstantiveexplanations.
Twootherpaperstakeupthephenomenonofcontext-sensitivity, consideringtheroleofcontextinsemanticsgenerallyandinthecase
ofknowledge-ascriptionsinparticular:PaoloSantorio’ s “Context-Free Semantics,” andMichaelGlanzberg’ s “SourcesofContextDependence: TheCaseofKnowledgeAscriptions. ” Santoriorejectsanydistinctive semanticroleforcontext;Glanzbergdefendsaformofcontextdependenceforknowledgeascriptionsandexploresthevarietiesof contextdependencefoundinnaturallanguage.
OfraMagidor’ s “ConditionalAcceptance” findsthatthreeprominent theoriesofconditionalscannotprovideanadequatetreatmentofacase shedevises.ThepaperbyGillianRussell, “SubordinatingSpeechand SpeakingUp,” exploresabroadlysocio-politicalquestioninphilosophy oflanguage:howcan “speakingup” workagainstthephenomenonof subordination?Frege’ s Begriffsschrift isthefocusofthepaperbyUlrich PardeyandKaiWehmeier:their “Frege’ s Begriffsschrift Theoryof IdentityVindicated” isconcernedtorehabilitateFrege’sviewinthe faceoftwomainobjectionsleveledagainstit.
Asyoureadtheentries,youwillseehowinalmosteverycase,the specifictopicstakenuparecloselyconnectedtoothertopicsofdeepand abidinginterestinphilosophy:collectiveaction(likethatinvolvedin establishingconventionsorpractices),explanation,identity,individual action(likethatinvolvedinmakingaspeechact),knowledge,reasoning, andsubordination.
Together,thisbroad-rangingsetofpapersrevealsthebreadthand depthofworkinphilosophyoflanguagetoday.Weexpectfutureissues toprovideanequallydiverse,rich,andvaluablecollectionofcontributionstoourdiscipline.
OurthankstoPeterMomtchiloffforhissupport,andfortheaddition ofthisseriestothe OxfordStudies family.
1 TheSubtleLivesof DescriptiveNames
ImogenDickie
Considerthefollowingexample:
Case1: ‘TremulousHand’ ‘TremulousHand’ isusedtorefertotheotherwise unidentifiedauthorofaround50,000thirteenth-centuryglossesinmanuscripts. Palaeographicalanalysisprovidesstrongevidencethattheseglossesarethework ofasinglepersonwithdistinctive(tremulousandleft-leaning)handwriting.All thatisknownaboutTremulousHandiswhatcanbededucedfromtheglosses themselves.
‘TremulousHand’ isa ‘descriptivename’:anameassociatedwitha stipulationofform ⌜Let α refertothe Ψ⌝.¹Theextantdiscussion²of suchexpressionsischaracterizedbyastandardclaimandacontroversy:
Standardclaim(satisfactionality) Adescriptivename’sreferent,ifit hasone,isthesatisfieroftheassociateddescription(if α refers,itrefers tothesatisfierof ⌜the Ψ⌝).
Centralquestionofthecontroversy(singularity?) Isthethought expressedbyasentencecontainingadescriptivenameasingular thoughtaboutthename’sbearer?(Partofwhatisatissueinthis controversyiswhatcountsasagenuinely ‘singular’ thought.)
¹ ‘ α ’ and ‘Ψ’ areschematiclettersrangingoverobject-languagesingulartermsand predicatesrespectively.
²See,forexample,Evans1982;Campbell1999,2002;Jeshion2004,2010;Reimer2004; Recanati2012;Goodman2016.
Thispaperarguesthatthestandardclaimisfalse,andsuggestsanew solutiontothecontroversy.
Herearetwomoreexampleswhichwillenableagesturetowardswhat Iamgoingtopropose:
Case2: ‘GerainttheBlueBard’ ‘GerainttheBlueBard’ wasusedforovera hundredyearsasanamefortheotherwiseunidenti fiedauthorofaseriesofsongs inmedievalWelsh,dealingwithmedievalthemes,andemployingmedievalmetres. Effortsto findoutmoreaboutGeraint’slife,takingofffromcuesinthetexts, supposedthathe flourishedintheninthcentury,andwaseitheranapothecary,a minoraristocrat,orapriest.Rivalfactionscollectedlargebodiesofevidenceto supporteachofthesehypotheses.Butin1956the ‘BlueBard’ songswereshown tobetheworkofnotoriousnineteenth-centuryforgerEdwardWilliams.
Case3: ‘Gizmo’ X,thenowagedheadofamanufacturingcompany,likesto boasttohisunderlingsabout ‘thegizmothatstarteditall’,withstrongsuggestionsthathewashimselfthisthing’sinventor.Theunderlingsintroducea descriptivename ‘Gizmo’ withaboutness-fixingdescription<X’smostremunerativeearlyinvention>,anduseX’sutterances(‘Ah,thatwastheyearthatthe gizmothatstarteditallreallytookoff ’ etc.)andthecompany’ s financialhistory totrytoworkoutwhichofthe firm ’searlypatentsGizmowas.Infact,therewas anearlypatentthatenabledthe firmtogetonitsfeet the firstversionofthe firm ’sfamousself-settingrattrap.ButXwasnotitsinventor.The firm ’searly patentswereallboughtforalmostnothingfromanunworldlyindividualwho diedanimpoverishedemeritusprofessorinauniversitytown.
Itakeitthattherearereasonablyclearintuitiveverdicts³aboutthese cases.In Case2,intuitioncriesoutthattherewasnoGeraint—‘Geraint theBlueBard’ asusedbytheunfortunatescholarsdidnotrefer.In Case3, wecanimagine fillinginthedetailsinsuchawaythattheintuitive verdictisthat ‘Gizmo’ does refer totherattrap:oneunderlingsaysto another ‘Well,here’sGizmo,butyourealizethatXdidn’tinventitafter all ... ’ Ifwetakethematfacevalue,theseintuitiveverdictsreversewhat weshouldexpectto findifthemost flat-footedversionofthe standard claim istrue. ‘Geraint ’ and ‘Gizmo’ aredescriptivenames,associated withstipulations ‘Let “Geraint” refertotheauthorofthesesongs’ and ‘Let “Gizmo” refertoX’smostremunerativeearlyinvention’.The descriptionthat figuresinthe ‘Geraint ’ stipulationissatisfied(byEdward Williams).Theoneinthe ‘Gizmo’ stipulationisnot.Ifthe standard
³IclarifytheextenttowhichIthink ‘intuitive’ verdictslikethiscarryevidentialweightat pp.19–22ofDickie2015.
claim asIhavestateditistrue, ‘Geraint ’ referstoEdwardWilliams,and ‘Gizmo’ isanemptyname:diagnosesrepugnanttointuition.
Bytheendofthepaper,IshallhavearguedforapositionthatIthink bestexplainstheseobservations.The standardclaim isfalse.Anditisnot falsefortheunexcitingreasonthattheaccompanyingexplicitstipulation mightnotcapturethe ‘real’ reference-fixingdescriptionassociatedwitha namelike ‘TremulousHand’ , ‘Geraint’ ,or ‘Gizmo’.The standardclaim is falsebecausethemechanismofreference-fixingfortheseexpressionsis notsatisfactionalatall.
Thepaperisstructuredasfollows.§1developsageneralframework foraccountsofaboutness-fixingforourthoughtsaboutordinary things aframeworkwhichwillprovidethebasisforaccountsof reference- fixingforthesingulartermswestandardlyusetoexpress thesethoughts.§2usesthisframeworktooverturnthe standardclaim andmotivateanalternative,non-satisfactional,accountofhowdescriptivelymediatedaboutness-fixingandreference- fixingwork §3develops theresponsetothe singularity controversythatIwanttopropose.§4considerstheconsequencesofthe§§1–3discussionforarightaccountof whatspeakerandhearercommitthemselvestowhenthespeakermakes, andtheheareracceptsa ⌜Let α refertothe Ψ⌝ stipulation.
Ishouldaddthat,fascinatingasdescriptivenamesareintheirown right,Itakemuchoftheinterestofthetopictoderivefromhowit fits intothewiderpictureofourthoughtandspeechaboutordinaryparticularthings.Ihaveallowededitorialdecisionsaboutwhichdetailsto developandwhichtoelidetobeguidedbythisview.
1.1Aboutnessandjustification
Thissectionintroducesaframeworkforaccountsofaboutness-fixingfor ourthoughtsaboutordinarythings thingsliketables,dogs,trees,and people.⁴ Togettheframeworkinplace,Ishallconcentrateonwhathave traditionallybeentakentobethecentralinstancesofsuchthoughts:the perceptualdemonstrativeandproper-name-basedcases,illustratedby Cases4 and 5 respectively
⁴ ThissectionpresentsanalternativeversionoftheargumentofDickie2015:ch.2. Ileaveopentheextenttowhichthesamepictureappliestothoughtsaboutnon-ordinary things,forexample,bosons,numbers,orsystemsofgovernment.
Case4 ‘That’ Youarelookingatagrapefruitonatableinfrontofyou.The viewingconditionsaregood,andthesituationdevoidofcausalandcognitive perversities:youarehavinganordinaryperceptualexperience,causedbythe grapefruitinanordinaryway.Youformabodyofbeliefsyouwouldexpressby sayingthingslike ‘Thatisround’ , ‘Thatisrolling’ , ‘Thatisorange’ .
Case5 ‘AneurinBevan’ Youhavenotheardthename ‘AneurinBevan’ before. SomebodybeginstoexplainwhoBevanwas: ‘AneurinBevanwasaBritish LabourPartypolitician.Hewasalong-standingmemberofparliament,anda cabinetministerinthe1940sand50s.Hewasinstrumentalinthefoundationof Britain’sNationalHealthService.’ Nothingaboutthesituationleadsyoutodoubt yourinformant’sreliability.Youtaketheutterancesatfacevalue,formingabody ofbeliefsyouwouldexpressusing ‘AneurinBevan’ .
Ineachofthesecases,Itakeitthatitisobviouswhichindividualyour beliefsareabout.In Case4 theyareaboutthegrapefruityouarelooking at;in Case5 theyareaboutthepoliticianAneurinBevan.Buttosaythat yourbeliefsareabouttheseindividualsisasyettosaynothingabout whatmakesitthecase thatthesearetheindividualstheyareabout.This sectiondevelopsanewanswertothis ‘Whatmakesitthecase?’ question. Thenewanswerisbuiltaroundaprinciplederivedfromtwofurther principleswhichItaketobebasic,oneconnectingaboutnessandtruth, theothertruthandjustification:
Principleconnectingaboutnessandtruth Ifan<α is Φ>beliefis aboutobject o,itistrueiff o is Φ. ⁵ (IfmybeliefthatJackhas fleasis aboutmydog,itistrueiffhehas fleas.)
Principleconnectingtruthandjustification Justificationistruthconducive;ingeneralandallowingexceptions,ifyourbeliefisjustified, youwillbeunluckyifitisnottrueandnotmerelyluckyifitis.
Giventheseprinciples,itwillbesurprisinganddisappointingifwe cannotcuttheintermediatetermandobtainathirdprincipleconnecting aboutnessandjustification aprinciplecapturingthesignificancefor accountsofaboutness-fixingand,therefore,forthetheoryofreferenceof thefactthatjustificationistruth-conducive.Therestofthissection arguesforsuchaprincipleasapplicabletotheperceptualdemonstrative
⁵‘An<α is Φ>belief ’ shouldbereadasanabbreviationfor ‘Abeliefstandardly expressedbyasentenceofform ┌ α is Φ ┐’ ‘Φ’/‘ <Φ>’ and ‘Φ’ arebracedtogether: Φ expressesconceptualrepresentation<Φ>ofproperty Φ.
andproper-name-basedcases.Thenextsectionextendsthediscussion tothecaseofdescriptivenames.
Asa firststeptowardsthe aboutnessandjustification principlethat Iwanttopropose,notetwofeaturesthat Cases4 and 5 haveincommon. Ineachcase,youaremaintainingabodyofbeliefswhichyoutreatas aboutasinglething.Andineachthebodyofbeliefsisassociatedwith whatIshallcalla ‘proprietary ’ meansofjustification:ameansof justificationwhichyoutreatastrumpingothermeans.Thefactthatin eachcaseyouaretreatingtheresultingbodyofbeliefsasaboutasingle thingshowsitselfinthewaysyouarepreparedtoallowittodevelop. Forexample,whenyoubelieve<Thatisround>and<Thatisrolling>in Case4,youareautomaticallypreparedtomoveto<Thatisroundand rolling>,withoutlookingforevidencethattheroundthingandthe rollingthingarethesame.Andasyoumaintainyourgrowingbodyof <AneurinBevan>beliefs,youautomaticallyguardagainstovertcontradictions,revisingyourbeliefsorreinterpretingorrejectingincoming testimonytoavoid<Bevanwas Φ>and<Bevanwasnot Φ>combinations.⁶ In Case4,theproprietarymeansofjustificationisuptakefrom yourattentionalperceptuallinkwiththegrapefruit.In Case5 itiscareful uptakefromthestreamof ‘AneurinBevan’ testimony.Abodyofbeliefs unitedbythe treatedbythesubjectasaboutthesamething relationmay cometoincludebeliefsnotjustifiedbytheassociatedproprietarymeans. Buttheproprietarymeansismarkedoutbyits ‘trumping’ status: ‘Actuallyit’smadeofglassandwillshatterifitfalls’ Itellyou,aswewatchthe grapefruittowhichwearejointlyattendingrollalong.Youhaveno reasontodoubtwhatIsay,andforma<Thatisfragile>belief,justified byuptakefrommytestimony.Butwhenyouseethegrapefruitfall fromaheightontothehardwood fl oorandrollaway,perception trumpstestimonyandthe<Thatisfragile>beliefisdiscarded.⁷
⁶ Abodyofbeliefstreatedbythesubjectasaboutasinglethingiswhatsomephilosopherscalla ‘mental file’—seeRecanati2012forarecentandthoroughdiscussion. IexplainmyownabstinencefromuseofthistermintheappendixtoDickie(forthcoming).
⁷ IprovideamoredetaileddiscussionofthenotionofproprietaryjustificationatDickie 2015:50–2.Therearevariousoptionstoexploreindecidinghowtoextendthetreatmentof thisnotiontoallowfor ‘mixed’ caseswhereasinglebodyofbeliefsisassociatedwith differentproprietarymeansofjustificationatdifferenttimes,orwithtwomeansof justificationthatcarryequalweight.Onthequestionofwhatcountsasa ‘ means ’ or ‘method’ ofjustification,seenote9.
The aboutnessandjustification principlethatIamgoingtopropose connectstheaboutnessofabodyofbeliefstreatedbythesubjectasabout asinglethingwithwhatIshallcall ‘justificatoryconvergence’ forthe associatedproprietarymeansofjustification:
Principleconnectingaboutnessandjustification(initialapproximate version) Abodyofbeliefstreatedbythesubjectasaboutsomesingle thingisaboutobject o iffitsproprietarymeansofjustificationconvergeson o,making o theuniqueobjectwhosepropertiesthesubject willbeunluckytogetwrongandnotmerelyluckytogetrightin justifyingbeliefsinthisway.
Hereisaparallelcasetoconsolidatewhatthe aboutnessandjustification principlesays.Supposethatanastronomer,hereafter ‘A’,iscompilinga reportfromthedatadeliveredbyatelescopefocusedonobject o inthe nightsky. A hasverifiedthatthetelescopeisbothfocusedandworkingas itshould.Thetelescopedeliversastreamofdata:detectionofmotion; detectionof fluctuatingtemperature;andsoon. A compilesherreport: ‘It’smoving.Itstemperatureis fluctuatingbetweensuch-and-such values ... ’.Thefactthatthetelescopeisfocusedon o doesnotentail thatthereportwillget o ’spropertiesright.Butitdoesentailthatthe reportwillget o ’spropertiesrightunlesssomeunluckyspoiler adirty mirror;deviantbehaviouron o ’spart intervenes.The aboutnessand justification principletreatstheaboutnessofourordinarybeliefsabout ordinarythingsaswhatIshallcall ‘cognitivefocus’:thefactthatabody ofjustifiedbeliefsisaboutanobjectdoesnotentailthatalloranyofthem willmatchtheobject.Itdoesentailthatifabeliefaboutanobjectis justifiedyetdoesnotmatchwhattheobjectislike,someunluckyspoiler hasgotintheway.
Toreachanofficialstatementofthe aboutnessandjustification principle,wemustsaysomethingmorepreciseaboutthenotionsofbeing ‘unlucky ’ togetanobject’spropertieswrong,and ‘notmerelylucky’ to getthemright.Thisinturnrequirestakingastandonhowtoprecisify theunderlyingprincipleconnectingtruthandjustification.Itakeitthat someversionofthisprincipleisinescapable:itispartoftheconceptof theoreticaljustification justificationforbelief thatformingjustified beliefsis,ingeneralandallowingexceptions,awaytoformtruebeliefs:if PhilosopherAshowsthatPhilosopherB’saccountofwhatitisfora belieftobejustifiedentailsthatnothinghasgonewrongincaseswherea
justifiedbeliefisnottrue,AwinsandBmustgobacktothedrawing board.Butthe(inescapable)claimthatwemustacceptsomeversionof the truthandjustification principleleavescompletelyopenexactlywhich versionistobepreferred.Itisobviouslynotpossibletodojusticetothe intricaciesinwhichthisquestionisembrangledinasectionofapaperon somethingelse.Soratherthanattemptingtoargueforaspecificversion oftheprinciple,IshallrestwithstatingtheversionthatIamgoingto employ.(Perhapsthereisnooneversionofthisprinciplewhichistobe preferredforallexplanatorypurposes.Inanycase,thoughIamnot confidentastowhetherthereisadefinitiveprecisificationoftheconnectionbetweentruthandjustification,Iamconfidentthattheargument Iamabouttodevelopcouldbereconstructed,withsuitableadjustments, aroundthevariousalternatives.Theresulting aboutnessandjustification principlemightitselflookalittledifferentfromtheprinciplethatIshall propose.Thesedifferenceswillnotmatterforthepurposesofthispaper.)
Theversionofthe truthandjustification principlethatIshallsuppose takesitsrisefromtheobservationthatthecognitivecapacitiesatour disposalforthepurposesofformingjustifiedbeliefsarelimitedrelative tothecomplexityofourenvironment,andthatthereare,therefore, manymorewaysabeliefmightfailtobetruethanwehavetheresources toruleoutaswegoaboutourbelief-formingbusiness.
Forexample,considermycurrentbelief,formedbyuptakefrom perception,thatpeopleareridingbicyclespastthewindow.Mypathto thisbeliefisinconsistentwithmanywaysitmightfailtobetrue.Ifweset asidepossibilitiesinwhichIambeingtakeninbysomedeviousor unusualfeatureofthesituation,mypathtothebeliefrulesoutthe possibilitythatwhatisoutsideisasix-lanehighwaydevoidofbicycle traffic;thepossibilitythatIaminfactstaringatablankwallratherthana three-dimensionalbicycle-containingstreetscene;andmanymore besides.Butingesturingtowardsthe ‘beliefnottrue’ scenariosthatmy pathtothebelief does ruleout,wehavealreadyconcededthatthereare othersuponwhichitissilent.Theseare ‘devious’ or ‘unusual’ scenarios ofthekindthatweresetasidepreliminarytothegesture:thepossibility thatthethingspassingafewfeetawayarecarsdisguisedtolooklike bicyclestoavoidthecity’scongestioncharge;thepossibilitythatrather thanlookingthroughawindowIamlookingatthelastinaseriousof disguisedandperfectlyalignedmirrors,andthepeopleonbicyclesfrom whommyperceptualexperiencederivesareinfactbehindmeand
severalblocksaway.Thoughthereis,onthefaceofthings,nothinginmy pathtobeliefthatrulesoutthesedeviousorunusualscenarios,Iwould not,inordinarylife,beregardedasunderarequirementtoholdback fromformingmy<Peopleareridingpastonbikes>beliefuntilIhad gatheredevidencetoexcludethem.Insituationsliketheonedescribed,it isbaddoxasticpracticetoholdoutforevidencethatexcludesarcaneand unusual,aswellashumdrumandcommonplacebelief-not-truecircumstances.Asubjectwithordinaryhumaninformation-processingcapacitieswhoinsistsonrulingouteventhemostarcanenot-ppossibilities beforebelievingthatpwillbetoosluggishacognitiveoperatorto flourish inourrapidlychangingworld.
Theelementsoftheprecise truthandjustification principlethatI shallsupposecanbeabstractedfromthediscussionofthisexample.Ishall supposethatabeliefisjustifiedonlyifformedbyaroutethateliminates somereasonablerangeofcircumstancesinwhichthebeliefisnottrue, where ‘elimination’ isdefinedasfollows:
Definition aroutetotheformationofabelief ‘eliminates’ acircumstanceiffthefactthatthebeliefisformedbythisrouteisincompatible withthecircumstance(sothatthefactthatthebeliefisformedbythis routeentailsthatthecircumstanceisnotactual).⁸
Ishallannextheterm ‘rational’ todescribebeliefsliketheoneinthe example,justifiedbyaroutethateliminatesasufficientrangeand proportionofthewaysthebeliefmightfailtobetruethatitwould havebeenbadpracticetoholdoutforfurtherjustificationbeforeformingthebelief:
⁸ Thedefinitionpresupposessomewayofindividuatingroutestobeliefformation. Philosopherswithreductionistagendaswhowishtoexplaintraditionalepistemicnotions (like ‘justification’ and ‘knowledge’)intermsofnotionslike ‘routetobeliefformation’ and ‘reliability’ takenaspriorfacenotoriousdifficultiesinsayinghowroutestobeliefformation aretobeindividuatedwithoutusingtheepistemicnotionsthatarethetargetofthe reductionistexplanation.Thisisthe ‘problemofindividuationofmethods’ forreductive reliabilism(sometimescalledthe ‘generalityproblem’).Forin-depthdiscussionanda pessimisticsurveyofsolutionsavailabletoareductivereliabilistseeConeeandFeldman 1998.Thisauthorhasnoreductionistagenda,andtakesthenotionofthe ‘route’ bywhicha beliefisformedtobeexplicablepartlyintermsoftheaspectsofthecausalstorybehindthe belief ’sformationthatcontributetoitshavingthekindofjustificationitdoes.Areaderwho does haveareductionistreliabilistagendaisinvitedtoplughisorherownpreferred solutiontotheproblemoftheindividuationofmethodsintothedefinition.
Definition abeliefis ‘rational’ iffitisformedbyacarefulenough justification-conferringroute.
AndIshallintroduceanotionof ‘rationalrelevance ’ definedasfollows:
Definition ConsiderbeliefBformedbysubjectS.AB-not-true circumstanceis ‘rationallyirrelevant’ toS’sformationofBiffitneed notbeeliminatedbyS’sjustificationforBinorderforthisjustificationtosecureB’srationality.AB-truecircumstanceis ‘rationally irrelevant ’ toS’sformationofBiffitisoneinwhichrationalitysecuring-justificationforthebeliefwouldfailtosecurethebelief ’ s statusasnot-merely-luckilytrue.Acircumstanceis ‘rationallyrelevant’ toS’sformationofBiffitisnotrationallyirrelevant.
(Forexample,thecircumstanceinwhichthethingsIamlookingatare carsdisguisedasbicyclesisarationallyirrelevantbelief-not-truecircumstance.AcircumstanceinwhichIam(thoughIdonotrealizeit)looking atthereflectionsofdistantcyclists,butthereare also cyclists,unseenby me,goingpastbehindthemirrorjustafewfeetawayisarationally irrelevantcircumstancewheremybeliefhappenstobetrue.)
Giventheseelements,theversionofthe truthandjustification principlethatIamgoingtosupposecanbestatedasfollows(capitalization signalsofficialstatus):
Justificationthatsecurestherationality ofabeliefeliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewherethe beliefisnottrue.
Itakethenotionsof ‘rationality’ and ‘rationalrelevance’ thatIhaveintroducedtobecorrelativetothatofknowledge:atruebeliefformedby rationality-securingmeanscountsasknowledgeiffthecircumstancein whichitisformedisrationallyrelevant.Ialsotakethenotionof ‘rational relevance’ tobecorrelativetothe ‘virtuereliabilist’ notionofa ‘manifestation’ oftrue-belief-formingcompetence.Anexerciseoftrue-belief-forming competence ‘manifests’ thecompetenceiffitgeneratesatruebelief,and doessoinvirtueofbeinganexerciseofthecompetence,ratherthanin somewaythatleavesthebelief ’struthamerematterofluck. ⁹ Inthese
⁹ Thenotionof ‘manifestation’ isaprimitiveofSosa’svirtuereliabilistframework.(See Sosa2015:ch.2forarecentandcarefuldevelopment.)Thesuggestionisthataperformance
terms,arationallyirrelevantcircumstanceisonewhereabeliefformed bythe exercise ofatrue-belief-formingcompetenceneverthelessfails to manifest thecompetence(leavingitamatterofluckwhetherthe beliefistrue).
Combiningtheseelements,wegetthepreciseversionofthe aboutness andjustification principleforwhichIamabouttoargue:
Abodyofbeliefstreatedbysubject Sasaboutasinglethingisabout o iffitsproprietarymeansofjustification convergeson o sothat,forall<Φ>,ifShasproprietaryrationalitysecuringjusti fi cationforthebeliefthat<α is Φ>,thisjustification eliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewhere o isnot Φ. ¹⁰
isabiconditionalconnectingaboutness andaprecisifiednotionofjustificatoryconvergence:
AboutnessJustificatoryconvergence , S’s<α>beliefs areabout o Forall<Φ>,ifShasproprietaryrationality-securingjustificationforbelieving<α is Φ>,thisjustificationeliminates everyrationallyrelevantcircumstancewhere o isnot Φ.
Toprovethebiconditional,weshallestablisheachdirection(left-toright;right-to-left)inturn.
Hereisanargumentfortheleft-to-rightdirection(fromaboutnessto justificatoryconvergence):
Suppose
1 S’sbeliefthat<α is Φ>isabout o.
Addthe aboutnessandtruth principle:
2 IfS’sbeliefthat<α is Φ>isaboutanobject,thebeliefistrueiffthat objectis Φ. manifestsacompetenceiffitiscausallyderivedfromthecompetenceinawaythatinvolves nodeviantcausalchains,wheretheright-handsideofthisbiconditionalisnottobe regardedasexplanatorilypriortotheleft:causalderivationofperformancefromcompetencewithoutadeviantcausalchainisjustwhatthereisincasesofmanifestation.
¹⁰ Thequantifieroverpropertyrepresentations(‘forall<Φ>’)rangesoverthe<Φ>such thattheproprietarymeansofjustificationmightdeliveran ‘ <α is Φ>’ or ‘ <α isnot Φ>’ verdict.IexplainthisinmoredetailatDickie2015:59and199–211.
1 and 2 entail
3 S’sbeliefthat<α is Φ>istrueiff o is Φ.
Add
:
4 Justificationthatsecuresabelief ’srationalityeliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewherethebeliefisnottrue.
3 and 4 entail
5 Justificationthatsecurestherationalityofthebeliefthat<α is Φ> eliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewhere o isnot Φ.
Sowehavetheleft-to-rightdirectionofthe
biconditional:
6 IfS’s<α is Φ>beliefisabout o,justificationthatsecurestherationalityof thebeliefeliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewhere o isnot Φ.
Theargumentfortheotherdirectionofthebiconditional(wherethere isjustificatoryconvergencethereisaboutness)isaproofby reductio:
Suppose
1 Itisnotsufficient,forS’s<α>beliefstobeabout o,thattheirproprietarymeansofjustificationconvergeon o.
Given 1,thefollowingcombinationiscoherent.Shasproprietary rationality-securingjustificationforbelieving<α is Φ>.Thereisnothing deviousinterferingwiththe ‘detectionof Φ-instantiation’ aspectofS’ s pathtothebelief:informingthebelief,Smanifestscompetenceat detectionofthepresenceofsome Φ-instantiatingobject. o istheobject uponwhichtheproprietarymeansofjustificationforS’s<α>beliefs converges,soS’smanifestationof Φ-detectingcompetenceispicking uponwhether o is Φ.But,becauseofthefailureofsomeextra conditiononaboutness someconditionaboveandbeyondjustificatory convergence S’s<α is Φ>beliefisnotabout ο.
2 Inthescenariojustdescribed,S’scircumstanceiseitherrationally relevanttoherformationofthe<α is Φ>belief,oritisrationallyirrelevant.
Buttheelementsalreadyinplacegenerateanargumentfor 3:
3 ThecircumstanceisnotrationallyrelevanttoS’sformationofthebelief.
Supposethat 3 isfalse thecircumstanceisrationallyrelevant. 1 specifiesthat o istheobjectuponwhichS’sjustificationforthebeliefconverges. Sotheleft-to-rightdirectionofthebiconditional,justestablished,entails
thatifS ’sbeliefsareabout anything,theyareabout o . 1 alsospeci fies thatS ’s<α>beliefsarenotabout o.Theyare,therefore,aboutnothing, inwhichcasetheyarenottrue.Inaddition,thedefinitionof ‘elimination’ entailsthatasubject’sjusti ficationforabeliefnevereliminates theactualcircumstance thecircumstanceinwhichthebeliefis formed.Soifwesupposethattheactualcircumstanceisrationally relevant,wearesupposingthatShasrationality-securingjustification forthebeliefthat< α is Φ>whichleavesuneliminatedarationally relevantcircumstanceinwhichthebeliefisnottrue.But
saysthatrationally-securingjustifi cationforabelief eliminateseveryrationallyrelevantcircumstancewherethebeliefis nottrue.Contradiction.¹¹
Andtheelementsalreadyinplacealsogenerateanargumentfor 4: 4 ThecircumstanceisnotrationallyirrelevanttoS’sformationofthe belief.
Toseetheargumentfor 4,note firstthatthecircumstanceisnot rationallyirrelevanttoS’sformationofthecorrespondingbeliefthat <Somethingis Φ>.Forinthecircumstanceasdescribed,thereisnothing deviousinterferingwithS’sdetectionof Φ-instantiation:informinga <Somethingis Φ>beliefonthebasisofthemeansof Φ-detectionthat underpinsproprietaryjustificationforher<α is Φ>belief,Swouldbe manifestingtrue-belief-formingcompetence,andacircumstancein whichformationofabeliefbyrationality-securingmeansmanifests true-belief-formingcompetence justis acircumstancerationallyrelevant tothebelief ’sformation.
Giventhatthecircumstanceisrationallyrelevanttoformationofthe beliefthat<Somethingis Φ>,todeny 4 istoendorsethepossibilityofthe followingcombination:
Acircumstancerationally irrelevant toformationofthebeliefthat <α is Φ>mayberationally relevant toformationofthebeliefthat <Somethingis Φ>.
¹¹Thereisinfactaloopholeinthisargument.Theenvisagedincoherentcaseisacase wherethereisauniqueobjectuponwhichjustificationconverges,andyetaboutnessfails. Sotheargumentissilentaboutcaseswherejustificationconvergeson morethanone object. IclosethisloopholeatDickie2015:52–3(downanddirtyversion)and65–72(fullversion, includingconnectiontoStrawson’s(1959)puzzleabout ‘massivereduplication’).
Andtoendorsethispossibilityistosupposethattheconditionsforthe rationalityofa<Somethingis Φ>beliefmightbemoredemandingthan thosefortherationalityofthecorresponding<α is Φ>belief.For example,itistosupposethatitmightberationaltobelieve<Thatis square>byuptakefromaperceptuallink,butirrationaltobelieve <Somethingissquare>onthesamejustification(becausetherationality ofthe<Somethingissquare>beliefrequirestheeliminationofextra ‘nothingsquarethere’ circumstances circumstancesthatmustbe guardedagainstifitistoberationaltomoveto<Somethingis Φ>on thebasisofperception,butmaybeignoredinmovingto<Thatis Φ>). Andthisjustgetsthingsthewrongwayaround.Acrossthetargetrange ofcases caseslike Cases4 and 5 fromthestartofthissection asubject rationallyentitledtobelieve<α is Φ>isautomaticallyrationallyentitled tobelieve<Somethingis Φ>too.(Therearecaseswheresomephilosopherswoulddenytheparallelclaim.Forexample,somepeopledeny thatbeliefs ‘about’ fictionalcharactersareexistentiallycommitting, maintainingthat<SherlockHolmeslivesat221bBakerSt.>doesnot entail<Someonelivesat221bBakerSt.>,andthatasubjectmightbe justifiedinbelievingthe firstbutnotthesecond.Buttheseandother instanceswherethevalidityoftheinferencefrom<α is Φ>to<Somethingis Φ>isupfornegotiationlieoutsidethetargetrange.)
Havingestablished 3 and 4,wehaveeliminatedbothdisjunctsof 2. Butthechoiceat 2 isgeneratedbyasituationwhosecoherenceisentailed by 1,so 1 mustberejected,givingus 5:
5 IftheproprietarymeansofjustificationforS’s<α>beliefsconverges on o,thesebeliefsareabout o.
With
inplace,wehaveablueprintfor answeringthe ‘Whatmakesitthecase?’ questionsabout Cases4 and 5 thequestionsofwhatmakesitthecasethatyourbeliefsareaboutthe grapefruitandthepoliticianrespectively.Ineachcase,theaccountof howaboutness-fixingworkswillbeanaccountofhowtheresulting beliefsarejustified,combinedwithanaccountoftheconditionsunder whichthismeansofjustification themeansofjustificationproprietary tothebodyofbeliefs convergesonaparticularthing.¹²
¹²Ideveloptheblueprintforthecasesofperceptualdemonstrativeandproper-namebasedthoughtinDickie2015,chapters4and5respectively.
Therearemanyquestionsofdetailaboutexactlyhowthisblueprintis tobe filledin.Andaraftoffurtherquestionsconcernhowtheresulting accountsofaboutness- fixingforourperceptualdemonstrativeand proper-name-basedthoughtswilldovetailwithaccountsoflinguistic competencetodeliveraccountsofreference-fixingfordemonstratives andpropernames.Butratherthanpursuethesequestionshere,Iwant nowtoturntothemaintopicofthispaper descriptivenameslike ‘TremulousHand’,andthethoughtsweusethemtoexpress.
1.2Descriptivenamesintheaboutness andjustificationframework
Theprevioussectionusedthecasesofperceptualdemonstrativeand proper-name-basedthoughttomotivateaframeworkforaccountsof aboutness-fixingforourthoughtsaboutordinarythings.Thissection extendsthediscussiontocasesinvolvingdescriptivenames.
The firststepstowardsthisextensioncanbereadoffthestructural parallelsbetweentheperceptualdemonstrativeandproper-name-based cases,illustratedby Cases4 and 5,andcaseslike Case1 ‘Tremulous Hand’ . Likethosein Cases4 and 5,subjectsin Case1 seemtobeinthe businessofusingaproprietarymeansofjustificationtodevelopbodiesof beliefthattheytreatasaboutasingleparticularthing.Theproprietary meansofjustificationinthiscaseinvolvesdeploymentofthedescription associatedwiththename.Thecoregroup¹³ofspeakersusethisdescriptiontoharvestinformationfromthevandalizedmanuscripts,looking forevidencefor<Theauthoroftheglosseswas Φ>beliefs,and,gathering theresulting< ... is Φ>claimsintoabodiesofbeliefswhichtheywould affirm,ifasked,tobe ‘about’ TremulousHand.
Giventhesestructuralparallels,wecanseehowthe
frameworkdevelopedintheprevioussection would applytothecaseslike Case1.Thesuggestionwouldbethatgraspofa descriptionmakesavailableameansofjustificationforabodyofbeliefs: usethedescriptiontoharvestinformationwhichyouthenbundletogether asaboutaparticularthing.Theresultingbodyofbeliefs standardly
¹³Obviouslytheremightalsobe ‘deferential’ users,whoareignorantoftheassociation betweenthenameandthedescription.
expressedusingadescriptivename isaboutobject o iff o istheobject uponwhichthismeansofjustificationconverges:theobjectwhosepropertiesthesubjectwillbeunluckytogetwrongandnotmerelyluckytoget rightinformingabodyofbeliefsjustifiedinthisway.
Butwhythinkthataboutness-fixingforthebeliefsweexpressusing descriptivenamesinfact does workinsomethinglikethisway?
Onereasonisthattheargumentfor asapplicableintheperceptualdemonstrativeandproper-name-based casesapplies,withafewwrinkles,¹⁴ tothecaseofdescriptivenamestoo. Anotheristhattheresultingviewgeneratesimprovementsonboth extantdiscussionsofwhethertherecanbe,asIshallsay ‘descriptively mediatedsingularthoughts’,andaccountsofhow ⌜Let α refertothe Ψ⌝ stipulationsworkinconversationalcontexts.(Idevelopthesepointsin §3and§4respectively.)Athirdreasonisthatthe
-basedaccountexplainstheintuitiveverdictssurrounding theproblemcasesfromthestartofthepaper caseswhichseemtoshow thatadescriptivenamemayrefertoanobjectthatdoesnotsatisfythe associateddescription,andfailtorefereventhoughtheassociated descriptionissatisfied.ThisisthelineofthoughtIshalldevelopinthis section.(Ishouldstressthatitisonlyincombinationwiththeothertwo reasonsthatIthinkthestoryIamabouttotellcountsasthe best explanationforthephenomena.)
Recall Cases2 and 3 fromthestartofthepaper.
Case2: ‘GerainttheBlueBard’ ‘GerainttheBlueBard’ wasusedforovera hundredyearsasanamefortheotherwiseunidentifiedauthorofaseriesofsongs inmedievalWelsh,dealingwithmedievalthemes,andemployingmedieval metres ...
Case3: ‘Gizmo’ X,thenowagedheadofamanufacturingcompany,likesto boasttohisunderlingsabout ‘thegizmothatstarteditall’,withstrongsuggestionsthathewashimselfthisthing’sinventor.Theunderlingsintroduce ‘Gizmo’ withthestipulation ‘Let “Gizmo” refertoX’smostremunerativeearlyinvention’ , andsetabouttryingto findoutwhichthingitwas
Theintuitiveverdictin Case2 wasthatthescholars’ <Geraint>beliefs wereaboutnobody,eventhoughthedescriptionassociatedwith ‘Geraint’ issatisfied inparticular,thebeliefswerenotaboutEdwardWilliams,
¹⁴ Thewrinklesconcerntheuniquenessclaimdiscussedinnote12.
eventhoughhewasthedescription’ssatisfier.Theverdictin Case3 was thatGizmo thethingtheunderlingsaretryingto findoutabout does not,afterall,satisfythe ‘Gizmo’ description.Ishallconsiderhowthe
frameworkpredictseachoftheseresults inturn.
Consider Case2 ‘Geraint’,andconsiderhowscholarsworkingbefore thediscoveryoftheforgeryjustifytheir<Geraint>beliefs.Wecan imagineScholarAarguingthatGerainthadseenamanuscriptofthe LifeofStCuthbert likethis: ‘Thereisstrongevidenceinthesongsthat Gerainthasreadthe LifeofStCuthbert.Intheninthcentury,theonly copiesofthe LifeofStCuthbert inexistenceweremanuscriptcopies.So Gerainthadseenamanuscriptcopy.’ Now,bythenineteenthcentury, thereweremanymanymoreprintcopiesofthe LifeofStCuthbert than manuscriptcopies.ButsupposethatEdwardWilliams,thesatisfierofthe ‘Geraint’ description,infactdidseeoneoftheraremanuscriptcopies. DoesanythinginScholarA’spathtohis<Geraintsawamanuscript copy>belieftendtoruleoutsituationsinwhichEdwardWilliamsdid notseeamanuscriptcopy(makingthematchbetweenScholarA’sbelief andapropertyhadbyEdwardWilliamsmorethanjustamatterofluck)? Theanswertothisquestionis ‘No’:ScholarA’sjustificationforthis <Geraintwas Φ>beliefsecuresthebelief ’srationality,butleavesita matterofluckwhetherEdwardWilliamswas Φ.And,giventheassociatedproprietarymeansofjustification,thisconclusionappliestothe scholars’ <Geraint>beliefsingeneral:itwillbeamatterofspectacular chanceifabodyof<Geraint>beliefsjustifiedbythemethodthescholars areusingmatcheswhatEdwardWilliamswaslike.So,given
,thesuggestionthatthescholars’ beliefsareabout EdwardWilliamsiswrong.
Nowconsider Case3 ‘Gizmo’.Inthesituationasenvisaged,thestory developssomethinglikethis.Thenameisintroducedusingthestipulation ‘Let “Gizmo” refertoX’smostremunerativeearlyinvention’.The underlingssetabouttheirinvestigation,combingthe financialrecords fromthe firm ’searlydays;studyingX’soldsketchbooksintheattemptto datevariousinventions;andsoon.Astheinvestigationunfolds, financial-record-combingprovesamuchmorefruitfullineofinquiry thanX’s-sketchbook-trawling,sothatthesketchbook-trawlingisleft behindasawayofarrivingat<Gizmo>beliefs.Inthisway,theunderlingsendupwithbodiesofbeliefwhosemeansofjustificationconverges
onanobject therattrapuponwhichtheirinvestigationsarehoming in whichdoesnotsatisfytheinitialaboutness-mediatingdescription.
Sothe
frameworkexplainsthe Case2 and Case3 intuitions,anddoessointermsofaprincipleforwhichthere isanindependent,from-first-principlesargument.Butthereisanobviousobjectiontomovingfromheretotheconclusionthatthemechanism foraboutness-fixingthatunderpinsourusesofdescriptivenamesisnot satisfactional.Theobjectormaintainsthatthereference-fixingmechanismatworkinthecasesIhaveconsidered is satisfactional itisjustthat therespective ⌜Let α refertothe Ψ⌝ stipulationsdonotcapturethe ‘real’ aboutness-fixingdescriptions.Forexample,thesuggestionmightbethat inthe ‘Geraint’ casethe ‘real’ aboutness-fixingdescriptionis ‘theninthcenturyauthoroftheseballads’—adescriptionthatEdwardWilliams doesnotsatisfy,andthatinthe ‘Gizmo’ casethe ‘real’ descriptionisone thattherattrap does satisfy—‘the firm ’smostremunerativeearlypatent’ .
IshallgivethereplytothisobjectionwhichItaketobemosthelpfulfrom thepointofviewofaddingdetailtothealternative,non-satisfactional,view ofdescriptivelymediatedaboutness-fixingthatIwanttopropose.
Considerthefollowingcase:
Case6Whatwillsavethequeen? (fromaHansChristianAndersenstory)The queen,belovedofherpeople,issickandindangerofdeath.Asageadvisesthat thequeenwillbesavedifsheisshowntheloveliestroseintheworld.Thepeople embarkonacollectivesearch.At firsttheyarelookingfortherosebloomthatis themostaestheticallypleasing.However,theresultsofthesearchforsucha bloomleadthemtorealizethattheyneednottherose ‘loveliest’ inthenarrow aestheticsense,buttherosethatshowsforththemostlove.Sotheyconsiderroses that(intheworldofthestory)havegrownspontaneouslyfromthegravesof loversorsoldierswhohavegiventheirlivesfortheircountries.Whattheyuncover inthisphaseofthesearchleadsthemtodecidethatwhattheyarelookingforisnot aliteralrose.At firsttheythinkitisa ‘flowering’ ofhumancreativity,andlookfor thehumancreationwhichshowsforththemostloveonthepartofitscreator.But thesearchinthatdirectionleadsthembacktomoreeverydaypossibilities:therose ‘seenonthebloomingcheeks’ ofayoungchild,orthe ‘whiteroseofgrief ’ inthe faceofsomebodyworriedaboutsomebodybeloved.Finallytheirsearchleadsthem towhattheyhavebeenlookingforallalong:Christ(intheworldofthestory, visibletothefaithful,wheninasuitablestateofenlightenment,asanapparition springingrose-likefromthepagesofthe Bible).
Case6 illustratesafeatureofouroperationswithdescriptivenamesthat isalsopresent,inlessextremeform,in Case3 ‘Gizmo’:thedescription
aroundwhichtheproprietarymeansofjustificationforadescriptivename isbuiltisnotastaticparameterwhichmuststay fixedthroughoutthe courseofdevelopmentofanassociatedbodyofbeliefs.Rather,itiswhat Ishallcallan ‘outcomesensitive’ parameter.Theproprietarymeansof justificationassociatedwiththebodyofbeliefsstandardlyexpressible usingadescriptivenameistouseadescriptiontoharvestinformation, lookingforevidencefor<The Ψ is Φ>precursorbeliefs,andbundlingthe resulting< ... is Φ>informationintoabodyofbeliefsyoutreatasabouta singlething.Instructurallysimplecaseslike Case1 ‘TremulousHand’ and Case2 ‘Geraint’,thedescriptionplayingtheinformation-harvestingrole remainsstablethroughtheperiodoftheuseofthename.Butinmore complexcaseslike Case3 ‘Gizmo’ and Case6 ‘ ... thequeen’,thedescriptiveconditionusedtoharvestinformationshiftsastheactivityofmaintainingthebodyofbeliefsunfolds.Anelementofthedescriptivecondition thatisfrontandcentreatthebeginningoftheinvestigationfailstobear fruitsintheformofresulting< is Φ>beliefs,andisleftbehind:thisis whathappenstothe< wasinventedbyX>elementoftheinitial descriptiveconditionin Case3.Subjects’ understandingofkeyelements ofthe ⌜the Ψ⌝ descriptionshiftssothat,thoughthereiscontinuityintheir unfoldinginvestigation,eachstagemakingsenseinthelightofwhathas beenuncoveredatearlierones,thereisnosingledescriptivecondition whichcanreallybesaidtounderpinthewholecourseoftheinvestigation. Thisiswhathappensin Case 6.Anditiseasytoimaginefurtherdimensionsof fluidityassubjectsadjusttheirinvestigativetacticstomaintainthe productivityoftheinvestigationandthecoherenceofthebodyofbeliefsit generates.(Forexample,itmightbethatthe ‘TremulousHand’ investigationendsupdiscardingsomesubsetoftheinitialsetofglossesasapocryphal;orthattheinvestigationcomestotakeforgrantedtheclaimthat TremulousHandwasalsotheauthorofoneofthemajortextsinwhichthe marginaliaappear;or )
Oneoptionthatmightsuggestitselftosomeoneattractedbythe ‘find therealaboutness-fixingdescription’ strategyistoclaimthatthe ‘real’ descriptionwhosesatisfactionbyanobject fixestheaboutnessofthe bodyofbeliefsexpressedusingadescriptivenamecanchangeovertime. Butthiswillentailthatmanycasesthatwe want tosayinvolvethinking aboutthesamethingallalonginfactinvolve flippingbetweenaboutness andaboutnessfailure,andfromthoughtabout o tothoughtabout o*,as the ‘real’ aboutness-fixingdescriptionchanges.
Anotheroptionthatmightsuggestitselfistoraisethelevelofcognitive sophisticationofthesupposedaboutness- fi xingdescriptivecondition. Forexample,thesuggestionmightbethattheaboutness- fi xingdescriptiveconditioninanygivencaseissomethinglike<theobjectupon whichthemeansofjustificationintroducedbythis ⌜Let α refertothe Ψ⌝ stipulationconverges>.Giventheproposalofthelasttwosections,the objectthebeliefsareaboutwillbethesatisfierofthisdescription.Butitis afamiliarobservationthattoformulateadescriptionthatissatisfiedina caseofaboutnessisonething,andtoshowthatthedescriptionplaysan aboutness-fixingrolequiteanother.¹⁵ Andinthiscasethesuggestionthat theproposeddescriptionisplayinganaboutness-fixingroleisopentoan obviousresponsefromredundancy.Thesuggestionthatthisdescription isplayinganaboutness-fixingroleoweswhateverplausibilityithastothe argumentof§1.Butgiventhisargument,we already haveanaccountof whatmakesanobjecttheobjectthebodyofbeliefsexpressedusinga descriptivenameisabout:itisabouttheobjectonwhichtheassociated meansofjustificationconverges.Thereissimplynoaboutness-fixing workleftforthemeta-leveldescription<theobjectuponwhichthe associatedmeansofjustificationconverges>todo. SoIsuggestthatthereisagoodcasefortheconclusionthatthe mechanismofaboutness-fixingforthethoughtswestandardlyexpress usingdescriptivenamesis,thoughdescriptivelymediated,notsatisfactional.Thisproposalcanbeputasadistinctionbetweentruth-conditions forwhatIshallcall ‘descriptionbased’ thoughtsontheonehand,and ‘meredescriptive’ thoughtsontheother:
Meredescriptivethought Ameredescriptivethoughtthat<The Ψ is Φ> istrueiffwhateversatisfies<the Ψ>is Φ.
Description-basedthought Adescription-basedthoughtthat<α is Φ>, withaboutness fixingdescription<the Ψ>,istrueiff(i)thereissome o uponwhichtheassociateddescription-centredroutetojustification converges,and(ii)this o is Φ.
(Ishallreturntotheclaimthatthethoughtswe ‘standardly’ express usingdescriptivenamesaredescription-basedthoughtsin§4.)
¹⁵ CompareKripke1980:88.
