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The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations

The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers

Michelle Murray

1

1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Murray, Michelle K., author.

Title: The struggle for recognition in international relations : status, revisionism, and rising powers / Michelle Murray.

Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018017069 (print) | LCCN 2018021177 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190878917 (Updf) | ISBN 9780190878924 (Epub) | ISBN 9780190878900 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Unipolarity (International relations) | World politics. | United States—Foreign relations. | China—Foreign relations.

Classification: LCC JZ5588 (ebook) | LCC JZ5588.M87 2019 (print) | DDC 327.73—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018017069 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

For Chris

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix CHAPTER 1 Introduction: The Problem of Rising Powers in

International Politics 1 CHAPTER 2 The Struggle for Recognition: State Identity and

the Problem of Social Uncertainty in International Politics 29 CHAPTER 3 The Social Construction of Revisionism:

(Mis)Recognition and the Struggle for Major Power Status 53 CHAPTER 4 Weltpolitik: The German Aspiration for World Power

Status 87 CHAPTER 5 Recognition Refused: The Tragedy of German Naval

Ambition before the First World War 113 CHAPTER 6 Looking Outward: The American Aspiration for World

Power Status 141 CHAPTER 7 Recognition and Rapprochement: America’s Peaceful

Rise 167 CHAPTER 8 Conclusion: Rising Powers and the Future of the

International Order 191 References 225 Index 251

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T

his book is about how states depend on each other to become the kinds of actors they want to be in the international sphere. The same is true of individuals and this book would not have been possible without the support, insight, and guidance of many people whom I depended on along the way.

This book began as a dissertation that I completed at the University of Chicago. It is no exaggeration to say that Alex Wendt has had the most formative effect on me as a scholar and professor. I first met Alex as an undergraduate, when I approached him with an incoherent idea for a BA thesis that he patiently listened to and generously agreed to supervise. As chair of my dissertation committee, he played a significant role in helping me conceptualize this project and provided much needed intellectual guidance along the way. And perhaps most importantly, he was there every step of the way as I undertook the tedious task of turning a dissertation into a book, always willing to offer advice when I wasn’t sure what to do next and encouragement when I was feeling hopeless. He read countless drafts of chapters and his constructively critical eye helped me to understand my argument better, to think harder about my ideas, and to trust my instincts when I was plagued with self-​doubt. Alex’s intellectual imprint on this book is unmistakable and I hope he is proud of how it turned out.

But beyond this, it is because of him that I became a professor of international politics, and his example—​as a generous mentor who encourages his students to think creatively and for themselves—​is one I try to emulate with my students.

Charles Lipson has been a devoted advisor from the earliest days of graduate school and persistently encouraged me to think big about the

contribution of this project. His depth of knowledge on a wide range of topics shaped my thinking at important moments and his suggestion to consider the rise of the United States alongside Imperial Germany changed the direction of this book for the better. I am especially grateful to him for his open-​mindedness, exceptional insight, and unwavering belief in me.

Patchen Markell has been enthusiastic about this project from the beginning and his advice to listen for “productive tensions” in an argument and to make them interesting has had an immeasurable effect on both the argument of this book and how I think about politics more generally. I thank him for his intellectual generosity, incisive comments, and the inspiration I take from his own example.

I could not have finished this book without the support and guidance of Jennifer Mitzen. Jennifer generously read two drafts of the entire manuscript and gave me extensive quality feedback that dramatically improved the overall quality of the book. I am especially indebted to her for encouraging me to set aside my realist detractors and foreground my voice in the manuscript. And even more so, I am grateful to Jennifer for her mentorship and friendship over the past several years. As I progress in the profession, I continue to look to her as the example of an intelligent, generous, and strong woman working in the fields of international relations and security studies.

The international relations community at the University of Chicago is like no other and the years I spent there as a graduate student were some of the most intellectually rigorous and challenging of my scholarly career.

This was due in no small part to the amazing cohort of graduate students that sustained the intellectual life of the department and who were always ready and able (for better or for worse) to find the “fatal flaw” in any argument they encountered. For their support, friendship, and countless conversations I want to thank Bethany Albertson, Alex Downes, Todd Hall, Vaidya Gundlupet, Anne Holthoefer, Jenna Jordan, Adria Lawrence, Mara Marin, Chris McIntosh, Emily Meierding, Emily Nacol, Takayuka Nishi, Jonathan Obert, Neil Roberts, Keven Ruby, Jade Schiff, Frank Smith, Ian Storey, Lora Viola, and Joel Westra. A special thanks is due to Jonathan Caverley, Sebastian Rosato, and especially John Schuessler, who have been reliable sounding boards for my ideas, fierce critics when I needed them to be, and a source of encouragement—​both during graduate school and since.

I had the great fortune to spend a year in residence as a fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. The vibrant intellectual community and sense of collegiality

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Acknowledgements

at the Dickey Center inspired me as I finished drafting the manuscript. Thank you to Megan Becker, Dan Benjamin, Stephen Brooks, Jeff Friedman, Michelle Getchell, Jennifer Lind, Stephen Macekura, Jonathan Markowitz, Benny Miller, Daryl Press, Benjamin Valentino, and Riqiang Wu for the many conversations that made me think harder about my ideas and indelibly shaped this book for the better. I am especially grateful to Bill Wohlforth for his unwavering enthusiasm for this project and willingness to offer astute and insightful comments at critical moments in its development. I can attest that his reputation in the field as both a first-​rate scholar and a generous mentor to junior scholars is well deserved.

Many generous colleagues have read and commented on my work over the years at various workshops, conference presentations, and/​or as discussants. I would like to thank (again, in some cases): Jonathan Caverley, Christopher Daase, Michael Desch, Abigail de Uriarte, Marina Duque, Tanisha Fazal, Caroline Fehl, Anna Geis, Charles Glaser, Todd Hall, Anne Holthoefer, Michael Horowitz, Ian Hurd, Jacques Hymans, Mattias Iser, Lena Jaschob, Jenna Jordan, Jonathan Kirshner, Georgios Kolliarakis, Deborah Larson, Adria Lawrence, Christopher Layne, Thomas Lindemann, Dan Lindley, Charles Lipson, Chris McIntosh, John Mearsheimer, Jennifer Mitzen, Emily Nacol, Henry Nau, Jonathan Obert, Robert Pape, T.V. Paul, Erik Ringmar, Sebastian Rosato, Keven Ruby, Jade Schiff, John Schuessler, Frank Smith, Duncan Snidal, Ian Storey, Lora Viola, Srdjan Vucetic, Steven Ward, Alex Wendt, Joel Westra, and Reinhard Wolf. Audiences at conferences and workshops have asked important questions that helped me to sharpen my ideas and improve the main arguments of the book: American Political Science Association, Bard College Berlin, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Studies Association, Northwestern University, Ohio State University, Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES) at the University of Chicago, Program on International Security Policy (PISP) at the University of Chicago, and the University of Notre Dame.

Jennifer Mitzen and Alex Wendt kindly hosted a book manuscript workshop for me at Ohio State University. I am grateful that Bear Braumoeller, Marina Duque, Ben Kenzer, Kyle Larson, Adam Lauretig, Jennifer Mitzen, Lauren Muscott, Jayan Nair, Ezra Schricker, Randy Schweller, Alex Thompson, Linnea Turco, and Alex Wendt were willing to take time out of their busy schedules to read my manuscript and offer insightful comments. The day I spent talking with them about my ideas helped me to

Acknowledgements

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rethink key parts of the argument and energized me to make the final push to revise the manuscript.

Since coming to Bard College, I have been delighted to find a community of generous friends who have helped me navigate the highs and lows of writing and publishing a book and balancing the demands of teaching at a very intense liberal arts college. For your friendship and intellectual camaraderie, I thank Bill Dixon, Kevin Duong, Simon Gilhooley, James Ketterer, Pınar Kemerli, Peter Klein, Chris McIntosh and Allison McKim. Omar Encarnacion has been an invaluable resource in helping me to understand the book publishing process, to make important decisions, and to stay on track.

Research grants from the Bard Research Fund and the Office of the Dean at Bard College allowed me to make three trips to London to conduct archival research. A yearlong fellowship at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College enabled me to take a year of research leave to finish writing the book. In addition, the Political Studies and Global and International Studies programs at Bard College provided me with funds to hire two research assistants. Sam Abbott helped me sort through stacks of primary source documents and cheerfully offered to type out (nearly illegible) handwritten documents so they would be easier for me to use. Harper Zacharias not only formatted and copyedited the entire manuscript, but also gave me important comments that helped me clarify my ideas in the penultimate draft of the manuscript.

As a first-​time author, I feel lucky to have worked with Angela Chnapko at Oxford University Press. Throughout the process Angela has been an enthusiastic, dedicated, and patient editor to work with, always willing to provide feedback and take the time to explain what the next steps were.

Three well-​chosen, anonymous reviewers provided detailed and constructive comments on the manuscript, and the book is much better because of their suggestions. I also want to thank Alexcee Bechthold and the production team at Oxford University Press for helping to bring this book to fruition. Portions of ­chapters 2, 3, and 4 were published as “Identity, Insecurity and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” in Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656–​688. Parts of ­chapters 4 and 5 were published in “Constructing the July Crisis: The Practices of Recognition and the Making of the First World War,” in Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking an Ambivalent Concept in a Global Context, eds. Christopher Daase, Anna Geis, Caroline Fehl, and Georgios Kolliarakis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 68–​75.

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Last, but certainly not least, this book would not be possible without the constant love and support I have received from friends and family.

Emily Nacol, our friendship has given strength to me throughout graduate school, the tumult of the tenure track, and the—​at times unpredictable—​ publishing process. You have never failed to be there for me when I needed urgent advice, a simple pep talk, or just a distraction. Joan Murray has been a steadfast source of encouragement and I cherish the conversations we have had about politics (and life) over the years. My grandmother Gabriele has never wavered in her support of me and the strength and courage she has shown in her own life stands as an example I try to follow.

I am forever indebted to my sister Meagan for the support and friendship she always provides me. And to my niece Gabby and nephews Andy and Joey: you never fail to brighten my day and I look forward to every moment I get to spend with you. My parents, Jeremiah and Doris Murray, taught me throughout my life that I could do anything I set my mind to and their belief in my potential inspires me every day.

Finally, Chris McIntosh has been with me from the beginning of this journey and my greatest debt is to him. You read and commented on innumerable drafts of this book and endured even more (sometimes trying) conversations as I tried to figure out what I wanted to say. You uprooted your life, moved to the middle of nowhere with me, and put your scholarly career second to mine. Yet, through all of this you have not once complained or ever failed to unconditionally support me. The unwavering respect you have for me is one of the greatest gifts of my life and makes it possible for me to be the person I am. I thank you for your love, your friendship, and the life we have built together. This book is for you.

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The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations

CHAPTER 1

Introduction The Problem of Rising Powers in International Politics

“This is an historic moment,” declared President George H.W. Bush when announcing American military intervention in the Persian Gulf.

“We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order.”1 In Bush’s estimation the importance of American leadership in this moment was unparalleled and historically unique. The end of the Cold War had given way to a “unipolar moment” where US military, diplomatic, and economic power and influence could not be rivaled.2 As the system’s preeminent superpower, the United States used this opportunity to maintain and extend the liberal international order it constructed after the Second World War. The so-​called Pax Americana is anchored in a dense web of economic and political institutions and a complex network of dominant military power.3 Its vast military capabilities enable the United States to project its power throughout the world, weaken and isolate adversaries before they pose a serious threat, and provide public

George H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf,” January 16, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed June 24, 2016, http://​www.presidency.ucsb.edu/​ws/​?pid=19222. On the continuity of “new world order” discourse in American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, see Annita Lazar and Michelle M. Lazar, “The Discourse of the New World Order: ‘Out-​ Casting’ the Double Face of Threat,” Discourse and Society 15, no. 2–​3 (2004): 223–​242.

2 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/​1991): 23–​33; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–​41.

3 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Charles A. Kupchan, “Unpacking Hegemony: The Social Foundations of Hierarchical Order,” in Power, Order and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 48–​53.

1

goods by promoting free trade, human rights and the spread of democracy.

The economic and political institutions representative of this order allow states throughout the world to reap the benefits of globalization and reinforce for many a perception of the United States as a benign hegemon.

More than two decades into its unipolar moment, US hegemony appears to be robust: in absolute terms the United States remains at the apex of its military and economic power and continues to set the rules that govern the international system.4 As history demonstrates, however, this unipolar moment will inevitably come to an end as new great powers rise and challenge the prevailing international order.5 Thus, one of the key challenges facing the United States in the coming years concerns the economic and military rise of China.

China’s economy has grown at unprecedented levels since the launch of market reforms, and some analysts predict it could soon surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy.6 Along with this expanding economic reach has come a heightened voice and political influence in world affairs. Concomitantly, China has used its stunning economic growth to increase significantly its military spending. While US military spending is projected to stay flat or decrease, China’s military spending continues—​as it has for the past two decades—​to grow by double digits nearly annually, enabling it to acquire the technology necessary to project power beyond its borders and challenge American global preponderance.7 In short, China is emerging as both an economic and military rival of the United States; a

Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011/​2012): 41–​78; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-​First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no. 3 (2015/​2016): 7–​53.

5 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 5–​51; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 44–​79; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

6 Measured in purchasing power parity, the World Bank predicted China’s gross domestic product (GDP) would exceed the United States’ sometime in 2014. When converted into US dollars, China’s GDP is not expected to surpass the United States’ for several decades. Tom Wright, “China’s Economy Surpassing the US? Well, Yes and No,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2014.

7 “At the Double: China’s Military Spending,” The Economist, March 15, 2014; Thomas M. Kane, “China’s ‘Power Projection’ Capabilities,” Parameters 44, no. 4 (2014/​15): 27–​37; Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—​Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 4.

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“late-​blooming great power” set on obtaining its rightful place in the international order.8 The consequences that China’s emergence to major power status will have for the US-​led international order remain uncertain. Chinese President Xi Jinping continues to promote his vision for a ‘new model of great power relations’ between China and the United States, centered on a working partnership that avoids the seemingly inevitable conflict that has characterized many power transitions in the past.9 Likewise, leaders in the United States have emphasized that a strong and prosperous China has the potential to be a stabilizing force in the world. Even so, many analysts worry that as China’s power continues to grow, so too will the assertiveness of its foreign policy and territorial ambitions, leading to an inevitable clash with the United States over the terms of the international order.10 Thus, the challenge facing policymakers—​and the subject of this book—​is how, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, “to write a new answer to the age old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.”11 Or rather, how can an established power manage the peaceful rise of new major powers?

The conventional wisdom in international relations (IR) scholarship is that power transitions are intrinsically destabilizing to the international order. Since Thucydides first observed that growing Athenian power and the fear it inspired in Sparta made the Peloponnesian War inevitable, IR scholars have focused on the differential growth of power among states as the primary cause of conflict during a power transition.12 At the center of Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” National Interest 62 (2000/​2001): 23; Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Quest for Great Power Identity,” Orbis 43, no. 3 (1999): 383–​402; Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (2010): 22–​41; Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Dominance Is a Sure Thing,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (2011): 66–​70, 71–​78.

9 Andrew S. Erikson and Adam P. Liff, “Not-​So-​Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s ‘New Type of Great-​Power Relations’ Slogan,” Foreign Affairs, October 9, 2014, accessed June 24, 2016, http://​ www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​china/​2014-​10-​09/​not-​so-​empty-​talk.

10 Richard Javad Heydarian, “China’s New Territorial Assertiveness,” Al Jazeera, July 9, 2014, accessed November 1, 2014, http://​www.aljazeera.com/​indepth/​opinion/​2014/​07/​china-​territorial-​ claims-​2014786350488424.html. For a dissenting view on Chinese assertiveness, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no.

4 (2013): 7–​48.

11 William Wan, “Hillary Clinton, Top Chinese Officials Air Differences,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2012, accessed June 24, 2016, https://​www.washingtonpost.com/​world/​asia_​pacific/​ hillary-​clinton-​top-​chinese-​officials-​air-​some-​differences/​2012/​09/​05/​78487e86-​f746-​11e1-​8253-​ 3f495ae70650_​story.html.

12 Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War,” in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, trans. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Touchstone, 1996): 1.23–​[6].

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this materialist argument is the view that the divergence between the extant distribution of benefits in the system (e.g. territory, economic interests, etc.) and the underlying distribution of power leads a rising state to want to revise the international order.13 As Robert Gilpin succinctly notes in his canonical work on the subject, the source of international political change “lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the distribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.”14 The logic is simple and straightforward. As a rising state grows more powerful, it seeks greater political influence commensurate with its new capabilities and shows an increased willingness to pursue its interests, if necessary, by using force. The established power, meanwhile, views its emerging rival with suspicion and fear, and acts simultaneously to contain its growing power and influence. These incompatible material preferences—​the established power’s determination to defend the international status quo and the rising power’s incontrovertible revisionism—​ make conflict difficult to avoid.15 As a consequence, power transitions are likely to generate security dilemmas, provoke dangerous arms races, and give rise to intense security competition as rising powers seek to establish their place in an international order not organized to their benefit.

The conventional wisdom offers a plausible and parsimonious understanding of power transitions. Indeed, many rising powers have pursued aggressive and expansionist foreign policies, challenged established powers in their regions and the system when they could, and sometimes even triggered expensive arms races or ruinous wars to secure their position among the great powers. That is, throughout history rising powers have been, more often than not, obviously revisionist powers.

Yet, despite capturing something important about the phenomenon of power transitions, the conventional wisdom is also limited. First, while it may be true that most rising powers act in an objectively revisionist manner, their aggressive foreign policies are not uniformly interpreted as such by the established powers of the time. Consider, for example, the consequential shift from British to American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere

Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf Books, 1958); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

14 Gilpin, War and Change, 9.

15 This is also the crux of what Graham Allison terms the “Thucydides Trap.” Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015.

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at the turn of the twentieth century. At this time the United States emerged onto the world stage as a major naval power and aggressively used its newfound capabilities to minimize the influence of foreign powers in the hemisphere, directly threatening important British interests in the region and Britain’s status as a regional power. The scale of American ambition was profound: from 1898 to 1913 the United States acquired seven times the amount of territory as Imperial Germany (often considered to be the quintessential revisionist power), upending the balance of power, and irreversibly shifting the international political landscape.16 However, instead of moving to contain growing American power and influence, as the conventional wisdom would expect, Britain accommodated American demands and effectively ceded control of the hemisphere to its former rival. In short, this case of peaceful power transition (and others like it17) present a significant empirical challenge to the conventional wisdom: neither shifts in the distribution of power nor an objective assessment of a rising power’s orientation toward the international status quo alone can explain why some power transitions end in conflict whereas others proceed peacefully.

Second, the conventional wisdom is also limited theoretically because it understates the importance of the social factors that shape the dynamics of power transitions. Theorists of power transitions have long accepted that significant shifts in the international distribution of power also raise questions about the prestige or status of rising and declining powers. An established power’s prestige plays a critical role in enabling it to govern the international order and controversies over the hierarchy of prestige in the system—​namely, when it lags behind changes in the distribution of power—​are an important source of international political change. Prestige functions as the “everyday currency of international politics,” which inclines weaker states to accept the legitimacy and utility of an existing international order and allows the hegemon to realize its interests without having to use force.18 Yet, despite acknowledging the important role that status and prestige play during a power transition, the conventional

Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 28–​29.

17 Ikenberry identifies eight power transitions between the years 1500–​2000, half of which were peaceful. G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order,” in China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008a): 95–​100. Graham Allison, using different classificatory criteria, lists sixteen power transitions during the same period, with four occurring peacefully. Graham Allison, “Thucydides Trap Case File” (Presentation, Belfer Center, September 23, 2015).

18 Gilpin, War and Change, 30.

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wisdom conceptualizes these social factors to be largely derivative of material power.19 For example, for Gilpin prestige is the “reputation for power,” which is best discerned through victory in a war that enables the hegemon to effectively reorder the international system. Likewise, recent approaches to status within the realist tradition define it as collective beliefs about a state’s ranking on valued material attributes.20 In both of these instances, status and prestige are reduced to accurate perceptions of a state’s material (and often military) capabilities. As a consequence, extant approaches to status and prestige have had difficulty fully incorporating what is a fundamentally ideational concept into a theoretical framework that prioritizes military power. In short, the conventional wisdom is under-​ socialized, rendering the social dimensions of power transitions epiphenomenal to the system’s material power structure.

The Social Dynamics of Power Transitions To address these empirical and theoretical limitations, this book provides a framework, grounded in the struggle for recognition, for understanding the social factors that shape the outcome of a power transition. The main argument is that a rising power’s revisionism—​that is, the perception that its growing power and attempts to alter the international status quo are illegitimate and thus must be contained—​is a social construct. Specifically, a rising power is constructed as revisionist through its social interactions with other states as it attempts to gain recognition of its identity as a major power. States’ foreign policies, I argue, are not only aimed at securing their material interests, but also are fundamentally about establishing their identities as particular kinds of actors in international society—​which requires recognition. Recognition is a social act through which another actor is “constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing,” and as a result is able to maintain a certain social status (or recognized identity) within a political community.21 Thus, to secure its identity and establish its desired status in the international order, an aspiring major power must be recognized as such by the established powers. When a rising power is Kupchan, “Unpacking Hegemony,” 25; Ikenberry, “Rise of China,” 93; William C. Wohlforth, “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations,” International Relations 25, no. 4 (2011): 503.

20 Deborah Welch Larson, T.V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” in Status in World Politics, T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 3–​32.

21 Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003): 511.

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recognized, its identity is brought into existence, its status as a political actor is secured and as a result, it is able to act in the international sphere in ways consistent with the role of major power.

The process of establishing and maintaining an identity in international politics, however, is deeply uncertain because identity formation depends on the unpredictable recognition responses of other states. Social uncertainty is a structural condition of anarchy and states must navigate this as they seek to obtain recognition of their identities. To manage this insecurity, I argue, states anchor their aspirant identities in symbolic material practices. The material world reflects back to the state the identity it seeks and lends relative stability to the social world by reducing uncertainty. To secure major power identity (in all its variants),22 these practices include the acquisition of particular military capabilities—​such as battleships, aircraft carriers, and nuclear weapons—​that are understood to be emblematic of major power status. These specific practices are constitutively linked to the establishment and maintenance of major power identity and therefore are at the center of rising power identity construction during power transitions. And, because these material practices so central to major power identity formation include the acquisition of military power, they also risk threatening the security of other states and thus can destabilize the international order.

The logic of identity formation in anarchy means all rising powers will acquire symbolic military power, despite its often-​questionable strategic utility and with its attendant security risks, to reduce their social insecurity and obtain recognition of their identities. Whether or not a rising state’s power is viewed as threatening—​that is, as revisionist—​depends on if the rising power is recognized by the established powers. When a rising power is recognized, its identity and status in the international order are secured and its growing social and military power are constructed as legitimate.

Despite the potentially destabilizing effects their capabilities could have on other states’ security and regardless of the challenges they pose to the established power’s authority and interests, recognized rising powers are understood to have rightful claims to alter the norms and rules that govern the international order. Recognition holds the security dilemma at bay and facilitates the emerging power’s “peaceful” rise.

Conversely, I show that if a rising power’s aspirant identity is not recognized, then its military power is constructed as illegitimate and Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004): 68–​71.

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for the purpose of dangerously undermining the international order.

Misrecognized rising powers are viewed as a threat and interpreted to have revisionist intentions. Misrecognition, in short, constructs the revisionism that creates instability during power transitions. In these instances, the established powers respond with military buildups of their own to contain the rising state’s increasing power and to mitigate their own growing social and material insecurity. This, in turn, gives rise to competitive arming spirals that are difficult to unwind and can lead to war. Far from being the inevitable outgrowth of its military power or even an objective assessment of its orientation toward the international status quo, revisionism is contingent on the social interactions of established and rising powers. Social uncertainty is at the center of the “tragedy of great power politics.”

To be sure, the struggle for recognition has figured prominently in power transitions throughout history. For example, Imperial Germany was not just a rising power, but wanted to secure “its place in the sun” alongside the other recognized world powers.23 Imperial Japan’s expansionism in Asia was, importantly, a response to the Western powers’ reluctance to accept it as an equal partner in European international society.24 The rise of Nazi Germany, and its retributive demands at Munich, were inextricably tied to the loss of respect mandated by the Versailles settlement.25 During the interwar years Soviet Russia aspired to be recognized as a legitimate European great power; as the Cold War unfolded it sought to be seen as a “superpower” on par only with the United States; and more recently, in Putin’s Russia it has used military power to reclaim the prestige James R. Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,” Comparative Strategy 23, no. 1 (2002): 27–​61; Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656–​688; Michelle Murray, “Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco: Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma,” in The International Politics of Recognition, Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, eds. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 131–​151; Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 662–​695.

24 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Hidemi Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 185–​199; Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-​Faced European International Society,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 137–​164; Steven M. Ward, “Race, Status and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,” Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 607–​639.

25 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005); Barry A. Jackisch, The Pan-​German League and Radical Nationalist Politics in Interwar Germany, 1918–​39 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012); Stacie E. Goddard, “The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler’s Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–​39,” Security Studies 24, no.

1 (2014): 95–​130.

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of an empire seemingly lost.26 In the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has come to see itself as the “one indispensable nation,” virtually destined to lead the post–​Cold War international order.27 And now, as many analysts note, China’s rise—​and its burgeoning naval capabilities, in particular—​is just as much about reclaiming a status stolen from it during the century of humiliation as it is about securing particular material interests.28 In each of these cases, the desire for recognition shaped the scope of rising powers’ foreign policy aims and the form of their military strategies.

In many of these cases, the struggle for recognition led rising powers to undertake costly, expansionist foreign policies—​at times even risking their existence as states, their physical security—​to secure an identity and status in the international order. From the perspective of rational IR theory, the prevalence of such risky recognition-​seeking behavior is puzzling because the assumption that states seek physical security is widespread and

Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 2 (2002): 115–​136; William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Iver B. Neumann, “Russia’s Quest for Recognition as a Great Power, 1489–​2007,” Institute of European Studies and International Relations Working Papers, no. 1 (2007): 2–​55; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Organization 57, no. 1 (2003): 77–​109; Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity and Security Interests (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2009); Toumas Forsberg, Regina Heller, and Reinhard Wolf, “Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy,” Communist and Post-​Communist Studies 47, no.

3–​4 (2014): 261–​268; Andrei Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” Post-​Soviet Affairs 31, no. 4 (2015): 279–​303.

27 Anne L. Clunan, “Why Status Matters in World Politics,” in Status in World Politics, T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 289; Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Madeline Albright first described the United States as an “indispensable nation” in 1998 to capture the importance of US leadership in international affairs.

Since then the phrase has become a persistent feature of US foreign policy rhetoric.

28 Reinhard Wolf, “Rising Powers, Status Ambitions and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial Germany’s Failure,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 185–​219; Xiaoyu Pu and Randall L. Schweller, “Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences and China’s Blue-​Water Naval Ambition,” in Status in World Politics, T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 141–​164; Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Deborah Welch Larson, “Will China be a New Type of Great Power?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 4 (2015): 323–​348; William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012); David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4 (2015): 99–​107; Joshua Freedman, “Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations (2015): 1–​26.

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longstanding in international relations scholarship.29 That is, the kind of security that states endeavor is inviolably physical in nature.

In recent years many scholars have challenged the physical security assumption, arguing that identity and status can also be a referent object of security. What this type of social security means and how it is achieved can be thought of in a variety of ways. Theorists of ontological security, for example, argue states need a stable sense of identity in order to act in the world.30 To achieve the cognitive stability that state agency requires, states routinize their relations with significant Others and in the process become attached to their recognized roles.31 Another theoretically diverse group of scholars have recently revived the study of status as an important driver of state behavior.32 Status, in this view, cannot be attained unilaterally or read off of capabilities alone, but rather must be recognized by high-​status actors to even exist. Each of these approaches incorporates recognition as ancillary to its primary theoretical framework, but has yet to consider recognition independently as logic of its own. By foregrounding the crucial role that recognition plays in the process of securing an identity and status, my argument should be read as a complement to these approaches and part of an emerging thread of recognition theory in IR that places struggles over identity at the center of power politics.33

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 31; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-​Hill, Inc., 1979), 91–​92; Dustin Ellis Howes, “When States Choose to Die: Reassessing Assumptions About What States Want,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 669–​670.

30 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–​370; Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-​Identity and the IR State (London: Routledge, 2008).

31 Mitzen, “Ontological Security.”

32 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28–​57; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Organization 57, no. 1 (2003): 77–​109; Ward, “Japanese Revisionism”; Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” 3–​32; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as a Motive for War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 3 (2014): 371–​393.

33 Ringmar, “Recognition Game”; Thomas Lindemann, Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010); Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 105–​142; Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Christopher Daase, Anna Geis, Caroline Fehl, and Georgios Kolliarakis, Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking an Ambivalent Concept in a Global Context (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations The arguments presented in this book rest on a simple proposition: states desire self-​certainty and so want recognition of their identities from other states. As theorists of interpersonal recognition observe, the conditions for individual self-​ realization—​ that is, the very possibility of identity formation—​depend on relations of mutual recognition.34 A stable, recognized identity enables individuals to have what Axel Honneth calls a “practical relation-​to-​self,” or assuredness about the value of one’s social identity within society.35 It is only once individuals are confident in their identities that they can formulate a coherent set of interests and on the basis of those interests be able to act out in the world.

Recognition, however, is not just an individual-​level phenomenon, it is also important to states.36 The desire for recognition can take two forms in international politics, what Alexander Wendt characterizes as struggles for “thin” and “thick” recognition.37 States acquire the basic elements of their identities as states and become members of international society when

The literature on interpersonal recognition is vast. See, for example: G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–​74; Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996); Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition,” The New Left Review 3 (2000): 107–​120; Arto Laitinen, “Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood,” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 4 (2002): 463–​478; Heikki Ikäheimo, “On the Genus and Species of Recognition,” Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 447–​462; Axel Honneth, “Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions,” Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 499–​519; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Recognition or Redistribution? A Political-​Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003); Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Christopher F. Zurn, “Identity or Status? Struggles over ‘Recognition’ in Fraser, Honneth, and Taylor,” Constellations 10, no. 4 (2003): 519–​537.

35 Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 79.

36 Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996a); Ringmar, “Recognition Game”; Wendt, “World State”; Brian Greenhill, “Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008): 343–​ 368; Murray, “Identity, Insecurity and Great Power Politics”; Lindemann, Causes of War; Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics”; Lindemann and Ringmar, Politics of Recognition; Jens Bartelson, “Three Concepts of Recognition,” International Theory 5, no. 1 (2013): 107–​129; Daase, Geis, Fehl, and Kolliarakis, Recognition in International Relations.

37 Wendt, “World State,” 511. Axel Honneth has argued that the struggle for recognition in international relations cannot be disaggregated in this way. See Axel Honneth, The I in the We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition (New York: Polity, 2012), 32–​36. On the importance of differentiating the forms the struggle for recognition may take in international politics, see Michelle Murray, “Differentiating Recognition in International Politics,” Global Discourse 4, no. 4 (2014): 558–​560.

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they are recognized as sovereign states—​which is a form of “thin” recognition.38 A state recognized in this way is legally entitled to all the benefits of statehood, enabling it to rule exclusively over a given territory, establish diplomatic immunity, sign treaties and other international agreements, and obtain a seat at the table of many international organizations.39 In return, it accepts limits on its own behavior vis-​à-​vis others, and in doing so acknowledges other states’ “generalized status” as an equal subject and bearer of rights within a community of law.40 States are entitled to these rights and responsibilities solely on the basis of their status as sovereign states and in spite of differences—​such as asymmetries in military power, levels of economic development, and distinct cultural or religious commitments and traditions—​that distinguish them from one another.41 Thin recognition enables their existence as states qua states.

The framework developed in this book assumes legally recognized states are the main actors in international society and instead focuses on another dimension of the struggle for recognition: the desire to establish what is different or unique about a state, or “thick” recognition. To have a practical relation-​to-​self, a state must also be confident in its distinctiveness from other states and recognized as a member of a group that

As an institution, sovereignty defines the criteria for membership in international society. These criteria include material factors, like territoriality, but also the terms of legitimating discourses that prescribe normative constraints on the conditions of sovereignty. These normative constraints are not fixed and change over time. On the changing standards of sovereignty, see Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 107–​130; Samuel J. Barkin, “The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms,” Millennium 27, no. 2 (1998): 229–​252; Christian Reus-​Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 519–​538; Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

39 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); David Strang, “Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutionalist Accounts,” International Organization 45, no. 2 (1991): 143–​162; James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Fabry, Recognizing States.

40 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 13; Anthony Simon Laden, “Reasonable Deliberation, Constructive Power, and the Struggle for Recognition,” in Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory, Bert van den Brink and David Owen, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 273; Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, 107–​121; Wendt, “World State,” 511. The effect of having such a “generalized status” is the creation of a collective identity, a society of states. Greenhill, “Recognition and Collective Identity Formation,” 2008.

41 Bartelson, “Three Concepts of Recognition,” 114.

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is valuable in its particular qualities.42 Thick recognition allows states to “relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities”—​including their material capabilities—​and as a result empowers them to take up specific roles in international society through which they can realize and sustain their identities in meaningfully distinct ways. This “esteem-​granting” type of recognition is important to states because it confirms the value of their distinct identity and also establishes for them a particular social status in international society.43 Because it establishes a particular identity, the form that demands for thick recognition take are as potentially unlimited as there are roles in international society. For instance, states may seek thick recognition for their role in promoting human rights and other humanitarian causes (a status Scandinavian countries pursue vigorously).

Equally so, states could tie their status to being law-​abiding, nonnuclear members of the international community (as signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty do). Or, as is the case during a power transition, a state may seek to establish, and thus gain recognition of, some variant of major power identity.

The observation that thick recognition matters in international politics is, in and of itself, not new. Recognition constitutes a foundational aspect of the constructivist research agenda in IR. Liberal constructivists have argued that being a Self—​that is, having an identity—​depends importantly on obtaining recognition from a significant Other and therefore is an important objective of states’ foreign policies.44 To obtain recognition, states accept and agree to abide by shared norms that constrain their behavior, and so over time the struggle for recognition has a socializing effect on state identities and becomes the means by which collective identities are created and reproduced in international politics.45 For example, Wendt has Laden, “Struggle for Recognition,” 274; Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 121–​130; Wendt, “World State,” 511–​512; Karl Gustafsson, “Recognizing Recognition through Thick and Thin: Insights from Sino-​Japanese Relations,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (2016): 258–​260.

43 In this way, status is intrinsic, although as Jonathan Renshon perceptively notes, the dichotomy between instrumental and intrinsic status is less useful than it first might seem. See Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 50.

44 See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

45 This view of the struggle for recognition has its basis in George Herbert Mead’s division of the self into the “I” and “me” and is the basis of liberal constructivist thinking about identity.

The “I” represents the inner or subjective dimension of identity that exists outside of action, an actor’s “potential.” Whereas the “me” is the social dimension of the self that is representative of the community, the product of the act of looking at oneself through the eyes of others. It is the 42

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