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AreWeBodiesorSouls?

AreWeBodies orSouls?

RichardSwinburne

GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom

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1 Introduction

A.WhatThisBookIsAbout

Thisbookisaboutthenatureofhumanbeings,personsofthe biologicalspeciestowhichwebelong.¹Ihaveaimedtomakemy treatmentofthistopicaccessibletoreadersfromanybackground,but alsoonecontainingnewphilosophicalmaterial,whosecentralargumentsacademicphilosophersandscientistswill Ihope ﬁnd challenging.

Ononeviewcalled ‘physicalism’ or ‘materialism’,wehumansare physicalsubstances(=physicalobjectsorthings),machinesdiffering fromothermachinesonlybybeingmuchmorecomplicatedand madeof ﬂeshandbloodratherthanplasticandsiliconchips.In thisbookIshallarguethatasconsciousrationalagents,wearebeings ofaverydifferentkindfrominanimatephysicalsubstances.Our bodiesmaybeforthemostpartverycomplicatedmachines;yetwe ourselvesarenotsuchmachines,butessentiallynon-physicalbeings: soulswhocontrolbodies.Thisviewisaversionofwhatiscalled ‘substancedualism’;itholdsthateachofuslivingonearthconsistsof twodistinctsubstances(twodistinctparts) bodyandsoul,butthe partthatmakesuswhoweareisoursoul.Bodieskeepusalive,andby enablingustointeractwitheachotherandtheworldmakeourlives sogreatlyworthliving;butsoulsarewhatweessentiallyare.Bysome miraclewemightcontinuetoexistwithoutourbody,butnomiracle wouldmakeitpossibleforustoexistwithoutoursoul becausefor eachofusoursoulistheoneessentialpartofus.

Physicalismandsubstancedualismarebothveryoldviews. The ‘ atomists ’ of ﬁ fth-century  Greece,suchasDemocritus, advocatedphysicalism,while theirfarmorefamousnearcontemporaryPlatoadvocatedsu bstancedualism.Yetthegreat modernreverencefortherecentachievementsofthephysicaland biologicalscienceshasledtoth eviewthatthosesciencescan explaineverything,andsowemustbethingsofthekindthat theycanexplain physicalsubstances.Hencethecurrentdominanceofphysicalism(=materialism)intheintellectualworld.The AmericanphilosopherJoh nSearlehaswrittenthat ‘ Thereisa senseinwhichmaterialismisthereligionofourtime,atleast amongmostoftheprofessionalexpertsinthe ﬁ eldsofphilosophy, psychology,cognitivescience,andotherdisciplinesthatstudy themind.Likemoretraditionalreligions,itisacceptedwithout questionanditprovidestheframeworkwithinwhichotherquestionscanbeposed,addressed,andanswered ’ .²

Ishallbearguingthatnoneoftheenormousachievementsof modernphysicalandbiologicalsciences,whichweallsorightly revere,provideorcouldprovideinfutureanyreasonatallfor denyingthecrucialdifferencebetweenhumansandinanimatephysicalobjectsanalysedbytheversionofsubstancedualismwhich Ishalladvocate;andthatsubstancedualismistheonlytheoryof humannaturewhichtakesseriousaccountofallthedataofneuroscienceandhumanexperience.AlthoughIshallalsobediscussing otherviewsofhumannature,intermediatebetweenphysicalism andmyversionofsubstancedualism,itisbecausethemostprominentrivalviewtomineisthephysicalismthatclaimsthatweare essentiallybodies,andtheviewwhichIshalladvocatethatwe areessentiallysouls,thatIhavegiventhebookthetitle ‘AreWe BodiesorSouls?’ Substancedualismisaviewavailablebothto religiousbelieversandtoatheists.Ifanyonefeelsthattheveryword ‘soul’ alreadyimpliesareligiousoutlook,substitutetheword ‘self ’ for theword ‘soul’ throughoutthisbook.Theword ‘mind’ issometimes usedinthesenseinwhichIamusingtheword ‘soul’,asanindividual thing,separatefromthebody;but ‘mind’ isoftenusedinothersenses,

sometimesveryunclearones.Forexample,tosaythatsomeonehas ‘agoodmind’ mayonlymeanthatthatpersonisintelligent,andmay notinanywayimplythatthepersonhasapartdistinctfromtheir body.HenceasfaraspossibleIwillavoiduseofthenoun ‘mind’ ; andalthoughIwillusetheadjective ‘mental’,Iwillgiveaprecise definitioninChapter2ofthesenseinwhichIamusingit. Anyphilosophicalargumentwhichaimstoreachclearanddefinite conclusionsmustdefineitscrucialexpressions.Iputdefinitionsof expressionswhichIuseforthe firsttimeinboldtype,sothatwhen Iusetheseexpressionsagainatalaterstageinthebook,readerswill beableeasilytocheckwhatImeanbythem.Ihaveputafewofthe moretechnicalphilosophicalpointswhichwillbeofinterestonly tothosefamiliarwithphilosophicalwritingonthetopicinendnotes andintheAppendixtoChapter5,allofwhichmaybeignoredby otherswithoutlosingthemainpointsofmyarguments.

B.TheProblemofPersonalIdentity

Ithasalwaysbeenofdeeptheoreticalimportanceforourunderstandingoftheworldtoknowwhethertheworldconsistsonlyofbitsof matteroralsoofsomethingsofatotallydifferentkindfrombitsof matter,whichinteractwiththatmatter.Butitisalsoofgreatmoral andpracticalimportancetoknowwhathumansare.Forsurelythe greaterthedifferencebetweenhumansandmachines,themore appropriateitistotreattheminverydifferentwaysfromeach other.Further,differentviewsaboutthenatureofhumanbeingsare closelyconnectedtodifferentviewsaboutthesolutiontotheproblem ofpersonalidentity.ThisistheproblemofwhatitisforapersonP₂ at timet₂ tobethesamepersonasacertainpersonP₁ atanearliertime t₁.Forexample,whatisitforarespectablecitizenGeorgein2018to bethesamepersonasa ‘George’ whomurderedsomeonein1968? (Notethatthisisnot,assuch,aquestionaboutwhatitisforP₂ to havethesamepersonalityasP₁.Ourpersonalityisamatterof whetherwearehard-heartedorkind,cleverorstupid,knowledgeable orignorant,impatientorpatient.Tosaythatsomeone’spersonality

haschangedistosaythatheorshe oneandthesameperson had onepersonalityatonetimeandadifferentpersonalityatadifferent time.OurquestionisaboutwhatitisforP₂ tobethesamepersonas P₁,whetherornotheorshehasthesamepersonality.)If,asphysicalismclaims,wearemerelyphysicalsubstances,thenwhetherthe laterGeorgeisthesamepersonastheearlier ‘George’ dependson whetherheisthesamephysicalsubstance,andthatcanbespelledout intermsofwhetherhehasthesamebody,orperhapsjustthesame brain,astheearlierGeorge. ‘Propertydualism’,aviewintermediate betweenphysicalismandsubstancedualismwhichIshalloutlinein Chapter2,holdsthathumanshavepropertiesoftwosharplydifferent kinds physicalandmental.Soit fitsnaturallywithaviewthat,while theextenttowhichGeorgehasthesamebodyorbrainmayplaya majorroleindeterminingwhetherthelater ‘George’ isthesame personastheearlierGeorge,thisdependsalsoonsimilaritiesbetween their ‘mental’ propertiessuchastheirbeliefs,andchieflyonwhether thememorybeliefsofthelaterGeorgeabouthispastexperiences coincidewiththebeliefsoftheearlierGeorgeabouthisthencurrent experiences.Substancedualism fitsnaturallywiththeviewthat whetherthelaterGeorgeisthesamepersonastheearlierGeorge dependsonlyonwhetherhehasthesamesoul.

Mostpeoplenormallysupposethat,whicheverofsuchphilosophicalviewsiscorrect,thelater ‘George’ isinfactthesamepersonasthe earlierGeorgeiffthelaterGeorgehasthesamebodyastheearlier George atleastaslongasheseemstoremembersomeofthe experienceshadbytheearlierGeorge.(‘iff ’ means ‘ifandonlyif ’.) Butwecannotkeepbodiesundercontinuousobservation;andsoin thepastwehaveusedthelater ‘George’’sappearanceasevidencethat thelater ‘George’’sbodyisthesamebodyasthatoftheearlierGeorge. Ifhelooksthesame(oratleasthisappearanceisdifferentonlyinthe kindofwaythatappearanceschangeaspeoplegetolder),thenthat (intheabsenceofevidencethatGeorgehasanidenticaltwin)isfairly goodevidencethatthelater ‘George’’sbodyisthesamebodyasthat oftheearlierGeorgeandsothelater ‘George’ isthesamepersonas theearlierGeorge.Nowadayswecanhavemuchstrongerevidence

thattwobodiesarethesameiftheir ﬁngerprintsandDNAarethe same.Morerecentlysurgeonshavelearnttotransplantmanybodily parts,andthereistheseriouspossibilitythatverysoonasurgeonwill transplantahead.Thisraisesthequestionwhetherthepersonwith thetransplantedheadisthesamepersonasthepersonwhopreviouslyhadthesamebody(apartfromthehead),orthesamepersonas thepersonwhopreviouslyhadthehead.Wemaywellthinkthatthe essentialpartofaperson’sbodyistheirbrain,andsoitistheperson whohasthebrainofanearlierpersonwhoisthatperson.Butitseems veryprobablethatwithinthenextfewyearsneurosurgeonswillbe abletomakelargechangestoaperson’sbrainandtoreplacepartsof it,andsotomakegreatdifferencestothatperson’scharacterandto whattheyseemtoremember.(Whatapersonseemstorememberof whattheydidorexperiencedIshalloftencalltheir memorybeliefsor ‘apparentmemories’,whichIshalloftenshortento ‘a-memories’ . Thesemayormaynotberealmemories;whethertheyarereal memoriesdependsonwhethersomeoneactuallydidorexperienced thosethingsandwhetherthepersonwhoseemstorememberthem wasthepersonwhoactuallydidorexperiencedthem.)WhenscientistsdomakechangessuchasIhavedescribed,thenevenifweknow exactlywhatarethedifferencesbetweenthebrain,apparentmemories,andcharacteroftheearlierpersonandthoseofthelaterperson,it willnolongerbeobviouswhetherthelaterpersonisorisnotthe samepersonastheearlierperson.Thisisbecausethereisnoobvious answertothequestionofhowmuchofthebodyorbrainormemory orcharacteroftheearlierpersonalaterpersonneedstohaveinorder tobethesamepersonasthatearlierperson.IfalargepartofGeorge’ s brainhasbeenreplacedbyapartofabraintakenfromanother person,orneurosurgeonshaveradicallyalteredGeorge’sa-memories, therewillbeaseriousquestionaboutwhetherthelater ‘George’ isthe samepersonastheearlierGeorge.Alawcourtwillneedtoknowthe answertothatquestionbeforethey ﬁndthelater ‘George’ guiltyof somecrimecommittedbytheearlierGeorge.

Thesamekindofquestionwillariseforanypersonwhohasa seriousbraindiseasewhichcanbecuredonlybyreplacinga

signiﬁcantpartoftheirbrain,perhapsfromthebrainofacorpsein whichthatpartisstillcapableoffunctioning.Thatperson letuscall her ‘Sally’—willwanttoknow,beforesheagreestohavetheoperation,whethersheislikelytosurvivetheoperation.Neurosurgeons aretheexpertswhomaybeabletotellherwhetheraftertheoperation Sally’sbodywillbethebodyofaliving,consciousperson.Theymight evenbeabletopredicthowmuchaboutSally’spastthatresulting personwillseemtoremember.Butwhattheirknowledgeofneurosciencewillnotenablethemtotellheriswhetherthatpost-operation personwillbeSallyorsomeoneelse(perhapstheperson,partof whosebrainwastransplantedintoSally).Thisisbecausetheissueis notaboutwhatthepost-operationpersonwillseeorfeel,orwhat theirbodyorbrainwillbelike,butaboutwhothatpersonis.Evenif thescientistscouldpredictwithcertaintyexactlywhatwouldhappen toalltheatomsintheearlierSally’sbrain,andexactlywhatthepostoperationpersonwouldseemtoremember,andwhatshewouldbe likeineveryrespect,theirknowledgeofneurosciencewouldnot enablethemtosaywhetherthatpersonwouldbethesameperson astheearlierSally.Andneithertheynorthepost-operationperson wouldbeinanybetterpositionaftertheoperationtoknowwhether theearlierSallyhadsurvived.ItistobeexpectedthatthepostoperationpersonwouldseemtohavesomeofSally’sa-memories, butitisalsotobeexpectedthatthatpersonwouldseemtohavesome ofthememoriesofthepersonfromwhosecorpsethenewbrainpart wastaken.Tobegintoanswertheall-importantpracticalandmoral questionofwhothepost-operationpersonis,weneedaviewabout whatmakesapersonSally.Isitjusthavingacertainbody,acertain brain(oracertainpartofabrain),certaina-memoriesorcharacter, orsomethingratherdifferent havingacertainsoul?Ananswerto thequestionofwhatmakesonepersonthesamepersonasanearlier personwillhelpustoanswerthemoregeneralquestionaboutwhat personsare,andsowhathumanswhoarepersonsofaparticularkind are.Andthatiswhatthisbookisabout.

Ifandwhenwecananswerthesequestions,wewillbeina positiontoassesstheplausibilityofsomeoftheprocedureswhich

‘transhumanists’ areinterestedinperforminginthemoredistant future.Ifscientists ‘download’ thewholecontentsofSally’sbrainon toacomputer,wouldthatcomputerthenbeSally?Andifthecontent ofGeorge’sbrainwas ‘teletransported’ intothebrainofapersonona distantplanet,wouldthatpersonthenbeGeorge?Andthisissueof whatmakesapersonthesamepersonasanearlierpersonhasalways beencrucialinassessingthecoherenceoftheclaimsofmajorreligionsthathumanswillliveagainonthisearthorinanotherworld aftertheirdeath.Inordertoliveagainaftertheirdeath,would someoneneedtohavethesamebody,oratleasttheskulland bonesoftheearlierperson?Orwoulditbeenoughifmanyoftheir a-memoriesabouttheactionsandexperiencesoftheearlierperson arecorrect?Orwouldtheyneedtohavethatperson’ssoul?Ifsomeone ’sdeadbodyisburnttoashesinthecrematorium,itisdifﬁcultto makesenseofthenotionthatthatverysamebodycouldexistagainin anewafterlife;butthereseemsmuchlessofaprobleminsupposing that ifhumanshavesouls theirsoulcouldcontinuetoexistafter theannihilationoftheirbody,andperhapsbejoinedtoanewbodyin anafterlife.

C.ThePlanofThisBook

IshalldevoteChapter2toexplainingsomephilosophicalterms,and then withtheaidoftheseterms tosettingoutandclarifyingmore fullythedifferenttheoriesaboutthenatureofhumanbeings.Thenin Chapter3Ishallproceedtoadetaileddiscussionoftheoriesof personalidentity.Thesetheoriesofpersonalidentitycanbedivided intomanycomplextheoriesandonesimpletheory.A ‘complex theoryofpersonalidentity’ claimsthat ‘beingthesameperson’ is analysableintermsofthelaterpersonhavingsomeofthesamebody orsomeofthesamephysicalormentalpropertiesastheearlier person forexample,havingmuchofthesamebrainormanyof thesamememorybeliefsastheearlierperson orsomedegreeof continuitywiththebodyorpropertiesoftheearlierperson.What Imeanbyalaterpersonhaving ‘somedegreeofcontinuitywiththe

body’ ofanearlierpersonisthattheirbodyistheresultofgradual replacementofpartsoftheearlierbodyovertimebynewparts.And whatImeanbyalaterpersonhaving ‘propertieswithsomedegreeof continuitywiththoseofanearlierperson’ isthattheirpropertiesare theresultofgradualchangeovertimetothepropertiesoftheearlier person.(Forexample,theirphysicalproperties suchastheirweight andappearance graduallychange,andtheygraduallylosesomeof thememorybeliefsoftheearlierpersonwhileatthesametime acquiringmemorybeliefsabouteventslaterthanthoseexperienced bytheearlierperson.)The ‘simpletheoryofpersonalidentity’ claims that ‘beingthesameperson’ cannotbeanalysedintermsofhaving someofthesamebodyorthesamephysicalormentalproperties (oranybodilypartsoranyphysicalormentalpropertiescontinuous withthoseoftheearlierperson);alaterpersonmightbethesame personasanearlierperson,whetherornotheorshehasanyofthe samebodyorthesamephysicalormentalproperties(orbodyor propertiescontinuouswiththoseoftheearlierperson).Ishallconclude Chapter3byrejectingallcomplextheoriesandclaimthatthesimple theoryprovidestheonlysatisfactorytheoryofpersonalidentity.

IshallthenargueinChapter4thatitfollowsfromasimpletheory thatthereisanon-physicalpartofeachperson,oursoul,which makesuswhoweare.Thequestionthenariseswhetheranybody (andsobrain)atallisnecessaryforourcontinuingexistence.Could wecontinuetoexistmerelyasdisembodiedsouls?Afamousargumentduetotheseventeenth-centuryFrenchphilosopherRené Descartesclaimsthatwecould,andthatoursoulaloneissufﬁcient forourcontinuingexistence.Byclaimingthatwe ‘could’ existwithout abody,hewasclaimingonlythatthisis ‘logically’ possible;thatis,that itwouldnotinvolveacontradictiontosupposethatwecouldexist withoutabody;hewasnotclaimingthatthisisphysicallypossible. Thislogicalpossibility,Descartesclaims,hastheconsequencethateach actuallyexistinghumanisessentiallyasoul,animmaterialthingto whichabodyisattachedwhilewearealiveonearth.

MostthinkersoftheWestern(andMiddleEastern)worldbefore theseventeenthcenturyheldthateveryhumanhasanon-physical

soul,butsomeofthemheldthatheorshecouldnotexist,orcould notexist ‘fully’,withoutalsohavingabody.IshallfollowDescartesin defendingtheextremeversionofasoultheorywhichclaimsthatwe areessentiallysouls,whicharejoinedonearthtobodies;ourthoughts andfeelingsandothermentaleventsareoursbecausetheyareevents inoursouls.Idonotwishtodenythat giventheoperationofthe lawsofnaturewhichcurrentlyoperateonearth oursoulsarekept inexistencebytheoperationofourbrains,andthatbrainevents causemanyofthementaleventsinoursouls.Butmyclaimisthatif thoselawsceasedtooperateandsotobindbodyandsoultogether,it wouldbethecontinuingexistenceofoursouls iftheycontinuedto exist whichwouldconstitutethecontinuingexistenceofus. Almostwithoutexceptionmodernphilosophershaveclaimedthat Descartes’sargumentcontainssomesimpleerror;andtextbooksof thephilosophyofmindoftenbeginwithaquick ‘refutation’ ofhis argument.IshallclaimthatalthoughDescartes’soriginalargument doesnotproveasmuchasheintended,aslightlyamendedversionof itdoesproveallthatheintended.However,thereisaverypowerful objectiontoDescartes’sargumentwhich,ifitwerecogent,wouldalso defeatmyamendedversionoftheargument,aswellasDescartes’ s originalargument.ThisistheobjectionthatDescartes’sargument dependsonacrucialassumptionthatwheneachofusrefersto ‘I’ ,we knowtowhatwearereferring;weknowwhatthe ‘I’ isaboutwhichwe aretryingtoassessthedifferenttheories.Butthat,theobjection claims,istobegthecrucialquestion.IargueinChapter5thatthis objectiontoDescartes’sargumentrestsonignoringanimportant philosophicaldistinctionbetweenwhatIcall ‘informative’ and ‘uninformative’ designators,andIgoontoexplainhowrecognizingthis distinctionenablesustoseetheerrorinvolvedinthispowerful objection.Iconcludethatthesimpletheoryofpersonalidentity doesindeedleadtothetheorythateachhumanbeingconsistsof twosubstances,bodyandsoul,andthatitisoursoulwhichmakes eachofuswhoweare.Hence ‘substancedualism’.Ibringoutthat substancedualismisnotmerelyatheorypostulatedasthebest explanationofmentalphenomena,butthatoursoulisadatumof

experience.Weareawarenotmerelyoftheoccurrenceofperceptions andthoughts,butalsoofourselvesasthinkingandperceiving;andso, Iargue,itisthe ‘I’ ofwhicheachofusisawareinhavingany consciousexperiencewhichisoursoul,thecoreofouridentity;and itisthecontinuedexistenceofoursoulwhichconstitutesthecontinuedexistenceofeachofus.Iarguethatthedifferencebetweenany twosoulsisultimate;theydifferfromeachotherwithoutneedingto havedifferentmentalproperties(suchasdifferentthoughtsorfeelings) theyarejustdifferentfromeachother.

IthengooninChapter6todefendtheviewthateachperson’ssoul interactswiththeirbrain.Itfollowsthatthephysicalworld,including ourbodiesandbrains,isnota ‘closedsystem’;notmerelydoour brainscauseeventsinoursouls,butwe,thatisoursouls,causeevents inourbrainswhichcauseustomoveourlimbs.Iarguethatany argumentsbyscientistspurportingtoestablishthecontrary,thatisto establish ‘thecausalclosureofthephysical’,wouldthemselvesdepend fortheirjustiﬁcationontheassumptionthatthephysicalrealmisnot closed,andhencewouldbeself-defeating.IcomeinChapter7to considerwhethertherecouldbeascientiﬁcexplanationoftheorigin ofhumansoulsandtheirinteractionwithbrainsandsowithbodies. Iclaimthatitisplausibletosupposethatthereisalawofnature whichbringsitaboutthatatacertainstageofitsdevelopmenteach humanfoetusgivesriseto a connectedsoul.Andcertainly,thereare alsoverymanydetailedlawsofnaturedeterminingthatbrainevents ofparticulartypescausementaleventsofparticulartypesinsouls, andthatmentaleventsofparticulartypesinsoulscausebrainevents ofparticulartypes.Forexample,thereissomelawthatacertaintype ofbraineventcausedbylookingatatreeoutsideawindowcausesin thesoulconnectedtoitavisualimageofatreeandabeliefthatthere isatreeoutsidethewindow;andthereissomelawthatadifferent typeofbraineventcausedbythenoiseofapassingcarcausesasound intheconnectedsoulandabeliefthatacarispassing.Andthereis somelawthatanintentiontomoveone’sarmcausesaneventinthe brainconnectedtoitwhich giventhatthebrainisthebrainofa typicalhealthyadult normallycausestheirarmtomove.However,

inconcludingChapter7,Ishallarguethatitisimpossible logically impossibleandsoimpossibleinanyweakersense becauseofwhata lawofnatureisthattheoperationofanylawofnaturecouldbringit aboutthataparticularfoetusgivesrisetoaparticularsoul.Itis notpossiblethatthereissomelawofnaturewhichbringsitabout thatyoursoulisconnectedtothebraintowhichitisinfactconnected,andmysoulisconnectedtothebraintowhichitisinfact connected,ratherthanviceversa.

2 PhysicalismandProperty Dualism

A.HumanBeings

Thisbookisaboutthenatureofhumanbeings. ‘Humanbeings’ are personsbelongingtothesamebiologicalgroupasourselves;andthat almostcertainlyinvolveshavingthesamegroupofancestorsas ourselves.Iunderstandby ‘ persons ’ beingswhohavethecapacity (orwillhavethecapacityasaresultofnormaldevelopmentalprocesses)tohaveconsciouseventsofcertainkinds,includingoccurrent thoughts(thoughtswhich ‘crossyourmind’)aboutpastandfuture (suchas ‘Johnwasbornmanyyearsago,andwillsoonbedead’), moralbeliefs(beliefsaboutwhatismorallygoodandwhatismorally bad),andtheabilitytodosomeverysimplelogicalreasoning(for example,toreasonbymentallyimagedsymbolsthat ‘ifthereare ﬁve applesinthebag,therearemorethantwoapplesinthebag’).Bya ‘consciousevent’ Imeananexperienceofwhichtheindividualwho hasitisawareofhaving;apainoranoccurrentthoughtareconscious eventsbecausetheindividualwhohasthemisawareofhavingthem.¹ Hencewhenanorganismhas ‘consciousevents’,thereiswhat ThomasNageldescribedas ‘somethingitisliketobethatorganism’.² (NotethatIdonotmeanbysomeonehaving ‘consciousevents’ that theyareawake,asopposedtobeingasleeporunawareoftheirsurroundings.Someonewhoisasleepmaybedreamingandsohave consciouseventsofwhichtheyareaware.)Iandmyreadersarenot merelyindividualswhohavethecapacitytohaveconsciousevents,but persons.Humaninfantsdonotcurrentlyhavethecapacitiestohave

moralbeliefsortodologicalreasoning,butIamcountingthem in accordwithnormalusage as ‘ persons ’,because giventhatthey developinthenormalway theywillhavethosecapacitiesinafew years ’ time.Theremaywellbepersonsondistantplanets,butthey wouldnotbehumanbeingsintheabovebiologicalsense.However, sincemostofthephilosophicalissueswhichIshalldiscusshavethe sameconsequencesforpersonsofallkinds,Iaskthereadertoassume asIdidinChapter1 thatwhatIsayaboutpersonsgenerallyappliesto humans,unlessIspecifyotherwise.

B.Substances,Properties,andEvents

Humanbeingsarewhatphilosopherscall ‘substances’.Ishallunderstandbya ‘substance’ acomponentoftheworld;aparticularobject orcollectionofobjects.Thusmydesk,thetreeoutsidemywindow, theearth,theMilkyWay,thephoton(particleoflight)emittedfroma certainlightsourcewhichlandedonacertainscreen,andeach individualhumanbeingareallsubstances.Substancesmayhave othersubstancesasparts;mydeskhasaspartsitsdrawersandthe deskframe,andthesetooaresubstances.Theworldconsistsofallthe substancesthatthereare.Substanceshaveproperties.A property maybeanintrinsicproperty ofonesubstance,possessedbythat substancequiteindependentlyofitsrelationstoothersubstances; ora relationalproperty consistingofarelationwhichasubstancehasto oneormoreothersubstances.Thusbeingsquareorbrown,orhaving zerorest-mass,orgrowinglargerorolder,areintrinsicpropertiesof substances.Thewindowissquare,andthephotonhaszerorestmass.Being-to-the-left-of-the-cupboardorbeing-taller-than-James ormoving-further-away-from-the-wallarerelationalpropertiesof substanceswhichrelatethemtoothersubstances.Thedeskisto-theleft-of-the-cupboard,Johnistaller-than-James,andSallyismovingfurther-away-from-the-wall.Substancesexistandhaveproperties forperiodsoftime.Mydeskexistedfrom1920whenitwasmade, andwillcontinuetoexistuntilitisdestroyed,maybein2030.Of thepropertieswhichasubstancehas,someareessentialproperties

(=logicallynecessaryproperties)ofthatsubstance. Anessential propertyofasubstance isonesuchthatitisnotlogicallypossible forthesubstancetoexistwithouthavingthatproperty.

Imustnowexplaintheseterms, ‘logicallynecessary’ and ‘logically possible’ . Asentences₁ islogicallypossible iffitisnotacontradiction anddoesnotentailacontradiction.Soasentenceis logicallyimpossible iffitisacontradictionorentailsacontradiction. Asentences₁ entailsanothersentences₂ iffs₂ drawsoutsomethingalreadyimplicit ins₁.Thus ‘Socratesisahuman,andallhumansaremortal’ entails ‘Socratesismortal’.Thatsomesentences₁ entailsanothersentenceis sometimesveryobvious,butwhenthisisnotobviousyoucanoften showitbyproducingachainofentailments;thatis,byshowingthat s₁ obviouslyentailssomesentences1a,ands1a obviouslyentails anothersentences1b,andsoonuntilyoureachs₂;proofsingeometry orarithmeticdrawoutthemoredistantentailmentsoftheirpremises. Acontradictionisasentencethathastheform ‘so-and-soandalso notso-and-so’.Thus ‘Johnwasaliveat10amon1December1920, andJohnwasnotaliveat10amon1December1920’ isacontradictionandsoisobviouslynotlogicallypossible. ‘Johnkilledhispaternal grandmotherbeforeshecouldbecomepregnantforthe ﬁrsttime’ is notasitstandsacontradiction,butitentailsacontradiction,and youcanprovethatbydrawingoutthecontradictionfromit.For thatsentenceobviouslyentails ‘ThemotherofJohn’sfatherdied beforeshecouldconceiveasonoradaughter’,andthislattersentence obviouslyentails ‘ThemotherofJohn’sfatherwasnotamother’,and thatobviouslyentails ‘Therewassomeonewhowasnotamother,and alsowasamother’,whichisacontradiction.Hencetheoriginal sentenceislogicallyimpossiblebecauseitentailsacontradiction.So toodoes ‘Thereisamalebarberinavillagewhoshavesallandonly themeninthevillagewhodonotshavethemselves’—Ileaveittoany readerunfamiliarwiththisapparentlyinnocentsentencetoworkout whyitentailsacontradiction,andsoislogicallyimpossible.

Ishalluse ‘conceivable’ inthesamesenseas ‘logicallypossible’ . Soasentenceis ‘conceivable’³iffeitheritis(was,orwillbe)true,or iftheworldhadbeendifferent(inawaythatdoesnotentaila

contradiction),itwouldhavebeentrue.Anditisoftenobviousthat somesentenceisconceivable(=logicallypossible)withoutneedingto trytoproveit.Asentenceisconceivableifonecanunderstandwhatit wouldbelikeforittobetrue andifspellingoutwhatitwouldbe likeforittobetruedoesnotentailacontradiction.Itisconceivable that ‘nohumanseverlivedonearth’,orthat ‘theworldbegantoexist only6,000yearsago’.Eventhoughthesesentencesarefalse,theyare ‘conceivable’ inthesensethattheymighthavebeentrueifthe universehadbeguninadifferentway,orifthelawsofnaturehad beensomewhatdifferentfromtheactuallawsofnature(thatis,laws suchasthelawsofQuantumTheoryorRelativityTheory);butitis notconceivablethatthereisaroundsquarebecausethatentailsa contradiction theworldcouldneverhavebeensuchthatthereexist roundsquares.Soasentences₁ entailsasentences₂ iff{s₁ andnot-s₂} isorentailsacontradiction;{‘Socratesisahuman,andallhumansare mortal’ entails ‘Socratesismortal’}iff{‘Socratesisahuman,andall humansaremortal,butSocratesisnotmortal’}entailsacontradiction. Asentenceis logicallynecessary iffitsnegation(thesentencewhich deniestheformersentence)isnotlogicallypossible(=islogically impossible).Thus ‘allsquareshavefoursides’ islogicallynecessary becauseitisnotlogicallypossiblethat ‘thereisasquarewhichdoes nothavefoursides’.Asentenceis logicallycontingent iffitis neitherlogicallynecessarynorlogicallyimpossible.Sentencesexpress propositions.A proposition iswhatasentencemeans.Twosentences whichmeanthesame(=whichmakethesameclaimabouthowthe worldis),suchas ‘allhumansaremortal’ , ‘everyhumandiesatsome time’,and ‘tuttiuominisonomortali’ (inItalian),expressthesame proposition.Becausephilosophersareconcernedwithwhatasentencesaysratherthanwiththeparticularwordsorlanguageituses, Ishallinfutureoftentalkaboutpropositionsratherthansentences. Then apropositionislogicallyimpossible/possible/necessary/contingent iffanysentencewhichexpressesitislogicallyimpossible/ possible/necessary/contingent.

Itisimportanttodistinguishthelogicallypossiblefromthenaturallypossibleandthepracticallypossible.Noteverythinglogically

possibleisnaturallypossible. Apropositionisnaturallypossible iff theoccurrenceofwhatitassertsiscompatiblewiththeactuallawsof nature(and,giventhatweareconcernedwithphysicallaws thatis, lawsofnatureaboutphysicalsubstances suchapropositionis physicallypossible).Forexample,althoughitislogicallypossible thatsomethingcouldtravelfasterthanlight,itisphysicallyimpossiblethatanyonecouldsendaspaceshiptoaplanetofanothersolar systematavelocityfasterthanthevelocityoflight(sincethelawsof RelativityTheoryruleoutanythingtravellingfasterthanlight).Itis, however,physicallypossiblethathumanscouldsendsuchaspaceship at99percentofthevelocityoflight.Whateverisentailedbythelaws ofnatureis naturallynecessary (andiftheselawsarephysicallaws,it is physicallynecessary);andwhateverisincompatiblewiththelaws ofnatureis physicallyimpossible (andiftheselawsarephysicallaws, itis physicallyimpossible).Butnoteverythingnaturallypossibleis practicallypossible;thatis,practicallypossibleforhumansnow. A propositionispracticallypossible iffitiswithinthecapacitiesof present-dayhumanstobringaboutnoworintheforeseeablefuture whatitasserts.Itwouldtaketheresearchanddevelopmentworkof verymanyscientists,fundedbyavastgovernmentgrantovermany decades,tosendaspaceshiptoaplanetofanothersolarsystemat 99percentofthevelocityoflightintheforeseeablefuture,andsoitis notpracticallypossiblethatNASAcouldsendaspaceshiptoaplanet ofanothersolarsystemat99percentofthevelocityoflight.

So torepeatthedeﬁnition anessentialpropertyofasubstance isonesuchthatitisnotlogicallypossiblethatthesubstancecould existwithoutthatproperty. ‘Occupyingspace’ isanessentialproperty ofmydesk;itisnotlogicallypossiblethatmydeskcouldexistwithout occupyingspace. ‘Beingnegativelycharged’ isanessentialproperty ofeveryelectron;ifanelectronlosesitsnegativecharge,itceasesto exist.Butsomeofthepropertiesofasubstancearenon-essential (= ‘logicallycontingent’)propertiesofthatsubstance;thatis,itis logicallypossiblethatthesubstancecouldexistwithoutthatproperty. Beingbrownisalogicallycontingentpropertyofmydesk;ifmydesk weretobepaintedredinsteadofbrown,thedeskwouldstillexist.

Ideﬁne anevent assomesubstance(orsubstances)eitherhaving (orgainingorlosing)acertainproperty(orproperties)atacertain time,orcomingintoexistenceorceasingtoexistatacertaintime. Thus ‘mydeskbeingbrownat10amon9June2008’ , ‘Birmingham lyingbetweenManchesterandLondonduringthewholetwentieth century’,and ‘thebirthofmymotherin1908’ areevents.Inordinary languageitisnormaltocallonlychangesinsomesubstance(or substances) ‘events’,whileasubstancehavinganunchangingpropertyduringsomeperiodoftimeiscalleda ‘state’ ofthatsubstance; andsoonlythedeskbeingmadein1920orthedeskbeingdestroyed in2030orceasingtobeownedbyme,butnotthedeskbeingbrown between1920and2020,wouldcountas ‘events’.Butitisusefulto haveawordcoveringallcasesofsubstanceshavingpropertiesat times(aswellasthecomingsintoexistenceandceasingstoexistof substances);and,whilesometimesalsousingtheword ‘state’ inthe ordinarysense,Ishallusetheword ‘event’ inthiswidesense.

Thedifferentviewsontheissuestobediscussedinthisbookare oftenexpressedasclaimsabouttwosubstancesortwopropertiesor twoeventsbeingthesamesubstance,property,orevent.Someone mayclaimthatreallyahumanbeingisjustthesameas thatis,the samesubstanceas hisorherbody,orthatfeelingpainjustishaving one ’sC-ﬁbres(certainbundlesofnervecells) ‘ﬁring’ (=emittingan electricdischarge),andthatmebelievingthat2+2=4justisthe existenceofcertainconnectionsbetweentheneurons(nervecells)in mybrain.Butinordertoassesssuchclaims,weneedaviewabout whatitisfortwosubstances,properties,oreventstobethesame substance,property,orevent thatis,weneedcriteriaforwhatitis foronesubstance(propertyorevent)pickedoutbyonewordtobe thesamesubstanceasasubstance(propertyorevent)pickedoutbya differentword,eitheratthesametimeoratadifferenttime.Although ‘substance’ isaphilosophers’ technicalterm,theaccountwhichIhave givenearlierofwhatitisforsomethingtobeasubstancemakesit clear,asalmostallphilosopherswouldagree,that therearedifferent criteriaofidentityforsubstancesofdifferentkinds.Forexample, beingthesamelumpofbronzeconsistsinbeingformedof

(approximately)thesamemolecules.Thelumpofbronzeabout whichIwastalking’ isthesamelumpofbronzeas ‘thelumpof bronzeaboutwhichyouweretalking’ iffthetwolumpsofbronzeare madeof(approximately)thesamemolecules.Whereasbeingthesame treeishavingthesametrunkandthesameupperrootsdirectly connectedtothetrunk;buthavingthesamebranchesastheearlier treeisnotinanywaynecessaryforthetreetobethesametree.The questionwithwhichweshallbeconcernedinChapter3iswhatitisfor apersonatonetimetobethesamepersonasapersonatalatertime. Therearenoclearcriteriainordinarylanguageofwhatitisfortwo propertiesoreventstobethesamepropertyorevent.Istheproperty ofreflectinglightofsuch-and-suchawavelengththesamepropertyas thepropertyofbeingred,orarethesedifferentproperties?Isthe eventofBrutuskillingCaesarontheIdesofMarchthesameeventas BrutusstabbingCaesarontheIdesofMarch,orarethesedifferent events?Ourinabilitytogiveeasyanswerstothesequestionsisnotdue totherebeingsomedeepmetaphysicaltruthaboutthesematters whichwehavenotbeenabletodiscover,butsimplybecauseweuse theexpressions ‘sameproperty’ and ‘sameevent’ withouttherebeing clearcriteriaforwhatcountsasthe ‘sameproperty’ and ‘sameevent’ . Soifwearetousetheseexpressionstoexpressdifferentphilosophical views,weneedsharpdefinitionsofwhatitisfortwopropertiesortwo eventstobethesame;anddifferentphilosophersofferdifferent definitions.Inowdefine apropertyAasthesamepropertyasa propertyB iffhavingA(oflogicalnecessity)alwaysmakesthesame differencetoasubstanceasdoeshavingB,andviceversa.⁴ Onthis definitionthepropertyofbeingatrilateral(beingaclosedthree-sided rectilinear figure)isthesamepropertyasthepropertyofbeing triangular(beingaclosedrectilinear figurehavingthreeinternal angles) becauseoflogicalnecessityanytriangleistrilateral,and conversely.Thepropertyofkillingsomeoneisthesamepropertyas thepropertyofcausingsomeonetodie,butitisnotthesameproperty asstabbingsomeone,becauseyoucouldkillsomeonewithoutstabbingthem.Andthepropertyofreflectinglightofsuch-and-sucha wavelengthisnotthesamepropertyasthepropertyofbeingred,

because itislogicallypossible somethingcouldberedwithout reﬂectinglightofthatwavelength.Thisisbecausethecriteriafora substancebeingredarethatitlookstomostpeopletobeofthe samecolourassuchparadigmobjectsasripetomatoes,raspberries, Londonbuses,orBritishpostboxes,anditisnotlogicallynecessary thatsubstanceswhichreﬂectlightofacertainwavelengthlookthat waytomostpeople it’slogicallypossiblethatinsomeotherworld theydon’t.Propertiesarewhatphilosopherscall ‘universals’;thatis, thesamepropertymaybehadbymanydifferentsubstances;and therearepropertieswhichperhapsnosubstancewilleverhave such asthepropertyofbeingatrilliontrillionyearsold.

Bycontrast,eventsareparticularoccurrencesinthehistoryof theworld.Idefine aneventFasthesameeventasaneventG ifftheoccurrenceofFmakes(hasmade,orwillmake)thesame differencetotheactualworldasdoestheoccurrenceofE.Thenormal caseoftwoeventsbeingthesameeventiswheretheyinvolvethe samesubstance(s)(whetherornotthesubstancesarepickedoutby logicallyequivalentexpressions),thesameproperty,andthesame time(with ‘sameproperty’ definedinthewayjustdefined).So, because ‘London’ and ‘The2018capitaloftheUK’ refertothesame cityintheactualworld(although ‘London’ and ‘The2018capitalof theUK’ arenotlogicallyequivalenttoeachother),andbeingoverpopulatedalways(oflogicalnecessity)makesthesamedifferenceto anysubstanceasdoeshavingtoolargeapopulation, ‘Londonbeing overpopulatedin2018’ and ‘The2018capitaloftheUKhavingtoo largeapopulationin2018’ arethesameevent.⁵

Thepointofdeﬁning ‘sameevent’ andso ‘sameproperty’ inthese waysisthatonthesedeﬁnitionsthereisnomoretothehistoryof theworldortothehistoryofsomenarrowspatiotemporalregionof theworld(intheobjectivesenseofwhathashappened,ishappening, orwillhappen)thanalltheeventswhichhaveoccurred,areoccurring,orwilloccurinitorinthatregion.Thathistoryconsistsofeach substancecomingintoexistenceatacertaintime,acquiringorlosing intrinsicproperties,acquiringorlosingrelationstoothersubstances, andthenceasingtoexistatacertaintime.Itincludes,forexample,a

particulardeskbeingmade,beingpaintedbrown,beingplaced10ft. awayfromthewall,beingmoved15ft.awayfromthewall,damaging the ﬂoorwhenmoved,andthenbeingdestroyed.Andsoonforevery substance.Ifyoulistedalltheeventswhicharedifferentfromeach otheronmydeﬁnition,therewouldbenothingmoretothehistoryof theworldorsomenarrowspatiotemporalregionofitthanwhatis listedthere.

Finally,Ineedtodeﬁneaphilosophicaltermmuchusedindiscussionsofourtopic ‘supervenient’.Propertiesaresaidto ‘ supervene ’ onotherproperties,andeventsaresaidto ‘ supervene ’ onother events.TosaythatsomepropertyA ‘ supervenes ’ onanotherproperty BcanmeansimplythatasubstancehavingBcausesthesubstance tohaveA,andtosaythatsomeeventofasubstancehaving A ‘ supervenes ’ onanothereventofthatsubstancehavingBcan meanmerelythatthesecondeventcausesthe ﬁrstevent.However, indiscussionsofthetopicofthisbook, ‘ supervenes ’ isnotnormally usedinthatcausalsense.Inphilosophicalwritingaboutthetopicof thisbook ‘ supervenes ’ isnormallyunderstoodinamuchstronger sense,asfollows. ApropertyAsupervenesonapropertyB iff (oflogicalnecessity)anyeventofasubstancehavingtheproperty Awould(ifitoccurred)makenofurtherdifferencetotheworld additionaltothatmadebyaneventofthatsubstancehavingthe propertyB,buttheeventofasubstancehavingBwouldmakea furtherdifferencetotheworldadditionaltotheeventofthatsubstancehavingA;andanysubstancewhichhasBhasAbecauseithas B.⁶ SohavingBinvolveshavingA,buthavingAdoesnotinvolve havingB.Thusbeing ‘coloured’ supervenesonbeing ‘ green ’,because anysubstancebeingcolouredisnothingextrabeyonditbeinggreen, butitbeinggreenissomethingextrabeyonditbeingcoloured;and substancesarecolouredbecausetheyaregreen(andnotviceversa). AneventFsupervenesonaneventE iff(oflogicalnecessity)the occurrenceofFmakesnofurtherdifferencetotheactualworld beyondtheoccurrenceofE,buttheoccurrenceofEdoesmakea furtherdifferencebeyondtheoccurrenceofF;andFoccurs becauseEoccurs.So ‘mydeskbeingsymmetricalat10am’ supervenes

on ‘mydeskbeingsquareat10am’;thedeskbeingsymmetricalisnot somethingfurtherbeyonditbeingsquare.Rather,thedeskbeing symmetricalisalreadyinvolvedinitbeingsquare,butitbeingsquare issomethingextrabeyonditbeingsymmetrical;anditissymmetrical becauseitissquare(andnotviceversa).Asthepointissometimes expressed,Godwouldnotneedtodoanythingextrabeyondmaking mydesksquareinordertomakeitsymmetrical,buthecouldmakeit symmetricalwithoutmakingitsquare.

C.Physicalism

Icannowusethesedefinitionstoarticulatethedifferentviewsabout thenatureofhumanbeingsinamoreprecisewaythanIwasableto doinChapter1.Ibeginbydiscussingviewsrivaltomyown,themost extremeofwhichis physicalism.Iunderstandphysicalismasthe doctrinethathumansarephysicalsubstances,andthatallthepropertiesofhumansarephysicalpropertiesorpropertiessuperveningon these.⁷ Ishall provisionallyunderstandbyaphysicalsubstance a substance,allofwhoseessentialpropertiesarephysicalpropertiesor propertiessupervenientonphysicalproperties.Ishall provisionally understandbyaphysicalproperty apropertyofakindpossessedby inanimatesubstances,aswellasoftenbyhumansandhigheranimals, oraconjunctionordisjunctionofsuchproperties.(A conjunction of severalpropertiesP,Q,Ristheproperty ‘PandQandR’ . A disjunction ofseveralpropertiesP,Q,Ristheproperty ‘Por QorR’.)Sobothpropertiessuchashavingacertainmassorelectric chargepossessedbyfundamentalparticleslikeelectronsandprotons, andpropertiespossessedbylargerinanimatesubstancescomposedof fundamentalparticles,suchasbeingslipperyoroctagonal,or flator mountainous,arephysicalproperties.Thusaparticulartableisa physicalsubstance,sincetheessentialpropertiesofsuchatableare beingmadeofsuch-and-suchsolidmatter(forexample,woodor steel),havinga flatsurface,havingacertainheight,andbeingusedby humansforputtingthingson.Allofthesepropertiesaretypical physicalproperties.Amongotherphysicalsubstancesaregates,

roads,trees,andotherplants.Also,humanbodiesarephysicalsubstances,becausetheironlyessentialpropertiesarepropertiesof height,mass,andhavingaspartsabrainandmostothertypical humanorganssuchasaheart,liver,andlimbsinteractingincertain ways.Thepartsofourbodies,suchasourbrains,arealsophysical substances;theessentialpropertiesofhumanbrainsincludesuch propertiesasconsistingofacerebrumandcerebellum,interconnectedbycomplicatedneuralnetworksofcertainkinds.Butphysicalismclaimsnotmerelythathumanbodiesorbrainsarephysical substances,butthathumansthemselvesarephysicalsubstances, since itholds alltheiressentialpropertiesarephysicalproperties (orpropertiessupervenientonphysicalproperties).Ishall provisionallyunderstandbyaphysicalevent aneventofasubstancehavinga physicalproperty(orgainingorlosingaphysicalproperty)ata particulartime,oraphysicalsubstancecomingintoexistenceor ceasingtoexistataparticulartime.Amongphysicaleventsareevents inahumanbrain,suchasneurons ﬁring.

Clearly,however,humanshave,aswellasphysicalproperties, propertieswhichinanimatesubstancesdonothave;humansget angry,areinpain,areafraid,intendtogotoLondon,believethat theworldisveryold,havethoughtsaboutphilosophy,andsoon;and tablesandplanets,electronsandprotons,donothavetheseproperties. Ishallprovisionallyunderstandbyamentalproperty apropertyofthiskindwhichhumans(andthehigheranimals)have,but physicalsubstancesdonothave.Ishallunderstandbya mental substance (ifthereareanysuch)asubstancewhichhasatleastone essentialmentalproperty(whetherornotitalsohasanyessential physicalproperties). Mentalevents areeventsofasubstancehaving (orgainingorlosing)amentalproperty(oramentalsubstance comingintoexistenceorceasingtoexist)ataparticulartime. Amongmentaleventsaresucheventsas ‘Jamesbeingangrywith Johnalllastweek’ and ‘Georgebeinginpainon22October2017’ .

Physicalistsclaimthatallmentalpropertiesarereallyidenticalto physicalpropertiesorsuperveneonthem,andthatthatiswhyall humansarephysicalsubstances;andthatallmentaleventsarereally

identicaltophysicaleventsorsuperveneonthem.Differentversions ofphysicalismgivedifferentaccountsofwhatmakesitthecasethat mentalpropertiesarethesameas,orsuperveneon,physicalproperties.Onsomeversionsofphysicalismthepropertiesareidentical becausethepredicatesdenotingtheproperties(=thewordswhich refertotheproperties)havethesamemeaningascombinations ofwordsdenotingphysicalproperties.Forexample, ‘analytical behaviourism’ holdsthattohaveamentalpropertyjustistobehave inawaywhichcanbeanalysedintermsofthepubliclyobservable movementsofourlimbs,tongue,andotherbodilyorgans,movementsofkindswhichinanimateobjectsalsomake.Accordingto analyticalbehaviourism, ‘JamesisangrywithJohn’ meanssomething like: ‘JamessaidthatJohnhadhurthim,andsohitJohnand/ordid nottalktoorshakehandswithJohnincircumstanceswherehe wouldnormallydothis,andsoon’.Theanalyticalbehaviouristwill admitthat ‘saidthatJohnhadhurthim’ needstobespelledoutmore fullyinphysicalterms;andthe ‘andsoon’,asafullanalysisof ‘being angry ’ intermsofpublicbehaviour,wouldneedtobealongand complicateddisjunctionofconjunctionsofphysicalevents.Butthe behaviouristclaimsthatsuchananalysiscouldbeprovided.Yet, contrarytoanalyticalbehaviourism,itseemsobviousthatpeople maybeangrywithoutthiseverbeingshownbytheirpublicbehaviour.Onephysicalisttheorywhichseekstotakeaccountofthispoint iscalled ‘analyticalfunctionalism’.Thistheoryholdsthathavinga mentalpropertyistobeanalysedashavinganinternalbodilystate (inparticular,abrainstate)whichis normally causedinacertain kindofwayand tends tocauseacertainpatternofbehaviour. ‘JamesisangrywithJohn’ justmeanssomethinglike ‘Jameshasan internalstateofakindnormallycausedbysuchpubliclyobservable causesasbeinghurtbysomeone’sconduct,andwhichtendsto causebehaviour[ofthekindjustdescribedabove]’.Analyticalfunctionalismdiffersfromanalyticalbehaviourisminthatforfunctionalism,beingangryconsistsinhavingacertaininternalstate;and thatinternalstateisnotalwayscausedinthesamewayandwill notalwayscauseanypublicbehaviour itissimplythestatethatis