Ali's Tunisia: Power and Contention in an Authoritarian Regime
Anne Wolf
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BenAli’sTunisia BenAli’sTunisia PowerandContentioninanAuthoritarian Regime ANNEWOLF GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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ToLeopold Acknowledgements Thisbookwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheinvolvementofthemany Tunisianswhowerewillingtogivemeimmenseamountsoftimeandto recounttheirsometimesdifficultexperiencesundertheBenAliregime,and Iamgratefultoallofthem.IamtrulyappreciativeofthemanyfrankdiscussionsIhadwithex–BenAliofficials,whoprovidedtestimoniesanddetailed accountsoftheregime’sinternalworking.Duringthisjourney,Ienjoyedthe unconditionalsupportofmysupervisorandfriendMichaelWillis,whoalways believedinmyproject,encouragedmetopursueit,andreadsuccessivedrafts ofmywork.IamalsodeeplygratefultoGeorgeJoffé,whofirstgotmeinterestedinTunisianpoliticsandhasprovidedpersistentmentoringandsupport overthepasttwelveyears.
Manyotherfriendsandcolleagueshaveprovidedinvaluableguidanceand feedback.DuringmytimeasadoctoralstudentatStAntony’sCollege,UniversityofOxford,IbenefitedfromdiscussionswithEugeneRogan,MohamedSalahOmri,RoryMcCarthy,GlenRangwala,RikkeHaugbolle,Noureddine Jebnoun,WalterArmbrust,ClementHenryMoore,andPaulChaisty.Itwas anhonourtobeaFellowattheTrajectoriesofChangeProgrammeofthe ZEIT-Stiftung,whereIattendedyearlyworkshopsandenjoyeddiscussions withIsabelleWerenfells,AnnaHofmann,andJaneBartels.Iwasfortunate enoughtohaveStathisKalyvasandCharlesTrippasexaminersofmydoctoralthesis,whoprovidedcriticalfeedbackandinvaluablecounselonhowto turnmyworkintoabook.
ItremendouslyenjoyedthestimulatingandsupportiveenvironmentatGirtonCollege,UniversityofCambridge,whereIsubsequentlyheldaresearch fellowshipandspentmuchtimeworkingonconnectingmydeeplylocal andethnographicresearchtowiderdebatesinauthoritarianpolitics.Iam extremelygratefulforStathisKalyvas’sencouragementtoorganizeabook workshop,whereIreceivedin-depthfeedbackfromIvanErmakoff,Giovanni Capoccia,MichaelWillis,ChristopherBarrie,MichaelBiggs,Christopher Mittelstaedt,RikkeHaugbolle,KaterinaDalacoura,RoryMcCarthy,Mathilde Zederman,andLaurenceWhitehead.Icouldnothaveorganizedtheevent withoutAllSoulsCollege,whichgenerouslyhostedandfinancedit.
IfinishedthebookasaFellowatAllSoulsCollege,UniversityofOxford, whereIenormouslybenefitedfromdiscussionswithcolleagues.Iamgrateful forhavingparticipatedinaProjectonMiddleEastPoliticalScienceresearch workshopin2021,organizedbyMarcLynch,whereAdriaLawrencekindly discussedmywork.Severalotherpeopleprovidedcommentsatthiscrucialfinalrevisionstage.TheyincludeMichaelaCollord,MortenValbjørn, GlenRangwala,andIvanErmakoff,whoofferedfeedbackonmytheoreticalframe,alongsideFrancescoCavatorta,whoverygenerouslyreadthe entiremanuscriptbeforesubmission.AtOxfordUniversityPress,Iamdeeply indebtedtoDomincByatt,whoimmediatelyrespondedtomybookproposalwithgreatenthusiasmandfoundthreefantasticreviewersformy manuscript,allofwhomprovidedexcellentcomments.Lastbutnotleast, thankstoRaphaël,whonevergottiredofdiscussingtheBenAliregime, readingchapters,andmotivatingme.
3.1.Gendercompositionofthecabinet
3.2.Averageageofministers
3.3.Partyleadershipprofiles
4.1.AnRCDmembershipcard
4.2.Regionalaffiliationofministers
4.3.RCDfollowerscelebratingBenAli’s‘victory’inthe2009elections
5.1.RCDresignationform
ListofAbbreviations ATCE TunisianAgencyforExternalCommunication
BTS TunisianBankofSolidarity
CCP ChineseCommunistParty
CPR CongressoftheRepublic
CPSU CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion
CREDIF CentreforResearch,Studies,Documentation,andInformationon theWoman
ENA NationalSchoolofAdministration
EUR euro(currency)
FLN NationalLiberationFront(Algeria)
FNE NationalEmploymentFund
FNS NationalSolidarityFund
GPC GeneralPeople’sCongress(Yemen)
LTDH TunisianHumanRightsLeague
MDS SocialistDemocraticMovement
MTI IslamicTendencyMovement
NDP NationalDemocraticParty(Egypt)
NGO non-governmentalorganization
PDP ProgressiveDemocraticParty
PRI InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty(Mexico)
PSD SocialistDestourianParty
RCD ConstitutionalDemocraticRally
RETAP RallyoftheTunisianStudentsinParis
RTF RallyoftheTunisiansinFrance
TND Tunisiandinar
UDU UnionistDemocraticUnion
UGET GeneralUnionofTunisianStudents
UGTE GeneralTunisianUnionofStudents
UGTT TunisianGeneralLabourUnion
UNFT NationalUnionoftheTunisianWoman
USD UnitedStatesdollar
UTICA TunisianUnionofIndustry,Trade,andHandicraft
ANoteonTransliteration ForcolloquialTunisianArabic,IhaveoptedforFrench-basedtransliterations, whicharemostcommonlyusedbyTunisiansthemselves,inordertoreflectthe localvariationsinlanguage.Forexample,theArabicletter ش istransliterated as‘ch’ratherthan‘sh’.Thenamesofwell-knowngroups,movements,names, andplacesmirrorgeneralusesothattheyaremoreeasilyrecognizable.For sourcesderivedfromModernStandardArabic,Iuseasimplifiedversionofthe guidelinesofthe InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies.Inquotations,I havekeptthetransliterationsusedintheoriginaldocuments.
‘Who’sWho?’inBenAli’sRegime Abdallah,Abdelwahab:longtimeBenAliadviserandpalaceassociate;previously ForeignAffairsMinisterandInformationMinister;fromMonastir.
Abidi,Samir:appointedCommunicationsMinisterinDecember2010;previously MinisterforYouthandSports;fromGafsa.
Ammar,Habib:militarycolonelandco-conspiratorinthe7November1987coup againstBourguiba,whoheadedtheNationalGuard;longtimefriendofBenAlifrom Soussebutwasmarginalizedshortlyafterhistakeoverofpower.
Baccouche,Hedi:co-conspiratorinBenAli’s7November1987coup;PrimeMinister fromNovember1987toSeptember1989;SecretaryGeneralofthePSD/RCDfrom November1987toSeptember1989;DirectorofthePSDfromMarch1984toApril 1987;fromHammamSousse.
BenAli,Cyrine:BenAli’sthirddaughterfromhisfirstmarriage.MarriedMarouane Mabrouk.
BenAli,Dorsaf:BenAli’smiddledaughterfromhisfirstmarriage;marriedSlim Chiboub.
BenAli,Ghazoua:BenAli’seldestdaughterfromhisfirstmarriage;marriedSlim Zarrouk.
BenAli,Leila:formerlyLeilaTrabelsi.BenAli’ssecondwife,marriedin1992;from Tunis.
BenAli,Mohamed:BenAli’sonlysonfromhissecondmarriage,toLeila;bornin 2005.
BenAli,Nesrine:BenAli’seldestdaughterwithLeila;marriedSakherel-Materi.
BenDhia,Abdelaziz:longtimeBenAliadviser;RCDSecretaryGeneralbetweenJune 1996andNovember1999,DirectorofthePSDbetweenApril1987andSeptember 1987,andheldvariousministerialposts;fromMoknine,Mahdiagovernorate.
BenMiled,Mounir:prominentbusinessmanandlongtimeRCDCentralCommittee member.
Chaabane,Sadok:BenAliadviser;inFebruary1991,appointedSecretaryofStateto thePrimeMinisterandinJune1991nominatedasfirstpresidentialadviseronhuman rights;fromSfax.
Chaouch,Ali:RCDSecretaryGeneralfromDecember2000toAugust2005;headed variousministries,includingtheInteriorMinistrybetweenOctober1997andNovember1999;fromBouArada,Silianagovernorate.
Cheikhrouhou,Mahmoud:BenAli’spersonalpilot;flewhimtoSaudiArabiaon14 January2011.
Chettaoui,Nabil:headofTunisairatthetimeoftheuprising;responsibleforBenAli’s presidentialplane.
Chiboub,Afif:brother-in-lawofDorsaf,BenAli’sdaughterfromhisfirstmarriage.
Chiboub,Slim:BenAli’sson-in-law,marriedtoDorsaf,BenAli’sdaughterfromhis firstmarriage.
Djilani,Hedi:longtimeheadoftheUTICAemployers’union;relatedtoBenAli throughhisdaughter’smarriagetoBelhassenTrabelsi.
Dkhil,Rafaa:TrabelsiassociateandbusinesspartnerfromBizerte;RCDCentral Committeemember.
Eltaief,Kamel:businessmanandlongtimeBenAliassociate;inFebruary2002,sentencedtoprisonafterafalloutwiththepresidentialfamily;fromHammamSousse.
Essebsi,BejiCaid:longtimeRCDCentralCommitteemember,headofParliamentin the1990s;ForeignAffairsMinisterunderBourguibaandelectedPresidentofTunisia in2014;fromTunis.
Ghannouchi,Mohamed:PrimeMinisterbetweenNovember1999andFebruary2011 andaformerFinanceMinister;fromSousse.
Ghariani,Mohamed:RCDSecretaryGeneralbetweenSeptember2008andMarch 2011;previouslyambassadortotheUnitedKingdomandheadedtheRCDstudent branch;fromKairouan.
Grira,Ridha:DefenceMinisteratthetimeoftheuprisingsandformerStateProperty andLandAffairsMinister;fromSousse.
Gueddich,Mohamed:longtimeBenAlipalaceassociateandhispersonaldoctor;from Hammamet.
Jegham,Mohamed:headofthePresidentialCabinetfromJanuary1997untilNovember1999andoccupiedvariousministries,includingtheDefenceandInteriorMinistries;fromHammamSousse.
Kallel,Abdellah:closeBenAliadviserwhooccupiedtheInteriorMinistry,the DefenceMinistry,andtheJusticeMinistry,amongstotherposts;fromSfax.
Karoui,Hamed:DirectorofthePSD/RCDfromOctober1987toAugust1988,then PrimeMinisterfromSeptember1989toNovember1999;fromSousse.
Kefi,Naima:firstwifeofBenAli;divorcedin1988.
Mabrouk,Marouane:BenAli’sson-in-law;marriedtoCyrine,BenAli’sdaughterfrom hisfirstmarriage.
Materi,Sakher,el-:BenAli’sson-in-law;marriedtoNesrine,BenAli’sdaughterwith Leila.
Mdhafer,Zouhair:createdandlaterheadedtheRCDCentreforStudiesandTraining; formerStatePropertyandLandAffairsMinister.
Mebazza,Fouad:leadingRCDfigureandHeadofParliamentfromOctober1997until 15January2011,whenhebecameInterimPresidentofTunisiaandalsooccupied variousministerialposts;borninTunis.
Mhenni,Hedi:RCDSecretaryGeneralbetweenAugust2005andSeptember2008; appointedInteriorMinisterinApril2002andDefenceMinisterinNovember2004; fromSayada,Monastirgovernorate.
Mohsen,Abbes:RCDCentralCommitteememberbetween2008and2011;mayorof Tunisfrom2000to2010;in1988,nominatedDirectorofProtocolofthePresidentand subsequentlyworkedintheInteriorMinistry;fromTunis.
Morjane,Kamel:ForeignAffairsMinisterfromJanuary2010toJanuary2011; DefenceMinisterfromAugust2005toJanuary2010,andpreviouslyworkedatthe UnitedNations;adistantrelativeofBenAlifromHammamSousse.
Moussi,Abir:lawyerandVice-PresidentoftheRCDCoordinationCommitteeat thetimeoftheuprising;chargedwithlegallydefendingthepartyandchallengedits dissolution.
Neffati,Chedli:RCDSecretaryGeneralbetweenFebruary1991andJune1996; headedvariousministries,includingtheInteriorMinistry,withapreviouscareeras governor;fromGabes.
Nasfi,Hassouna:SecretaryGeneraloftheRCDstudentwingbetween2000and2003; fromGabes.
Rouissi,Moncer:advisertoBenAliwhenhefirsttookpower.Directorofhis1989 presidentialcampaign;occupiedvariousministerialposts,andwasambassadorto FrancebetweenSeptember2003andMay2005;fromDegache,Tozeurgovernorate.
Saada,Ryadh:DirectoroftheRCDCentreforStudiesandTrainingbetween1995and 2008.
Seriati,Ali:BenAli’skeysecuritychiefandheadofthepresidentialguardatthetime oftheuprising;on14January2011,convincedBenAlitoboardtheplaneforSaudi Arabia.
Tarhouni,Samir:commanderoftheAntiterrorismBrigadeatthetimeoftheuprising.
Trabelsi,Belhassen:LeilaBenAli’sfavouritebrother,whobecameaneconomic heavyweightandheadedKarthagoAirlines;fromTunis.
Trabelsi,Imed:LeilaBenAli’sfavouritenephew;electedmayorofLaGoulettein2010.
Zarrouk,Naziha:previousRCDVice-SecretaryGeneral,ambassadortoLebanon (2003–2005),andMinisterforWomenandFamilyAffairs;fromJemmal,Monastir governorate.
Zarrouk,Slim:BenAli’sson-in-law;marriedtoGhazoua,BenAli’sdaughterfromhis firstmarriage.
Zenaidi,Mondher:memberoftheRCDCentralCommitteeandPoliticalBureauo occupiedvariousministerialposts,includingTransport,Commerce,Tourism,and PublicHealth,andassociateofBelhassenTrabelsifromTunis.
Zouari,Abderrahim:RCDSecretaryGeneralbetweenAugust1988andFebruary 1991andbetweenNovember1999andDecember2000;heldseveralministerialposts, includingForeignAffairs,andhadapreviouscareerasagovernor;fromDahmani,Kef governorate.
Introduction AvenueBourguiba,downtownTunis:thousandsofpeoplearecheering, dancing;somearecryingoutinjoy,stupefiedatwhathasjusthappened.It is14January2011andmomentsearlier,at6:45pmlocaltime,PrimeMinister MohamedGhannouchiannouncedhewilltakeovertheinterimpresidency— thefirstinaseriesofstepsthatwillleadtotheoustingofZineel-AbidineBen Ali,thedictatorwhohasruledthecountrywithanironfistforalmosttwentyfiveyears.‘Given[BenAli’s]inabilitytoexercisehisdutiesI...havetaken overthepositionofPresidentoftheRepublic’,GhannouchideclaresinatelevisedspeechfromthePresidentialPalaceinCarthage.Hevowstoimplement the‘political,economicandsocialreforms’thatthepeoplehavedemanded duringweeksofmassprotests—launchingthewider‘ArabUprisings’inthe region—andstressesthathewillinclude‘allnationalsides,politicalparties, nationalorganizationsandcomponentsofcivilsociety’inthisprocess.¹
JustascelebrationsburstoutonthestreetsofTunis,screamsofangerand ragecanbeheardonboardtheairbornepresidentialplane,hundredsofmiles away.‘Whatisgoingon?!’BenAlireportedlyexclaimsincompleteshock whenhehearsthatGhannouchi—oneofhislongtimeassociatesandasenior figureinhisrulingparty—hasassumedthepresidency.Newspapersaround theworldhavealreadybegunproclaimingthatBenAli—whoseflightisen routetoSaudiArabia—hasbeen‘forcedtofleeTunisiaasprotestersclaimvictory’.² BenAlihad,infact,plannedonlyondroppinghisfamilyoffinJeddah beforereturningimmediatelytoTunisia.Furiousandpanic-stricken,BenAli callsGhannouchiandotherseniorofficialsofhisregime.Heinformsthem thathewillreturntoTunisiawithoutdelayanddemandstheyrescindany statementstothecontrary.ArrivinginJeddahintheearlymorningof15January,BenAlidulyordershispilottopreparetheplaneoncemore,fullyintent onheadingbacktoTunisialaterthatday.³ ButBenAliwasnevertoreturn.
¹ ‘Mr.MohamedGhannouchiAnnouncesTakingOverasInterimPresidentofRepublic’, PresidencyoftheGovernmentPortal,14January2011, http://www.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite. php?id=1898&lang=en,lastaccessed10August2022.
² AngeliqueChrisafisandIanBlack,‘Zineal-AbidineBenAliForcedtoFleeTunisiaasProtesters ClaimVictory’, TheGuardian,15January2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/ tunisian-president-flees-country-protests,lastaccessed10August2022.
³ InterviewswithMohamedGhannouchi,Tunis,2October2015;MahmoudCheikhrouhou (BenAli’spersonalpilot),Tunis,1July2016;andNesrineBenAli,Viber,6February2017.Seealso BenAli’sownaccountofevents:‘Tasrihal-RaʾisBinAli—20Huzayran2011’[‘DeclarationofPresident BenAli—20June2011’],publishedviahislawyer,AkramʿAzuri,Beirut,20June2011.
BenAli'sTunisia.AnneWolf,OxfordUniversityPress.©AnneWolf(2023). DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192868503.003.0001
Afteralmostadecadeinexile,hediedinJeddahinSeptember2019,never havingsetfootagainonTunisiansoil.
Thisbookisanin-depthstudyoftheBenAliregime,itsinnerworkings, andeventualcollapsein2011.Extensiveresearchhasfocusedonanti-regime protestersinTunisiaandthewiderregionduringtheArabUprisings,includingtheirdemandsandthedynamicsofmobilization.Bycontrast,innerregime processeshavereceivedrelativelylittlescholarlyattention.Inthisbook,Iseek toaddressthisgap,offeringanentirelynewperspectiveononeofthemost importantrevolutionaryepisodesinrecenthistory.Thebookhaditsgenesis, asinsomesensesdidtherevolutionitself,inSidiBouzid—theTunisiancity wheredemonstrationsfirsttookofffollowingtheself-immolationofstreet vendorMohamedBouaziziinDecember2010.DuringconversationsIhad withpeoplethereaftertherevolution,Iwasconfrontedwithanintellectual puzzlethatmotivatedmetoresearchmoredeeplyintotheBenAliregime and—ultimately—writethisbook.
Thepuzzle WhenvisitingSidiBouzid,onecannotbutbestruckbytherevolutionary heritageinscribedinthecity’sfabric.Graffitiwithanti-regimeslogansfeatures prominentlyonwallsthroughoutthecity;amonumentwaserectedinmemoryofBouazizi,and—nexttoitandmostvisibly—amassiveplacarddepicting the‘martyr’overlooksthecity’smainsquare,whichwasrenamedMohamed BouaziziSquare.Suchsymbolismaside,Iwasmovedbythegreatpridepeople inthismarginalizedsouthernprovinceholdforitsroleinbirthingoneofthe greatestrevolutionarymomentsinrecenthistory.Incafésandinconversation withforeignvisitors,localsfromallkindsofsocialbackgroundspassionately recounttheiractivismduring al-thaura (‘theRevolution’).Thisremainedso eveninthelate2010s,whenpoliticalandeconomiccrises—andinsomecases, civilwarandtheriseofnewauthoritarianregimes—haddampenedenthusiasmfortheArabUprisingsinmostotherpartsofthecountryandthewider region.SidiBouzidremainedimpregnatedwiththespiritoftherevolution—at leastsoitseemedtome.
IwasthereforesurprisedwhenIfirstlearnedthatthehistoryofSidiBouzid wasintimatelylinkednotonlytotheTunisianRevolutionbutalsotoitsmain opponent:theregimeoflongtimedictatorZineel-AbidineBenAli.Inparticular,thecityhadadeepassociationwithhisrulingConstitutionalDemocratic Rally(RCD)party.Asamatteroffact,theSidiBouzidgovernoratehadthe
greatestconcentrationofRCDmembersinallofTunisia:atthetimeofthe uprising,itwashometoabout650RCDcells,eachconsistingof200–300 members.⁴Ofthegovernorate’s415,900-strongpopulation,⁵about39.1%were thuscard-carryingRCDmembers.⁶TofindsomanyRCDmembersinthevery cradleoftheArabUprisings,aplacewherelocalsacrosssocialstrataandprofessionscontinueferventlytodefenditslegacy,seemedcontradictorytome, tosaytheleast.Theprotestsof2010–2011aregenerallyunderstoodashaving beendirectedagainstBenAliandtheRCD,aswellasrespondingtowider grievancessuchaspoliceviolenceandeconomicstagnation.Thus,itdidnot makesensetomethatthebirthplaceoftherevolutionwasswampedwithRCD members.
OnemighthaveexpectedthatRCDfollowerswouldvigorouslyhave opposedtherevolution—afterall,itdeposedtheirleaderandresultedinthe party’sdissolution.Butquitetothecontrary,IsoonuncoveredthatmanyRCD activistsinSidiBouzidhadinfactendorsedthemassprotests.Grassrootsfollowerscommonlyparticipatedinthedemonstrations,andlocalpartyleaders evenencouragedthemtodoso.Ininterviews,someactivistsevenclaimedthat therevoltshadoccurredintheveryspiritoftherulingparty.⁷ Thismadelittle sensetome,atleastinitially—notleastbecauseRCDofficeshadbeenattacked byprotestersinmanypartsofthecountryandwereconsideredkeysymbols oftheBenAliregime.YetpartyfollowersinSidiBouzidferventlyinsistedthat theRCDhadarevolutionarylegacy,givenitsrootsinTunisia’sNeo-Destour independencemovement(Destourmeaning‘constitution’).Hence,belonging totheRCDandparticipatinginrevolutionaryactivismwasnotacontradiction,atleastsotheyclaimed.⁸ Somelocalsevenwentsofarastosuggestthatit wastheRCDthathadforcedBenAlioutofpower—aneventwhichledtothe dissolutionoftherulingpartyitself.Asonegrassrootsactivistproclaimed:‘All RCDactivists...protestedandencouragedtheproteststoturnintoarevolution.RCDfollowerswererevolutionaries...Whodoyouthinkwasbehind BenAli’sfall?The[RCDactivists]ofSidiBouzid!’⁹
⁴ InterviewswithMohamedGhariani,RCDSecretaryGeneralatthetimeoftherevolution,Tunis, 27May2016;andwithAbirMoussi,Vice-PresidentoftheRCDCoordinationCommittee—theparty’s highestregionalinstance—atthetimeoftherevolution,Tunis,31May2016.
⁵ Thedataisfor2011andwasretrievedfromal-Nashraal-Shahriyyali-l-Ihsaʾiyyat [MonthlyBulletin ofStatistics],Tunis:al-Maʿhadal-Watanili-l-Ihsaʾ[NationalInstituteforStatistics],September2012, p.9.
⁶ Thesecalculationsarebasedonanestimatedaverageof250membersperRCDcell.
⁷ InterviewswithvariousRCDmembersinSidiBouzid,JulyandAugust2016.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ InterviewwithSouhail,SidiBouzid,25June2016.
Crucially,suchstatementswerenotfacileattemptsbyisolatedpartyfollowerstoretroactivelybolstertheirlegitimacybyinventingsomerevolutionary activism.Foronething,theseaccountsweretoonumerousandwerealso echoedbypeoplewhodidnotbelongtotherulingparty.¹⁰Moreover,evidence foranti-regimeresistancebysomepartyfigureswentbeyondoraltestimonies. Amongstotherexamples,inRegueb,aruraltownintheSidiBouzidgovernorate,adocumentwascirculatedamongstRCDfollowersaskingthemto resignfromtherulingpartyandcallingfornothinglessthantheparty’sselfdissolution.¹¹ ThepatterninSidiBouzidexemplifiedatendencyfoundmore widelyacrossTunisia:RCDfollowersinotherpartsofthecountryalsonot onlyfailedtocountermobilizebutinmanycasesevensupportedthemass demonstrations.
Fromatheoreticalpointofview,RCDfollowers’dissentagainsttheBen Aliregimepresentsaconundrum:oneofthekeypremisesoftheliteratureon authoritarianpoliticsisthatrulingpartiesareaforceforstabilityinthatthey possessanumberofpositive-feedbackmechanismsthatstrengthenregimes overtime.Thisliteratureprovidesfewcluesastowhenandwhyrulingpartiesturnintoarenasforoppositionanddissent,possiblyevencontributingto regimebreakdown.Similarly,thescholarshiponrevolutionsandcontentious politicsofferslimitedinsightsintowhysomeRCDfollowersjoinedtheArab Uprisings:itfocusesoncontentionagainst,not within,theregime.Itisinthis lightthatthisbookseekstoanswerthefollowingquestions.Whywouldsome membersofBenAli’srulingpartyparticipateinprotestsagainsthisregime and,insomeinstances,evengosofarastocallforhisdownfallandthe dissolutionoftheRCD—theirownparty?Moregenerally,whichfactorsinfluencetherelationbetweenadictatorandrulingpartyandwithwhateffectson authoritarianstabilityandcollapse?
Keyargumentsandtheory Iuncoveredthat—farfrompursuingaunifiedcause—RCDactivistswhosupportedtheprotestsdidsoforavarietyofreasons,dependinginpartontheir partyrankandregionalaffiliation.InSidiBouzid,aselsewhereinTunisia, manymid-levelandgrassrootsfollowershadlostalltrustinBenAli,giventhe city’sseveresocioeconomicmarginalization;theywereconvincedthataslong
¹⁰ Forexample,interviewswithSalmaandKhalid,SidiBouzid,July2016.
¹¹ Muhammadal-Arabial-Zuraibi,al-Reguebminal-Tahririlaal-Taʿmir [al-Regueb:FromLiberation toReconstruction],Tunis:DarAl-QalamPublishingandDistribution,2016,pp.225,227.
asheremainedatthehelm,matterswouldonlygetworse.Bycontrast,some seniorofficialsinthecityhopedthattheprotestswouldpressureBenAlito pourmorefinancialresourcesintothelocalRCDbranch.Theylamentedthat beingaregionalpartyleadermeantnothing.‘IamfromtheRCDbutIhave four[familymembers]withlawdegreeswhoarejobless:mywife,mysister, aswellasmytwobrothers!’,exclaimedSidiBouzid’sRCDVice-President.¹² FiveyearsonfromBenAli’souster,hewasstillangrythatotherpartyfigures inthecityhadsupportedcompleteregimechange,affirmingthatBenAliwas abouttoallocatemoremoneytotheRCDinSidiBouzidbutcouldnotpursue thisplanbecausehewasousted.
Otherpartyactivistsadvancedotherreasonsfornotsupportingtheregime atatimeofcrisis.BeyondSidiBouzid,inJendouba,acity150kilometres westofTunis,amid-levelofficialtoldmethatheandhiscolleaguesengaged in‘passiveresistance’—thatis,completeinaction—inordertosignaltothe powerbrokersinTunisthattheywantedinternalpartyreforms.Inparticular,theychargedthatlocalandmid-levelrepresentativesnolongerhadany politicalleverage,andtheyhopedthat—bywithdrawingfrompro-regime activism—theywouldcompelBenAliandhisassociatestorestoretheinfluencetheyonceheld.Bycontrast,inTunis,fewhighofficialsengagedinany contentiousactionsagainstthepowerbrokersatall—thatis,until14January, whenPrimeMinisterMohamedGhannouchiannouncedhehadtakenover theinterimpresidency.
Whilstthenatureofthechangespartyfollowerssoughtvaried,activists’core critiquesoftheBenAliregimewerestrikinglysimilartooneanother:they deploredthatthePresidenthadgainedvastpersonalpowersandprogressively marginalizedrulingpartyactivists.Inparticular,theydisapprovedofBenAli’s family,who,theyclaimed,hadaccumulatedextensivewealthonthebackof ordinaryTunisians—includingmanyRCDactivists.Partyrepresentativessaid theylackedanyinfluencevis-à-visthesefiguresandincreasinglyfeltlikepuppetsintheserviceof‘thefamily’.TheychargedthatBenAliandhisrelatives hadrobbedtheRCDofitsidentityandnationalistcause,andthatthePresidentandhiskinlackedanypoliticalvisionandproject—thatis,otherthan accumulatingmoreresourcesforthemselves.RCDfollowerswereparticularly dismayedthatintheyearsbeforetherevolution,somemembersoftheBenAli familyhadintegratedintotherulingpartyandplacedtheirassociatesinkey positions.TheysuspectedthatBenAli,whowasseventy-fouratthetime,was tryingtogroomarelativeasapresidentialsuccessorthroughtherulingparty.
¹² InterviewwithAbderrazekDaly,SidiBouzid,25June2016.
‘TheRCDhadbecomeafamilyparty’,onehighofficialsaid,summingupher indignation.¹³
GiventhattheliteraturefailstoexplaintheRCD’srevoltagainstBenAli,I decidedtodrawupatheoryofpowerandcontentionwithinrulingpartiesin authoritarianregimes.Itdelineateshowincumbentsseektofortifytheirrule andfosterparty-politicalstability,aswellaswhenandwhytheysuccumbto internalcontentionandwithwhateffect.Thistheoryrespondstothecomplexpicturesetoutabove,inwhichpartyfollowers’diverseinterestsgiverise tointra-partypressuresthatultimatelydestabilizedtheregime,apatternthat extendsbeyondtheTunisiancase.Chapter1outlinesthisindetail,butthe keytenetsareasfollows:partyleadersalwaysseektoaccumulatemorepower but,intheprocess,marginalizeimportantconstituentswhomaydecideto turnagainstthem.Hence,thereisnothingautomaticallyself-perpetuatingor stabilizingaboutrulingparties.Regimedecayandcollapsecanoweasmuch tointernaldevelopmentsasitcanbetheresultofexternalprocessesora combinationofboth—thoughinternecinefactorsaremoredifficulttoobserve.
Atthemostbasiclevel,contentiousactorscanbedifferentiatedaccording towhethertheyoperateintheeliteoramongstthemid-levelandgrassroots ranks.Ifarulingpartyactsasaconstraintinthatitcontrolsthepowerof theleader,itiselitefigureswhoyieldmostinfluence,andtheymayoustan incumbentwhodoesnotservetheirinterests,especiallyifhehaslostsupport amongstwiderpartyranks.Becauseofthepersistentthreatsofelitecoups, leadershaveaninterestinpersonalizingtheirpower;thatis,theywantto ruleunchecked.Personalistdictators—suchasBenAliwasbeginningtobe inthe1990s—havesidelinedanyvetoplayersintheeliteandplaceseniorofficialsunderclosescrutiny,whichmakesitchallengingforanydissentersatthe party’supperechelonstomoveagainsttheirleader.
However,mid-levelandgrassrootsfollowerstypicallystillenjoysomefreedomofactioninpersonalistregimes.Anditisattheselevelsthatfollowersmay stagearevoltfromwithintheregimeifanincumbent’sauthorityandlegitimacyhavecomeunderthreat.Thisisespeciallythecaseoncethegrievances theyharbourmultiplyandbeginoverlappingwithnoprospectthatmatters willimproveontheirown.However,initiallyfollowers’contentionismostly inconspicuous,anditdoesnotnecessarilyleadtothechangestheyseekas incumbentsrespondwithsevererepressionandauthoritarianreinforcement. Butinternaldissentdoesmaketheeventofregimebreakdownmorelikely, specificallyduringmomentsofwiderpoliticalcrisis:itexposesaleaderasa
¹³ InterviewwithNazihaZarrouk,apreviousambassadortoLebanonandRCDVice-Secretary General,Tunis,30January2017.
strawmanwhohaslostthesupportamongstwiderregimeranks.Thisincites otheractorstomobilizeagainsttheregime,notonlyinvigoratingthepolitical oppositionbut,importantly,alsounsettlingtheincumbent’straditionalsupporters,whofearbeingtrappedonasinkingship.Thisiswhathappenedin Tunisiaon14January2011whenMohamedGhannouchi—oneofBenAli’s longtimeloyalists—tookoverpower.
Methodologicalconsiderations Thisstudyispartofawiderattemptundertakenbyanewgenerationof scholarsinareastudiestodrawupontheirin-depthcountryorregional expertise‘toelucidatefeaturesofalargerclassofsimilarphenomena’.¹⁴ I operatefromthepremisethatthiscanbestbedonebyrecognizing—indeed, highlighting—thespecificityofone’scaseandallofitsbreadth—thatis,by reportingandanalysingtrendsthataregeneralizableandthosethatarenot. Asamatteroffact,itistypicallynotimmediatelyapparentwhichfeatures arecase-specificandwhichoneshavewiderrelevance.Thismeansthatthe bookaimstoelucidatephenomenaattwolevels:(1)thoseoftheBenAli regimeandtheRCDand(2)thoseofdictatorshipsandrulingpartiesmore generally.Eachchapterstartswithatheoreticalorempiricalpuzzle,which Isubsequentlyseektoanswerthroughanarrative-guidedapproachof‘processtracing’.Thisqualitativeresearchmethoddraws‘descriptiveandcausal inferencesfromdiagnosticpiecesofevidence’,typicallyinvolvingaclose examinationofspecificeventsandsituationsandhowtheyunfoldovertime.¹⁵ Respectforhistoricaldetailandaccuracyisparamountinameticuloustechniquethatuncoversnovelempiricalphenomena,thespecificmechanismsthat underliethem,andhowtheyrelatetoexistingcausalclaims,generatingnew theoreticalinsights.¹⁶
Thisbookdrawsonawealthofqualitativeinterviewscarriedoutacrossthe eighteenmonthsIspentinTunisiabetween2014and2018.Theinterviewees includedeightgroups:(1)112RCDofficialsandactivistsofvariousranks andpositions,including6outofits8formerSecretariesGeneralandall ofitsthreevice-presidents,¹⁷ manyofwhomIinterviewedseveraltimes;
¹⁴ JohnGerring,‘WhatIsaCaseStudyandWhatIsItGoodFor?’,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview, 2004,98,2,p.341.
¹⁵ DavidCollier,‘UnderstandingProcessTracing’, PoliticalScienceandPolitics,2011,44,4,p.824.
¹⁶ JohnGerring,‘WhatIsaCaseStudyandWhatIsItGoodFor?’,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview, 2004,98,2,p.346.
¹⁷ AbdelazizBenDhia,RCDSecretaryGeneralbetween1996and1999,passedawayin2015;Hedi Mhenni,SecretaryGeneralbetween2005and2008,wasunavailableforaninterviewduetohealth issues.
(2)18high-leveldiplomatsandministerswhowerenotformallymembers oftherulingparty;(3)6closerelativesofBenAli;(4)7keyactorsduringthe 2010–2011uprising,includingMohamedGhannouchiandBenAli’spersonal pilot,whoflewhimtoSaudiArabiaon14January2011;(5)13representativesofgroupsandassociationsthatwerecloselylinkedtotheRCD,suchas theemployers’federationandthepublicadministration;(6)35opposition activistsinpoliticsandcivilsociety,includingbloggers,labourunionactivists, andrepresentativesofthekeyoppositionparties;(7)19demonstratorsinthe 2010–2011uprisingwhowereotherwisenotpoliticallyactive;and(8)6journalists,experts,andscholarsofTunisianpolitics.Unlesstheywereprominent publicofficials,Iusepseudonymstosafeguardinterviewees’anonymity.
MaterialsgatheredintheNationalArchivesinTunissupplementthisinterviewdata,asdodocumentsfromtheprivatehouseholdsofpreviousRCD activistswhoagreedtosharetheirmaterialwithme.Theseincludeofficial RCDpamphlets,internalpartystatutes,andelectoralcampaignmaterial, alongsidebooksandconferencematerialpublishedbytheparty’sideological educationwing.Ialsoaccessedregimemouthpieces,mostimportantlythe officialRCDdaily LeRenouveau andthelocaldaily LaPresse,whichauthoritiesalsocontrolled.Thesesourcesareparticularlyusefulinreconstructing theevolutionofofficialregimediscourseandyieldadeeperunderstanding ofkeypoliticalplayers,events,anddecisionsatthetime.Moreover, LeRenouveaureportedinmuchdepthonformalRCDevents,partycongresses,andthe generalelections,andthiscoverageisinstrumentalintracingchangewithin thepartyofamoreevolutionarynature,suchasthewaysinwhichalliances wereconstantlyredrawnandformalizedorwhenandhownewleadersand rulesemerged.
Tobalancetheweightofthisofficialregimepropaganda,Idrawalsoondissidentmagazinesandsourcesfoundtodayin‘expandedarchives’,inparticular incyberspace.UnderBenAli,socialmediaoutlets,includingFacebook, Twitter,andYouTube,wereimportantchannelsthroughwhichopponents expressedtheirdiscontent.HumanrightsreportsonTunisiawerealsopublishedonline,andWikiLeaksyieldedcablesfromtheUSembassyinTunis thatprovedinformative.Myfirstmonograph,onBenAli’smainpolitical opposition,theIslamistEnnahdaparty,alsoprovidesvaluablebackground.¹⁸ Itriangulatedthesematerialsinthisbooktoreconstructspecificeventsand processesandthecausalmechanismsunderlyingthem.
¹⁸ See,fordetails, AnneWolf, PoliticalIslaminTunisia:TheHistoryofEnnahda,NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress,2017.
Outlineofchapters Chapter 1 setsoutthetheoryappliedthroughoutthisbook.Iarguethat thepoliticsofideasiscentraltoscrutinizingthedurabilityofdictatorships withrulingparties,challengingstudiesthatfocusprimarilyonincumbents’ useorthreatofforce.Iholdthattherootofdictatorialstabilityisinternal:incumbentsalwaysseektoaccumulategreaterpower,butinthisprocess theyrisklosingthesupportoftheirconstituency.Tocounterthisthreat,dictatorshavetwoideationalstrategiesattheirdisposal:(1)correctivismand (2)thecreationofnewnormativepriorities.Bothinvolvethepromotionof innovations,ostensiblyforthegoodofthepartyoralargerobjectivebut throughwhichincumbentsinfactseektofortifytheirownrule.Forthese strategiestosucceed,theproposedchangesneedtoresonatewithpartyfollowersandappeardesirableandcredible.Ifthisisnotthecaseandfollowers considertheincumbent’spowerreinforcementtobeunjustandillegitimate, theymayrebelagainsthim.Anyinternecinecontentionlaysthegroundfor widerpoliticalinstabilityandpossiblyevenregimecollapse.
Chapter 2 uncovershowintheTunisiancaseBenAlimanaged—within justtwoyearsofassumingpowerin1987—toestablishpersonalcontrolof theRCD,eventhoughhelackedabackgroundintheparty.Fromatheoreticalpointofview,BenAli’squickconsolidationofpowerpresentsapuzzle: prevailingtheoriespredictthat,whenanewleaderhastobargainwithapreexistingrulingparty,theadventofpersonalautocracyisunlikely.Isolvethis puzzlebydemonstratinghowBenAlibolsteredhispowerbasebypropagating acorrectivistideology,akeyfeatureofwhichwasthepromiseofapoliticalopening,includinginsidetherulingparty.Amongstotherstrategies,he launchedan‘internalcritique’withintheparty:ostensiblyaimedataddressing pastwrongs,thisinfactservedBenAli’sinterestsbyfacilitatingwiderregime transformations.Crucially,itallowedhimtoaltertheRCD’sinternalrules andprocedures,includingthosepertainingtotheelectionofthepresident, aprocessthroughwhichheestablishedexecutivecontrol.
InChapter 3,Iinvestigatehow,inthe1990s,BenAlimanagedtoenforce authoritarianstabilityandevenattractsubstantialdomesticandWesternsupportdespitehaltinghispoliticalopeningandestablishingpersonalrule.I demonstratethatBenAliproppeduphispowerbasebyconstructingnewnormativepriorities—inparticular,nationalsecurityandeconomicgrowth—as opposedtodemocraticpolitics.Aspartofthisstrategy,officialsusedstateandparty-controlledmediaoutlets,amongstotherchannels,topropagatethe impressionthatTunisiafacedalarge-scaledomesticterroristthreat;though
fabricated,thisnotionwasinternalizedbywidesectionsofthepopulation, includingmanyRCDactivists.Importantly,thesenewsecurityprerogatives allowedBenAlitobolsterhispower:hepromotedtheriseof‘Lumpenactivists’ withinthepartygrassroots,aconstituencynotoriousformonitoringand coercingdissidents.BenAlialsotransferredresourcesfromthepartytothe PresidentialPalace,furtherreinforcinghisgripontheRCD.
Chapter 4 shedslightonwhy,inthe2000s,BenAli’ssupportbasebegan tocrumble,includingamongstRCDranks,eventhoughhepropagatedthe sameeconomicandsecurityprerogativesandevenlaunchedatentative politicalopening.Idemonstratehowthesepolicyprioritiesexhaustedthemselves,inthatpeople—includingmanyRCDactivists—nolongerperceived themascredible.TheregimehaddefeatedthemainIslamistparty,thesupposedterroristthreat;inaddition,thePresidentandhisrelativeswereopenly accumulatingvastwealthattheexpenseofordinarypeople,includingRCD followers,manyofwhomwerestrugglingtomakeendsmeet.Toaddinsultto injury,BenAlibegantogroomapresidentialsuccessorfromhisownfamily, furtherweakeningtherulingparty.ItisforthesereasonsthatagrowingnumberofRCDactivistscametoquestionthelegitimacyofBenAli’srule.Some evenengagedincontentiousactivityagainsttheregime,thoughatfirstthiswas mostlyinconspicuous.
IshowinChapter 5 thatduringthe2010–2011Tunisianuprising,internecinecontentioneruptedpublicly,becomingakeyfactorbehindtheregime’s collapse.InsteadoforganizingralliesinsupportofBenAli,partyactivists turnedintoagentsofcontention:somejoinedthemassprotests,especiallyat thegrassrootslevel,whereasothersdecidedtopursuepassiveformsofresistance.MostRCDfollowerssoughtpoliticalreforms,inparticularcallingon BenAlitostrengthenthepartyanddesistfromnepotism;theydidnotseek thetotaloverhauloftheregime,letalonethedissolutionoftheirownparty, thoughsomelatercametoadoptsuchanagenda.However,theircontentious actionsexposedBenAli’svulnerability,andtheoverallcontingencyofthe momentpromptedasmallcliqueofregimeofficialstomoveagainstthePresident.Indeed,incontrasttothewidelyacceptednarrativethatBenAlifledthe massprotests,Iprovideevidencethathewas,infact,oustedinasecretcoup d’état.
Theconclusionrevisitsthemaintheoreticalandempiricalfindingsofthe bookandplacesthemincomparativecontext.Inparticular,Ishowhowa rangeofdictatorsotherthanBenAlihaveadvancedcorrectiviststrategiesto consolidatetheirpower,includingSyria’sHafezal-AssadandChina’sXiJinping.Ifurtherillustratehowpersonalistleaderselsewherehavepropagated newnormativeprioritiestofortifytheirrule,attimessuccessfully,butalso
discussingwhenandwhytheseattemptsatauthoritarianregenerationfailed orexhaustedthemselvesandwithwhateffects.Indeed,otherrulingparties haveincubatedinternaldissent,includinginEgypt,Yemen,andSyriaduringtheArabUprisings,aswellasbeyondtheregion,trendsthatsometimes contributedtothecollapseofauthoritarianregimes.
1 TheDictator’sParty ATheoryofPowerandContention WhywouldsomemembersofBenAli’srulingpartyparticipateinprotests againsthisregimeand,insomeinstances,evengosofarastocallfor hisdownfallandthedissolutionoftheRCD—theirownparty?Thisriddle promptedmetoscrutinizetheinternalworkingsoftheBenAliregimeand theRCD.Italsoledmetoinvestigatemoregenerallythefactorsinfluencingthe relationshipbetweenadictatorandarulingpartyandtheeffectsonauthoritarianstabilityandcollapse.Astheintroductionhasshown,RCDfollowers protestedforavarietyofreasons:somedemandedinternalpartyreforms orsocioeconomicbenefits,whilstotherssoughtthefalloftheregime.Their revoltillustratesthatrulingpartiesarenotnecessarilyself-perpetuatingand stabilizingforauthoritarianregimes.Leadingscholars,indeed,maintainthat rulingpartiesinauthoritarianregimesare‘historicallystickyandpolitically stabilizing’.¹ Isuggestthattherootsofbothauthoritarianstabilityandcollapse are internal totheseregimesandtheirrulingparties,thoughinternecinefactorsaremoredifficulttodiscern.Thischapterdrawsupatheoryforfathoming howleadersseektofortifytheirruleandidentifyingwhen,why,andhowparty activistsengageincontentiousactionsagainstthemandwithwhateffects.
Iproposethattwokeyvariablesdeterminethebalanceofpowerbetween partyfollowersandtheirincumbent:first,theinternalopportunitystructure— thatis,theextenttowhichpartyrepresentativesholdswayovertheirleader. Partyofficialsmayentirelycontroltheirincumbent,ortheymaysharepower withhimonanequalfooting;however,apartyleadermayalsoescape anyaccountability,whichmakesitmorechallengingtomoveagainsthim. Second,theincumbent’ssuccessatmobilizinginternalpartysupport—that is,theextenttowhichhesucceedsingeneratinglegitimacybeliefsamongst followers.Iuncovertwoideationalstrategiesthroughwhichincumbentsseek topropuptheirpower:first,thepropagationofacorrectivistideology,and
¹ DanSlater,‘InstitutionalComplexityandAutocraticAgencyinIndonesia’,inJamesMahoneyand KathleenThelen(eds.), ExplainingInstitutionalChange:Ambiguity,Agency,andPower,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,p.137.
BenAli'sTunisia.AnneWolf,OxfordUniversityPress.©AnneWolf(2023). DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192868503.003.0002
second,thecreationofnewnormativepriorities.Bothinvolvethemobilizationofideology—notonlyornecessarilyoutofconvictionbutalso,crucially, toredistributepowertotheirpersonaladvantageandfosterregimestability. Differentideationalstrategiesfavourtheriseofcertainpartycoalitionsand actorsoverothers.Notably,suchinternalreshufflesalwaysoccur,evenduring generallystabletimes;indeed,acertainamountofpartypersonnelchangeis evennecessarytopre-emptregimestagnationordecay.However,Ipropose thatmarginalizedsectionsoftherulingpartymayturnintoimportantinternal challengersifanincumbent’slegitimacyandauthorityhavecomeunderthreat. Ifthepartylimitsthepoweroftheincumbent,eliteactorsenjoythemostleverageandconstitutethekeycontenders;however,manyincumbentseventually becomepersonalistrulersandplacethemunderclosescrutiny.Inthisscenario,thecentralcontentiousactorsaremid-levelandgrassrootsfollowers, whooftenstillenjoysomeautonomy.Actorslikethesemaydecidetorevolt againstanincumbentiftheirgrievancesarelefttomountandtheybelieve matterswillonlygetworse.Theirdissentmakesregimecollapsemorelikely: internecinecontentionlaysbarethatthedictatorhaslostthesupportofhis ownconstituency.Thispromptsothers—includinglongtimeloyalistsseeking tosavetheirownskin—toturnagainsthim.
Whowantsthefalloftheregime? Al-shaʿbyuridisqatal-nizam! Or: Thepeoplewantthefalloftheregime! This slogan,themostfamousoftheArabUprisings,waschantedfirstinTunisia, andresoundedalongAvenueBourguibaon14January,thedaytheBenAli regimefell.ThesepopularrevoltsinspiredanentiregenerationofnewscholarshiponTunisia,whichfocusedon‘peoplepower’andprotestdynamicsto explaintheoustingofBenAliandthesubsequentdissolutionoftheRCD.² Similarframeshavebeenusedtobetterunderstandthetrajectoriesofother
² Keyworksinclude LaryssaChomiak,‘TheMakingofaRevolutioninTunisia’, MiddleEastLaw andGovernance,2011,3,pp.68–83; PeterJ.SchraederandHamadiRedissi,‘BenAli’sFall’, Journalof Democracy,2011,22,3,pp.5–19; OlivierPiot, LaRévolutionTunisienne:DixJoursquiÉbranlèrent leMondeArabe,Paris:PetitsMatins,2011; RidhaZouaoui, al-Thawraal-Tunisiyya, ThawratalHamishʿalaal-Markaz [TheTunisianRevolution:ThePoweroftheMarginalized],ʿAlaʾal-Din: Sfax,2012; NouriGana(ed.), TheMakingoftheTunisianRevolution:Contexts,Architects,Prospects, Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2013; AlcindeHonwana, YouthandRevolutioninTunisia, London:ZedBooks,2013;SalemLabiadh,Tunis:al-ThawrafiZamanal-Haymana[Tunisia:TheRevolutionduringTimesofDomination],Tunis:Muʾassassatal-Hasad,2013; AmiraAleya-Sghaier,‘The TunisianRevolution:TheRevolutionofDignity’,inRicardoLarémont(ed.), Revolution,Revoltand ReforminNorthAfrica:TheArabSpringandBeyond,Abingdon:Routledge,2014,pp.30–52.
