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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Ryan, Richard M., editor.
Title: The Oxford handbook of self-determination theory / [edited by Richard M. Ryan].
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022026824 (print) | LCCN 2022026825 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197600047 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197600061 (epub)
6. Causes, Costs, and Caveats: Reflections and Future Directions for Goal Contents Theory 139
Emma L. Bradshaw
7. Relationships Motivation Theory 160
C. Raymond Knee and Lindsay Browne
Basic Research Themes
8. Mindfulness and the Satisfaction of Basic Psychological Needs 187
Polina Beloborodova and Kirk Warren Brown
9. Integration versus Minimization of Emotional Experiences: Addressing Adaptive Emotion Regulation 200
Guy Roth and Moti Benita
10. The Energy behind Human Flourishing: Theory and Research on Subjective Vitality 215
Christina Frederick and Richard M. Ryan
11. Need-Supportive and Need-Thwarting Socialization: A Circumplex Approach 236
Nathalie Aelterman and Maarten Vansteenkiste
12. Neuropsychological Research in Self-Determination Theory 258
Woogul Lee
13. How Life Events Are Integrated into the Self as Memories: A Memory Approach to Need Satisfaction and Emotion Regulation 272
Frederick L. Philippe
14. Toward a Neurobiology of Integrative Processes 292
Stefano I. Di Domenico and Richard M. Ryan
15. Self-Determination Theory as the Science of Eudaimonia and Good Living: Promoting the Better Side of Human Nature 309
Frank Martela
Special Topics and Models
16. The Role of Motivation in the Lifecycle of Personal Goals 327
Anne C. Holding and Richard Koestner
17. Using Free Will Wisely: The Self-Concordance Model 346
Kennon M. Sheldon and Ryan Goffredi
18. The Authentic Inner Compass as an Important Motivational Experience and Structure: Antecedents and Benefits 362
Avi Assor, Moti Benita, and Yael Geifman
19. The Role of Passion in Optimal Functioning in Society and Resilience 387
Robert J. Vallerand and Virginie Paquette
20. With My Self: Self-Determination Theory as a Framework for Understanding the Role of Solitude in Personal Growth 402
Netta Weinstein, Thuy-vy Nguyen, and Heather Hansen
21. Philosophical Perspectives on Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory 423
Alexios Arvanitis and Konstantinos Kalliris
22. Psychometric Approaches in Self-Determination Theory: Meaning and Measurement 438
Joshua L. Howard
Development
23. A Lifespan Perspective on the Importance of the Basic Psychological Needs for Psychosocial Development 457
Bart Soenens and Maarten Vansteenkiste
24. How Parental Autonomy Support, Structure, and Involvement Help Children
Flourish: Considering Interactions, Context, and Diversity 491
Wendy S. Grolnick and Rachel E. Lerner
25. Autonomy-Supportive Behaviors: Common Features and Variability across Socialization Domains 509
Geneviève A. Mageau and Mireille Joussemet
26. Supporting Children’s Autonomy Early On: A Review of Studies Examining Parental Autonomy Support toward Infants, Toddlers, and Preschoolers 529
Mireille Joussemet and Geneviève A. Mageau
27. Conditional Regard in Development and Relationships 548
Yaniv Kanat-Maymon, Avi Assor, and Guy Roth
28. Developmental Issues in Emerging Adulthood 571
Catherine F. Ratelle and Frédéric Guay
Education and Learning
29. Education as Flourishing: Self-Determination Theory in Schools as They Are and as They Might Be 591
Richard M. Ryan, Johnmarshall Reeve, Haya Kaplan, Lennia Matos, and
Sung Hyeon Cheon
30. Self-Determination Theory and Language Learning 619
Kimberly A. Noels
31. Motivation and Self-Regulation in Music, Musicians, and Music Education 638
Paul Evans
32. Self-Determination Theory in Health Professions Education Research and Practice 665
Rashmi A. Kusurkar
33. Self-Determination Theory and the Education of Learners with Disabilities 684
Michael L. Wehmeyer
Physical Needs, Activity, and Sport
34. Self-Determination Theory Applied to Sport 701
Martyn Standage
35. Motivational Processes in Physical Education: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 724
Ian M. Taylor and Chris Lonsdale
36. Self-Determination Theory in Physical Activity Contexts 740
John C. K. Wang and Martin S. Hagger
37. The Interplay between Basic Psychological Needs and Sleep in Self-Determination Theory 760
Rachel Campbell and Maarten Vansteenkiste
Clinical and Health Applications
38. Facilitating Health Behavior Change: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 777
Nikos Ntoumanis and Arlen C. Moller
39. Autonomy Support and Autonomous Motivation: Common Factors in Counseling and Psychotherapy 801
David C. Zuroff and Richard Koestner
40. The Transdiagnostic Role of the Basic Psychological Needs in Psychopathology 819
Jolene van der Kaap-Deeder
41. The Ethics and Practice of Autonomy-Supportive Medicine 837
Jamie M. Besel and Geoffrey Williams
42. Self-Determined Motivation, Oral Hygiene Behavior, Oral Health, and Oral Health–Related Quality of Life 861
Anne Elisabeth Münster Halvari and Hallgeir Halvari
Work and Organizations
43. Shaping Tomorrow’s Workplace by Integrating Self-Determination Theory: A Literature Review and Recommendations 875
Jacques Forest, Marc-Antoine Gradito Dubord, Anja H. Olafsen, and Joëlle Carpentier
44. How Important Is Money to Motivate People to Work? 901
Marylène Gagné, Alexander Nordgren Selar, and Magnus Sverke
45. Leadership: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 920
Anja Van den Broeck and Gavin R. Slemp
46. How to Motivate People to Care about Prejudice Reduction in the Workplace 939
Nicole Legate and Netta Weinstein
Media and Technology Applications
47. Captivated by Meaning: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Motivation for Entertainment Media 959
Paul J. C. Adachi and C. Scott Rigby
48. Self-Determination Theory and Technology Design 978
Dorian Peters and Rafael A. Calvo
49. Flourishing in Digital Environments: The Case for Self-Determination Theory as a Beneficial Framework for Individuals, Industry, and Society 1000 C. Scott Rigby
The Self in Society
50. Self-Determination Theory in Cross-Cultural Research 1023
Martin F. Lynch
51. Self-Determination Theory and International Development 1051
Nobuo R. Sayanagi and Marieke C. van Egmond
52. Social Issues: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 1070
Randall Curren
53. A Group-Conscious Approach to Basic Psychological Needs Theory 1088
Frank J. Kachanoff
54. A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Stigma and Prejudice 1106
William S. Ryan and Annabelle Moore
55. The “What” and the “Why” of Pro-Environmental Deeds: How Values and Self-Determined Motivation Interact to Predict Environmentally Protective Behavior 1130
Lisa Legault
56. The Social Conditions for Human Flourishing: Economic and Political Influences on Basic Psychological Needs 1149
Richard M. Ryan and Cody R. DeHaan
Epilogue
57. Acting as One: Self-Determination Theory’s Scientific and Existential Import 1173
The Center for Self-Determination Theory (CSDT) is proud to have been a part of producing this authoritative volume documenting the current state of research using self-determination theory (SDT). CSDT is a nonprofit organization created to sponsor and advance SDT’s scientific research as well as help people learn more about intrinsic motivation, basic psychological needs, and human autonomy and apply these concepts in their professional and daily lives. Now in our sixth year, CSDT’s work engages people worldwide through our online library of articles and metrics, interviews, videos, and posts by SDT experts. In addition, we host a variety of events, including SDT’s international conferences. CSDT’s commitment and the purpose of this present handbook are one and the same: disseminating the latest scholarship and creating the best possible conditions for high-quality motivation, engagement, and wellness.
The release of The Oxford Handbook of Self-Determination Theory will mark 20 years since the first handbook of SDT research was published, derived from presentations at the first International Conference on Self-Determination Theory. At that inaugural event, a group of approximately 75 researchers and students from four countries gathered in a small conference room at the University of Rochester, sharing the latest evidence, thoughts, and ideas and asking each other to think big: What could SDT contribute to human flourishing? Although the answers to that question may not have been fully apparent at the time, in the more than 20 years since then SDT has had enormous impact in many different areas of basic research and real-world practice, showing its forward motion in promoting human flourishing that continues today.
To put this growth into perspective: in 1999, there were fewer than 800 published papers on self-determination theory, according to Google Scholar; today the collection of publications on SDT is roughly 100,000—that is an increase of over 12,000%. And the number of citations for these publications is beyond remarkable, at over 1.5 million (per Publish or Perish data pulled from Google Scholar; see Figure 0.1).
0.1 Cumulative Self-Determination Theory publications from 1980 to 2021.
Since that first conference, scholars adopting an SDT lens have also proliferated, with hundreds now actively researching and applying the theory. They are generating new ideas and elaborating the theory’s contents to make it ever more useful. SDT’s principles backed by rigorous scholarship and action-oriented approaches have meaningfully contributed across the fields of basic and applied behavioral science, a fact well-evidenced in this Handbook
For us at CSDT, the most fulfilling part of the theory has been the journey: the shared stories, the connections to others around the world, and the building of the sturdy framework that this book is helping to document. This work emerges from small research groups around the world in places like Rochester, Montreal, Ghent, Sydney, Be’er Sheeva, Lima, Paris, Singapore, and many other locations where new ideas are being spawned using the SDT framework. Particularly important for the theory’s growth have been the SDT international conferences (held every three years prior to the COVID pandemic), which have always felt like family reunions as well as being incubators of innovation. It’s all of those stories and the generativity of this community that has defined SDT. As we organized this Handbook, communicating with this varied group of authors, we reexperienced the thread that connects the SDT community, which is a focus on human flourishing and its facilitators. No matter how big or far-reaching, our community also comes together (perhaps more virtually these days) and connects through the shared language of SDT.
Figure
In this regard we at CSDT are particularly excited to present this new Handbook, with 57 chapters examining the latest findings, exploring newfound domains, grappling with complex issues that have local and global impact, and mapping directions for future research and interventions for the next generation of SDT scholars. We have many times thought the work in SDT had reached its conclusions, only to have new questions arise and new ways of applying SDT introduced, continuously expanding its scope, as the contents of this Handbook demonstrate. So, whether you’ve been a part of the SDT journey or this is the first SDT book that you’ve held in your hands, we hope you’ll find in this volume new perspectives, methods, and creative solutions for many of the problems facing our science and our world today.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Paul J. C. Adachi
Immersyve, Inc.
Nathalie Aelterman
Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology, Ghent University
Alexios Arvanitis
Department of Psychology, University of Crete
Avi Assor
Department of Education, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Polina Beloborodova
Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University
Moti Benita
Department of Education, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Jamie M. Besel
Department of Collaborative Science & Innovation, Billings Clinic
Emma L. Bradshaw
Institute for Positive Psychology and Education, Australian Catholic University
Kirk Warren Brown
Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University
Lindsay Browne
Department of Psychology, University of Houston
Rafael A. Calvo
Dyson School of Design Engineering, Imperial College London
Rachel Campbell
Faculty of Science, School of Psychology, University of Sydney
Joëlle Carpentier
École des Sciences de la Gestion de l’Université du Québec à Montréal
Shannon L. Cerasoli
The Center for SelfDetermination Theory
Sung Hyeon Cheon
Department of Physical Education, Korea University
Randall Curren
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester
Edward L. Deci
Department of Psychology, University of Rochester
Cody R. DeHaan
Immersyve, Inc.
Stefano I. Di Domenico
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Scarborough
Paul Evans
School of Education, University of New South Wales, Sydney
Jacques Forest
Departement of Organization and Human Resources, École des Sciences de la Gestion de l’Université du Québec à Montréal
Christina Frederick
Human Factors and Behavioral Neurobiology, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Marylène Gagné
Future of Work Institute, Curtin
University
Yael Geifman
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Ryan Goffredi
Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri
Marc-Antoine Gradito Dubord
Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montréal
Wendy S. Grolnick
Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark University
Frédéric Guay
Department of Fundamentals and Practices in Education, Université Laval
Martin S. Hagger
Department of Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced
Anne Elisabeth Münster Halvari
Department of Dental Hygienist Science, University of Oslo
Hallgeir Halvari
University of South-Eastern Norway
Heather Hansen
University of Reading
Anne C. Holding
New York University
Joshua L. Howard
Department of Management, Monash
Business School, Monash University
Mireille Joussemet
Department of Psychology, Université de Montréal
Frank J. Kachanoff
Wilfrid Laurier University
Konstantinos Kalliris
School of Law, University of Essex
Yaniv Kanat-Maymon
Department of Psychology, Reichman University
Haya Kaplan Center for Motivation and SelfDetermination, Kaye Academic College of Education
C. Raymond Knee
Department of Psychology, University of Houston
Richard Koestner
Department of Psychology, McGill University
Rashmi A. Kusurkar
Amsterdam UMC, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Research in Education; LEARN! Research Institute for Learning and Education; Faculty of Psychology and Education, VU University Amsterdam
Woogul Lee
Department of Education, Korea
National University of Education
Nicole Legate
Illinois Institute of Technology
Lisa Legault
Department of Psychology, Clarkson University
Rachel E. Lerner
Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark University
Shelby L. Levine
Department of Psychology, McGill University
Chris Lonsdale
Institute for Positive Psychology and Education, Australian Catholic University
Martin F. Lynch
Warner School of Education, University of Rochester; Kazan Federal University; National Research University Higher School of Economics
Geneviève A. Mageau
Department of Psychology, Université de Montréal
Frank Martela
School of Science, Aalto University
Lennia Matos
Department of Psychology, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru
Arlen C. Moller
Department of Psychology, Illinois Institute of Technology
Annabelle Moore
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Thuy-vy Nguyen
Department of Psychology, Durham University
Kimberly A. Noels
Department of Psychology, University of Alberta
Alexander Nordgren Selar
Department of Psychology, Stockholm University
Nikos Ntoumanis
Department of Sports Science and Clinical Biomechanics, Danish Centre for Motivation and Behaviour Change, University of Southern Denmark
Anja H. Olafsen
School of Business, University of South-Eastern Norway
Virginie Paquette
Laboratoire de Recherche sur le Comportement Social, Département de Psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal
Luc G. Pelletier
School of Psychology, University of Ottawa
Dorian Peters
University of Cambridge
Frederick L. Philippe
Department of Psychology, University of Quebec at Montreal
Catherine F. Ratelle
Department of Foundations and Practices in Education, Université Laval
Johnmarshall Reeve Institute for Positive Psychology and Education, Australian Catholic University
C. Scott Rigby Immersyve, Inc.
Meredith Rocchi
Department of Communication, University of Ottawa
Guy Roth
Department of Education, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Richard M. Ryan
Institute for Positive Psychology and Education, Australian Catholic University, College of Education, Ewha Womans University
William S. Ryan
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
Nobuo R. Sayanagi
Faculty of Human Sciences and Cultural Studies, Yamanashi Eiwa College
Kennon M. Sheldon
University of Missouri; Higher School of Economics, Russian National University
Gavin R. Slemp
Centre for Wellbeing Science, Melbourne Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne
Bart Soenens
Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University
Martyn Standage
Centre for Motivation and Health Behaviour Change, Department for Health, University of Bath
Magnus Sverke
Department of Psychology, Stockholm University
Ian M. Taylor School of Sport, Exercise, and Health Sciences, Loughborough University
Robert J. Vallerand Laboratoire de Recherche sur le Comportement Social, Département de Psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal
Anja Van den Broeck Department of Work and Organisation Studies, Faculty of Economics and Business
Jolene van der Kaap-Deeder Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
Marieke C. van Egmond Tranzo, Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University
Maarten Vansteenkiste Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University
John C. K. Wang Physical Education and Sport Science, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University
Michael L. Wehmeyer Department of Special Education, University of Kansas
Netta Weinstein University of Reading
Geoffrey Williams Collaborative Science and Innovation and Department of Endocrinology, Billings Clinic
David C. Zuroff Department of Psychology, McGill University
Introduction
1 Self-Determination Theory: Metatheory, Methods, and Meaning
Richard M. Ryan and Maarten Vansteenkiste
Abstract
Self-determination theory (SDT) represents a comprehensive framework for the study of human motivation, personality development, and wellness as evidenced by the breadth and variety of chapters in this Handbook. This introductory chapter provides a review of the basic assumptions, philosophy of science, methods, and mission of SDT. It also includes a brief history of SDT, linking various developments within the theory to the contributions found in this volume. Finally, discussion focuses on the place of SDT within the landscape of past and contemporary theoretical psychology, as well as its relations with modern historical and cultural developments, in part explaining the continued growth of interest in SDT’s basic research and real-world applications.
Over the history of psychology there have been periodic attempts to provide overarching theories of human behavior. Within the behaviorist tradition the associationist views of Watson, the drive theory of Hull, the operant approach of Skinner, and the socialcognitive framework of Bandura are prominent examples. Within the humanistic perspective, both Rogers and Maslow presented comprehensive views. And for over a century the psychodynamic thinking of Freud and his followers has supplied both a method of analysis and a worldview for many. Each of these perspectives has shed light on important phenomena, opened up unique lines of inquiry, used distinctive research methods, and spawned applied practices. Each has also, by making their assumptions and predictions explicit, helped to illuminate what is within their theoretical horizons, as well as what they cannot, or will not in principle, explain.
Self-determination theory (SDT) represents a general framework for understanding why we do what we do, and what leads to flourishing versus degradation in a human life. As a broad, evidence-based, theory of motivation and personality development, it aims to supply an integrative yet open framework for a truly human behavioral science, using a set of concepts and assumptions that make sense philosophically, phenomenologically, empirically, mechanistically, and historically. It is also intended to be a practical theory,
with direct and meaningful implications for familial, educational, organizational, healthcare, and clinical contexts.
The Oxford Handbook of Self-Determination Theory is comprised of chapters presenting both basic and applied research on SDT, authored by current experts in the field. Our purpose in this introduction will therefore not be to comprehensively review SDT research, as the chapters that follow will accomplish that task. Instead, our primary aim will be to articulate the theory’s basic assumptions, its unique framing of questions central to human motivation and wellness, and the methods and criteria it uses to establish its knowledge base. We then briefly describe its development and, in doing so, connect the varied chapters in this Handbook to that history of inquiry and practical applications. Suggesting that SDT cuts across traditional subfields of psychology, we distinguish SDT from related or overlapping movements or approaches in the field such as humanistic psychology, positive psychology, and “third wave” cognitive behaviorisms, all of which share some important sensibilities. Finally, we discuss the social significance of building a broad theory focused on meeting human needs, both as levers for personal change and as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of social contexts and institutions in promoting human flourishing.
Self-Determination Theory: Some Basic Assumptions
Why Have a Theory at All?
SDT is unabashedly a theory, which is to say, a framework for organizing ideas, observations, reflections, and inquiries. It is a broad theory because in addressing the most central of human concerns such as motivation and well-being it carries implications across developmental periods, cultures, and life domains. It is also a theory with depth, as its cumulative knowledge base allows for ongoing refinement in terms of both specificity and underlying mechanisms.
Attitudes toward broad theory vary within behavioral sciences, with many recent commentators describing the field as facing a theory crisis (Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). The claim is that new broad theories have not taken root, with the result that there is an absence of cumulative and actionable knowledge. Hastings, Michie, and Johnston (2020) argue that, contributing to this, too few theories make explicit their ontological and epistemological tenets, making them difficult to coordinate with other theories and bodies of knowledge in other disciplines. Eronen and Bringmann (2021, p. 785) suggest that solid theory construction has been hindered because “not enough attention is paid to defining and validating constructs.” This absence of deep theory and careful validation of constructs is also accompanied by an academic culture that rewards publishing “new” phenomena (or rebranding old ones) rather than the pursuit of what Kuhn (1970) called the “normal science” of slowly extending extant theory. Finally, Berkman and Wilson (2021) suggest that contemporary theories can rarely pass a “practicality test”; too often
they are simply not useful in real-world settings and have meaning and significance only within academia.
In large part we agree with these critiques, which apply to many theories and models in the current psychological landscape. In fact, these are all pitfalls that SDT scholars and researchers have been navigating by making explicit the theory’s assumptions, carefully validating constructs, focusing on meaningful themes, and doing research and interventions with translational value. In contrast to most current approaches, SDT’s formal theory has been built “brick by brick” (Ryan & Deci, 2019; Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010), with newer SDT theorizing being iteratively scaffolded upon already well-validated constructs and findings, leading to an ever-widening space for hypotheses. In this way the theory has grown from a more restricted focus on the dynamics of intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1980a) to address the wider spheres of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, and then further to the study of values, personality development, emotion regulation, and the social supports necessary for wellness and flourishing (Ryan et al., 2021). Applied research in education, parenting, organizations, sport, health, and other areas has followed from this theory building, with more and more intervention studies and randomized trials.
We see theory as critically important to both basic science and evidence-based, effective practice. As a scientific theory, SDT supplies constructs that serve to coordinate its empirical observations and formal propositions to organize its cumulative knowledge. A theory also constrains and sharpens hypotheses, which must fit within its logic and established knowledge base to be seriously proposed. This rules out flashy yet anomalous ideas that too often are headlining as psychology yet fail to stand up across time or situations. Good theory reduces the uncertainty space in exploring new problems or applications, while providing clear hypotheses in novel situations. It also yields principles that are generalizable, crossing domains and types of inquiry. In addition, a truly scientific theory must connect with empirical observations at every level of analyses, locating its own body of knowledge within the larger disciplinary and interdisciplinary spaces. It must be compatible within the systems of science, including both evolutionary and biological perspectives on the reductive side and broader political and economic perspectives on the societal side.
SDT’s Organismic Metatheory
As a theory of human motivation and flourishing, SDT has from its outset been explicitly formulated as an organismic approach (see Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Deci, 2017). Organismic approaches are focused on the qualities associated with living entities, including their active tendencies to expand and express themselves while maintaining their integrity (Mayer, 1982). Organismic approaches are distinctive in conceptualizing living things as open systems that must actively sustain themselves through exchanges with an
environment. In these exchanges every organism has needs, and its environment presents affordances and challenges that meet or thwart those needs.
Organismic thinking emerged as a resolution of century-long debates within biology between vitalists and reductionists. Vitalists championed something unique and special about life that would escape mechanistic and determinist thinking, whereas reductionists posited that all processes observed in living things could be reduced to basic chemicalphysical causes. Organismic perspectives arose as neither an endorsement of vitalism, which failed to provide researchable hypotheses, nor a vindication of reductionism, which had difficulties explaining the coordination and ordered behaviors of living systems (see Jacob, 1973). Instead, organismic thinking acknowledges that living beings, while material, exhibit properties that distinguish them from inanimate nature and which are essential to understanding their activities.
Organization. Among these attributes, the most general is that of organization. As per the etymology of that term, living entities actively and systematically work in the direction of maintaining and extending themselves. Such organization entails the hierarchical coordination of multiple parts into a relative unity that manifests as adaptive behavior. In social organisms this organization is reflected within the individual through increasing self-regulation and congruence, and by the anchoring and integration of the individual within a social network. Angyal (1965) described these as the dual trends toward autonomy (integration within the self) and homonomy (integration of the self within a larger social group).
Organismic frameworks are also inherently developmental, as living things are assumed to unfold and grow their inherent capabilities over time. Healthy development involves increasing differentiation and hierarchical integration, as new learning and abilities are brought into coherence, unity, and control. In this developmental view, adaptation and wellness at later stages are built on earlier foundations of support and nurturance, whereas developmental harms and threats often produce cascading negative effects across age (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, this volume).
Person-centered and psychologically focused. Another key assumption underlying organismic perspectives is that individual living things, rather than merely being objects of external forces, are centers of activity and experience (Polanyi, 1958). They are purposive entities (Walsh, 2015). Behavior is therefore analyzed and understood not only from an external point of view but also, and we think more effectively, by taking an internal frame of reference. In this perspective even what we call an environment is defined by the individual insofar as the parts of an environment that they act toward and react to are most often those related to their interests, needs and goals, variables located at a psychological level of analysis. It is in this sense that SDT’s organismic view is by definition personcentered, understanding motivational dynamics from the psychological viewpoint of the actor (Ryan et al., 2021).
Personhood is an emergent feature of the human organism, entailing not only selfconsciousness but also agency. Because we can reflect on our own behaviors and can evaluate alternative pathways for action, we can exert top-down influences upon behavior; that is, we can self-regulate actions and experiences. This means that we can distinguish and enact behaviors we value and can experience volition and ownership of actions via personal knowledge and awareness (de Charms, 1968). At the same time, as social beings we are influenced and even controlled at times by external factors, which engenders phenomenal experiences distinct from those underlying self-regulated action. SDT captures this with its distinctions between autonomous and controlled forms of motivation.
Psychologists have often argued against notions of both autonomy and selfdetermination because, they suggest, these have biological causes or neurological sources (see Ryan & Deci, 2004). But when understood from a person-centered perspective, autonomy describes an experiential quality of behavior that is not in any way at odds with a biological view of organismic functioning (see chapters in this volume by Arvanitis & Kalliris; Lee; Sheldon & Goffredi). Research has so far revealed that the neurological underpinnings of autonomy and control reflect networked processes with meaningful patterning, including the striatal responses expected with satisfactions, mechanisms reflective of initiation (e.g., insula) and oversight (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex), and most generally interconnectivity (Di Domenico & Ryan, 2017, this volume). Autonomous motivation also involves physiological processes reflected in cardiac responses and variability in oxygen intake. Again, the goal of SDT’s organismic thinking is to coordinate observations at this biological level with psychological, behavioral, and social accounts of events, as these are mutually informative and complementary analyses.
Persons are unique among living things not only in their self-awareness and capacity for autonomy, but also in their awareness that others are similarly self-aware and potentially agentic. This inner recognition that other persons have their own perspectives and motives shapes all of our social experiences and behaviors, and it is this phenomenal world within which we lawfully act and react and about which SDT is concerned. For example, it is not merely the magnitude of rewards that motivates people but also their functional significance or meaning as being controlling or as conveying competence information that determines their effects (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Similarly, emotions such as guilt, resentment, admiration, and gratitude all entail an assumption of the potential autonomy of others, as when we feel more gratitude when help is autonomously provided (Weinstein, DeHaan, & Ryan, 2010). In the phenomenal realm within which people actually live and act, reasons and motives most often supply the relevant explanations for behavior. To put it briefly, psychology matters.
SDT’s person-centered perspective redirects inquiries in empirical psychology toward the dynamics of agency and need satisfaction, affording new avenues of understanding. For most of empirical psychology’s history the central question has been: How do external
factors control people’s behavior? This locution stems from long-standing Baconian traditions in experimental science of manipulating external variables to look for causal effects on behavioral “outputs.” Although this is a powerful method, it mainly tells us how external factors “can” alter behaviors; it tells us much less about what people spontaneously do, what motivates them in the absence of such external impositions, or how external controls impact people’s motivations from within. SDT thus asks instead: What are people volitionally motivated to do? and What internal and external factors facilitate, hinder, or even undermine that motivation to act? This reframing starts from the assumption that organisms are active and open systems: they are “already” motivated to act in ways that are neither random nor reactive as operant theory suggested (Skinner, 1953), but rather are organized by inherent physical and psychological needs.
This organismic perspective was apparent even in SDT’s earliest focus on intrinsic motivation, which describes people’s spontaneous propensities to explore, assimilate, and master their worlds (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). Healthy development in humans is universally characterized by this active, synthetic nature described by interest, curiosity, and desire to learn. Across the lifespan intrinsic motivation supplies an engine of growth and learning. SDT also sees this synthetic propensity expressed in people’s proactive internalization of practices and values. As people take in and endorse new regulations and acquire new skills, they gain increasing control over outcomes, greater autonomy in the regulation of their behavior, and greater homonomy within their families, communities, and social groups, satisfying competence, autonomy, and relatedness needs, respectively. These integrative tendencies can also be discerned at the emotional level in people’s tendency to be receptive to and interested in their inner emotional world, finding meaning in it and using it as an informational resource for action (Roth, Shane, & Kanat-Maymon, 2017). Overall, then, the organismic approach sees healthy human functioning as becoming increasingly complex yet more integrated and coordinated over time, expressing inherent capacities to grow, quest, connect, and ultimately flourish.
The assumption of such an internal propensity for growth and integration has significant ramifications for real-world practice and applications, as it speaks to the sensibilities and aims of practitioners. When practitioners such as teachers, managers, and mentors assume an inner growth propensity and respect the importance of volition, their attention goes to ideas about facilitating and nurturing that inner resource of development. In the absence of such an assumption, attention goes instead to controlling, shaping, and training people to act in specific ways. For instance, an organismic approach suggests that schools support and nurture students’ active inquiry to grow their knowledge from within, whereas an external approach prescribes contingent control using rewards and punishments to shape predetermined learning outcomes. We shall see throughout this volume how the very tenets of organismic theory inform SDT perspectives on supportive environments in various life domains.
Basic Needs as Organismic Foundations
Even though an organismic approach is built upon the assumption of an active, growthoriented nature, this natural growth propensity, like all developmental processes, requires specific affordances and supports. SDT thus inquires into the conditions within which these inherent organismic propensities are facilitated and under what conditions they are undermined. It is these questions that led to the specification of basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, as satisfactions essential to thriving.
These three needs inductively emerged as central to SDT across its first two decades of research. In keeping with its organismic orientation, SDT was initially focused on intrinsic motivational processes, with intrinsic motivation defined as activity that is motivated (energized and directed) by its inherent satisfactions. Through experiments and field research it became clear that intrinsic motivation for any given activity requires a sense of both autonomy and competence (Deci & Ryan, 1980b; Reeve, this volume).
Subsequently, SDT research showed that supports for autonomy, competence, and relatedness also described the conditions under which internalization and integration of social regulations were most likely (Pelletier & Rocchi, this volume). Beyond these motivational phenomena, SDT research was increasingly confirming that as these psychological need satisfactions are enhanced, people demonstrate not only more intrinsic motivation and internalization but also more wellness, meaning, and vitality, ultimately leading to SDT’s basic psychological needs theory (Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & Ryan, this volume).
Notably, these three basic needs also have a deductive rationale within SDT’s organismic theorizing; that is, they can be derived from what is meant by a vitally functioning living being. A general principle is that organisms actively move in a direction of selfregulation, where possible, and away from heteronomy, relating to our deeply evolved sensibilities about autonomy and control. Organisms are also oriented toward increasing effectiveness in their behavior and toward moving in a direction of competence and efficacy when possible. Finding satisfaction in experiences of mastery and progress is undoubtedly related to this propensity. As social organisms we are equipped with inherent propensities toward social integration and are accordingly extremely sensitive to inclusion and rejection. From an organismic perspective, these living propensities toward autonomy, competence, and relatedness pervade activities, life domains, and developmental phases.
Reductionist scholars may argue that there is no such “thing” as a basic psychological need. They would be correct. SDT instead specifies these basic needs are not things but rather are organizing constructs that can be used to coordinate observations that have functional import such as those described above. This functional view specifies and gives expression to the salient factors supporting integrity and wellness, which are robustly captured by SDT’s trio of autonomy, competence, and relatedness and their various constituting facets.
These three basic needs have also been found to have a dual nature, their satisfaction associated with personal flourishing and psychological health and their frustration being predictive of degradation and even psychopathology (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). In
other words, these needs are essential not only for enhancing growth, integrity, and wellness; they are also essential for staving off illness and dysfunction.
Recognition of this dual process is critical both metatheoretically and functionally. At the metatheoretical level, it implies that apart from our growth-based inclinations we also have a vulnerable nature, as this natural growth–oriented course of development can be disrupted by environments and events that thwart psychological needs (Ryan, Deci, & Vansteenkiste, 2016). Interests and curiosity can be crushed by controlling environments or even devastated by suppression and abuse. Chronic or severe frustrations of autonomy and relatedness can translate directly to compensatory defenses, and sometimes into psychopathology and antisocial attitudes and activities (e.g., Ryan & Moore, this volume; van der Kaap-Deeder, this volume). Understanding the social-contextual elements that nourish human psychological development and those that are toxic to our inherent growth and wellness capacities is thus an inherent feature of an organismic approach and a mission of SDT research (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).
Full functioning. This organismic approach also allows for a refreshing and welldelineated view of what psychological health and wellness involves. Unlike hedonic approaches, SDT’s concept of full functioning implies more than the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. Instead, awareness, subjective vitality, autonomy, and meaning are all critical indicators of maturation and psychological health. Autonomous persons are those who can be receptively and nondefensively aware of what is occurring, both internally and externally, can reflectively evaluate their choices, and can act in ways that are congruent with their needs and abiding values (Ryan et al., 2021; Shepard & O’Grady, 2017). Such full functioning is captured in the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, or the pursuit of activities comprising a good life (Martela, this volume; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008).
The Methods of SDT
SDT is an empirical approach to the questions of human flourishing, with an epistemology based on testing, refining, and integrating SDT’s formulations using convergent evidence. Given its organismic philosophy, SDT’s methodologies are varied and eclectic, drawing from biological, behavioral, phenomenological, and clinical inquiries. This methodological valuing of consilience is consistent with the holistic viewpoint in which behavior and experience can be examined at all levels of analysis, bringing more clarity to what is, after all, a single living process. SDT is thus concerned with how biological mechanisms, social influences, and experiential reports interconnect in describing and predicting behavior.
Rather than writing off human experience as irrelevant, trivial, or epiphenomenal, as reductionists do, or ignoring mechanisms and their implications, as some humanists do, SDT’s organismic view posits that descriptions of human functioning at all levels of analysis can, and in principle should, be integrated. In this organismic perspective we
expect variations in experiences of autonomy, relatedness, and competence to be manifest in distinct brain and physiological processes, as well as different functional outcomes.
Psychological focus and mechanism without reductionism. This interest in integrative knowledge across levels of analysis in no way detracts from the central psychological focus of SDT. When it comes to intentional behavior, SDT argues that psychological processes are most often the regnant level of analysis because they are the level where behavior is often initiated and where intervention that changes the course of events can actually take place (Deci & Ryan, 2011). For such behaviors, reductionistic explanations are, in contrast, often the least relevant to a causal analysis. For the question “Why did that individual visit her mother?,” the most meaningful answers lie in motives and reasons rather than the neurological processes supporting them. However, for other reactions and events, such as why that person flinched when startled, psychological explanations may be the least regnant or relevant level of analysis.
Neuroscience research based in SDT can therefore best be characterized as mechanism without reductionism. Neuroscience studies are helping to refine the theory’s process models associated with variations in autonomy and organization (e.g., Di Domenico & Ryan, this volume; Lee, this volume). Thus, within the SDT perspective, neuroscience is being used to characterize and understand more deeply, rather than explain away, the motivational dynamics we study at the psychological level of analysis.
Tapping diverse methods. Much of the early work in SDT was experimental, a methodological tradition that continues today, as reviewed in many of these chapters. But SDT as a psychological theory also draws heavily on other methods, including observational studies, qualitative inquiries, and interventions as strategies of research.
As a theory that embraces the importance of psychological experiences, SDT research has also from its outset utilized self-report survey (Deci et al., 1981) and interview (e.g., Grolnick & Ryan, 1989) strategies. There is today a rather strong bias against self-report in behavioral science, often one that is not well thought through or empirically justified. In fact, self-report measures often have much greater construct validity than so-called hard variables such as regions of interest activations assessed with fMRI, biological assays, or external observers’ ratings. People’s internal experience is, in fact, quite predictive of many outcomes precisely for the reasons we stated: most intentional behaviors and often unintentional reactive ones are influenced or determined by their attributions, needs, reasons, and motives. For instance, perceiving a mentor as controlling in fields as divergent as music (Evans, this volume) and medicine (Kusurkar, this volume), no matter what one’s culture or age, predicts diminished persistence and wellness. At the same time our methods of tapping perceptions and motives often rely on self-reports, which must themselves be understood as behaviors, with their own motivational and cultural dynamics. This is just a part of what must be interpretively considered in evaluating evidence.
SDT also uses methods that vary in time perspective, from experience sampling to long-term longitudinal research. For example, motivation and vitality can vary from
