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Goal Systems Theory: Psychological Processes and Applications Arie W. Kruglanski
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“Tis book is a celebration of over 20 years of theoretical and empirical work studying Goal Systems Teory. It is well worth celebrating. Te initial ambitious vision for this theory was to revise the study of motivation, and, impressively, it has done just that. It is extremely rare for a theory to have the breadth and depth displayed here. We used to call such theories ‘Grand’, and the research and ideas discussed in this book are grand indeed. And inspiring. Tis is a milestone that is must reading for anyone interested in motivation science.”
E. Tory Higgins, Professor of Psychology, Columbia University, Author of Beyond Pleasure and Pain: How Motivation Works
“Do you have more than one goal? Ten this book is for you! Like the stars in the sky, goals wax and wane, harmonize, confict, or live next to each other. Diving into this volume summarizing the unique research on goal systems, will give you access to a new universe of discovery and surprise, of guidance and practical advice. A uniquely fruitful collaboration of world-leading scientists over the past two decades will lead you through their research journey into the sky of goal systems.”
Gabriele Oettingen, Professor of Psychology, New York University, Author of Rethinking Positive Tinking: Inside the New Science of Motivation
“Pursuing goals is one of the most universal and basic human activities. In this exceptional book, leading experts summarize their contributions to Goal Systems Teory, grappling with diverse and fascinating aspects of how people think about, select, desire, manage, and achieve (or fail to achieve) their goals. Tis book covers the latest and most creative work in the feld. It is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in human goal pursuit—which is to say, anyone interested in human motivation.”
Roy F.
Baumeister, Professor of Psychology University of Queensland
“Goal psychology is emerging as a hub of many areas of scholarship in the behavioral and social sciences. Goal Systems Teory has ushered a paradigmatic reorientation of this feld by uncovering the means-end architecture of the systems of individuals’ goals. Tis timely book presents a comprehensive and integrative review of the important lessons learned over the last two decades from research inspired by Goal Systems Teory. Te diverse programs of research by the contributors to this book, renowned motivation science scholars, attest to the explanatory power of Goal Systems Teory and its rich implications for the betterment of individual
and societal functioning. I recommend this authoritative book as a valuable resource for advanced undergraduate students, graduate students, as well as researchers and practitioners in psychology and the social sciences.”
Yaacov Trope, Professor of Psychology, New York University
“Goal Systems Teory has been an especially generative model of motivation for the feld of psychology in general and for me in particular. Commemorating two decades of research, this volume stands as testament to this theory’s breadth of infuence as well as a harbinger of advances to come. Required reading for anyone who wants to know why and how people pursue the goals they do.”
Angela Duckworth, Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Author of Grit
“Goal Systems Teory is a marvelous compilation of essays that will help readers better understand, navigate, and achieve their multiple goals. Whether you’re a scholar of motivation interested in the latest research or a curious novice ready to learn about goal systems from the world’s experts, this book is for you.”
Katy Milkman, Professor of Business at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and author of How to Change
“Goal Systems Teory is the most important advance in decades in our understanding of human motivation. It revolutionizes classic ideas such as intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, how people juggle multiple goals, and the relation between means and goal outcomes. Tis volume presents novel directions and the latest research on goal systems, explaining political extremism, risk taking, fow, problem solving, and identity. It is simply a must-read for all social and behavioral scientists as well as anyone interested in why people do what they do. I can’t overstate the signifcance of this book.”
Wendy Wood, Professor of Psychology and Business, University of Southern California, Author of Good Habits, Bad Habits: Te Science of Making Positive Changes that Stick
“Goal Systems Teory is among the towering achievements of twenty-frst-century motivation science. Its power was readily apparent upon publication of the landmark 2002 paper introducing the theory, and yet its infuence has grown in ways that were hard to fathom at the time. Tis essential book captures the power and scope of the theory across domains ranging from attitudes to problem-solving, from risky behavior to extremism. Tese chapters are required reading for anybody seeking to understand the nature of goals, motivation, or self-regulation.”
Eli Finkel, Professor at Northwestern University and author of Te All-Or-Nothing Marriage
Goal Systems Teory
Psychological Processes and Applications
Edited by
ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI
AYELET FISHBACH
CATALINA KOPETZ
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kruglanski, Arie W., editor. | Fishbach, Ayelet, editor. | Kopetz, Catalina E., editor.
Title: Goal systems theory : psychological processes and applications / [edited by] Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifers: LCCN 2022060618 (print) | LCCN 2022060619 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197687468 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197687482 (epub) | ISBN 9780197687499 (online)
Classifcation: LCC BF 505 . G 6 G 64 2022 (print) | LCC BF 505 . G 6 (ebook) | DDC 158.1—dc23/eng/20230222
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060618
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060619
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197687468.001.0001
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Contributors
Introduction: Te Principles of Goal Systems Teory 1
Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski
1. New Developments in Goal Systems Teory 9 Arie W. Kruglanski
2. A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior 25 Catalina Kopetz and Wesley Starnes
3. Te Means–Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation 55
Kaitlin Woolley and Ayelet Fishbach
4. Te Structure of Immersive and Engaging Activities: Insights from a Computational Model of Flow 77 David Melnikof, Ryan Carlson, and Paul Stillman
5. Te Temporal Dynamics of Goal Systems: How Goal Progress Changes the Drivers of Motivation 103
Szu-chi Huang
6. Paying for Goals and Means 130 Franklin Shaddy
7. Variety among Means: Advancing Understanding of Equifnality in Goal Systems 150 Jordan Etkin
8. A Goal Systematic Approach to Persuasion: Infuencing Attitudes and Behavior 173 Birga Mareen Schumpe
9. Needs Find a Way: Means-Shifs, Domain Jumps, and Leaps of Faith 190
L. Maxim Laurijssen and N. Pontus Leander
10. Problem Solving from a Goal-Systems Perspective 211 Benjamin A. Converse
11. Extremism and the Extreme Personality 239
Ewa Szumowska, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Catalina Kopetz
12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the Goal Systems Teory 257
Katarzyna Jaśko
13. Te Interplay between Goal Systems and Identities 280 Maferima
Touré-Tillery
and Jessica Gamlin
Index 307
Ryan Carlson
Yale University
Benjamin A. Converse University of Virginia
Jordan Etkin
Duke University
Ayelet Fishbach University of Chicago
Jessica Gamlin University of Oregon
Szu-chi Huang
Stanford University
Katarzyna Jaśko Jagiellonian University
Catalina Kopetz
Wayne State University
Arie W. Kruglanski University of Maryland
L. Maxim Laurijssen University of Groningen
Contributors
N. Pontus Leander
Wayne State University
David Melnikof
Northeastern University
Birga Mareen Schumpe University of Amsterdam
Franklin Shaddy University of California, Los Angeles
Wesley Starnes
Wayne State University
Paul Stillman
Yale University
Ewa Szumowska Jagiellonian University
Maferima Touré-Tillery
Northwestern University
Kaitlin Woolley
Cornell University
Introduction
Te Principles of Goal Systems Teory
Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski
In the fall of 2021, between two waves of the COVID pandemic and university closures, a group of people who study goal systems theory (GST) met at the University of Chicago to discuss ongoing research and exchange ideas on where to go next with the research.
Te story of this group started more than 20 years before the Chicago meeting. In the fall of 2000, Arie met Ayelet at the University of Maryland in College Park. He was an established professor and a world expert on research on motivation and cognition. She was a postdoc who wrote her dissertation on self-control. In their frst meeting, Arie expressed his vision that their group would revise the study of motivation. Ayelet thought it would be nice if they published a paper.
Tey started working on what they initially referred to as “goal networks.” In just a few months, the group, which included Arie, Ayelet, James Shah, Ron Friedman, Woo Young Chun, and David Sleeth-Keppler, published a paper titled “A Teory of Goal Systems.” It came out in 2002, and for many of us, it marked the beginning of long and productive research programs that supported, expanded, and applied the original GST (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
Te following year, a new graduate student arrived at the lab. Arie handed Cata the GST paper and invited her to work on multifnality (a concept that, as an international student, she could barely pronounce). Cata found the group’s enthusiasm about the new theory contagious, and she soon became a true believer in GST and an enthusiastic researcher of multifnality.
Our team was intrigued by what we found, curious about what we have yet to fnd, and generally busy uncovering the relationships between goals and means and the implications of these structures for motivation.
None of us could have predicted the breadth of discoveries that GST would inspire in the 20 years that followed. We were clueless about the relevance of our work and the number of questions that were inspired by it and that would still
Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski, Introduction
occupy the feld of motivation more than 20 years later. Tis book is a celebration of the work in motivation science that was and is inspired by GST.
GST
A theory ofers a set of general principles that explain some empirical observations or phenomena. At times, the phenomenon begs an explanation. Humans asked about the origins of diseases thousands of years before Louis Pasteur ofered an answer articulated in his work on germ theory. Other times, the theory informs us what phenomena might exist and what to watch for. Because we have heard of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), we expect people who supported a political candidate to feel more (and not less) committed when this elected politician’s performance fails to meet the general expectations of a person who holds a public ofce.
GST was originated to explain why people pursue the goals they pursue the way they pursue them. Why, for example, does one person fnd personal meaning in planting a garden while their neighbor travels the world for that same purpose? And why do some choose political extremism while others do not even bother to vote in a democratic election? Beyond goal selection, what guides people’s choice of means, that is, the activities or objects they choose to facilitate their goals? Why, for example, do some health-conscious individuals eliminate junk food from their diet while others sign up for the gym?
When there are multiple goals, research on GST asked when do people prioritize one goal over others, and when do they seek a compromise between goals? When there are diferent means to achieve a goal, GST research asked how people prioritize these means. When will pursuing one means substitute for another? For example, when will healthy eating substitute for exercising? In contrast, when will means complement each other such that pursuing one makes pursuing another means more likely? To address these questions, GST ofers several principles and goal confgurations.
Te Principles of GST
An efcient motivational system operates to maximize goal attainment. Te frst principle of GST is: People want to pursue actions, choose objects, and relate to others who help them achieve more goals without compromising any of these goals. For example, people prefer healthy food that is tasty and cheap and a job that is interesting and supports them fnancially.
Yet, at times people choose the means that achieve less. Tey might prefer a pen that is just a pen instead of one that is also a laser pointer (Zhang et al., 2007).
Tey might even choose a means that undermines other goals. People sometimes choose a risky activity (e.g., substance abuse) to promote their social status because, rather than despite, the fact that it undermines their physical health (Kopetz et al., 2019). People behave as if they do not always prefer the means that maximize goal attainment.
Te reason for these observed anomalies is the second principle of GST: Te number of goals that a given means serves and the number of means that are connected to a given goal are negatively related to the strength of a given means–goals link. For example, if biking serves both commuting and exercising, it will be less strongly connected and, hence, appear less instrumental for either commuting or exercising. By the principle of maximizing attainment, a person may spend hours on the exercise bike at the gym and yet commute to work by car. Even more so, most gym-goers choose to park their car closer to the entrance to minimize the walk.
Tis second principle implies that the confguration of a goal system— the number of means that serve a goal and the number of goals served by a means—will determine activity selection. Specifcally, GST ofers four basic goal confgurations.
Equifnality
Equifnal means all serve the same goal and can therefore substitute for each other. Tis structure is best captured in the idiom “all roads lead to Rome.”
Equifnal means ofen seem redundant. Why would a traveler need more than one way to get to Rome? Yet, equifnal means form a backup plan. When people are presented with several equifnal means to a goal, they feel more confdent that they can reach the goal. Hence, the mere presence of these means increases the goal commitment.
On the downside, the presence of equifnal means dilutes the cognitive association between the activity and the goal it serves, resulting in less transfer of properties such as commitment and positive experience from achieving the goal to pursuing the means (Fishbach et al., 2004). Ultimately, when several activities serve the same goal, we should expect lower intrinsic motivation to engage in any of these activities (Kruglanski et al., 2018).
Multifnality
Multifnal means achieve more than one goal. Tis is best captured in the (less famous, more animal-friendly) idiom “feeding two birds with one scone.” Multifnal means maximize attainment, and therefore they should be superior.
In principle, getting more for the same unit of efort should always be the dominant choice. Even if a person does not care for the additional benefts (e.g., they only wanted to feed one bird), they should not oppose it either.
Take the example of kosher food. If a person learns that some food is kosher, they should either see it as a beneft (i.e., if they observe the Jewish tradition) or not; but this information should not undermine their interest in that food. And yet it does. In a classic demonstration (Simonson et al., 1993), presenting information on the status of an ice cream as kosher reduced consumers’ interest in it. Tey concluded that it was less favorful.
Indeed, people ofen prefer means that achieve fewer goals. Te children in Lepper et al.’s (1973) studies on overjustifcation were less interested in expressing themselves through drawing afer they learned that drawing is not only a means for self-expression but can also win them a reward. And children as young as 3 years inferred that food that was said to make them strong cannot be delicious, so they had little of it (Maimaran & Fishbach, 2014).
Unifnality
Unifnal means achieve only one goal. If only a single road led to Rome, it would have been unifnal. Unifnal means are less efcient but ofer one advantage— they are strongly associated with the single goal that they help achieve. As a result, people are ofen highly intrinsically motivated to pursue their unifnal means. In this way, the disadvantage of equifnal means is the advantage of unifnal means.
Counterfnality
Counterfnal means achieve some goals while undermining others. For example, a homemade lunch may be healthier than dining out, but it undermines a person’s goal to socialize with colleagues over lunch at a restaurant. Counterfnal means are ofen non-optimal. Instead of maximizing, they minimize attainment. Tey are the opposite of multifnal means.
Yet counterfnal means may seem more instrumental for the goal that they facilitate exactly because they inhibit another goal. When a Canadian pharmaceutical company advertised its cough syrup as “it tastes awful and it works,” the message was that because this cough medicine undermined the taste goal, it was more instrumental for the goal of getting rid of the cough. Indeed, people ofen prefer counterfnal means, and those who have high need for cognitive closure are even more likely to display this preference (Kramer et al., 2012).
Research Inspired by GST
Te principles and confgurations of goal systems helped us explain many of the anomalies we observed in activity selection. Moreover, they inspired us to make new predictions for phenomena we did not know existed. One of the earlier examples comes from research on self-control. We predicted that temptations might be cognitively associated with the goals that override them. For example, to watch their weight, people should abstain from high-calorie foods. So, we predicted and found that dieters associate “chocolate” and “cake” with “dieting” (Fishbach et al., 2003). It was Arie and Ayelet’s frst empirical publication, coauthored with Ron Friedman.
In another paper, Cata, Ayelet, and Arie found that people who watched their weight chose healthier foods mainly when no other goals (e.g., food enjoyment, alleviating hunger) were salient and important. However, when alternative goals become relatively more salient and important (e.g., people were hungry), the weight-watching goal lost its pull so that people ate less healthy food (Köpetz et al., 2011).
Te chapters in this book describe research that the principles and confgurations of GST inspired. Tese chapters illustrate how having a theoretical framework helped to predict phenomena we did not know existed as well as explain what we ofen observed but were not sure why.
A Peek into the Discoveries in Tis Book
Te essays included in this book cover part of the recent research in GST. Tey connect research in motivation to the basic topics of psychological research, including identity, persuasion, problem-solving, and political extremism, among others. Tey further advance motivation theory by addressing topics such as intrinsic motivation, resource allocation, and means choice.
In Chapter 1, Kruglanski explores several new directions in goal systems research, including identifying that political (and other) extremism stems from motivational imbalance, a state in which a given need dominates other basic concerns, and that intrinsic motivation stems from a psychological fusion between a goal and a means. Importantly, Kruglanski argues that one basic need— the need for social signifcance—underlies many of the goals that people pursue (from fnding romance to political extremism).
In Chapter 2, Kopetz and Starnes explore risk behavior. Tey argue that risktaking is not irrational; neither does it represent self-regulatory failure. Instead, risk behavior is a means to a goal. For example, the appeal of substance abuse for adolescents (prior to addiction) comes from the perception that certain
substances signal high social status and belonging to the group. By their analysis, risk behavior ofen results in focusing on one goal and the inhibition of alternative considerations for health or safety.
In Chapter 3, Woolley and Fishbach return to intrinsic motivation and explore the means-ends fusion model of intrinsic motivation. According to this model, intrinsic motivation results from the strong association between an activity (means) and its end goal; it occurs when the means and the ends collide. Tey explore the antecedents of means–ends fusion and its consequences for adherence to work, health, and academic goals.
In a related line of research, Melnikof, Carlson, and Stillman explore fow in Chapter 4. Tis chapter provides a goal systems analysis of psychological fow. Building on the notion of means–end fusion, the authors ofer an information theory of fow, according to which learning tasks that induce the strongest goal–means association are more efective at generating fow and, consequently, learning.
Goals are not static, and neither is the process of pursuing them. In Chapter 5, Huang explores the temporal dynamics of goal pursuit. Her temporally dynamic goal pursuit model explains how various factors (e.g., the number of equifnal means) infuence motivation at the beginning versus middle versus toward the end of a goal. Motivation is a function of expectancy and value, yet expectancy matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, while value matters more once expectancy has been established. It follows, for example, that having multiple means matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, when people are less confdent they can do it, than later, when their confdence and commitment are established.
In Chapter 6, Shaddy explores resource allocation in goal systems. He argues against the common perception that people invest resources only in means to a goal. Instead, he documents instances where people can invest both indirectly in the means and directly in the goal and that people prefer to invest in goals. He then explores how the architecture of goal systems and the characteristics of the individuals involved both infuence resource investment.
Chapter 7 explores variety among means. Etkin describes the relationship between equifnal means to a goal, asking how actual and perceived variations among means to a goal infuence motivation. She further explores means variety as an end in itself.
Goal systems have important implications for attitude research and persuasion, which are topics Schumpe explores in Chapter 8. She explains how GST helped develop persuasion techniques. For example, the principle of counterfnality (e.g., presenting a mouthwash that causes burning sensation) inspires persuasion appeals that emphasize rather than hide the fact that a product that facilitates one goal also inhibits others. Similarly, multifnality
(adding a goal), equifnality (adding a means), and contrafnality (adding a means that undermines the goal) ofer distinct persuasion techniques.
In Chapter 9, Laurijssen and Leander explore means substitution. When goals are disrupted, we should expect people to switch to a diferent means or goal. Unlike Etkin’s analysis of choosing between equifnal means, this chapter is about fnding a route afer the original one was frustrated. Te authors present a shifs–jumps–leaps perspective of means substitution, which distinguishes between three qualitatively distinct types of shifs: shifs between means within a current goal domain, jumps to other domains, and leaps of faith into unexpected or new directions. Tey next explore implications for the frustration-aggression phenomena and how shifs can produce aggressive responding.
Chapter 10 discusses implications of GST to problem-solving. Converse analyzes what theory on problem-solving can gain by incorporating motivation theory to its analysis. He highlights a key diference between a goal and a problem, which is that a problem lacks a representation of the appropriate means and their relationship to overriding goals. A problem arises when the goal system is incomplete. Converse specifcally addresses how viewing problem-solving through a goal systems lens sheds new light on elements the components of problem-solving—and processes the generic problem-solving cycle.
Chapter 11 explores extremism. Szumowska, Kruglanski, and Kopetz propose that motivational imbalance, in which one need dominates over the others, releases pursuit of activities that would not be considered if the person was considering their entire set of goals. Tey use this principle to explain both violent extremism and devoted humanism. Tey argue that similar principles also explain self-harming behaviors.
In Chapter 12, Jaśko focuses on political engagement. She identifes how the principles of goal systems explain people’s decision to engage in all sorts of political actions, from signing a petition to risking one’s life for a political cause.
Finally, Chapter 13 applies GST to the study of identity. In exploring the interplay between these related but distinct areas of research, Touré-Tillery and Gamlin note that both goals and identities are stored in memory in an interconnected, hierarchical structure. Te cognitive structures that support goals and identities are further intricately linked. Goal pursuit shapes identities, and identities infuence which goals are being pursued and which means are selected in pursuing these goals. Tese authors’ work specifcally demonstrates how goal systems shape identities and how identities shape goal systems.
References
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not into temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(2), 296–309.
Fishbach, A., Shah, J. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). Emotional transfer in goal systems. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(6), 723–738.
Köpetz, C., Faber, T., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2011). Te multifnality constraints efect: How goal multiplicity narrows the means set to a focal end. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(5), 810–826.
Kopetz, C. E., Woerner, J. I., Starnes, W., & Dedvukaj, J. (2019). It’s risky, therefore I do it: Counterfnality as a source of perceived instrumentality of risk behavior as means to goals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 81, 39–52.
Kramer, T., Irmak, C., Block, L. G., & Ilyuk, V. (2012). Te efect of a no-pain, no-gain lay theory on product efcacy perceptions. Marketing Letters, 23(3), 517–529.
Kruglanski, A. W., Fishbach, A., Woolley, K., Bélanger, J. J., Chernikova, M., Molinario, E., & Pierro, A. (2018). A structural model of intrinsic motivation: On the psychology of means–ends fusion. Psychological Review, 125(2), 165–182.
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 331–378). Academic Press.
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the “overjustifcation” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), 129–137.
Maimaran, M., & Fishbach, A. (2014). If it’s useful and you know it, do you eat? Preschoolers refrain from instrumental food. Journal of Consumer Research, 41(3), 642–655.
Simonson, I., Nowlis, S. M., & Simonson, Y. (1993). Te efect of irrelevant preference arguments on consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2(3), 287–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-7408(08)80018-6
Zhang, Y., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007). Te dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3), 389–401.
1 New Developments in Goal Systems Teory
Arie W. Kruglanski
Te year 2022 marks a 20-year anniversary of goal-systems theory (GST), which made its debut in a 2002 paper at the Advances in Experimental Social Psychology volume (Kruglanski et al., 2002). At a recent conference at the University of Chicago dedicated to this event, colleagues whose work was inspired by the theory presented exciting papers on a wide range of topics attesting to the theory’s usefulness and breadth. Tese presentations in their complete form constitute the various chapters of this volume. In the present chapter my aim is to review several theoretical and empirical developments in the goal systemic framework that informed the research in my own lab over these last decades. Tese include further exploration of the constructs of equi- and multifnality, as well as the introduction of a new structural construct, counterfnality, and examination of its implications. Tey also include a new model of intrinsic motivation based on the structural properties of the GST. Both the structural and allocational properties of the GST are drawn upon in a model of extremism that we have recently presented (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021); it identifes a common psychological dynamic that underlies such diferent types of “extremism” as terrorism, engagement in extreme sports, embarking on extreme diets, extreme love crushes, and extreme humanism. Finally, I tie the concept of goal systems to the fundamental notion of basic human needs and show how this conjunction can be used to understand and modify a wide range of behaviors, including the aggressive response to frustration and romantic love.
Te Architecture of Goal Systems: Equifnality, Multifnality, and Counterfnality
Te relations between goals and means can be mentally represented via several diferent confgurations, each with important psychological implications. Tree
such forms, equifnality, multifnality, and counterfnality, were addressed by work in our lab. Equifnality (see Figure 1.1a) refers to the case wherein several means are attached to a given goal such that each of the means can on its own accomplish (is sufcient condition for) goal attainment. Multifnality (see Figure 1.1b) represents the case wherein the same means simultaneously serves several goals. Counterfnality (Figure 1.1c). Studies addressing these confgurations were reviewed at some length in a paper published by Kruglanski et al. (2015). Here, I ofer a thumbnail discussion of this work.
Equifnality
A major implication of the equifnality confguration is the possibility of substituting one means for another. Tis basic motivational concept, immanent already in Freud’s (1920) notion of symptom substitution and Lewin’s (1935) work on task substitution, was touched upon in several research domains including work on diferent routes to dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957), different routes to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and diferent methods of self-esteem maintenance (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser, 2000), among others.
Substitutability work carried out in our lab examined the efects of multiple means to a goal on commitment to the goal and to the means. Tis research found that having alternative means to the goal increases goal commitment, while at the same time reducing commitment to each of the separate means (Kruglanski et al., 2011). Te reduced commitment to the equifnal means is attributable in part to the dilution efect the reduced association strength of a given means to the goal in the presence of alternative such means. Evidence for the dilution effect in the context of the equifnality confguration was obtained in a series of studies by Bélanger et al. (2015) and a research program (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2013) about commitment to groups viewed as means to social identity.
A series of studies by Etkin and Ratner (2012) hypothesized and found that individuals who perceive themselves as having made little goal progress prefer a set of equifnal means that is high in variety as such means carry greater assurance of goal attainment than a homogeneous means set. Finally, Milyavsky et al. (2022) found that personal agency and social assistance can be viewed as alternative means of goal attainment such that reliance on one reduces reliance on the other, with important downstream consequences for people’s social attitudes.
Multifnality
Te simultaneous presence of several salient goals can lead to goal confict and require a choice as to which goal to prioritize. But ofen a means can be found that accomplishes all those goals at once. One may fnd a job that is interesting, ofers good working conditions, and provides an opportunity to serve society. One may cook a dish that is nutritious, tasty, and easy to prepare. On frst glance, fnding a way to accomplish several goals at once may seem all good and to aford greater value than the pursuit of each goal individually. But there is a downside to this story in that the greater the number of goals connected to a given means, the weaker the connection. In other words, the number of connections to a given entity (goal or means) in a goal system dilutes the strength of the connections. Further, because connection strength is typically construed as instrumentality of
the means with respect to the goal, the greater the number of goals that a given means serves, the lower its perceived efcacy in serving those goals.
Tis dilution efect, mentioned earlier in reference to the equifnality confguration, was frst discovered in a series of experiments by Zhang et al. (2007). For instance, in a scenario, a means (e.g., eating tomatoes) was related with one goal (e.g., preventing heart cancer or preventing eye disease) versus two goals (e.g., preventing heart cancer and preventing eye disease), which in turn afected the means’ perceived instrumentality to the goal(s): A means said to serve one goal was seen as more instrumental to that goal than a means said to serve two goals. Tis efect was replicated in several studies that varied in the contents of the goals as well as in the manner in which those goals were presented (self-generated vs. described by the experimenter). Zhang et al. (2007) also varied the similarity (vs. distinctiveness) of the goals to each other and the degree of association of each of the goals to the focal means. Te dilution efect was more pronounced when two goals were distinct rather than similar, presumably because similar goals activated each other. Too, the greater the manipulated association between the means and one of the goals, the lesser was the perceived association between the means and the remaining goal.
Zhang et al.’s (2007) experimental paradigm was used in a series of studies by Orehek et al. (2012), who found evidence for moderation of the preference for unifnal versus multifnal means. Specifcally, individuals high on the locomotion tendency (the self-regulatory orientation that constitutes a desire for movement and change) prefer unifnal means, whereas those high on the assessment tendency (the self-regulatory orientation that involves a desire to critically evaluate alternatives) prefer multifnal means. Tis supported the authors’ hypothesis that high locomotors are particularly afected by the expectancy component of motivation that afords quick progress toward the goal, whereas high assessors are particularly sensitive to the value component that they strive to maximize.
Catalina Kopetz’s doctoral dissertation explored another facet of the multifnality confguration, thus discovering the multifnality constraint efect (Kopetz, 2007; Kopetz et al., 2011). It has to do with the fact that the simultaneous presence of several active goals exercises constraints on means to those goals such that means that serve some of those goals while undermining others will tend to be avoided. Consider the co-active goals of satisfying one’s hunger, satisfying one’s taste, and taking care of one’s health. Tis creates a situation in which the selected foods will be those that, while nutritious, are also tasteful and healthy, whereas unhealthy and tasteless foods would be avoided.
Kopetz et al. (2011) also investigated the case in which one of the active goals becomes dominant. According to the allocational principle of fnite mental resources, this should result in the concomitant withdrawal of resources from the
alternative goals, thus weakening the constraints they would normally exercise on means to the dominant goal. In consequence, the consideration set of means to the dominant goal now expands, producing a situation in which nearly “anything goes” that serves the dominant goal, including means that normally would undermine (some of) the alternative goals. I revisit that point at a later juncture when reviewing the GST-inspired work on the psychology of extremism (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021).
Counterfnality
Tose latter means, ones that undermine some goals while serving others, are therefore labeled as counterfnal. Ofen, those means are avoided, especially when the goals they undermine are salient; but occasionally they are even preferred over other means to a goal. Specifcally, when one goal becomes dominant and other goals are crowded, the counterfnal means that serve the dominant goal (while undermining other goals) can be particularly attractive. Counterfnality has intriguing psychological properties that “irrationally” enhance its appeal: Such means ofen are alluring precisely because they are counterfnal. Tat may be the case because the counterfnal means is perceived as uniquely, and hence particularly strongly, attached to the focal goal (Kruglanski, 1996; Zhang et al., 2007) and because it brings to mind the “cost heuristic” whereby costs are seen as a proof of efcacy, along the lines of the “no pain no gain” slogan that portrays pain (or cost) as the necessary condition of goal attainment (see Kruger et al., 2004; Labroo & Kim, 2009). Along these lines, a set of studies by Freund and Hennecke (2015) demonstrated that less enjoyable means (and in that sense counterfnal to the goal of enjoyment) were viewed as more instrumental to the goals they were assumed to serve. Another example of this phenomenon is the so-called martyrdom efect whereby people believe that someone who sufers while helping is actually more helpful (Olivola & Shafr, 2009).
Schumpe et al. (2018) demonstrated the counterfnality efect in fve studies. For instance, the more pain people experienced when getting tattooed, the more they perceived getting tattooed as instrumental to the goals of being unique and showing of. And the more counterfnal a consumer product was considered to be (i.e., a “burning oral rinse”), the greater was its perceived efectiveness (in fghting germs). Other studies in the Schumpe et al. (2018) series showed that counterfnality resulted in a more positive attitude toward the means and that a simultaneous commitment to both the focal and the alternative goals reduced the preference for the counterfnal means. Research by Catalina Kopetz (see Chapter 2 in this volume) also demonstrates that risk behavior is perceived as more instrumental to one’s goals, particularly when it is seen as counterfnal.
Because counterfnal means are perceived as particularly instrumental to goal attainment, their attractiveness is more pronounced when the general expectancy of goal attainment is low. In this vein, Bélanger et al. (2015) found that individuals high on depression or anxiety who are generally pessimistic about their likelihood (expectancy) of goal attainment exhibit a strong preference for a counterfnal means. Klein (2013) found that a goal that was portrayed as difcult to attain (curing severe illness) led participants to prefer a counterfnal (expensive) means more so than a goal that was easier to attain (curing a common cold).
Te appeal of counterfnal means may in some cases promote dependency and addiction. Tus, Connor et al. (2011) found that individuals who felt that smoking cannabis has negative consequences (e.g., makes them feel insecure) are more dependent on the drug. Similarly, Li and Dingle (2012) found on the basis of survey data that beliefs about the negative consequences of alcohol consumption (e.g., being hungover) were positively related to risky alcohol consumption such as binge drinking.
Te Psychology of Extremism
An important feature of the GST is its breadth and scope. In this way, it afords a prism on a wide variety of phenomena, all of which are governed by the same basic cognitive and motivational principles. A recent example of a GST-derived insight into an important social phenomenon is the application of work on counterfnality and the multifnality constraint efect to the psychology of extremism. In popular parlance, the term extremism has come to signify specifically political violence and terrorism. Yet there are numerous other types of behaviors generally regarded as extreme: extreme diets, extreme sports, extreme (exceptional) humanitarianism, extreme substance or behavioral addictions, etc. A goal systemic perspective allows a common understanding of all those extreme behaviors (for extensive discussion, see Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska, 2021; Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021). Tat approach views extremism as based on a motivational imbalance in which a given need dominates other basic concerns. A motivational balance exists where all of the person’s basic needs are in their region of satisfaction. Such well-rounded care for all one’s basic needs defnes the state of moderation. A state of motivational imbalance, which gives rise to extremism, occurs where one of the basic needs gains dominance and crowds out other basic concerns. As noted earlier, this liberates the means to the dominant need from constraints exercised by those alternative (and now faded) concerns. Te resulting expansion of the consideration set of means to the dominant goal comes to include now counterfnal means, ones that efectively undermine or sacrifce the alternative concerns. As most people attempt to maintain a
motivational balance, they refrain from carrying out counterfnal behaviors that sacrifce some of their needs. As a consequence, counterfnal behaviors are typically rare, consistent with their labeling as extreme.
Extensive empirical evidence for the proposed motivational imbalance model of extremism is reviewed by Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska (2021) and Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al. (2021). It includes studies attesting to the negative relation between the motivation to pursue dominant versus alternative needs as well as research examining cognitive, behavioral, afective, and social consequences of motivational imbalance. Te cognitive consequences included studies of selective attention, inhibition, rumination, projection, and choice expansion (in considered means to the focal goal). Behavioral consequences included increased tendency to choose the counterfnal means when under motivational imbalance and a decreased tendency for such a choice prompted by the restoration of balance. Afective consequences included studies of considerable emotional volatility when under a state of motivational imbalance, the alternation between the proverbial “agony” and “ecstasy.” Finally, the social consequences of motivational imbalance were attested to by the relative infrequency of protracted tendencies to perform counterfnal behaviors and by the status of social deviants accorded to individuals who exhibit such tendencies.
Te GST-based work on the psychology of extremism has resulted so far in two conferences on this topic that brought together scholars with diverse interests (from neuroscience to culture) yet sharing in common the focus on extreme behavior and in an edited volume on the psychology of extremism whose chapters describe the varied extremisms and their underlying dynamics (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021).
Te Means–Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation
Another important application of the GST is to the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation. According to the theory, the links that connect means to goals can vary in strength. And the greater the links’ strength, the more the means brings to mind the goal and vice versa. In fact, when the association between the means and the goal is very high, the two are nearly indistinguishable, or cognitively “fused” with each other. In other words, under such fusion, performance of the activity (the means) is experienced as attainment of the goal, and the activity is perceived as intrinsically motivated, that is, as an end in itself. Based on this logic, Kruglanski et al. (2018) defned an intrinsicality continuum that refects the degree to which the means–end fusion (MEF) is experienced. Te MEF theory assumes that fusion is afected by four major factors: (1) repeated pairing of the activity and the goal, (2) uniqueness of the activity–goal connection,
(3) perceived similarity between the activity and its goal, and (4) temporal immediacy of goal attainment following the activity. Kruglanski et al. (2018) ofer evidence for each of the foregoing determinants of intrinsic motivation.
Te idea that repeated pairing of a stimulus and a reward results in association between the two has been the mainstay of classical conditioning theory, one of the most robust and well-documented theories in the history of psychology (for review of the relevant evidence, see, e.g., Hilgard & Bower, 1966). As a result of classical conditioning, the neutral stimulus acquires motivational value and comes to serve as a secondary reinforcer (e.g., see discussion by Robinson & Berridge, 1993), that is, a goal that the animal or the human would then strive to attain.
Kruglanski et al. (2018) reasoned that a continuum of intrinsicality refects the degree to which the activity (the means) is seen as likely to result in goal attainment, the upper bound of which is where the activity is itself perceived as constituting goal attainment. To address this implication of the MEF theory, Zhang et al. (2007, Study 4) repeatedly (and subliminally) fashed words related to the goal of strengthening muscles (e.g., muscle) concomitantly with a (supraliminal) presentation of a specifc means to that goal (i.e., jogging). Tis procedure signifcantly increased the perceived instrumentality of the means to the goal while concomitantly decreasing the perceived instrumentality of the same means to an alternative goal (increasing blood oxygen). Tese fndings were conceptually replicated in research by Bélanger et al. (2015, Study 4).
Strengthening the means–end connection increases the perceived instrumentality of the means to the goal and, in this sense, increases intrinsicality. On the other hand, establishing alternative links between the means and alternative goals or between the goal and alternative means dilutes the strength of a given means–end connection, and hence reduces the means’ perceived intrinsicality.
Work reviewed earlier on the dilution efect, in both the multifnality and the equifnality contexts (cf. Bélanger et al., 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2007), yields fndings supportive of this theoretical implication.
Goal attainment results in positive afect. Terefore, increasing the fusion between the activity and the goal should result in that positive feeling seeping into the activity as well. Tis prediction of the MEF theory was supported in research by Fishbach et al. (2004, Study 1), where participants reported more positive afect toward the activity (means) in a condition where they generated a single versus two means to the goal, the latter known to dilute the means–end connection, and hence to reduce the MEF (Zhang et al., 2007).
Other research supportive of the MEF theory is work by Woolley and Fishbach (2018; see also Chapter 3 in this volume), showing that the immediacy with which the goal follows the means increases the degree of the MEF and, hence, the means’ instrumentality/intrinsicality to the goal. Specifcally, it was found that
receiving the immediate (vs. delayed) reward for performing the experimental task increased experienced enjoyment, interest, and intention to pursue the experimental task in the future—typical efects of intrinsic motivation to an activity (e.g., Deci et al., 1999). Similarly, research by Fishbach et al. (2004) supported the theoretical implication of the MEF model whereby the magnitude of afect toward the fused activity should be correlated with the magnitude of afect that the goal attainment itself engenders. Specifcally, Fishbach et al. (2004) found that the afect felt toward the means corresponded more to the afect toward the goal when the two were strongly versus only weakly associated.
Studies also found support for the mediating role of fusion in efects of immediacy on means instrumentality (Woolley & Fishbach, 2018) and for the implication that for the fused means to be endowed with qualities that characterize goal attainment, the goal needs to be active in the frst place. In short, the MEF model of intrinsic motivation is based on extensive and wide-ranging research concerning its varied implications. In so far as intrinsic motivation toward activities is of considerable importance in multiple domains of human endeavor (e.g., in work, sports, and education), the novel insights that this model provides could prove to be of considerable practical utility.
Applying the GST to Real-World Phenomena: Current and Future Research Directions
On the Origins of Goal Systems. Te Origin Question: Where Do Goals Come From?
A fundamental assumption of the GST is that goal systems are hierarchical; that is, all goals actually are means that serve a supreme goal at the apex of the hierarchy. Tat supreme goal is nothing but a basic psychological need. Psychological theorists from Freud onward (including Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Higgins, 2012; Maslow, 1943; McDougall, 1908) assume the existence of basic biological and psychogenic needs, and from the GST perspective each goal system is “crowned” by a basic need. Tis suggests that all our goals, at the end of the day, are geared to serve basic needs. Te basic needs are the “dogs that wag the tails” of all that we ever do. We assume them to be universal and fxed, part and parcel of “human nature,” the structure of our psyche if you will.
In contrast, the goal systems that serve those needs are fuid and highly variable. Tey are culture-specifc, context-specifc, and socially constructed. Tey are tied to the satisfaction of the basic needs via narratives that are validated by one’s in-group or social network. Te need, the narrative, and the network defne our 3Ns model of behavior that we believe to be quite general (see Kruglanski,
Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019). In other words, any behavior whatsoever is in service of some need or need combination (the need component of the 3Ns); the satisfaction of that need factor is guided by a narrative that specifes what goals, subgoals, etc. would, in a given situation, serve the need(s) in question; in turn, that narrative is socially validated by a network of signifcant others, members of one’s in-group. Tis gives it credibility, and hence the power to guide behavior. Diferent goal systems can be constructed to satisfy any basic need out of beliefs shared within a network or a community of meaning. Tis is important because it afords substitution of a given goal system regarded as problematic or undesirable in some sense by another goal system that is more desirable.
According to this analysis, a goal systemic understanding of any behavior should start with identifying the basic need that ultimately drives it. Tis is the departure point from which one can explore the goal systems that have been or can be constructed to gratify that basic need. So you can always ask what basic need does a given behavior serve? And are there other means that serve the same basic need and that can be substituted for the current behavioral means?
In the past decade or so, my colleagues and I were interested in one such basic need, the need for social signifcance and worth (arguably, the single most important social need), and examined it empirically in a series of papers in which Pontus Leander, Kasia Jaśko, and other friends have participated, including our comprehensive statement of signifcance quest theory, now published online in the Perspectives on Psychological Science.
Terrorism
We have been studying this need in several contexts starting with the context of terrorism. In the terrorism literature a major question has been that of terrorist motivation: Why in the world do they do it? And terrorism researchers have identifed a variety of motivations (the perks of paradise, vengeance, adoration of the leader, feminism). Tey concluded, therefore, that terrorism is multiply determined. But there is a diferent, and potentially more useful and parsimonious, way to think about it, namely that these are all means to the same end, satisfaction of the same basic motive, the quest for signifcance. Take vengeance, for example. Vengeance comes in response to a humiliation or a loss of signifcance, and by avenging one’s humiliation one regains signifcance and shows that one too matters and has the power to punish the original ofender. Other causes, like the perks of paradise or earning the leader’s appreciation, refect an opportunity for signifcance gain.
In multiple studies, we obtained evidence that manipulating the quest for signifcance or measuring it in various ways promotes behaviors seen as signifcance-enhancing ofen through violence. So, in one paper we estimated suicide bombers’ quest for signifcance by gleaning from open-source data
evidence for their loss of signifcance or ambition for signifcance gain and found that the stronger the quest, the greater number of people these suicide bombers killed or wounded (Webber et al., 2017); and in another study, with members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, one of the most cruel and determined terrorist organizations in history, we found that the greater the signifcance gain they experienced from a deradicalization program, including vocational and language courses and other activities allowing them to reintegrate into Sri Lankan society, the greater was their degree of deradicalization, illustrating the substitution of vocational preparation for terrorism as a means to signifcance gain (Webber et al., 2018).
Frustration–Aggression
Whereas we have ample published data (see, e.g., Kruglanski, Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019; Kruglanski, Webber, & Koehler, 2019) attesting to the role that the quest for signifcance plays in violent extremism, our lab is currently pursuing two new topics from the signifcance quest perspective for which we do not yet have sufcient data: the frustration–aggression hypothesis and romantic love. Our novel analysis of both these issues is frmly grounded in the GST perspective. With respect to the frustration–aggression hypothesis, the question is what logic moved Dollard et al. (1939) to come up with the hypothesis that frustration leads to aggression? What basic need does aggression serve? What is the end to which aggression is a means? Why aggression, of all things, in response to frustration? In response, we surmise that aggression is a primitive, primordial means to dominance and that dominance or power is a form of signifcance or social worth.
Tis framing suggests several hypotheses: One is that, depending on the narrative, and the network, frustration can lead to other signifcance-afording responses. In a study that Pontus Leander and his colleagues published recently (Leander et al., 2020) we manipulated frustration through failure on an anagram task and then manipulated the norm presumably endorsed by college graduates of whether the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. We found that the frustrated participants more so than the controls tended to go more with the narrative endorsed by the network, whether aggressive or non-aggressive.
A second hypothesis that follows from our analysis is that frustration will elicit an aggressive reaction to the extent that the goal serves the signifcance quest. Molly Ellenberg, of our lab, recently analyzed the survey responses of a sample of 272 incels (involuntary celibates), men who feel unfairly rejected and mistreated by women. She found support for a mediational model (see Figure 1.2) in which an index of signifcance loss (agreement with items such as “were you ostracized,” “did you have trouble with sports,” “did you face rejection from girls”) predicted an aggressive response toward women, namely agreement with the statements “I sometimes entertain thoughts of violence” and “I would rape if
a = 0.1694*
“I admire Elliot Rodger for his Santa Barbara attack.”
b = 0.45926***
Number of Signi cance Loss Items (Ostracism, Rejection from girls, Trouble with sports, Bullying)
c’ = 0.13471
c = 0.2135*
“I would rape if I could get away with it.”
Figure 1.2 Readiness to commit rape as a function of Signifcance Loss and approval of Rodger Manifesto.
I could get away with it.” Tis was mediated by agreement with the statement “I admire Elliot Rodger for his Santa Barbara attack.” Notably, Elliot Rodger carried out a misogynistic terror attack in Isla Vista California, in which he killed six people, as well as himself.
Gabriele di Cico of our lab recently carried out a diferent project in which he performed a linguistic analysis on 33,484 posts on the incels.co web forum. Words indicating honor loss had a direct efect on words related to death (indicating aggressive intentions), and the relationship was also mediated by the number of words indicating anger (see Figure 1.3).
A third hypothesis is that this frustration–aggression relationship will be moderated by the individual’s personal degree of signifcance quest. Finally, we predict that the frustration–aggression relationship will be moderated by the degree that the culture subscribes to the narrative that violence restores or brings about signifcance (e.g., an honor culture), that is, the narrative that violence is the means to the end of signifcance. Research bearing on this hypothesis is presently under way in our lab.
Figure 1.3 Relations between Signifcance Loss words, Death words, and Anger words.
Tis Ting Called Love
Ironically perhaps, the very motivation that leads to aggression could be the main underlying force in its diametric opposite, namely love. People like to think of love as an unfathomable mystery, a matter of fate, magic, or interpersonal chemistry. But our role as scientists is to solve mysteries and explode myths—in other words, to be joy spoilers and make everything seem rational and simple. In this vein, our hypothesis, supported by the way in the writings of the great early prophets of love, the 15th-century Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino and the 18th-century thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is that love is a means to the basic need of signifcance. You love someone or fall in love with someone in order to be loved in return, and to be loved is to be truly appreciated as someone very special, that is, to gain immense signifcance in that relationship.
A GST framing suggests several hypotheses about love. First, a person will fall in love with people who have considerable social worth because being loved by someone worthy is more signifcance-bestowing than being loved by someone less worthy. We name it the trickle-down efect. Second, people will tend less to fall in love with someone if they had alternative means of getting signifcance. Tese could be alternative persons (i.e., possible alternative romantic partners) or alternative sources of signifcance from an entirely diferent dimension (e.g., power, professional work).
Tird, people who experienced signifcance loss in some domain should be more likely to fall in love than people who did not. Also, fourth, people who lost signifcance in a diferent domain would be ready to “lower” their love-falling standards, that is, fall in love with less worthy people (on some dimensions), that is, people less likely to bestow signifcance upon them. Our lab is presently collaborating on these issues with Ed Lemay, a colleague at the University of Maryland and an expert on close relationships.
In short, we assume that behavior, cognition, and afect are motivated: Tey are driven by goals that serve basic needs. Because GST is a basic perspective on goal-driven behavior, it afords insights into diverse psychological phenomena, and I found it to be an exceedingly fruitful approach. Tis is amply attested by the exciting work reported in the remaining chapters in this volume.
References
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