MYANMAR
APoliticalLexicon
NickCheesman
AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra
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DOI: 10.1017/9781108565523
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APoliticalLexicon
ElementsinPoliticsandSocietyinSoutheastAsia
DOI:10.1017/9781108565523
Firstpublishedonline:November2023
NickCheesman
AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra
Authorforcorrespondence: NickCheesman, nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au
Abstract: Myanmar:APoliticalLexicon isacriticalinquiryintohow wordsanimatepolitics.Acrosssixteenentries,thelexiconstages dialoguesaboutpoliticalspeechandactioninthiscountryatthenexus ofSouth,EastandSoutheastAsia.ThisElementoffersreadersvenuesin whichtoconsiderthehistoryandcontingencyofideaslikepower,race, patriarchyandrevolution.Contentionovertheseandotherideas,it shows,doesnotreflectthepoliticalworldinwhichMyanmar ’speople live – itrealisesit.
Keywords: Myanmar,Burma,politics,meaning,lexicon ©NickCheesman2023
ISBNs:9781009454339(HB),9781108464741(PB),9781108565523(OC)
ISSNs:2515-2998(online),2515-298X(print)
APoliticalLexicon:HowCome?
Myanmarisacountrydensewithpoliticalideasandcrowdedwithpolitical actors.Ifthiswerenotobviousbefore1February2021,whenthecountry’s militaryagainseizeditsgovernment,itwasalmostimmediatelyafterward. ThequalityoftheresistancethatpeopleinMyanmarshowedtothetakeover wasremarkable.Forovertwomonths,acephalousprotestsranupanddown thecountry’slength.ThrongsofbodiesandemotionsenvelopedYangon, Mandalay,andprovincialtownsandcitiesaroundthecountry.People assembledinafestiveatmosphere,celebratingDawAungSanSuuKyi, whoseNationalLeagueforDemocracyhadoverwhelminglywonageneral electiontheyearbeforeandwhowasabouttoleadanewlegislature.They calledforherrelease,alongwiththatofhundreds,thenthousands,ofother politicalprisonersfromherpoliticalpartyandothers,nottomentionmany fromstateagencies.
Withtheirnumbersgrowing,assembleddemonstratorsbegantochallenge notionsofpoliticalorderinMyanmarthat,inthethree-quartersofacentury sincethecountrypulledfreefromthedisintegratingBritishEmpirein1948, haveneverbeensettled.Evenbeforesoldiersandparamilitariesstartedsystematicallyshootingprotestersdead,abductingpeoplefromtheirhomesand profaningcorpses,demandsfortherecallofthesemi-electedlegislaturewere supplemented,andthensupplanted,bycallstooverthrowthemilitarystate itself.Assoldiers,paramilitarypoliceandtheirproxiesshot,assaultedand humiliateddemonstrators,civilianswhoyettooktothestreetsinvertedthe relationshipbetweenthemselvesandtheiradversaries.Theydenouncedthe soldiersandparamilitarycopswhoapproachedthemasrobbersofsovereign power,notguardiansofit.Theydidthisinchantsandjeersandbyholding placardsthatreadlike:
/Downwithusurpermilitarygovernment!
/Ouraim:overthrowthemilitaryrebels!
/Cutthefascistarmyattheroots!
Takenoutofcontext,thesemightseemlikeexpressionsofangerthatcouldbe directedtowardsmilitarygovernmentanywhere – evocativeofwhatpeoplein thoseassembledcrowdsfelt,butnotrevealingmuchofpoliticalthoughtand action.Thislexiconrestsontheoppositepremise.Thecountlessaphorisms, poemsandsongsheapingridiculeonthearmyanditsrunningdogs, sitkwe, aftertheFebruarycoupdidmuchmorethanmerelyconveycontempt.They theorisedformsofpowerrelationswhichwerealternativestotheonesonwhich Myanmar’smilitaryinsists.
How?Well,inconditionsinwhicharmyofficersclaimanexclusiveand unmediatedrighttodefendsovereignpowerfromthenation’senemies,protestersinvertedtherelationofsoldierstosovereignty.Theylabelledthe Tatmadaw(DefenceServices)arebelarmy, thubônsitdat.Inthisoneusage, Myanmarcitizens,politicalactivistsandenemiesofitsarmedforcesturnedthe politicalworldupsidedown.Theydeniedthemilitaryanyexclusiverightto guardsovereigntyandassignedthatrighttothemselves.Inthisway,they upendedtheirrelationswithsoldierssenttokill,captureandhumiliatethem. Thubônsitdat isnotagloriousinstitution.Itisamurderousgang,arabble.The onlyrightthingtodoisto fightit.
Whataboutcondemnationofthearmyasfascist?Isn’tthisjustasmear borrowedfromthelanguageofsocialmovementsabroad?No,itisnotthat atall.Itisanallusion,butnottofascismasanidealtype,nortothe historicalexperienceoffascisminEuropethatgivesthetermsubstancein English.Instead,itregistersthehistoricalnarrativeoffascisminMyanmar (thencalledBurma)duringtheSecondWorldWarand,withthis,the fascismofhistoricalmythagainstwhichpeoplebackthenunitedinstruggle. Thatistosay, ‘fascistarmy’ islessaboutthequalitiesofthearmyitself thanitisaboutthoseofitsanti-fascistopponents.Itdoesnotmatterwhether thearmymeetscriteriaforaformaldefinitionoffascismornot,andtocast aroundforsuchcriteriawouldbetomissthepoint. ‘Fascist’ hereis anegativedescriptor,aplaceholder; ‘anti-fascist’,thetermimpliedbyit, isitsproductiveopponent.Theepithet ‘fascistarmy’,then,placestoday’s struggleinanhistoricallineagetowhichpeoplecanreferandfromwhich theycandrawastheyorganise,innovate,formalliances,pressclaimsand togethermakethepoliticalworldinwhichtheylive.
Thelanguagepeopleusewithoneanother,themeaningstheyinferandthe assembliestheyformtohearandbehearddonotreflectthepoliticalworld;they realiseit.Whenlanguageisrevolutionary,itendowsthosewhouseitwith apowerofpublicspeechthattheywouldnototherwisehave.Itprovidesthem, asthehistorian WilliamSewell(1980:201)haswritten,withthe ‘powerto redefinethemoralandsocialworld’.Thisiswhythewordswithwhichpeople aremadepoliticalsubjectsandthroughwhichtheyinterpretandremakepoliticalsubjectivitydeserveattention.
Butwhichwordsshouldgetattentionandwhy?Thatquestionbringsmeto thedesignofthislexicon:totheapproachthatItooktoresearchingandwriting it;andthechoicesIhavemadewhendecidingwhichwordstoselectforits entries.IntheremainderofthisintroductionIexplainthese.Ibeginwiththe principlesthatguideditsdesign,itsbackgroundanditsrationale.Iconclude withthreecontributionsIhopeitcanmaketotheunderstandingofpoliticsin
Myanmar.TheremainderoftheElementconsistsofthelexicon’ssixteen entries,followedbyrecommendedreadingsforeach.
Myanmar:APoliticalLexicon isacriticalinquiryintopoliticalusagesandinto thetimesandplacesthattheseusageshaveanimatedpoliticsinthemainland SoutheastAsiancountrythatisitssiteofinquiry.Therubricsforitsentriesserve asaseriesoflexicalprompts.Thoughtheyarefollowedbydictionarydefinitions,theentriessketchlexicalrelations.Inthisrespect,theydepartfromthe keywordsapproachthat RaymondWilliams(1983) madefamous.Inthat approach,theauthor ’sconcernremainswiththewordsthemselvesassemantic units(see FassinandDas2021).Inthislexicon,theselectedwordsdonotmirror meanings.Theyareentries,oropenings,intopossibledialogues.Itfollowsthat, unlikecertainterminologicalworksonMyanmar(e.g., Seekins2006),the lexicondoesnotaimatcompleteness.Itmakesnopretenceofcomprehensiveness.Itsentriesarefew.Theydecidenothing.Whattheyoffer,incombination, isavenueinwhichtostagerelationsbetweencertainwords,toseewhattheydo ordonotdopolitically,howtheycoexistandhowtheymightotherwisebe.
Williamssaysthat,althoughtheymightseemsomewhatarbitrary,hiskeywordsforcedthemselvesontohisattentionbecausetheproblemsoftheir meaningsseemedtobeboundupwiththeproblemsthewordswerebeing usedtodiscuss.Thewordscaughthiseyeandearbecausetheyweredoing thingsthatmatteredtocultureandsociety.Likehim,Ihaveselectedtermsthat havetroubledmepersonally.Thesearewhat CraigReynolds(2014) hascalled ‘worrywords’.Itisbecausetheyareworryingthattheyhavepressedmeto thinkharderaboutconceptsandcategories.AnditisbecauseIhaveworried aboutthemthattheyhavefromtimetotimerevealedsomethingsandledmeto thinkaboutsomeothers.
AsconditionshavechangedinMyanmar,sohaswhathasworriedme. However,mybasicintuitionhasnot.Ratherthantrytosumthingsuporwrite areportbasedonthecontentsofsourcematerials,myaimthroughouthasbeen tochoosewordswithwhichtomakethelexiconpoliticalintwosenses:one,in thesensethatitisaboutpoliticsinMyanmar;theother,inthatitisitself political,becauseitstagesadialoguebetweenthetermsitcontainsandinvites aconversationbetweenmetheauthorandyouthereader.
UnlikeWilliams,Ineverintendedtoteaseouttheentries’ semantichistories. Thelexicon’smethodis,as CarolGluck(2009) writesofherandAnnaTsing’s jointlyedited WordsinMotion,situatedintimeandplace.Butwhatdoesthat meanforthewritingofthislexicon?Throughout,Ihavebeenguidedbythree principles(drawingon Bernstein,OphirandStoler2018).The firstgoesbackto criteriaforselectionofentries.Itwasthatthelexiconshouldcomprisean
admixtureofconventionalpoliticalusages,inBurmeseandEnglish(likethe entriesfor Dictatorship and Federalism),whileincludingwordsthatarenot necessarilypolitical(likethosefor Interrogation and Buddhism).Mygoal wastoqueryassumptionsaboutpoliticsandthepoliticalinMyanmarsoasto openwordstoinquirythattheymightnototherwiseget.
Asecondprinciplewasthatthelexiconshouldremainattentivetohow translationitselfisapoliticalconcept(Lezra2018).Thepoliticsoftranslation inorfromBurmeseisunliketranslationinorfromEnglish(Cheesman2021).In English trans-lation,somethingismovedfromoneplacetoanother.Awordor phraseistransferred.Itispickedupanddroppedoffasifbytaxi.InBurmese,on theotherhand,wordstranslatebyreboundingfromonelanguagetoanother. Theyarenottransferredsomuchastheyarenegotiatedandreinterpreted.Ihave triedtoevokesomethingofthisback-and-forth,whichiswhyreadersmay find thattheentrieshaveanopen-endedquality.Theirinconclusivenessisnotan oversight.Itisforthereadertodecidewhatcomesnext.
Thethirdprinciplewasthatthelexiconshouldreachforbigideasabout politicswithouttryingtograsptheminalltheirbignessand,likewise,thatit shouldlookintosmalldetailsofpoliticswithoutgettingentangledinthem. Followingthisprinciple,thelexiconisneitheraworkofgeneraltheorynor acompendiumoffactsand figures.Itisaseriesofexchangesinwhichideasthat wordsconnoteordenotearecalledtoaccount.Aprincipleannexedtothisone wasthatthelexiconshouldbeunencumberedbyjargonandminutiae,tomakeit easytoread – butnotsoeasythatitcanbereadhastily.Theentriesareshort,but theyaskthereadertopauseandquestionthetruthsthatwordsineverydaylife conveyasself-evidentandinneedofnofurtherjustification.Theyinvitethe reader,Ihope,intoaconversationthatfollowsfromwhatare,forme,bynow threedecadesofconversationsthatIhavehadaboutthemanymeaningsof politicsinMyanmar.
Ithasbeenwrittenthatthepastisaforeigncountry.Ifso,itsforeignnessmay provetohavebeenanadvantageformewhenwritingthislexicon.Isense Myanmar ’spastasIdomyown,butIcanonlyapprehenditassomething distantandforeign,familiarbutunsettling.WhenI firsttookinterestinwhat washappeninginMyanmar,asanundergraduateattheUniversityof Melbourne,thenewsreportswereofsoldierswhohadseizedgovernment. Myanmar – or,asweinsistedoncallingit,Burma(see Metro2011) – hadhad astudent-leduprisingin1988thatbroughtdowntheBurmaSocialist ProgrammePartystate,butthis,asin2021,endedbloodily.Iread Bertil Lintner ’s(1990) accountofit,foundoutaboutthecountry’shistoryofcolonial invasionandoccupation,andlearnedabouthowBurmawas,fromthemoment ofitspoliticalindependencein1948,besetbystrife(see Charney2009).
Igotholdofhumanrightsgroups’ newsletters,whichcirculatedthroughthe officesofthetradeshall.Thesedocumentedatrocitiesinthecountry’shighlands andtoldofhalfacenturyofcivilwarand ‘thepoliticsofethnicity’ (Smith1991).
InThailandImetpeopledocumentingstateviolenceandread first-person narrativesofpoliticalstruggleandresistance(e.g., AyeSaung1989).
IvolunteeredatarefugeecampontheborderwithMyanmar,whereIlearned therudimentsofBurmese – thoughitwasnotuntillaterthatIwenttoYangon (orRangoon)tostudythelanguageinearnest.Thearmywaspursuingarmed enemiesinMyanmar ’shighlandsandfrontiers.Itpushedhardagainstpartsof theborderwithThailandandChina,anditcutdealswitharmedgroupsclaiming sovereigntyovercertainsubnationalterritoriesandthepeople,creaturesand thingsinthem.Para-statesliketheKarenNationalUnion,whichgovernedthe campwhereIlivedandworked,splintered.Membersofabreakawaygroupin 1997and1998burnedthecampdown.
InthelowlandstheStateLawandOrderRestorationCouncilthathad usurpedpowerin1988repressedallunarmedpoliticalopponents.Dissidents wentunderground.Many fledabroad.TheCouncillockedAungSanSuuKyiin herhouse;membersofherparty,inanarchipelagoofprisonsoldandnew. Meanwhile,inthenameofdevelopment,itwelcomedcapitalistsfromChina, Korea,JapanandotherpartsofSoutheastAsia – SingaporeandThailandin particular.Internationalsanctionsandbadpresskeptnon-Asiancapitalawayfor atime,thoughprofitsfrompetroleumandnaturalgasbroughtmultinationals likeTotalandUnocal.Peri-urbanindustrialzonescontainedfewfactoriesand manyweeds.Thecountryremainedagricultural.Thejuntacontinuedtoimpose socialist-stylequotasonfarmers,withwhichtoacquiregrainsandpulsesfor redistributiontopublicservantsandforinternationalsale.Hundredsofthousandsofyoungmenandwomenwentabroadinsearchofwork – inthe fisheries andcanneriesofThailand,intheconstructionsitesofSingaporeandAbu Dhabi,andinmerchantvesselscriss-crossingtheIndianandPacificOceans. Themilitaryinsistedthatitwouldgoverntemporarily.Thiswasnecessary,it said,toprepareforthe ‘discipline flourishing’ multipartydemocracyunder anewconstitutiontocome.Itsuspendeditsconstitution-draftingconvention in1996andreconfigureditselfthefollowingyearastheStatePeaceand DevelopmentCouncil.Workonthedraftconstitutionresumedin2003,andit passedthroughapantomimereferendumin2008.ThemilitaryCouncilindicatedthatitwasnowreadytoconsiderelectoralpolitics.Oneofitsconstitutionalprovisoswasthatitssoldierswouldoccupyaquarteroftheseatsinthe newunionlegislature.Thelegislatureitselfwouldoccupyagrandiosecomplex thatwasthecentrepieceofMyanmar ’snewlyerectedhigh-modernistanswerto Brasilia,CanberraandIslamabad:Naypyidaw.
In2011themilitary’sownUnionSolidarityandDevelopmentPartytook governmentviaatightlycontrolledelectionheldtheyearbefore.Thepremierof theoutgoingjunta,GeneralTheinSein,becamepresident.Heprovedtobe adeptatforginganelitepactwithAungSanSuuKyi,bringingherandher NationalLeagueforDemocracyonsidewhilekeepingthemilitarycommittedto partialwithdrawalfromgovernmentandadministrationofasortthatwouldnot, atleastintheshortterm,threatenitscoreeconomicandpoliticalinterests.As aresult,SuuKyiandfortyothermembersofherpartyenteredtheunion legislatureinaby-electionin2012,rightoncuefortheanti-Muslimviolence thattraversedthecountrythatyearandthenext.
Therestistherecentpast,thoughnolessforeignforthat.TheNational LeagueforDemocracysweptthe2015election,forminggovernmentin2016 aquarter-centuryafterthemilitary firstdeniedittherighttodoso.In2020it wonevenmoreseatsthanitdidin2015 – despite,orperhapsbecauseof,the army’sgenocidalcampaignagainstRohingyainthenorthofRakhineState, whichtheLeaguedidnothingtotrytostopandinternationalcriticismofwhich AungSanSuuKyideflected.ButifgenocidalviolencedidnotcosttheLeague anyvotesandadvantagedafewminorparties,liketheArakanNationalParty, thenitcameatacosttoothers.Manythathadhopedtopickupsmallnumbersof seatsrepresentingparticularconstituencieswentawaydisgruntled,blaming campaignrestrictionsduetothecoronaviruspandemicandmajorpartytrickery fortheirpoorresults.
Evenbeforethevote,militaryspokesmenhadindicatedthattheywouldnot acquiescetoanotherresoundingNationalLeagueforDemocracyvictory. Eggedonbyresentfulminorpartyleaders,themilitaryandtheUnion SolidarityandDevelopmentPartylodgedaslewofcomplaints.Onemilitary spokesmanmadetheextraordinaryclaimthattheveracityof8.6millionvotes outofaround27millionwasindoubt(theUnionElectionCommissionrejected theclaim).Afterthesoldierswhooccupiedone-quarteroftheseatsintheunion legislatureandtheiralliesfailedtogetaspecialsessioncalledtodebatealleged voterfraud,theircommander,SeniorGeneralMinAungHlaing,threatenedto act.Hegavenotimeoropportunitiestonegotiate.Hehadalreadyinitiatedhis plan.Thedaythatthenewlegislaturewasduetosit,soldiersdetainedPresident UWinMyint.OneofWinMyint’sdeputies,aformerarmyofficer,tookhis place.Hesignedtheorderforastateofemergencywithwhichtohand governmenttothemilitary,whichestablishedtheStateAdministrativeCouncil. Thencametheprotests.Theycutacrossclass,religious,linguistic,occupational,culturalandgenderedlines.Theywerestrongestamongunionsformed byworkingpeopleinstate-ownedindustries,incityquarterswherecharismatic youngleadersinspiredresidentsto fightback,andinperi-urbanareaswhose
occupantshadhadenoughofdecadesofdispossessionandoppressionatthe handsofMyanmar ’smilitaryanditslackeys.Theycontinueduntilparticipants couldnolongerbearthegunfireandsystematic,performedatrocitiesthatthey metinMarchandApril.Thenprotestsgavewaytowhathasbecomeaprotracted revolutionarysituation(see El-Ghobashy2021; Lawson2019; Tilly1993).New defensivearmedgroups,concentratedinupperMyanmarbutextendinginto Yangonandotherlowerregionsofthecountry, firstproliferatedandthenin partsconsolidated.TheNationalUnityGovernmentthatinAprilformedinlieuof theNaypyidawlegislatureinitiallyseemedanunlikelycontenderbutthenshowed itselftobeaviablealternativetothemilitary.However,themilitarystatedidnot collapse.TheStateAdministrativeCouncil,liketheStateLawandOrder RestorationCouncilandtheStatePeaceandDevelopmentCouncilbeforeit, succeededincontainingpoliticsviatheonemethodfordealingwiththemthat Myanmar’smilitaryhasmastered:theirprevention.
ThissituationruledoutanyfurtherresearchforthelexiconinMyanmar.Priorto it,beforethecoronaviruspandemic,in2018Ihadheldtwenty-fivediscussions withlawyers,legislators,politicalactivists,humanrightsdefenders,serving andretireduniversityprofessors,Buddhistmonksandfellowresearchersabout whatwordstheywouldincludeinsuchapoliticallexiconandwhy.Icollated theirrecommendationsandalsocollectedandreadprintnewsmedia.Overthree monthsIdidasimplecontentanalysisofthetitlesofarticlesinthenews sectionsofthen-populardomesticnewspapers(DailyEleven, TheVoice, The Standard, 7DayNews).In2019Icarriedoutadditionalcontentanalysisof Burmese-languagetitlesinperiodicalsheldattheNationalLibraryofAustralia, whereIconsultedmonographsandeditedvolumes,alongsidethoseinmy personallibrary.LaterthatyearIwentthroughnewlypublishedBurmese booksatKyotoUniversity.
SinceFebruary2021myresearchforthelexiconhasbeeninthemannerofan ongoingdialoguewithcolleaguesandstudents.IhaveconsultedBurmese-language newswebsites(BBCBurmeseService,Mizzima,MyanmarNow),listenedto podcasts(InsightMyanmar,MyanmarMusings,MyanmarRevolutionaryTales), watchedvideos,andreviewedphotographs,statementsandmemesonplatform media(e.g.,Facebookpagesofpeople’sdefenceforcesandinterimuniversity councils),organisationalwebpages(e.g.,theAssistanceAssociationforPolitical Prisoners,theNationalUnityGovernment),militarystatemediaandwebsites, briefingpapersandreportsissuedbyresearchers,andpersonalcorrespondence.
Mostentriesinthelexiconstartwithadefinitionfromthestandard Myanmar–EnglishDictionary compiledbythe MyanmarLanguageCommission(1998).In thecaseofthe firstentry,forexample,thisis ‘naingnganye /npolitics’ .
Thepurposeofincludingthesedictionaryentriesisnot,asindicated,toinsiston anauthoritativemeaning.ItistoprovideaconvenientRomanisedversionor versionsoftheBurmesewordorwordsrelevanttoeachentryatitsoutset.Andit istogiveasenseofwhichwordsappeartohave,inthedictionarycompilers’ view,stabilityinmeaningwhenmovingbetweenBurmeseandEnglish,asin ‘dictatorship’,andwhichdonot,asin ‘power ’ .
AfewoftheentriesbeginwithEnglishdefinitionsfromthe ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary (2007)ratherthanwithBurmeseones.Thereasonforthisis thattheirBurmeseequivalentsarenot,tomymind,invitingofthetypeof dialoguetowhichtheentriesaspire.Theyarestiltedandratherawkward translations.Thisisnottoimplythatallpoliticalwordsthataretranslatedor transplantedfromEnglishandotherlanguagesareuninterestingorunimportant tothevernacular.As TamasWells(2021) and MatthewWalton(2017) have shown,theBurmese dimogarezi,forinstance,isnotathinveneeronanEnglish orFrenchorLatinorGreekwordfordemocracy.Burmese dimogarezi is culturally,historicallyandlinguisticallydistinctive.WeareliabletomisunderstandwhatpeopleinMyanmarsayaboutdemocracyifallwetrytodois find pointsofcorrespondencebetweentheir dimogarezi andourdemocracy.The samegoesforalloftheentriesinthislexicon,regardlessofwhethertheybegin withBurmeseorEnglishdefinitions.
BurmeseandEnglisharethetwolanguageswithexplicitstakesinthis lexicon.TheyarenottheonlytwolanguageswithstakesinMyanmar ’spolitics. Thecountryishometoamind-bogglingdiversityoflanguages.Alotof minoritylanguageshavewell-establishedpoliticalvocabularies,especially thoselanguagesadoptedandtaughtbyarmedgroupsinthecountry’sfrontier areas,likeMonandSgawKaren(see,e.g., SouthandLall2016).Theattention thatthislexiconpaystoBurmeseandEnglishdoesnotimplythatother vernacularsdonotmatter.However,anattempttowriteapoliticallexicon thatwouldconsidermultiplelanguageusersandsourcesinMyanmarwould havecalledforadifferentresearchdesign,workingtowardsdifferentgoals fromthisone(see,bywayofoneexample, Balletal.2007).
Followingthedictionaryextractorextractswithwhicheachofthesixteen entriesbeginsisashortquoteorproverb.Thesegesturetothepoliticsofthe wordinquestion,itstranslationorboth,bywayofametaphororproposalor argumentaboutitsuse.
Theentriesarenotalphabeticallyordered,buttheyarenotarrangedarbitrarilyeither.Theyare,asIhavebeenatpainstopointout,performingandinviting dialogue.Certainentriestalktooneanother;others,acrossoneanother.Thereis noreasontoreadthemintheordertheyappear,sincetheyarenot aconcatenatedseriesbutavenue,aplaceforcomingtogether.Readerscan
choosetoparticipateintheirdialoguesormoveon.Theycanenterasthey pleaseandleaveastheychoose.
Toassistreaderswho findtheirownwaysthroughwhatfollows,eachtime oneofthewordsfortheentriesinthelexicon(otherthanthewordwithwhich thatentryisconcerned)appearsitisin bold.Readersmightusethesewordsas cuesforotherentriestovisit,ortheymay findanotherwaytogetabout.Afew placesinthelexiconcontainparentheticalrecommendationstolookatanother entry,wheretheserelatedirectlytothetopicdiscussed.
Thelexiconhasnodesignatedexit,noconclusion.Insteaditendswithshort listsofrecommendedfurtherreadings,organisedbyentry.Theselistsfollow thebibliographicreferencesforthisintroduction.Aswiththeentriesinthe lexiconthemselves,manymoreworksmi ghthavebeenincludedintheselists. Readersmight findsomeoftheminAndrew Selth’s(2018) bibliographyof BurmastudiesorintheOnlineBurmaLibrary( https://burmalibrary.org ).For readersofBurmese,anindicativelistofreferencesfollowsthefurtherreading lists.
Throughoutthelexicon,withtheexceptionofpropernouns,thetranscription ofBurmesefollowstheRomanisationSystemforBurmese,BGN/PCGN1970 Agreement.ThisincludesthedictionarydefinitionsoftheMyanmarLanguage Commission(whichusesadifferentsystem).TheBGNisacrudesystemthat groupssimilar-soundingBurmeseconsonantsandvowelstogetheranddisregardstonalmarkers.Butithastheadvantageofbeingsimpletouseandeasyto read.Namesofpeopleandplacesfollowpopularisedspellings.
WhatcanasmalllexiconcontributetoourunderstandingofpoliticsinMyanmar? Whatcanitsayordoinaneraofrevolution?Tothesequestions,Ihavethree responseswithwhichtoconcludethesepreliminaryremarks.The firstisthat,by attendingtohowpoliticalvaluesarenegotiatedandtransformedthroughwords anddeeds,talkandaction,Ihopethisbookcanbeaplaceforthinkingandtalking aboutpoliticsinMyanmardifferentlyfromworksthattrytofollowallthattalk andaction.Intumultuoustimesitishardtokeepup.Thereisalwayssomething goingon.Attentiontohowwordsareused,totheirvalencesandhistories,totheir relationstootherwordsandtopowercanhelpustothinkwhenitishardtoget agriponthings.Theimportantthingistoresisttheurgetopileupfacts – to describeneweventsandadddataasiftheaccumulationofthesewillautomaticallyaidunderstanding.As LisaWedeen(2019) hasshowninherworkonSyria, theoppositecanbethecase.Undoubtedly,withoutfactsitisnotpossibleto interpretevents;however,accumulationoffactsnotguidedbypurposeor informedbytheoryisunproductive,ifnotcounterproductive.Ihavewritten thislexiconagainstthatimpulse.
Thesecondrelatedcontributionthatalexicalapproachtopoliticalmeaningmakingcanmakeistoshowhowourinterpretationsofthepoliticalworldshape thatworldandtheinterpretationsthatcompriseit(see Blakely2020).The lexiconitselfinterpretsavernacularworldofpoliticsinMyanmar.Itdoesnot describeit.Itisnotalensontothatworld.Itisaseriesofentriesintoit.It communicateswithit.Itrecountspoliticalpractices,notwiththegoalof providing,onitspages,faithfullikenessesbutwiththeobjectiveofproducing trustworthyinterpretations.Thereare,afterall,nolikenessestobehad.There areonlymoreorlesstrustworthyinterpretationsofotherinterpretationsof politicalfacts.Inthiswaythelexiconenfoldswithallthoseotherinterpretations ofpoliticsinMyanmarthatIhavereadandheardanddiscussedandconsidered.
ThethirdcontributionIthinkthispoliticallexiconmakesisthatitresists hopelessness.Cynicsmultiplyindarktimes.Forthem,thereisnopointin opposingdictatorship.Dictatorsgettheirwayandthevulnerablesufferif peopleresist,theysay.Violenceisneverthesolution,somewell-meaning principledfolksargue,implyingthatthosewhoopttouseviolenceinselfdefenceare,withtheirattackers,blameworthywhenitintensifies.Otherstalk knowinglyoffailedstatesandmilitarystalemates,asifrevolutionarysituations werelikechessgames.Thoughnoteveryoneofthelexicon’sentriesishopeful, Ihavewrittenitagainstsuchexpressionsoffutility.Itspremisecontainsmy hope.Politicalideas flourishintimesofconflictandchangebecausethereis causetobehopeful.Andwherethey flourish,thereis.
1Politics
/naingnganye/npolitics.
Politicsarelikepuppetry,orwalkingwithastick. – Burmesesaying
Politics, naingnganye,pronounced naing-gan-ye,arematters, -ye,ofastateorpolity, naingngan or nainggan.Thisdenotationchimeswithanold-fashionedwayof talkingaboutpolitics,thatwhereastateorpolityexists,politicsdo;conversely,no stateorpolity,nopolitics.ButliketheideaofthestateinEnglish, nainggan connotes differentthings.ThesecomplicatetheideaofthepolityinMyanmarandofits politics.
Takethe2008ConstitutionofMyanmar,whichanticipatedthepolitical reform ofthe2010s.Compareitstwoversions,BurmeseandEnglish.Thecomparison revealsanumberofshiftsinusage.InEnglish, nainggan,orformally,for Myanmar,theelevated naingngandaw,or nainggandaw,designatesinits first chapterthebasicprinciplesofthe ‘union’ andinitssecondthe ‘state’ structure. ‘Thesovereign power oftheUnion[naingngandaw]’,theconstitutionatitsoutset runs, ‘isderivedfromthecitizensandisinforceintheentirecountry[naingngandaw]’ (section4).Atitsotherend,theconstitutioninchapter13referstothe ‘state’ (naingngandaw) flagandthe ‘national’ (naingngandaw)anthem.
Naingngan (or naingngandaw),then,isatplayindifferent fieldsofmeaning. Itdoesdifferentthings,dependingonwhetherpoliticsareimaginedasmatters ofthestateornation,countryorunion;whethertheyareconstitutedbycitizens orconstitutiveofthem.Politicsas naingganye refertothestatebutdonot correspondtoit.Thestateisasiteofpoliticalactionbutnotacontainerforit. Politicalaffairsspillallovertheplace.
ForMyanmar’smilitary,spillagemakespoliticsproblematic.Itstasksareto preventandcontainspills – toinsistthatthestateis,infact,thecontainerinwhich politicsmustbeconductedandthatthemilitaryalonecandefinethelimitsofthe stateandofthoseactivitiesthatareproperlypolitical.Itstheoriesandmethodshave varied.TheRevolutionaryCouncil(1962to1974)andtheBurmaSocialist ProgrammePartystates(1974to1988),eachofwhichwascommandedbythe country’sprototypicaldictator,GeneralNeWin,mademonopolyclaimsonwhat waspolitical.Toparticipateinpoliticslegitimately,citizenshadtojointheParty programme.Thismeantbeingamemberofamassorganisationunderstate leadershiporotherwisecontributingtothenewsocialisteconomicsystem.
Aftertheprogrammemetwithnationwideprotest,thePartycollapsedin 1988,andanewjunta,theStateLawandOrderRestorationCouncil(1988to 1997;reconstitutedastheStatePeaceand Development Councilfrom1997to 2011),triedcontainmentthroughelectoralpartypolitics.Inthe1990general
electiontheNationalLeagueforDemocracy,ledbyAungSanSuuKyi, charismaticdaughterofthecountry’sindependencehero,trouncedthemilitary’sNationalUnityParty(inBurmese,the ‘National Race’ UnityParty).The militarylearnedfromthisexperiencethatifpoliticswerelikeproverbialartsof puppetrythenthesewerepracticalartsithadnotmastered.Politics,itturned out,werehardertohandlethanpuppetsandwalkingsticks.Andwhatthe militarycouldnotkeepitshandson,itwouldnotallow.
Themilitarynowprohibitedpolitics, firstbylockingawayAungSanSuuKyi,as wellasleadingmembersofherpoliticalpartyandassortedothers,forthebetterpart ofthenexttwodecades;second,bymakingamockeryofpoliticsthemselves.Its officersdelineatednationalpolitics, amyothanaingganye,frompartypolitics, padi naingganye.Theformer,theysaid,weretheproperaffairsofstateinwhichthey wereduty-boundtoparticipate.Thesewereforthegreatergood.Theywerematters ofstate sovereignty,racialsolidarityandterritorialintegrity.Overthesethemilitary wouldhavethe finalsay.Thisisanotionofpoliticsascommand.Thereisno dialogue,nomeetingofmindsorexchangeofviews.Norisanyinvited.Theactive exchangeofideasisunwelcome.Dialogue,inthemilitary’sscheme,isanattribute ofpartypolitics.Thosearesmall-mindedaffairsthatoccupytheattentionofpeople whowould,whethertheyknowitornot,ruinthecountry.Nationalpoliticsarethe military’sbulwarkagainstthatpossibleoutcomeofanythingaberrantlypolitical. Nationalpoliticsareformlessandaimless.Thoughtheyhavetheappearance ofastructureandasetofobjectivesinthemilitary’sthreenationalcauses –non-disintegrationoftheUnion;non-disintegrationofnationalsolidarity,which istosay,thesolidarityofnationalraces;andperpetuationof sovereignty – these arenothingotherthanarestatementofwhatanysovereignstatestandsfor. Existentialthreatstoterritory,authorityand sovereignty arerepugnanttoall existingstates.Allstatescircumscribethepossibilitiesforpoliticalaction.Itis inhowthesethreatsareformulatedandcircumscribedthatstatesdiffer.Where thosethreatsarelocatedinthepracticeofpoliticsitself,theonlythinglefttodo istopreventpeoplefromthinkingandactingpolitically.
Consequently,fromtheelectionin1990tothenextin2010thestrugglebetween Myanmar’smilitaryanditspoliticalopponentswasnotapoliticalstruggleinthe senseofonefoughtforpolitical power.Itwasastrugglebyonesidetoredefine politicsabsentofpoliticalthoughtoraction;byothers,tokeeppoliticsalive.The strugglewentoninpoliticalpartygatherings,foraslongasthosewerepermitted,in publicprotestsandintheclosed-doortrialsofdissidents.Itwentoninmyriadother placesandways.PeopleinMyanmar,likepeoplelivingunderpoliticallyrepressive conditionselsewhere,cameupwithstrategiestoundermineormockorbypass militarystrictures,manyofwhichconstitutedformsofpoliticalresistance,though theywerenotspokenofinthisway.Peoplewroteandtalkedaboutpolitics elliptically.Anyonewhowasnotovertlypoliticalavoidedspeakingabout
naingganye andprofesseddisinterestinthem.Bettertoleavesomethingunsaid thantosaysomethingthatyoumightlaterregret.
Politicsdidnotmagicallyreappearwhenthemilitarynexttrieditshandat ageneralelectionin2010.ThejuntakeptAungSanSuuKyilockedinherhouse andthousandsofherparty’smembersandtheiraffiliatesinjailsaroundthecountry. In2011itusheredthelastpremierofthemilitaryjunta,GeneralTheinSein,intothe presidency.Itdeliveredthemilitary’sUnionSolidarityand Development Partythe bulkofseatsinthe firstunionlegislature.Itsrepresentativesmetwithuniformed soldiersthere.Thelatteroccupiedaquarterofthelegislature,notasrepresentatives ofanyconstituencybutinthenameofnationalpolitics.Thereafter,themilitary releasedSuuKyiandherpartyleadershipfromcaptivity.
AungSanSuuKyiandherpartymemberscontestedandwonnearlyall availableconstituenciesina2012by-election.Shewentontochairthelegislature’sruleoflawcommitteeandby2014wascampaigningforthenextgeneral election.In2015theNationalLeagueforDemocracywonover57percentof thevotefortheunionlegislatureand78percentoftheelectedseats – stillover 59percentofthetotalseats,includingthemilitary’sbloc.Itwasahugevictory andanunequivocalrejectionofthemilitaryanditsaffiliates.SuuKyi,constitutionallyblockedfromthepresidencybecauseshehadmarriedandraised childrenwithanon-Myanmarnational,insteadtookthesupra-constitutional roleofstatecounsellorandin2016effectivelybecameheadofgovernment.
Withthereturnofpolitics,peoplefoundtheirvoicesandformednewinstitutions forpoliticalaction.Theyassembledinordertobeseenandhavetheirclaimsheard. Bytheearly2010snotadaywentbywithout,somewhereinMyanmar,peasants blockingaroadtodemandthatlandtakenfromtheminthenameof development be returnedorworkersoccupyingafactorycompoundtoinsistthattheybepaidmore andthatconditionsbeimproved.Buddhistmonkscametogetherandcalledon laypeopletodefendtheirreligionand race againstMuslims.Representativesof armedgroupsoccupyingfrontierareasgatheredinconferencehallstonegotiate ceasefiresanddiscusstheprospectsfor federalism.Politicsstartedspillingallover theplaceagain.The citizen wasback. Power wasoncemore,sotospeak,upfor grabs.Orwasit?
2Power
/ana/npower;authority.[Paliana] /awza/n 3power;authority;influence(asin ~,~ [thevoiceof ~,exceeding~]). Awza,asdistinctfrom ana, ‘permeates’ . – GustaafHoutman, MentalCulture inBurmeseCrisisPolitics
InBurmese,twoshortwordsusefullyconveyideasofpoliticalpower.Bothhave IndicrootsinSouthAsianstatecraft.The firstis ana.Politicallyspeaking, ana is asourceofcommandsthatareobeyedbecausetheyareissuedintheformof maximsbackedbyforce. Ana is,asGustaafHoutmanonceobserved,centralised power:thepowerof dictatorship,thepowerof sovereignty.Itispowerrepresentedinorganisationalchartsofauthoriseddecision-makers, ana-baing,whoby virtueofofficepossessaquantumof ana withwhichtoact.
Ana,lestitbemisunderstoodasarationalbureaucratictypeofpower,standsin needofsupernaturalinterventionandprotection.Dictatorshavetobeaidedby intermediariestrainedinesotericarts,suchasastrologersandnumerologists,to anticipatethreatsandheadoffchallengers.Theycandothisbyvisitingsiteswhere confluencesofsupernaturalpowercanbeaccessedandbyparticipatinginritualsto anticipateandoutperformfutureunwantedevents – orbyforcingotherstoparticipateinthem.Thoseothersmightincludeanyonewhohasevertravelledbyroadin Myanmar,sinceonewell-knownstorygoesthatthereasondriversinMyanmar,then Burma,wereorderedfromthelefttotherightsidein1970wasthatanastrologer advisedGeneralNeWinthatviathisexpedienthewouldavertaright-wingputsch. Awza denotesanothertypeofpower.Thistypegivesthoseinwhomitaccrues, througheducation, race,religionandthearrangementsof patriarchy,opportunitiestosayanddothingsthatotherscannot.Thisispowerthat(like ana)existsas aforceintheworld;liketwoothertypesof awza withwhichitislexicallylinked –the awza ofnourishingfood,whichgivescreatureslife,andthe awza ofhealthy soil,onwhichplantsthrive – itisanutrient,notaninstrument.Thoughsomebody maybepossessedof awza,theycannotwieldit.Thisdoesnotmeanthatitisnotin theirservice.Theycaninfluenceotherstodotheirbidding.Butthepower/awza to influenceothersissuesfromelsewherethanthatofpower/ana.Thelatterpoweris intheformofcommandmentexemplifiedassovereignpower.Theformeris relational. Ana canbeobtainedandmovedaboutthroughmundaneandsupramundaneinterventions. Awza haspotencythatistangiblebutnottransferable. Thereare,tobesure,otherwordsthatdenotepower.Amongthem, bôn (sometimesRomanisedas hpoun),isatypeofpowerthataccruesthrough meritoriousaction.ItismanifestintheformoftheBuddhistmonk,the bôngyi,oronewithgreat bôn (seetheentryon Buddhism),sincehaving adequatepowerofthissort,accruedfromthedeedsofpreviouslives,is aconditionofpossibilitytobecomeamonk.Itcorrelateswith awza inasmuch asitradiatesratherthandominates.AnotheristheEnglishloanterm pawa, whichrockerLayPhyu’salbum Power54 adoptedbackin1996.Fifty-fouris thenumberofAungSanSuuKyi’shouseonUniversityAvenue.Thenumber disappearedfromofficiallabelswhencensorsbelatedlygotthereferenceand cassettescirculatedasmere pawa,withthe54intheirellipses,oncrooners’ lips inthekaraokebarsandteashopsof dictatorship
Perhapsthe pawa in Power54 wasmeanttorefernottoeither ana or awza butto both. Ana and awza,afterall,arenotmutuallyexclusive.Thepoweroftheideal politicalleaderisconstitutedbyeach.Militarydictatorsarefarfromideal.They haveasurfeitof ana andanexiguityof awza.AungSanSuuKyi,bycontrast,has comeclosetotheideal.Thisiswhy,asleaderoftheNationalLeaguefor Democracyandpeople’schampion,shehasconstitutedasurpassingthreattothe military – onethatithasbeenunabletocontainotherthanbypreventing politics. GeneralAungSan,herfather,indeathachievedtheidealbyvirtueofhislifelong strugglefornationalliberationandmartyrdom.Hisdaughtercarrieshislegacy.
WhileAungSanSuuKyi’s awza derivesinnosmallpartfromherfather, genealogyisbutpartofthestory.ThepowerofSuuKyi’s awza isthatitisatonce hereditaryandcultivated,throughreligiouslyimbuedpracticesofself-discipline, whichinformherideaof freedom;herbilingualeloquence,whichbroughtherto prominenceatmassdemonstrationsin1988;herperformedselflessness;and,for overthreedecades,herunbrokencommitmenttoherBurman(or Bama) race among othernationalraces.Inthe1990ssherefusedtoleavethecountry,andwithitthe strugglefordemocracy,evenasherhusbandlaydyinginOxford,lestshebedenied re-entry.In2017sherefusedtocriticisetheMyanmarstatewhenitstoodaccusedof genocide.Forpeopleabroad,thesetwopositionsmightlookcontradictory:theone indefenceofhumanrights,theotherindefenceoftheirviolators.Athometheydo not.Bothwereindefenceofthenation.BothenhancedSuuKyi’s awza
The reform eraofthe2010swasatestingtimeforpowernotonlyforthe militaryandforAungSanSuuKyiandherpartybutalsoforothersin governmentordealingwithgovernment.Peoplewhowerenewtotheexperienceofbeinginproximitywithpower/ana wantedtotryitout.Theseinclude membersofthelegislaturesattheunionlevelandthoseinthesevensubnational regions(AyeyarwadyoronanearlierRomanisationIrrawaddy,BagoorPegu, MagweorMagway,Mandalay,Sagaing,TanintharyiorTennasserim,Yangonor Rangoon)andsevenstates(Chin,KayahorKarenni,KayinorKaren,Kachin, Mon,RakhineorArakan,Shan).Theyincludedthelikesofthenewcommissionersforhumanrightsandcorruption,theUnionElectionCommission,and theleadersandrepresentativesofarmedgroupsinceasefiretalksordeals.
Throughoutthisdecadethemilitarycededaquantumofpower/ana tocivilians intheseandotheragencies,butitneverrelinquishedit.Aswellasholdingonequarteroftheseatsintheunionlegislature(seetheentryon Politics),itretained theministriesofdefence,borderaffairsandhomeaffairs,thelastofwhich oversawthepoliceforce,prisonsandthe firebrigade,whichhasanauxiliary securityfunction.Itsmensatattablesintripartiteceasefirenegotiations,with civiliansfromgovernment,whilearmedgroupsdemandedrightsto development anddebatedthemeaningof federalism.Throughtheseprocessesitsucceededin
winningcivilwarbykeepingbelligerentsatthenegotiatingtableandenhancedits statusbybeinginproximitywithAungSanSuuKyi.
Itshouldbeclearfromthisentrythat,amongdifferenttypesofpower, ana clashes whereas awza absorbs. Awza hasnoresourceswithwhichtoresistthecoerciveforce of ana.Butifitspowerisgreatenough, awza candeadentheeffectsof ana.Itcan renderthemasterofthattypeofpower,the anashin ordictator,politicallyspeaking apathetic figurewhosesovereigncommandsringhollow – whoseachievements,if theycanevenbecalledthat,remainlimitedtothepreventionof politics.
3Dictatorship
/anashin/ndictator.
/anashinzanit/ndictatorship.
Thecontentofthelegislator ’sactionisright,butdevoidoflegalpower:itis powerlessright.Dictatorshipisomnipotencewithoutlaw:itislawless power. – CarlSchmitt, Dictatorship
UnliketheEnglishword ‘dictator’,whoseoriginsinRenaissanceinterpretations ofaRomanrepublicanofficefordealingwithemergenciesCarlSchmitttracedin his1921bookonthetopic,theBurmeseword anashin isdescriptive,not juridical.Thedictatorisnobodyotherthanonewhomasters ana, power.Hisis indeedalawless power,butitisnotfreedfromlegalrestrictionsthroughcertain arrangementstoresolveanabnormalsituationlikeawarorrebellion.Thoughwar andrebellionhavebeenjustificationsforthemilitary’srepeatedusurpationof power inMyanmar,thesearefalsemotives;pretextstoseizepower, ana-thein. DictatorshipinMyanmarisnotameanstoanend,exceptinasmuchasitsendsare immanent.Thepointofdictatorshipistoconstituteadictator.
InMyanmar,withtheexceptionoftheconstitutionalemergencygovernment, whichGeneralNeWintemporarilyheadedfrom1958to1960whenthecivilian legislaturecontinuedworkingunderconstrainedcircumstances,everymilitary governmentthathasfollowedhasbeendespotic(seetheentryon Politics). Nonehaveheededconstitutionalorder.Usurpersin1962(GeneralNeWin)and 1988(GeneralSawMaung)neverevenbotheredtorevoketheconstitutionsthat themilitarystatesuperseded.Astheyhadgrabbed power/ana lawlessly,they hadnoreasontobotherwithpowerlessright.
GeneralNeWin,whoincivilianguiselaterwentbythehandleUNeWin (U beingthehonorificforanadultmale,like ‘mister ’ inEnglish; Daw the equivalentforwomen)wastheprototypical anashin whosetthetermsandtone forthosewhofollowedhim.Hewaspetty,hiseffortsparochial,his power
adequate.Thepartydictatorshipheestablishedwashisown,notthemasses’ . Burmaneverleaptforwardintoupheavalofthesortthatthecommunistparty broughttoChina.NeWin’spartydidn’tengineeraprogramforradicaleconomicandculturaltransformation.Hedidn’twantittodothat,andtheparty couldn’thavedoneitevenifhehad.TheBurmaSocialistProgrammePartywas notthattypeofmassorganisation.NeWinwasnotthattypeofdictator.Burma wasnotChina.
ThisisnottoimplythattherewerenomajorchangesinNeWin’stime.Inthe mid-1960stheRevolutionaryCouncilnationalisedprivateenterprises.These includednewspapersandprintingpresses,endingwhatlittleremainedofpublic communicationsthatwerenotthoseofthecomingparty-state.Itdispossessed largelandholdersandnon-natives(seetheentryon Race)ofcapitalthatit concludedwouldbebetteroffinitsownhandsorinthoseofnativepeasants whomitaddressedasacoreconstituency.Withthe1974Constitutionitintegratedpartyandstatefunctionarieshorizontally.Whilekeepingthemformally separate,itcollapsedtheexecutive,legislatureandjudiciaryintooneanother.
Throughoutthesedecades,soldiersandpolicecontained politics byputting downpublicprotestsastheyarose,likethosethataccompaniedtheSoutheast AsianPeninsularGamesin1969andtheworkers’ andstudents’ demonstrations of1974and1975.Butprotestsin1988wouldn’tletup.Themilitaryshotitsway backto power,jettisonedthepartystateandreturneditsmentotheforeground ofgovernment.Twomoredictatorsfollowed:GeneralSawMaungfrom1988to 1992,whomSeniorGeneralThanShwepushedasidetobecomeandremain chairmanoftherulingmilitaryjuntaineachofitsiterations(theStateLawand OrderRestorationCouncilto1997andthentheStatePeaceand Development Councilto2011),untilthebeginningoftheshort-lived reform era.
Afterthejuntaback-pedalledonthe1990electionresult,ittookoutits frustrationsonwhatitlabelledinternaldestructiveelements.Peoplewho spokeuploudlyfordemocracyor federalism orhumanrightsdisappeared intoanobscurenetworkof interrogation camps.Throughintrusiveand arbitraryadministration,SawMaungandthenThanShwekepteveryone elseincheckandthemselvesin power.Allattemptsatforcingthemout, whetherthroughuseofarmsorthroughunarmedprotest,failed.Intheend,it wasviaastagedconstitutionalreferendumin2008andthenanelectionin 2010thatdictatorshipgaveground,with theestablishmentofnewlegislatures in2011,to politics.
Thingswerechanging,andlastingchangebegantolookinevitablewhenthe NationalLeagueforDemocracywona firstelectionin2015andasecondonein 2020.ButMyanmar ’sarmedforceshadn’tgoneanywhere.Theywerenolonger attheforefrontofallnationalaffairs,buttheywerefarfromoutofthepicture.
Armyofficersranministries,plannedfor genocide,talkedabout federalism, profitedfromeconomic development,andwerevisibletoallandsundryas ablocsittinginone-quarterofthenationallegislature.Militaryspokesmen soundedvociferouscomplaintsabouttheconductofthe2020vote,andin Januarythenextyeartheircommander-in-chief,SeniorGeneralMinAung Hlaing,utteredthreatsabouttheconsequencesofnotheedingthemilitary’s concerns.
Afewdayslater,MinAungHlaingusurped power andbecamethecountry’s fourthmilitarydictatorsince1948.Hebrokefromhispredecessorsbyinsisting thathewasactinginaccordancewiththemilitary’sown2008Constitution,by abductingthecivilianpresidentandputtingaformerarmyofficerinhisplace (seetheentryon Sovereignty).Afterabriefinterval,protestsbegan.Within afewweeks,theyhadenvelopedtownsandcitiesupanddownthecountry. Oncetheshootingstarted, politics spilledinto revolution.The reform erathat thearmyhadtakenoveradecadetoengineerwas finished.Withitwent prospectsforbrokeringafederalunion.
4Federalism
ˈfɛd(ə)rəlɪz(ə)mnoun.l18.(Theprincipleof)afederalsystemofgovernment; advocacyofthis ...
Inordertoachievelastingandsustainablepeace,weagreeto ... Establish aunionbasedontheprinciplesofdemocracyandfederalisminaccordance withtheoutcomesofpoliticaldialogueandinthespiritofPanglong – NationwideCeasefireAgreement,2015;officialtranslation
TheMyanmarLanguageCommission’sBurmese–Englishdictionarycontains noentryforfederalism.NordoestheCommission’s five-volumeconcise Burmesedictionaryredresstheoversight.Bothcontaindefinitionsforthe alphabeticallyadjacentEnglishloanterms,fascism, petsit-wada,andfashion, pet-shin.Butfederalism, petdarè-wada or petdarè-zanit,dependingonwhether oneistalkingoffederalideology(-wada)orafederalsystem(-zanit),has disappearedintothedictionaries’ ellipses.
Itmaybethattheomissionwasunintended.Evenso,theunintendedcanbe telling.Beforethe2010sfederalismwasrarelymentionedinMyanmar. Participantsatseminarsinterritoryoccupiedbyarmedgroupsrepresenting variousnationalracesalongMyanmar’sborders,aswellasthoseintraining programsintheofficesofexilegroupsinThailandorIndia,talkedaboutit.People inthecountrydidnot.Itisnotthattheywerenotinterested,butforthemilitary
federalismwasaeuphemismforseparatism:athreattotheunionthatitcouldnot tolerateasguardianofnational sovereignty andterritorialintegrity.
Soldiersinsistedthattheyhadgotteninvolvedin politics inthe firstplaceto counteractthisthreat.Themilitaryhadtousurp power in1962,theirstorygoes, topreventhereditaryShanrulersfrompullingoutoftheunion.Thethreatof secessionfollowedanearlierproposaltoamendthe1947Constitutionof Burma,whichmarkedtheendofBritishcolonialrule,tomakeafederalinstead ofunitarygovernment.TheShanleadershadonlyagreedtoentertheunionon conditionofautonomy.Aconstitutionalprovisograntedarightofsecessionto anystatewhoserepresentativeswereunhappywithhowthingsweregoing –oncetheyhadwaitedforatleastadecadeafterindependence.AungSan,the country’sindependencehero,hadreachedthisagreementwithrepresentatives ofgroupsinfrontierareasatthetownofPanglong,insouthernShanState,andit hasbeenpopularizedasthePanglongAgreement.
Itistothespiritofthisagreementthatnegotiatorsinthe2010srepeatedly referred,notleastamongthemAungSanSuuKyi,sinceherfatherwas instrumentalinmakingitasuccess.PanglongmadepostcolonialBurma areality.In1962therealitychanged.GeneralNeWin’stakeoverputanend tothatdealanddashedhopesforafederatedstate.TheonlywaythatShanor Kachinorwhicheverracialisedminoritywouldsecuretheautonomythey soughtwouldbeby fightingfor freedom.Andsotheydid.
Sincethen,muchtimeandenergyhasbeenspentincombatamongmultifariousarmedgroupswhohaveasserted sovereignty overonesliceoranotherof Myanmar ’sterritory.Inthe1990sand2000s,manyharbouredhopesthat MyanmarwouldfragmentastheformerYugoslaviahad.Onereasonitdidnot wasthatwhiletheStateLawandOrderRestorationCouncilthatseized power in1988foughtmultitudinousenemiesitsoughttermsonwhichtocedeterritory tocertainarmedgroupsthroughbilateralceasefires.Notalltheseventeen ceasefiresitsofficersnegotiatedheld.Butenoughofthemheldlongenough forthemilitarytostitchtogetherapatchworkofrelationshipsthatmeantatany giventimeitdidn’thaveto fightonallfronts.Norwasitever fightingagainst aunitedfront.
Withthereformsofthe2010s,thingschanged.Federalismwasnolonger atopicthatthemilitarywouldnotorcouldnotbroach.Somepeoplesaidthatthe 2008Constitution,whichwasauthoredunderthemilitary’swatch,couldbe readasconcedingtoakindoffederalismwithoutsayingasmuch.Underits terms,thefourteenstateandregionallegislaturescanraiserevenuethrough taxesonland,buildings,basicservicesandexcise.Theycanmakedecisions aboutcommerceandagriculture,electricityproduction,forestryandmining; manageroads,bridges,portsandtransport;andoverseeculturalandsocial
affairs.However,governmentsofsubnationalstatesandregionslackautonomy. TheyaresubordinatedtoNaypyidaw,whereformalpolitical power remains concentrated.Soregardlessofwhetheritcanbereadasallowingforakindof half-sailfederalism,likethehalf-saildemocracythatThailand’smilitaryhas practised,Myanmar ’sconstitutiondoesnotenvisageorarticulateaquasifederalpoliticalorder.
Nevertheless,inthe reform erafederalismwasnowanacceptedtopicof discussionamongmilitaryrepresentatives,theirciviliancounterpartsin governmentandnegotiatorsforarmedparastatesinfrontierareas. Discussionswerenolongerone-on-oneaffairs.Theybroughtalotofdifferentgroupstothetableforcomprehensivenegotiationsfromwhichbut ahandfulofbelligerentswereexcluded,chiefamongthemtheArakan Army,whichhadformedin2009,muchlaterthanmostothergroups. Myanmar ’ssoldierswerepreparedtoentertainfederalismnotionally,at least – asthetextofthe2015NationwideCease fi reAgreementwitheight armedgroupsshows.Whethertheywereatallpersuadedbytheideais anotherstory.Itmightbethattheyuseditasastallingtactic,tokeep negotiatorsfromarmedgroupsintheroom.Afterall,ifeverybodywanted totalkaboutfederalismbuthaddivergentideasaboutwhatitmeant,thenthe chancesthatprogresscouldbemadetowardsitwereremote.
Consequently,despitesuperficiallyfavourableconditionsthedecadeof effortstowardsthisendaccomplishedpreciouslittle,atleastatthenational level.Bythelate2010sMyanmarwasnoclosertoadealthatwouldend fighting andtransformthecountryintoafederalunionthanithadbeenbeforethe NationalLeagueforDemocracycametogovernmentin2016.Inpartsofthe countrytherewasprogressondecentralisation,butthepromiseoffederalism layfaroff.
Inthemeantime,parastatesdidasmuchcease fi restate-makingasthey could.Theideawasthat,regardlessofwhatwasagreed,theywould materiallyhaveinplace,atleastprovisionally,institutionsthatthey couldsubstituteforthoseoftheunion – schoolstoteachlocallanguages; courtsandpoliceforcestodealwithcer taincategoriesofoffencesconsistentwithlocalideasofjustice;departmentsofland,agriculture,forestryand theenvironment.
Whenthemilitaryusurped power in2021,the reform-eranegotiations cametoanabruptend.Althoughthemilitaryinsistedthatitwantedto continuetalks, fightingsoonrenewedinpartsofthecountrythathadbeen peaceablebeforehand,includinginChin,Kachin,Shan,Karenni(Kayah) andKaren(Kayin)States.Certaingroups,liketheKachinIndependence Organization,cameoutinsupportofthenewNationalUnityGovernment,
whichhadformedinApriltostandinfortheNationalLeaguefor Democracygovernmentthathadbeenunabletosit.Theyandothers gavetrainingandlentarmstopeople’sdefenceforcesbubblingupall overtheplace:notably,inpartsofSagaingandMagwayRegionswhere armedgroupshadnotpreviouslybeenactive(seetheentryon Revolution ).TheArakanArmy,whichthegovernmenthadclassedas aterroristgroupandexcludedfromnegotiationsinthe2010s,condemned thecoupandremainedincombatbutdidnotextenditsactivitiesbeyond itshometerritoryinRakhineStateorpubliclybacktheNationalUnity Government.Others,liketheUnite dWaStateArmyandtheShanState ProgressParty,refrain edfromcommentingoractingonthechanged conditions.
TheNationalUnityGovernmentforitsparthascommittedtotheideaof afederalsystemofgovernmentandafederalarmy.Ithasaministeroffederal unionaffairs.Ithasrevivifiedanearlierideafroma2011coalitionofarmed groupsthathadproposedafederalunionarmybeforethenegotiationsofthe 2010sgotunderway.Thatproposalremainedonpaper.InMay2021the revolutionarygovernmentestablisheditsPeople’sDefenceForceasastep towardsitsgoalofafederatedforceforafederalMyanmarandanassertion ofitsdeterminationtocontest sovereignty.
5Sovereignty
/agyôk/n1personinfullchargeofanundertaking.2Anythingofthe highestkindororder
/agyôkagya/n1sameas n1. …
/agyôkagya-ana/nsovereignty.
Don’tbeovercomewithsadnessifIdie,formydeathwillhavebeeninthe struggleforpopularwillovernationalsovereignty. – KoThihaTun,undated letter,2021
Thepretextforthearmy’susurpationof power in2021was,aspreviously, threatstotheintegrityofsovereignty.Unlikepreviously,themilitaryclaimedto actindefenceofpopularsovereignty, pyithuagyôkagya-ana,ratherthanoldfashionedstatesovereignty, naingngandawagyôkagya-ana.Theelectoralprocesshad,themilitarysaid,beenunderminedbytheNationalLeaguefor DemocracyandtheUnionElectionCommission.Itfelltothemilitarytorestore thepeople’srighttohavetheirsovereignpoweracknowledged.Theproblem
wasthatthemilitaryhadnorightfulbasistodeclareastateofemergencywithin thetermsofthe2008Constitution.PresidentUWinMyintwouldnotgivethat right.Themilitarysolutionwastoabductthepresidentandinstalloneofhis deputies,aformerarmyofficer,inhisstead.Theofficerthensignedanorderfor astateofemergencyandhanded power tothecommanderinchief,Senior GeneralMinAungHlaing.
Ifthecharadewasintendedtodemonstratealegalisticconcernforthe nicetiesofaconstitutionalorderthatthemilitaryhaditselffashioned,thenit failedtopersuadeanyone.Whatitsucceededindoingwasunderscoringthe supremecontemptthatMyanmar ’smilitaryhasfor politics andforanypart thatcitizensmightplayinthem.Protesterswhotooktothebarricades againstthenew dictatorship,likeKoThihaTun,ayoungmedicaldoctor whomsoldiersshotdeadonthestreetinMandalay,wereexplicitthatthey wereina fight firstforsurvivalandsecondlyforsovereignty.Againstthe military’sconceptionofsovereign power asreferentobjectofsecurityfor apreeminentsecuritystate,protestersembodiedsovereigntyincoming togetherpolitically.In2021sovereigntywascontestedinMyanmarwhen citizensenjoinedoneanothertomakeclaimsthatwerenotcontrolledby institutionaltermsforitsdemarcation.Thatistosay,theycontestedsovereign power andtheconceptofsovereigntyitself.
PeopleinMyanmararewellpreparedtodothis.Sovereigntyhaslong beenarecurrenttopicamongwritersandspeakerson politics inBurmese. Historians,commentatorsandagitatorshaveallmadeittheirbusinessto remindeveryoneelseofhowsovereignty, agyôkagya-ana,waslosttothe BritishwiththefallofMandalayin1885,theexiletoIndiaofthelastking oftheKonbaungdynastyandtheindignityofcolonialdomination.British sovereigntycamethrougharmedconquest,policedoccupation,legislated violenceandracialisedadministration.Allthesefeaturesofcolonialrule passedoverintotheperiodafterpoliticalindependencefrom1948:inwars foughtagainstgroupswithcompetingclaimstosovereigntygoingunder variousbanners,ideologicalandracial;andinthepolicingofpostcolonial citizensinthemannerofcolonialsubjects.
Wheninthe1990sand2000sMyanmar ’smilitarydiditsbestto preventparty politics ,itfellbackonsovereign power.Sovereigntywas somethingoverwhichitcouldhavethe fi nalsay.Theperpetuationof sovereigntybecameoneofitscatchphrasesandafeatureofits ‘ national ’ politicalscheme.Inthisscheme,sovereign power isinert.Ithasnoforce ofitsown.Sovereigntyhastobecaredfor.Itiscriticaltothesurvivalof thestatebutvulnerabletoattack.Itstandstoreasonthatsovereigntywill alwaysbeinneedofguardianship.Thisistherolethatthemilitary
assignedtoitself.To defendsovereign power againstitsenemiesisthe burdenthatthemilitaryhastobear – itsheaviestduty.Todothisitneeds noexternalauthorization.Itisitse lftheauthorofthisauthorityandthe exclusiveactor.Themilitaryis,initsschemeofthings,theonlyinstitutioncapableandmeritoriousenoughtosucceedinthistaskofnational politics .Thepremiseisthat,withoutitplayingthisrole,sovereignty wouldbelost.TheUnionofMyanmarwouldceasetoexist.
Inthisway,themilitaryrelatestothecitizennotthroughbindingobligationsofcareandassistancebutoutofbenevolenceorgoodwill.Byitsown lights,thispracticereaf fi rmsthemoralsuperiorityofitsleadershipandthe inevitabilityandindispensabilityofits guardianshiprole.Thisrolecontrasts withthatofallpartypoliticalopponentsof dictatorship ,aboveallthe NationalLeagueforDemocracy,othersliketheShanNationalities [NationalRaces]LeagueforDemocracy,whichhasbeencompetitivein thecountry ’svastnortheasternstate,armedgroupsinfrontierareaswholay claimstosovereigncontrolofsubnationalterritoriesandtheiroccupants, andmyriadactivistsinthecountryandtheiralliesabroad.
IfsovereigntyisforMyanmar ’smilitaryareferentobjectofsecurity,then thecorollaryisthatthe citizen isalatentsecuritythreat.Thethreatisrealised whenthelikesofKoThihaTunbandtogetherwithothersandthroughtheir wordsanddeedschallengethemilitary ’spreventionofpolitics.Hence, thoughsuccessivejuntashaveenjoinedcitizenstodefendsovereignty,the exhortationhasnotbeenacalltoactionbutawarningtoremaininert. PoliticallyactivepeoplelikeThihaTunendangersovereigntyand,hence, themselves.Politicallyiner tpeopleendangerneither.
ThatisnothowMyanmar ’scitizenshaveseenthings,not,inanycase,if thesizeandheterogeneityoftheprotestsagainstmilitary dictatorship in 1974,1988,2007andaboveall2021areanythingtogoby –‘ aboveall ’ in 2021becausewhatitmeanstobea citizen has,throughthestrugglefor sovereign power andthe revolution thathasfollowedfromtheprotestsof thatyear,beenthrownintodoubt.Incontestingnotonlythesovereign power ofthemilitarystatebutthemilita ryconceptionofsovereignty, peoplelikeThihaTunhavecreatedconditionsinwhichitmightbepossible tomakethemselvescitizensastheywill.The citizen ,theyhaveshown,isnot someonewhoisformedattheendofpoliticalupheaval.The citizen is formed,rather,inupheaval,notbecausesovereigntyhasbeensuccessfully contestedbutbecauseithasbeenplausiblydisputedbypeopleenacting citizenshipandupsettingsovereign power.Becausesovereigntyhasbeen contested,citizensinMyanmarhave,inresistanceandin revolution,refashioned themselves.
/naingngantha/ncitizen.
Myanmarcitizensarethosenationalracesandsubgroups,beingKachin, Kayah,Kayin,Chin,Bama,Mon,Rakhine,Shan,etc.,havingpermanently residedinsomepartofthenationalterritoryastheiroriginalcountryanterior totheyear1185MyanmarEra,1823ChristianEra. – 1982CitizenshipLaw, section3,unofficialtranslation
In1948,almostanyoneresidinginBurmacouldopttobeacitizen:achildor son, -tha,ofthestateorpolity, naingngan.Thestrugglefor freedom from Britishcolonialsubjugationhadbeenhardfoughtandwon.BurmeseandIndian nationalistshadhadacommoncause.PeoplefromthroughoutAsiaforwhom Burmawasnowhomehadjoinedtheanti-colonialstrugglethere.Manydiedfor it.Someofthoseresponsibleforthenewlyindependentcountry’sconstitution andlawsoncitizenshipandresidencyhadacosmopolitanandeliteliberal visionofthecitizenassomeonewhocameintobeingbyjoininginamodern polityratherthanbyvirtueoftheirlineagealone.Theydraftedlaws accordingly.
Afterthemilitaryusurpedgovernmentin1962,thesituationchanged.The newRevolutionaryCouncildeclaredthatthecountrywasburdenedwith unscrupulousforeignexploitersofhonestworkers.Bydispossessingthemof capital, dictatorship madelifeunbearableforhundredsofthousandswhohad livedinBurmafordecades.Formany,thosedecadeswerethewholeoftheir lives.ItputtensofthousandsontoboatstoIndiaandtowhatwasthenEast Pakistan,laterBangladesh.In1978theBurmaSocialistProgrammePartystate, whichfollowedtheCouncil,launchedapolicingcampaigntoreclaimBurma’s frontiers,orthosefewpartsofthemoverwhichithadcontrol,forcitizens.This ledtoaforcedexodusofMuslimstoBangladesh.Officialaccountshaveitthat mostofthosewho fledreturnedunderabilateralagreement.Buttheagreement struckanerve.PartychairmananddictatorNeWinhadacommissionsetupto reexaminethequestionofwhoshouldbeacitizenanddraftanewlawonthe same.
Underthe1982CitizenshipLaw(inBurmesetheCitizenLaw, NaingnganthaUbade ),citizensarethosepeopledescendedfromothers bornintheterritorytodaydesignatedMyanmaranteriorto1823,theyear precedingthe fi rstAnglo-Burmesewar,whichendedwithatreatyandthe occupationbytheBritishofcoastalareasandtownsintheterritory’swest andeast.Toproducegenealogicalevidenceofthesortthatthelaw
