THE LAW OFFICER’S POCKET MANUAL
2023 Edition
John G. Miles Jr., David B. Richardson, Anthony E. Scudellari
Prepared by Robert E. Wilhelm Legal Editor
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-032-44518-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-37256-1 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003372561
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CONTENTS
I. Purpose and Use of This Manual .......................... 1:1
II. The Police–Citizen Encounter ............................ 2:1
A. Police Activities That Require No Evidence of Wrongdoing ................................... 2:2
1. Routine Patrol ............................................... 2:2
2. The Consensual Encounter ........................... 2:2
3. Community Caretaking Activities ................ 2:4
4. Roadblock or Checkpoint Vehicle Stops ...... 2:4
1. What You Need to Make an Investigative Detention—Reasonable Suspicion ............... 2:8 a. Personal Observation and Information Known to Other Officers ......................... 2:9 b. Tips From Informers ............................... 2:9
c. Pretext Stops ........................................... 2:11
2. Conduct During Detention ........................... 2:12 a. The Terry Stop ........................................ 2:12 b. The Terry Frisk ....................................... 2:15
c. Plain Touch Seizures ............................... 2:16
d. Additional Officer Security Measures .... 2:18
3. Detention During Execution of a Warrant .... 2:20
4. Motor Vehicle Stops ..................................... 2:21
a. Occupants of Vehicles ............................. 2:21
b. Duration of Motor Vehicle Stop .............. 2:23
c. Luggage in Vehicles ................................ 2:24
G. Constitutional Requirements of an Arrest Warrant .............................................................. 4:15
H. Requirements for Execution of an Arrest Warrant .............................................................. 4:17
I. Foreign Nationals .............................................. 4:19
J. Retaliatory Arrests ............................................. 4:20
V. Search Incident to Arrest .................................... 5:1
A. Automobile Searches ......................................... 5:2
B. Time and Place ................................................... 5:5
C. Plain View .......................................................... 5:7
D. “Sweep” of Premises Where Arrest Has Been Made ......................................................... 5:8
E. More Intrusive Searches .................................... 5:9
F. Obtaining Physical Evidence From the Body of a Suspect Under Arrest .................................. 5:10
G. Obtaining Physical Evidence From the Body of a Suspect Not Under Arrest ........................... 5:12
VI. Interrogation ........................................................ 6:1
A. When Warnings Should Be Given ....................... 6:2 1. “In Custody” ................................................. 6:2 2. “Interrogation” .............................................. 6:5
B. When Warnings Are Not Necessary ................... 6:7
C. Miranda Warnings ............................................. 6:11
D. When to Repeat the Warnings ........................... 6:13
E. Interrogating Juveniles ...................................... 6:14
F. The Suspect’s Answer ....................................... 6:15
G. Questioning ....................................................... 6:25
H. Belated Warnings ............................................... 6:27
I. Exceptions to Miranda’s Exclusionary Rule ..... 6:28
J. Dealing With a Formally Charged Suspect ....... 6:30
VII. Search and Seizure ............................................. 7:1
A. Search Without a Warrant .................................. 7:3
1. Search Incident to Arrest .............................. 7:3
2. Automobile Searches .................................... 7:4
3. Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances ............................................... 7:7
4. Hot Pursuit .................................................... 7:9
5. Consent ......................................................... 7:10
6. Administrative Searches .............................. 7:16
7. Probation and Parole Searches ..................... 7:16
B. “Searches” That Aren’t Really Searches ........... 7:17
1. Abandoned Property .................................... 7:17
2. Open Fields .................................................. 7:18
3. Aerial Surveillance ....................................... 7:19
4. Public Places, “Open View” ......................... 7:20
5. “Plain View” ................................................. 7:20
6. “Plain Touch” ............................................... 7:21
7. Private Searches ........................................... 7:22
8. Chemical Field Tests and Blood Alcohol Tests ............................................................. 7:23
9. Canine Sniffs ................................................ 7:23
C. Search With Warrant .......................................... 7:24
1. Probable Cause ............................................. 7:24
2. Constitutional Requirements for Search Warrants ....................................................... 7:25
a. Particularity of Description ..................... 7:26
b. Anticipatory Search Warrants ................. 7:27
c. Computers and Other Special Cases ....... 7:28
d. Prompt Execution of Warrant ................. 7:28
e. Unannounced Execution of Warrant ....... 7:29
f. Damaging Property ................................. 7:30
g. Items Not Mentioned in Warrant ............ 7:31
h. Mistake ................................................... 7:31
3. Oral Applications for Search Warrants ......... 7:32
4. Media Presence ............................................ 7:33
D. Automobile Inventories ..................................... 7:34
E.
F.
G.
1.
X. Disabled Persons .................................................... 10:1
A. Assessing the Condition of Persons Who Are Not Fully Conscious or Able to Communicate ..................................................... 10:1
B. Arresting Persons With Disabilities .................. 10:2
C. Communicating With Disabled Persons ............ 10:3
XI. Case References .................................................... 11:1
I. PURPOSE AND USE OF THIS MANUAL
The 2023 Edition is current through September 30, 2022.
The purpose of The Law Officer’s Pocket Manual is to provide law enforcement personnel with basic operational knowledge of the impact of constitutional law on police practices. The Manual is not a guide to police technique. Officers should always defer to their departments’ operational manuals.
The statements and rules in the Manual flow from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions through the Court’s 2021–2022 Term, which was completed in October 2022. The Court’s rulings dictate what the Constitution permits, requires, or forbids. They do not necessarily represent the only course of action permissible. Therefore, they may differ in detail from practices instituted by local law enforcement officials.
Officers should, therefore, keep in mind that some state and local courts have imposed stricter standards under state constitutions or statutes than the U.S. Supreme Court or the lower federal courts have imposed under the U.S. Constitution. Wherever local implementation differs in practical detail from the court-based dictates of this Manual, the local deviations should be noted in the blank spaces left at the end of most chapters and at the back of the Manual.
Areas in which a lack of uniform implementation commonly exists have been indicated in the text of the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003372561-1
Purpose and Use 1:2
Manual itself. For those interested in further research, a detailed table of cases appears as Chapter XI.
This Manual follows a situational format. It is intended to be used at the operational level and is tabbed to provide ready access to the needed material. Cross-references are used to avoid duplication of text while allowing users to find quickly all material in the Manual that may bear upon the problem they face.
NOTES
II. THE POLICE–CITIZEN ENCOUNTER
The constitutional rules that govern police interaction with individuals are determined by (1) the purpose of the police officer’s conduct, (2) whether or not the individual has been “seized” by the officer at some point during the encounter and, if so, (3) the strength of the evidence of criminal activity known to the officer at the time the “seizure” occurs.
You must be thoroughly familiar with the circumstances that will convert a consensual, voluntary encounter with a person into a detention or de facto arrest. The first, and often critical, stage of a criminal prosecution is the point at which the law officer comes face to face with a suspect. A mistake by the police officer during this initial confrontation can often make otherwise good evidence unusable and thus make conviction impossible.
The Fifth Amendment’s requirement of interrogation warnings (see Chapter VI) does not apply if you make it clear to the individual you have stopped that he is not obliged to answer your questions and that he is free to stop talking and leave you any time he wishes to do so. However, if you give him reason to believe that he is not free to go, the Fifth Amendment comes into play.
Once you actually detain a person, search and seizure rules take effect. If you actually arrest the person, further search and seizure rules apply (see Chapter V).
A. Police Activities That Require No Evidence of Wrongdoing
1. Routine Patrol
Ordinarily, a person has not been “detained” if you have simply asked him for his name and some identification. You need not have any suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity in order to approach and speak to the person, so long as you exert no physical control or official authority over the person, and a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she is free to terminate the encounter at any time.
Note: A circuit court ruling held that where a suspect initially doesn’t submit to officers’ show of authority, the suspect isn’t seized. If the officers later seize the suspect, they have reasonable suspicion to do so and can search the suspect without a warrant. Consult the rules in your jurisdiction.
2. The Consensual Encounter
An encounter with a person does not amount to a “seizure” unless a reasonable person would believe, under all the circumstances, that he is not free to end the encounter.
The Fourth Amendment does not require you to specifically tell people that they are free to ignore your questions for an encounter to be consensual. A few state courts have held that, in some circumstances, it will be hard for a prosecutor to prove that an encounter
was consensual if the officer did not give a “free to go” advisory (see the discussion of the duration of motor vehicle stops on pages 2:23–2:24).
In confined places, such as buses or rooms with only one door, make sure that you and your fellow officers do not block the exit in such a way that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave.
For example, you and other officers board an intercity bus at a stopover and ask a passenger to respond to questions about his destination and to permit a search of his luggage. You do not block the aisle between the seats. You have not seized him if a reasonable person, under all the circumstances, would feel free to refuse to do what you ask or to tell you to go away. Asking a passenger whether or not he or she is carrying drugs or a weapon is permissible during a consensual encounter.
Another example: A witness implicates a juvenile in a murder. You and several other officers go immediately to the juvenile’s home to see if he will agree to speak with you. You arrive at 3:00 a.m. and are admitted by his parent. You awaken the juvenile and say “We need to talk.” The juvenile says “Okay.” The juvenile does not ask to put on clothes and does not object to your handcuffing him before placing him in a patrol car for the ride to the station for the interview. During the interview, the juvenile confesses. The confession can’t be used to convict him. Even though he said “Okay” when asked for an interview, a reasonable person who was awakened in the middle of the night by multiple police officers and taken to a police station in his underwear and handcuffs would believe he was not free to say no to the officers. The
encounter was the functional equivalent of an arrest and required probable cause.
3. Community Caretaking Activities
You may make a search or detention of a person for the purpose of rendering assistance, provided that your actions are justified for reasons unrelated to the investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the commission of a crime.
Courts have recognized that police officers have a duty to maintain public order and render assistance to individuals in apparent distress. This “community caretaking” function is distinct from police officers’ duty to investigate crime and apprehend criminal suspects. Thus, a police officer does not need any grounds for suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before he may investigate the circumstances surrounding a motor vehicle that appears to be broken down, or a person who appears to be intoxicated or injured.
Caution: The Fourth Amendment typically applies, requiring a warrant.
Caution: The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, said the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement doesn’t extend to the home.
4. Roadblock or Checkpoint Vehicle Stops
You may not make random, arbitrary stops of automobiles on the public roadways.
The rule against random, suspicionless stops applies whether your purpose is to investigate a suspected crime or just to check the motorist’s documents or the condition of his vehicle. Thus, before you can stop a vehicle on a public roadway, ordinarily you must observe specific facts giving you at least a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are in violation of some law.
Brief, systematic stops of vehicles as part of a roadblock or checkpoint program can be constitutional.
The U.S. Constitution permits highway checkpoints at which vehicles are stopped without individualized suspicion to check motorists for signs of drunken driving and to check motorists’ license, insurance, and registration. The Supreme Court has also upheld roadblocks to check motorists’ immigration status and to obtain information from motorists about particular recently committed crimes that the motorists may have witnessed.
A roadblock program that is primarily intended to serve a general interest in enforcement of criminal laws is not constitutional.
This is true even if a secondary purpose of the roadblock program is to check for signs of intoxicated driving, or some other valid purpose.
For example, a police department institutes a program of “Narcotics Checkpoints” to catch motorists transporting narcotics. As part of the program, an
Encounter 2:6
officer will walk a narcotics detection canine around each vehicle stopped at the roadblock. Meanwhile, another officer will check the motorist’s license, insurance, and registration, as well as look for signs of intoxication. Because the primary purpose of the program is to find narcotics smugglers, the program and each stop are unconstitutional.
The rule against roadblock programs primarily aimed at furthering a general interest in criminal law enforcement does not forbid police from conducting a roadblock program to catch an escaped inmate or a fleeing bank robber. Nor does the rule prohibit police from setting up roadblocks designed to locate possible witnesses to a recent crime or to obtain other information about crimes committed by people other than the motorists themselves.
For example, a bicyclist is killed in a hit-and-run accident at a particular intersection. A week later police officers set up a roadblock near the intersection and stop all the motorists to ask them if they saw anything that might help in the investigation of the accident. One of the motorists stopped at the roadblock appears to be intoxicated, and he is arrested. The arrest is lawful because the roadblock was part of an investigation of someone other than the motorists who were stopped and was otherwise conducted in a constitutional manner.
Courts generally require roadblocks to be conducted according to a detailed plan devised by supervisory officers.
Stops made as part of a constitutional roadblock program must be brief. Every vehicle need not be stopped; however, field officers may not exercise any discretion in deciding whom to stop and must use some neutral selection system. Care must be taken not to make motorists fearful or surprised, and to protect motorists’ safety.
Your jurisdiction may have other requirements as well, or it may even forbid sobriety roadblocks on state constitutional grounds.
5. Canine Sniffs
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that having a canine that is trained to detect drugs, explosives, or other contraband sniff the exterior of luggage or vehicles in a public place does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment, and thus does not require any particularized suspicion. Many courts have built on this idea to rule that a canine sniff is not a search in any other circumstances either.
An “alert” by a reliable canine is sufficient to establish probable cause to search.
If a person, vehicle, or container must be detained in order to accomplish a canine sniff, then the detention must be justified either by reasonable suspicion or consent. On the other hand, if the vehicle or container is already lawfully detained for some other purpose, such as for a lawful sobriety checkpoint, the Fourth Amendment does not require additional justification for a canine sniff. But be careful; if the way the narcotics detection canine is employed at a roadblock indicates to a reviewing judge that the primary purpose of the roadblock was drug interdiction, then any evidence
Citizen Encounter 2:8 found during the roadblock stop may be unusable in court (see the rules for roadblocks on pages 2:4–2:5).
Conducting a dog sniff of a residence does qualify as a search regulated by the Fourth Amendment. This rule is based on the special privacy protection for residences (see page 7:3).
Caution: Some courts have held that other uses of canine sniffs require some level of suspicion, usually the reasonable suspicion required for an investigative detention.
Find out how the courts in your jurisdiction view canine sniffs, and write it in the Notes section at the end of this chapter.
B. Investigative Detention
1. What You Need to Make an Investigative Detention—Reasonable Suspicion
If you have knowledge of specific facts that lead you to reasonably suspect that a person is involved in criminal activity, you may stop and briefly detain the person for questioning even without probable cause for an arrest.
A stop and temporary detention cannot simply be based on a hunch or an educated guess. You must be able to point to specific facts that support your suspicion. Your decision to act may be based on your assessment of the whole picture before you, including the reasonable conclusions your experience enables you to draw from the facts. If you cannot articulate
specific facts and conclusions, then any evidence that you uncover as a result of your stop cannot be used in a prosecution.
The “criminal activity” you wish to investigate can be ongoing at that moment; it can also be crimes that have already been committed or crimes you think the suspect is about to commit.
a. Personal Observation and Information Known to Other Officers
You may obtain enough cause to stop and frisk from sources of information other than your own personal observation.
Information that a certain individual is involved in criminal activity may give you good reason to stop that individual, and frisk him if appropriate, even though you don’t have probable cause to arrest him.
If the information comes from a reliable source, it may be enough by itself to justify a stop. Other police officers and citizen witnesses or crime victims are generally considered reliable sources. For example, your department gets a “wanted flyer” from another jurisdiction indicating that a particular person is wanted for questioning about an armed robbery. On the basis of this flyer, you may stop the person, ask him questions, and detain him long enough to determine whether there is a warrant for his arrest.
b. Tips From Informers
Information from known criminals or anonymous sources must be corroborated.
Citizen Encounter 2:10
Suppose the information comes from a less reliable source, such as a known criminal, or from an anonymous source, so that nothing is known about his reliability. You then need corroboration. When you propose to make only a stop and frisk, the information can be less reliable and the corroboration less complete than when an arrest or full search is intended.
Tips that indicate that the person is providing information he or she learned from first-hand observation are more reliable.
For example, you receive an anonymous call saying that a woman will soon drive to a motel carrying cocaine in a briefcase. The caller tells you the woman’s name, the apartment from which she will leave, the make and color of car she will drive, the name of the motel, and the approximate time of the trip. You set up surveillance and see a woman leave the apartment building at the predicted time, enter the car, and drive toward the motel; you do not see a briefcase. Because the tip is anonymous and describes facts that are mostly innocent in themselves, the tip alone would not be enough to support a stop. However, enough of the details have proved true to allow you to form the reasonable suspicion for a brief stop because the accuracy of an informer’s predictions indicates that the informer has insider knowledge and is reliable.
The fact that a tip was called in to a 911 emergency line adds a measure of reliability in light of officials’ ability to track down callers if their information proves to be false.
For example, an anonymous motorist calls a 911 line and reports that a silver Ford F-150 pickup just ran her off the highway. You travel to the location on the highway where the truck would be if it had continued traveling in the same direction. You locate a silver F-150 and confirm the license plate provided by the caller. You have reasonable suspicion to stop the driver of the truck for drunken driving even though you don’t witness any reckless driving yourself. Drunken driving is an ongoing offense, and running someone off the road is the type of thing a drunken driver would do. Moreover, the caller’s information indicates that she personally observed the events that she reported. Adding to the reasonableness of the suspicion is your corroboration of the vehicle’s location and direction of travel and the fact that the call was made to a 911 line.
There is no “firearm exception” to the reasonable suspicion requirement that would permit an officer to immediately stop and frisk someone solely on the basis of an anonymous tip that an individual with a particular description has a concealed firearm. Even in this dangerous situation, an officer must first obtain facts demonstrating that the informer is reliable before conducting a stop and frisk. Courts may look at this question differently, however, if the tipster reported that shots had actually been fired, or there was some other reason to believe violence was imminent.
c. Pretext Stops
The warning on page 4:19 about using arrests as “pretexts” to investigate other crimes also applies to stops.
2. Conduct During Detention
An investigative detention is commonly referred to as the “Terry stop and frisk.” This phrase suggests that if you have grounds to stop a suspect you may in all cases frisk him as well. This is incorrect. A stop is lawful if you reasonably suspect that a person is involved in criminal activity. A frisk is lawful if you reasonably believe that the suspect is armed and may be dangerous to yourself or others. For example, if you stop a person to investigate the likelihood that he has committed a nonviolent offense, and you have no reason to believe that he may be armed and dangerous, your frisk of that person would be unlawful.
a. The Terry Stop
You can stop a suspect for a brief investigative detention even though you do not have sufficient cause to arrest him IF:
— You have knowledge of facts that reasonably lead you to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal activity.
— You identify yourself as a police officer and make reasonable inquiries as to the suspect’s conduct.
— His response to your stopping him and questioning him does not relieve your suspicions.
You may frisk the suspect if you have knowledge of facts that reasonably lead you to believe that the
suspect is armed or otherwise dangerous to yourself or others. A frisk must be carefully limited to a search of the suspect’s outer clothing, aimed at discovering weapons.
For example, you observe two men loitering outside a bank. They confer several times and walk in front of the bank several times, looking through the bank’s windows. Each wears a topcoat though it is a warm day. One of the suspects, just before the noon hour, goes to a car parked directly across from the bank and sits behind the wheel. As a bank guard leaves the bank, the second suspect starts to head into the bank. You can then stop the suspect, identify yourself, ask for an explanation of his conduct, and frisk him if he does not give you answers that relieve your suspicions. You have reason to believe that criminal activity is afoot, that he is a bank robber likely to be armed, and that he poses a threat to safety.
Stops and frisks usually concern ongoing criminal conduct. But you are also permitted to stop and, if appropriate, frisk someone you suspect of being involved in an already completed crime.
Caution: To justify a stop, your “reasonable suspicion” must be based on specific objective facts and the logical conclusions your experience enables you to draw from those facts. However, such general considerations as the high-crime nature of the area are no substitute for specific facts about the suspect or his conduct.
For example, you are in a neighborhood that is a hangout for junkies and pushers. You see two men in an alley, a few feet apart from each other and starting to
Encounter 2:14
walk in opposite directions. You have not seen enough to justify a stop of the men, even though, because of the area, you suspect a drug buy has just taken place.
Facts that are innocent in themselves may, when considered together in the light of an officer’s experience, provide grounds for a stop. Such facts may be part of a “profile”—a list of characteristics sometimes used in identifying persons likely to be committing certain crimes, especially the transporting of drugs. However, it is not a good idea to rely mechanically on a profile. The question must always be whether the “whole picture” would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that a crime was being committed.
During a stop you may question the suspect, have him viewed by witnesses, and detain him while you pursue other avenues of investigation. Also, the Supreme Court has indicated rather strongly that an in-the-field stop may include the taking of fingerprints from a suspect.
A detention on less than probable cause should be brief. No absolute time limit can be set, but the duration of the stop is one of the factors courts will examine to determine whether the “stop” was really an “arrest.” You may detain a person only so long as you are diligently pursuing a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel your suspicions quickly. You may not detain a person longer than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the stop.
Your right to transport a suspect away from the place where he was first stopped is uncertain. Some courts have allowed suspects to be taken short distances so
that witnesses could identify them; other courts have disagreed. If possible, have the witnesses brought to the suspect. Taking the suspect to a police station will probably turn the stop into an arrest requiring probable cause (see page 3:2 for a fuller discussion of show-up identifications).
Your state may have a statute allowing you to get a “warrant,” based on reasonable suspicion, to detain a suspect at a police station for the purpose of obtaining his fingerprints. The constitutionality of such statutes is uncertain.
If nothing that occurs during the stop gives you probable cause for an arrest, you must allow the suspect to continue on his way.
b. The Terry Frisk
A frisk may not be a full search. Instead, it must be a carefully limited search of the suspect’s outer clothing, aimed at discovering weapons.
If you detect an object that feels like it is or could be a weapon, you may seize it. However, your authority to conduct a frisk on reasonable suspicion does not allow you to remove an item from a suspect’s clothing that you do not reasonably believe is a weapon.
For example, while patting down a suspect’s clothing, you feel a soft package in his pocket. You may not remove the package.
The Terry frisk also encompasses other types of protective conduct. For example, you may order a suspect to lift his shirt far enough to uncover a bulge near his
Citizen Encounter 2:16 waistband. For another example, you may forcibly open a suspect’s clenched fist. In both cases, however, you must have reasonable suspicion that these actions may reveal the presence of a weapon (see discussion of additional security measures on page 2:18).
You cannot force a suspect to reply to your questioning, but his failure to do so may give you sufficient justification to frisk.
Once you have a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous, you have identified yourself, and you have made reasonable inquiries, the requirements for a valid frisk have been met and it is up to the suspect to dispel your fear for personal or public safety. A failure to reply to your reasonable inquiries would strengthen rather than weaken those fears.
Note: Lawfully stopped individuals may be frisked even in states that allow concealed-carry permits. The permit law doesn’t invalidate safety concerns.
Caution: One circuit court ruled that officers need more than to believe a suspect possesses something illicit—they must have a reasonable belief the suspect may pose a threat.
c. Plain Touch Seizures
If, while frisking a suspect for weapons, you detect an object that is not a weapon, you may seize it without a warrant if your experience and sense of touch make it “immediately apparent” to you that the object is contraband or evidence of a crime.
“Plain touch” seizures commonly grow out of weapons frisks based upon reasonable suspicion. For this reason, the “search” that precedes the seizure must be limited in nature. Once you determine from patting the object that it is not a weapon, you may not continue to probe it, as by squeezing it or sliding it around. The “plain touch” doctrine does not limit the officer to a single “touch” of the object. You may manipulate the object until you are able to conclude that it is not a weapon.
You may “reasonably suspect” that the object is contraband, such as drugs, but you are allowed to seize it only if you have a higher level of suspicion, “probable cause.” You have probable cause if you can tell immediately upon touching the object that it is contraband (see the discussion of “plain touch” on page 7:21).
Application of the “plain touch” depends a great deal on the particular facts presented to the officer and, especially, on the testimony given by the officer at trial.
For example, you see a person leaving an apartment building where you know crack cocaine has recently been sold. The person is walking in your direction, but when he sees you, he stops abruptly and then walks away. You decide to stop and frisk him. In patting him down you feel a small lump in his pocket. You can tell it is not a gun or other weapon but cannot immediately identify it. You proceed to squeeze it and move it around with your fingers while leaving it in the suspect’s pocket. This examination leads you to conclude that the lump is crack cocaine wrapped in plastic; at that point you remove it from the suspect’s pocket and confirm your suspicion. Your search of the pocket and seizure of the cocaine violated the
