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The Substance of Consciousness

The Substance of Consciousness

A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism

Copyright © 2024 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Hardback ISBN: 9781394195473; Paperback ISBN: 9781394195480; ePub ISBN: 9781394195497; ePDF ISBN: 9781394195503

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“There is exactly one overriding question in contemporary philosophy….How do we fit in?…How can we square this self-conception of ourselves as mindful, meaning-creating, free, rational, etc., agents with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles?”

To Richard Swinburne, whose meticulous reformulation and rigorous defense of substance dualism has inspired and challenged generations of philosophers to contend with the reality that we are body and soul.

To the prolific substance dualists of our lifetime who have greatly inspired and informed our work: Todd Buras, Roderick Chisholm (in his better moments), C. Stephen Evans, Stewart Goetz, W. D. Hart, William Hasker, Robert Koons, H. D. Lewis, E. J. Lowe, David Lund, Alexander Pruss, Uwe Meixner, Charles Taliaferro, Dean Zimmerman, and Dallas Willard.

2.3.3

2.4.5.1

2.4.5.2

2.4.5.3 Emergence

5.2.3.1 Explanatory

5.2.3.2 Unity and Simplicity Seemings 85

5.2.3.3  The Cognitive Science of Commonsense Substance Dualism 86

5.2.3.4 Eighteen Distinct Dualist Seemings 88

5.2.3.5 Artificial Intelligence Test Seemings 90

5.2.3.6  Three Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings 90

5.3  A Direct Self-Awareness Argument for Substance Dualism

5.3.1  DSA: The Direct Self-Awareness Account of Dualist Seemings

5.3.2 Knowledge by Acquaintance

5.3.3 Monadic Intentionality

5.3.4 Givenness and Directedness

5.3.5 Direct Self-Awareness as a Self-Presenting Property 98

5.3.6 Self-Awareness Necessity

5.3.7 The Causal-Acquaintance Principle

5.3.8  Monadic Intentionality, Direct Self-Awareness, and Dualist Seemings

5.3.9  Satisfying the Explanatory Conditions of Dualist Seemings

5.3.10 Explanatory

5.4  A Direct Reflective Self-Awareness Argument for Substance

5.4.1  Husserlian Fulfillment Structures and Self-Knowledge

5.4.2 Knowledge and Intentionality

5.4.3 Fulfilled

5.5 Objections to Self-Awareness

5.5.1 Hume’s Phenomenological

5.5.2 Commonsense Materialism

5.5.3 Linguistic

5.5.4 Absent

5.5.5 Religious

5.5.6 Neuroscientific

5.5.7 Self-Awareness

5.5.8 The Dual-Process Defeater

5.5.8.1 Dualist Seemings and Moorean Facts

5.5.8.2 A Dualist Rival to DPA

5.5.8.3 A Generality Problem for DPA

5.5.8.4  A Superior Physicalist Account of Self-Awareness

5.6  A Crucial Implication of the Direct Self-Awareness

6.2.1 Phenomenal

6.2.2 Phenomenal

6.2.3 Subject

6.3 Phenomenally

6.3.1 The

6.3.2 A

6.3.3 The

6.3.4 A

6.3.5 A

6.3.6 The

6.3.8  Not

6.4  Phenomenally

6.4.1 The

6.4.2

6.5 General

6.4.2.4

7.3.3 Plantinga’s Replacement Argument

7.3.4  Normative, Teleological Rationality, Rational Deliberation, and the Simple Enduring Spiritual Self 160

7.3.4.1 Reasoning Is Intrinsically Teleological 160

7.3.4.2  Fulfillment Structures and Teleologically Arranged Action Plans 162

7.4  Defense of Premise (1): MAs Are Mereological Inconstant Objects 163

7.4.1 An Ontological Assay of MAs 164

7.4.2 Defeaters for the Complex View of PI

7.4.2.1 The Circularity Problem 165

7.4.2.2 Gradualism, Transitivity, and Sorites 166

7.4.2.3 The Fission Problem 166

7.4.2.4 Immanent Causation to the Rescue? 167

7.4.3  Two Physicalist Alternatives to Human Persons as MAs 169

7.4.3.1 We Are Atomic Simples 169

7.4.3.1.1  Chisholm on Extended Physical Atoms or Simple Souls 169

7.4.3.1.2  Mental Subjects Are Simple Souls: Assessing the Case 170

7.4.3.1.3  The Ubiquitous Rejection of the EPA Position 171

7.4.3.2 We Are Homeodynamic Systems 172

7.4.3.2.1  Objections to the Systems Approach 173

7.4.3.2.1.1  What We Seem to Know About Ourselves 174

7.4.3.2.1.2  Avoid Spooky Entities at All Costs 174

7.4.3.2.1.3  Complex Systems as Synchronically Unified Wholes 174

7.4.3.2.1.4  Problems with Harmonizing Physicalism and Downward Causation (DC) 174

7.4.3.2.1.5  Complex Systems as Enduring Continuants 178

7.4.3.2.1.6  Versions of Staunch Hylomorphism Are Superior to Systems Theories of Organisms, Specifically, Human Persons 179

PART IV Updated and Novel Arguments from Modality and Libertarian Freedom

CHAPTER 8 Upgrading Modal Arguments for Substance Dualism 191

8.1 A Modal Argument for SD 191

8.1.1 Statement of the Argument 191

8.1.2 Clarification of the Argument

8.2 Defense of the Argument 193

8.2.1 Contingent Physicalism and Premise (2) 193

8.2.1.1 Merricks on Contingent Physicalism and the Modal Argument 193

8.2.1.1.1 Objections to Merricks’s Argument 194

8.2.1.2 Contra Bailey’s Contingent Physicalism 201

8.2.1.2.1 Four Features of Bailey’s Position 201

8.2.1.2.2  Four Problems with Bailey’s Position 203

8.2.1.2.3  An Addition Response to Bailey’s Via Negativa 211

8.2.2 Clarification and Defense of Premise (3)

8.2.2.1 Conceivability and Possibility

8.2.2.2  Modal Epistemology, Rational Intuitions as Seemings and Adequate Intuitive

8.2.2.2.1 Timothy

8.3 Five Objections Against Modal Arguments for SD

8.3.1 The

8.3.2

8.3.3 Physicalist and Dualism Intuitions Cancel Out Each Other

9.2.1 The

9.2.2 Our

9.3.2.5  Free Agents Act for the Sake of Teleological Ends 245

9.3.2.6 Free Agents Exhibit Top/Down Causation 246

9.4 Alternatives to SLA 249

9.4.1 Daniel Dennett and Free Will Irrealism 249

9.4.2 John Searle and Creative Compatibilism 250

9.4.2.1 Free Will Within Naturalist Constraints 250

9.4.2.2  A Solution to the Naturalist Problem of Free Will

9.4.2.3 A Critique of Searle’s Solution 254

9.4.3 Robert Kane and Faint-Hearted Libertarian Freedom 257

9.4.3.1 Kane and Naturalistic Constraints

9.4.3.2 Three Objections to Kane’s Position 259

9.4.3.2.1  Kane’s Denial of a Substantial Agent 259

9.4.3.2.2  Two Problems with Kane’s Account of Causality

9.4.3.2.3  Kane’s Rejection of Reasons as Teleological Ends 261

9.4.4  Kevin Timpe and Jonathan Jacobs: Minimalist Naturalism and Libertarianism 261

9.5 Causal Closure of the Physical and “Top-Down” Causation 263

9.5.1 Kim’s Supervenience Argument 263

9.5.2 Kim’s Crucial Background Assumption

9.5.3 The Major Difficulty: Emergence

9.5.3.1 No Causal Overdetermination

9.5.3.1.1  Ted Sider’s Counterargument and Our Response

9.5.3.1.2 Macro-Objects Are Aggregates 266

9.5.3.1.3  Adapting a Defeater from O’Connor and Churchill 267

9.6 Conclusion

PART V New and Neglected Responses to Common Defeaters Against Substance Dualism

CHAPTER 10  Important Frequently Raised Defeaters Against Substance Dualism

10.1 The Three Problems of Causal Interaction

10.1.1  Disambiguating “How Can Mental Entities Causally Interact with Physical Entities?”

10.1.2  Causal Interaction Violates the Conservation of Energy Principle

10.1.3  Causal Interaction Falls Prey to the Problem of Causal Pairing

10.2 Nine Neuroscientific Objections to SD

10.2.1 SD as a Soul-of-the-Gaps Argument

10.2.2 Neuroscience and the Explanatory Impotence of SD

10.2.3  Empirically Equivalent Theories and the Findings of Neuroscience 288

10.2.4

10.2.6  Scientific Explanation, Necessitation, and the Failure of the

10.2.7

and an Ad Hoc, Bloated

10.2.8 The

11.3.3 SD

8.2

8.3

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the following people (listed in alphabetical order) who provided helpful feedback on various parts of an earlier draft of this book: Andrew Bailey, Todd Buras, William Lane Craig, Brian Cutter, C. Stephen Evans, Greg Ganssle, Robert Garcia, Stewart Goetz, Paul Gould, Mihretu Guta, Walter Hopp, Ross Inman, Greg Jesson, Sheki Lafanzio, Timothy O’Connor, Timothy Pickavance, Alexander Pruss, Joshua Rasmussen, Richard Swinburne, and Charles Taliaferro.

I (Moreland) want to give special thanks to my research assistants who went beyond the call of duty in helping me with research and editing: Jane Gropp, Eli Haitov, Hal Haller, Samantha Hawley, Jonathan Metcalf, Megan Reeve, and Mark Stanley.

I (Rickabaugh) want to give special thanks to the Martin Institute and the John Templeton Foundation for their very generous financial support, as well as Robert Garcia, Eff and Patty Martin, Steve Porter, Sam Kimbriel, James Catford, Michael Wear, and my diligent research assistants, Lucas Merritt, and Anna Ruth. Most importantly, to my wife, Laura, and our children, Alyssia, Sawyer, and Willow: your wellspring of love, support, play, and encouragement makes possible everything I do.

PART I ONTOLOGICALLY SERIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Contemporary and Tenacious Insights

CHAPTER

1

Substance Dualism in the 21st Century

1.1 THE RETURN OF SUBSTANCE DUALISM

1.1.1 The Great Revolt Against Dualism

At the end of the 19th century, substance dualism—roughly, the thesis that the human person is comprised of a substantial immaterial soul and a physical body—was widespread. Materialism was not a live option. As U.T. Place observed,

[Ever] since the debate between Hobbes and Descartes ended in apparent victory for the latter, it was taken more or less for granted that whatever answer to the mind-body problem is true, materialism must be false.1

This sociological fact changed quickly, bringing about what William James described as “the evaporation of the definite soul-substance.”2 Arthur O. Lovejoy deemed the 20th century as “the Age of the Great Revolt against Dualism.”3 The inevitable defeat of substance

1 Place, U. T. (2002). A pilgrim’s progress? From mystical experience to biological consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 36. As quoted in Kind, A. (2019). The mind-body problem in 20th century philosophy. In A. Kind (Ed.), Philosophy of mind in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: A history of the philosophy of mind (Vol. 6, p. 73). New York, NY: Routledge.

2 James, W. (1904). Does “consciousness” exist? The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1, 478.

3 Lovejoy, A. O. (1930). The revolt against dualism: An inquiry concerning the existence of ideas (p. 1). La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing.

The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism, First Edition. Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland. © 2024 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2024 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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