Towards a Unified Italy 1st ed. Edition Salvatore Dimaria
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Table of Contents
Cover Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Notes on Contributors
Introduction to the Second Edition
Introduction to the First Edition
Content
Physicalism
The Place of Consciousness in Nature
Conclusion
References
PART I: MENTAL CONTENT
IS THERE A VIABLE NOTION OF NARROW MENTAL CONTENT?
CHAPTER ONE: Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions
1. Background
2. Doubting Definitions
3. Paderewski Variations
4. DeRe and De Dicto
5. Attitude Attributions, Neologisms, and Generalizations
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
CHAPTER TWO: There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content
1. Narrow and Broad Content
2. Narrow Narrow Content
3. Epistemic Narrow Content16
4. Thoroughly Narrow Content
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Notes IS EXTERNALISM ABOUT MENTAL CONTENT COMPATIBLE WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS?
CHAPTER THREE: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent
1. Anti‐individualism
2. The McKinsey Problem
3. Types of Response to the McKinsey Problem
4. Anti‐individualism Does Not Imply (2)
5. Reconsideration of McKinsey’s Position
6. Problems for McKinsey
7. Unproblematic Privileged Access to the World?
8. Conclusion
Acknowledgment
References
Notes
CHAPTER FOUR: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent
1. The Reductio Argument for Incompatibilism
2. The Proper Response to the Reductio
3. Why Semantic Externalism (SE) Is True
4. The Retreat to MSE Is Unmotivated
5. Individuating Thoughts
6. What’s Wrong with Metaphysical Externalism (ME)
References
Notes
IS THE INTENTIONAL ESSENTIALLY NORMATIVE?
CHAPTER FIVE: Resisting Normativism in Psychology
1. The Background Normativity Claims
2. Norms and Psychology3
3. Wedgwood’s Arguments
4. General Qualms
References
Notes
CHAPTER SIX: Normativism Defended
1. A Version of the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”
2. An Argument for the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”
3. A Hopelessly Panglossian Picture of the Mind?
4. Psychology, A Priori and Empirical Acknowledgments
References
Notes
IS THERE NON‐CONCEPTUAL CONTENT?
CHAPTER SEVEN: The Revenge of the Given
1. Introduction
2. Kinds of Representations
3. Some Data at Last
4. Conclusion Reference
Note
CHAPTER EIGHT: Are There Different Kinds of Content?
1. What Is Conceptual Structure?
2. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Cognitive Maps
3. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Visual Perception
4. Syntax and Semantics
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
PART II: PHYSICALISM IS NON‐REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM VIABLE?
CHAPTER NINE: Everybody Has Got It
References
Notes
CHAPTER TEN: The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism
1. An Epistemological Detour
2. The Independent Case for Theoreticity
3. Totting up the Prospects: Sensory Qualia
4. Totting Up the Prospects: The Propositional Attitudes
5. Is There a Residual Case for Propositional Attitudes in Humans?
References
Notes SHOULD PHYSICALISTS BE A PRIORI PHYSICALISTS?
CHAPTER ELEVEN: A Priori Physicalism
1. Physicalism and the Mind–Brain Identity Theory
2. The Disagreement between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalism
3. De Re versus De Dicto Versions of the Debate
4. The Epistemological Argument from Zombies for A Priori Physicalism
5. The Semantic Argument for A Priori Physicalism
6. Some (Substantial) Tidying Up
7. The Analogy with Shapes and the Relevance of Functionalism
8. De Re A Posteriori Physicalism and the Problem of Distancing De Re A Posteriori Physicalism from Dual Attribute Theories
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
CHAPTER TWELVE: On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism
1. Common Ground
2. Disputed Territory
Acknowledgments
References
Notes IS THERE AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION?
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Causation and Mental Causation
Notes
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough
1. What Is “Non‐Reductive Physicalism?”
2. Why NRP Replaced RP
3. The Exclusion Argument Defanged
References
Notes
PART III: THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE IS CONSCIOUSNESS ONTOLOGICALLY EMERGENT FROM THE PHYSICAL?
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Dualist Emergentism
1. Conscious Individuals and Consciousness Properties
2. The Evolution of Consciousness
3. Substance Dualism
4. Qualitatively New Properties
5. Subject Causation
6. Causal Relevance of Consciousness Properties
7. Why Believe in Subject Causation?
8. The Adequacy of Amazement
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness
1. Introduction
2. The Emergentist Idea
3. Some Non‐Starters
4. Anodyne Novelty
5. The Role of Ontological Emergence
6. How to Implement the Role of Emergence
7. More than Merely Nomological Supervenience
8. Analytic Necessitarianism
9. An Ontology of Powers
10. Necessitarianism with Strong Necessity
11. Other Roles for Ontological Emergence
12. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
Notes ARE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS AND INTENTIONAL CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES IDENTICAL?
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: New Troubles for the Qualia Freak
1. Against Phenomenal Dualism
2. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Intrinsic Properties
3. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Nonrepresentational Properties
4. Phenomenal Externalism
5. Lolita, XP1, and Bodily Sensations
6. An Alternative Proposal and Some Final Thoughts on Qualia
Acknowledgments
References
References
Notes
IS AWARENESS OF OUR MENTAL ACTS A KIND OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS?
CHAPTER NINETEEN: All Consciousness Is Perceptual
1. Perceptual Consciousness
2. Action
3. Thinking
4. Why Peacocke’s View Isn’t PC
5. Conclusion
References
CHAPTER TWENTY: Mental Action andSelf‐Awareness (I)
1. The Distinctive Features of Action‐Awareness
2. The Nature and Range of Mental Actions
3. The Principal Hypothesis and Its Consequences
4. The Principal Hypothesis: Attractions and Possibilities
5. Describing and Explaining Schizophrenic Experience
6. The First Person in Action Self‐Ascriptions
7. Concluding Remarks: Rational Agency and Action‐Awareness
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
PART IV: PERCEPTION AND MENTAL CAPACITIES
SHOULD PERCEPTION BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION, DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE WORLD, OR A HYBRID VIEW?
CHAPTER TWENTY‐ONE: Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science
1. Naïve Realism
2. The Slightest Philosophy
3. Is Naïve Realism Inconsistent with Contemporary Vision Science?
4. Cognitive Penetration
5. Multimodal Perception
6. Dorsal and Ventral Visual Streams
7. Unconscious Perception
8. Conclusion References
Notes
CHAPTER TWENTY‐TWO: Naïve Realism v. Representationalism
1. Internal Dependence: The Organismic Contribution to Experience
2. Representationalism Accommodates Internal Dependence
3. Basic Naïve Realism v. Representationalism
4. French and Phillips’s Modified Naïve Realism v. Representationalism
5. Conclusion References
Notes
CHAPTER TWENTY‐THREE: Capacities‐First Philosophy
1. What Is Explanatorily Fundamental in an Analysis of Perception?
2. Why Analyze the Mind in Terms of Mental Capacities?
3. The Hallucination Question and Perceptual Particularity
4. Particularism and Attributionalism
5. The Commitments of Capacities‐First
Philosophy
6. Perceptual Capacities
7. Ways of Perceiving, Perceptual Capacities, and Modes of Presentations
References
Notes
IS PERCEPTION GENERAL, PARTICULAR, OR A HYBRID?
CHAPTER TWENTY‐FOUR: Perceiving Particulars
1. Introduction
2. Two Arguments for Existentialism
3. Two Objections to Existentialism
4. Perceptual Awareness of Particulars
5. Visual Objects
Acknowledgment
References
CHAPTER TWENTY‐FIVE: Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content
1. Background
2. Alleged Benefits of Abstract Content
3. Alleged Benefits of Particular Content
4. The Pluralist View: The Best of Both Theories
5. Conclusion References
Notes
HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND COGNITION?
CHAPTER TWENTY‐SIX: The Perception–Cognition
Border
1. Introduction
2. The Dimension Restriction Hypothesis
3. Objections to DRH
4. The Full Iconicity View
5. Challenges to Block’s Format‐Based View
6. Block on Iconic Object Representations
7. Conclusion References
Notes
CHAPTER TWENTY‐SEVEN: Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File
1. Perceptual Object Representations Are Iconic
2. Object Files of Working Memory and Thought
References
Note
IS PAIN A NATURAL KIND?
CHAPTER TWENTY‐EIGHT: Scientific Eliminativism for Pain
1. Introduction: Clarifying the Landscape
2. The Promiscuity of Pain
3. Spotlight on Utility
4. What the Problem Is and What It Isn’t
5. Conclusion: Why It Matters
References
Notes
CHAPTER TWENTY‐NINE: Pain Is a Natural Kind
Introduction
1. Why Theorizing about Pain Is Such a Pain (a Quick Recap)
2. Natural Kinds for Psychology
3. Moderate Pluralism about Pain
4. The Eliminativist Alternative
5. Concluding Thoughts
References
Notes
DO WE NEED IMAGINATION OVER AND ABOVE IMAGERY AND SUPPOSITION?
CHAPTER THIRTY: Against Imagination
1. How Not to Explain the Mind
2. Varieties of Skepticism about Imagination
3. Mental Imagery
4. Mental Imagery and Imagination
5. Sensory Imagination / Propositional Imagination / Supposition
6. Mental Imagery in Propositional Attitudes
7. Between Sensory Imagination and Supposition
8. Conclusion: Imagistic versus Linguistic Cognition
References
Notes
CHAPTER THIRTY‐ONE: Why We Need Imagination
1. What Imagination Is
2. The Challenges from Supposition and Conception
3. The Challenge from Belief
4. The Reductionist Challenge
5. Concluding Remarks
References
Notes
Index
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
In teaching and research, philosophy makes progress through argumentation and debate. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy provides a forum for students and their teachers to follow and participate in the debates that animate philosophy today in the western world. Each volume presents pairs of opposing viewpoints on contested themes and topics in the central subfields of philosophy. Each volume is edited and introduced by an expert in the field, and also includes an index, bibliography, and suggestions for further reading. The opposing essays, commissioned especially for the volumes in the series, are thorough but accessible presentations of opposing points of view.
1. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion
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2. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science
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3. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
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4. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics
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5. Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
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6. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory
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7. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science
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8. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
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9. Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy
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10. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics
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11. Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy
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12. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology
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13. Contemporary Debates in Bioethics
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14. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition
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15. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Second Edition
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16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition
edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon
17. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition
edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
SECOND EDITION
Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen
This edition first published 2023
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