Where can buy Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind 2nd edition edition jonathan cohen ebook wi

Page 1


Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind 2nd edition Edition Jonathan Cohen

Visit to download the full and correct content document: https://ebookmass.com/product/contemporary-debates-in-philosophy-of-mind-2nd-edi tion-edition-jonathan-cohen/

More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant download maybe you interests ...

Leibniz’s naturalized philosophy of mind First Edition. Edition Jorgensen

https://ebookmass.com/product/leibnizs-naturalized-philosophy-ofmind-first-edition-edition-jorgensen/

Current Debates in Comparative Politics 2nd Edition J Tyler Dickovick

https://ebookmass.com/product/current-debates-in-comparativepolitics-2nd-edition-j-tyler-dickovick/

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1 Uriah Kriegel

https://ebookmass.com/product/oxford-studies-in-philosophy-ofmind-volume-1-uriah-kriegel/

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3 Uriah Kriegel

https://ebookmass.com/product/oxford-studies-in-philosophy-ofmind-volume-3-uriah-kriegel/

The Philosophy of Philosophy 2nd Edition Timothy Williamson

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-philosophy-of-philosophy-2ndedition-timothy-williamson/

Feminist Philosophy of Mind Keya Maitra (Editor)

https://ebookmass.com/product/feminist-philosophy-of-mind-keyamaitra-editor/

The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Avner Baz

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-crisis-of-method-incontemporary-analytic-philosophy-avner-baz/

For a Dollar and a Dream: State Lotteries in Modern America Jonathan D. Cohen

https://ebookmass.com/product/for-a-dollar-and-a-dream-statelotteries-in-modern-america-jonathan-d-cohen/

Metaphysics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates and Their History Anna Marmodoro

https://ebookmass.com/product/metaphysics-an-introduction-tocontemporary-debates-and-their-history-anna-marmodoro/

Table of Contents

Cover Series Page

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication Page

Notes on Contributors

Introduction to the Second Edition

Introduction to the First Edition

Content

Physicalism

The Place of Consciousness in Nature

Conclusion

References

PART I: MENTAL CONTENT

IS THERE A VIABLE NOTION OF NARROW MENTAL CONTENT?

CHAPTER ONE: Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions

1. Background

2. Doubting Definitions

3. Paderewski Variations

4. DeRe and De Dicto

5. Attitude Attributions, Neologisms, and Generalizations

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWO: There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content

1. Narrow and Broad Content

2. Narrow Narrow Content

3. Epistemic Narrow Content16

4. Thoroughly Narrow Content

5. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes IS EXTERNALISM ABOUT MENTAL CONTENT COMPATIBLE WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS?

CHAPTER THREE: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent

1. Anti‐individualism

2. The McKinsey Problem

3. Types of Response to the McKinsey Problem

4. Anti‐individualism Does Not Imply (2)

5. Reconsideration of McKinsey’s Position

6. Problems for McKinsey

7. Unproblematic Privileged Access to the World?

8. Conclusion

Acknowledgment

References

Notes

CHAPTER FOUR: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent

1. The Reductio Argument for Incompatibilism

2. The Proper Response to the Reductio

3. Why Semantic Externalism (SE) Is True

4. The Retreat to MSE Is Unmotivated

5. Individuating Thoughts

6. What’s Wrong with Metaphysical Externalism (ME)

References

Notes

IS THE INTENTIONAL ESSENTIALLY NORMATIVE?

CHAPTER FIVE: Resisting Normativism in Psychology

1. The Background Normativity Claims

2. Norms and Psychology3

3. Wedgwood’s Arguments

4. General Qualms

References

Notes

CHAPTER SIX: Normativism Defended

1. A Version of the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”

2. An Argument for the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”

3. A Hopelessly Panglossian Picture of the Mind?

4. Psychology, A Priori and Empirical Acknowledgments

References

Notes

IS THERE NON‐CONCEPTUAL CONTENT?

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Revenge of the Given

1. Introduction

2. Kinds of Representations

3. Some Data at Last

4. Conclusion Reference

Note

CHAPTER EIGHT: Are There Different Kinds of Content?

1. What Is Conceptual Structure?

2. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Cognitive Maps

3. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Visual Perception

4. Syntax and Semantics

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART II: PHYSICALISM IS NON‐REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM VIABLE?

CHAPTER NINE: Everybody Has Got It

References

Notes

CHAPTER TEN: The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism

1. An Epistemological Detour

2. The Independent Case for Theoreticity

3. Totting up the Prospects: Sensory Qualia

4. Totting Up the Prospects: The Propositional Attitudes

5. Is There a Residual Case for Propositional Attitudes in Humans?

References

Notes SHOULD PHYSICALISTS BE A PRIORI PHYSICALISTS?

CHAPTER ELEVEN: A Priori Physicalism

1. Physicalism and the Mind–Brain Identity Theory

2. The Disagreement between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalism

3. De Re versus De Dicto Versions of the Debate

4. The Epistemological Argument from Zombies for A Priori Physicalism

5. The Semantic Argument for A Priori Physicalism

6. Some (Substantial) Tidying Up

7. The Analogy with Shapes and the Relevance of Functionalism

8. De Re A Posteriori Physicalism and the Problem of Distancing De Re A Posteriori Physicalism from Dual Attribute Theories

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWELVE: On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism

1. Common Ground

2. Disputed Territory

Acknowledgments

References

Notes IS THERE AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION?

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Causation and Mental Causation

Notes

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

1. What Is “Non‐Reductive Physicalism?”

2. Why NRP Replaced RP

3. The Exclusion Argument Defanged

References

Notes

PART III: THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE IS CONSCIOUSNESS ONTOLOGICALLY EMERGENT FROM THE PHYSICAL?

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Dualist Emergentism

1. Conscious Individuals and Consciousness Properties

2. The Evolution of Consciousness

3. Substance Dualism

4. Qualitatively New Properties

5. Subject Causation

6. Causal Relevance of Consciousness Properties

7. Why Believe in Subject Causation?

8. The Adequacy of Amazement

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness

1. Introduction

2. The Emergentist Idea

3. Some Non‐Starters

4. Anodyne Novelty

5. The Role of Ontological Emergence

6. How to Implement the Role of Emergence

7. More than Merely Nomological Supervenience

8. Analytic Necessitarianism

9. An Ontology of Powers

10. Necessitarianism with Strong Necessity

11. Other Roles for Ontological Emergence

12. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes ARE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS AND INTENTIONAL CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES IDENTICAL?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: New Troubles for the Qualia Freak

1. Against Phenomenal Dualism

2. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Intrinsic Properties

3. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Nonrepresentational Properties

4. Phenomenal Externalism

5. Lolita, XP1, and Bodily Sensations

6. An Alternative Proposal and Some Final Thoughts on Qualia

Acknowledgments

References

References

Notes

IS AWARENESS OF OUR MENTAL ACTS A KIND OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS?

CHAPTER NINETEEN: All Consciousness Is Perceptual

1. Perceptual Consciousness

2. Action

3. Thinking

4. Why Peacocke’s View Isn’t PC

5. Conclusion

References

CHAPTER TWENTY: Mental Action andSelf‐Awareness (I)

1. The Distinctive Features of Action‐Awareness

2. The Nature and Range of Mental Actions

3. The Principal Hypothesis and Its Consequences

4. The Principal Hypothesis: Attractions and Possibilities

5. Describing and Explaining Schizophrenic Experience

6. The First Person in Action Self‐Ascriptions

7. Concluding Remarks: Rational Agency and Action‐Awareness

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART IV: PERCEPTION AND MENTAL CAPACITIES

SHOULD PERCEPTION BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION, DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE WORLD, OR A HYBRID VIEW?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐ONE: Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science

1. Naïve Realism

2. The Slightest Philosophy

3. Is Naïve Realism Inconsistent with Contemporary Vision Science?

4. Cognitive Penetration

5. Multimodal Perception

6. Dorsal and Ventral Visual Streams

7. Unconscious Perception

8. Conclusion References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐TWO: Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

1. Internal Dependence: The Organismic Contribution to Experience

2. Representationalism Accommodates Internal Dependence

3. Basic Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

4. French and Phillips’s Modified Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

5. Conclusion References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐THREE: Capacities‐First Philosophy

1. What Is Explanatorily Fundamental in an Analysis of Perception?

2. Why Analyze the Mind in Terms of Mental Capacities?

3. The Hallucination Question and Perceptual Particularity

4. Particularism and Attributionalism

5. The Commitments of Capacities‐First

Philosophy

6. Perceptual Capacities

7. Ways of Perceiving, Perceptual Capacities, and Modes of Presentations

References

Notes

IS PERCEPTION GENERAL, PARTICULAR, OR A HYBRID?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FOUR: Perceiving Particulars

1. Introduction

2. Two Arguments for Existentialism

3. Two Objections to Existentialism

4. Perceptual Awareness of Particulars

5. Visual Objects

Acknowledgment

References

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FIVE: Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content

1. Background

2. Alleged Benefits of Abstract Content

3. Alleged Benefits of Particular Content

4. The Pluralist View: The Best of Both Theories

5. Conclusion References

Notes

HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND COGNITION?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐SIX: The Perception–Cognition

Border

1. Introduction

2. The Dimension Restriction Hypothesis

3. Objections to DRH

4. The Full Iconicity View

5. Challenges to Block’s Format‐Based View

6. Block on Iconic Object Representations

7. Conclusion References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐SEVEN: Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File

1. Perceptual Object Representations Are Iconic

2. Object Files of Working Memory and Thought

References

Note

IS PAIN A NATURAL KIND?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐EIGHT: Scientific Eliminativism for Pain

1. Introduction: Clarifying the Landscape

2. The Promiscuity of Pain

3. Spotlight on Utility

4. What the Problem Is and What It Isn’t

5. Conclusion: Why It Matters

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐NINE: Pain Is a Natural Kind

Introduction

1. Why Theorizing about Pain Is Such a Pain (a Quick Recap)

2. Natural Kinds for Psychology

3. Moderate Pluralism about Pain

4. The Eliminativist Alternative

5. Concluding Thoughts

References

Notes

DO WE NEED IMAGINATION OVER AND ABOVE IMAGERY AND SUPPOSITION?

CHAPTER THIRTY: Against Imagination

1. How Not to Explain the Mind

2. Varieties of Skepticism about Imagination

3. Mental Imagery

4. Mental Imagery and Imagination

5. Sensory Imagination / Propositional Imagination / Supposition

6. Mental Imagery in Propositional Attitudes

7. Between Sensory Imagination and Supposition

8. Conclusion: Imagistic versus Linguistic Cognition

References

Notes

CHAPTER THIRTY‐ONE: Why We Need Imagination

1. What Imagination Is

2. The Challenges from Supposition and Conception

3. The Challenge from Belief

4. The Reductionist Challenge

5. Concluding Remarks

References

Notes

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Illustrations

Chapter 10

FIGURE 10.1 THE HURVICH–JAMESON NEURAL NETWORK MODEL (HURVICH, 1981).

FIGURE 10.2 THREE OPPONENT‐PROCESS NEURONS.

Chapter 14

FIGURE 14.1 KIM’S FAVORITE DIAGRAM.

Chapter 21

FIGURE 21.1 THREE‐DIMENSIONAL EBBINGHAUS ILLUSION.

Chapter 22

FIGURE 22.1 COINCIDENTAL VARIATION.

Chapter 26

FIGURE 26.1 THE RAT‐MAN.

FIGURE 26.2

FIGURE 26.3

FIGURES 26.4A (LEFT) AND 4B (RIGHT)

Chapter 27

FIGURE 27.1 IF A AND B ARE QUICKLY ALTERNATED, ONE SEES APPARENT MOTION, USU...

FIGURE 27.2 THE LIKELIHOOD OF SEEING HORIZONTAL (RATHER THAN VERTICAL MOTION...

FIGURE 27.3 A CLOCKWISE ORIENTED BAR CAN BE SEEN TO ROTATE TO A COUNTERCLOCK...

FIGURE 27.4 IF CUED TO C, SUBJECTS ARE FASTER TO DETECT TARGETS AT S THAN AT...

FIGURE 27.5 A VISUO‐SPATIAL NEGLECT PATIENT WAS ASKED TO COPY THE TOP PICTUR...

FIGURE 27.6 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN A BASIC MULTIPLE OBJECT TRACKING EXPERIMEN...

FIGURE 27.7 ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECT OF DIVISIVE NORMALIZATION. THE CENTER...

FIGURE 27.8 VERSION OF THE OBJECT‐SPECIFIC PREVIEW BENEFIT THAT SHOWS THAT O...

FIGURE 27.9 VERSION OF THE OBJECT‐SPECIFIC PREVIEW BENEFIT.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy

In teaching and research, philosophy makes progress through argumentation and debate. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy provides a forum for students and their teachers to follow and participate in the debates that animate philosophy today in the western world. Each volume presents pairs of opposing viewpoints on contested themes and topics in the central subfields of philosophy. Each volume is edited and introduced by an expert in the field, and also includes an index, bibliography, and suggestions for further reading. The opposing essays, commissioned especially for the volumes in the series, are thorough but accessible presentations of opposing points of view.

1. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

2. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

edited by Christopher Hitchcock

3. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa

4. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

5. Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art

edited by Matthew Kieran

6. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory

edited by James Dreier

7. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science

edited by Robert Stainton

8. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen

9. Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy

edited by Laurence Thomas

10. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics

edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman

11. Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy

edited by Thomas Christiano and John Christman

12. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology

edited by Francisco J. Ayala and Robert Arp

13. Contemporary Debates in Bioethics

edited by Arthur L. Caplan and Robert Arp

14. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition

edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa

15. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Second Edition

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

17. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition

edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

SECOND EDITION

This edition first published 2023

© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Edition History

Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 2007)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

The right of Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen to be identified as the author(s) of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.

Registered Offices

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Office

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about Wiley products visit us at www.wiley.com.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print‐on‐demand. Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in other formats.

Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty

The contents of this work are intended to further general scientific research, understanding, and discussion only and are not intended and should not be relied upon as recommending or promoting scientific method, diagnosis, or treatment by physicians for any particular patient. In view of ongoing research, equipment modifications, changes in governmental regulations, and the constant flow of information relating to the use of medicines, equipment, and devices, the reader is urged to review and evaluate the information provided in the package insert or instructions for each medicine, equipment, or device for, among other things, any changes in the instructions or indication of usage and for added warnings and precautions. While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data applied for Paperback ISBN 9781119637004

Cover Design: Wiley

We dedicate this volume to Judy H. McLaughlin and Liza Perkins‐Cohen.

Notes on Contributors

Louise Antony is Professor Emerita at the University of Massachusetts, and Regular Visiting Professor at Rutgers University. In her research she attempts to develop naturalistic accounts of meaning, knowledge, and agency that square with our scientific understanding of the mind. She is the author of numerous articles in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and feminist theory, and has co‐edited two collections of original essays, Chomsky and His Critics (with Norbert Hornstein) and A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (with Charlotte Witt).

Ned Block is Silver Professor at New York University in the Department of Philosophy with secondary appointments in psychology and the Center for Neural Science. He works in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, with a focus on philosophy of perception.

David Braddon‐Mitchell is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He has published papers in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics in Noûs, the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Erkenntnis, Synthese, and various others. He is author, with Frank Jackson, of The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.

Anthony Brueckner (1953–2014) taught at Yale and University of California, Santa Barbara. He wrote influential papers on topics in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. He also wrote two books: Essays on Skepticism (Oxford, 2010) and Debating Self Knowledge (Cambridge, 2012, co‐authored with Gary Ebbs).

Paul M. Churchland is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Matter and Consciousness, and Neurophilosophy at Work. His research lies at the intersection of cognitive neuroscience, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.

Jonathan Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of

perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (OUP 2009), and the coeditor of Color Ontology and Color Science (with Mohan Matthen, MIT, 2010).

Jennifer Corns is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Her published research focuses on pain, affect, and suffering. She is interested in how everyday thinking is appropriately employed for specialised scientific and ethical theorising.

Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) held appointments at MIT, CUNY Graduate Center, and Rutgers. He published widely and influentially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and cognitive science. Among his most important works are The Language of Thought (1975), The Modularity of Mind (1983), Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (1987), Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (1992, with Ernie Lepore), Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998), and LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited (2008).

Matthew Fulkerson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has written on haptic touch, pain, perceptual emotion and motivation, and bodily awareness.

Craig French is an Associate Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Nottingham. He is author of numerous articles focusing on the metaphysics and epistemology of perception.

E. J. Green is Associate Professor of Philosophy at MIT. He has published articles in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of perception. Recent papers focus on the perception of spatial properties, multimodal perception, and the border between perception and cognition.

Richard Kimberly Heck (formerly Richard G. Heck, Jr.) is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. They have written about philosophy of language, logic, mathematics, and mind, and the work of Gottlob Frege. Currently, they are working on issues related to gender and sexuality.

Christopher S. Hill is Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He is the author of five books and a number of articles on

topics in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.

Frank Jackson is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University.

Jaegwon Kim (1934–2019) taught at Swarthmore College, Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, Notre Dame University, the University of Michigan, and Brown University where he was William Perry Faunce Professor Philosophy until his retirement. One of the world’s leading philosophers of mind and metaphysics, Kim wrote many seminal articles and authored five books: Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge, 1993), Mind in a Physical World (MIT, 1998), Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton, 2005), Philosophy of Mind (Westview, 2006), and Essays on Metaphysics and Mind (Oxford, 2010).

Amy Kind is Russell K. Pitzer of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. Though her philosophical work centers on issues relating to imagination, she has authored numerous articles across a range of topics in philosophy of mind. She has also written two introductory textbooks, Persons and Personal Identity (Polity) and Philosophy of Mind: The Basics (Routledge).

Barry Loewer is Distinguished Professor at Rutgers, Director of the Rutgers Center for Philosophy and the Sciences. He is the author of many articles in the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and logic. He is the author of a forthcoming book, What Breathes Fire into the Equations, on the metaphysics of laws, causation, and chance.

Heather Logue is Associate Professor at the University of Leeds. Her research interests lie mostly in philosophy of mind (focusing on metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological questions related to perception) and feminist philosophy (particularly the metaphysics of gender and feminist epistemology).

Michael McKinsey is Professor of Philosophy at Wayne State University. He is the author of many articles in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. His work has primarily concerned the semantics of natural language, especially the meaning

and reference of proper names, indexicals, and natural kind terms, as well as the meaning and logical form of cognitive ascriptions.

Brian P. McLaughlin is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in a wide range of fields, including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He has a forthcoming book with Oxford University Press, co‐authored with Vann McGee, entitled Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth.

Bence Nanay is professor of philosophy and BOF research professor at the University of Antwerp. He published three monographs with Oxford University Press (Between Perception and Action, 2013, Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception, 2016, Aesthetics: A Very Short Introduction, 2019) with seven more under contract. He has won the prestigious Bessel Award of the Humboldt Foundation, Germany. He is the principal investigator of a two million Euro ERC grant and the director of the European Network for Sensory Research.

Martine Nida‐Rümelin is Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Her research focuses on issues in the intersection of philosophy of mind and metaphysics concerning the ontological status of conscious beings, their identity (across time and possible worlds), and the nature of their experiential properties. Further topics in the center of her research are pre‐reflective self‐awareness and self‐reference; and agency, freedom, and the capacity of being active (in human and nonhuman animals). She aims at developing a naturalistic version of subject‐body dualism which avoids the weaknesses of traditional substance dualism. She has been awarded the Jean‐Nicod‐Price 2019 for her work in philosophy of mind and is the announced recipient of the Frege Prize 2022.

Adam Pautz is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He works on the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. He is the author of Perception (Routledge, 2021) and is writing a book on consciousness.

Christopher Peacocke is Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University and an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Philosophy in the School of Advanced Studies in the University of London. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Ian Phillips is Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Brain Sciences at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of numerous articles, focusing especially on the nature of perception, the science of consciousness, and our experience of time.

Jesse Prinz is Distinguished of Philosophy at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. His books and articles concern various aspects of the mind, including consciousness, concepts, emotion, moral psychology, aesthetic experience, and cultural cognition.

Georges Rey is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland at College Park. He works primarily in the philosophy of psychology, particularly the foundations of cognitive science, particularly linguistics. He has written extensively on the nature of concepts, qualia, consciousness, and language and is the author of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1997), the editor of the cognitive science entries for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (with Barry Loewer) of Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991), and, most recently, Representation of Language: Philosophical Issues in a Chomskyan Linguistics (Oxford University Press, 2020).

Sarah Sawyer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex. Her research is in the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. She is the author of numerous articles on a range of topics within these areas and editor of New Waves in Philosophy of Language.

Susanna Schellenberg is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. She is the author of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence (OUP, 2018). Her contribution to this volume was generously supported by a Guggenheim Fellowship, a NEH Fellowship, and a Mellon New Directions Fellowship.

Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.