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The U.S. Cybersecurity and Intelligence Analysis John Michael Weaver
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chapter 1 Introduction: National Security Issues Confronting the United States: An Overview.................1
John Michael Weaver
Chapter 2 Relentless Resiliency: A Qualitative Assessment of the United States’ Homeland Security 11
Rebekah Dodson, Cassidy Finnerty and Lauren Gable
Chapter 3 Russia: A Strengthening Power in the Far North.........35
Jason Bratcher, Brianna Chavis and Michael Durant
Chapter 4 China: Rising to Become the New Global Hegemony?..................................................65
Erich Steinke, Benjamin Kretzing and Jack Langstaff
Chapter 5 Northeast Asia’s Sovereignty: The Analytic Study of North Korea’s Capabilities and Strategies .............................................87
Nitzi Salinas-Gaitan, Christian Kellaher and Alpha Wordsworth
Chapter 6 Iran’s Rogue Policy: Approaching Power through Destabilization and Influence.........................107
Brendan Li, Colin Day and Trevor Gimbor
Chapter 7 The Death and Aspiring Rebirth of ISIL’s Caliphate.............................................................127
Lauren Grow, Emily Ditt and Hollianne Sebrosky
Chapter 8 Terms and Conditions May Not Apply: A Critical Dive into the Cyber Threats to the United States..................................................................147
Amy McGee, Kyle Strazdus, Katrina Jara-Siza and William Bridge
Chapter 9 Conclusion: Understanding Intersectional Dynamics as the Key to Sustained Global Power Primacy...............................................................171
Jennifer Yongmei Pomeroy
About the Editors
Preface
The United States, as the world’s sole superpower, is seeing its position wane as China and Russia look to reassert themselves as global powers, especially when seeing what is going on regarding Taiwan and Ukraine. These are significant challenges confronting President Biden and his national security team. Moreover, there are many other security issues confronting the United States. This book is an amalgam of open-source intelligence analysis of countries andnon-state actors fromaroundtheglobe thatcould hurttheUnited States. Chapters in this work dissect issues using qualitative analysis techniques focusing on secondary data sources in order to provide an unclassified assessment of threats as seen by the United States using two models (the York Intelligence Red Team Model and the Federal Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model). The key audience for this book includes the 18 members of the U.S. intelligence community, members of the U.S. National Security Council, allies of the United States, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) looking to provide support abroad, universities with international relations and intelligence analysis programs, and private sector companies considering expanding their operations overseas.
Chapter 1
Introduction: National Security Issues Confronting the United States:An Overview
John Michael Weaver,
DPA
York College, York, Pennsylvania, USA
As the United States moves through its first year under President Biden, there are issues surfacing that pertain to national security that will confront this country for the rest of his term. Many countries are still vulnerable to acts of terrorism as one has seen through several attacks in recent years (WTA 2021, 23). Terror organizations will continue to alter their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to include the use of easily obtainable items to bring about these attacks.
State actors have also exerted greater assertiveness. Russia continues to rank high when looking at this country’s cyber forays into the past elections in the United States, United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, and elsewhere. As the United States moves towards new mid-term elections, this is a notable concern.
AsBidencontinuesto move forward with his agenda,his nationalsecurity teamwillhave to analyze threats, identifypriorities, and come up with his own National Security Strategy (NSS). Nevertheless, the authors in this book used the legacy NSS (NSS 2020) and Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG, 2022). The documents provide an overview of what is of the highest priority to the United States in an effort for this nation to hold onto its position as the dominant world leader regarding its military and economic might. The NSS served as the starting point in which the U.S. Departments of
Defense and State developed and implemented their own strategies in early 2018. More to the point, this book looks at the latest documents to guide the researchers into comprehending priorities from which they assessed a myriad of threats to the United States. The NSS is a top-down strategy; it serves as a road map for the executive branch to provide an azimuth for other federal departments and agencies to use in their role supporting the United States’ security interests. It is both timely and relevant, has fiscal implications, and assists department leaders in narrowing the focus to contribute to national security, especially to those in the Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States, and the leaders of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security and more.
Some implications go well beyond the borders of the United States. The NSS and other supporting strategies and plans of the United States make cogentargumentsforwhyissuesareconcernsforthiscountryandeventhough they are relatively short, do telegraph the priorities of this nation to allies and belligerents where American focus will be directed as it moves forward in future years.
Accordingly, the NSS is usedbythe DefenseDepartment, the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the State Department as the center of gravity fromwhich theybackward plan, to request resourcing, allocate manpower and effort, and assign missions towards those ends. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the State Department’s Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) provide amplification into how the likes of hard power and soft power will work in concert (and in a complementary fashion) to the NSS to help the president obtain his goals (The Department of Defense, 2018). The 18 members of the United States’ IC turn to the National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) and the unclassified version of the Worldwide Threat Assessment (WTA) constantly to look at requirements and the subsequent tasking of intelligence collection systems and efforts and provide updates on global threats respectively.
This book looks at seven prevailing threats that are either explicitly stated or implicitly derived from the NSS. These include five sovereign countries (to include the United States’ homeland), and two that pertain to non-state actors (Islamic State, and cyber).
The homeland will always be at the epicenter of U.S. efforts. Domestically, the authors of this chapter see the security of the homeland as the center of gravity for this nation’s concerns. Cassidy Finnerty, Lauren Gable, and Rebekah Dodson look at the primary threats confronting the homeland of the United States
When moving across the Atlantic, Europe has shifted to a position of significant importance for the United States. Consider for a moment, Russia and its activities in recent years. Jason Bratcher, Michael Durant, and Brianna Chavis conducted an analysis of the Russian Federation (Russia). As one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), compounded with the nuclear arsenal it possesses, its formidable military, and its capability to execute cyber-attacks, Russia continues to demonstrate to the world the influence it still has. Specifically, these authors investigated Russia’s assertiveness of power on the world stage and in its ability to conduct military operations elsewhere as a way to look for its continued rise in power.
Erich Steinke, Ben Kretzing, and Jack Langstaff looked at another significant player in the world and one that could become problematic for the UnitedStates.TheseauthorsresearchedthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC) and what it hopes to achieve as the United States is possibly relegated to a lesser position regarding trade initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region. They provide amplification into China’s investment and buildup of the Spratly Islands, influence in the South China Sea, and the country’s continuously growing cyber capabilities
China’s northeast neighbor, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea, has risen as an emerging world actor with significant regional sway. Kim Jong-un’s North Korea had appeared steadfast and resolute on his nuclear weapons program but has in recent years softened his stance (though he appears bent on moving back to a more assertive position). Nevertheless, his authoritarian regime still presents a major challenge to countries in Northeast Asia especially since it still possesses the fourth largest military in the world. Moreover, Alpha Wordsworth, Nitzi Salinas-Gaitan, and Christian Kellaher look at threats to see what Kim hopes to achieve in this region.
When moving to the Middle East, one just needs to turn to Iran to see that it has significant influence in the region. It would like to emerge as the Shiite counterbalance to the Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia for influence in this region and as one has seen since the disintegration of European sanctions, is increasingly becoming more capable at presenting itself as a potent actor. Colin Day, Trevor Gimbor, and Brendan Li provide elaboration into what is occurring and the likely direction that Iran will pursue for the future.
One contemporary threat that has emerged and remains still today as the major actor regarding transnational threats is terrorism and more specifically the Islamic State. Though much has transpired in recent years with military operations launched against terror organizations, threats emanating from
terrorismstillare a significantchallenge thattargets U.S. interests athome and abroad.EmilyDitt, LaurenGrow,andHollianneSebroskyprovideinsight into their perspective on this threat and enumerate on what has occurred in recent years.
Finally, cyber was explored by Jennifer K. Jara-Siza, Amy McGee, Kyle Strazdus, and WilliamBridge. Those using cyber see this as a formidable TTP to counter U.S. influence around the world. Moreover, the authors of this chapter looked at the overarching computer network operations (CNO) and how adversaries are using computer network attacks (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE) to look for weaknesses in the United States’ infrastructure.
The concluding chapter encapsulates the collective assessment of the research performed throughout this book. Accordingly, Dr. Jennifer Pomeroy provides her analysis and alternative approaches to the components of the instruments of national power.
Consistency in research is of the utmost importance. To achieve this and to help better bring to fruition a standardization to make sense of what is occurring, most of the authors used a logic model incorporated extensively in other research that is grounded on the four instruments of national power (JP 1-02 2010, 112). These instruments include diplomacy, information, military, and economic (hereafter referred to by the acronymD.I.M.E.) measures; these instruments have been used by leaders of the United States to better exert influence throughout the globe. The National Security Act of 1947 includes all but “information” and these have been used to apply influence by the United States (Brantly 2016). Other publications have used D.I.M.E. to analyze worldwide threats (Weaver 2015b and Weaver 2015c). Clearly, these instruments of national power have been important to all presidential administrations. Moreover, these instruments have been used by instructors and faculty at the mid-grade and senior-level staff and war colleges in the United States, inculcating a strong appreciation for making use of all available resources when working to shape outcomes throughout the world.
More specifically, all the chapters that follow employ a redirection of these instruments. The chapter authors in this book explore just how state and non-state actors use or will most likely use diplomacy, information, military, and economic means to better extend pressure back towards the United States to weaken its strategic influence and power throughout the planet. Moreover, this study turned to these instruments to see just how potential adversaries could direct them against the United States as a way to weaken its security.
Figure 1. The York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM).
The authors also used the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM) shown in Figure 1; it visually depicts intervening relationships. Directionality along with temporalprecedence canlend greater credenceto the relevance and importance of a logic model. This ordering of elements is useful; however, by no means could these specific variables be the only factors one considers for helping establish an understanding of influences leading to shaped outcomes.
This model begins with the strategic direction of the actor driven to the weakening of the national security position of this country.
It begins with guidance and direction by a leader (either from within a state or a non-state actor) who provides basics on the “who,” “what,” “when,” “how,” “why,” and “where.” It is through this direct corollary of the guidance and direction provided bythe leadership (lookingat“who”) to see “what” they are doing, and “when” to better understand “how” they are doing it, “why” and “where” in order that one can then look at the four instruments of power as a wayto implementtheir TTPs in directsupportof one’s cause to ultimately lead to the weakening of the United States.
Diplomacy is the first one. This instrument involves leaders that engage others to bring to fruition conditions favorable to what one wants to achieve. It considers not only the application to one specific country but should also look regionallyor globallyatoutcomes thatdecisions willhave in surrounding countries and well beyond to undermine the interests of the United States.
Information is an enabler of power, and the application of its use could more aptly affect influence activities throughout the world. Message targeting is often very useful to sway popular opinion to help promote a cause all while delegitimizing the messaging of another countryor non-state actor at the same time. Likewise, potentialbelligerents can make use of information particularly through social media conduits to inexpensively sell others to their cause to
acquire greater support as the non-state actor or country expands its position and influence. This instrument also includes the weaponization of cyber to exploit weaknesses of a country and more specifically, how one can use it to expose vulnerabilities in the United States. It is often seen as one of the least expensive of the instruments of power; it is available to all countries and nonstate actors and is a formidable TTP.
Conventionally, the instrument that is probably most known and understood throughout the world is the military. Most of the chapter authors looked at the military capabilities of state actors, militant TTPs and their competence (non-state actors), and vulnerabilities to U.S. Department of Defense-related activities.
Money is a precursor for action, and it underpins most activities and has always been associated with power. Nations can exert influence by using their economic position to coerce others to change behavior. What’s more is that state and non-state actors can turn to opportunities to weaken a nation’s economy by identifying vulnerabilities and in the case of this study, looking at how to weaken the United States’ economic position.
Methodology
This book specifically used data that came solely from secondary unclassified open sources. More to the point, these authors made use of qualitative techniques to triangulate in on results (Remler & Van Ryzin 2010). More specific to this research, the authors looked at the most prevalent threats confronting the United States in the context of the NSS, JSP, and NDS. Creswell (2008) provides one with his perspective into the understanding of qualitative techniques. Specifically, he writes on the strength in using this methodologyto more aptlyexplore the interconnectedness among variables in the pursuit of answering research questions (Creswell 2008).
Accordingly, contemporary research has shown why secondary data is relevant and the need to ensure the high quality of the data one uses (Remler & Van Ryzin 2010, 180). Triangulation of information increases comprehension of just what is occurring. Furthermore, using this data is relatively low cost in comparison to the pursuit of primary data acquisition and often is quite accessible; practitioners and those who engage in research alike in the policy and social science fields have turned to these sources to leverage the data to conduct research (Remler & Van Ryzin 2010, 180).
The authors in this book turned to a model previously covered in other research to help balance sources and their approach to problemdissection. The model used throughout this work is the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model found in Figure 2 (Weaver 2015a).
The model used is a Venn diagram and consists of three concentric components. The first of these includes plans and systems and the subsequent assessments. The model also affords consideration to a variety of credible written works; these include the following: government documents, legislation, scholarly reports, and more. Often these are the most credible in the eyes of most researchers. The final component has more of an oral feel; it affords consideration to transcripts of testimony, press statements coming from official government agencies, speeches, interviews, and information covered by key leaders.
All scholarly research has concerns with validity. Accordingly, this book andthechaptersinit,addressedthetopicofvalidity;itconsideredtwoaspects. First, variable checks were performed. These included efforts to ensure that variables measured what they were supposed to measure.
Figure 2. Federal qualitative secondary data case study triangulation model
Secondly, face validity was used to ensure that models and variables inherently made sense (Creswell 2008). Likewise, face validity techniques assisted in the evaluation of the logic model, variable directionality, and purpose to help ensure that what the authors covered was not counterintuitive to what one would reasonably consider when looking at shaped outcomes. The chapter authors in this book used the logic model to better frame contemporary issues while also looking at just how state and non-state actors might consider the D.I.M.E. against the United States to weaken its strategic position in global affairs; the book also considered whytheywould want to do this. Moreover, the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model, which has been vetted and used in other studies, provided authors in this book with the opportunity to ensure a balanced approach when considering data sources.
Consideration was also afforded to reliability. Consistency in research approaches turned to similar scholarly works to contribute to reliability (Creswell 2008, 190). Likewise, Remler and Van Ryzin (2010, 118) have also provided amplification to the necessity of achieving consistency in measures when looking to bring about reliability when conducting research. Facilitating this was enabled by the consistency of the D.I.M.E. as instruments of power and the use of the YIRTM and the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model to analyze the data sources in all chapters. To better corroborate information, the authors considered multiple data sources.
References
Brantley, A. F. 2016. Cyber Actions by State Actors: Motivation and Utility. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 27 (3): 465-84.
Creswell, J. W. 2008. Research Design; Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
INSSG. 2022. Interim National Strategic Guidance https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. Accessed on March 4, 2022.
NSS. 2017. National Security Strategy. http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/12/2017pdf. Accessed on January 1, 2018.
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JP 1-02). 2010. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication, 1-02. Washington DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010.
Remler, D. K. and Gregg G. Van Ryzin. 2010. Research Methods in Practice: Strategies for Description and Causation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
TheDepartment ofDefense(NDS). 2018. NationalDefenseStrategy. https://www.defense. gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed on January 20, 2018.
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (JSP). 2018. Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) FY 2018-2022 https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/277156.pdf. Accessed on April 17, 2018.
Weaver, J. M. 2015a. The Department of Defense and Homeland Security relationship: Hurricane Katrina through Hurricane Irene. Journal of Emergency Management, 12(3): 265-74.
. 2015b. The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend… Or Still My Enemy: The Challenge for Senior Civilian and Military Leaders. International Journal of Leadership in Public Service, 11(3-4): 192-6.
. 2015c. The Perils of a Piecemeal Approach to Fighting ISIS in Iraq. Public Administration Review, 75(2): 192-3.
WTA. 2021. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-UnclassifiedReport.pdf Accessed on April 29, 2021.
Chapter 2
Relentless Resiliency: A QualitativeAssessment of the United States’Homeland Security
Rebekah Dodson, Cassidy Finnerty and Lauren Gable
York College, York, Pennsylvania, USA
Introduction
The United States is confronted with many challenges to maintain its position as the globalhegemony. Accordingly, the U.S. homeland is threatened bylone actors, aggressive states, cyber warfare, and organized crime. Lone actors and domestic violent extremists continue to be a critical threat to internal stability and security. The state actorsof China,Russia,North Korea, andIran are more aggressively engaged in actions against the United States, using tactics consistent with information warfare and weapons of mass destruction. Cyber threatstotheU.S.poseasubstantialrisk tothesecurityofdigitalinfrastructure and the exploitation of personal data creating an insecure cyberspace. In addition, the homeland is also confronted with organized crime by drug trafficking organizations’ networks within the United States. Through a qualitative approach, this chapter used the two models: the Federal Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model and the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM). It was found that the threats against the homeland that weaken the hegemonic position of the U.S. rest on the variant model of the I.M.E.D. which refers to the information, military, economic, and diplomacy instruments. These findings indicate that the information was the most
Corresponding Author’s Email: rdodson1@ycp.edu
In: Intelligence Analysis
Editors: John Michael Weaver and Jennifer Yongmei Pomeroy
powerful instrument presented through cyberspace with the most opportunity to harm the United States and will remain the largest challenge for protecting the homeland.
Literature Review
In the currentenvironment, there arecontinuallyevolving threats to theUnited States both abroad and domestically. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was stood up in 2002 to combat the threats with which the homeland is faced. Appropriately, the mission of the DHS is to safeguard the American people, homeland, and values (DHS, 2020a, p. 3).Under the NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States, it outlines its “fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life” (NSS, 2017, p. 4). Safeguarding the homeland is an essential and a critical component of national security.
The United States, on September 11, 2001, experienced the largest transnational act of terrorism on American soil. It was a simultaneous coordinated attack on three different targets within the United States. These included the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a failed attempt that crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The terrorist group, al-Qaeda, was responsible for claiming the loss of 2,977 lives. The aim of the attack was directed against the American people and their wayof life (DHS, 2020b, p. 2). The impact of the attack on U.S. national security led to the reorganization of the intelligence community, creating the DHS, and the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (DHS, 2020b, p. 3).
Post-September 11, the homeland has frequently been faced with terrorism and extremism. The threat of terrorism is not uniform and includes the widespread use of tactics that limits the transparency of forecasting future attacks (Sacco, 2021, p. 1). The most common form of terrorism experienced in the homeland is a lone wolf style attack. Lone wolves (also hereafter referred to simply as lone actors), or leaderless resistance within the United States, are the most lethal type of terrorism experienced in the homeland in recent years (FBI, 2019, p. 8). Each decade following 1970 experienced a noticeable increase in lone actor terroristattacks (Phillips, 2017, p.535). From 1990 to 2013, the U.S. experienced 63% of all the global lone actor attacks (Ochan, 2021, p. 13). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Behavioral AnalysisUnit(BAU),whichconductedastudyonloneoffendersintheUnited States, found that individuals perpetrating these attacks primarily prescribe to
ideologies of anti-government. They are often extremists, radical Islamist extremists, pro-life extremists, environmental violent extremists, and other violent extremists (2019, p. 30). These ideological differences also led to a large disparityin the targets of their attacks (FBI, 2019, p. 42). Lone actors are also typically young adults with varying psychological motivating factors that determine the ideologies they consume (Ochan, 2021, p. 12). Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, stated that the DHS is countering terrorism with local partnerships through the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) as a method to identify potential threats and then preventacts of terror (DHS,2021c).TheCP3 is anewprogramunder theDHS and does nothave enough data to see if it is effective in countering lone actors. Phillips (2017, p. 538) conducted a research study on the lethality of lone actor attacks. Lone offenders are most likely to exist and operate effectively within highly industrialized states. He asserts that within the United States, lone wolf offenders are especially lethal because of the counterterrorism capacity of the United States government against organized terrorist groups (Phillips, 2017, p. 534). One of the most notorious examples of a highly lethal lone actor attack occurred in 2009. On November 13 of that year, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan shot and killed 13 individuals on a Texas military installation (Phillips, 2017, p. 534).
When examining threats to the national security of the U.S. related to terrorism, common factors include far-right extremism and Jihadi practices (Amarasingam and Argentino, 2020). An example of a right-wing domestic terrorist act characterized under the Department of Justice (DOJ) was fromthe 2017 protests in Charlottesville, VA (Sacco, 2021, p. 2). James Fields was among the protestors in Charlottesville and pled guilty to federal hate crimes linked to his driving a car into a crowd of the counter-protestors (Sacco, 2021, p. 2). Domestic violent extremist groups have ties back to former President Obama’s administration. The original motive for these groups was that President Obama was becoming more lenient with immigration policies and imposing gun control (Rapoport, 2021). Additionally, given that President Obama was the first Black president, these groups were willing to outwardly show their hate for this administration just because he was a Black man (Rapoport, 2021). Although these groups were founded under the Obama Administration, they became more present during former President Donald Trump’s Administration, as they felt their agenda was more closely aligned with this new administration.
The DHS has designated domestic violent extremists (DVE) as a “National Priority Area,” signaling the escalation of these actors on the
homeland (DHS, 2021c). The increase of actions by DVEs is indicated with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) acknowledging the threat of small cells against the United States (ODNI, 2021, p. 2). Domestic violent extremists have notably had multiple ideological reasons for their attacks. In October of 2018, Robert Bowers entered the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania and was armed with multiple firearms (DOJ, 2018). Bowers acted alone and killed 11 individuals inside the synagogue and injuredmultiple others duringthe shooting (DOJ,2018).It was reported that Bowers made anti-Semitic statements during the attack, indicating thathe was most likelylooselyaffiliated to similar extremistgroups (DOJ, 2018).
While conspiracy theories have existed within the United States, the recent rise of online conspiracies, specifically QAnon, has proven to be a threat to both domestic and national security. The group originated in 2017 when an anonymous user posted a thread on a message board and signed off as “Q”- referencing a security clearance used by the Department of Energy (Amarasingam and Argentino, 2020). QAnon has evolved to become an amalgam of theories from various far-right organizations which has culminated into the belief that former PresidentDonald Trump was conspiring with a group of people to launch a secret war against pedophiles (Amarasingamand Argentino, 2020). While the central idea of Donald Trump engaging in a secret attack initially bonded the conspiracy theorists together, the group has since grown and now engages in criminal attacks with a violent ideology.
Given the far-right ideologies held by members of the QAnon conspiracy, its members have felt driven to participate in political demonstrations, most notably the January 6th United States Capitol Insurrection. This attack on the U.S. Capitol was different from other attacks in that no other one had been motivated by trying to overturn the results of an election (Hannah, 2021). Although this was not the only time the Capitol had been attacked, it was the first time that a far-right group, alongside others who held violent ideologies, were motivated by what they believed to be a fraudulent presidential election. QAnon alongside other groups such as the Proud Boys, Boogaloo, and the Oath Keepers made their presence known at the insurrection by displaying white-supremacist symbols such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and Nazi flags (Rapoport, 2021).
Under President Joe Biden’s Administration, protecting cyberspace has been the most critical goal of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS, 2021b). Under Biden, the DHS will focus heavily on how to combat
ransomware attacks and better protect cyber capabilities (DHS, 2021b). In a press conference on March 31, 2021, Secretary Mayorkas said he has created a plan called “sprints” that consist of a tripod of elevating existing work to address specific cybersecurity challenges, removing any barriers that have stopped any progress towards better defending cyber systems, and creating new partnerships when needed. This new outline for protecting cybersecurity aligns with the goals of the Biden Administration and will best protect the cyber capabilities of the United States
Ransomware, an attack on computers that limits or stops any of its capabilities until a sum of money is transferred to the group launching the attack,hasbecomeanincreasinglyimportanttacticthatthe DHS istaskedwith deterring (DHS, 2021a, p. 2). To further protect the United States, the DHS and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have created a joint cybersecurity mission to further investigate threats in cyberspace and remain steadfast to protect against cyber threats. CISA will primarily focus on protecting and updating federal unclassified systems and plans to protect the homeland (DHS, 2021a, p. 2).
The Interim National Security Strategy (INSS) outlines the guidelines to which the U.S. will follow as it relates to cybersecurity and cyber threats. These outlines direct the United States to share information between the private sector and all levels of government in order to create safe cyberspace for Americans (INSS, 2021, p. 18). Cybersecurity and cyberspace are a vulnerable section for the homeland as tactics such as hacking and ransomware attacks are constantlyevolving. TheU.S. federalgovernmentwill continue to expand its network in terms of partnerships, investments, and relationships with its allies and the American people to effectively utilize and practice the tactics needed to best protect the homeland (INSS, 2021, p. 18). Most importantly, the U.S. will continue to take a strict approach to those countries or groups that threaten the safety of the homeland by holding those foreignactorsaccountablefortheiractionsaswellasrespondingappropriately to these attacks by imposing severe costs through both cyber and other capabilities (INSS, 2021, p. 18). This ties into the rise of hostile states engaging the United States through cyberspace and its tactical capabilities.
The hostile state actors against the U.S. have increasingly consequential effects on the security of the homeland. The hostile state actors of China, Russia,North Korea, and Iran are engaged in actions againsttheUnited States, using tactics consistent with information warfare (IW) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). IW is a conflict between two or more states in the information space, where the goal is to damage information systems and carry
out psychological campaigns against a state’s population to create instability within their society and government (Theohary, 2018, p. 1). While another consideration for the rise of hostile nation-states is their conventional military strengths including nuclear capabilities.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasing its economic and military power on a global scale. The PRC, within the last decade, has mainly engaged in IW through intellectual theft and information superiority. Recently, Chinese companies and the PRC have been accused of intellectual theft. The telecommunications conglomerate, Huawei, allegedly worked for the Chinese government, using fraud to gain trade secrets from United States companies and American counterparts (DOJ, 2020). The target of this specific fraud was for the acquisition of technologyincluding source code, manuals for internet routers, and robot testing technology (DOJ, 2020). Investigations of the allegations against Huawei found evidence that the fraud ploy took years toevolvetostealintellectualproperty(DOJ,2020).Theseattempts werenoted to be successful in their endeavor (DOJ, 2020). The PRC also seeks to gain these innovations from American citizens; an example includes the use of YiChi Shih, an American citizen (DOJ, 2021). Shih worked as an electrical engineer who was prosecuted for conspiring to export semiconductor chips that have military uses to China (DOJ, 2021). IW from China involves activities directly within the United States through academic institutions. The PRC provides financialincentives for personnelinvolved in research onChina so that they will create a bias towards fostering a more positive image of the Chinese government (Theohary, 2018, p. 12). The PRC is also a nuclear power. Theyhave an expressed interest in expanding their nuclear capabilities through intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with delivery systems. China has the capability to produce hundreds of nuclear warheads through the state’s highly enriched uranium and plutonium programs but is estimated in the low hundreds for stockpile (DIA, 2018, p. 16).
Specifically looking at the Russian Federation, this state is actively involved in IW against the United States and is a nuclear power. Russia is engaging in election-related information operation tactics. The efforts of IW tactics were noticed in the 2016 United States Presidentialelection; the Robert Mueller investigation reported their engagement outlined the active measures taken by Russia (Theohary, 2018, p. 10). The goal of the Russian operatives on the social media platforms was to deepen the social divides within the American population (Theohary, 2018, p. 10). To achieve this goal, the operatives were creating disinformation campaigns across multiple accounts on many social media platforms (Theohary, 2018, p. 10). Another capability
the Russian Federation has is its conventional military weapons, and mainly, its nuclear missiles. Russia is a nuclear power that has strategic ICBM nuclear capabilities and nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), which are employable on ships, aircraft, and from land bases (DIA, 2018, p. 8).
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been consistently building and advancing its ballistic missile and nuclear program. Since 2006, North Korea has been observed to be testing its nuclear capabilities, with each test showing a progression of the program(Nikitin, 2021, p. 1). In 2018,North Korea publicly stated that they had achieved their nuclear goals; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has estimated that they have a nuclear stockpile of about 60 nuclear warheads (Nikitin, 2021, p. 1). There is no conclusive data on the state’s capability to arm a nuclear warhead to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at this time (Nikitin, 2021, p. 1-2). The short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) have precision-guided rocket launch systems; this indicates consistency with North Korea’s statements of advances within their military (Nikitin, 2021, p. 2). North Korea engagesin information operations against the U.S. homeland and domestic corporations. (Theohary, 2018, p. 14). The 2014 cyberattacks on the U.S. company, Sony, were attributed to North Korea by the FBI (Theohary, 2018, p. 14).
To continue, another state that engages in IW and is trying to become a nuclearpoweragainsttheUnited States is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian information operations are presented through cyber capabilities including hacking attempts and intellectual theft (Theohary, 2018, p. 15). In 2011, the Iranian government targeted the United States financial district and disrupted daily banking operations of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Capital One, and PNC Bank (Theohary, 2018, p. 15). Through indictment under the DOJ, Iran was found to be associated with a cyberattack on the banking industry. Cyber intrusions into technology companies to steal source code were found to be working on behalf of the Iranian government (Theohary, 2018, p. 15). The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen advancements in cyberattack methods moving towards the inclusion of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, showing the evolution of cyber capabilities. However, Iran has not reached nuclear weapons capabilities at present but is in active pursuit through uranium enrichment that could eventually lead to a weapons’ grade nuclear power capability (DIA, 2018, p. 25).
Another crucial threat to the homeland is organized crime groups; the largest organized crime rings threatening the homeland today are drug trafficking groups. Although transnational crime organizations (TCOs) have
been operating within the U.S. for decades, advancing technology has made it easier for themto operateunder the radar and recruityoung members into their circles (FBI, n.d.). Mexican and Colombian drug TCOs, the largest crime groupsbringingdrugsintotheUnitedStates,areworkingtogethertodistribute cocaine, heroin, and to a lesser extent, marijuana, to American citizens (DEA, 2021).AccordingtotheDrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA) (2021),two of the most well-known Mexican cartels having the highest impact on the United States are the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). In Columbia, the most significant drug trafficking cartel is the Gulf Clan, with aliases Los Urabeños, Clan del Golfo, and Clan Úsuga; Armed CriminalOrganizationsandgroupsrelatedtotheRevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia have also significant influence on the drug trade to the homeland (DEA, 2021).
Mexican TCOs are the largest producers of heroin, methamphetamine (meth), and marijuana in the western hemisphere, while Columbian TCOs are the largest producers of cocaine (DEA, 2021). They rely on each other to export and route shipments of illicit drugs into the U.S. through direct pipelines, the Central American corridor, and through Mexico itself. Smaller gangs and TCOs help push these shipments into the U.S. where gangs and Mexican cartel members distribute them at the local level. Central American countries have seen an increased amount of drug flow from Mexico because of the increase of Mexican law enforcement attention on the drug trade in Mexico. This has caused a shift of power, however slightly, to countries such as Columbia, Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador, resulting in a displacement of criminal activity and gang violence to the surrounding Central American countries (FBI, n.d.). These countries are becoming more influential to the drug trade in the United States.
Research Questions and Rationales
After reviewing the sources on the threat environment of the homeland, the authors began to answer the two research questions as they sought to analyze the actions within. The two research questions are centralized around the national instruments of power model within the intelligence community: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (D.I.M.E.). Specifically, these authors considered the following research questions in terms of the homeland’s security were asked:
Q1: How are state and non-state actors weakening the homeland security of the United States in the context of YIRTM?
Q2: Why are state and non-state actors weakening homeland security of the United States in the context of the YIRTM?
To answer these research questions, these researchers used the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM) (Weaver & Pomeroy, 2020). To ensure the quality of data, the authors applied the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model covered in the first chapter of this book for triangulation of the data (Weaver & Pomeroy, 2020). See Annex A for the data sources qualified in this research.
Analysis and Findings
Analyzing the how and why questions above will provide much-needed insights for tackling the homeland’s national security issues. Annex A lists all data sources derived from the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model and the codes of the D.I.M.E. The qualitative analyses were conducted by applying the YIRTM. Addressed in Annex A, information has 17 counts, the military has 6 counts, economics has 3 and, diplomacy has 2 counts.TheI.M.E.D. modelis the resultof the nationalinstruments of power counts.
Lone Actor Attacks
The homeland’s main threat comes from lone actors and DVE attacks. Over the past few decades, there are continual increases in the frequency and lethality of this style of attack. Lone actor and DVE attacks are unpredictable in nature and difficult to predict specific targets and timelines but have the capacityfor inflicting the most damage (ODNI, 2021, p. 2). This threat mainly relies upon information, almost exclusively using the internet for radicalization, some military aspects because of the weapons employed in the attacks, and lone actors are less restrained in organizational financing of attacks.
Information is the most frequently used instrument that DVEs exercise to their advantage through accessing the internet. The internet has exacerbated the amounts and the rate at which ideologies are spread. More specifically, the use of social media has contributed to the domestic terrorism threat environment (Killion, 2019, p. 4). Moreover, the internet allows groups to exert it as a tool to intimidate individuals on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or other attributes (Killion, 2019, p. 4). Thus, this allows for the proliferation of information in cyberspace helping the spread of extreme ideologies to be freely accessed anytime without the need of physically belonging to an organization.
The internet also serves as a platform to help in the radicalization of individuals to extremist ideologies; this is known as “self-radicalization” (Killion, 2019, p. 6). Lone actors and small cells typically consume a wide variety of extremist ideologies (ODNI, 2021, p. 2). The continuation of conditions within the U.S. related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and perceived government overreach could strengthen individuals’ consumption of materials and domestic self-radicalization (ODNI, 2021, p. 2). The vast amounts of information and propaganda allow for DVEs within the U.S. to become radicalized and could help them remain undetectable because their ideologyis not directed byany organization (ODNI, 2021, p. 2). However, the internet does allow for the government to monitor the web pages and social media sites that post content on topics that lead to self-radicalization. That stated, due to a large number of sites, it is difficult for the government to monitor them all. Self-radicalization allows these individuals to become motivated withouthaving directcontactwith an organization, further allowing them to have greater mobility and obfuscating their true identity. Thus, the mobility of individuals affords DVEs the capability to continue consuming further ideological information freely. The lack of direction and cooperation with an organization affords DVEs the mobility to finance their own operations (Ochan, 2021, p. 12). Lone actors and DVEs are not restrained by the direction of an organization for funding and can use something simple as tax returns to finance an attack (Ochan, 2021, p. 12). Because these actors are not restrained in their ability to gather resources, the CP3 DHS program could be easily undermined and places the burden and responsibility on local partners and communities to try and identify potential DVEs and lone actors (DHS, 2021c).
