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Hitler’sAllies Thisbookexaminesthesignificanceofalliancesintheinternationalsystem, focusingonthedynamicsbetweengreatandregionalpowers,andonthealliances NaziGermanymadeduringWorldWarII,andtheirimplicationsforGermany. Itexaminesavarietyofcasestudiesandlooksathoweachoftherespective statescontributedtoorweakenedNaziGermany’ swarfightingcapabilities.The casescoverprincipalAxismembersItalyandJapan,secondaryAxisalliesHungary andRomania,aswellasneutralstatesthathadeconomicandmilitarysignificance forGermany,namelyBulgaria,Iran,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,Turkey,and VichyFrance.AdditionalcasestudiesincludetopicssuchastheGermanattempts tocultivateArabnationalism,focusingonGermaninvolvementinthecoupin Iraqagainstthepro-Britishgovernment,andthewartimestateofCroatia,whose creationwasmadepossiblebyGermany,withtherivalrybetweenGermanyand Italyforcontrolbeingamajorfocus.Thebookalsoincludesacasestudyexploring theuniquepositionofFinlandamongGermanalliesasademocracyandhowthe countrywasessentially fightingaverydifferentwarfromNaziGermany.
Thiswillbeofinteresttostudentsandacademicswithaninterestinpower dynamicsinWorldWarII,economic,political,strategic,andalliancetheory, andscholarlydebateonNazismandEurope.
JohnP.Miglietta hasaPhDinPoliticalSciencefromNewYorkUniversity. HeisaProfessorofPoliticalScienceatTennesseeStateUniversityinNashville, TN.Hisresearchandteachinginterestsareinternationalrelations,American foreignpolicy,MiddleEastpolitics,andCentralAsianpolitics.Heistheauthor of AmericanAlliancePolicyintheMiddleEast,1945–1992 (2002)andeditorof IntroductiontoPoliticalScience:AnAnthology (2021).
RoutledgeStudiesinSecondWorldWarHistory TheSecondWorldWarremainstodaythemostseismicpoliticaleventofthepast hundredyears,anunimaginableupheavalthatimpacteduponeverycountryon earthandisfullyingrainedintheconsciousnessoftheworld'scitizens.Traditional narrativesoftheconflictareentrenchedtosuchadegreethatnewresearchtakes onaneverimportantroleinhelpingusmakesenseofWorldWarII.Aimingto bringtolighttheresultsofnewarchivalresearchandexploringnotionsof memory,propaganda,genocide,empireandculture,RoutledgeStudiesinSecond WorldWarHistoryshedsnewlightontheeventsandlegacyofglobalwar.
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Hitler ’sAllies TheRamificationsofNaziAlliancePolitics
inWorldWarII JohnP.Miglietta Firstpublished2022 byRoutledge
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Names:Miglietta,JohnP.,1962-author.
Title:Hitler’sallies:theramificationsofNazialliancepoliticsinWorldWar II/JohnP.Miglietta.
Description:London;NewYork,NY:Routledge,Taylor&FrancisGroup, 2022.|
Series:RoutledgestudiesinSecondWorldWarhistory|Includes bibliographicalreferencesandindex.
Identifiers:LCCN2021041969(print)|LCCN2021041970(ebook)| ISBN9780367138738(hardback)|ISBN9781032200484(paperback)| ISBN9780429029011(ebook)
Subjects:LCSH:WorldWar,1939-1945–Diplomatichistory.|WorldWar, 1939-1945--Germany.|Alliances--Casestudies.|Germany--Foreign relations--1933-1945.
Classification:LCCD751.M542022(print)|LCCD751(ebook)| DDC940.54/213--dc23/eng/20211110
LCrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2021041969
LCebookrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2021041970
ISBN:978-0-367-13873-8(hbk)
ISBN:978-1-032-20048-4(pbk)
ISBN:978-0-429-02901-1(ebk)
DOI:10.4324/9780429029011
TypesetinBembo byTaylor&FrancisBooks
Acknowledgments vi
1Thesignificanceofgreat/smallpoweralliances1
2ItalyandGermany12
3GermanyandJapanduringWorldWarII:alliesatadistance28
4Hungary38
5Romania66
6Finland:theco-belligerentofNaziGermany88
7VichyFrance:theoccupiedally121
8Spain:thefriendlyneutral140
9Bulgaria:anallyatadistance153
10Croatia:thevassalstate166
11SwitzerlandandSweden:thearmedneutrals182
12TheIslamicworldandNaziGermany194
13Conclusion:thepitfallsofgreatandsmallpoweralliances207
Acknowledgments ThereareseveralpeopleIwishtothankwhohelpedmakethisworkpossible.I wanttothankthestaff oftheBrown-DanielLibraryatTennesseeStateUniversity. Theyprovidedagreatdealofassistanceingettingresources,andencouragement.I wouldespeciallyliketothankMichaelDosterandLynettaAlexander.Iwantto thanktheinter-libraryloanstaff,NancyHenthorne,BarbaraVanhooser,and especiallyMs.ToccariaPorter,whotirelesslyarrangedformetogetmuchneeded resources.IalsowanttothankthemembersoftheDepartmentofHistory,PoliticalScience,Geography,andAfricanaStudiesfortheirsupportforthisproject, especiallythedepartmentheadDr.AdebayoOyebade.Ialsowanttothankthe OfficeofSponsoredResearchatTennesseeStateUniversitywhosupportedmy researchwithasummerresearchstipend.Icompletedthe finaleditingofthis projectwhileonaFulbrightFellowship.Iwanttothankmycolleaguesatthe UniversityofCentralAsiainKhorog,Tajikistanfortheirsupportandforprovidingaconduciveacademicenvironmenttocompletethisproject.Ialsowantto thankmyfamily myparentsMarioandTulliaMiglietta,aswellasmybrother Dr.JamesMiglietta,andmygrandparentsReneandCarolineValentini who instilledadesireforeducationandreading,andwhowereconstantsourcesof encouragementduringmygraduateeducation.Iespeciallywanttothankmy familyBeth,Cypher,Jackie-O,andMokiforalltheirencouragementandputting upwithmylonghourssequesteredinmyoffice.
1Thesignificanceofgreat/small poweralliances Introduction
ThisworkexaminesGermanalliancepoliticsduringWorldWarIIandhow thisultimatelydetractedfromGermanmilitaryandpoliticaleffectiveness.In additiontolookingatthecasestudiesdescribedbelowthisworkalsoprovidesa discussionoftheeconomic,military,andpoliticalramificationsofalliancesin general.ThisputsGermanalliancepoliticsintoageneralframeworkofalliances ingeneral.Thefollowingcasestudiesareexaminedinsomedepthandare dividedintoseveralcategories.The firstconsistsofGermany’smajorAxis partners:ItalyandJapan.ThesecondtieralliesthosestatesthatactivelyparticipatedinWorldWarIIonthesideofGermany:Hungary,Romania,and Finland.ThisworkalsolooksattheneutralsthatsupportedGermanybyprovidingeconomicandsomemilitarysupport:Bulgaria,VichyFrance,andSpain. Afurthercategoryofneutralstateswerethosethatprovidedeconomicsupport: Sweden,Switzerland,Iran,andTurkey.Anothercategoryofstateswasthe NazipuppetstatesfullyunderthecontroloftheAxiscountries.Whilethere wereseveral Norway,Slovakia,andCroatia onlyCroatiaisdiscussedinthis work.HungaryandItalyeffectivelybecamesatellitestatesastheGermans exertedtotalcontrol.TherewereotherpuppetgovernmentssetupinAlbania, Greece,andSerbia,aswellasfascistpoliticalmovementsinBelgiumandthe NetherlandswhichweresupportedbyGermanylargelytofacilitatetheoccupationofthosecountries.TherewerealsoGermanattemptstocultivateallianceswithnationalistgroupsandpolitical/religiousmovements.Althoughnot statesinthetraditionalmeaningoftheterm,theyaspiredtowardstatehoodand wereafactorinNazioccupationpoliciestowardtheSovietUnionandpartsof southeasternEurope,aswellastryingtoweakentheBritishcolonialempire. WhilesomewithintheGermangovernmentofferedthehopeofindependence orautonomy,thesewerenotseriouslycontemplated.ThisaffectedGerman relationswithBalticandUkrainiannationalists,aswellasArabnationalism, specificallytheshort-livedRashidAligovernmentofIraq,aswellasIslamic groupsdrawnprimarilyfromsouthernRussia.Theseareveryinterestingcase studies,butexceptforthepro-AxiscoupinIraqthesewillnotbediscussedin thiswork.
DOI:10.4324/9780429029011-1
Thesignificanceofalliances Allianceshavebeenaveryimportantcomponentofinternationalrelationssince thedevelopmentofcentralizedstatesinancienttimes.Alliancesaremadefor manyreasons.Themostcommonistoaugmentthemilitarycapabilitiesofthe nationsinvolvedandtoprotectthemfromthreats.Acommonthoughtwasto combinetherespectivemilitariesandstrategizeforcommonprotection.
Inthemoderntheoryofalliancesthesetreatiescanbebilaterallyormultilateral.Theycanbebrokendownasfollows:
Defensepacts areinterventionstosupportafellowmemberwhoisattacked militarily.
Neutrality and non-aggressionpacts,asthenamesimply,concerncountries requiredtobeneutralifanyco-signersareattacked.Anon-aggressionpact ismorecomprehensiveandpledgesthesignersnottogotowaragainst eachother.Oneofthebetter-knownnon-aggressionpactsistheMolotov–Ribbentropagreementof1939.TheSovietUnionandNaziGermanypledgednottoattackeachotherbutinthesecretprotocolsofthe agreementtheyagreedtopartitionPoland,andtheSovietUnionwas givenafreehandintheBalticStates(Lithuania,Latvia,andEstonia), whichwerereincorporatedbackintotheSovietUnion.Hitlerwould lamenthepaidtoohighapriceforgainingSovietneutralityagainstthe West.However,itdidfreehimupmilitarilyintheEastwhilealsoprovidinggreatquantitiesofrawmaterialstotheReich.Thetwosides engagedinaveryrobusttradearrangementrightuptotheGermaninvasionofJune1941.
Finally,an entente whichpledgesthepartiestoconsultandcooperateina crisiswhichcanincludeanarmedattack.Themostfamousexampleofan ententewasthetripleententeofWorldWarIcomposedofGreatBritain, France,andImperialRussia.Therewasnoonetreatyofalliancebutrather aseriesofagreementsinvolvingthestates.1
ThucydidesdiscussesatlengththeelaboratealliancesystemofAncientGreece whereAthensandSpartaledrivalcoalitions.TheGreeksalsobandedtogetherto defeattheinvasionofGreeceledbythePersiankingXerxes.However,alliances areadouble-edgedsword;whiletheygenerallyareviewedasbenefitingthestates, theycanalsohavenegativerepercussions.TowardtheendoftheWesternRoman empireRomemadeallianceswithvariousGermanictribestohelpguardtheir borders.ThisdidnotendwellassomeofthesetribesendedupattackingRome. IntheseventhcenturyboththeByzantineandSassanianPersianEmpiresused Arabauxiliariestoaugmenttheirownmilitaryformations.ThisgaveArabforces advancedmilitarytrainingandaccesstomodernweaponrywhichtheyput throughgooduseintheserviceoftheIslamicstate.TheIslamicstateestablishedby theProphetMuhammadontheArabianPeninsulaspreadafterhisdeath.Itwas undertheCaliphUmarthattheArabsinvadedanddefeatedtheSassanianEmpire.
TheyalsomadeimpressivegainsagainsttheByzantinestakingEgypt,Syria,and Palestine.TheGermansalsousedauxiliariesduringWorldWarII.Non-Germans wererecruitedintotheWaffenSSwheretheyfoughtalongsideGermantroopson theEasternFrontoragainstpartisansintherearareas.SomeofthelastSStroops fightingforBerlinattheendofthewarwereFrenchandNorwegianSSunits.
Ideologyanddomesticpolitics Anotherimportantfactorinallianceformationistheroleofideologyand domesticpolitics.OftenduringtheMiddleAgesandtheearlymodernera alliancesweremadeaspartofroyalmarriages,ortosecurethepositionofa newruler.Afamousroyalmarriagethatestablishedandallianceforashort periodoftime,wasthealliancebetweenEnglandandSpainduringthereignof HenryVIIofEnglandandFerdinandandIsabellaofSpain.Spainwasthemost powerfulstateinWesternEurope.In1492thelastMuslimstateofGrenadain southernSpainwasdefeated.Thisreunitedtheentirecountry.Columbus’ s voyagesofdiscovery,intheserviceofSpain,ledtoSpainclaimingmuchof north,andSouthAmericaandallofCentralAmerica.Spainbecamethe first moderntranscontinentalempireandwasgrowingwealthyfromthegoldand silvercomingfromtheAmericas.WhenHenryVIIsonAlfreddied,they wishedtopreservetherelationshipsotheyreceivedpapalpermissionfor CatherineofAragontomarryAlfred’syoungerbrother,Henry,whowould eventuallybecomeHenryVIII.
AnotherexamplewastheWaroftheAustrianSuccessioninthe1740s. CharlesVIofAustriaattemptedtoassurethesuccessionofhisdaughterMaria Theresa.HesoughttousethemarriagesofhisniecesMariaJosephandMaria AmaliatotheroyalhousesofSaxonyandBavaria.Inreturntheyagreedto renounceanyrightsofsuccessioninfavorofMariaTheresa.Unfortunately,at thedeathofCharlesVIwarbrokeoutwhichinvolvedmostEuropeanstates. TheTreatyofAix-la-Chapellein1748providedatemporarysettlementofthe conflict.MariaTheresawasrecognizedasarchduchessofAustriaandQueenof Hungary.TheHabsburgsagreedtogiveupSilesia.Thissettlementwasonly temporary,anditservedasapreludetotheSevenYearsWar(1756–1763).
Germany’salliancewithItaly,thePactofSteel,wasinpartideologically based.MussoliniviewedBritainandFranceashismajorthreatstowardbuilding anItalianempireinAfrica.Germanydidnothaveanyterritorialambitionsin AfricaandwasonlydrawnintoAfricaduringWorldWarIItobailoutthe ItalianswhowerefacingdefeatatthehandsoftheBritish.Ideologyplayedless ofaroleintheotherGermanalliances.InHungaryandRomania,theGermansseemedtoprefertoworkwithtraditionalconservativesandkeptthe nativefascistsonashortleasetousethemasathreatintheconservativegovernmentshoulddecidetoswitchsides.InHungary,theArrow-Crosswasput inpowerinOctober1944whenitwasevidentthattheconservategovernment,ledbyAdmiralHorthy,wasabouttomakepeacewiththeAllies.Other thanItalytheonlyGermanallywheretherewasastrongideologicalaffinity
wasCroatia.TheUstašeregimeinCroatiawassupportedandcametopower becauseofGermanyandItaly.However,theNaziswereoftenatoddswiththe UstašebecauseinmanywaystheyweredestabilizingsoutheasternEuropewith theirgenocidalpoliciesagainsttheSerbsespecially.Attemptingtopacify YugoslaviawasahugedrainonGermany.Somehistoriansarguethatthe invasionofYugoslavia,whichledtothepostponementofOperationBarbarossabyaboutamonth,mayhavedirectlyledtoNaziGermanylosingthewar astheGermanslostamonthofgoodweatherinthespringof1941onthe EasternFront.
Coalitionsagainstadominantpower:balancing Allianceshaveoftenbeenutilizedtoreigninadominantcountryfrom becomingtoopowerful.Inthelatesixteenthandearlyseventeenthcenturies thiswasdonetocurbtheambitionsofFranceunderLouisXIV.Heattempted tohavehisgrandsonPhilipofAnjouputontheSpanishthrone,theWarof theSpanishSuccession(1701–1714).Thiscouldhaveledtotheunionofthe twomostpowerfulcountriesinEurope.Acoalitionarosecomposedofthe HolyRomanEmpire,Britain,Holland,theGermanstates,andtheKingdom ofSavoytopreventthis.DuringtheNapoleonicwarsintheearlynineteenth century,agrandcoalitionofmostofEurope,ledbyBritain,alliedtodefeat France.Likewise,asimilarcoalitionofGreatPowersalliedtodefeatarising GermanyduringWorldWarI.
Alliancesaretheoldestinternationalorganizationsinhumanhistory.Alliance dynamicsrevolvearoundstrategicissuesbutcanfrequentlyalsoinvolveeconomics.Oftensocialaspectshelptobindanalliance.Anexampleofthisisthe USandBritainfromaboutthemiddlenineteenthcenturyonward.Acommon politicalsystem,language,andethnicityoftheearlysettlerstotheUShelped pavethewayforacloserelationshipamongthegovernments.Animportant dynamicofallianceformationistherelationshipbetweengreaterandlesser powers.Historicallyallianceswereviewedasawayforstatestoenhancetheir power.Statescouldaugmenttheirmilitaries,gainaccesstostrategicresources, andmilitarybases.ItwasapolicyofGreatBritaintokeeptheirnavyasstrong asthenexttwonaviescombined,shouldthesestatesformanallianceagainst GreatBritain.Thepowerdynamicsoftherespectivepowersdoraisesome issues.Frequentlywhileallieshaveacommonenemytheirinterestscan diverge.Theyalsomaybepursingdifferentstrategicinterests.Anexampleof thiswastheCrimeanWar(1850–1853).TheBritishandFrenchweresupportingtheOttomanEmpiretopreventtheRussiansfromtakingtheDardanellesandgainaccesstotheEasternMediterranean.Theyhoweverwerenot interestedinsupportingtheTurkishefforttoreconquerformerTurkishterritoryintheCaucuses.InthisendeavortheTurkshadtogoitalone.
Anothercomponentofalliancedynamicsistherelationshipbetweengreat andsmallpowers.Greatpowersfocusongeopolitics.Theyarelookingatthe globalsystemandoftenseekingwaystheycanincreasetheirpoweratthe
expenseoftheirrivalsandbecometheglobalhegemon.Smallerpowersare interestedinbecomingadominantpowerintheregionorregimesurvival. Theymayalsobeattractedtothepotentialeconomic,military,andpoliticalbenefitsthatanalliancewithagreatpowercangivetothem.Statusandlegitimacyare alsoveryimportantconcepts.Thereisadebateoverwhoholdsswayinanalliance. Thetraditionalviewisthatthesmallerpowersaremanipulatedbythemajor powers.Anotherargumentisthatthegreaterpowerhastheperceptionthatit needsthesmallerpowersandattemptstoplacatethem.Ineffecttheregional powerinterestsbecometheirown.Oftenthisleadstotheallocationofmilitary, political,andeconomicresourcestopromotetheinterestsofthesmallerpower.
ThislaterviewisillustratedbylookingatthealliancepolicyofNaziGermany duringWorldWarII.Germany,asinWorldWarI,alienatedthestrongestpowers whileallyingwithrelativelyweakstatesthatithadtosupport.Thiswasthecasein WorldWarIasAustria–Hungary,Bulgaria,andtheOttomanEmpiredidnotcontributemuchtotheGermanwareffortandweresupportedbyGermany.Attempts atjointmilitaryoperationsbetweentheGermansandAustrianswhileattimessuccessful,largely floundered.Amajorfactorwastheinabilityofthehigherlevelsof commandtogetalong.SeveralGermanmilitarycommandershadcontemptforthe Austriansandjointmilitaryplanningwasnotahighpriority.TheGermanshad difficultiesthemselvesincoordinatingmilitaryplanningasthearmyandnavywere notabletocometogetherandformaunifiedjointwarplan.Thisinterservicerivalry didnotcreateaclimateforjointmilitaryplanningwithforeignarmies.2
InWorldWarIIGermanyattemptedtoforgeabroadideologicalalliance withfellowfasciststates,aswasthecasewithItaly,aswellasconservativestates suchasHungaryandRomania.DuringthewarwiththedefeatofFrancethey allowedthecentralandsouthernpartsofthecountrytomaintainnominal independenceunderapro-GermangovernmentbasedinVichy.Theirallies hadwaraimsaswell.Italy’sMussoliniwasattemptingtocarveoutanempirein AfricaandgaincontroloftheMediterranean.VichyFrancewantedtomaintain theFrenchcolonialempireandaplaceatthetableasagreatpower.Therewas alsoFranco’sSpainafascistneutralstate.Madridalsohadterritorialambitions inAfrica,andtheywantedtoregainGibraltarfromBritain.InEasternEurope HungarywantedtoregainterritorylostafterWorldWarI,andRomania soughttogainterritoryattheexpenseoftheSovietUnion.BothHungaryand RomaniawerecompetingforcontroloverTransylvania.
TheearlyvictoriesofGermanymadepossiblethecreationofparallelempires amongitsallies.Germandiplomaticandmilitaryeffortswereresponsiblefor creatingagreaterHungaryandRomaniaandfedMussolini’sdesireforempire. ItalsogaveSpainanopportunitytoexpand.Thesecountries,asillustrated above,oftenhadconflictingterritorialandpoliticalaims.
Theimportanceofgeography Geographyhasbeentiedintotheconceptofstatehoodandnationalidentity. Aristotlediscussedtheideathatpeoplewereinseparablefromtheirenvironment.
JeanBodin,thesixteenth-centurywriter,discussedtheroleofclimateonthe developmentofnation-states.Thisisapparentwhenlookingatthemodernworld. TheUnitedStatesisfortunatethatmostofthecountryliesinatemperatezone.In mostofthecountrytherearelonggrowingseasons,insomecasesmultipleseasons, sotheUShasbeenandcontinuestobeself-sufficientinfoodproduction.The UnitedStatesalsohasphysicalboundaries,whichservedasadeterrenttoforeign invasion.Untilthemissileeraanadversarywouldhavetocrossandmaintaina supplylineoverthousandsofmilesofocean.Also,theUnitedStateshasneighbors (CanadaandMexico)whodidnotposeamilitarythreat.TheUShasbeenlargely insulatedfromthecrediblethreatofmilitaryattackformostofitshistory.Thisisin sharpcontrasttomostEuropeancountrieswheretherearefewphysicalbarriersto invasion.Inaddition,therearenumerouscountriesthathavestrongmilitariesand variousterritories,notablyAlsace-Lorraine,andgonebackandforthbetween countries.
Thedevelopmentofgeopoliticsinthelatenineteenthtoearly twentiethcenturies Geographybegantoinfluenceinternationalrelationsthoughtinthelatenineteenthcentury.OneofthefactorswasthedevelopmentofsocialDarwinism. Theviewthatitwasnecessaryforspecies,andpeople,toadjusttotheirphysicalenvironment.Oneofthe firsttoadaptthesurvivalofthe fittestideato stateswasFriedrichRatzel.Hedevelopedtheideaof Anthropogeographie,a synthesisofgeography,anthropology,andpolitics.Hecoinedtheideaof lebensraum,livingspace.Humanswereinconstantconflictoverland.This conceptwouldinfluencelaterwritersnotablyKarlHaushofer,whoinfluenced Hitler.3
Animportantscholarwhohelpedcreatetheconceptofgeopoliticswas HalfordMackinder.MackinderbelievedintheconceptofaWorldIsland. Acountrythatcontrolledtheworldislandcouldcontroltheworld.He identi fiedEurasiaastheheartlandofthisworldisland.Theheartlandwas thecenteroftheworldisland.Keytocontrollingtheheartlandwasthe “pivot ”.Hede fi nedthepivotasthegeographicalcenteroftheplanet.This istheriverbasinsofthegreatriversofCentralAsia,includingtheCaspian andAralSeas.Thepivotcouldnotbeattackedbymaritimepowersbut couldsustainlargepopulations.Itwasalsotheareawherenomadscameout ofandspreadtootherregions. 4
Mackinder’sgeographicalboundariesofthePivotwouldchangeandexpand aswerefinedhistheoryduringthetwentiethcentury.Healsolabeledother regionsoftheworldintheirrelationshiptothepivot/heartland.Ofparticularly importancewastheinnercrescent.ThisincludedEasternEuropeandEuropean Russia.Controlofthisregionwascentraltocontrollingthepivot/heartland.In hislateryearsthereisevidencethatMackinderthoughtofEasternEuropeas partofthepivotitself.AccordingtoMackinderthecountrythatcontrols EasternEurope(theinnercrescent)controlstheheartland,andtheheartland
controlstheworldisland.Possessionoftheworldislandenablesacountryto controltheworld.Thisideaofdividingtheworldintodifferentsectorswould berefinedbyotherscholarsusingslightlydifferentterminology.Haroldand MargaretSproutwouldcallEasternEuropetheRimlandandessentiallyagreed thatifacountrycontrolledtherimlandtheycouldcontroltheheartlandand thustheworldisland(i.e.,theEurasianlandmass).Mackinderputapremium onlandpowerandlargearmies.Otherwritersongeopolitics,notablythe AmericanAlfredThayerMahanandtheItalianGuilioDouhert,wouldput muchgreateremphasisonseaandairpower,respectively.
InthedecadesleadinguptoWorldWarIItherewasagreatdealofscholarship buildingontheimportanceofgeopolitics.AccordingtotheworkofMackinder, theSprouts,andlaterKarlHausofer,EasternEuropewasespeciallyimportant. GermanyhadagreatdealofinfluenceinEasternEurope.TheAustro-Hungarian Empireatitsheightextendedandencompassedalargepartofsoutheastern Europe.TherewereGermanpopulationsinHungaryandRomania,theVolkdeustch,thattheGermanssoughttoexploitduringWorldWarII.German nobilityhadbecometherulingfamiliesofmanyEasternEuropeancountries, notablyYugoslavia,Greece,andRomania.TheregentofHungary,Admiral Horthy,wasascomfortablespeakingGerman,thelanguageoftheoldofficercore oftheAustro-HungarianEmpire,aswithHungarian.TherewasalsoaGerman populationinsouthernRussiabroughttherebyCatherinetheGreat,whowasof theGermannobilitybeforeshemarriedTsarPaul.Manyofthese “VolgaGermans ” endedupbeingdeportedbyStalintoCentralAsiaduringandafterWorld WarII.MuchofthisGermanpopulationendedupinKazakhstanwherethey composeasignificantminoritypopulationeventoday.
HitlerandtheNazisdidnoteveninventtheterm lebensraum (“livingspace”). However,theydidseektoexploittheseideastojustifytheiridealsofconquest. Theyalsocreatedaracialjustificationarguingthatmostofthepeoplesofthese regionswereunworthyandshouldbeconquered.Thiswouldeventuallycontribute totheirgenocidalpoliciesandtheirharshtreatmentofthepopulationsoftheseterritories,eventhoughinitiallymanyofthesepeoplewerereceptivetotheGermans. ThiswasespeciallytrueinpartsofthewesternandsouthernSovietUnion,notably theBalticStates,Ukraine,andpartsoftheCaucuses.TheNazipolicyofexploitation andappropriationofresourcesturnedmanypeopleagainstthem.
EasternEuropeandtheSouthernSovietUnionwereespeciallyimportantto theNazisbecauseofoil.DuringWorldWarIItheirprimarysourceofoilwas Romania’sPloesticomplex.Oneofthereasonswhyin1942Hitlerdecidedon focusingonastrategyofconqueringthesouthernSovietUnionwastocontrol theBakuoil fields.Thiswouldultimatelyculminateinthedisasterofthebattle ofStalingrad.
Alliancetheory:greatandregionalpowers Asegmentoftheliteratureonthetheoryofalliancesrevolvesaroundrelationshipsbetweenlargeandsmallpowers.Liskaidentifiesthreereasonswhy
statesalign:(1)todeterandcoerce;(2)toenhancethedomesticstabilityofthe nation;and(3)toconveystatusonaparticularnation.5 Greatpowerstendto formalliancesforgeostrategicreasonssuchaspowerprojection,assesstobases andthemilitaryinfrastructureofitsally.Anotherreasonisaccesstoraw materials.Thisisparticularlytrueoftwentieth-andtwenty-first-centuryalliancesduetotheimportanceofoil.InthetwentiethcenturythisdrewtheUS andGreatBritainintotheMiddleEast.DuringWorldWarIItheimportance ofoilinfluencedthewarplanninginbothTokyoandBerlin.Japanwasdrawn toIndonesiaandSoutheastAsiaingeneralduetoitsdemandforrawmaterials, oilbeingthemostimportant.Likewise,Germanywasdrawntowardthe southernSovietUnionformuchthesamereason.Incontemporarypoliticswe seeseveralgreatpowersbeingdrawntoAfricatoexploitrawmaterials.China hasbeenespeciallyactiveinattemptingtoworkouttradedealswiththenewly oilrichstatesofAngolaandMozambique.
Smallerpowershavetheirownreasonsforformingallianceswithmajor powers.Someseektopromotetheirregionalinterestsandpromotetheirgoals ofregionalhegemony.Inthe1960sand1970simperialIranundertheShah useditsalliancewiththeUnitedStatestoconstructhugemilitaryforcesinpart tobecomearegionalpower.Smallerpowersmayalsoseektousealarger powertogainterritorialconcessionsattheexpenseofregionalrivalries.This wasthecasewithseveralofGermany’salliesduringWorldWarII.Both HungaryandRomaniahadconflictingclaimstoTransylvania.Theyhopedthat inbeingworthyalliestheywouldgainGermansupport.Hungaryespecially benefittedearlyonfromitsalliancewithNaziGermany.Thebreakupof CzechoslovakiafollowedbytheAxisinvasionofYugoslaviaallowedHungary toannexterritorythatithadlostduringthepeacesettlementofWorldWarI. OfallthedefeatedpowersofWorldWarIHungarylostthemostintermsof territoryandpopulation.
Ideologycanalsoplayalargeroleinallianceformationbetweengreatand smallpowers,andbetweenthepoliticalelitesoftherespectivecountries.Certainly,inlookingatthealliancebetweenGermanyandItaly(thePactofSteel), Hitler’sadmirationofMussolinicontributedtothetwostatesforminganalliance.Likewise,thefascismoftheUtashehelpedformanalliancebetweenthe breakawayCroatianstateandGermanyandItaly.Thepoliticalideologyof VidkunQuislingledhimtobetrayhisnativeNorwayandassumetheleadershipofapro-NazipuppetstateinNorway.Hisdevotiontofascismwassuch thatastheThirdReichwascrumblinginthelastdaysofthewarthathe shouldbenamedsuccessortoHitlerandalast-ditchdefenseshouldbedonein Norwaybypro-Axisforces.HeevenconsideredextendingNorwegiancitizenshiptothe100,000strongGermanoccupationarmy.
Theliteratureonalliancesreflectstheviewthatlargerstatesgainmorebenefitsinallyingwithsmallerpowers.Classicalrealismisaboutmaximizingpower forastate,andthiswouldincludebeingabletomanipulateone’sownalliesas wellasadversaries.Thus,smallerpowerscouldbevulnerabletoamorepowerfulally.ThepoliticalphilosopherMachiavelliwarnedsmallstatestoallywith
greaternationsonlywhennecessary.SeveralofGermany’salliesexperienced thisduringWorldWarII.InresponsetotheremovalofMussolinifrompower andtheattemptbyItalytomakeaseparatepeacewiththeAlliesGermany occupiedItalyessentiallyreducingMussolinitoarulerofapuppetstate.In HungaryandRomania,theNazisattemptedtoextractpoliticalconcessions fromtheconservativegovernmentsbythreateningtosupporttheseizureof powerbylocalfascistmovements,theArrowCross,andIronGuardrespectively.InHungarytheydidsupportacoupinOctober1944whichbroughtan ArrowCrossgovernmenttopoweranddeposedAdmiralHorthytokeep HungaryfromwithdrawingfromtheAxis.
Historically,thegreatpowershavelookedtoallywithsmallerstatesasaway ofbuildinguptheirownmilitaries.AfterthebreakupoftheConcertofEurope in1890manyleadersthoughtifamajorconflictshouldoccur,minormilitary gainsinstrengthcouldtipthebalanceforacoalition.Thisledtostateslike Romaniagaininginimportance,asitwasviewedthattheirresourcescouldbe themarginofvictorytowhatevercoalitionitalliedwith.
Thisviewofthesignificanceofsmallpowerslastedintotheinterwarperiod andwasreinforcedbytheFrenchalliancesysteminEasternEurope.Asaresult oftheiralliancewithFrance,thesestatesgainedmilitaryaidandtheprestigeof beingalliedwiththemostpowerfulnationinEurope.Moresignificantly,they hopedthisalliancewouldguaranteetheirindependencegainedbecauseofthe peacesettlementafterWorldWarI.However,aswarapproachedbytheend ofthe1930s,theinfluenceofthesepowers,andsmallpowersingeneral, becamenegligibleingreatpowercalculations.Bythistime,advancesintechnologyhadmadewar fightingmoresophisticatedandlessenedtheimportance ofminorpowers.
ThispointwasbroughthometoGermanleadersinbothWorldWarsas theiralliancepoliciestiedGermanytorelativelyweakstates.Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,andtheOttomanEmpireinWorldWarIandinWorldWarII Germany’salliesincludedItaly,Bulgaria,Hungary,Romania,andFinland, noneofwhichcouldaiditsignificantly.OnecanalsoincludeJapaninthisset. AlthoughnotadrainonGermany,bothstatesweretooremotetobeableto offeranymeaningfulassistancetoeachother.TheGermanJapanesealliance didincreaseGermany’sliabilities,astheGermandeclarationofwaronthe UnitedStatesaftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbordidnotrequireJapanto issueareciprocaldeclarationofwarontheSovietUnion.PresidentRoosevelt wasabletomobilizeAmericanresourcesagainstGermanywithnodomestic politicalresistance.Conversely,theJapanesenon-aggressionpactwiththe SovietUnionenabledStalintoshiftRedArmytroopsfromtheSovietFarEast totheEasternFront,whichprovedsignificantinstoppingtheGermansjust outsideMoscowinDecemberof1941.
Theprospectofgreatandsmallpoweralliancescanleadtomisconception anddifferencesinpolicyduetothedifferentlevelsofanalysisofthealliance partners.Thelargerpowermustconcernitselfwithissuesatthesystemiclevel, whiletheorientationofthesmallerpowerisontheregionalsituation,and
eventhesurvivaloftheindividualregime.Inaddition,thegreaterpowerfrequentlyisinthemiddle,sittingbetweenitsalliesthataredirectlyimpactedbya particularthreat,andthosestatesthataremoreremotefromit.Thislatter grouponlyhasalimitedinterestandunderstandingofthesethreatsandisless likelytocontributetothealliance.
ThereistheissuethattheGreatpowerwillgetembroiledinconflictsdueto itssmalleralliancepartners.ThiswascertainlythecasewithGermanyinWorld WarII.GermancommandershadtokeeptheHungarianandRomanianunits separatedfromeachotherontheEasternFrontforfearthattheywouldstart fightingwitheachother.LikewiseattemptsbyGermanytoenticeSpaininto thewar flounderedinpart,becauseSpanishterritorialclaimsclashedwiththose ofGermany’sotheralliesintheregionItalyandVichyFrance.Inthelarger arenatheprincipaladversariesofGermanytheSovietUnion,GreatBritain,and theUnitedStatesweresuperiorinmanpowerandindustrialmight.Onpaper Germany’salliescouldhaveprovidedagreatdealofsupport.Altogetherthey possessednearlytwicethepopulationandindustrialcapabilityofGermany82 percentofthedivisionsand85percentofcasualtiesontheAxissidewere German.SpainrefusedtoletGermanytakeGibraltar,Italywasnotableto closeoff theMediterraneantotheAllies.Thiscausedproblemsofresupplyfor theAfrikaKorps.AtthesametimelendleasesupplieswerepouringintoGreat BritainandtheSovietUnionfromtheUnitedStates.Germany’salliesprovided verylittleinthewayofmanpowerontheEasternFront.VichyFranceprovidednotroops,Spainveryfew,andtheHungarianandItaliantroopswere largelyineffective.InAsiaJapanhadformidablemilitaryforcesbuttheyoperatedindependentlyofGermany.OneofthebiggestblundersNaziGermany madeduringthewarwasdeclaringwarontheUnitedStatesaftertheJapanese attackonPearlHarbor,whilenotinsistingthatJapandothesameregardingthe SovietUnion.
AnotherfactorwhichinhibitedtheformationofsolidalliancesforGermany inWorldWarIIwasthefearamongthealliesthattheywouldbedominated byGermany.ThishappenedinthecaseofVichyFrancewhereeventhepretextofindependencewasdissolvedinNovember1942whentheGermans occupiedVichy.PriortothistheFrenchweredisturbedbythepossibilityof GermanexpansionintoNorthAfrica.TheGermansweredemandingbasesin CasablancaandVichyfeltthiswouldleadtodominationoftheregionby Germany.
GermanywantedtotakeGibraltarfromBritaintocloseoff theMediterraneantoBritainaswellasgainapositioninNortheastAfricatofurthertheir powerprojectioncapabilitiesintheAtlantic.Thiswouldbeimportantin eventuallychallengingtheUnitedStates.InameetingatBerchtesgadenin February1941,HitlerstatedtoSpanishforeignministerRamónSerranoSuñer thathewantedtotakeGibraltarandmoveGermantroopstoMorocco.Hitler wantedGermanbasesthereandwantedtopreventVichyfromdefectingtothe Allies.InresponsetowhattheSpanishfeltwereencroachmentsontheir interestsinNorthAfricatheybegantoimpedetheactivitiesofGermanagents
inSpanishMoroccoandtheCanaryIslands.Moreimportantly,theywithdrew cooperationwiththeGermannavyindefendingtheCanaryIslands.Therewas evenaplan,OperationFelix,tosendGermantroopstoSpaintoattack Gibraltar.GermantroopsweretoenterSpainwiththeintentofseizing GibraltarfromBritainifFrancowouldagree.Thiswassubsequentlyabandoned byHitlerinfavorofOperationIsabellawhichwasacontingencyplanincase ofaBritishinvasionofSpain.
Notes
1 J.D.SingerandM.Small, “FormalAlliances,1815–1939:AQuantitativeDescription,” JournalofPeaceResearch,2(January1966),p.5.
2 RichardL.DiNardo, GermanyandtheAxisPowers:FromCoalitiontoCollapse (Lawrence,KS:UniversityofKansasPress,2005),pp.12–17.
3 JamesE.DoughertyandRobertL.Pfaltzgraff,Jr., ContendingTheoriesofInternational Relations (NewYork:HarperandRowPublishers,1990),pp.151–152.
4 EldarIsmailovandVladimerPapava, RethinkingCentralEurasia (Washington,DC: CentralAsia-CaucasusInstituteandtheSilkRoadStudiesProgram,JohnsHopkins University,2010),p.85.
5 GeorgeLiska, AlliancesandtheThirdWorld (Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1968).
Bibliography Singer,J.D.,andM.Small, “FormalAlliances,1815–1939:AQuantitativeDescription,” JournalofPeaceResearch,2(January1966),pp.1–32.
DiNardo,RichardL., GermanyandtheAxisPowers:FromCoalitiontoCollapse (Lawrence, KS:UniversityofKansasPress,2005).
Dougherty,JamesE.,andRobertL.Pfaltzgraff,Jr., ContendingTheoriesofInternational Relations (NewYork:HarperandRowPublishers,1990).
Ismailov,Eldar,andVladimerPapava, RethinkingCentralEurasia (Washington,DC: CentralAsia-CaucasusInstituteandtheSilkRoadStudiesProgram,JohnsHopkins University,2010).
Liska,George, AlliancesandtheThirdWorld (Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,1968).
2ItalyandGermany Italiancolonialism ItalyhadbeenacolonialpowerlongbeforetheriseofMussoliniandFascism. ItalyexpandedintoEastAfricain1882acquiringterritoryontheRedSea.In 1889furtherterritorywasacquiredontheIndianOcean.ThiswouldeventuallybecomethecoloniesofEritreaandItalianSomalia,respectively.In1911 theyengagedinashortconflictwiththeOttomanEmpirewhichgainedthem nominalcontroloverLibya.ForItalythiswasthe “FourthShore” andwasseen notonlyasanareaofeconomicandmilitaryexpansion,butalsosuitablefor Italiancolonization.1 Thisconflictisthe firstmodernwarthatutilizedacombinationofground,naval,andairforces.Othercountrieshadbeengaining territoryatOttomanexpense.FranceinTunisiaandBritaininEgyptgained controlovertheseareasafterlongperiodsofgainingprivilegesintheseterritoriesundernominalOttomanrule.Austria–Hungaryin1908annexedBosniaHerzegovinaafter30yearsofmilitarycontrolandadministration.2 Italyhad previouslyusedthesetacticsingainingcontrolinSomalia,andEritrea.Inthe mid-1880sanItalianshippingcompanypurchasedtheharboratAssabin1882. TheItaliansoccupiedMassawain1885.TheItalianoccupationofSomaliawas donepiecemealthroughtreatieswithlocalrulers.3 InthiswaytheItaliansgraduallygainedapositioninEastAfrica.
ItalywaswoefullyunpreparedforconductingmilitaryoperationsinNorth Africa.Italianleadershadanticipatedaquickvictoryagainsttheweakened Ottomanempire.Italianforcesgainedcontrolofthecoastalareas.Thesmall Ottomangarrisonwasoverwhelmed,theremnantsretreatedintothedesert. TheOttomangovernmentwasillpreparedforamajormilitaryengagement withItaly.Theirmilitarywascommittedto fightinginsurgenciesinAlbania andYemen.Theynavalforceswerenotstrongenoughtoforceasupplyline totheirbeleagueredforcesinNorthAfrica.Ininitialstatementsregardingthe wartheOttomangovernmentwaswillingtocedeItaliancontrolofthecoastal areas.However,RomewantedallofTripolitaniaandCyrenaica,withtotal Italianpoliticalsovereignty.Theywerewillingtoentertainsomereligious authorityfortheOttomanSultanMahmudV,whoinadditionhadthereligioustitleofcaliphreligiousleaderofallMuslims,aswellasconsideringpaying
DOI:10.4324/9780429029011-2
anindemnity.TheItaliansfearedthatiftherewasanydoubtastothesovereigntyoftheterritorythiscouldbearepeatofthedisasterinEthiopia.In1896 anEthiopianarmyhadroutedtheItaliansatthebattleofAdowa.Acauseof theconflicthadbeenamisunderstandingregardingthescopeoftheItalian protectorate.Thissteadfastuncompromisingpositionmadeitverydifficultfor theItalianarmy.Ithadnoplanstoadvanceawayfromthecoast.Theremnants oftheOttomangarrisongainedvaluabletimetoregroupandorganize.They alsoworkedatorganizingtheArabandBerberpopulationstoresisttheinvaders.Theseforcesillustratedtheirabilityto fightbackbystagingaraidon Tripolijustafewweeksaftertheinitiallandingthatkillednearly500Italians. Althoughtheattackingforcesufferedhigherlosses,itillustratedtotheItalians thattheenemywasfarfrombeaten.Themilitarycommandersresigned themselvesthattheywereinvolvedinaprolongedcampaignthatwouldfocus moreonmakingpoliticalinroadsasopposedtoapurelymilitarysolution.This conflictcostItalyagreatdeal.Inthe1912–1913 fiscalyearthewarcostItaly 498millionlireandresultedin46.9percentoftotalstateexpenditurewith verylittletoshowforitotherthanagradualexpansionofthedefensiveperimeteraroundthecoastalareas.4
TheOttomansillustratedthattheywereadaptatdenyingtheItaliansultimatevictory.OnOctober23,1911,theremnantsoftheOttomangarrison, togetherwithlocalirregulars,coordinatedanattackwhichkilledover400 Italians.5 Peacetalksopenedin1912.TheOttomanswerewillingtoallow ItaliancontroloverthecoastwhiletheOttomansultannominalsovereignty. TheOttomansproposedvariousscenarioswhichincluded:partitioningLibya withItalyretainingthecoastandtheOttomansretainingtheinteriorwith accesstoaport;ortheSultancouldgrantautonomytoLibyaunderalocal leaderwithItalianagreement.Italywouldhaveextensiveeconomicprivileges.6 TheItalianshoweverwereuncompromising.Assertingfullsovereigntyoverall ofLibyawasimportantinItaliandomesticpolitics.7
ItalywassavedfromastalemateasconditionsintheBalkans,whichwould ultimatelycausethe firstandsecondBalkanwarsin1912and1913,forcedthe TurkstoyieldtoItaliandemands.TheItaliansgainedtotalsovereigntyover LibyawhileacknowledgingthereligiouslegitimacyofSultanMuradVas caliphoftheMuslims.TheyalsopaidanindemnitytoTurkey.WhileItaly gainedalargecolonyinNorthAfricathecostswerehighandmostofthe Italianaimscouldhavebeengainedatacheaperpriceinblood,treasure,and prestige.8 TheOttomanscapitulated,andleftLibyabutItalywasstillconfrontedwithanindigenousrebellionthattookuntilthe1930stobefully pacified.ThiswastobeaharbingerofsubsequentItaliancampaignsduring WorldWarII.
ItalyattemptedtogainterritorialadvantagesinEastAfricarightafterWorld WarI.ItalyclaimedundertheTreatyofLondon,1915,thatinreturnfor BritishandFrenchoccupationofformerGermancoloniesItalywasdueterritorialconcessionsaswell.BritainultimatelydidagreetocedeJubaland,a borderregionbetweenBritishKenyaandItalianSomaliland,toItaly.Thisleft
openthepossibilityofnegotiatingthedivisionofEthiopiaintospheresof influence. 9
Post-WorldWarIFranceandItalywerecompetitors.TheItaliansdistrustedthe Frenchbecausetheyfailedtohonortreatycommitmentsmadeduringthewar regardingthecoloniesaswellasItalygainingterritoryontheDalmatiancoast.Italy wasalsoupsetattheFrenchnationalitypoliciesinTunisiawhichimpactedtheItaliancommunitythere.ThecomingtopowerofMussoliniandtheFascistsgave FranceanopeningtocultivateItalyasacounterweighttoBritainespeciallyregardingpolicytowardGermany.Mussoliniinturnreciprocatedthisthawinrelationsby supportingtheFrenchoccupationofthe Ruhrvalleyin1923overBritishobjections.ItwastheobjectiveofFrancetobuildaviableententewithItalyinthe AdriatictoconstrainGermany.TheFrench didnotprotestwhentheItaliansseized theislandofCorfufromGreece,thiswasafteradisputeovertheAlbanian-Greek frontierandthemurderofanItaliandelegationsenttodemarcatetheborder.The FrenchalsosupportedtheItaliansontheFiumequestionwhichwasresolvedwith theItalian–YugoslavconventionofJanuary1924inwhichFiumebecamepartof ItalywhileYugoslaviareceivedthehamletsbehindthecityandaccesstoitsport facilities.ThiswasasuccessforItaly,butalsoillustratedtheabilityofFranceto brokerthisagreement,illustratingits growingrelationswithYugoslavia.10
Tunisia AtthetimeoftheestablishmentoftheFrenchprotectorateoverTunisia,ItalianswerethemajorityoftheEuropeanpopulationinthecountryandItaly hadestablishedeconomicintereststhere.In1896anagreementwassignedin whichinreturnforItalianrecognitionoftheprotectoratetheItalianpopulationwasgiventherighttoestablishschools,hospitals,andmaintaintheirown nationalidentity.TheseaccordshelpedstabilizeFranco-Italianrelationsleading uptoWorldWarI.Italyhowevernevergaveuptryingtogainterritorial concessionsinTunisia.TheTreatyofLondonpostWorldWarIhoweveronly grantedItalyspecificallyterritoryattheexpenseofAustriainnorthernItaly.In 1918Francerenouncedthe1896accord.Theirgoalwastotryandgetthe ItalianpopulationtoacceptnaturalizationasFrenchcitizens.Thiscontributed toItaliandissatisfactionwiththepostwarsettlement.11
AtthebeginningofWorldWarIIGermanyandItalywerebothconsidered greatpowers.However,Italy’smilitaryposition,whileappearingformidable, wasnotverystrong.ThisonlybecameapparentduringthewaronceItaly engagedinhostilities.Theseincludedtheirill-fatedattemptatinvadingEgypt, aswellasitsill-conceivedcampaignagainstGreece,andItaly’spoorperformanceontheEasternFront.
FrenchandItaliandiplomacyintheMediterranean AmajorareaofItalianambitionwasAfrica.Italybegantoexpandonthe Africancontinentshortlyafteritsunificationin1861.Inthe1870and1880s
withtacitBritishsupporttheygainedcontrolofthesouthernedgeofthe westernshoreoftheRedSea,whatisnowknownasEritrea.ItalyhadalongstandinggoalofconqueringEthiopia.12 Whilethe firstattemptfailedinthe 1880s,thesecondattemptin1935ultimatelyledtotheconquestofthe country.ItalythoughtithadafreehandinEthiopiabecauseofitsrelationship withFrance.MussolinithoughthehadanunderstandingwithPierreLaval, foreignminister,andeventuallyprimeministerofFrance,thatItalycouldhave freedomofactioninNorthAfricaifRomesupportedFranceagainstGermany. ThisthreatenedBritishinterestinEgypt,especiallytheSuezCanal,thelifeline oftheBritishEmpire.Britain’spositionintheMediterraneanwassomewhat vulnerable.Thebaseshadnotbeenupgradedduringtheinterwarperiodand didnothaveanyanti-aircraftdefenses.13
TheItaliansalsosoughttomakegainsinNorthAfrica.TheycovetedTunisia butthiswasoccupiedbytheFrenchin1881whoestablishedaprotectorate.In 1911–1912ItalyengagedtheOttomanEmpireinawarandgainedcontrolof Libya.Thiswouldlaterbecomeknownas “theFourthShore” inItalian nationalistcircles,andmanyItalianssettledthere.TheItalianswantedtouse theirpresenceinLibyatogaininfluenceinNorthAfrica.TheItaliansfoughta brutalcampaigntopacifyLibyautilizingtanks,airplanes,aswellasconcentrationcamps.OnceLibyawassecured,theywouldcontinuetopressforterritory inNorthAfrica.14
FrancehadinterestsintheMediterraneanastheywantedtomaintainlinks andcontrolwithSyriaandNorthAfrica.Inaddition,itservedasaconduitto maintainingcommunicationlinksandaccesswithitsalliesinEasternEurope, theLittleEntente.FrancewasdisturbedbytheBritish-Germannavaltreaty whichendedthenavalrestrictionsonGermanyimposedbytheTreatyof Versailles.Francewantedtodevelopa fleetthatwastheequalofGermanyand Italycombined.InJune1935.JustbeforeItaly’sinvasionofEthiopia,Parisand RomecametogetherandformedadefactoallianceagainstGermany.Both countrieswithdrewtroopsfromtheirrespectivebordersinEuropeandtheir colonialboundaries.AtthispointMussoliniwasstillsuspiciousofHitler.He hadcooperatedwithBritainandFranceinpreventingHitlerfromformulating acoupinAustriabymobilizinghisforcesontheBrennerPass.Mussolini thoughtthatanalliancewithFrancewouldbetterenablehimtoprotectAustria andpreventitsunificationwithGermany.Thiscouldhaveledtoanenlarged GermanyborderingItalyandpossiblymakingterritorialclaimsonpartsof northernItalywhichhadaGermanspeakingpopulation.Hewasalsoworking ontheassumptionthatthisdefactoalliancewithFrancetranslatedintosupport forItaly’sinvasionofEthiopia.TheLaval–Mussoliniagreementprovidedfor someterritorialadjustmentandjointdiscussionsbetweenthemilitaryservices ofthecountries.ForFrance,analliancewithItalywouldstrengthenitsability tocoordinatewiththeLittleEntente:Poland,Czechoslovakia,Romania,and Yugoslavia.15
InJuly1934,anagreementwasconcludedbetweenBritain,Italy,andEgypt whichdefinedtheLibyan–Sudaneseborderandsettledterritorialdisputesto
Italy’sadvantage.TheFrenchinaseparateagreementgrantedItalyterritorial concessionsontheSouthernLibyaandEritrean–Somalianborders.Thishas beenlabeledan “artichokepolicy” inwhichItalianinfluenceexpandedlittleby little,likepeelingtheleavesofanartichoke.16 FranceandItalyhadstrained relationsafterItaly’sattackonEthiopia.In1938Italywasdemandingthe FrenchcedeNice,Savoy,Corsica,andTunisia.PrimeMinisterDaladier declaredthat “FrancewillnotcedeanacreofherterritoriestoItaly,evenif maintainingsuchapolicyresultsinarmedconflict.” Hethenscheduledvisitsto severaloftheseterritoriestodemonstratehisresolve.17
PrimeMinisterDaladierdidnotwanttomakeanyconcessionstoItaly.The FrenchbelievedthatMussoliniwoulduseanyhintofconcessionstoaskfor more.TheFrenchconcludedthatItalywouldalignwithGermanyanywayand anyconcessionswouldbefutile.18 AstheGermansweredefeatingFrance PrimeMinisterDaladierwastryingtoassureItalianneutrality.Hepresenteda proposaltothecabinetregardingItaly:
CessionoftheFrenchSomalicoasttoItalyandallowingtheuseofthe Jibuti-AddisAbabarailwaytolinkEthiopiatotheRedSea.(Italyhad previouslywantedsharesoftherailwaytogaincontrol.)
AdjustmentoftheLibyanfrontiertoItaly’sadvantage. LargeterritorialcessionsfromtheLibyanfrontiertotheCongolesecoast. HealsowouldconsiderchangingthestatusofTunisiatoallowItalysome controlovertheFrenchprotectorate.19
ItalywantedspecialrightsforItaliansresidinginTunisia.20 Daldierwascriticizedforagreeingtoconcessionswhenitwastoolate,ratherthanearlierwhen Francewasdealingfromapositionofstrength.
AtthebeginningofthewarChurchillviewedItalyasthesoftspotofthe Axis,andtheMediterraneanSeawouldbeBritain’ s firstbattlefield.TheFrench viewedItalyasessentialto fightingthewarwithGermany.Anon-belligerent ItalywouldallowFrancetotransfertroopsfromtheAlpstoreinforcethefront againstGermanyandtofacilitatethetransferoftroopsfromNorthAfricato France.TheGreatDepressionseverelyweakenedFrance’sEasternEuropean alliesfrompotentiallybeingasuccessfulcounterweightagainstGermany. FrenchleaderswerehopingtheycouldsendsuppliesthroughItalytotheir easternEuropeanalliestoestablishasecondfront.Italyalsoprovideddecisive supportinpreventingGermanyfromannexingAustriain1934.Opinionin FrancewasdividedastotheutilityofanalliancewithItaly.TheFrenchnavy hadbeendevelopinginthe1930stocounteractthegrowthoftheGerman navy.FrancewentalongwithsanctionsagainstItalyoverEthiopia.Inresponse ItalybegantomoveclosertoGermany.MussolinifeltthattheBritishand FrenchcouldnotorwouldnotstanduptoGermanyafteritoccupiedthe RhinelandandonlyimposedtepidsanctionsonItalyforinvadingEthiopia. GermanyappreciatedItaly’ssupportduringtheRhinelandCrisisof1935and begantoincreasenavalcooperationintheMediterraneanandplanningfor
whatwouldbecometheRome-Berlinalliance.TheFrenchnavyviewedItaly asathreatandcontinuedtoadvocatefortoughersanctionsagainstItaly.The navyactivelyquestionedParis’splanofcheapappeasementregardingItaly.21
Italian–Germanrelations ItalywasveryambitiousregardingAfrica.InhismeetingattheBrennerPasson theGerman–Italianborder(AustriahadbeenannexedbyGermany)inOctober 1940theItalianspresentedalistofterritorialdemandstotheGermans.MussoliniwantedtheoutrightannexationofNice,Corsica,andMalta,aswellas Tunisia,withanItalianbufferzoneinAlgeria.Healsowantedprotectorates overSyria,Lebanon,Palestine,andTransjordan.Whilethesestateswouldhave nominalindependenceItalywouldcontroltheoilindustryintheregionand havemilitarybasesintheseterritories.MussolinialsowantedItalianoccupation ofAden,Perim,andSokotraaswellasEgyptandSudan.ThiswouldgiveItaly controlovertheSuezCanal.CypruswastobegiventoGreeceandin exchangetheItalianswouldgetCorfuandCiamuria.Italywouldalsoacquire BritishSomaliland,Djibuti,andFrenchEquatorialAfricauptoChad.Hitler wasverycooltothesedemands.MostoftheterritoriestheItaliansdemanded wouldbeattheexpenseofFrance.HadHitlerexpressedevenmildsupportto awardItalysomeoftheterritoriesonthelistthiswouldhavemadenegotiationswithMarshallPetainverydifficult.22
MussoliniwastryingtocarveoutanempireinAfrica.BetweenAugust1939 andJuly1940MussolinireinforcedtheItalianarmyinLibya.Hisdesirewasto conquerEgypt.AfterFrance’sdefeatMussolinirefusedHitler’ sofferofarmored divisionsinNorthAfricaashewantedtolimitGermaninfluenceinhisAfrican empire.HehopedthatonceGermanyinvadedBritain,hewouldhaveafree handtoinvadeEgypt.Hesent200airplanestoassistintheBattleofBritain,as wellas30submarinestooperatewithHitler’sU-boatsintheAtlantic.With thefailureoftheGermanAirForcetowintheBattleofBritainandachieveair supremacy,OperationSeaLion,theproposedGermaninvasionofBritain,was postponedindefinitely.MussoliniorderedhisarmytoattackEgyptanywayand theyadvancedsixtymilesintoEgyptwheretheyhadtostopanddigindueto logisticsdifficulties.TheBritisheventuallycounterattackedinDecemberand drovetheItaliansbackthroughLibya.TheyoccupiedallofCyrenaica,eastern Libya,capturing130,000prisoners.InearlyFebruaryRommelandtheAfrica KorpsweresenttoNorthAfricatobailoutMussolini.Hitlerwasalsoforcedto assistMussoliniafterhisill-fatedattemptatinvadingGreece.Inaddition,the BritishinvadedItalianEastAfricainJanuary1941andbyNovemberhad defeatedallItalianresistance.Thesedisastrousmilitarycampaignsandtheneed forGermanmilitaryassistancemadeItalyaGermansatellite.23
HadGermanysucceededinNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastItalywould havebeenonthewinningside,butMussoliniwouldhavelosthisdreamsof empireinAfrica.TheItalianlosesandtheinabilitytocontributesubstantially tothewareffortalsohadtheimplicationofFrancobecomingmorehesitant
aboutcommittingforcestothewareffort.Spanishdemandsforeconomicand militaryaidescalatedwhichdraggedoutnegotiations.Germanyhadmilitary commitmentsintheBalkansandtherewastheplannedinvasionofRussiawhich hadalreadybeenputoff.Asaresult,HitlerwasnotabletotakeGibraltarandthe BritishstrategicpositionintheMediterraneanwassaved.24 Maltacontinuedto playastrategicroleintheMediterraneanservingasanimportantAlliedbaseand wassignificantininterdictingAxisconvoystoNorthAfrica.
ItalyandtheBalkans:Italianmilitaryreversesopenthewayfor thegrowthofGermaninfluence
MussoliniviewedtheBalkansasanimportantareatospreadItalianinfluence.He desiredtomaketheAdriaticanItalianlake.ItalyannexedAlbaniain1939withno bloodshed.MussoliniusedAlbaniaasaspringboardtoexpandintoGreeceand Yugoslavia.Hitlerwantedtokeepthisareastableasitdidnotwanttojeopardize hisplannedinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Inaddition,Germanydidnotwantto haveitsaccesstotheRomanianoilfieldsdisrupted.TokeepMussolinifrom expandingintotheBalkanstheGermanssoughttobringGreece,Yugoslavia,and BulgariaintotheAxisalliance.TheGermansweresuccessfulwithBulgariaasit joinedtheAxis,allowingGermantroopstotransitthecountry.AlthoughBulgaria didnotactivelyengageinhostilities.BerlinwasabletogetBelgradetotemporarily acquiescetotheAxis.GreecedidnotagreetothrowinitslotwiththeAxis.25
Albania ItalyhadlongbeeninterestedinAlbania.ControloftheportofVloraandthe islandofSazanwouldgiveItalycontroloftheAdriatic.Albaniawouldalso serveastheroadtotheBalkans.ItalytookadvantageofWorldWarIto occupySazanandVlorainOctober1914.InthesecretTreatyofLondon duringthewarItalywaspromisedextensiveterritoryinAlbania.However, ItalianterritorialgainsinAlbaniawerenotrealizedbecauseofavarietyoffactors.TheseincludedoppositionbytheUnitedStates,armedinsurrectioninthe country,Italiandomesticpolitics,andtheoppositionofotherstates.26
Mussolini’scomingtopowersawrenewedItalianinterestinAlbania.Italy soughttocapitalizeonthepoorAlbanianeconomyandtheinabilityofKing ZogtosecurecapitalfromothersourcestoprovideItalianloanstodevelopthe economy.KingZogattemptedtodevelopthecountry’seconomyandresourcesbutalsoattempttokeepItalianinfluenceincheck.Italiancontrolover AlbaniawasentrustedtoItalianForeignMinisterCountCiano.Heencouraged Mussolini’sdesiretocontrolAlbania.KingZogwasunpopularduetocorruption,poverty,andnepotism.HepointedouttoMussolinithatifItalydidnot actAlbaniacouldbecomeasatelliteofGermany.Cianoadvocatedforan annexationofthecountryasthequickestwaytopromotingItalianinterests.In preparationforthisCountCianoattemptedtoincreaseItalianinfluenceinthe countrybysendinginmoremilitaryadvisorsinparttocultivatesupportwithin
thearmy.OnthediplomaticfrontCianowasalsonegotiatingwithYugoslavia togettheirsupportforthetakeoverofAlbania.ThisledtoanItalianultimatumtotakeoverAlbaniaunderthefollowingconditions:controlofallports, communications,roads,andairfields;anItalianrepresentativeinallAlbanian governmentministries;ItaliansinAlbaniawouldhaveequalcivilandpolitical rights;thelegationsofbothcountrieswouldbecomefullembassies.27
KingZogopposedtheseconddemandwhichwouldhavegivenItalian’ s controloverhisgovernment.HeagreedtoconveycivilrightstotheItalian population,buttheycouldnotownlandorbeelectedtoParliament.Zog soughttodelayinthehopesofgettingforeignsupport.Healsoencourageda nationalistdemonstrationinTiranatodiscourageanyItalianmilitarymoves. However,KingZog’sregimedidnothavepopularsupport.Thepeoplewere overtaxed,thegovernmentwascrippledbynepotism,andthearmywassmall andforthemostpartdominatedbyitsItalianadvisors.Theinvasionoccurred onApril7,1939.TheItalianinvasionforceconsistedof22,000soldierssupportedbyseveralhundredaircraftandtanks.TheItaliannavyattackedDurres, Vlora,Shengjin,andSaranda.TheAlbanianarmybyandlargedidnotresist. Therewassome fightingatDurresastownspeople,andthegendarmerie, whichweretrainedandledbyBritishadvisors,putupsomeresistance.The captureofthecapitalTiranawasdelayedbysixhourslargelybecauseofpoor logisticsonthepartoftheItalianinvasionforce.Hadthegovernmentbeen morepopularandofferedanykindoforganizedresistancethiscouldhavebeen amilitarydisasterforItaly.MostoftheItaliantroopswerepoorlytrained.Italiancommunicationsweredifficult,andtheyhadalmostnointelligenceprior totheinvasion.KingZogconsideredretreatingtothemountainstomakea defense.Theunpopularityofhisregimeandthefactthathehaddisarmed manyofthenortherntribesmeantresistancewouldbeverydifficult.Italian diplomacyhadbeensuccessfulingettingYugoslavsupport.BelgradethreatenedtosealtheborderwhichwouldhavetrappedKingZog,andwhatever supportershecouldhavemustered.TheParliamentvotedthatheshouldleave thecountryandfacedwithnoreasonablealternativeshecomplied.FascistItaly baskedinitstriumphandratherthanheedthelessonsofitslackofmilitary preparationtheysetaboutintegratingAlbanianintotheItalianempire.They setupapuppetgovernmentledinitiallybyShefqetVerlaciwhoamajor landownerandlongtimeopponentofKingZog.Theyalsocreatedafascist youthleagueandgottheAlbanianparliamenttoofferthecrownofAlbaniato KingVictorEmmanuelIII.Italywasabletogetthesupportofsomeofthe Albanianelitebybuyingthemoff withpositionsandtitlesinthenewadministrationandemphasizingtheirunitywithItaly.28
TheItalianinvasionofGreece TheItalianconquestofAlbaniaopenedthedoorforfurtherterritorialexpansionattheexpenseofGreeceandYugoslavia.TheconquestofAlbaniaopened thedoortoItalyclaimedpartsofGreeceandYugoslaviathathadanAlbanian
population,EpirusinGreece,andKosovoinYugoslavia.Partofthiswasfor theItalianstogaintheloyaltyofpartsoftheAlbanianpopulation.29
MussoliniwassurprisedbytheGermanpartitionofPolandwiththeSoviet Union,andconflictwithBritainandFranceultimatelyledtotherapidconquestofWesternEurope.MussoliniunderstoodthatItalycouldnothopeto effectivelyparticipateinhostilitiesuntil1942attheearliest.AlthoughItalydid declarewarinJune1940ItalianandGermanwaraimsclashed.Italytookevery opportunitytotryandlaunchanattackintheBalkans.Germanyhowever wantedastablesoutheasternEuropeandwantedallItalianmilitaryefforts directedagainstdislodgingtheBritishpositioninNorthAfrica.30 Therewas disagreementinthehighestItalianfascistcircles.CountCianowasintenton expansionintheBalkans.Mussoliniwouldalternatesometimesencouraging thisandatothersagreeingwiththeGermanposition.
ToputpressureonGreeceitwasnecessarytohaveBulgariansupportas SofiaalsohadterritorialclaimsagainstGreece.Thiswouldalsotiedownalarge partoftheGreekarmydefendingagainstapotentialBulgarianassault.Foreign MinisterCianodidnotseriouslyconsiderthis,andMussoliniagreedwithhim. MussolinidecidedtoattackGreeceonOctober15thwithminimalconsultationwithhisseniormilitaryadvisors.MostoftheItalianmilitaryleaderswere opposedtothisinvasion.HischiefsoftheAirForceandNavywerenotpresentatthismeeting.MussoliniinformedHitlerofthisbyletteronOctober19. TheItalianpressureonGreecepushedAthenstowardacloserrelationshipwith GreatBritain.MuchliketheinvasionofAlbaniatheinvasionofGreecealso hadlogisticalproblems.TheItalianarmywaspoorlyequippedforamilitary campaign.Therewasacriticalshortageoflighttanks.Onethousandseven hundredhadbeenallocatedtothecampaignbutonly107reachedthefront lines.TheItalianunitswerestrungoutalongamountainouslineandhas unabletosupporteachother.Therewerealsocommunicationsproblems,and alackof fieldhospitals.TheItalianshadnowayofmovingsuppliesthrough themountainsduetotransportationbottlenecks.Theirsupplymuleswere stuckinItalianports.RatherthanaquickconquestofGreece,theGreekswent ontheoffensiveandinvadedItalianoccupiedAlbania.Inaddition,Athens grewcloserpoliticallyandmilitarilytoGreatBritain.BritishAirForceunits weredeployedtosouthernGreeceandtheRoyalNavyoccupiedtheharborsofCrete.InNovember1940GermanyinitiatedOperationMarita, whichconcentratedtendivisionsinRomania,andwiththesupportofKing BorisofBulgarialaunchedanattackagainstGreecealongthenortheastern border.Greekresistancequicklycollapsed.InitiallytheGreeksonlysurrenderedtotheGermans,butaspecialceremonywasstagedtoincludethe Italians.ItalyandGermanybecameembitteredovertheGreekcampaign. GermanywouldgaingreatercontrolinsoutheasternEuropeattheexpense ofItaly.AfterthecampaignItalyoccupiedAlbaniaandaportionofGreece. ManyoftheseoccupationtroopswouldbeabandonedaftertheItalian armisticewiththeAlliesinSept.1943andsu fferedatthehandsoftheir formerGermanallies.
TheItalianswantedGermansupportformilitaryactionsagainstGreeceand Yugoslavia.TheGermansbothofficiallyandunofficiallyattemptedtogetthe ItalianstonotstarthostilitiesintheBalkans.BothGermanyandItalywerenot informingeachotherregardingtheirrespectivestrategicplans.Thiswastobea problemthroughoutthewarbetweentheAxiscountries.Germanydidnottell ItalythattheywerepostponingOperationSeaLion,theinvasionofGreat Britain.ItalyforitspartdidnottellHitlerthatitwasmakingmilitarypreparationsagainstGreeceandYugoslavia.InSeptember1940MussoliniadmittedtoForeignMinisterRibbentropthatItalyhadamassed200,000soldierson theGreekborderand500,000soldiersontheYugoslavborderbutdidnotplan anyimmediatehostilities.31 TheGermanshoweverunderstoodtheItalians wereplanningmilitarymovesintotheBalkans.MussoliniwaiteduntilHitler wasaway(meetingwithMarshalPetainofVichyFranceandGeneralFrancoof Spain)beforeheinformedhiminaletterthathewasattackingGreece:32
Hitleralwaysfacesmewithafaitaccompli.ThistimeIamgoingtopay himbackinhisowncoin.Hewill findoutfromthepapersthatIhave occupiedGreece.Inthiswayequilibriumwillbere-established.Benito MussoliniOctober12,1940.33
OnOctober28,1940,at5:30a.m.,sixdivisions(atotalof140,000soldiers) attackedGreece.Theyweretaskedwithoccupyingthewholecountry.These forceswereinadequatetocarryouttheirmission.TheyalsohadtocrossdifficultterrainandexperiencedunexpectedstoutresistancefromtheGreekarmy. TheItaliansquicklymetwithreverses.TheGreeksquicklylaunchedacounterattackwhichpushedtheItalianforcesbacktoAlbania.PrivatelyHitlerwas furiouswithMussoliniforinitiatingthisattackandpotentiallydrawingBritish forcesintotheregion.MussoliniwasforcedtoaskGermanyformilitaryassistance.TheGermansinitiallywerequietonthesubjectbutbegantodevelopa processforsendingassistance.HitlerpromisedMussolinithathewouldinvade Greece.PriortothisHitlerhadtoensurethatBulgariawas firmlyontheside oftheAxisbyjoiningtheTripartitePact.KingBorisagreedtosupportGermanyinDecemberof1940.TheGermanswantedbridgesconstructed betweenRomaniaandBulgariathatwouldfacilitateGermantroopspassing throughthecountryontheirwaytoGreece.InreturnBulgariawouldreceive someGreekterritory.34
PriortotheinvasionofGreece,theYugoslavcrisisintervened.Inadditionto GreeceMussolinialsohadintentionstoattackYugoslavia.Hedevotedagreat dealofefforttopreparinganattackonBelgrade.TheGermanswouldhave preferredhedevotedattentiontoNorthAfricaorperhapsCreteandCyprus. HitlerwaspreparedeventuallytoallowItalytooccupyYugoslavia,buthe wantedtoputthisoff ashefearedifItalymovedagainstYugoslavia,Hungary mightattackRomania,andtheSovietsmightmoveagainstTurkey.35
HitlerwasabletogainthesupportofYugoslaviainitially.InMarch1941the YugoslavianCrownCouncil,ledbytheRegentPrincePaul,agreedtosignthe
TripartitePact.YugoslaviawasattemptingtotryandgetGermanguaranteesto ensurethecountry’sterritorialintegrity.However,thesigningoftheTripartite Pactprovedextremelyunpopular.Twenty-fourhoursafteragreeingtoitthe Yugoslavgovernmentwasoverthrowninamilitarycoup.PrincePaulwent intoexile.YoungKingPeterIItookthethrone,andanewgovernmentwas establishedledbyGeneralSimovic,theformercommanderoftheairforce. Thenewgovernmentrenouncedthetreaty.36
TheGermansquicklyplannedhostilitiesagainstYugoslavia.Theylinedup Hungarian,Bulgarian,andItaliansupport.German,Hungarian,andItalian forcesmovedintoYugoslavia.TheItaliansoccupiedtheDalmatiancoastwith littleresistance.GermanylauncheditsattackonGreeceandwasabletooccupy thecountry.ThisdrovetheBritishoutofthecountryandsafeguardedGerman accesstotheRomanianoilfields.TheItalianshadtriedtolaunchanoffensive againstGreecebeforetheGermanscouldintervene,butitfailed.TheAxis positionintheBalkanswassolidifiedwiththeGermansnowincontrol.This wasastrategicdefeatfortheItalians.Itcamealsoatatimewhentheyhad alsosu ff ereddefeatinNorthAfricaandwe rebecomingincreasinglydependentontheGermans.TheGermanspressuredthemtomountoffensive operationsagainsttheBritishnavyo ff theGreekcoast.Thistoowasafailure astheBritish,duetoULTRAintercepts,knewtheItalianplananddefeated theItaliannavywhichsawthesinkingofthreeheavycruisers,andtwo destroyers,Italy’sonlyoperationalmodernbattleshipwasalsoheavily damaged.Inaddition,theItalianpositioninEastAfricawasalsoprecarious. TheItalianarmywascuto ff andattackedbytheBritish.ByearlyMay AsmaraandAddisAbabaweretaken,withtheresultof80,000Italianprisonerstaken.TheremnantsoftheItalia narmyinEastAfricafoughtonuntil Novemberbutweree ff ectivelycuto ff 37
InconclusiontheBalkancampaignhadsevererepercussionsfortheAxis. WhiletheGermansgainedagreatdealofterritoryandsecurityontheir southern flankwithcomparativelyfewcasualtiesexceptfortheCretecampaign,therewerelogisticalproblems.Mussolinigainedavictorybutatatremendouscost.WhileItalysolidifieditspositionintheBalkanstoincludenot onlyAlbaniabutmostofYugoslaviaandGreece,atitsheightItalianoccupationforcesreached500,000soldiers.Theseweretroopswhichprovedtobe badlyneededelsewhere.AsItalycollapsedmilitarilytheGermanswouldbe forcedtoexertmoreandmoretroopstokeepcontroloftheBalkans.This wouldtiedownGermanresourcesthatwouldbebadlyneededontheEastern Front.ThesupplyingofItalianforcesintheBalkansalsofurtheroverstretched theItaliannavywhichwasalreadystretchedsupplyingAxisforcesinNorth Africa.38 ThemostimportantrepercussionoftheinvasionofYugoslaviaand GreecewasthatitforcedthepostponementofOperationBarbarossa(the invasionoftheSovietUnion).InsteadofopeningtheEasternFrontinMayit delayedtheattackuntiltheendofJune.Asaresult,theGermanslostabouta monthofgoodweatherwhichprovedfatalastheiroffensivestalledbefore Moscowpartlybecauseofseverewinterweather.
TheItaliansontheEasternFront
TheattackontheSovietUnionbeganintheearlymorninghoursofJune22. AfterhearingthenewsMussoliniimmediatelyissuedadeclarationofwar againsttheSovietUnionandpledgedtosendtroops.Hitlerinitiallyattempted todissuadeMussolini.HewantedMussolinitofocushisattentionagainstthe BritishinNorthAfrica.TheItalianshadjustsufferedadefeatinwhichtheylost 130,000soldiers.MussoliniwascountingontheGermanarmywinningaswift victoryandhewantedItalyinonthespoilsofwar.Hewassaidtohavetold theItalianChiefofStaff PietroBadoglio,whowouldeventuallyleadthe governmentthatsucceededMussoliniin1943,that “Ineedseveralthousand deadtobeabletotakemyplaceatthepeacetable.”39
OnpaperthetroopsMussolinisenttotheEasternFrontwereformidable. Theforcewascomprisedofthreedivisionsconsistingof60,000troops.Mostof themhadsomecombatexperiencehavingparticipatedintheinvasionof Yugoslaviaearlierintheyear.However,theywerewoefullylackinginartillery,andtheyhadfewanti-tankguns.Theonestheyhadweretoolightto destroySoviettanks.ThedivisionswerealsounderstrengthrelativetoGerman divisionsandhadinferiortransportation.40 Thelackofanti-tankgunswasto plaguealltheAxissatellitearmies.41
TheItalians,liketheHungariansandRomanians,suffereddisasterduringthe Stalingradcampaignof1942–1943.ThiswasHitler’sattempttoconquersouthern RussiaandtheoilwealthoftheSovietUnion.Hitlerdividedhisarmies;GroupA wasattheendofalongsupplylineintheCaucasus.GroupBwasboggeddown attemptingtotakeStalingradandsevertheVolgaRiver.ThisarmywassurroundedinNovember1942andafterseveralmonthsofbitter fightingcapitulated inearlyFebruary1943.The flanksoftheGermansouthernarmywereonthe DonRiverandwerebeingheldbyGermany’sAxisalliesHungary,Romania,and Italy.TheSovietoffensivestartedonNovember19andquicklyoverwhelmedthe Romanians.TheItaliansweresituatednexttotheRomaniansandtheyinturn wereattacked.InwhattheSovietsreferredtoasOperationLittleSaturntheItaliansalongtheDonsufferedappallingloses,21,000killedand64,000takenprisoners.ByChristmas1942theItalianarmyintheSovietUnionceasedtoexistasa fightingforce.42 TheItalianEightArmywasbrokenupanddisbanded.Itssurvivingunitsweretransferredtootherdivisions.
Conclusion HitlersoughttocreateacontinentalcoalitionagainstBritain.Thiswould includeItaly,Spain,andVichyFrance.AtthistimeVichystillheldtheallegianceofthecolonialauthoritiesinFrenchNorthAfrica.TheFrenchalsowere incensedattheBritishattackonthe fleetatMers-El-KébirandDakar.Itwould beimpossibletoreconciletheexpansionistambitionsofItaly,andSpain,with themaintenanceofFrenchcolonialinterestsinAfrica.Hitlerattemptedto mollifyPetain,Mussolini,andFrancothroughaseriesofconferences.43
