John Christian Laursen, Univers ity of California, River side, CA, USA
Editorial Board Members
Michael J. B Allen, University of Californi a Los Angeles, Los Angeles , USA
Jean -Robe r t Armogathe, Eco le Pratique des Hautes Et udes, Paris, France
Stephen Clucas, Birkbeck, Univers ity of London, London, UK
Javier Fernandez Sebastian , Univers idad del Pais Vasco, Bilbao, Spain
Peter Harrison, The University of Queensland , Brisbane, Au stralia
John Henry, Science Studie s Unit , Univers ity of Edinburgh, Edinburgh , UK
Jose R. Maia Neto, University of Belo Horizonte, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Martin Mulsow, Universitat Erfurt, Gotha, Germany
Gianni Paganini, University of Eastern Piedmont , Vercelli, Italy
Jeremy Popkin, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA
John Robertson, Clare College , Cambridge , UK
G A. J. Rogers, Keele Univers ity, Keele, UK
Ann Thomson , European University Ins titute (EUI) , Flore nce , Italy
Theo Verbeek, Univers iteit Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Koen Vermeir, Paris Diderot University, Paris, France
International Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives intemationalt:1> <l'histoire des idees is a series which publishes scholarly works on the history of ideas in the widest sense of the word. It covers history of philosophy, science, political and religiou s thought and other areas in the domain of intellectual history. The chronological scope of the series extends from the Renaissance to the PostEnlightenment. Founded in 1963 by R.H Popkin and Paul Dibon , the International Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives internationales d ' histoire des idees publishes, edits and translates sources that have been either unknown hitherto, or unavailable, and publishes new research in intellectual history, and new approaches within the field. The range of recent volumes in the series includes studies on skepticism, astrobiology in the early modem period, as well as translations and editions of original texts, such as the Treatise of the Hypochondria ck and Hysterick Diseases ( 1730) by Bernard Mandeville.
All books to be published in this Series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance.
More information about this series at https://link .springer.comlbookseries/5640
John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration
Flavio Fontenelle Loque
Flavio Fontenelle Loque G
Federal
University of Lavras Minas Gerais, Brazil
ISSN 0066-6610 ISSN 2215-0307 (e lectronic)
International Archives of the History ofldeas Archives intemationales d' histoire des idees
ISBN 978-3-030-90362-6 ISBN 978-3-030-90363-3 (eBook) http s://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90363-3
This work is subject to co pyright. All rights are so lely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher , whether the whole or part of the material i s concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illu stra tion s, recitation , broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or informatio n storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by s imilar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general desc riptive names , registered names, trademarks, ser vice marks, etc. in thi s publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11 , 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For my parents
L'instant ou nous croyons avoir «tout » compris nous prete l'apparence d'un assassin
E. Cioran
Acknowledgements
This book was originally written between 2016 and 2018, for my PhD dissertation, which I defended in February 2019 before the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The research on Locke was quite a challenge for me, because in the previous decade my work had basically focused on the history of early modem scepticism. I must say, though, that this challenge was rewarding. I learnt a lot; Locke broadened my intellectual horizons and introduced me to new people and places. After defending my dissertation, I turned to the more detailed study of other authors, such as Pierre J urieu, and to some related issues, such as the concept of lai"cite. Meanwhile, I have attempted to incorporate the works on Locke and toleration, published in 2019 and 2020, into the present book.
Several people supported me in different ways on the long path that led to the publication of this book. I am happy to take this opportunity to publicly acknowledge them for their assistance and friendship.
First of all, I am grateful to Professor Jose Raimundo Maia Neto, my supervisor since my time as an undergraduate. My PhD dissertation owes a lot to his knowledge and erudition. I could always count on him, even in the years between my Master's and my PhD, when we had no formal or institutional bonds. I deeply admire not only his ability to focus on the main philosophical issues but also his generosity and politeness. Rarely have I seen so remarkable an example of excellence and simplicity.
I am also profoundly grateful to Professor Ian Harris, who advised me as a PhD candidate when I was an exchange student at the University of Leicester in 2018. We had several meetings to discuss Locke's philosophy. I owe a debt of gratitude to him, not only for all that he taught me, through his incisive comments and his wit, but also for his assistance in grappling with the practicalities of settling in a foreign country. While in England , I had the honour of discussing my research with Professor John Dunn, at his office in King's College, Cambridge, and with Professor John Coffey at the University of Leicester. I thank Professor Timothy Stanton for placing his trust in me, in sending me an advanced version of his transcription of Locke'sA Defence of Nonconformity. I also mention Professor G. A. J. Rogers, who was extremely kind to me , and I regret the fact that we were not able to meet. I thank ix
Acknowledgements
The Warburg Institute for giving me opportunity to conducl research lhere , which made a significant difference for my work.
The suggestions I received from the committee that evaluated my di ssertation led me to see some points that I was unable to perceive before I am grateful to Professors Eunice O s tren s ky, Antonio Carlos dos Santos , Telma Birchal , Helton Adverse , and Newton Bignotto for their attenti ve reading.
Throughout my research, especially in the initi a l years, I relied on several friends in Germany, France , England, and Canada to send me articles and books lhat I was unable to access in Braz il. I can hardly express how indebted I feel to them. I owe my sincere gratitude to Daniel Arelli, Roberta Miquelanti , Pedro Vianna Faria, Luiz Philipe de Caux, Julio Cesar Terra, Celso Neto, Sacha Kontic, and Joao Cortese In regard to access to bibliographical material, I also record my gratitude to Professors Jose Raimundo Maia Neto and Ian Harris, who ordered book s related to my research for i nclusion in the library archives of the Federal University of Minas Gerais and the University of Leicester.
I am grateful to Fabio Fortes and Wellington Ferreira Lima for agreeing to translate the Epistola de Tolerantia for the commented edition that I organised , and that was published by Autentica Editora in November 2019 The technical re vision I did of the Latin translation was es sential for my understanding of Locke.
I thank the two reviewers who approved the manuscript of this book . Both were very generou s. I am also grateful to a group of people that, at various times and in different ways, helped me to improve my English . Writing in a foreign language i s always a challenge, and Isabela Caixeta, Bennett Bullock, Fiona Stephens on, and Hu s ain Bhana saved me from countless pitfalls.
To my family and close friends, I am grateful for all their support for this work , but in their case , this is to say too little. My whole life has been shaped and moulded by them.
References.
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia 15 2.1 The Evangelical Argument.
2 2 The Argument from Commi ss ion
2 .3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force
2.4 The Argument of Redu ctio ad Abs urdum. 4 7
2.5 Argumentative Synthesis
52 References.
The Locke and Proast Controversy
3.1 The Argument of 'Th e Le tte r Con ce rning Toleration' Briefly Consider'd andAnswer 'd................
Flavio Fontenelle Loque is associate professor at the Federal University of Lavras, Brazil. His primary research interests are toleration and the his tory of scepticism. He has published a work on fideism, Ceticismo e religiao no in{cio da modernidade (L oyola, 2012), Scetticismo e religione all'inizio dell'e ta moderna (Morcelliana, 2018), and a bilingual and co mmen ted edition o f John Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia (Autentica, 2019) in partnership with Fabio Fortes and Wellington Ferreira Lima . His researc h interests include the no ti o n of laicite and the translation of mode rn authors, suc h as John Locke, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre B ayle.
Abbreviations
Proast, The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly consider'd and answer'd, ed. 1690
Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. P. Schuurman
Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. de Beer
Locke, A Discourse of Miracles, John Locke: writings on religion, ed. V. Nuovo
Locke, A Defence of Nonconformity, ed. Stanton (the quotations give the page of the manuscript)
Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch
Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia, A Letter on Toleration, ed. Klibansky and Gough
Locke, An Essay concerning Toleration, ed. Milton and Milton
Locke, Fourth Letter for Toleration, Posthumous Works, ed. 1706
Augustine, Letters, ed. 1870-1873
Locke, Political Essays, ed. Goldie
Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, ed. Montuori
Locke, The Rea sonableness of Christianity, ed. Higgins-Biddle
The Reception of Locke's Politics, ed. Goldie, vol. 5: Long, The Letter for Toleration deciper'd ; Proast, The Argument , A Third Letter. , A Second Letter. ..
Locke, A Second Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1690
Proast, A Second Letter to the author of the Three Letters for Toleration , ed. 1704
Locke, A Third Letter for Toleration, ed. 1692
Proast, A Third Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1691
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett
Locke, The Works of John Locke, ed. 1823
1 No changes have been made in order to modernise either the spelling or the punctuation of the early modem English works, or of their critical editions.
Chapter 1 Introduction
Abstract This chapter presents a brief overview on toleration in early modern Europe. It then presents the purpose of this book, which consists of an effort to understand, in detail, how Locke justified religious toleration in the Epistola de Tolerantia, in the letters written as part of the controversy with Proast and in An Essay concerning Human Understanding. The definition of toleration and the central conceptual distinction between vertical and horizontal toleration are explained, along with the two main questions that this book claims are at the core of Locke's reasoning: why should the ends of State not be extended to include the care of souls? and why should private persons tolerate each other?. The chapter ends with a brief methodological remark and a summary of the structure of the book.
Religious intolerance is a common phenomenon, but it emerge s with greater force at certain times and places. Once such example occurred in early modern Europe, when the Reformation divided Christianity, causing the coexistence of Christians to become such a serious problem that it resulted in a series of wars. Due to these conflicts, the beginning of the modern age was also a period when the forms of coexistence with the otherness were widely di sc ussed. In general terms, we can say that the initial attitude towards religious diversity among Christians was the quest for concord. Especially in the sixteenth century, the ideal of reconciliation between Catholics and Prote stants was very much alive, and encompassed a political dimension (restoring peace) as well as a theological and ecclesiastical dimen sio n (agreement about the fundamental articles of faith and the communion of all men in the same church). The unity that had been lost with the Reformation needed to be recovered, and this was meant to happen with the reestablishment of uniformity through consensus rather than through force. The hope was to achieve an agreement as to the fundamentals of the faith - smoothing out all the most crucial differences - so that only the so-called indifferent things would be left to the individual believer's discretion. Therefore, the main ambition of those who yearned for concord was not really the coexistence of different Christian denominations, but th e ir reunification . Accordingly, concord s hould not be confused with toleration, even though both
F. F. Loq ue , John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration , International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idees 237, https://doi.org/10 1007/978 -3-030-90363-3_1
conl:t:pls reject the use of force in religious matters , for toleration presupposes that diversity is insurmountable. 1
The contrast between these two concepts is illuminating, as it reveals that toleration holds as permanent the coexistence with the otherness or, strictly speaking , with a relevant otherness (i) of which we make a pejorative judgment and (ii) to which we have power to make opposition. By definition , the adjective 'tolerant ' refers to an institution or a person that does not make opposition to what is taken as bad or false, 2 although he has the power to do so. Without these two features, we should not speak of toleration, but of indifference (when there is no pejorative judgment) or acquiescence (when there is no superiority of power). 3 Consequently, in its more immediate sense, toleration consists in a coexistence with an otherness that we do not have a good opinion of, but that we choose not to combat. This is the reason why toleration is commonly conceived as concession.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the notion of toleration as concession was prevalent and it had a characteristic that needs to be emphasised : it was always a concession of the State towards religious dissenters. The emphasis on this characteristic is important because it helps us to delineate a polysemy that is intrinsic to the notion: toleration can describe either the vertical relationship between the State and its citizens, or the horizontal relationship between private persons or groups. 4 Historically speaking, the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the Declarations oflndulgence of Charles 11 (1672) and James II (1687) instance the vertical relationship, whereas the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555) instances the horizontal one. As we can see, toleration as concession springs from a power asymmetry, and is properly exemplified by the institutional acts of France and England, countries already very centralised in early modem Europe. In the absence of such an asymmetry, toleration can no longer be conceived as concession, for it refers to a horizontal relation between similar forces, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, where political dispersion and independence led to an accord among reasonably equal parts that allowed different regions to have different religions, as the maxim cuius regio, eius religio shows.
1 0n the notions of concord and toleration , see Turchetti (199la, b), Bejan (2017 , 20-49) and Guggi sberg ( 1983 , 37-39). As Laursen (1999, 4) points out, " the bas ic idea of concordance was the proto-Haberrnasian idea that we can all agree in the long run ; the bas ic idea of tolerance is that we will c o ntinue to di sagree and dislike one another". For a broad view of re search on toleration in early modem Europe and it s main interpretati ve lines sin c e the end of the nineteenth century, see Wal sham (2006, 6-13 ).
2 Thi s pejorative valence o f the c oncept is found in the Latin ori g in of the word, but it is also found in the Greek word s to which it goes back. A s tntoµovf] and µaKpo0oµia, tolerantia describe s the capacity to s uffer an evil ( both Greek term s occur in the New Testament and were translated a s patientia and longanimitas , cf. Harris 201 3 , 82-83) . In some verna cular languages , the negative valence is conveyed in the synonymous of the verb to tolerate : souffrir and Leiden. On the negative tone o f toleration and its medieval heritage, see Bejczy ( 1997) .
3 For a good view of the concept of toleration in it s more abs tract and broader aspects, see Forst ( 2003) , Horton ( 1996, 2 011 ) and Galeotti (2015 ) .
4 On the difference between the vertical and horizontal dim e ns ion s of toleration , see Williams and Waldron (2008 , 5 )
With regard to toleration in early modem Europe , we must also take into account the fact that political stability was traditionally as sociated with religious uniformity, i.e . dissidence was seen as politically di sruptive . The threat to social order rai s ed by sedition was a justification for intolerance -a jus tification of a political nature to which others were added , notably those of a theological nature, as we shall see. In this respect, it is interesting to remember the case of France, whose history illustrates thi s line of thought very well. In that country, where the adage une Joi, une Loi, un roi clearly depicts the association between religious uniformity and political stability, the disturbances cau sed by the civil wars were so damaging that they led the State to concede toleration to dissenters at the end of the sixteenth century (those who defended toleration in these pragmatic terms became known as politiques ) Nevertheless, almost a century later, France turned to its old conception of itself as an exclusively Catholic country, and the religious persecutions reached new heights with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. 5
In fact, and not only in France, the pragmatic defence of toleration rests on a con stellation of political forces. As it is a concession , there is nothing to prevent it being revoked in the future. If its value is merely instrumental, as a means of ensuring peace, it is clear that a social or institutional rearrangement might lead to the s ubsequent conclusion that toleration can be discarded. All that would be required, for instance, would be for the State to gain enough power to suppress dissidence. If one does not bring into question the association between religious uniformity and political stability, it is impossible to assign to toleration a value in and of itself. However, aside from this politically based justification for intolerance, there are also those of a theological nature, whose central aspect rests on the need to correct the people that are in error and guide them to truth and salvation . Throughout the modem age, opposition to these two types of justification for intolerance represented the main philosophical advancement with regard to toleration. Therefore, in order to decisively establish the concept of toleration in principle (and not merely in pragmatic terms), it was necessary to show that religious diversity does not impinge on the social order, and that each person must be free to search for salvation in whatever way he deems most suitable.
There are several concepts and arguments that can be deployed in the philosophical drive to underpin toleration , 6 but it is not the intention of this book to discuss all of them . The aim here is to analys e the reflection of one of the most important and influential thinkers on this theme, John Locke ( 1632-1704) , in order to understand, in more detail, how he justified religious toleration. More precisely, this book aims to elaborate an interpretation of his mature works, reconstructing his arguments and highlighting some of their political, ethical, theological, and epistemological aspects While it is well known that to achieve religious toleration the ends of the State must be circumscribed to the pres ervation and advancement of civil goods and
5 0n the history of toleration in France, beside s Lecler (1994, 400-554), see Garrisson ( 1985 ), Labro usse ( 1990), Armogathe (1985 ) and Negroni ( 2014).
6 For a broad view of different approache s to tol e rati o n, see Nederrnan and Laurs en ( 1996) and Lau rs en and Ne derrnan (1998 ).
must never extend lU the salvation uf souls, we cannot say that the reasons for religious toleration, and the correlation of these reasons, are well-established. Moreover, the distinction between the secular ends of the State and the saving ends of the Church cover just one of the dimensions of Locke's treatment of toleration: the vertical one. But a thorough interpretation of his thought must also encompass the reasons why private persons should not impose their opinions on others in the horizontal relationship, i.e. between themselves Indeed, as we shall see, Locke's treatment of toleration is primarily concerned with the question why should the ends of State not be extended to include the care of souls? But he is also interested in answering another question: why should private persons tolerate each other? With regard to his main writings, the first question is the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia whereas the second is touched upon in a crucial section of An Essay concerning Human Understanding. In An Essay concerning Human Understanding, though, Locke deals still with a third question: Why does a person become impositional?
Throughout the present book, issues related to epistemology will receive particular attention because we believe it is necessary to disentangle three arguments that are often confused, especially in the readings of the Epistola. As we shall see below, all of these arguments deal with the problem of truth, but they are based on different concepts - fallibility, reciprocity and distinction between belief and knowledge - to explain why the care of souls should not belong to the State, or the magistrate, as Locke prefers to call it. Without clarifying these arguments, it is impossible to perceive clearly the moral implications of the duty to examine, which, according to Locke , is incumbent upon human beings as rational creatures, i .e. it is impossible to ascertain the horizontal dimension of toleration in contrast to the vertical one. By way of introduction, we submit that the interpretation proposed here is that in the Epistola, the arguments of fallibility and reciprocity are politically framed because they are related to the institution of the ends of the State (the vertical dimension of toleration) whereas, in An Essay concerning Human Understanding , these two arguments are formulated and deployed with a moral purpose: to demonstrate that private persons should not impose their opinions on others (the horizontal dimension of toleration). Meanwhile, the argument of the distinction between belief and knowledge , whose locus classicus is An Essay concerning Human Understanding, is explicitly adduced in Locke's treatment of toleration only in A Third Letter, as a rejoinder to an important objection to the argument of reciprocity, as we shall explain.
It must be noted , however, that the distinction between secular and sacred ends related to State and Church never implied that ethics and politics could be conceived without taking into account God's existence and de s igns. From Locke's perspective, human life (individually and socially) is inconceivable without God's designs. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to affirm that Locke's philosophy is immersed in a religious worldview. 7 Inevitably, his arguments in favour of toleration also assume
7 As Harri s (2002, 181) points out, "in agreement with most of hi s contemporaries, Locke acknowledged that God wanted there to be a civil government and thought that God was the moral lawmaker". On this topic , see Dunn (1969, 1989, 1990), Waldron (2002) and Nuovo (201 1). On
the standpoint, although his writings on this theme more presuppose than exhibit it. Accordingly, since it is impossible to disentangle theology from politics, ethics and even epistemology, the present book points out their relations, but it nonetheless emphasises the problem of truth, as we just said.8 It is important to remember, though, that Locke himself was never a sceptic, but that he neatly saw the limits of human understanding as well as the frequent misuse of truth as a justification (indeed, as a pretext) for persecution . 9
With regard to toleration , the period in which Locke lived was a troubled one. Born in 1632 and dying in 1704, 10 he lived through some very important events, such as the end of the Thirty Years War with the Peace of Westphalia ( 1648) and the above-mentioned revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in October 1685. With respect to the history of England, Locke saw the civil wars of the 1640s, the regicide of Charles I (1649), Cromwell's Protectorate (1653-1659), the Restoration of Monarchy (1660) and the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689), to quote just the great historical landmarks. A lthough it is very difficu lt to establish precisely how these events may have influenced Locke's treatment of toleration, it is reasonable to say that at one stage the entanglement of politics and re ligion was seen by Locke as a target of attack through the distinction between the ends of State and Church and the criticism of private persons who impose their beliefs on others, or who make their own beliefs a pretext to violate civil laws.
In early modem Europe, the mos t evident entanglement of politics and religion consisted in the statement that the State should promote salvation , and, ergo, that the use of force by the State to convert souls was legitimate. Thus, not only a civil function , the conservation of political stability, but also pastoral and ecclesiastical ones were assigned to the magistrate , since force was supposed to help guide erroneous persons to communion into the only true church. As we shall see below, this view was shared and underpinned by Locke's most important critic, Jonas Proast (c. 1642-1710), but its origins goes back to Augustine (354-430), in particular to his
Locke's religious worldview and the interpretations of his philosophy, see Ashcraft (1996) and Sigmund (2005).
8 The pre sent work occupies a sort of intennediary position between two groups of interpretations: on the one hand , the group devoted to the religious worldview that underlies Locke's treatment of to leration , s uc h as Stanton (2006) and Harris (20 13); on the other, the group that focuses on particular explicit topics on the texts, especial ly th e discussion of u seful ness of force , such a s Waldron ( 1988).
9 Although Locke was not a sceptic and n ever defended tolerat ion based on scepticism, it is convenient to remark that there i s a common v iew according to which there is a necessary conjunction between sce pticism and toleration. This common view, however, is far from true From a philosoph ical perspective, toleration would be a straightforward issue if it could be treated in such lin ear tenns. In this respect, see Popkin (1998), who discusses two branches in the modem defence of toleration, the one sceptical, the other dogmatic; and Tuck (1988), who s hows how scepticism can entail intolerance. For a synthesis of thi s issue, see Coffey (2006).
1°For Locke's life, see Cranston ( 1985) and Woolhouse (2007), along with Le Clerc ( 1732), Coste ( 1735), King (1830) and Fox Bourne ( 1876). There are also excellent biographical syntheses written by Goldie (2010) and Milton (2011).
writings concerning the Donatists , 11 where several biblical passages are seen as authorising the use of force to correct heretics and schismatics. Compelle intrare, an imperative found in Luke's version of the parable of the great banquet (14:23), is the emblematic expression of this tradition to which Locke opposed himself, and against which an open attack was launched by Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) in his Philosophical Commentary on these words of the Gospel, 'Compel them to come in, that my house may be full ' (1686-1688)_12 In Locke's case, the opposition to Augustine consists not of an express rebuttal of the injunction compel them to come in , but essentially of a discussion of the notions of charity in the Epistola and obstinacy in An Essay concerning Human Understanding.
After the Restoration of Monarchy, especially when the reestablishment of the Anglican Church was at issue, this view was the main justification for the adoption of persecuting laws for dissenters and Catholics. 13 In spite of the discussions about comprehension and indulgence, 14 what really took place in the aftennath of Charles II's enthronement was the institution of laws 15 aimed at preserving the structure of the Anglican Church and restricting the religious exercise of dissenters and Catholics. Later, after the Glorious Revolution , the same view concerning the functions of the State still prevailed, but even so, small advances were made towards
11 Of Augustine 's writings on the Donatists, the most important are Letters 93 (to Vicentius, dated 408) and 185 (to Boniface, dated 417). For a list of all Augustine 's writings in the Donatist controversy ( letters , sermo ns and treatises). see Monceaux (1923, 275-292) There is a good syn the sis of Augustine's pos ition in Lecler (1994, 83-88) and Zagorin (2003, 24-33) On the Donatist controversy and the development of Augustine 's thought on coercion , see Evers Brown (1964) and Gaddis (2005, 131 - 150) For a detailed analysis of the revival of Augustine during the Restoration , see Goldie (199 1). On intolerance at the end of the seventeenth century in several countries of Europe, see Marshall (2006).
12 0n the third volume of A Philosophical Commentary , published in 1687, Bayle openly discusses Augustine's letters: the two most important ones, letters 93 and 185 , but also , on the final chapters, other letters against the Donatists. For a list of these other letters, see Bayle (2002, 21-22, n. 1). For a comparison of Locke and Bayle , see, for example, Dunn ( 1996), Jenkin so n ( 1996), Almeida (2010) and Savonius-Wroth (20 12).
13 In general , the word 'dissen ter' describes those who do not follow the established re ligion of their country. In France, the term refers to Protestants as a whole. In England, however, it refer s o nly to the non-Anglican Protestants (also called non-conformists). For this reason , it is neces sary to point out the 'Catholics' in the universe of tho se who are not in the Anglican communion.
" In a letter to Philip van Limborch ( 1633-1712) of 12 March 1689 (cf. Corr, v III, 1120), when once again Parliament de bated comprehension and indulgence, Locke explains these notions as follows: " the que stion of toleration has now been taken up in parliament under a twofold title , name ly Comprehension and Indulgence The former signifies extension of the boundaries of the Church, with a view to including greater numbers by the removal of part of the ceremonies. The latter s ignifies toleration of those who are either unwilling or unable to unite themselves to the Church of England on the terms offered to them".
ll Tuese laws constitute the famous Clarendon Code, composed by the Corporation Act (1661 ), Act of Uniformity (1662), Five Miles Act (1665) and Conventicle Act (1670), which were followed by two versions of the Test Act (1673). All this legislation , as well as other relevant documents on tole ration from 1660 to 1714, is gathered in English Historical Documents, see Browing (1953, v. VIll).
toleration - after all, political decisions are not based on ideology alone , but also on circumstantial considerations. 16 Clearly a mere concession, the so-called Toleration Act ( 1689)17 suspended the penalties of part of the legislation against the Trinitarian dissenters and authorised them to worship in public. That is why it is often seen as an advancement, even if, on the one hand, nothing was conceded to Anti-Trinitarians and to Catholics and, on the other, the Test Act ( 1673) remained untouched.
In England, to sum up, the institutional debate about toleration was dualistic. The debate centred around what should be (r) the conduct of the State regarding those who do not profess the established religion (dissenters and Catholics) and (11) the degree of dogmatic, disciplinary and ceremonial rigidity of the Anglican Church. In the former case, the issue was civil toleration while , in the latter, it was ecclesiastica l toleration. These two branches must be demarcated because there is no necessary bond between them. It was perfectly possible, for instance, to claim ecclesiastical toleration (as did the latitudinarians) without claiming civil toleration. 18 With respect to Locke, the defence of the distinction between the ends of State and Church falls into the field of civil toleration, but he was also in favour of ecclesiastical toleration. 19
An uncertain issue with respect to Locke is the extent to which the distinction between State and Church should be pursued. It is not clear whether the distinction between the ends of these two societies required a real separation of them 20 It
16 ln England , the most important circumstantial e lement was anti-Catholicism, which influenced the Glorious Revolution and the so-called Toleration Act ( 1689) . For a broad view of Restoration, Glorious Revolution and the debate on comprehension and indulgence, see Beddard ( 1979) , Spurr ( 1989), Schochet (1996) and, in particular, Coffey (2000).
17 Although this act is known as Toleration Act, the word 'toleration' never appears in the text of the official document, not even in the resume of it s content: "an act for exempting their majesties' Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the penalties of certain laws" (cf. Browing 1953, v. VIII, 400). On the Toleration Act and its meaning, see Wykes (1990).
18 ln An Essay concerning Toleration, Locke define s latitudinarianism as the amplification of the term s of church communion: "few & large" articles in spec ulative opinions and " few & easy" ceremonies in worship (cf. ET, 302). However, a s we pointed out, latitudinariani sm is not necessarily linked with toleration; in this respect, see Ashcraft ( 1992). For the context of the concept, and a general overview of the similarities and differences between Locke and other authors on latitudinarianism , see Spurr (1988), Mars hall (1992) and Simonutti (2003).
19 According to Coffey (2000, 11-13, 2006, 630), besides the civil and ecclesiastical branches of toleration , there are two others: a social and a polemical one. The social branch of toleration refers to the actual coexistence of private persons , usually in villages and local communities, a coexistence that may be hostile or courteous regardless of the legal status of dissenters and Catholics. On this topic , see, for instance, Bossy (1991) and Walsham (2006, 269-280). The polemical branch of toleration , in its tum , describes the civi lity or incivility of the public debates and corresponds to a reflection on the persecution of the tongue. For a reading of Locke with an emphasis on this last branch, see Wilhelm ( 1999) and , in particular, Bejan (20 17)
20 According to Goldie in his introdu c tion to the ed ition of A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, "it is unclear if Locke was a categorical separationist. If we assume that Locke was a categorical separationist, then it is not to Britain that one would look for a modern Lockean state , but to the United States, where the argument of Locke's Letter found futfillment in Thoma s Jefferso n's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom ( 1779), or to France , with its secular republican
seems that the Stale could have an established religion as long as it did not discriminate among its citizens based on religious motives, i.e. as long as it assured equal civil rights for all. At any rate, this is not a question that the present book seeks to answer. Similarly, the aim here is not to reconstruct Locke's treatment of toleration from a chronological perspective in which, in broad terms, toleration was initially refused and later supported by him, as is commonly said when Locke's major writings on toleration are compared: on the one hand, his two speeches, one in English (1660), the other in Latin (c. 1662), known nowadays as Two Tracts on Government; and on the other, An Essay concerning Toleration ( 1667),A Defence ofNonconformity (1681-82) and the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689). 21 As we said above, the present book seeks to analyse Locke's mature reflection in order to understand, in as much detail as possible, how he sustains religious toleration and how he does so with regard not only to the vertical relationship between State and citizens, but also to the horizontal relationship between private persons. From a methodological standpoint, the interpretation proposed here is focused chiefly on the concepts and arguments adduced by Locke, i.e. on the objective of identifying, defining and assessing them by giving precedence to the texts themselves. Evidently, there are other possible approaches to Locke's writings (as well as to any other author's writings). There are methodological choices that emphasise the historical and political context or that seek to ascertain the sources of his tho ught but, although relevant and fruitful, these are research itineraries that will not be adopted in this book. 22
The interpretation that will be developed here encompasses three chapters, besides the introduction (Chap. 1) and the conclusion (Chap. 5). In the second chapter, we shall examine the Epistola de Tolerantia in order to establish its arguments
tradition of lai'cite" (Locke 2010, xiv). In this respect, see also McCabe (1997) and Pritchard (2014). According to Coffey (2000, 12), Locke was a radical tolerationist who defended "the natural right or entitlement of religious dissenters to worship freely and enjoy civil equality. The most radical tol erationists went a stage further and advocated what was later called 'disestablishment', or 'the separation of church and state', a development that we tend to associate with the American and French Revolutions, but one which has never taken place in England itself'. For a contemporary discussion of toleration and of the so-called separation of church and state, see Maclure and Taylor (2010), Baub6rot and Milot (2001), Laegaard (2011) and Taylor (2014).
21We indicate here the dates of composition, except in the case of the Epistola, written in the European winter of 1685-86 and published in 1689. OfLocke's main writings on toleration, apart from the publication of excerpts, A Defence of Nonconformity remains unpublished. There is, though, a transcription of the manuscript in Stanton (2003). An Essay concerni11g Toleration was published for the first time in 1876 in the Life of Joh11 Locke by Fox Bourne; the Two Tracts 011 Government were originally published in 1961 by Viano (both of Locke's works received a critical edition in 2006 and 1967, respectively). Of the uncountable articles and books that reconstruct and analyse Locke's treatment of toleration, see Gough (1973), Cranston (1987), Cay6n (1996), Sommerville (2004), Tate (2016) and, above all, Stanton (2013), besides the more comprehensive research of Harris ( 1998), Marshall (1994) and Collins (2020).
22 For examples of other methodological approaches, see Ashcraft ( 1986), whose research focuses on the historical and political context of Locke's political philosophy, and Loconte (2014), who seeks to ascertain the sources of Locke's conception of toleration. For a discussion of methodology and of the interpretations of Locke's philosophy, with an emphasis on the liberal and Marxist readings as well as on the reading of the so-called Cambridge school , see Santos (2017).
and their correlation. In this analysis we shall reson to some of Locke's already published manuscripts, to Two Treatises of Government and to The Reasonableness of Christianity. In the third chapter, our task is to scrutinise the controversy between Locke and Proast, an adversary against whom Locke composed other three letters concerning toleration (the last of which remained unfinished). In the fourth chapter, based on An Essay concerning Human Understanding, and also on the writings Of the Conduct of the Understanding, A Discourse of Miracles and An Essay for the Understanding of St Paul's Epistles by consulting St Paul himself, we discuss how the due examination of truth is associated with toleration. We then analyse Locke 's broader reflection concerning the duty to examine that is incumbent upon the human being as a rational creature. From a conceptual perspective, Chaps. 2 and 3 discuss the grounds for tolera tion concerning the relationship between State and citizens, while Chap 4 develops the grounds for toleration with regard to the relationship between private persons.
At the end of this book, we hope to convey a coherent and comprehensive view of Locke's mature treatment of toleration, in which we see clearly the two dimensions of to leration and their grounding reasons. We also hope that this book will provide elements for reflecting on our contemporary world, in which religious fanaticism has prompted urgent discussion on the ends of State and Church, and reflection about the duties of private persons one to another.
References
Primary Sources
Augustine. 1870-1873. <Euvres Completes de Saint Augustin, traduites en frarn;:ais et annotees par MM. Peronne, Vincent, Ecalle et Barreau, vol. 4 (lettres I a CV), vol. 5 (lettres CVI a CLXXXIX), vol. 6 (lettres CXC aCCLV). Paris: Librairie de Louis Vives.
--. 2019. Retratar;oes Tr. A. Belmonte. Sao Paulo: Paulus. Bayle, Pierre. 2002. Supplement du Commentaire Philosophique, ed. M. Pecharman. In Les Fondements Philosophiques de la Tolerance, ed. Y.C. Zarka, F. Lessay and J. Rogers, vol. 3 Paris: PUF.
--. 2014. De la Tolerance - Commentaire Philosophique, ed. J.-M. Gros. Paris: Honore Champion.
Browing, Andrew. 1953. English Historical Documents 1660-1714, ed. A. Browing, vol. 8. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode
Coste, Pierre. 1735. Eloge de M. Locke. In Locke, John. Essai Philosophique concernant l'Entendement Humain, tr. P. Coste, trosieme edition revue, corrigee et augmentee de quelques additions importantes de !'auteur qui n'ont paru qu'apres sa mort & de quelques remarques du traducteur. Amsterdam: chez Pierre Mortier.
Le Clerc, Jean. 1732. Eloge Historique de feu Mr. Locke. In Locke, J. <Euvres Diversesde M. Locke , tr. J. Le Clerc et al., nouvelle edition considfrablement augmentee, vol. I. Amsterdam: chez Jean Frederic Bernard.
Locke, John. 1823. The Works of John Locke, 10 vol. London : Printed for Thomas Tegg et al.
--. 1961. John Locke - Scritti Editi e lnediti sulla Tolleranza, ed. C.A. Viano. Torino: Taylor.
--. 1967. Two Tracts on Government, ed P. Abrams Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---. 1968. Epistola de tolerantia, ed. R. Klibansky and J.W. Gough. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
---. 1976-1989. The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E.S. de Beer, 8 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
---. 1999. The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. J.C. Higgins-Biddle. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000. Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. P. Schuurman. PhD dissertation, University of Keele.
---. 2002. John Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 2003. A Denfence of Nonconformity, Transcription T. Stanton. In Stanton, Timothy. John Locke, Edward Stillingfieet and Toleration, PhD dissertation, Appendix, University of Leicester.
---. 2006. An Essay Concerning Toleration and Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667- 1683, ed. J.R. Milton and P. Milton. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
---. 2010. A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. M. Goldie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
---. 2011. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2015. Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, 26 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Proast, Jonas. 1999. The Argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration Briefly consider'd and answer'd; A Third Letter Concerning Toleration: In Defense of the Argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration Briefly consider'd and answer'd; A Second Letter to the Author of the Three Letters for Toleration In The Reception of Locke 's Politics, ed. M. Goldie, vol. 5, 23-128. London: Pickering & Chatto.
Secondary Sources
Almeida, Maria C.P. 2010. A toleriincia e sua medida em John Locke e Pierre Bayle. Princfpios 17: 31-52.
Arrnogathe, Jean -Robert. 1985. Croire en Liberti: L 'Eglise catholique et la revocation de l'Edit de Nantes. Paris: O.E.l.L.
Ashcraft, Richard. 1986. Re volutionary Politics and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government'. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- - - 1992 Latitudinarianism and Toleration: Historical Myth Versus Political History. In Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640-1700, ed. R. Kroll et al., 151-1 77 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---. 1996. Religion and Lockean Natural Rights. In R eligious Diversity and Human Rights, ed. I. Bloom, J.P. Martin, and W.L. Proudfoot, 195-21 2. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bauberot, Jean, and Micheline Milot. 2001. l..ai'citis sans Frontieres. Paris: Seuil.
Beddard, Robert A. 1979. The Restoration Church . In The Restored Monarchy 1660-1688, ed. J.R. Jones, 155-175. London: Macmillan.
Bejan, Teresa M 2017. Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Bejczy, Istvan. 1997. Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept. Journal ofthe History of Ideas 58: 365-384. Bossy, John. 1991. English Catholics After 1688. In From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England, ed. O.P. Grell, J.I. Israel, and N. Tyache, 369-387. Oxford: Clarendon University Press
Brown, Peter. 1964. St Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion. The Journal of Roman Studies 54: 107-116.
Cay6n, Jose. 1996. La teoria de la tolerancia en John Locke. Madrid: Editorial Dykinson.
Coffey, John. 2000. Persecution and 'JOLeration in Protestant t:ng land 1558-1 689. Edinburgh: Longman.
---. 2006. Scepticism, Dogmatism and Toleration in the Seventeenth-Cen tury England . In Persecution and Pluralism: Calvinists and Religious Minorities in Early Modern Europe 1550-1700, ed. R. Bonney and D.J.B. Trim , 149- 176. Bern: Peter Lang.
Collins, Jeffrey R. 2020. In the Shadow of Leviathan : John Locke and the Po li tics of Conscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cranston, Maurice. 1985. John Locke: A Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Pres s
---. 1987. John Locke and the Case fo r Toleration. In On Toleration, ed. S. Mendus and D. Edwards, 101-121. Oxford : Clarendon Press.
Dunn, John. 1969. The Political Thought of John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press .
---. 1989. 'Bright Enough for All Our Purposes': John Locke's Conception of a Civilized Socie ty. Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 43: 133-153.
---. 1990. What ls Living and What Is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke ? In In terpreting Political Responsibility: Essa ys 1981-1989, ed. J. Dunn, 9-25. Oxford : Polity Press.
---. 1996. The Claim of Freedom of Conscience: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Worship? In The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, ed J. Dunn, 100-120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Original: Dunn, John. 1991. In From Perse cut ion to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in Eng land, ed. O.P. Grell , J.I. Israel, and N. Tyache. Oxford: Clarendon University Press.].
Evers, Alexander. 2002. Augustine on Church (Agai nst the Donatists). In A C ompanion to Augustine, ed. M. Vessey, 375-385. Malden: Blackwell.
Forst, Rainer. 2003. Toleration, Justice, Reason. In The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance, ed. C. McKinnon and D. Castiglione, 7 1-85. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Fox Bourne, H.R. 1876. The Life of John Locke, 2 vols. London: Henry S King
Gaddis, Michael. 2005. There ls No Crime for Those Who Ha ve Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire. Berkeley: University of California Pres s.
Galeotti, Anna E. 2015. The Range of Toleration : From Toleration as Recognition B ack to Disrespectful Tolerance. Philosophy and Social Criticism 41: 93-110.
Garrisson, Janine. 1985. L'Edit de Nantes et sa revocation: Hi stoire d'une intolerance. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Goldie, Mark. 1991. The Theory of Re lig iou s Intoleran ce in Restora tion England. In From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in Eng land, ed. O.P. Grell, J.I. Israel, and N. Tyache, 331-368. Oxford: Clarendon University Pres s.
---. 2010. The Life of John Locke. In Th e Continuum Companion to Locke, ed S.-J SavoniousWroth, P. Schuurman, and J. Walms ley, 1-36. London: Continuum.
Gough, J.W. 1973. The Development of Locke's Belief in Toleration. In John Locke 's Political Philosophy, ed. J.W. Gough, 2nd ed., 193-220. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Guggisberg, Hans R. 1983. The Defence of Religious Toleration and Reli gious Liberty in Early Modem Europe: Arguments, Pressures, and Some Consequences. History of Eump ean Ideas 4: 35-50.
Harris, Ian. 1998. The Mind of John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Tolerance, Eglise et Etat chez Locke Tr. M.-A. Solasse. In Les fondements philosophiques de la tolerance, ed. Y.C. Zarka, F. Lessay, and J. Rogers, vol. 1, 175-218 . Paris: PUF.
---. 2013. John Locke and Natural Law: Free Worship and Toleration. In Natural Law and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment, ed. J. Parkin and T. Stanton, 59-105 Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Proceedings of the British Academy n. 186).
Horton, John. 1996. Toleration as a Virtue. In Toleration: An Elusiv e Virtue, ed. D. Heyd, 28-43. Princeton: Princeton Unive rs ity Press.
2011. Why the Traditional Conception of Toleration Still Matters. Critical Review of international Social and Political Philosophy 14: 289-305.
Jenkinson, Sally L. 1996. Two Concepts of Tolerance: Or why Bayle Is Not Locke. The Journal of Political Philosophy 4: 302-321.
King, Peter. 1830. The life of John Locke with Extracts from Hi s Correspondence, Joumals and Commonplace Books. New Edition with Considerable Additions in Two Volumes. London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley.
Labrousse, Elisabeth. I 990. la revocation de l' Edit de Nantes: uneJoi, une loi, un roi? Paris: Payot. Laegaard , Sune. 2011. Religious Neutrality, Toleration and Recognition in Moderate Secular States: The Case of Denmark. Les ateliers de l 'erhique, The Ethics Forum 6: 85-106. Laursen, John C. 1999. Orientation: Clarifying the Conceptual Issues. In Religious Toleration: "The Variety of Rites " from Cyrus to Defoe, ed. J.C. Laursen, 1-11. Scranton: Macmilliam. Laursen, John C., and Nedennan, Cary J. 1998. Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment, ed. J.C. Laursen and C.J. Nedennan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Lecler, Joseph. 1994. Histoire de la tolerance au siecle de la Reforme. Paris: Albin Michel.
Loconte, Joseph. 2014. God, Locke and Liberty: The Struggle for Religious Freedom in the West. New York: Lexington Books.
Maclure, Jocelyn, and Charles Taylor. 2010. lai'cite et liberte de conscience. Montreal: Boreal. Marshall, John. 1992. John Locke and Latitudinarianism . In Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640-1700, ed. Kroll et al., 253-282. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
---. 1994. John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
---. 2006. John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCabe, David. 1997. John Locke and the Argument Against Strict Separation. The Review of Politics 59: 233-258.
Milton, J.R. 201 1. A vida ea epoca de Locke In Locke, ed. V. Chappell and tr. G. Rodrigues Neto, 17-40. Campinas: ld eias & Letras. [Original: Milton, J.R. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. V. Chappell , 5-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
Monceaux, Paul. 1923. H istoire litteraire de l'Afrique Chretienne depuis les origines ajusqu'a /'invasion arabe. Vol. 7. Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux.
Nederman, Cary J., and Laursen, John C. 1996. Difference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in Medieval and Early Modem Europe, ed. C.J. Nederman and J.C. Laursen. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Negroni, Barbara de. 2014. Intolerances: catho/iques et protestants en France, 1560-1787. Paris: Artheme Fayard.
Nuovo, Victor. 201 1. Locke's Religious Thinking and His Politics. In Christianity, Antiquity and Enlightenment: Interpretations of Locke, 235-246. New York: Springer.
Popkin , Richard. 1998. Skepticism About Religion and Millenarian Dogmatism: Two Sources of Toleration in the Seventeenth Century. In Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment, ed. J.C Laursen and C.J. Nederman, 232-250. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pritchard, Elizabeth A. 2014. Religion in Public : Locke's Political Theology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Santos, Antonio C. 2017. John Locke ea diversidade de Sapere Aude 8: 469-491. Savonius-Wroth, S.J. 2012. 'Lovers of Truth' in Pierre Bayle 's and John Locke's Thought. In The Intellectual Consequences of R eligious Heterodoxy /600-I 750, ed. S. Mortime r and J. Robert son, 155-180. Leiden : Brill.
Schochet, Gordon J. 1996. The Act of Toleration and the Failure of Comprehension: Persecution, Nonconformity, and Religious Indifference. In The World of William and Mary: Anglo- Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of I688-89 , ed. D. Hoak and M. Feingold , 165-187. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Sigm un d, Paul E. 2005. Jeremy Waldron and the Religious Turn in Locke Scholarship. The Review of Politics 67: 407-418.
Simonutti, Luisa. 2003. Scepticism and the Theory of Toleration: Human Fallibiliry and adiaphora. In The Return of Skepticism from Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle, ed. G. Paganini, 283-302. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Sommerville, Johann. 2004. Conscience, Law, and Things Indiffe rent: Arguments on Toleration from the Vestiarian Controversy to Hobbes and Locke. In Contexts of Conscience in Early Modem Europe, 1500-1700, ed. H. Braun and E. Vallance, 166-1 79. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Spurr, John 1988. ' Latitudinariani sm' and the Re storati on Church. The Historical Journal 31: 6 1-82.
---. 1989. The Church of England, Comprehension, and the Toleration Act of 1689. The English Historical Review I 04: 927-946.
Stanton, Timothy. 2006. Locke and the Politics and Theology of Tolera tion. Political Studies 54: 84-102.
---. 2013. Natural Law, Nonconformity, and Toleration: Two Stages on Locke's Way. In Natural law and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment, ed. J. Parkin and T. Stanton, 35-57. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Proceedings of the British Academy n. 186).
Tate, John W. 2016. Liberty, Toleration and Equality: John Locke, Jonas Pro ast and the letters Concerning Toleration. New York: Routledge.
Taylor, Charles. 2014. How to Define Secularism. In Boundaries of Toleration, ed. A. Stepan and C. Taylor, 59-78. New York: Columbia University Press.
Tuck, Richard 1988. Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century. In Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. S. Mendus, 21-35. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Turchetti, Mario. 199la. Religious Concord and Po lit ical Tolerance in Sixteenth- and SeventeenthCentury France. The Sixteenth Century Journal 22: 15-25.
---. 1991b. Une question mal posee: Erasme et la tolerance. L'idee de sygkatabasis. Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance 53: 379-395.
Waldron , Jeremy. 1988. Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution . In Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. S. Mendus, 61-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---. 2002 God, Locke and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke's Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press.
Wals ham , A lexandra. 2006. Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500- 1700. Mancheste r: Manchester University Press.
Wilhelm, Anthony G. 1999. Good Fences and Good Neighbors: John Locke's Positive Doctri ne of Tol eration. Political Res earch Quarterly 52: 145- 166
Williams , Melissa S., and Jeremy Waldron. 2008. Introduction. In Toleration and Its Limits, ed. M.S. Williams and J. Waldron, 1-27. New York: New York Uni versity Press. (Nomos XLVIIO. Woolhouse, Roger 2007. Locke: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wykes, David L. 1990. The Tricentenary of the Toleration Act of 1689: A Cause for Celebration? In Truth and Tolerance, ed. E.J. Furcha, 60-82. Montreal: Faculty of Religious studies, McGill Un iversity.
Zagorin , Perez. 2003. H ow the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 2
The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
Abstract This chapter aims to identify and analyse the argumentative struct ure of the Epistola de Tolerantia. The interpretation developed here argues that there are two dimensions of toleration in Locke's reasoning-a vertical one ( State -to-citizens) and a horizontal one (citizen-to-citizen)- and that, when considering his arguments, both dimensions should be taken into account. Vertical toleration relates to the socalled three considerations and other important arguments. Deeply intertwined, they constitute the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia, whose central purpose is to demonstrate that the ends of the Commonwealth cannot be extended to the care of souls, i.e. that the magistrate has no commission to use force in religious matters. Horizontal toleration, meanwhile, is fonned by a single argument built on the notions of meekness and charity. Its aim is to show that no Christian shall compel hi s neighbour in religious matters, because force is incompatible with Christ's life and teachings.
Toleration is the abstention from force as a means to convert souls (cf. SL, 2, 6, Works, 62, 67). 1 Formulated in 1690, approximately one year after the publication of the Epistola de Tole rantia , Locke's definition presents, in a few words , a duty that private persons, churches, clergymen an d the magistrate should respect. The great challenge, though, is to substantiate this. Why s hould one not compel others to salvation when one has the power to do so and believes that he has the truth? Why
1 In his Second Letter, Locke addresses Proast as follows: "Force, you all ow, is improper to convert Men to any Religion To leration is but the removing that Force" (SL, p. 2 , Works, p. 62); "The purpose of the Letter is plainly to defend Toleration , exempt from al l Force; especiall y Ci vi l Force, or t he Force of the Magistrate " (SL, p. 6, Works , p. 66). ln A Defence of Noncofonnity, Locke defines to leration as follows: "tak ing off the power of the Magistrate from restraining any differe nc es amongst Christians" (DNC, 7), and, in the same vein, "takeing off the Magistrates hand from holding men close to uniformity" (DNC, 42). In a similar fas hi on, this straigh tforward definition is also adopted by Bayle. In a letter to David Constant de Rebecque (1638- 1733) from 16/26 July 1690, he says that tolera tion (in his own words , "poli tica l to leration") "is nothing but the exempt io n from the penal law s" (Bayle 1737, 645).
F. F. Loque, John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration, International Archives of the History ofideas Archives intemationales d'histoire des idees 237, https: //do i.org/l 0.1007/978 -3-030-90363-3_2
2
should one accept religious diversity? In the Epistola, the most famous arguments to support toleration can be easily found (cf. Epist., 66.19-70.17). They are what Popple's translation 2 designates three considerations, but besides not comprising all of Locke ' s arguments, neither their interpretation nor their value is consensual.
The first and foremost expression of this lack of consensus about Locke's arguments is Proast's The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly consider'd and answer'd, since he judged that there was just one argument in Locke's reasoning (cf. Arg., 3-4, RLP, 26-27). 3 Nonetheless, at the beginning of A Second Letter (cf. SL, 6, Works, 67), Locke presents a metaphor to contest this reading: from his perspective, the house he has built is supported by several beams , not just one. If one of them were removed, the others would hold it up. This analogy i s not enough to prove the insufficiency, maybe even the error, of Proast's reading (a metaphor is not an argument), but it is an excellent illustration of the way Lo cke himself conceived the Epistola, and a significant indication of the difficulty of interpreting it, especially if we take into account the historical recurrence of readings like that of Proast. 4 If Locke makes so blunt an opposition to his main critic 's reading, and it continues to be formulated centuries later, we shall conclude that his case for toleration is more intricate than he imagines.
As for the metaphor, it is important to emphasise two conclusions that may be drawn from it: firstly, there are different arguments to support toleration ; secondly, they are independent of each other, each capable of supporting the whole building by itself. Nevertheless, when Locke explains the metaphor and sets out the arguments that he describes as the beams of his case for toleration, they do not correspond exactly to the famous three considerations found in the Epistola. It is puzzling that Locke does not follow literally that exposition enumerated by the adverbs primo, secundo, tertio which seemed to contain the central points of his reasoning . Hence , we may ask (1) what, precisely, the arguments to support toleration are and (n) how they relate to each other. Without answering these questions, it is impossible to understand the controversy with Proast and assess the grounds for religious toleration proposed by Locke.
Nonetheless, before analysing Locke's arguments and the relationship between them, we must have a clear idea of what it means to support religious toleration in the seventeenth century. As the Epistola shows, the duty to tolerate relates to private persons, churches, clergymen and the magistrate (cf. Epist., 78.lss). None of them are permitted to use force in religious matters , but Locke s tresses the role of the magistrate, whose jurisdiction must be circumscribed to the preservation and
2 0n Popple 's life and thought, see Robbins (1967) and Simonutti (1998).
3 It is the argument of unfitness of force, as we shall see below. In The Argument edited by Vernon (Proast 2010, 55) , there is a mistake in the passage referred to here: one should read single argument and not.final argument.
4 Undoubted ly, Waldron (1988) is the greatest contemporary example of a reading of the Epistola focused on the argument of unfitness of force. Co ncerning this topic, see a lso Spitz (2002) and Bou-Habib (2003) For a criti cal assessment of this reading , see Schwartzman (2005) and C hen (2006), but in particular Stanton (2006) and Harris (2013).
2
advancement of civil goods (cf. Epist., 64.27-28).5 It is in this context - the effon to define the ends of the Commonwealth and hence its legitimate sphere of actionthat the three considerations are introduced. In political terms, the defence of toleration requires a distinction to be made between the ends of Church and State, so that the care for the salvation of souls should be left exclusively to private persons and the religious societies they enter into, each one of these societies searching to procure salvation through its own way. To put it crudely, the distinction between the ends of Church and State means that each person should be allowed to search for his own salvation in the church he deems most appropriate, i.e. that the magistrate should not legislate - in other words, prescribe penalties - concerning religion.
If a person is to be punished when he professes hi s religion, this must never be done for religious reasons, only for political ones, as the sole obligation of the civil power is to maintain public order. The magistrate must be guided by political reasons, as we see in Locke's exposition of intolerable practical beliefs ( cf. Epist., 130.12-134.21) and in hi s example of the prohibition of the slaughter of calves (cf. Epist., 108.23-110.26). In summary, it is incumbent upon the civil power to punish crimes, not heresies, schisms or sins. The distinction between the ends of Church and State sustained in the Epistola implies that the magistrate has no duty regarding beliefs and ways of worship as such, but solely regarding the consequences these may have to civil society. Only their political dimension mu st concern the magistrate, not their religious dimension.
In this sense, Locke's main arguments - i.e. the three considerations - are intended to support the thesis that the magistrate's jurisdiction must be concerned " only" (unice) with the civil goods, that the right and dominion of the civi l power must be circumscribed and limited "solely" (so/is) by the care and advancement of these goods, and that the magistrate's jurisdiction neither can nor ought "in any manner" (ullo modo) comprise the salvation of souls (cf. Epist., 66.14- 18) . 6 Locke's case for toleration, therefore, is essentially focused on the restriction of the ends of the State, i.e. on the vertical dimension of toleration . In A Second Letter, referring to the author of the Epistola as a third person, Locke sums up his purpose as follows: "all that he endeavours, i s to show the bounds of Civil Power; and that in punishing others for Religion, the Magistrate misapplies the Force he has in his hands , and so goes beyond Right, beyond the limits of his Power" (SL, 66, Works, 135).
5 Locke writes " ad bona civilia conservanda promoven daque", which Pop ple tra nslates as " for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests" (Popple, 15)
6 As Spitz (2002, 114) says, "Locke does not take the right to l iberty of conscience as a starting point in order to s how, then, t hat all legitimate government ought to respect thi s right and so abstain from all persecu tion. Rather, he meditates on the poss ible governme ntal functions in order to show that compelling consciences is no t one of them". Accordingly, it seems inadequate to divide Locke' s defence of toleration into two branches, civil and religious, as Silva (2013) does. Although the duty to tolerate regards c hurches and clergymen (bes id es private persons and the magistrate), this does not amount to two different types of to leration, a civil toleration based on the first consideration and a religious to leration based on the second consideration.
From Locke ' s perspective, although it is necessary to distinguish between the ends of Church and State, the magistrate is not supposed to abandon altogether the care of the salvation of souls. Indeed, he is required not to seek this goal by the use of force - that is, by the use of his power as magistrate to prescribe laws and thereby resort to coercion. 7 However, the magistrate is not forbidden to resort to discourses, as any private person, clergyman or church. He is not forbidden to teach, admonish , and persuade. There is a crucial distinction between two types of care: cura authoritativa, based on authority, and cura charitativa, based on charity (cf. Epist., 90.6-7): "in teaching, instructing, and correcting the erroneous by arguments, he certainly does what it becomes any good man to do; the magistrate is not obliged to put off either humanity or Christianity" (Epist., 68.12-15). Locke's purpose is to remove from the magistrate just one of the means by which the conversion of souls can supposedly be wrought. All the others - that amount to discourse but also to the example of a good life - are preserved.
There is no doubt that by establishing the distinction between magisterial and charitable care, Locke wishes to stress that the use of force cannot be conceived as a charitable act and, thereupon, that Christians must abstain from it as a means to save souls. If charitable admonitions and endeavours to refute errors "are indeed a Christian's greatest duties (maxima ... officia)" (Epist., 124.9-10), 8 thei r accomplishment must necessarily be exempt from force. "We pray every day for their Conversion , and I think it is our Duty so to do", Locke says in reference to Pagans, Muslims , and Jews when he replies Proast's critique concerning the extension of toleration proposed in the Epistola, "but it will, I fear, hardly be believed that we pray in earnest, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of Conversion, either by driving them from, or persecuting them when they are amongst us" (SL, 2, Works , 62).
According to Locke, there is a Christian duty to evangelise, 9 a duty that Proast also acknowledges (cf. TL-P, 2 , RLP, 42), but the use of force as a means to lead the erroneous to salvation is incompatible with Christianity: coercion affronts charity, the main Christian principle. This incompatibility between force and charity constitutes, then, an argument to support religious toleration, but it is distinct from the three considerations in two aspects, as we shall see below: firstly, given its theological and moral character, it corresponds to the hori z ontal toleration (whereas the three considerations have a political character and so correspond to the vertical toleration); secondly, since it is based on Scripture it has a confessional nature (while the three considerations tend to have no appeal to Scripture and so have a secular nature). The se differences are not a problem, however. It is no wonder that Locke sustains toleration in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Moreover, his use of
7 Evidently, it means here physical force or the threat to use it. However, in the Epistola there are metaphors relating the notion of force to persuasion, as Walker (1996) shows.
8 Trans lation slightl y altered.
9 For an interpretation of the modem debate on toleration and the duty to evangelise, see Goldie and Popkin (2006, 99-104). See also Goldie's introduc tion to hi s edition of A Letter (Locke, 2010, xi - xii ) and Marshall (1994, 179).
sc riptural and non- scri ptural arguments should cause no wonder either, given that toleration is "agreeable" (consona) to the Gospel and to reason (cf. Epist., 64.10-12). In either case, neverthe less , it is important to note the sense and the limits ofLocke's reasoning. Hence, considering Locke's reasoning as a whole, we may say that the Epistola displays four arguments: the t hree considerations and the argument concerning charity, with which we shall begin our analysis.
2.1 The Evangelical Argument
Of all the arguments displayed in the Epistola, the first is the one concerning charity. As we have seen, this argument is based on Scripture, particularly the New Testament, and for that reason it is described here as confessional. Thi s argume ntwhich we shall call the evangelical argument - is found especially in the prologue (cf. Epist. , 58.1-64.26). 10 It is grounded on a conception of Christianity as conforming to the example of Christ, the Prince of Peace, according to Locke (cf. Epist., 64. l; Isaiah 9:6). In his own words, "if the Gospel and the Apostles are to be believed, no man can be a Christian without charity (sine charitate), and without the faith which worketh, not by force, but by love" (Epist., 58.25-26; cf. Galatians 5:6).
In the opening pages of the Epistola , some passages of the New Testament are expressly mentioned: Luke 22, Romans 1, Galatians 5, and some others are allu ded to, such as Mathew 11, Luke l 4, 2 Corinthians 10. 11 Nevertheless, it is the reference to Galatians 5, in particular to Galatians 5:6, that is the most important point to highlight, because it is based on this passage that Locke not only sustains the bold opposition between love and force, but also emphasises action over belief. In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke quotes the same passage when he speaks of obedience to Christ's laws, and again he stresses the role of love and action. In The R easonableness of Christianity, Locke reiterates his interpretation, citing the second chapter of the Epistle of James , whose predominant theme is faith and works
10 The expression evangelical argument was inspired by Goldie and Popkin (2006, 102), who speak of an "evangelical case for toleration". However, the se nse we give to thi s expression is different from that of Goldie and Popkin. Here, evangelical argument is the name given to a specific argument co ncerning charity or love and Chri st 's example, which correspo nd s to just one conceptual strand explored in the evangelical case .
11 When Locke gives the references of hi s quotations in the prologue of th e Epistola, he mentions the chapters, but not the verses. The complete references are as follows: Luke 22:25-26, 22: 32, Romans I: 19, Galatians 5: 19-21 (th e first edition of Popple's translation inte rpolated a quotation from 2 Timothy 2: 19: "let every one that nameth the na me of Christ depart from iniquity"). As for the allusions, we fi nd Matthew 11 :29-30 , 26:52-53, Luke 14:26, 2 Corinthians 10:4, Ephesians 6:10-18, H ebrews 2:10, besides th e important allusion to Isaiah 9:6. In th e case of Galatians 5: 19-21 , L ocke does not mention "heresies" as one of t he "works of the flesh ", as Wolfson (2010, 85-91) points out.
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia (cf. RC, 118 , §§ 210-211; Epistle ofJame s 2:14-26). 12 ln a manuscrip t of uncertain date 13 entitled Tolerantia Pro, Locke lists a series of biblical passages in favour of toleration 14 and presents the same perspective: all the verses extracted from the New Testament are concerned with love and its practice, as well as the persecution of Christ's followers; the verses taken from the Old Testament explore the treatment given to foreigners. 15 For Locke, therefore, the core of Christianity is a faith that consists in love and charitable actions, a faith, then, that is incompatible with the use force, i.e. with intolerance.
According to Locke, toleration should be understood as a way to follow Christ's example. Persecution of supposed heretics or schismatics is contrary to the evangelical laws, to the precepts of charity (cf. Epist., 146.4-5). Hence, when Locke responds to the question about mutual toleration among Christians in the opening paragraph of the Epistola, he states that toleration is " the chief distinguishing mark (praecipuum criterium) of a true church" (Epist., 58.3). The explanation is simple: intolerance is contrary to Christ's example . Other criteria may be cited as distinguishing marks of a true church, for instance, the antiquity of places and names , the splendour of ritual, the reformation of teaching, or the orthodoxy of faith, but these can hardly be taken as "signs" (notae) of the church of Christ. Rather, they are probably signs of a desire for power and empire. Thus, nothing more clearly distinguishes a true church (and a true Christian) than toleration, which is tantamount to saying that no intolerant church (or person) can be considered Christian. 16 Nonetheless, the incompatibility between Christianity and intolerance has two features that need to be highlighted: the first, as we read in the prologue to the Epistola , concerns the relatio nship between Christians and Christian churches; the second, as Locke says in the conclusion of the Epistola (cf. Epist., 142.32-144.3) and in A Third Letter (cf. TL, 183, Works, 354), concerns the attitude of Christians and Christian churches towards other religions and their followers. In summary, Locke contends that the use of force in religious matters is incompatible with Christianity, and that nobody can be called a Christian if he does not show his charitable
12 The relevance of works - and not only of faith - is a point Locke also stresses in his Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul, as Russo (2019, 129) singles out: "the task Locke set for him self in his las t essay was precisely the attempt to " save works" on a Scriptural, Pauline basis, ground the need for doing good squarely in the Bible , and oppose those interpretations of Christian faith that would lead to an e thicall y anarchical world incomprehensible to reason".
13 Goldie (Locke 2010, xl) es timate s that the manuscript was written between 1676 and 1690 whilst Marshall (2006, 367) considers that it is from 1688 .
is In the Epistola, there is one reference to the New Testament concerning foreigners, 1 Corinthians 5: 12-13, which aims to demonstrate that the church does not desire their exclusion from the Commonwealth (cf. Epist., 144.4).
16 This reasoning supposes tha t Christianity is the true religio n In A Second Letter, this supposition is openly admitted (SL, 2, Works, 63).
2. 1 The Evangelical Argument 21
religiosity in practice, towards other Christians and towards the followers of other religions. 17
Ultimately, Locke gives prominence to the way people live, to the obedience to Christ's example, "the great pattern for our imitation" (Pol. Es., Pacific Christians, § 6, 305); metaphorically, what really matters is to "tread in his steps" (Epist., 64.1 ). This is why Locke in sists on the centrality either of meekness, c harity and benevolence, or of sanctity of life, chastity of c ustom and goodness. There cannot be a better way to follow Christ than to engage in the struggle against vices and the cultivation of virtues, particularly the greatest one of all: charity. Any conscientious conviction, "even though erroneous" (quam erronea), 18 or any abstention of outward worship, if accompanied by an innocent life, is not so contrary to God as a vicious life (cf. Epist., 60.15-17). What is the point of searching to rectify the dogmas of a so-called heterodox person, to correct his ceremonies, if the one who persec utes does not extirpate hi s own vices, if he is negligent with the moral errors of his own close friends and relatives? As we see in the post scriptum to the Epistola, Locke rejects the zeal devoted to subtle questions, to things that surpass the common human grasp. To him, there is no doubt that this "zeal" (zelus) serves as a pretext to cover non-religious interests, especially when the "fanatics" (zelotae) make use of force or violence against the su pposed heterodox believers. In the manuscript Toleration A (c. 1675 ), there is a severe criticism of clergymen who do not use "the meekness and tender methods of the Gospel" to attract more members to their congregations. 19 When force is used to increase the number of churc h members, we can suspect, as Locke says, "that 'tis not the feeding of the sheep, but the benefit of the fleece that makes these men endeavour by such methods to enlarge their fold" (Pol. Es., Toleration A, 231 ). In A Defence of Nonconformity, we find a similar remark when Locke points out that "it is no wonder they should contend for the largnesse of their flocks since they have the more to milk, & shear & have often the selling of them" (cf. DNC , 5", 15). Strictly speaking, Locke reveals an enormous lack of confidence in, sometimes even contempt towards clergymen,
"Marshall (1994, 367) affirms that in the Epistola there is "the unequivocal statement that it was a duty of Christianity to tolerate others" and, along the same lines, Marshall (1994, 104) sta tes that "persuasion ... had been Christ's method". According to Harris (2013, 84), "tolerantia is a product of lo ve". As Curley (2017) shows, it is radically different from Augustine's position. Marshall (1994, 119-121 , 367) points out that , in a draft o n Galatians 5 :6 among Locke's manu scripts, which he dates from January 1667 and thinks unlikely to be from Locke him self, one of its passages speaks of "evangelick charity" and states that it is "not confi ned to those of our opinion, or party, or brotherhood, but is extended far and w ide".
18 Translation slightly altered.
19 It would not be amiss to observe that, in the article 87 [97) of The Fundamental Constitutions of Caroline, w here there is an express mention of "diversity of opi ni ons", the co nversion of heathens, Jews and dissenters is supposed to be wroug ht "by good usage and persuasion, and all those convincing methods of gentleness and meekness suitable to the rules and design of the Gospel" (cf. Pol. Es., The Fundamental..., 178). Likewise, in A Defence of Nonconfonnity Locke states that the ways Christ authorises are "those wayes of meeknesse, & gent lenesse preaching of the gospell in simplicity, & exemplarinesse of life in conversation" (DNC, 110).
given the fact that the zeal for a church, " combined with love of dominion" (cum amore dominandi conjunctus),20 can "easily " (commode) degenerate into a pretext for rapine and ambition (cf. Epist. , 112.28-114.3). In the conclusion of the Epistola , Locke expresses his mistrust even more directly, when he states that the cause of religious disputes and wars does not lie in the "diversity of opinions" (opinionum diversitas) , but in the refusal of toleration, and when he accuses church leaders of inciting both the magistrate and the people against the supposed heterodoxies "due to their avarice and will for domini on" (avaritia et dominandi libidine) (cf. Epist., 144.24-146.7). 21
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke employs, for the first time in his writings, the word ' priestcraft' (RC, 162, § 286) to indicate the clergymen's inclinati on to dominion and the political and religious distortions that it implies. 22 However, thi s critique had been formulated by him many years earlier, at least since An Essay concerning Toleration, where he states that compulsion as a means to convert has nothing to do wi th the expansion of truth, but with interest and dominion (cf. ET, 296). In the manuscript Toleration A , written a lmost a decade after An Essay conce rning Toleration , the same critique appears, but with more detail, some of which is restated in the Epistola. In this text composed around 1675, Locke imagines that throughout hi s tory the magistrates of different Commonwea lth s abstained from meddling with indifferent things in religion because once these things enter a cult, they cease to be indifferent to this or that devotee , who considers that they are pleasing to God. However, there was a change when Christianity became the established religion. Since then, " affecting dominion" (Pol. Es , Toleration A, 233), clergymen started to vindicate an independent power from the civil government, so th at (a), when the magistrate was more powerful than they were, they pretended that their own power was only spiritual, but yet pressed him to persecute tho se they disliked, and when that happened, they made an apology of the divine right of monarchy, but (b) when the magistrate was not serviceable to them, they were the first to question his authority and to disturb the government; finally, (c) when they could not confront the prince, they were liberals. In this sense, Locke remarks in the Epistola that the great combatants for truth rarely manifest their zeal when the magistrate is not on their side. When the magistrate is not on their side, they encourage mutual tolera-
20 Translation slightly altered.
21Translation slightly altered According to Ashcraft (2009, 60), "Locke's position in the Letter concerning Toleration expresses a radical anticlericalism Whi le Locke's discussion in the Letter centres on the magi strat e's use of force - because he is the only authority that c an legitimately employ force for any purpose - Locke has no do ubt that the real force driving religious persecution is the clergy". When Locke unveils the clergy's inte re st, he presents what can be called, according to Tarcov ( 1999), the psyc hological foundations of intolerance. In the present book, we shall give a different meaning to what we shall call psychological justification for intolerance 22J n his introduction to A Lette r concerning Toleration and Other Writings, Goldie notes that the word priestcraft "became fashionable in the 1690s" and that " it denoted a general theory of the propensities of all priesthoods to pervert religion in pursuit of earthly domination" (Locke 2010, xxii). On priestcraft, see also Goldie (2018) and Lancaster (2018). For a broader treatment of the issue, see Lancaster and McKenzie-McHarg (2018).
tion, but, as soon as they become s uperior due to the magistrate's favour, they transgress peace and Christian charity. Is it not interesting that when they are inferior in power, they make no effort to refute the errors that are pleasing to the magistrate and to the court? (cf. Epist. , 82.25-84.11).
There are yet three other points in this hi storical reading of the ascension of Christianity in the manuscript Toleration A: (d) princes favoured those who promoted their authority, (e) the magistrate began to judge religious dissension dangerous and assumed the duty to punish those who, according to the clergy, were heretics , schismatics and fanatics, and (f) people fonned confederacies and combinations to protect themselves when they realized that they could be harmed for worshipping God in their own way, so that the clash between the oppressor and people's desire of religious freedom often resulted in persecution and war. These three points can be found in the Epistola in almost the same words . The third one is explored in a long section in which Locke discusses the popular view of assemblies as seditious and factional (cf. Epist., 134.22 -140.27). At any rate, what is essential here is to note that the conflation of Church and State stems from the clergymen's vicious conduct. Instead of seeki ng virtue and guiding themselves by charity, they resort to religion as a pretext to gain power In the name of faith, they try to achieve their desire for dominion by imposing beliefs and ways of worships , i.e. by persecuting dis senters.
As we can see, Locke's conception of Christianity has a moral nature. Locke stresses the importance of action and life compared to belief and worship So great is his emphasis on the moral nature of the Christian religion that in the manuscript Error (1698) he uses the expression "saving orthodoxy" as exempt from any reference to beliefs and ceremonies: "I lay it down as a principle of Christianity, that the right and only way to saving orthodoxy, is the sincere and steady purpose of a good life" (Pol. Es., Error, 347). In another manuscript from 1698, Sacerdos, in which Locke points out the reunion of religion and morality in Christ, branches that in Antiquity were split between priests and philosophers, he states that, "for the obtaining the favour and forgiveness of the deity, the chief part of what man could do consisted in a holy life, and little or nothing at all was left to outward ceremony" (Pol. Es., Sacerdos, 344-5). Around the same time, Locke wrote in one of his bible s: "the reforming our lives is the way to believe the Gospel". 23 In this sense, it is clear how much this conception of Christiani ty reduces the relevance of disputes concerning doctrines and rituals, and how it states the centrality of the imitation of Christ, who persecuted nobody and asked his disciples to convert souls through exemplary conduct and evangelical lesso n s - never through the use of force. As Locke notes, "the Gospel frequently declares that the true di sciples of Christ must expect and s uffer persecution; but that the true church of Christ should persecute or censure others, or compel them by force, by sword and fire, to embrace her faith and doctrines, I do not remember to have read anywhere in the New Testament" (Epist.,
23 This note is mentioned by MarshalJ (1994, 373) a nd Marshall (1990, 997-998), who explains that it summarises Locke and Benjamin Whichcote's (1609-1683) views of faith and represents "the later soteriology of Locke himselr'.
76.4-9). In the manuscript Pacific Christians (1688), a sort of catalogue of principles for a religious society,24 Locke not only subscribes to the same position, but also relates it to the problem of the unity among Christians and acknowledges the impossibility of avoiding difference of opinions:
Nothing being so opposite, or having proved so fatal to unity, love and charity, the first and great characteristical duties of Christianity, as men's fondness of their own opinions, and their endeavours to set them up and have them followed, instead of the Gospel of peace; to prevent these seeds of dissention and division, and maintain unity in the difference of opinions which we know cannot be avoided, if anyone appears contentious, abounding in his own sense rather than in love , and desirous to draw followers after himself, with destruction or opposition to others, we judge him not to have learned Christ as he ought, and therefore not fit to be a teacher of others (Pol. Es., Paci.fie Christians,§ 8, 305-306).
Although Locke never literally states it, his line of thought may have led him to the express statement that Christ is tolerant. Nevertheless, even without a literal statement as such, it is clear that his conception of Christianity contradicts the dominant one of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries , i.e. the conception inspired by Augustine's epistles written in the Donatist controversy. It is strange that Locke never mentioned it, given that he cannot be supposed not to know it. It was ubiquitous in the modem debate on toleration. 25 In the work The 'Letter for Toleration' deciphrer'd, and the absurd and impiety of an absolute toleration demonstrated, the very first critique of the Epistola, Thomas Long (1621-1707) refers to the Donatist controversy and cites De Correctione Donatistarum that Augustine addressed to Boniface. Proast himself acknowledges that his method, which Locke sarcastically describes, several times, as "new" in A Second Letter (e.g., SL, 24 , 30, 42, Works, 87, 93, 107), was "at least as old as St. Austin" (TL-P, 43, Works, 82). Certainly, we must admit that Christianity may be conceived in different ways. As we can see by Augustine's position, it is possible that these different conceptions have scriptural basis besides the emblematic compelle intrare found in the parable of the great banquet in Luke 14:23. 26 The gist of Augustine's view is that since the prophecies concerning the submission of the secular power to God were
24 Jn England, after his exile in the Netherlands, Locke founded a society of virtuosi w ith edifying ends, but also concerned with political and philosophical issues, the Dry Club. If we take i nto account Pierre Des Maizeaux's ( 167213-1745) remark in the dedication of A Collection of Se veral Pieces of Mr. John Locke, this kind of society had always p leased Locke. For more details on this topic, see Simonutti (2001 and 2008).
25 According to Goldie (1993, 169), "Locke knew well enough that both Anglicans and French papists drew their arguments from St Augustine 's teaching , and that one of the most influential versions of the Augustinian case amongst Anglican divines had been produced by Thomas Long [The History of the Donatists, of 1677]."
26 Besides Luke 14:23 (cf. Letters, 93.2.5, 173.10, 185.6.24), Augu stine employs other biblical sources in his letters to Vincentius and Boniface, such as the conversion of Paul in Acts 9:4 (cf. Letters, 93.2.5; 185.6 .22), the domain of Sarah over Hagar in Genesis 16:6 and Galatians 4:26, 29 (cf. Letters, 93.2.6; 185.2.9-11 ), the conversion of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 3:24-30 (cf. Le//ers, 93.3.9; 185.2.8). The statement of the neces sity to bring to the church those that are in error is based on Ezekiel 34:4 (cf. Letters, 185. 7 .31 ) On Augustine's justification of intolerance, see Joly (1955) and Scalise (1996).
2.1 The Evangelical Argument
accomplished (cf. Letters, 87.8, 88.l l , 93.5.18, 105.2.5-6, 204.4; Psalms 2:2, 10-11, 72:11), penalties can be imposed on those who refuse the unity of the Church. If persuasion was, originally, the only means to restore tho se who divided the Church, then afterwards, another means became available: force. In Augustine's reading of the parable of the great banquet, these two epoch s and means correspond to the two actions of the man who laid on the great feast. When his originally invited guests made excuses not to come , he asked his servant to "conduct" (adducere) 27 to his house the poor, the maimed, the halt and the blind, but finding that there was still room, he then asked the servant to go into the "highways and hedges" and to "compel" (cogere) them come in, hence the distinction between "gently" (leniter) conducting and compelling (Letter, 185.6.24). For Augustine, the great banquet represents the Church, and the highways and hedges are a figure for heresies and schisms. Pointing out that some erroneous people are not corrected through persuasion, that they resist the "evident" (Letters, 88.9, 185.10.47) and "most man ifest" truth (Letters, 128.4, 141.2, 141.13, 144.1 ), Augustine infers that their correction requires coercion. Being too hardened, "they cannot be corrected with words" (verbis emendari non potest), but they can be corrected "with a bit o f severity of the discipline" (aliquantula severitate disciplinae) (Letter, 185.7 .26), as Augustine says euphemistically. This "hardness" (duritia) that makes force necessary to conversion is, so to speak, a psychological justification for intolerance. Augustine also describes it in other terms - obstinacy (cf. Letters, 43.1.1, 53.3.7, 89.1, 89.3, 139.1, 185.10.47), perversity (cf. Letters, 43.1.1, 53 3.7, 56.2, 87.9, 89.2-3, 93.3.10, 97.4, 105.2.6, 139.1, 185.1.1 ) and animosity (cf. Letters, 33.5, 43.1.l, 82.2. 93.3.10, 93.5.17)and seems to associate it with the notion of habit (cf. Letters, 52.4, 56.2, 89.6, 89.7, 93.1.1-2, 141.13, 142.4, 185.7.29). Metaphorically speaking, the erroneous people who resist conversion through words alone are seen as frenetics and lethargies that must be refrained or awaked for their own health (cf. Letters, 89.6, 93.2.4) and as children whose parents, for the love of them, must not spare the rod (cf. Letters, 133.2, 185.6.21, 173.3; Proverbs 13:24, 23:14, 29:19, Ecclesiasticus 30:12). For Augustine, the point at stake is not that they are coerced, but to what they are coerced (cf. Letters, 93.5.16, 185.6.24). Correcting such people is a "duty of charity" (officium caritatis) (Letter, 43.1.1) whilst toleration is a "false indulgence" (Letter, 105.2.6), a "freedom for error" (Letter, 105.2.10), a "false and cruel meekness" (Letter, 185.2.7). In short, as Augustine affirms, referring to Pro verbs 27 :6, " it is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency" (melius est cum severitate diligere, quam cum lenitate decipere) (Letter 93.2.4, cf. Letter 151. 7). 28
27 Referring to Luke 14:21, Augustine uses the verb adducere (in the Vulgate, the verb is introducere) In her English translation, Atki n s chose to invite, but this does not seen to be a good alternative (cf. Augustine 2001, 188). As we read in a sermon devoted to the parable of the great banquet, Augustine thinks that there are three groups of people: those who were invited (or called), those who were conducted and those who were compell ed to come in (cf Sermon, 112. l ).
28 As Goldie ( 199 1, 348) summarises, "when the mind in bondage is lost to Christian truth, and an e ternal soul is at stake, the n coercive discipline by the magistrate in the service of the Christian pastor is an act of the greatest charity. Indulgence is a 'mis taken kindness' and penal laws are an
It is no accident, therefore, that one of the points at stake in the modem debate on toleration concerns the notion of charity - and it concerns the notion of charity not only from a moral point of view, as we see in the evangelical argument, but also from a political one, as we shall see in the following chapter concerning the Locke and Proast controversy. In both cases , however, the main issue remains the same: can force be compatible with love? For Locke, there is no doubt that force and charity are incompatible, as we just saw in his emphasis on the faith that works "not by force, but by love" (Galatians 5:6, Epist., 58.25). As he states in An Essay concerning Toleration, "I am much indebted to the man that takes care I should be happy but tis hard to thinke that that comes from charity to my soule which brings such ill usage to my body" (ET, 296). Locke's position is centred in Christ's meekness, 29 the major expression of which is seen in the Sermon on the Mo untain, and is summarised in the Golden Rule (cf RC, 123 , § 219). This rule was described in An Essay concerning Human Understanding as " that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all social Virtue" (E, I.iii.4). 30 When Locke composed The Reasonableness of Christianity, he restated his conception of Christianity, citing Christ's answer to Pilate, according to which his kingdom is not of this wor ld because, if it were, his followers would have struggled for it, since they were not few and were forward to consider hi m king; if force should be used, Christ would have ordered it (cf. RC, 84-85, §§ 144-145; John 18: 33-37). In the Epistola, we find the same statement when Locke says, ironicall y, that if infidels should be converted by constraint, an army of heavenly legions wou ld be much more adequate than the troops of any patron of the church (cf. Epist., 64-7-9) . The purpose of Christianity is "to institute a life with righteousness and piety" (ad vitam recte pieque instituendam), 31 so that all people that neglect virtue and are inclined to vice attribute "in vain" (jrustra) to themselves the name of Christian (cf. Epist., 58.15-19). Christianity is more a rule of r igh teousness towards good life, "the great business of true religion", than a no tional science (Pol. Es. , Pacific Christians,§ 6, 305). As we can see in The Reasonableness of Christianity , the good life, i.e. the sincere effort to obey Christ's law (cf. RC , 112, § 198) is a grounding notion of Locke's conception of the Christian religion, but it does not exempt the believers from giving assent to an essential dogma, that Jesus Christ is the Messiah
act of love. It may be better to win by gentle persuasion, but amongst the stubborn there is a ' hardness of heart that cannot be softened by such words'."
29 In A Second Letter, however, Locke acknowledges that on one occasion - the expelling of merchants from the temple (cf. John 2:13-25) - Christ used force (cf. SL, 49, Works , 115 ). When Augustine justified hi s change of at tit ude regarding the coercion of Dona tists, he used this Biblical passage (cf. Augustine 2019, I, 13, 6).
30 Being easy and plain , thi s rule may be u sed in the instruction of children (cf. Locke 1989 , 2 13, § 159) In Of the Conduct of the Understaruling (§ 43 (84)) , Locke affirms that "our Saviours great rule [is) that we should love our neighbour as our selves" a s he did in Of Ethic in General(§ 11): "thi s rul e of our action s set us by our lawmaker is conversant about, and ultimately terminates in , those s imple ideas before mentioned; viz. thou s halt love thy neighbour as thyself' ( Po l. Es. , Of Ethic , 303).
31 Translation slightly altered.
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 27 (cf. RC , 23, § 26 ), and to some co ncom i tant artic le s (cf. RC , 164 , 169, §§ 29 1, 301; Locke, 2016, 21 , § 28, 49, 162- 163, §§ 25, 306-308): " these t wo, Faith and Repentance ; i.e. , believi ng Jes us to be the Me ssiah, and a good Life; are the indispensable Condi tions of the New Covenant to be performed b y all those, who wou l d obtain Eternal Life" (RC , 112 , § 199). To ob tain eternal life, Chri st gave te ach i ngs concerning "faith and manners" (cf. Epist., 116.21-22: quafide, quibus moribus ), so that each person has duties related to " believing" (crede) and " ac ting" (agere) : everyone is supposed "to investigate" (investigare) and "to perform" (p eragere) the things neces sary to salvation (cf. Epist. , 122.27-124.1 ).32 In a manu sc rip t w ritten in 1694, Locke sustains the same po si ti on when he lists "w hat one mus t believe to be saved" (quae credenda ad salutem ) and "what one mu st do to be saved" (quae agenda ad salutem) (Adversaria The ologica 94, § 5). 33 Therefore, the opposition between notional science and rule of righteousness is not intended to cast doubt on the need to believe, but to condemn the speculative excess that ends up serving as a pretext for clerical dominion. Hence, in t he prologue to the Episto la, there are allusions to the so- called indifferent thing s to s alvation. The imposi tio n o f indifferen t things concerning either doctrine or way s of worship is a characteristic procedure of those who distort religion to suit their own interests. In A Third Letter, Locke refer s to " those generou s Principles of the Gospel, which so much recommend and inculcate universal Charity, and a Freedom from the Invention s and Imposi tions of Men in the things of God " (TL, 349, Works , 544-545 ) Naturally, Locke' s conception of Christianity is very conciliatory and may be easily linked with his defen ce of to leration , because it reduces the dogmatic and ceremonial dimension s of reli g ion to a mi nimum.
34 As Locke states in A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, his conception of Christianity "tends to Peace and Union amongst Christians" (Locke 2016, 37, § A3 '). Indeed , for him "charity [is] a Vertue much more necessary than the attaining of the Knowledge of obscure Truths , that are not easie to be found; and probably, therefore, not ne cessary to be known" ( Locke 2016, 232, § 479).
35
Locke focuses on the moral development of individual s (an aspect with w hich no Christian would disagree), rather than addressing abstruse discus s ions (that are so
32 Translation slightly altered.
33 T he manus cript , Adversaria Theo logia 9 4, is quoted here according to Nuovo's edition a nd translation (cf. Locke 2002b, 23)
34 This is the so-call ed latitudi nariani s m. Bejan (20 15 , n 13) re fe rs to Th e Reasonableness of Christianity as an "an exercise in latitudinarian t heology". This perspective of Christianity was shared by th e Dutch Re monstrants with w hom Locke l ived in exile. On Lo cke ' s frie ndly relations in the Netherlands, see Simonutti (1999).
35 Similarly, in A Third Letter, Locke wrote: "An Agreeme nt in Tru ths necessary to Salvation, and the maintaining of Charity an d brotherly Kindness with t he D ivers ity of Opi nions in other things, is that whi c h will very well cons ist wit h Christian Un ity, a nd is all poss ibl y to be had in this World, in such an incurab le Weaknes s and Difference of Mens Understandings" (TL, 82, Works, 237). In the same ve in, we read in A Defence ofNonconformity th at '"tis want o f joyneing in peace, & charity, an d not in all the circumsta nces of outward worship t hat ca uses our eviUs" (DNC, 1, cf. DNC, 107).
liable to hide the ulterior motives). It is little wonder, therefore, that in the manuscript Error he criticises the churches "in which, as one may observe, opinions are preferred to life and orthodoxy is that which they are concerned for, and not morals" (Pol. Es., Error, 346). More broadly, in the manuscript Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, written in 1674, Locke states that "all things tending to the attainment of future bliss ... are of three sorts": credenda, cultus religiosus and moralia. He then points out that those things one needs to do to be saved are twofold: some of them concern "the ways of expressing our honour and adoration of the deity, and of address to him for the obtaining any good from him" (cu/tus religiosus), others concern "the right management of our actions in respect of ourselves and others" (moralia) (Pol. Es., Civil , 217). 36 A few years later, in 1681-82, in A Defence of Nonconformity, Locke would formulate a definition of religion that comprises "those opinions, & actions alone which I entertaine, & performe, onely to please God, & such as have no concemement at all with my neighbour or the interest, or affaires of this world" - a definition that seems to exclude moralia from religion. However, this definition of religion is certainly framed in a restrictive fashion, as Locke asserts that morality is "acknowledged to be a great part of that wherein God may be offended or pleased with us" (DNC, 76).
Specifically formulated against the use of force in religious matters, the evangelical argument may thus be settled in the following terms: (i) 'Being a Christian is to follow Christ's example'; (ii) 'Christ's example is to act virtuously with meekness and charity'; (iii) 'Hence, being a Christian is to act virtuously with meekness and charity'. As the first premise is evident to all Christians, there is no doubt that the biblical passages to which Locke resorts are intended to support the second premise. 37 It must be noted, however, that the Augustinian reading of compel/e intrare in Luke 14:23 clearly contradicts the second premise, at least from Locke's perspective. Yet, in the Epistola, and also in the works and manuscripts explored above, Locke never openly compares his conception of Christianity with other conceptions, particularly the Augustinian one. He only does so indirectly, when he describes the violence to which the supposed heretics were exposed - they were mutilated, despoiled and killed, to mention nothing more (cf. Epist., 60 . 1) - and above all, when he opposes religious coercion to the faith acting through love (cf. Galatians 5:6, Epist., 58.25).38
36 For a discussion on whether the cultus religious, understood as public worship, and affiliation with a church are required for salvation, see Lucci (2020, 196-197) We should bear in mind, though, that at the time Locke composed A Defence of Nonconformity, he believed that "since the actions of a private solitary life cannot reach to all the instances & purposes of religion in its full extent therefore men find themselves obliged, when they embrace any religion, to associate, & joyne in Communion with some society, wherein that religion is professed" (DNC, 19, cf. DNC, 23, 30, 39, 76-77).
37 This is why, contrary to Goldie and Popkin (2006), we have shortened the scope of the evangelical argument here. The latitudinarian position regarding indifferent things, even though very important, does not have a scriptural basis like the statement of Christian meekness and charity.
2.2 The Argument from
Commission
38 Goldie (1991) shows how Locke confronted the Augustinian legacy in the controversy with Proast, but he doe s not explore Locke's rebuttal of Augustine (focused on charity) in the Epistola. Goldie and Popkin (2006 , 102), Bejan (2015) and Vernon (1997, 9) touch upon this issue whereas
At any rate, despite the simplicity of the argument, which can be put in the logical form of a valid categorical syllogism (i) 'C is EC'; (ii) ' EC is ML'; (iii) 'Hence, C is ML', it is not difficult to perceive the great moral consequences of it, even though they are restricted to those who identify themselves as Christians, i .e. to those who accept its scriptural basis. In light of the evangelical argument, we can say that no Christian can enforce his beliefs and ways of worship upon other persons, which corresponds to an approach to toleration in its horizontal dimension, as mentioned above. From Locke's perspective, in short, the use of force in religious matters is a betrayal of charity, which is the "Spirit of the Gospel" (RC, 3, § A2v). Charity, if it is not to become an empty word, must be understood as "an effectual forbearance 39 and good will" (Pol. Es., Pacific Christians, § 5, 305).
2.2 The Argument from Commission
As we have seen previously, the other three arguments to support toleration appear in the section of the Epistola that defines the Commonwealth as "a society of men constituted only (solummodo) for preserving and advancing their civil goods"
Marshall (2016, 656-{)57) makes this point very clearly. In this sense, it is important to remember that, in the reviews of the Epistola in the Bibliotheque Universe lie et Historiqu e and in the Histoire des Ouvrages des Sfavans, there is an emphasis on the "cruel and ridicule chari t y that consists in oppressing or beheading one's neighbour for the sake of converting him" (Basnage de Beau val 1721, 22) and a clear assertion that "wi thout toleration there can be no charity, because we cannot say that dishonouring people, preventing them from keeping their lives, persecuting them, taking away their goods, and killing them, as those who have no toleration towards those who do not share their beliefs, are actions compatible with charity" (Le Clerc 1689, 403). On the reviews and on the immediate recept ion of the Epistola, see Sou lard (2019) and Loque (2020). Likew ise, in his correspondence with Locke, Limborch asserts that the Epistola proves , "on grounds never hitherto s o set forth , that all religious persecution is contrary both to the spirit of religion and to the law of nature" (Corr., v. III, 1131). As Loconte (2014) demonstrates, the emphasis on the incompatibility of the example of Christ and intolerance represents an influence of Christian humanism on Locke. From this perspective, contrary to what Nuovo (2011, 242) affirms, we cannot say that the equation of toleration and the "Christian virtue of charity" seems to be "purely rhetorical". Lamb and Thompson (2009 , 239) also consider that in the Epistola there is an "intermarriage of charity a nd toleration", but they focus on the meaning of charity related to Locke' s notion of property and justice (cf. TTG I § 42).
39 In Locke's index to An Essa y con cerning Human Understanding , there is an entry for toleration with only one remission to the work, specifically to E, IV.xvi.4, the title of which is "the right use of it Uudgement] is mutual Charity and Forbearance". Since forbearance has the sense of a b s ta ining from, it appears that Locke is considering it synonymous of tolerat ion, which he defines literally as the removal of force (cf. SL, 2, 6, Works , 62, 67), as we saw above. In this respect , it is noteworthy that Pierre Coste (1668-1747) chose 'toleration' when he translated this passage (cf Locke 1735, 548). In an earlier stage, though, Locke seems to have conceived forbe arance in a different way. In A Defenc e of N onconfonnity, Locke also associates charity and forbearance (cf DNC, 7 , 1 10, 112, 151, 154), but apparently, he believes (referring to Romans 14, in particular, to Romans 14:13: "Let us not therefore judge one another any more") that forbearance is the action of not judging others (cf. DNC , 142).
(Epist., 64.27-28). These arguments correspond to what Popple calls three considerations, and, for the sake of clarity, we shall call them here the argument from commission, the argument of unfitness of force, and the argument of reductio ad absurdum. Given their political nature and their sec ular character, all these arguments are independent of the evangelical argument, which has a theological and moral nature, and a confessional character. However, taken as a whole, these three arguments are interconnected, as we s hall see.
In order to understand the structure and the interconnection between these three arguments, we s hall start with the first one. It is condensed in one paragraph in which Locke begins his exposition of the proofs "to demonstrate" (demonstrare) why the magistrate's jurisdiction must be limited exclusively to civil matters.
First, because the care of sou ls is not committed to the civi l magistrate, any more than to other men It is not committed to him by God; because it does not appear that God ever gave any s uch authority to one man over another as to compe l other men to embrace his religion . Nor can any s uch power be vested in the magi strat e by men, because no man can so far abandon the care of his own eternal salvation as to emb race under comp ul sion a worship or faith prescribed by someone else, be he prince or subject. For no man, even if he would, can beLieve at another's dictation It is faith that gives force and efficacy to the true religion that brings salv ation. For whatever profession you make, to whatever o utward worship yo u conform, if you are not fully persuaded in your own mind that it is both true and well pleasing to God, far from being any furtherance, it is an obstacle to salvation For in thi s way, instead of expiating your other s ins by the exerci se of religion, in offering to God Almighty a worship which you believe to be displeasing to him you add to the number of your sins those of hypocrisy and contempt of hi s Divine Majesty (Epist., 66.19-68.2).
Broadly speaking, this is the argument: (iv) 'God has not committed the care of souls to the civil magistrate '; (v) 'Men have not committed the care of souls to the civil magistrate'; (vi) 'Hence, the care of souls has not been committed to the civil magistrate', which is tantamount to saying that his jurisdiction must be confined to civil matters 40 The argument is straightforward, but its premises are not evident. They do not s upport the thesis without further grounding. Why have neither God nor men committed the care of souls to the civil magistrate? Moreover, what does Locke mean by 'committing' the care of souls to the civil magistrate?
Locke employs the verb demandare (cf. Epist., 66 .20) to refer to the care of sou ls committed to the magistrate. Literally, it means to trust and corresponds to the verb to entrust, often used in the Two Treatise s of Government. 41 In the Locke and Proast controversy, developed in English, it is discussed whether or not, in religious matters, the magis trate has authority or commission , a word that comes from the Latin
40 In fact, this argument is an enthymeme. In order to be valid, the reasoning requires another premise: the commission to take care of so uls may be committed to the magistrate either by God or by men. It seems that Locke has always worked with this disjunction. It is found in the First Tract on Government (cf. Locke 1967, 126) and reappears in An Essay concerning Toleration (ET, 270).
41 When we compare Locke's Latin and English writings, notably the Two Tracts on Government, it seems that the Latin verb demandare may be doubled in English: to comm ission and to entrust. Compare: "whe the r you suppose him [magistrate) immediately com mi ssioned by God and by him entrusted with the care of the society " (Locke 1967, 126) and "verum cum magistratui a deo societatis cura demandatur ..." (Locke 1967 , 194) .
2.2
verb committere, and also accepts the sense of to trust. The issue is always a concession made in confidence, with a determined end. The emphasis on the substantive commission, however, helps to show that the task to be performed by the magistrate corresponds to an end entrusted to him. Ultimately, as we see in the Two Treatises of Government, legislative power is "on l y a Fiduciary Power" (TTG, II§ 149). 42 The magistrate cannot do whatever he wants, because he has a trust that restricts what he can legitimately do.
Therefore, regardless of the translation chosen for demand.are and its cognate forms, it is important to note that by focusing the discussion on the notion of commission or trust, Locke is indicating that the functions of the Commonwealth are not evident: his aim is, precisely, to determine them. For Locke, it is necessary to establish which mandate should be entrusted lo the magistrate. In other words, it is necessary to explain why it should not include the care of souls. Since there are two ways whereby power may be committed to the magistrate, Locke discusses each one se parately, as he did in the First Tract on Government and in An Essay concerning Toleration.
The first way regards God, but, according to Locke, it seems that God has neverliterally, " nowhere" (nusquam) 43 - given to one man over another the authority to compel others to embrace his r e ligion. In the Epistola, this is Locke's claim for denying to the magistrate the commission that could be given to him by God. As we can see, a modest (ironic, even?) tone is lent to the claim by the expression apparet, but its most important feature is its script ural basis. Locke clearly presupposes that the Scripture contains God's will, and affirms that nowhere in the Revelation does God concede, to the magistrate, the care of souls. Given the absence of any explicit concession of this commission to the magistrate, we must conclude that he does possess it or, at least, that he does not possess it as a divine concession. In A Second Letter, Locke quotes some biblical passages, such as I Peter 2: 13 , to support his position (which he says is coherent with Richard Hooker (1554-1600)) on the restriction of the magistrate's jurisdiction: Commonwealths or civil societies or governments are nothing but an "all0pro7ti VTJ K-ricnc;;", "the contrivance and
42 Fo r the sake of clarity, it is worth quoting this passage in full: "Though in a Constituted Commonwealth, standing upon its own Ba sis, and acting according to its own Nature, that is, acting for th e preservation of the Community, there can be but one Supream Po wer, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and mu st be subordinate, yet the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certai n e nd s, there remains still in the People a Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the tru st reposed in th em. For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeitecf' (TTG, TI§ 149).
43 Some translators , starting with Popple, give a temporal sense to nusquam when its meaning is locative, as we see in two analogous passages: in A Second Letter, Locke says that "I do not find any whe re that. .. " (SL, 54, Works, 12 1); and in the manuscript Toleration D, which will be discussed below, where Locke states that "God has nowhere given such power to any man or society " (Pol. Es, Toleration D, 276). In the review of the Epistola published in the Bibliotheque Universe/le et Historique, which was based on the Latin edition, nusquam is interpreted in the locative sense: "Dieu n'a dit nulle part qu'il entendoit. " (Le C lerc 1689, 404).
