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Communication and Catastrophic Events
Communication and Catastrophic Events
Strategic Risk and Crisis Management
Edited by
H. Dan O’Hair and Mary John O’Hair
University of Kentucky
This edition first published 2023 © 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: O’Hair, Dan, editor. | O’Hair, Mary John, editor.
Title: Communication and catastrophic events / edited by H. Dan O’Hair, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, Mary John O’Hair, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.
Description: Hoboken, New Jersey : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2023. | Series: Communicating science in times of crisis | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022029601 (print) | LCCN 2022029602 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119751816 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119751830 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119751823 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Crisis communication | Risk management | Communicating science
Classification: LCC HD49 .C658 2023 (print) | LCC HD49 (ebook) | DDC 363.34–dc23/eng/20220812
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022029601
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022029602
Cover Design: Wiley
Cover Image: © Rasica/Shutterstock
Set in 9.5/12.5pt STIXTwoText by Straive, Pondicherry, India
This book is dedicated to the victims and survivors of catastrophic events and to those who are driven in their pursuit of communicating science in times of crisis, when strategic communication is needed most.
Contents
List of Contributors ix
1 Addressing Catastrophes Through Communication Science 1
H. Dan O’Hair, Daniel P. Chaney, and Mary John O’Hair
2 Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis 11
Ellie Holliday, Jason Hope, and Amanda U. Potterton
3 Addressing the Role of Prior Experience in the Development of Risk Perceptions, Information Seeking and Processing Behaviors During Natural Disasters 29
Laura M. Fischer, Cara Lawson, and Taylor K. Ruth
4 Enhancing Catastrophic Event Preparedness and Response: The Inoculation Approach 49
Bobi Ivanov, Lindsay L. Dillingham, Erin B. Hester, and Kimberly A. Parker
5 Communication Strategies to Initiate and Sustain Catastrophe Compassion 65
Erin B. Hester, Bobi Ivanov, Kimberly A. Parker, and Mehroz Sajjad
6 Social Marketing Strategy: Enhancing Preparedness for Crises and Catastrophic Events 84
Kimberly A. Parker, Sarah A. Geegan, Erin B. Hester, and Bobi Ivanov
7 Building Risk Communication Infrastructure by Bolstering Emergency Managers’ Formal and Informal Communication Networks 103
Bradley A. Trefz, David H. Bierling, Andrew Christjoy, and Joshua B. Barbour
8 Individual Disaster Communication Following Catastrophic Mass Violence: The Case of the Pulse Nightclub Shooting 120
Matthew L. Spialek and J. Brian Houston
9 Social Media Misinformation About Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change: Structures, Communication Processes, and Individual Factors that Influence the Diffusion of Misinformation 137
Kevin B. Wright
10 “The Princeton Outbreak”: A Case Study of a University Health Crisis and Implications for Communicating Science 155
Judy F. Jarvis, Ralph A. Gigliotti, and John Kolligian
11 Blue or Stormy Skies? The Roles of Strategic Risk Communication in Protecting Communities Before, During, and After Severe Weather 174
Anita Atwell Seate, Brooke Fisher Liu, Ji Youn Kim, Xin Ma, Saymin Lee, and Daniel Hawblitzel
12 Risk and Crisis Communication: Considering Catastrophic Mudslides in Uganda’s Bududa District 191
Angella Napakol, Ann Neville Miller, Timothy L. Sellnow, Deanna D. Sellnow, Ann Mugunga, and Johnny Khaukha
13 Risk, Science, and Health Collaborations During Cascading and Simultaneous Disasters 206
Rebecca M. Rice and Megan E. Cullinan
14 Communicating Inclusively and Reliably About Climatological and Meteorological Events: Social Network Analysis, Message Framing, and Communication Competence 219
William T. Howe and Maria Shpeer
15 How Government Leaders Use Social Media During Disasters: A Scoping Review 239
Lauren B. Cain
Index 255
List of Contributors
Anita Atwell Seate
Department of Communication University of Maryland, College Park, MD
Joshua B. Barbour
Department of Communication Studies University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX
David H. Bierling
Texas A&M Transportation Institute
Texas A&M University College Station, TX
Lauren B. Cain
College of Emergency Preparedness Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity University at Albany SUNY, Albany, NY
Daniel P. Chaney
Department of Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Andrew Christjoy
Texas A&M Transportation Institute
Texas A&M University College Station, TX
Megan E. Cullinan
Department of Communication and Media Merrimack College North Andover, MA
Lindsay L. Dillingham
Department of Management, Marketing, and Entrepreneurship
Lipscomb University Nashville, TN
Laura M. Fischer
Department of Agricultural Education and Communications
Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX
Sarah A. Geegan
Department of Integrated Strategic Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Ralph A. Gigliotti
School of Communication and Information
Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ
Daniel Hawblitzel
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Silver Spring, MD
Erin B. Hester
Department of Integrated Strategic Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Ellie Holliday
Department of Curriculum and Instruction University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Jason Hope
UK International Center University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
J. Brian Houston
Disaster and Community Crisis Center
Department of Communication University of Missouri Columbia, MO
William T. Howe
Department of Communication Studies
Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX
List of Contributors x
Bobi Ivanov
Department of Integrated Strategic Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Judy F. Jarvis
Princeton Campus Life Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Johnny Khaukha
Department of Communication
Uganda Christian University Mukono, Uganda
Ji Youn Kim
Department of Communication
University of Maryland College Park, MD
John Kolligian
Princeton University Health Services
Princeton University Princeton, NJ
Cara Lawson
Department of Agricultural Communication, Education and Leadership
The Ohio State University Columbus, OH
Saymin Lee
Department of Communication University of Maryland College Park, MD
Brooke Fisher Liu
Department of Communication University of Maryland College Park, MD
Xin Ma
Department of Communication University of Maryland College Park, MD
Ann Neville Miller
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
University of Central Florida Orlando, FL
Ann Mugunga
Department of Communication
Uganda Christian University Mukono, Uganda
Angella Napakol
Department of Communication
Uganda Christian University Mukono, Uganda
H. Dan O’Hair
Department of Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Mary John O’Hair
Department of Educational Leadership Studies University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Kimberly A. Parker
Department of Integrated Strategic Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Amanda U. Potterton
Department of Educational Leadership Studies University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Rebecca M. Rice
Department of Communication Studies University of Nevada, Las Vegas Las Vegas, NV
Taylor K. Ruth
Department of Agricultural Leadership Education, and Communication University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE
Mehroz Sajjad
Department of Communication University of Kentucky Lexington, KY
Deanna D. Sellnow
Nicholson School of Communication and Media University of Central Florida Orlando, FL
Timothy L. Sellnow
Nicholson School of Communication and Media University of Central Florida Orlando, FL
Maria Shpeer
Department of Communication University of Oklahoma Norman, OK
Matthew L. Spialek
Department of Communication University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR
Bradley A. Trefz
Texas A&M Transportation Institute
Texas A&M University College Station, TX
Kevin B. Wright
Department of Communication
George Mason University Fairfax, VA
Strategic Risk and Crisis Management
Introduction
Focusing on risk and crisis communication may provide insight into the source of the message more than it does the audience: are they trying to arm people with response plans? Avoid panic runs at the grocery store? Reassure the population despite an absence of certainty or knowledge? We found that dissecting the message in the search for its intent is as difficult as trying to parse what the message(s) meant or were supposed to mean. The relative personal impact from the Delta variant, seemingly far worse than the Omicron variant and subvariants, made distinguishing risk vs. crisis very difficult (Heath & O’Hair, 2009). We are wary of falling for the trap of risk only becoming real when it becomes personal. Furthermore, the distinctions among care, crisis, and consensus communications (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013) became even more blurred thanks to COVID-19. These distinctions were helpful to show an early imbalance: COVID care communication was at its infancy and consensus was elusive, leaving crisis communication as the bulk of what was communication science.
In the following sections, we briefly examine some noteworthy theories and concepts that discuss risk and crisis communication. First, the role of concepts and theory in risk and crisis contexts is examined, followed by a section on the social amplification of risk (SARF) theory that is intended to help distinguish between risks and crises. The following section focuses on the precautionary principle (“erring on the side of caution”). The section examines the role of science communication during risk and crisis management. Subsequent sections include science communication in catastrophic events, the discourse of renewal (DoR) theory, and finally, the role of social media in risk and crisis management.
Concepts and Theory
It is common for risk and crisis communication scholars to invoke “theory” as a basis or guide for developing practical plans for managing catastrophes. Overall, we are not certain risk and crisis communication is being driven by theory at the practitioner level, despite effective frameworks and foundations being available. We have learned and will continue to learn from theories as they expand and evolve, although currently, a real-world gap persists between theory and praxis. In some cases, what is being done follows the guidance and projection of theories, particularly around the continuously emerging role of social media. However, we do not sense that risk communication theories and models are being consciously invoked by the planning and response teams before, during, or after an event. Nishizawa (2018) and Beaumont (2018) are somewhat retrospective, showing where theories and known approach did or would have made a difference, and Kamaté (2018) argues that the role of public input is important—even if it is underutilized. Nishizawa (2018) summed it up well: “However, it would not be an overstatement that the nature of effective risk communication is yet to be fully understood. As a result, risk communication is sometimes only partially integrated into risk management practice or is not considered at all” (p. 82). However, social media usage (by all stakeholders) may be a growing exception to this rule.
Social Amplification of Risk
Fellenor et al. (2020) took up the concept of SARF and the challenges around it and provided a holistic overview of the complexity of risk as it is seen by, developed for, and/or created in spite of “the public.” The whole idea of creating public awareness has a chicken-and-egg problem with respect to the media: does the media draw the public’s attention to an existing problem or does the media generate public’s attention by reporting a problem? Do policymakers follow the public’s opinion or the media’s interpretation of the public’s opinion? (Ideally, they would follow the science, but we fear that ship may have sailed in many situations.) It seems like the more closely you try to define an aspect of the public’s opinion on risk, the more complex catastrophic events become.
One of the core problems is the lack of a generally agreed-upon source of information that is deemed to be trustworthy (unbiased, factual, serving the best interests of the public, etc.). We find SARF insightful as it applies to ripple effects across a broad range of topical areas: nuclear energy in the United States (perceived vs. actual safety), climate change over the decades (trustworthiness), the Russian–Ukraine conflict (political perception vs. the lens of the reporting organization), and any other worldwide event that we may or may not be trying to reference.
Precautionary Principle
We next point to Hansson (2020) on the Precautionary Principle’s strengths, weaknesses, and usage limitations. Where Hansson observed that most see it as the “better safe than sorry” approach, we perceive it as “err on the side of caution.” The difference—as we see it—is how one handles uncertainty. For example, in climate science, “better safe than sorry” would suggest avoiding the use of a chemical that is potentially damaging to the environment until the impact could be assessed. “Erring on the side of caution,” however, would argue against making declarations that are not at least modestly supported by the science. Thus, two seemingly similar adages produce very different perspectives and results. From our view, “erring on the side of caution” can be read as a caution against making an assertion before all, or at least a preponderance, of the data is in—which is not the extreme of “do nothing until we know everything” as the author highlights. Another way of looking at it is to borrow a concept from the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. That is, do nothing until you are sure you can do (or be reasonably sure that you are doing) something (positive).
Science Communication
According to Hansson (2020), using the science-based principle, with its heavy reliance on science as the evaluative source, simplifies things: science is data, and a lot of the scientific method is geared to remove as much error from the data as possible. Thus, the results are as solid as they can be (or, said another way, the risk of the data being “wrong” is as minimized as possible). Moreover, science continually questions itself, creating a closed loop cycle of continuously reducing error (risk of the unknown). Science, then—to our view—is objective and therefore much, much easier to deal with when factoring complexities like risk, crisis, response, etc. Of late, it seems, we have lost some of the general consensus that science produces objective facts because, somewhere along the way, the interpretation of the data—by
people with varying levels of expertise—was somehow made generally equivalent, allowing for non-satirical statements like “My opinion is as valid as your facts.” So long as this mindset continues to flourish (particularly among policy- and lawmakers), we are violating the underlying principles of many things, including the precautionary principle. The sheer size and implications of that risk, or should we say threat, can be overwhelming.
Discourse of Renewal
The DoR (Pile et al., 2020) approach to risk strikes us as a (healthy) mixture of Veil et al. (2020) pre-crisis and post-crisis constructs. DoR optimizes pre-event planning but also sets some lofty goals, particularly around setting up relationships and expectations before the crisis occurs. Looking back on a few large events, we have observed aspects of DoR successfully employed in the corporate world during the post-crisis stage, notably drawing on the “reservoir of goodwill” mentioned by Pile et al. (2020). Similarly, doing as much work up front as possible, as Berger-Sabbatel and Journé (2018) suggest, is vital—building relationships and trust ahead of time is why the character of those relationships comes through when the crisis hits.
Positioning post-crisis communication as provisionally forward-focused is putting a more positive “we are in control” spin on post-crisis communications. Yes, there will be a need, time, and place for the retrospective of what happened and how to prevent it, but this approach intends to make the post-crisis communications focus very much on an “in the future” better post-event state. Cynically, it has a certain amount of distraction capability, to shift the story to what will be versus what is and most recently was. But that shift can indeed be wrapped in optimism and, when done successfully, strong ethical positions, owning the issue, and banking heavily on preexisting good will can make it work (Pile et al., 2020).
In the cybersecurity world, there is some pre-planning and pre-crisis expectation setting going on when you hear CISOs (chief information security officers) for a corporation or large organization make statements like, “A cyber incident is not a question of if, it is when.” They are proactively setting the expectation that a successful breach is inevitable but also disabusing the stakeholders of the notion that any organization can be 100% safe from a successful attack.
Social Media
Several perspectives on social media highlight the challenge that people will discuss a perceived risk; the question is whether it will be an informed, coordinated, and collaborative discussion or whether it will happen in isolation, far removed from the policymakers and key stakeholders. Granted, this is not a binary, all-of-one-none-of-the-other landscape, but the degree to which public interaction is proactive/collaborative versus reactive/isolated can be controlled and influenced.
The logic behind public engagement appears sound: active is better than passive, informed is better than not, a trusting public is better than a wary one, and public engagement avoids the appearance of locking out an impacted stakeholder (i.e., the public at large). However, demanding access and using access are not synonymous. The COVID fatigue we are seeing highlights the difficulty in maintaining the public’s interest—particularly during the informative stages (Kamaté, 2018, p. 22). Risks remain abstract in some cases or become both normalized and familiar in others.
Nonetheless, we do see glimpses of Kamaté’s suggestions on organizing the debate in the early days of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention response to COVID. They strove for:
● Trust and transparency
● Asymmetry between participants (highly complex data conveyed by subject matter experts to non-experts that need the data interpreted in order to be useful/evaluated)
● Legitimacy of participants—(is it representative of the affected stakeholder population?)
● Formal vs. informal discussion spaces (meetings vs. open-dialogue town halls)
Similarly, Beaumont (2018) promoted the critical and positive role that social media can play during and after an event. We were particularly struck by the similarities between the response pattern explored in that research (Fukushima nuclear accident) and the initial U.S. federal response to COVID: transparency, trust, faithfully responding to each and every inquiry. Strategic risk and crisis management is a complex blend of theory, practice, planning, execution, and coordination. Effective communication plays a key role in each of these aspects and can often be the difference between success and failure. What are the communicative goals: coordinate responses? avoid panic? inform the public? manage stakeholders? The communication style and structure will vary for each of these, yet all are required—often simultaneously—before, during, and after a crisis event. Modern risk management practitioners have a number of tools at their disposal: theory, principles, findings from science communication, and a long list of real-world examples of what worked as well as what did not work. Navigating this abundance of options, however, requires both the broad overview presented in this chapter and deeper dives into specific areas. These will be covered in the following chapters.
Chapter Highlights
The Holliday, Hope, and Potterton chapter, entitled “Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis” (Chapter 2), explores issues of student international travel during a particular catastrophe, the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter follows universities’ preliminary responses and continuing issues through guidance from federal agencies to address international travel. Additionally, the authors argue that federal sources may not be enough and accessing knowledge and practice from other sources would be a more prudent strategy for managing these types of risks and catastrophes.
Chapter 3 is authored by Fischer, Lawson, and Ruth and entitled “Addressing the Role of Prior Experience in the Development of Risk Perceptions, Information Seeking and Processing Behaviors During Natural Disasters.” This chapter takes the reader on a journey exploring how risk perceptions are developed and then identifies the effect of how prior experiences with a catastrophe influence an individual’s cognitive processing and information seeking (both types of communication and content).
Chapter 4, entitled “Enhancing Catastrophic Event Preparedness and Response: The Inoculation Approach” and authored by Ivanov, Dillingham, Hester, and Parker, places careful attention on a reliable theoretical concept (inoculation theory) to develop unique means for communicating science before and during catastrophes. The authors argue that inoculation-based strategies, as discussed in this chapter, offer a promising way to mitigate the effects produced by catastrophes.
Most of the author team returns for Chapter 5, “Communication Strategies to Initiate and Sustain Catastrophe Communication,” in order to delve into an area that is often overlooked
in risk and crisis research. Hester, Ivanov, Parker, and Sajjad squarely focus on “catastrophe communication” as a means for addressing the feelings and emotions of those individuals who have experienced a catastrophe. Using case studies, the chapter illuminates the role of compassion when individuals and communities prepare for, and recover from, catastrophic events. The authors argue that compassionate strategies have a positive effect on social capital and facilitating positive social change.
By focusing on social marketing theory (SMT) in Chapter 6, Parker, Geegan, Hester, and Ivanov elucidate critical aspects of SMT toward the purpose of scaffolding and enriching strategies that address crises such as environmental protection, public safety, financial hardship, and community violence, among many others. In this chapter, entitled “Social Marketing Strategy: Enhancing Preparedness for Crises and Catastrophic Events,” the authors isolate three contexts that are worthy of a received-based strategy such as SMT: excessive alcohol use, school violence, and gender-based crime.
Chapter 7 takes on a fruitful discussion of a critical part of our risk management infrastructure—emergency managers and their communication strategies. Trefz, Bierling, Christjoy, and Barbour authored “Building Risk Communication Infrastructure by Bolstering Emergency Managers’ Formal and Informal Communication Networks” with an eye toward emphasizing the role of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) at the local level. The authors make important points for how LEPCs act as crucial pieces of the risk communication infrastructure at the community level. Special attention is placed on social media as a networking mechanism.
Using the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting as a case study, Spialek and Houston highlight individual disaster communication as a coping effect for individuals exposed to catastrophic mass violence through media coverage. In Chapter 8, “Individual Disaster Communication Following Catastrophic Mass Violence: The Case of the Pulse Nightclub Shooting,” the authors advance the argument that media outlets have the opportunity to contribute coping stratagems by “sharing restorative narratives that empower audiences,” and by identifying community resources that help with the healing process following traumatic events.
Chapter 9 is authored by Kevin Wright and is entitled, “Social Media Misinformation about Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change: Structures, Communication Processes, and Individual Factors that Influence the Diffusion of Misinformation.” Using extreme weather events and climate change misinformation as contexts, the chapter explores and uncovers many of the negative implications emerging from communicative interaction on social media platforms. As the title suggests, a number of factors influence the diffusion of misinformation, and this chapter exposes several of them.
In Chapter 10, Jarvis, Gigliotti, and Kolligian delve into Princeton University’s health crisis involving the 2013 meningitis B outbreak on campus and the importance of communicating science throughout the outbreak. The chapter is entitled “‘The Princeton Outbreak’: A Case Study of a University Health Crisis and Implications for Communicating Science” in which the authors conduct interviews with various university and campus leaders and examine publications related to the crisis. The authors go on to highlight themes related to the specific crisis at hand and communicating science more generally during crises. The findings align in part with the best practices found in the literature, while other unique strategies were identified and are worthy of future exploration from scholars and practitioners. Overall, this chapter serves as a model for other higher education institutions facing similar public health crises.
As indicated by the title of Chapter 11, “Blue or Stormy Skies? The Roles of Strategic Risk Communication in Protecting Communities Before, During, and After Severe Weather,” authors Seate, Liu, Kim, Ma, Lee, and Hawblitzel provide a comprehensive review of
message strategies that help alleviate the negative impacts of catastrophic weather. For example, the literature indicates that specific message strategies shown to be effective in one context may not apply to other contexts. The authors not only highlight research gaps and nuances but also provide guidance for important areas of future weather risk communication research designed to help communities become more resilient to severe weather.
Using the IDEA model (Sellnow & Sellnow, 2019) for risk and crisis communication, Chapter 12 authors Napakol, Miller, T. Sellnow, D. Sellnow, Mugunga, and Khaukha examine concerns expressed in interviews with survivors of catastrophic mudslides in the Bududa District of Uganda in Africa. In this chapter, entitled “Risk and Crisis Communication: Considering Catastrophic Mudslides in Uganda’s Bududa District,” the authors highlight the survivors’ multiple frustrations with the status quo, including the lack of information offered by the government, perils of a unidirectional instructional communication process, and the unfulfilling relocation options provided for Bududa District residents. The authors stress the key role that dialogue plays to avoid instructional communication failure as well as lessons learned from this important case study to inform future instructional risk and crisis communication research.
Chapter 13 is authored by Rice and Cullinan and entitled, “Risk, Science, and Health Collaborations during Cascading and Simultaneous Disasters.” This chapter stresses the pressing need for interorganizational collaboration among scientists and risk and crisis managers as societies face cascading and simultaneous disasters, and also proposes how organizational communication theories and practices can enhance understanding of these collaborations. Using a case study of a local crisis collaboration working during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 wildland fire season, authors make recommendations for risk, crisis, and science communicators, with an increased focus on strengthening relationships as simultaneous disasters become our new normal.
The Howe and Shpeer chapter, entitled “Communicating Inclusively and Reliably about Climatological and Meteorological Events: Social Network Analysis, Message Framing, and Communication Competence” (Chapter 14), examines internal and external issues in risk and crisis communication stemming from two studies designed to inform current practices as well as illuminate areas for growth in communicating about climate change before the effects of climate change are felt. The first study examines how disaster experts can look inward when considering how communication is occurring, and the second study demonstrates how we can look outward to determine the types of messages our audience are willing to receive.
In Chapter 15, “How Government Leaders Use Social Media During Disasters: A Scoping Review,” Lauren Cain highlights four theories in crisis communication (situational crisis communication theory, the social-mediated crisis communication model, DoR theory, and dialogic communication theory) and provides implications for sharing crisis messages via social media. Additionally, the scoping review exposes both general benefits and potential concerns of using social media to share official messages during natural disasters.
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Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis
Ellie Holliday, Jason Hope, and Amanda U. Potterton
Introduction
The halting of nearly all international travel due to the emergence of COVID-19 created farreaching consequences for educational institutions that persist to this day. Rising numbers of cases and deaths, travel bans, and the designation of the novel coronavirus as a global pandemic in 2020 forced students who had been studying abroad to return to the United States. In the ensuing months, universities and international education organizations were presented with a challenge to balance their commitment to international education with fluctuating policy and health guidelines from the federal government that inform policies related to academic international travel. The result has been conflicting statements, stops and starts, pushback against federal government travel advisory levels, and a reconsideration of whom university leaders listen to when creating international travel policies. In this chapter, we present the context for the catastrophic event of the early spread of COVID-19, universities’ early responses, ongoing issues with guidance from federal agencies, an analysis of the reliance on federal guidance for international travel, and recommendations for educational institutions moving forward.
Catastrophic Event: Early Spread of COVID-19 and Responses
In March of 2020, as the novel coronavirus was spreading rapidly around the world, U.S. students studying abroad were recalled home by their universities, schools, and study abroad program providers (Redden, 2020). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Department of State (DoS) travel advisories increased to levels that highly discouraged travel for all U.S. citizens. Many U.S. universities and international education organizations have traditionally relied on CDC and DoS travel advisories to gauge the risk to their students in potential education abroad locations (NAFSA: Association of International Educators [NAFSA], 2022). They also tend to have strict policies against student travel to countries with a DoS Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021). As the cases of COVID-19 rapidly increased around the world in early 2020, CDC and DoS travel advisory levels began to rise in specific countries such as China, South
Communication and Catastrophic Events: Strategic Risk and Crisis Management, Edited by H. Dan O’Hair and Mary John O’Hair.
© 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2023 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
University of Kentucky
Korea, and Italy (Schumaker et al., 2020). This triggered the enforcement of policies that meant that students traveling in those countries were alerted to the situation and given the choice to come home, encouraged to come home, or forced to come home based on the specific institution or organization’s policy.
On March 11, COVID-19 was officially declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization, or WHO (WHO, 2020). That same evening, President Trump addressed the nation from the Oval Office about an impending travel ban that would begin just two days later (Colorado Public Radio Staff and The Associated Press, 2020). The President said the following about travel:
After consulting with our top government health professionals, I have decided to take several strong but necessary actions to protect the health and well-being of all Americans.
To keep new cases from entering our shores, we will be suspending all travel from Europe to the United States for the next 30 days. The new rules will go into effect Friday at midnight. These restrictions will be adjusted subject to conditions on the ground.
There will be exemptions for Americans who have undergone appropriate screenings, and these prohibitions will not only apply to the tremendous amount of trade and cargo, but various other things as we get approval. Anything coming from Europe to the United States is what we are discussing. These restrictions will also not apply to the United Kingdom. (para. 12–14)
These comments led to confusion, and his administration clarified them afterwards, noting that the ban applied to nonimmigrant travelers and not to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who would be screened before entry (Liptak & Vazquez, 2020). However, in the Oval Office address to the public, Trump misstated that the ban would apply to “all travel from Europe to the United States for the next 30 days [emphasis added]” and did not explicitly mention an exemption for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (Liptak & Vazquez, 2020, para. 2). The speech sparked panic among U.S. citizens and legal residents who were actively traveling in Europe (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020). The announcement came in the very early hours of the morning for travelers in affected European countries, which created an overnight crisis management situation for many students, parents, and educational administrators. By the time the President’s administration officials clarified the terms of the travel ban, many universities and parents had already booked flights home for students studying abroad (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020).
Additionally, on March 19, 2020, the DoS issued an unprecedented global Level 4 health advisory (U.S. Mission Panama, 2020), which effectively ended any remaining U.S. study abroad programming and, for many universities and study abroad organizations, prevented any new programs from beginning.
During this time period in mid-March 2020, thousands of U.S. citizens, including study abroad students, were rushing home to the United States (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020). This resulted in massive crowds of people in airports around the world who were mostly unmasked and not socially distanced (Baker, 2020). Images of the airports flooded the Internet and sparked conversations about whether these people would contract and spread the coronavirus to each other and their families and classmates. It was around this same time that most universities were moving classes and meetings online and encouraging students to move out of university housing and back to their permanent residences (Kamenetz, 2020). At this early stage of the pandemic, much was still unknown about the
nature and transmissibility of the virus, and the quick return of students from locations outside of the United States forced universities to grapple with questions about whether those students should return directly to their families’ homes or quarantine for some period of time upon arrival (and, in the latter situation, who would support them during a quarantine). The risks of traveling home, being exposed to the virus in crowded spaces, and potentially exposing family and community members to the virus upon return had to be balanced against the risks of allowing students to stay in a potentially unfamiliar country with limited support while, concurrently, public services were becoming increasingly unavailable due to lockdowns.
University Health and Safety Policies
Within most U.S. institutions of higher education, study abroad or education abroad offices and staff members develop and facilitate programming in which students take courses or complete other types of experiences such as internships for academic credit that applies to their degree program. Therefore, any policies related to academic-based international travel for students can also have implications for or apply to faculty and staff members traveling overseas if they are developing and leading education abroad programs. Additionally, many third-party provider organizations exist that connect both high school and college students with schools or programs overseas at which they can be placed for educational experiences (Heyl, 2011). As one sector of the larger field of international education, education abroad offices, organizations, and the staff members within them generally adhere to guidelines and competencies published by leading professional development organizations such as NAFSA, The Forum on Education Abroad, and others. Student health, safety, and crisis management are priorities for those working in education abroad (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021; NAFSA, 2015). These priorities generally refer to both monitoring and understanding health and safety situations on the ground (e.g., illness outbreaks, risk of terrorism, natural disasters, kidnapping, crime, etc.) in countries to which school and higher education organizations send students. Education abroad offices and organizations also monitor and support the health of students before, during, and after their travel overseas (NAFSA, 2015).
One of the most easily accessible and reliable methods of monitoring conditions in overseas locations is through the U.S. DoS and CDC, and professional organizations in international education generally recommend the use of their travel advisory and notice systems in assessing risk for student travel (NAFSA, 2022; The Forum on Education Abroad, 2016). The DoS publishes “travel advisories” for all countries other than the United States, which are intended to “help U.S. citizens traveling and residing abroad by providing them important safety and security information” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.-a). The CDC publishes “travel health notices” and, new in 2020, “COVID-19 travel health notices” to “inform travelers and clinicians about current health issues that impact travelers’ health” (CDC, n.d., para. 1). According to the DoS, many factors are used to determine the travel advisories for countries, and the information is gathered from “U.S. government sources” (U.S. DoS, n.d.-a), while the CDC primarily uses incidence rate and new case trajectory to determine their travel health notices for COVID-19 (CDC, 2021a). Both systems follow a relatively consistent pattern of notices/advisories that escalate from encouraging travelers to proceed as usual up to strongly encouraging U.S. citizens to avoid all nonessential travel to a certain country or region. There are two or three levels in between those that caution travelers to take enhanced
precautions. While these systems have historically been independent of each other, in April of 2021, the U.S. DoS (2021a) updated the methodology they used for risk assessment to be more consistent with CDC travel health notices.
Because of the ease and reliability of a three- or four-tiered warning system, and the acknowledgment by the DoS that the U.S. government may be unable to assist U.S. travelers in the event of an emergency if they are traveling in a country that has a high-level warning or advisory (U.S. DoS, n.d.-c), certain levels are used as triggers for universities to further review programs in those destinations or prohibit travel to them (Redden, 2018). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Level 4 advisories were generally reserved for countries where travel posed a significant and potentially immediate risk to a traveler’s wellbeing, or even their life. Travel advisory pages on the DoS website for these destinations provided, and in some cases still do provide, links to specific travel recommendations (U.S. DoS, n.d.-b). Included among these recommendations are considerations like, “draft a will,” “discuss a plan with loved ones regarding . . . funeral wishes,” “leave DNA samples with your medical provider,” and “be sure to appoint one family member as the point of contact with hostage takers” (U.S. DoS, n.d.-b). Such dire warnings in many cases led to institutional policies that precluded even the consideration of student travel to those destinations, particularly for undergraduates. Some universities’ policies as of this writing state that they will suspend and prohibit travel to DoS Level 4 travel advisory countries with the note that students already studying in those countries may be forced to return home (see University of Houston, 2019; University of Louisville, n.d.).
Persisting Issues with Federal Guidance Throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic
The initial halting of international travel and publishing of advisories to return to the United States in March 2020 may have been prudent steps to take at the outset of the pandemic due to the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the disease in its early days. In addition to considerations related to the spread of the virus itself, the DoS warned U.S. travelers remaining outside the country that they “should be prepared to remain abroad for an indefinite period” (U.S. Department of State, 2020). As airlines stopped flying and embassies and consulates suspended operations, there was a real risk that travelers would end up on their own in an unfamiliar environment during the most significant public health crisis of our time.
However, ensuing issues related to federal guidance created barriers for educational institutions seeking to restart education abroad programming even after it seemed safe and reasonable to do so. In mid-2020, the levels of many travel advisories/notices began to decrease as the first global wave of COVID-19 cases receded. This enabled universities and organizations to resume some education abroad programming. However, on April 19, 2021, the DoS (2021a) updated their travel advisories to “better reflect CDC’s science-based Travel Health Notices,” which resulted in over 80% of countries around the world being assigned a Level 4 advisory once again (Romo, 2021). Many institutions found this change particularly perplexing because, by this point, the risk to individual travelers of contracting the disease had fundamentally changed due to wide (although not complete) rollout of vaccines for many individuals. It should be noted that on the same day the travel advisories were updated, the Biden administration announced that COVID-19 vaccines were officially available to any adult in the United States who wanted one (Treisman, 2021). Furthermore, more than two
Cooounicating ealthand Safetyy: n neasy alance 15
weeks earlier, on April 2, 2021, the CDC (2021b) had issued guidance that fully vaccinated people could travel within the United States “at a low risk to themselves” (para. 1) without the need for testing or quarantine, and indeed that they could even travel internationally without being tested, unless the destination required it, and without quarantining upon return unless their home jurisdiction required it.
To discuss the changing DoS advisories, The Forum on Education Abroad (2021) held an open forum virtual meeting on May 3, 2021, over a year into the COVID-19 pandemic. A series of polls were conducted with the approximately 191 participants (most of whom were staff members in education abroad offices across the United States) that asked how organizations used external factors such as CDC and DoS guidance in COVID-19-related decision-making on education abroad programming. Approximately 65% of the attendees stated that CDC guidance was one of the top three main external factors that affected their decision-making, and 74% stated that DoS travel advisory guidance was one of their top three factors (The Forum on Education Abroad, 2021). When asked whether their organization would allow travel to countries rated at Level 4 by the DoS, only 22% said yes, while 33% said “only as an exception,” 16% said no, and 30% were unsure (The Forum on Education Abroad, 2021, slide 6).
Two days later, on May 5, 2021, the DoS’s travel advisory update was protested by international education professional organizations as well as associations made up of college representatives. Arguments included that the changes significantly impeded universities’ ability to use the advisories as a primary risk analysis tool due to their lack of nuance, and that many of them were bound by institutional travel policies that did not allow them to send students to countries with the highest-level ratings (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021). They argued that the new advisories did not acknowledge varying levels of COVID-19-related risk for different destinations and students, including the consideration of “vaccination rates and the status of individual travelers” (Alliance of International Exchange et al., 2021, p. 1). The Council on International Educational Exchange’s Vice President for Risk Management, Bill Bull (2021), also argued that the updated methodology had made the Level 4 rating “essentially meaningless” (para. 3), due to the fact that it resulted in strange outcomes, noting that Germany and North Korea were assigned the same advisory level (thus implying that they were equally risky destinations for U.S. travelers). The international education professional organizations asked for the DoS to make clear that their own travel advisories should not necessarily constitute the sole source that educational organizations rely on to determine risk at overseas destinations, and they also requested a meeting with the DoS. On May 20, 2021, The Forum on Education Abroad reported that they had met with DoS officials along with several other education abroad organization representatives, and the DoS reportedly clarified that they would be “updating their advisories weekly and that 20 countries were returned to Level 3” (McCauslin, 2021, para. 3).
Communicating Health and Safety: An Uneasy Balance
Despite the focus in the field of international education on health and safety for students, few empirical studies explore best practices for creating policies that ensure education abroad student health and safety or legal implications for organizations (Hull, 2019). Studying abroad generally involves risks above and beyond what a student might normally experience at their home school, and the CDC and DoS are often recommended as resources
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when evaluating risks in foreign countries (Rhodes, 2014). However, contradictory CDC, DoS, and local health official guidance can complicate university messaging to students about the risks of studying abroad or remaining on their home campus. During the swine flu outbreak in 2009, Gary Rhodes, director of the Center for Global Education at Loyola Marymount University, emphasized that the outbreak presented an opportunity for institutions to review their health and safety policies and ensure that messaging from education abroad staff was consistent with messaging from campus health officials (Fischer, 2009). He specified that students and their families can become distressed when they hear caution and warning from education abroad staff but perceive campus health officials as “downplay[ing] risk” (Fischer, 2009). In fact, this scenario seemed to occur in the spring of 2021 when many universities were publicizing their plans to fully reopen in the fall following wide distribution of vaccines while education abroad staff members and organizations were struggling to contend with increasing DoS travel advisory levels. Universities found themselves communicating to students that it was safe to return to campus but not safe to study abroad.
Since the start of the pandemic, universities and educational organizations have struggled to navigate the swiftly changing status of COVID-19 cases around the world, especially with apparently contradictory information from the CDC (Torres, 2020). For example, on March 1, 2020, the CDC issued guidance specifically to universities that recommended they consider bringing students home from abroad and postponing study abroad programs (American Council on Education, 2020), even though existing CDC guidance at the time only recommended that older adults and people with chronic health conditions postpone their travel. However, as previously discussed, just a few weeks later, educational organizations with students abroad had no choice but to bring students home from abroad (if not immediately following the Trump administration’s impending travel ban from several European countries, then certainly afterwards when it became increasingly clear that COVID-19 was a dangerous global pandemic spreading rapidly around the world). Unfortunately, bringing students home during this time period meant that airports around the world struggled to handle the massive crowds. Reports from those inside the airports stated that effective screening procedures were not well implemented, and protective gear was not available or used (Baker, 2020). In fact, at the time, the WHO was actively encouraging the public not to wear face masks despite growing clear evidence that the virus spreads through respiratory droplets, which can be contained by masks (Oreskes, 2020). Oreskes (2020) surmised that this conflicting guidance, which was later changed, was due to a severe shortage of personal protective equipment for health personnel and the desire by the WHO to retain what equipment did exist for those health-care workers. This presented a catch-22 situation for the policies and strategical decision-making processes at universities and in other educational organizations. In other words, bringing students home for the sake of their health and safety also put their health and safety at risk.
While some students may have been safer or avoided the virus more easily if they had stayed in their host countries, it is only possible to review which countries had lower rates of COVID-19 community spread in hindsight. Additionally, although students traveling abroad generally have travel medical insurance provided by their home university or provider, navigating an unprecedented global pandemic while overseas and possibly in a country in which a different language than their own is spoken is much more difficult than navigating the health-care system and regulations within their own home country. As airlines suspended flight operations, embassies closed, and the U.S. government advised that travelers who remained in-country should be prepared to stay there indefinitely, decisions about bringing
people back had to be made quickly. For this reason, we can reasonably conclude that most universities and educational organizations used the method of satisficing by making the best decision they could given limited resources, information, and time (Simon, 1956). Satisficing (Simon, 1956) refers to decision-making processes that are made when less than optimal results will occur. In this situation, education abroad leaders needed to make quick and complex choices that would aim to both satisfy and suffice (Simon, 1956), even though all choices carried the burden of less-than-optimal outcomes.
However, the continued pause in global mobility that persisted through 2020 and 2021 has provided an opportunity for reflection on and analyses of the reliance that schools and higher education organizations have on policies that are informed by the U.S. federal government travel advisory systems. This is especially important when there are perceived health and safety risks in potential education abroad locations. As stated previously, some education abroad organizations and universities have criticized the DoS for creating generalized and non-contextual guidelines that present barriers to sending students abroad, and many organizations rely on these agencies’ guidelines. Further, the CDC has been criticized for promoting political messaging over scientific and medical guidance (Weiland, 2020). Former Trump-appointed CDC officials came forward in late 2020 to reveal that CDC guidance was regularly subjected to intense scrutiny by White House officials, which often resulted in “soften[ed]” (Weiland, 2020) language to better fit the messaging coming from President Trump that the virus was under control in the United States. As previously mentioned, professional international education organizations recommend incorporating CDC guidance into educational policies related to international risk, health, and safety. But political interference during the Trump administration meant that this guidance was no longer entirely reliable. Therefore, schools and higher education organizations that rely exclusively on federal guidance may do so at a detriment to their students and miss important context even if the systems and guidelines were not intended to be prescriptive.
To understand how schools and higher education organizations and their education abroad programs can emerge stronger from the COVID-19 pandemic, in the following sections, we analyze policy used by many organizations that bans or severely limits education abroad programming based exclusively on federal guidance. By utilizing a critical policy analysis (CPA) framework, we suggest that policy roots and development have the potential to reveal and reinforce ethnocentric U.S. perspectives. Meanwhile, institutions and organizations that develop educational travel opportunities and/or send students overseas should include and value international perspectives on relative risk in overseas travel, should be just in the distribution of power, knowledge, and guidance, and should be consistent in their practices even when rhetoric is problematic (Diem et al., 2014).
A Closer Examination of Policy Communication and Miscommunication
In this section, ethnocentrism and American exceptionalism are defined and considered in the context of policy communication (and potential miscommunication) related to education abroad travel for students in higher education and other education settings, at the onset of and during the year following the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. We suggest that these concepts help to inform, of course not completely, some of the challenges faced by international education organizations, higher education, and other education setting
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decision makers during a global pandemic crisis. Then, we highlight the issues via a CPA approach, which Diem et al. (2014) explain is a way to problematize otherwise rational and normative approaches to studying educational policies. This helps to open possibilities for understanding policy problems with nontraditional and typically nondominant frameworks. In the final part of this chapter, we discuss implications and recommendations for leaders in the field of international education, as they may also face, or may continue to face, future challenges in quickly moving health crisis situations.
Ethnocentrism and American Exceptionalism
Ethnocentrism includes the tendency to view one’s own culture as the norm to which all other cultures are compared, usually as inferior to one’s own (Thompson, 2015). In providing guidance to U.S. travelers overseas, the U.S. DoS (n.d.-a) considers relative risk above and beyond what they might normally experience in the United States. The practice of relying exclusively on U.S. government-generated intelligence on health and safety abroad, and the failure to consider the lower relative risk to the health of U.S. travelers in other countries versus the United States, where COVID-19 case counts were higher than for any other country for a period of time, promotes a problematic ethnocentric view of health and safety through the lens of “American exceptionalism.”1 American exceptionalism presumes that, “America’s values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration” (Walt, 2011, para. 2). A belief in American exceptionalism is problematic and ethnocentric, according to Thompson (2015), and suggests that the United States is superior to other countries and their cultures. However, the field of international education has long promoted intercultural understanding and sensitivity as an important component of educational travel overseas. One of the first large-scale exchange programs established in the United States for educational travel was the Fulbright–Hayes Act of 1946, which provided federal funds for exchanges and research that would “increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries” and “assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations” between nations, among other goals (Fulbright–Hays Act, 1946, p. 1). If international education professionals are to continue promoting study abroad programming as a way to help students gain intercultural awareness and understanding, policies exhibiting American exceptionalism have no place in guiding these programs. This is especially true for a field that serves self-selecting students that are primarily White women traveling from the United States to other countries in the Global North (Institute of International Education, 2021). Promoting ethnorelativism and a sense of intercultural awareness through education abroad programming means that students must be guided to develop a critical eye toward the normative nature of their own cultural upbringing. Professionals in international education must do the same when considering and writing policies that guide their decision-making, including those that address relative risks and safety in international destinations.
Critical Policy Analyses and Problematizing Policy
Within educational policy analysis, CPA involves critiquing, interrogating, and exploring structures of inequality and oppression that are built into policies (Diem et al., 2014). CPA in educational policy studies tends to focus on five main concerns, including policy rhetoric versus reality, policy roots and development, distribution of power, resources, and knowledge, social stratification and policy effects on privilege and inequality, and the engagement
