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Foreword
A successful approach to the challenges and opportunities that we face in a dynamic and complex world must be based on an informed discussion of the issues that is open, clear, and unambiguous. This book, American National Security, provides an impressive, comprehensive discussion of the issues, actors, policies, and history that have influenced national security policy in the past and will shape its direction in the future. Just as America and the world are continuously evolving, the authors have significantly revised this edition based on recent US history, some of the initial policy approaches of the Trump administration, and changing global dynamics.
A comprehensive approach to American national security policy is necessary to avoid the strategic myopia that can often afflict policy makers. It is not sufficient to conduct a “soda straw” examination of issues using a country-by-country or issue-by-issue approach. It is important to look at regions and strategies holistically to understand trends and to anticipate how actions in one area will reverberate throughout the world.
For example, in the Middle East, the world is facing a number of challenges that have affected and will continue to have implications for US national security. First, Sunni Islamic extremism, which is embodied in alQaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and their affiliates, continues to motivate and support violent attacks that foment instability. Second, Shia Islamic extremism, as led by Iran and its proxy forces fighting throughout the Middle East, exacerbates conflicts in the region and exploits state weakness to further Iran’s strategic ends. Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains salient throughout the region, in spite of significant efforts of the United States and others to achieve a long-term solution. Finally, in spite of
recent increases in US energy production, the world remains dependent on energy resources from the region, which is why the Middle East will continue to be strategically important. These trends are difficult to discern if one only examines particular incidents, but they become clearer through a more comprehensive review of the issues. Circumstances are changing in the Middle East and opportunities abound, but considerable strategic dangers remain.
The information revolution is affecting security and political stability throughout the Middle East, as well as the broad array of US national security interests in that region and beyond. More individuals throughout the world have greater access to information, which compresses decisionmaking cycles and accelerates the effects of any particular action, either by the United States or by those who would oppose US policy. Individuals and organizations are networked globally and have the ability to see beyond the local areas in which they live, which can be positive, as it opens opportunities, but also negative, as it raises expectations and enhances perceptions of relative deprivation. Moreover, ubiquitous technology empowers and connects individuals, corporations, and others in ways that can be extremely unpredictable and potentially harmful to American interests and to the ability of states to influence the trajectory of events.
The United States led the West during the Cold War, and US policy was the driving force behind many global issues, especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, American leadership remains essential to global security and to developing and executing strategies to confront challenges. That does not mean that the United States should have policies that only employ American assets, but it does mean that there should be an American commitment to lead so that other countries understand there are some enduring policies that the United States will continue to support over time. To manage costs, the United States will need to demonstrate its sustained commitment to allies and to international peace and security through means that do not always include a large-scale deployment of US forces. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy recognizes the continuing challenges in the Middle East but also clearly points to the growing strength of America’s near-peer competitors, China and Russia. When these issues are considered alongside persistent and emerging security challenges in places such as North Korea and parts of Africa, it becomes clear that the United
States will face an extremely complex security environment for the foreseeable future.
It is important to understand the perspectives and approaches that provide the context for American national security policy making. As discussed in part I of this book, “National Security Policy: What Is It, and How Have Americans Approached It?,” one of the strengths that the United States brings to policy making is its values. Those values are represented both by the ideals enshrined in the Constitution and Declaration of Independence and by the strength and dedication of the American people to do the hard work necessary to make the United States and the world a stronger, safer, and better place for future generations. A successful and sustainable approach to national security will rest on these values, which should continue to influence policy choices in the future.
With national security policy, it is sometimes difficult to understand all the players involved, which is addressed in part II, “National Security Policy: Actors and Processes.” During my career as a military leader, I worked with all the actors discussed, often engaging with the White House and Congress. With the intelligence, diplomatic, and homeland security communities as partners with the military, the challenge was to integrate our efforts in support of shared strategies. Understanding the proper role of the military, the vital importance of the budget process, and the intricacies of national security decision making are crucial to the effective formulation of security policy. There is no substitute for learning about all of these actors and agencies firsthand, but studying their history, culture, organization, and practices is a great first step toward understanding their important roles in American national security.
Recently, the United States seems to have had an overreliance on the military element of power. As this book describes in part III, “Ways and Means of National Strategy,” it is critical to understand and incorporate all elements of power when developing a successful long-term strategy. Our overreliance on the hammer of military power has created a dynamic that makes every problem look like a nail. While military action can gain time for political activity to take place, it is vital that we incorporate economic, diplomatic, informational, educational, intelligence, law enforcement, and other aspects of power in the development of a sustainable strategy. All elements of national power need to be adequately resourced so that we can
most effectively advance American interests in the world.
Finally, understanding the history and dynamics of global security issues, examined in part IV, “International and Regional Security Issues,” is particularly important. There is a tendency to view the issues in a particular country or region in only their current circumstances, without understanding the historical context or perceptions of past US policy in the region. Many of the issues that policy makers deal with today are the legacy of previous, seemingly well-intentioned decisions that may not have adequately reflected the underlying reality of the various groups on the ground. Only by being willing to listen to the issues from the perspective of those who live with them will US policy makers be able to understand how to develop an effective, sustainable strategy over the long term.
American National Security is an ideal resource that ties together theory, actors, instruments of power, and regions of the world, with clear, detailed explanations that facilitate understanding of international relations and security policy. The people who are likely reading this book students of national security policy, diplomats, policy makers, military officers, intelligence professionals, engaged citizens, and others collectively provide the strength, insight, and hope for America going forward. The challenges that we face are great, but the wisdom in this book will help its readers develop a comprehensive understanding of the issues affecting national security policy. That understanding can lead to effective, long-term strategies that will serve US national interests while enabling the United States to continue to lead allies and other international partners in fighting for shared prosperity and peace.
General John P. Abizaid, US Army (Retired)
Preface
The seventh edition of American National Security continues the rich tradition of providing a single authoritative book that describes and explains US national security policy, actors, processes, and issues in a comprehensive and understandable way. This edition has been substantially rewritten to account for significant changes in the national security environment in the past decade. It is intended to provide a foundation of understanding for teachers, students, and practitioners of national security policy, one of the most important and least understood subjects in public policy.
This book provides this foundation in a logical structure that introduces the reader to the subject and provides a topically organized reference for immediate or future use. The first part of the book explains what national security policy is and how Americans have approached it over time. Understanding the theory, history, and evolution of American national security policy helps explain existing institutions and strategy. Part II describes each of the major actors and processes, including the president, Congress, homeland security, intelligence, the military, budgeting, and the national security decision-making process. Part III explains the ways and means of national strategy, including diplomacy, information, economics, and military power. Part IV tours the globe with chapters on each major region of the world, which examine the history of American engagement, current US interests and policies, and enduring issues likely to affect American national security policy in each area. Finally, part V encourages the reader to consider major dynamics that may shape American national security decisions in the future.
All seven editions of this text are the result of the dedicated scholarship
and unparalleled knowledge and experience of the two men to whom we dedicate this book: Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor Jr. Brigadier General Joe Jordan graduated as the highest-ranking cadet in the West Point Class of 1946, studied at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, earned his PhD from Columbia University, and served on the faculty in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point for twenty years, eventually retiring as the Professor and Head of the Department. He continued to serve in senior civilian positions in the Department of Defense and the Department of State and was a member of the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. He served as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), President of the CSIS Pacific Forum, and as a Senior Advisor at the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young University. Colonel Bill Taylor was commissioned through the US Army Officer Candidate School (OCS) in 1955 and was later elected to the OCS Hall of Fame. He earned his PhD from American University and served on the faculty in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point for sixteen years. At the time of his retirement, he was serving as the Director of National Security Studies. He then became an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and served at CSIS, where he led the International Security Program, was a Senior Advisor, and helped lead the professional development program. These men provided a tremendous legacy of excellence, precision, rigor, and clarity one that continues to inform this seventh edition of American National Security.
As faculty in the Department of Social Sciences in the 1970s, Jordan and Taylor recognized the need for a textbook that would explain US national security to an audience with renewed interest in security issues after the Vietnam War. The first edition was published in 1981 and quickly became the most relied-upon text in national security policy courses at institutions serving undergraduates, graduate students, and military and civilian government professionals. Subsequent editions of the book followed the same basic approach identifying the history, continuities, and trends in American national security policy that provide context for the contemporary challenges that policy makers face on a daily basis. Jordan and Taylor combined their efforts with Lawrence J. Korb of the Brookings Institution for the third and fourth editions, and Michael J. Mazaar of CSIS for the fifth edition. The sixth edition returned partial responsibility for the book’s
authorship to the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, as Jordan and Taylor recruited Michael Meese and Suzanne Nielsen, previous and current Department Heads, respectively, to co-author that edition. Rachel Sondheimer, an Associate Professor who teaches American politics at West Point, has joined Meese and Nielsen to co-author this seventh edition.
The Department of Social Sciences at West Point is responsible for teaching the disciplines of political science and economics to cadets, and it is also home to the Combating Terrorism Center, which provides cutting-edge research on the terrorist threat, as well as the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, which supports the Army’s senior leaders as they shape the future force. It is a national resource of talented military and civilian faculty who teach cadets about the national security policies that they will observe, encounter, help develop, and execute throughout their professional careers. Classrooms at West Point are the ideal laboratory to test the concepts from this text, and the current version has benefited greatly from the insights of faculty and students as it was developed. Indeed, this work would not have been possible without this collaboration at the United States Military Academy, which is among the reasons why proceeds from the sale of this book are donated back to West Point. Several faculty members leveraged their considerable national security expertise to help draft significant revisions to many chapters. In particular, we would like to acknowledge the work of Terry Babcock-Lumish (“Putting the Pieces Together: National Security Decision Making” and “Nuclear Policy”), Jordan Becker (“Europe”), Ruth Beitler (“The Middle East”), Ryan Bell (“Putting the Pieces Together: National Security Decision Making” and “Nuclear Policy”), Steven Bloom (“Economics”), Roxanne Bras (“Irregular Threats: Terrorism, Insurgencies, and Violent Extremist Organizations”), Tania Chacho (“East Asia”), Robert Chamberlain (“Latin America”), Meghan Cumpston (“The International Setting”), Joe DaSilva (“The Evolution of American National Security Policy” and “Congress”); Brian Dodwell (“Homeland Security”), Dean Dudley (“Planning, Budgeting, and Management”), Brian Forester (“Presidential Leadership and the Executive Branch” and “South Asia”), Jim Golby (“The Role of the Military in the Policy Process” and “Military Power”), Jessica Grassetti (“Planning, Budgeting, and Management”), Liesl Himmelberger (“East Asia”), Seth Johnston (“Europe”), Bonnie Kovatch (“Sub-Saharan Africa”), Patrick Kriz (“Latin America”), Charlie Lewis (“The
Evolution of American National Security Policy” and “Congress”), David Myers (“Latin America”), Rob Person (“Russia”), Don Rassler (“South Asia”), Adam Scher (“Traditional Approaches to National Security” and “Intelligence and National Security”), Nathan Strickland (“The Evolution of American National Security Policy”), Mike Walker (“Economics”), Ray Walser (“Latin America”), Tom Walsh (“Diplomacy and Information”), Jason Warner (“Sub-Saharan Africa”), and Richard Yon (“Presidential Leadership and the Executive Branch” and “Congress”).
We would like to express our appreciation to the Department of Defense Minerva Project, which supported the completion of this volume. We would also like to recognize Brandon Mohr, whose significant cartographic design assistance is reflected in the maps in part IV. Teresa Lawson provided exceptionally helpful editorial assistance as the manuscript was being developed that improved it significantly. The book would not have been possible without the help of Lauren Straley and Julie McCarthy at Johns Hopkins University Press, who oversaw its development and production. Copy edits and indexing under the supervision of Kim Giambattisto improved the final text. Of course, any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. Additionally, the views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government.
With the cacophony of information that bombards practitioners, teachers, and students of national security policy, it is critical that individuals from all backgrounds have a good understanding of the history, concepts, institutions, processes, and policies that provide essential context. We hope that this book serves as a foundation that will help students and practitioners to understand better the important issues that affect American national security. The more that individuals learn, the better they will be able to contribute to effective national security policy development and implementation.
Abbreviations and Acronyms
A2/AD anti-access/area denial
ABM anti–ballistic missile
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACRF African Crisis Response Force
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
AFRICOM US Africa Command
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APC armored personnel carrier
AQAP al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
AU African Union
AVF all-volunteer force
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BCA Budget Control Act
BMDS ballistic missile defense system
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Brexit British exit from European Union
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CARSI Central American Regional Security Initiative
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBSI Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CENTCOM US Central Command
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (treaty of 1990)
CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
COIN counterinsurgency
COM chief of mission
COMINT communications intelligence
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CSCC Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
CSCE Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe
CSSTA Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement
CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction
CVE countering violent extremism
CYBERCOM US Cyber Command
DC Deputies Committee (of the National Security Council)
DCA Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCS defense commercial sales
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DMZ demilitarized zone (Korean peninsula)
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DoD Department of Defense
DoDIN Department of Defense Information Network
DOJ Department of Justice
DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ELINT electronic intelligence
ESDP European Security and Defense Program
EU European Union
F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI foreign direct investment
FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIRE Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISINT foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
FMF foreign military financing
FMS foreign military sales
FSB Federal Security Service (Russian)
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
FY fiscal year
G7, G8, or
G20 group of seven, eight, or twenty (international economic forums)
GAO Government Accountability Office
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP gross domestic product
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GNP gross national product
GPS global positioning system
HASC House Armed Services Committee
HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HSC Homeland Security Council
HUMINT human intelligence
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IED improvised explosive device
IGO intergovernmental organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMINT imagery intelligence
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (treaty of 1987)
IOB Intelligence Oversight Board
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTTF joint terrorism task force
KGB Committee for State Security (Russian)
KMT Nationalist Kuomintang Party (Chinese)
MAD mutually assured destruction
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South (Spanish)
MIRV multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle
MISO military information support operations
MNC multinational corporation
MOOTW military operations other than war
MWe megawatt
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NEC National Economic Council
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM US Northern Command
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
NSR National Security Review
NSS National Security Strategy
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OBOR one belt, one road
OCO overseas contingency operations
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OHS Office of Homeland Security
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT open source intelligence
PA Palestinian Authority
PC Principals Committee (of the National Security Council)
PCC policy coordination committee (of the National Security Council)
PDD presidential decision directive
PDVSA Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (Venezuela’s National Oil Company)
PEO peace enforcement operations
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PfP Partnership for Peace
PIAB President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PKO peacekeeping operations
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRC People’s Republic of China
PREACT Partnership for East African Counterterrorism
PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
PSUV United Socialist Party of Venezuela
QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
R&D research and development
R2P responsibility to protect
RMA revolution in military affairs
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
SDF Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SOCOM US Special Operations Command
SOF special operations forces
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002)
SOUTHCOM US Southern Command
SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991)
TCO trans-national criminal organization
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TSCTP Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
USA
PATRIOT Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIA US Information Agency
VEO violent extremist organization
VTC video teleconference
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
YPG Kurdish People’s Protection Units
Perspectives on International Politics
Three of the most important intellectual perspectives in the field of international relations are realism, liberalism, and constructivism.6 These three worldviews reflect different basic assumptions about which phenomena are truly important and how the world is expected to operate. It is useful for both scholars and policy makers to be self-conscious about their perspectives so that they understand the likely strengths and weaknesses of their approaches to international events and developments. Clarity about core assumptions may also help policy makers anticipate circumstances under which their various initiatives may be mutually reinforcing or might instead be contradictory.
Realism. The oldest and perhaps the predominant view of the nature of international politics is realism, which has intellectual roots dating back to Thucydides and Machiavelli. Realists see international politics as a dangerous, conflict-prone realm in which security is far from guaranteed. States are the primary actors and can be analyzed as if they were unitary and rational actors whose core national interest can be defined as power. Given the presence of anarchy defined as the lack of a single authority having sovereign power over the states in the international system realists assert that states must pursue self-help strategies in order to survive. Although some states may strive only to maintain their positions in the system, others may pursue domination. To preserve independence and prevent destruction, states seek to balance the power of other states either through alliances or through internal means of increasing their relative power, such as arms buildups or economic mobilization. Although alliances may be useful forms of cooperation, they should be expected to last only as long as the common threat that initially brought the allies together remains relevant.
An important contribution of the realist school of thought is its emphasis on the central concept of power. Although it can be tempting to define power as influence or as the ability to get one’s way, this approach can easily become misleading. For example, a Canadian victory in a trade dispute with the United States does not make it reasonable to conclude that Canada is more powerful. Seeking to give the term a more scientific and measurable
formulation, political scientist Kenneth Waltz argues that power is a combination of seven components: size of population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence.7 All of these elements must be considered in any assessment, although the weighing of the elements varies in different contexts. Waltz’s central prediction is that states can be expected to react to the power of other states by engaging in balancing behavior. He argues that if “there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it.”8
In an effort to refine Waltz’s approach, Stephen Walt argues that power is important but not fully adequate to explain what motivates state behavior. States respond not just to the power of other states but also to the level of threat they pose, with threat defined as encompassing material capabilities as well as geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.9 This formulation suggests that states can influence how others respond to their power through the extent to which they develop offensive means and through the manner in which they convey their intentions. Although Waltz and Walt differ slightly on the key motivator for balancing behavior, they have in common most of the assumptions that characterize the realist school of thought: that the world is a dangerous place in which each state must ensure its own survival by obtaining and competently applying power. Although realism has proven itself an enduring and valued paradigm with many strengths, it also has weaknesses. Realists have traditionally emphasized the primacy of the state and the relative importance of relations among the great powers.10 The current era, marked by the decreasing relevance of state boundaries and by critical transnational threats stemming from weak and failed states, presents a challenge to the primacy that realists give to great power competition. A second issue is the priority that realists give to power and security, especially military security. Realists may be right in regarding these state concerns as central, but this may make realism a less valuable approach to explaining state policies in other issue areas. For example, although a realist perspective may help to explain international trade issues in some cases, other variables such as domestic interests, domestic and international institutions, the structure of the international economy, and the interactions of state and non-state actors are frequently significant as well.11
Finally, realism does not contain within itself an adequate explanation of change. To a great extent, realists have taken pains to point out continuity in international politics. For example, realists might claim that the same fear that Sparta had of an increasingly powerful Athens which, according to Thucydides, contributed to war between those powers more than two thousand years ago could serve as a powerful explanation for war today.12 This dual emphasis on the balance of power among states and on states as key actors makes realists less likely to explore such potential systemtransforming phenomena as the rising importance of transnational actors and the impact of the process of globalization on the international system.
Liberalism. A second major international relations tradition has its roots in the political writings of Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. Whereas the core value for realists is state security, the core values for liberals are individual liberty and moral autonomy. Although states may still be seen as the key actors in international politics, their status rests on whether or not they can reasonably be seen as the legitimate guarantors of the rights and aspirations of their populations. This perspective underpins the right to rebel found in the political theory of John Locke and other important liberal thinkers.13 Where a realist may be content to assume that a state is unitary and may not carefully analyze domestic institutions or politics, a liberal sees societal actors as having central importance.14 According to the liberal tradition, democratic institutions, as well as liberal democratic values within a population, will have an important impact on foreign policy behavior.
With regard to US national security, perhaps the single most important international relations insight stemming from the liberal tradition is democratic peace theory. This theory seeks to explain the empirical fact that liberal democracies have rarely gone to war with one another.15 Although the exact mechanisms that have contributed to preventing such wars are the focus of ongoing research, explanations generally focus on the nature of democratic institutions and norms. Democratic institutions require consensus and therefore create time for debate, thus averting wars for unpopular purposes (such as, presumably, war with another liberal democracy). Democratic norms emphasize peaceful conflict resolution and compromise, especially with another democratic government, which is seen as the legitimate custodian of the interests of its people.16 Although a democratic state may not
be more peaceful in general, it is less likely to go to war with another state that shares its democratic institutions and norms.
In addition to focusing greater attention on the domestic characteristics of states, liberalism also differs from realism in the mechanisms it suggests for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Realists would likely dismiss any suggestions that a permanent peace among states is possible, but they would hold that periods of relative peace and stability can be achieved if states prudently look to their interests (defined as power) and pay adequate attention to maintaining a balance of power in the international system.17 Liberals, on the other hand, would be more likely to look to the mechanisms identified by Kant in his 1795 political essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” There, he hypothesizes that a permanent peace among states would have three characteristics: all states would have representative, elected governments; these governments would form a federation among themselves to resolve differences and to ensure an overwhelming response to any state’s aggression; and individuals would have the basic right not to be automatically treated as an enemy when arriving in a foreign land.18 This last provision, a minimal human right that opens the door to commerce, identifies a mechanism for the development of peaceful relations, which is explored more fully in Kant’s 1784 work “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.”19 According to this essay, trade will increase the interconnectedness among societies, which will in turn increase the benefits of peaceful relations and heighten the costs of increasingly destructive wars. Though scholars working within the liberal tradition have refined these basic arguments and developed more specific propositions, Kant’s central ideas still underpin much of the liberal approach. Democratic peace theorists explore the possible benefits of democracy in terms of peace and security. Kant’s notion of a federation of states was an early articulation of the focus of modern liberal theorists on the roles that international institutions and international law can play in furthering common interests among states.20 Finally, the idea that increased trade can promote peace continues to inform liberal thinking. For example, political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed an approach called complex interdependence that sees the mutual dependence between states created by economic interconnectedness as making conflict less likely.21
For most liberals, these ideas are underpinned by concepts of universal
human rights and the view that the freedom and moral autonomy of the individual are central values. A classic statement of this viewpoint can be found in the US Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”22 The liberal desire to protect the individual is also embodied in international law, such as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” adopted by the United Nations in 1948, as well as in the Geneva Conventions and other laws of warfare.23
Like realism, liberalism has both strengths and weaknesses. It is a historical fact that liberal democracies have rarely if ever fought one another, although the process of democratization can itself be quite dangerous to international peace and security.24 International law can be useful in defining standards and in establishing a mechanism to punish individuals when domestic systems cannot, but its most significant shortcoming is the lack of guaranteed enforcement. Similarly, international institutions have been significant in helping states to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organization, or WTO) has facilitated free trade and global economic growth, for example but they, too, are limited by uncertain enforcement. Finally, increased international commerce has improved individual welfare around the world if unevenly and the mechanism of mutual dependence has been used in efforts to make war less likely between states. As an example, in the early post–World War II years, Germany and France established the European Coal and Steel Community (which later evolved into the European Union [EU]) with the intent of making war between them less likely. However, even in the area of trade, there have been disappointments. In 1910, Sir Norman Angell argued in The Great Illusion that economic interconnectedness had made war obsolete and conquest counterproductive; World War I broke out only four years later. Overall, the world wars in the middle of the twentieth century were great setbacks to the liberal vision. Enlightenment did not necessarily mean progress, and economic interdependence, democracy, and international institutions were not adequate to preserve the peace.
Perspectives and Practice. In the actual practice of American national security policy, it is often possible to discern a combination of realist and liberal influences at work. For example, an American school of thought known as neoconservatism achieved prominence and influence in the early twenty-first century. Neoconservatives, in common with realists, see the international environment as dangerous and as characterized more by conflict than by cooperation. Like realists, they put power at the center of their analyses and see it as the responsibility of the great powers or, more precisely, the United States, as the world’s only remaining superpower to manage world affairs and to provide what peace and stability can be attained.25 They are skeptical of the notion of an international community and of the idea that consensus among states that uphold different values confers meaningful legitimacy on foreign policy action. They also question the value of international law and international institutions, especially the United Nations, which has proven itself, in their view, to be the “guarantor of nothing.”26
Despite these commonalities with a realist perspective, neoconservatism also incorporates strands of liberal thought, especially in viewing realism as ultimately inadequate because of its lack of moral vision. The use of US power should always be guided by moral values and should be used to promote “democracy, free markets, [and] respect for liberty.”27 Like many liberal-tradition thinkers, neoconservatives have argued that doing the morally right thing such as supporting the development of liberal, democratic governments abroad would also be the best way to promote US interests. Neoconservatives also share with at least some liberals the notion that the condition of international affairs is improvable, although their chosen means to do so is through the use of US power rather than through efforts to strengthen mechanisms of global governance. International institutions and international law, in the neoconservative worldview, often merely mask efforts of weak or undesirable actors to restrict US freedom of action.
The reader can evaluate the degree to which the neoconservative outlook reflects traditional American approaches to national security by consulting chapter 2. Here, it is sufficient to note that both realists and liberals challenge the neoconservative outlook, but for different reasons. As a first example, take the neoconservative claim that “America must be guided by its
independent judgment, both about its own interest and the global interest.”28 Realists dismiss the notion of a “global interest” and would question the claim of any state that it possesses universal moral values and will act in accordance with them. Liberals question both the legitimacy of US claims to this decisionmaking authority and the ability of the United States to exercise it well. A second example is the neoconservative assertion that the United States is a uniquely benign global hegemon whose status validates its claim to world leadership.29 Realists, who might question the importance of a benign status, are even more skeptical of the notion that the United States is capable of remaking the world in its own image. Liberals question whether the unilateral use of US power, particularly US military power, can succeed at promoting democracy and whether such an approach would preserve global perceptions that the United States is benign.
Whatever its future, neoconservatism has been charged with being excessively realist for its focus on material power and US national interests, as well as excessively idealist in its agenda of democracy promotion abroad.30 It has also been widely criticized for providing the rationale for increased unilateralism and the justification for the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Although US policy makers seeking practical solutions to complex problems might draw on insights from a combination of the realist and liberal traditions, it is useful to probe the contradictions that a blending of these two worldviews can create.
Constructivism. In addition to realism and liberalism, a third worldview is constructivism. Scholars working within this paradigm examine the potential importance of nonmaterial as well as material factors in shaping situations and affecting outcomes. For example, Alexander Wendt rejects the realist emphasis on the distribution of material capabilities, arguing instead that relative material capabilities affect behavior only in the context of amity or enmity between the actors involved. For example, the imbalance of power between the United States and Canada does not foster the same sense of insecurity that is created by the imbalance between India and Pakistan (a topic explored further in chapter 19). Shared knowledge and the practices of the actors involved are also important to understanding how states will behave in any given situation.31
Besides illuminating the potential importance of nonmaterial factors in
