Duke East Asia Nexus 1.1

DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS U.S.- China Relations Democratization in Taiwan Social Movement in Taiwan U.S.- Taiwan Relations U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reform Ma Ying-jeou’s Election A Taiwanese Perspective Book Review: Social States History of ChinaTaiwan Relations

A Pacific Dragon?

21st Century Chinese Foreign Policy JENNY LIN

Taiwan’s Political Transformation Angela Chang

A Million Voices Against Corruption HSUAN LI

Taiwan Relations Act and the Swinging of Pendulum Power Jack Zhang

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2009

DUKE EAST ASIA nexus Vol 1 Issue 1 Linda Zhang President Jack Zhang Editor-in-Chief Alice Ren Graphics Editor Sarah Smith Webmaster Mario Parks Secretary Angela Ryu Chief of Public Relations Youngsoo Kwon Chief of Finance Editorial Board Pablo Vasquez, Alice Ding, Linda Peng, Bruce Xu Advisors Ralph Litzinger Bai Gao Yan Li Anne Allison Alumni Review Board Andrew Cheon, Muyan Jin, Xiameng Sun, Mai Li, Soyoon Sung, Neinei shirakawa, Yue Yin, Yi Xiang, Paul Zhao, Roxanna Goudarzi Special thanks to James Wong for the original DEAN logo design, and to Vice Provost Gilbert Merckx and Dean and Vice Provost Stephen Nowicki for their generous support.

Copyright Š 2009 by Duke East Asia Nexus (DEAN) at Duke University DEAN receives support from the Asian Pacific Studies Institute and from the John Spencer Bassett Memorial Fund.

DEAN publishes full-length academic papers related to East Asia.

The journal is released biannually. DEAN also publishes continuously on its website:

www.dukenexus.org.

Duke East Asia Nexus Volume 1 Issue 1 2009

I am excited and honored to present to you the inaugural edition of Duke East Asia Nexus - the beginning of a new journey for our organization, DEAN. Since our launch in 2007, we have dedicated ourselves to enriching Duke University’s understanding of East Asia, a region with a rich cultural history, one of the fastest growing economies of the 21st century, and a growing presence in the global community.

Inspired by a conversation between Andrew Cheon, our first founder and President, and Ning Ai of the Harvard Asia Pacific Review, DEAN has grown as an academic organization in many ways. First, in 2007, DEAN initiated its online journal and forum, Dukenexus.org, dedicating it to publishing academic writing on East Asia and providing connections for others from other institutions across the world to participate in dialogues about East Asia. Since then, we have also committed ourselves to bringing these dialogues to campus by sponsoring speaker events, on topics such as Sino-Japanese relations, East Asian economies, and East Asian cultural art forms. This journal that you see before you now is the next effort in our initiative to enrich Duke academic life and to raise awareness of East Asian affairs. The first journal focuses on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, and The Republic of China (Taiwan). In the future, we wish to also focus on other countries of East Asia as we have done on Dukenexus.org. We hope to bring to you some of the most intriguing discussions and academic work on East Asia explored here at the Duke community.

Cheers, and enjoy, Linda Chen Zhang Trinity College 2011 President of DEAN

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Table of Contents Letter From the Editor 5 Essays A Pacific Dragon? 21st Century Chinese Foreign Policy Jenny Lin 6 Taiwan’s Political Transformation Angela Chang 15 Taiwan Relations Act and the Swinging Pendulum of Power Jack Zhang 29 A Million Voices Against Corruption: The Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan Hsuan Li 38 Disentanglement: A Case to End U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Jack Zhang 45 Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reformist Policies and the Ensuing Legitimacy Crisis Soyoon Sung 55

Letters to the Editor Taiwan: Ma Ying-jeou and the Revolutionary Status Quo Muyan Jin 63 What Taiwan’s Closer Ties with China Means to Me Herng Lee 65 Book Review Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000 Andrew Cheon 68 Classroom Understanding China-Taiwan Relations Muyan Jin 82

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Dear Reader, This inaugural edition of Duke East Asia Nexus explores the complex trilateral relationship between the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, and The Republic of China (Taiwan). Having emerged from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, China now appears poised to play a central role in the international arena. As academics and policy makers in the U.S. worry abstractly about China’s emergence as a potential peer competitor with the United States, the people and government of Taiwan have are immediately impacted by the reality of shifting geopolitics.

The political status of Taiwan and U.S. arms sales have historically been a major stumbling blocks in Sino-American relations. Since democratization, Taiwanese domestic politics also play a significant role in cross strait relations. US-China-Taiwan relations entered a particularly strained period when Chen Shui-Bien of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party became president in 2000 and raised the contentious issue of Taiwanese Independence.

However, now with Chen discredited, and the Kuomintang back in power, cross strait relations have taken a more cooperative turn. President Ma Yingjeou of Taiwan have worked with the mainland to establish the “three-links” (direct flights, mail, and trade) between China and Taiwan. The current Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement being negotiated is set to ease trade restrictions across the strait even further.

The shifting balance of power between the U.S. and China puts cross strait relations are at a critical new juncture. Even as economic relations across the Taiwan Strait continue to improve, questions regarding Taiwan’s political status and the nature of U.S. security commitment in the region continue to linger.

The essays featured in this issue explore different facets of cross-strait relations through the lenses of policy, politics, and history. Our aim was to unpack some of the nuance in cross-strait relations by examining critical issues ranging from the implications of the rise of China, to the significance of democratization in Taiwan, to the consequence of the Taiwan Relations Act. Those who are unfamiliar with the topic of China-Taiwan relations may learn more in the Classroom section (p.80).

All of the articles of this issue along with many other essays on East Asia can be found on our website: www.dukenexus.org. Thank you for reading this edition of Duke East Asia Nexus.

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang Trinity College 2011 Editor in Chief

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A Pacific Dragon? 21st Century Chinese Foreign Policy Jenny Lin Abstract: With China poised to overtake the United States as the next superpower, the international community is captivated by Chinese progress and concerned by its foreign policy. Policy decisions made by the politburo in the past few years reveal that the Chinese government has consistently focused on economic development and has thus oriented all policy measures to that end. In recent years, China has pursued cooperative relationships with many states and complied with various international protocols to ensure continued growth. Fundamentally, Chinese foreign policy can be categorized by four fundamental goals—establish a multipolar system; minimize the power contest; address national security concerns; and promote an image as a responsible power—all aimed towards unobstructed Chinese economic growth and prosperity.

government branches, in reality, the politburo sets the ultimate direction of Chinese policy which is eventuAs an autocratic state, the People’s Republic of China reaches its foreign ally realized, adjusting for reality, by policy strategy through the decisions the “lower” offices. In order to fully represent the administrative support made and general framework set by the politburo receives throughout the its top leadership—the paramount leader and the core nucleus of a few decision making process, this committee includes important governgovernment officials formally a part ment officials from branches like the of the Chinese politburo standing military who are key in putting overcommittee. Currently, the politburo consists of nine government officials arching foreign policy ideas as determined by the politburo into practice. who determine the overall direction of Chinese foreign policy through History recommendations by various specialized departments and offices Since the end of the Cold War and (Kahn 2007). Although it may apthe dissolution of the bipolar interpear that China’s foreign policy is a national structure, the People’s Recombination of work by numerous Introduction

Jenny Lin is a junior at Duke University, double majoring in Political Science and Environmental Science and Policy.

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public of China has risen to prominence in the international system.

While some continue to suspect Beijing of embarking on its own quest of imperialism in the developing world, the entirety of Chinese foreign policy can be summarized to be following one primary goal—the strengthening of Chinese economic power and consequently increasing China’s clout on the international stage (Suzuki 2009). “The rise and fall of great powers are based on economic power that grows within states at different rates”(Li 2004). In order to foster a favorable environment for China’s national goal of economic growth and rise to power, the Chinese government has pursued a foreign policy promoting multipolarity as well as international and regional stability.

growth. The national economic goals have been maintained as the “overriding consideration” throughout the state’s policies, as Deng had originally recommended (Zhang and Yao 2004).

Foreign Policy Goals

One of the main policy measures undertaken to ensure unobstructed economic growth and development has been a promotion of multipolarity in international politics—a system that would allow China more political influence and economic opportunity. During the Cold War, China enjoyed a unique position as the “swing” power between two dueling superpowers. Without significant investment in the national military, China was able to impact global politics at the level of a global power As the People’s Republic of China simply by aligning with either the reaches its thirty-first year since United States or the Soviet Union initiating market reforms, the state (Zhao 2004). However, after the continues on its quest for economic collapse of the USSR, the People’s development and modernization Republic of China suffered from a (Scissors 2009). However, unlike political identity crisis. Without the Mao’s original emphasis on indebipolar power dynamic, Beijing’s role pendence and autarchy, the Chinese in global politics diminished signifileadership has realized that ecocantly. Recently, China has started nomic growth cannot be sustained in to re-assert itself in global affairs “by isolation from global politics and has increasing its trade, peddling arms, therefore undertaken policy measures attracting foreign aid and investthat further secure and stabilize the ment, and exporting construction political environment for Chinese workers” (Zhao 2004). As long as 2009

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the world order progresses towards multipolarity, China would remain relatively free to build the perfect base from which to modernize while gaining greater economic and political power.

multipolar world. Especially after the experiences of the Tiananmen incident, China has come to realize the constraints of active and powerful American-led interference. China has since strongly advocated for “the development of constructive relations To further clear the path for its ecoof mutual trust and cooperation” nomic modernization, China has with a number of nations. Following been actively working towards staDeng’s principles of independence bilizing its immediate surroundings and self-reliance in regards to nationand other areas of interest, like the al and foreign policy, China has been oil supplier countries of the Middle able to establish partnerships with East. While such policies directly the world’s major powers without secure Chinese economic pursuits forming a binding political alliance by ensuring a safe and stable envi(Cheng and Zhang 2004). Examples ronment for Beijing’s operations, include a cooperative partnership such international involvement also with Russia established in 1996, and adds to the image of China as a comprehensive partnerships estabresponsible power—working within lished with France, Canada, and the realms of the United Nations to Mexico the following year (Cheng promote progress and world peace. and Zhang 2004). This insistence on Such beneficent behavior, however non-alignment has given Beijing a superficial, works to abate interhigh degree of diplomatic flexibilnational concern and suspicion of ity. Relations with one state can be China as an aggressive revisionist pursued without affecting China’s state out to upset the status quo and relationship with another. Such a replace liberal democratic ideals with configuration allows China access to the “Beijing model” of communism various sources of trade and techand autocracy (Suzuki 2009). nological exchange—diversifying in case of future opposition from one Multipolarity nation and further aiding in the nation’s modernization. This resulting In the pursuit of a hospitable ensystem of international relationships vironment for Chinese economic also sets a precedent for a future codevelopment, Beijing has worked operative multipolar world order. diligently to construct a stable and 8

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Specifically, Chinese elites foresee a future power configuration with China and the European Union as two of the major poles. China and the EU share a concern over American aggression and possible hegemony, as well as issues concerning nuclear proliferation and international organized crime, like human trafficking. Beijing is supportive of the consolidation of the European Union and seeks to preserve the valuable partnership (Bezlova 2009). Over the last decade, there have been eleven China-EU summits as a part of the comprehensive strategic partnership to address a variety of international issues and policy concerns. During the 2007 summit, both sides appeared to agree on the importance of economic cooperation, and the European Union has offered diplomatic support of the PRC’s One-China policies (Faiola and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, European apprehension regarding China’s human rights record has resurfaced following the Tibetan uprising. However, considering the current condition of the world economy, the European Union cannot be too demanding of one of the fastest growing economies in the world— the 11th summit finally took place in Prague after its initial cancellation over the Dalai Lama’s visit to France.

Even though China and the EU have reached a tentative understanding 2009

based on mutual economic goals, China’s greater economic clout may not be as effective as the EU grows and consolidates.

Minimize Power Contest A similar problem is present in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States—although the US is the uncontested superpower, China’s economic prosperity grants it a certain degree of leverage. In September of 2008, China officially surpassed Japan in becoming the owner of the largest portion of the US debt; the American trade deficit with China amounted to an astonishing $268,040 million in the same year (Morrison and Labonte 2008).

In order to keep the Chinese Yuan undervalued against the dollar—sustaining high export levels of Chinese goods—the Bank of China has been purchasing large amounts of US dollars. Rather than simply hold on to American currency, the Chinese central bank has converted them into US securities as an investment strategy (Barroso and Socrates 2007).

Along with over $585 billion of US Treasury securities, China has essentially purchased the ability to alter the monetary policy of the United States (Bezlova 2009). Although the Chinese leadership have consistently restated the intention to maintain the

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status quo, possible worst case scenarios continue to haunt the American government. If the Chinese central bank decided to suddenly unload a large portion of its bond holdings, a cascade of consequences would follow leading to an eventual collapse of the American economy.

the first time in years, China has a clearly formulated periphery policy.

China has reached out to India to mitigate security concerns regarding the shared border area, as well as to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the same month to address economic cooperation measures. Formal agreeLogically, the Chinese leadership ments aside, China has also assumed would hesitate to pursue such a the posturing of a regional leader as policy because a defunct Ameriseen in the way Chinese elites recan economy would mean a much sponded to the Asian financial crisis smaller market for Chinese goods during the summer of 1997. Beijing’s and a slowing of export-lead growth. “stand-by-Asia” policy garnered it However, the possibility remains and acceptance and influence in Souththe American government will only east Asia along with improved rebecome more anxious as the PRC lations, especially economic ones, gains greater political power (Faiola with nations in the area (Morrison and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, and Labonte 2008). The Chinese the US economic model is structured leadership has even pursued a level to remain heavily reliant on foreign of friendship with Taiwan. Unfortuinvestment and credit—until that nately, despite progress in the realms changes, the Sino-American relation- of finance, air travel, and cross-strait ship will be a tenuous one. The US crime, peace and stability will not may look to extend its power in other be possible or permanent until the forums to check growing Chinese island of Taiwan is officially declared power. as a part of the People’s Republic of China. As much as the Chinese leadConsidering such complications in ership is content with the economic the forum of international powbenefits and the current progression ers, China has chosen to a pursue of events, Chinese cultural history a path under the radar and reloand current popular sentiments say cated its focus onto its immediate otherwise. As one Chinese scholar environment—striving for regional so eloquently put it, “the day when power status as opposed to that of Taiwan declares independence will an international superpower. For be the day war begins” (Zhao 2004).

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A part of the Chinese Communist Party’s revitalization of nationalism is the current fervor and popular demand for the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. However, the Chinese leadership has been able to downplay cross-strait concerns in light of other, more pressing issues.

Security Concerns Towards the north, China has fostered the spirit of cooperation with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security focused arrangement, in 2001 with some countries of the former Soviet Union including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well as the Russian Federation (Brown 2009). While the Shanghai Pact addresses select concerns, Beijing has also been in pursuit of a more evolved partnership with Moscow to secure economic and security interests. Not only is Russia one of the main suppliers of energy for the ever-growing Chinese industries but it also shares an extensive border with China posing a possible threat to China’s national security.

Even though the strategic triangle arrangement of the Cold War is no longer in use, a ghost of the old relationship remains alive today.

Efforts have been in place since the 2009

early 1990s to coordinate both trade and security arrangements between the two powers. Although the two countries regard each other with wariness, both governments acknowledge the importance of this partnership. While a friendly Russia ensures China’s energy supply and security along its northern border, a cooperative China is the biggest customer of the Russian military industrial complex. As the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations comes to pass, leaders from both nations are busy coordinating responses to the current financial disaster, and the respective militaries are contemplating a possible joint exercise (Liu 2004). As the oil pipeline from Skovorodino to northeast China is finally being constructed—15 years after its proposal—China has yet another source of petroleum to fuel its growing industrial complex and, as President Medvedev said, “minimize negative effects of the world crisis on [both] economies” (Zhao 2004).

In analyzing this particular development with the Russian Federation, it is important to note the lack of appeal to a common ideological tradition of either nation (Zhao 2004).

Contrary to Western sentiment, the partnership is established predominantly in pursuit of mutual economic interests rather than the beginning of a communist world order seeking to

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supplant the current ideals of liberal democracy.

Image as a Responsible Power Outside of the immediate region, Beijing has recently pursued a more mainline, popular approach in dealing with the third world. As exemplified by its involvement in Africa as a part of UN aid forces, China is very keen on cultivating its image as a responsible global power. Chinese foreign policy makers like to emphasize China’s fundamental beliefs in “multilateralism, peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and common development” (Dittmer 2004).

Although China’s commitments in countries in the Middle East and Africa are logical from an economic standpoint—countries like Sudan and Saudi Arabia are some of the biggest supplies of petroleum to the PRC—Beijing is also involved in UN efforts in countries like Cote d’Ivoire from which China receives no apparent benefit. Some observers have labeled such altruism as the Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of influence in countries that have yet to adopt the Western model. However, a large number of these peacekeeping operations have had the explicit purpose to establish liberal democracies in unstable nations modeled after Western states (Suzuki 2009). Even in 12

countries where Chinese economic interests do exist, Beijing has implemented policies consistent with that of the international community— like pressuring Sudan to respect basic human rights conventions despite the possible damage on the petroleum trade relationship between the two states. While such seemingly worthless acts of kindness may actually result in the “excessive responsibilities” that Beijing has been worried about since joining international organizations, it ultimately adds to the image of the PRC as undergoing a “peaceful rise” that other states need not be wary of (Zhao 2008). It is simply a way for the People’s Republic of China to demonstrate that it is capable of undertaking the great power responsibilities of promoting international stability and development (Suzuki 2009).

A similar theme of a “responsible” and “peaceful” rise to power can be seen in the Chinese administration of Hong Kong since its return to the PRC in 1997. Instead of strictly implementing the rule of the Chinese Communist Party as some feared, the Chinese leadership actually chose to implement the “one country, two systems” approach in order to maintain the foreign investments flowing into the mainland from Hong Kong (Li 2004). Although leaving Western

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capitalism in full functioning force may pose security challenges to the PRC, the foreign investment in the area is crucial to China’s modernization process which is, after all, the overriding national interest regardless of the circumstances. The establishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region further demonstrates the commitment to national economic development of Beijing, even at the expense of national security.

Undeniably, it is within China’s best interest to continue its course of economic development and rise to power. However, in order to achieve future power status, the People’s Republic of China must pay great attention to the balance between its various foreign policy interests. First and foremost, Chinese economic interests must be considered regardless of the political agenda.

share of damages and set-backs with the current economic conditions. In the near future, the Chinese leadership may also have to make a decision between petroleum and human rights in places like the Middle East and Africa, finally settle the Taiwan situation, and strategically deal with the trade balance contention with the US. Considering the recent internal issues brought about by unrest in Xinjiang, the Chinese government will also need to discover a domestic policy framework that will both maintain national stability and appease international human rights concerns. While the numerous partnerships with other major powers should ameliorate the situation, any US- or EU- led Western opposition in the international forum could pose a formidable challenge. Within the context of China’s thousand-year political history, this is merely the transitional phase before China secures its spot as one of the influential poles in the international political system.

As the People’s Republic of China pursues its quest for economic sucReferences cess and influence, its policy of focusing on the economy while adopt1. Barroso, J. M., J. Socrates, et al. (2007). Joint ing a non-threatening appearance Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit should last well into the 21st century. China-EU Summit. Beijing.

However, despite Beijing’s attempts 2. Bezlova, A. (2009). “China-EU: Summit at ensuring a peaceful rise to power, Redefines Diplomatic Boundaries.” Inter Press the future of China will not be as News. unobstructed as the leadership would 3. Bin, Y. (2009). “China-Russia Relations: Belike. China has not been spared its 2009

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tween Crisis and Cooperation.” Comparative Connections.

4. Cheng, J. Y. S. and W. Zhang (2004). Patterns and Dynamics of China’s International Strategic Behavior. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao.

New York, M.E. Sharpe: 179-206.

5. Brown, D. G. (2009). “China-Taiwan Relations: New Economic Challenges.” Comparative Connections.

6. Dittmer, L. (2004). Ghost of the Strategic Triangle: The Sino-Russian Partnership. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe.

207-223.

7. Faiola, A. and Z. A. Goldfarb (2008). China Tops Japan in U.S. Debt Holdings. The Washington Post. Washington, The Washington Post Company.

8. Li, R. (2004). Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao.

New York, M.E. Sharpe: 23-57.

9. Liu, J. (2004). Making the Right Choices in Twenty-first Century Sino-American Relations. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 243-255.

Foreign Affairs 88(3).

13. Suzuki, S. (2009). “Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy.” Third World Quarterly 30(4): 779-793.

14. US Census Bureau. (2009, 06/10/09).

“Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China.” Foreign Trade Statistics Retrieved 06/20/09, from http://www.census. gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2009.

15. Zhao, S. (2004). The Making of China’s Periphery Policy. Chinese Foriegn Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 256-275.

16. Zhang, J. and Y. Yao (2004). Traditional Chinese Military Thinking: A Comparative Perspective. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe:128-139.

17. Zhao, S. (2008). “Chinese Foreign Policy in Hu’s Second Term: Coping with Political Transition Abroad.” Retrieved 06/18/09, 2009, from http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20080510. zhao.chineseforeignpolicyhu.html.

18. Zhao, S. (2004). Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M. E. Sharpe: 140-150.

10. Kahn, J. (2007). Politburo in China Gets Four New Members. New York Times, The New York Times Company.

11. Morrison, W. M. and M. Labonte (2008).

China’s Holdings of US Securities: Implications for the US Economy. C. R. Service.

Washington.

12. Scissors, D. (2009). “Deng Undone: the Costs of Halting Market Reform in China.”

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Taiwan’s Political Transformation Angela Chang Abstract: Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, this paper argues that, although preconditions for democracy were present in Taiwan, they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but instead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of democratic forces defeating KMT one-party rule, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberalized autocracy into a democracy. By initiating it from the top, the elites within the party were able to control the process in such a manner that renewed the KMT’s legitimacy and preserved it in a high level of power. As a one-party system, the KMT not only transformed the national government but also the party by default. The KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for themselves (Keating 2006, 143).

Introduction In the global arena, Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is forever intertwined with China, or the People’s Republic of China; however, Taiwan’s democratization has distinguished the island from the authoritarian mainland. Alongside Taiwan’s economic miracle, the world witnessed a political miracle, which lends support to the idea that economic and political developments are mutually reinforcing (Copper 1996, 50). In the 1980s, the seemingly stable and unchallengeable Kuomintang Party (KMT) gave way to a

number of variable pressures which liberalized the party and led to the democratization of Taiwan. Some claim that Taiwan’s transition has been “one of the smoothest…among newly democratized countries” (Hood 1997, 10). Did the KMT’s unprecedented political openness simply reflect Taiwan’s modernization, or were there other contributing factors? Furthermore, why did the KMT decide to “transition” into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s when it had claimed the status of a democratic party since founding? This paper adopts Joseph Schumpter’s minimalist definition of democracy – a procedural definition

Angela Chang is senior at Duke University majoring in International Comparative Studies.

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for free, fair, and competitive elections of governing officials. Taiwan is defined as a one-party system of the KMT between the time of its transition from a Japanese colony in the mid-40s to its transition into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s. Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, this paper presents the argument that although preconditions for democracy were present they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but instead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of a KMT defeat, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberalized autocracy into a democracy.

Theoretical Arguments This paper applies modernization theory to study preconditions before political transition in Taiwan and transformation theory to examine the process of transition itself. The modernization theory postulates that democracy is a consequence of a progression of socioeconomic changes, such as urbanization, industrialization, rising per capita income, education, mass communication, mobilization, and political incorporation, which ready society for 16

the final step (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2; Przeworski et al 2000, 889) However, socioeconomic growth does not guarantee democratization, as famously exemplified by Singapore, and can lead to more severe policies when the government sees its legitimacy irrevocably bounded to economic growth. As Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard argue in Political Change in Taiwan (1992), “The crucial political processes that constitute democratization are either not articulated or are assumed to follow a simple model of increasing demand for democratization eventually yielding its supply” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2). Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that socioeconomic change increased democratic pressures on the KMT which responded by gradually liberalizing the party, preparing it to assume democratization.

Taiwan’s democratization process is broken down by Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, found in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington’s exploration of the global ‘wave’ of democratization concludes that there is no single explanation or cause for democratization; the breakdown of authoritarianism does not equal the emergence of democracy; and differences among authoritarian

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regimes shape the transition processes to a democratic regime. Of Huntington’s four transitions, Taiwan is best explained through transformation, a top-down approach, where the elites within the authoritarian regime “take the lead and play the decisive role” to change into a democratic system (Huntington 1991, 124). Such a process, however, requires the support of either a well established military or economically successful regime, lending support to modernization influences (Huntington 1991, 125).

Huntington differentiates five phases of transformation, four of which occur within the authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991, 127-41). In the first phase, reformers emerge within the authoritarian regime viewing the party’s liberalization as a desirable or necessary “way of defusing opposition to their regime without fully democratizing.” In the second phase, the reformers gain power over the conservatives within the party, and this often happens when a reformer succeeds the death of an authoritarian ruler. In the third phase, the liberal reformers realize their failure since a liberalized autocracy is an unstable equilibrium that needs to move towards one of two directions. In the fourth phase, democratically oriented reformers succeed the liberal reform2009

ers but must now effectively counter conservative forces and establish its own legitimacy within the context of the old party. In the fifth and final phase, the democratic reformers must act quickly to begin negotiations now that they have gained power. The reformers and opposition must reach moderate agreements to ensure a successful transformation, but if the reformers are particularly adept, they will utilize their relationships to coopt the opposition and guide the negotiations in their favor.

While Taiwan’s opposition arguably played an active role in the transition, the strategic transformation was always carefully controlled by the KMT leadership.

Preconditions Lean Towards Liberalization Many variables contribute to an authoritarian regime’s decision to shift its balance of power, but the most crucial are those affecting the regime’s legitimacy. As a one party system, the KMT’s rule was “legitimated” with its ideology, allowing it to achieve “a relatively high level of political institutionalization” (Huntington 1991, 110). Sun Yat-sen founded the KMT in 1912 according to San Min Chu I, or The Three Founding Principles, of nationalism, democracy, and liveli-

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hood (socialism). He believed that “Once China’s sovereignty had been established, the livelihood principle could be introduced which would develop the country economically and pave the way for the realization of democracy” (Hood 1997, 5). This period of tutelage was undefined, but democracy was understood to be the end goal; however, should the KMT achieve its goal of democracy, it would lose legitimacy, but its inability to effect change would also cause loss of legitimacy. When the KMT fled to Taiwan during the civil war, it brought a continental sized administration and constitution with “provisions for political representation, mass participation, democracy, and civil right…already written into [it]” (Copper 1996, 19). These provisions were canceled out in 1949 under Martial Law (Temporary Provisions) for the sake of security. The KMT relied heavily on the idea, or myth, that it was the rightful government of all China, and until then, any support for an independent Taiwan would be seen as “subversive” (Huntington 1991, 119). Taiwan would remain under a KMT emergency dictatorship for the next four decades, for democracy and civil liberties are a luxury in the face of security.

Does the economy come first and then democracy, as Sun Yat-sen 18

claimed, or vice-versa? It is generally agreed that a new democratic regime experiences greater stability if economic development precedes democratization. Taiwan’s economic miracle was realized under a KMT leadership striving to actualize its promise to develop economically and to win Taiwanese support, whom outnumbered the transplanted regime. A number of economic reforms were initiated in the 50s and 60s which destroyed the old feudal land system and dispersed industrialization throughout the island.

Due to these reforms, Taiwan experienced one of the highest growth rates in the world from the 60s to 80s, and its relatively equal income distribution eased pressures for democratization (Huntington 1991, 71). Nonetheless, economic growth has created independent sources of power, exemplified by the government’s decreasing control in Taiwan’s industrial production: 56% in 1952, 19% in 1972, and less than 10% in 1992 (Huntington 1991, Foreword x). Although economic factors are not the deciding factor in democratization, the likelihood of democratization increases once a country reaches a certain mid-level of income stability. The emergence of a strong middle class entailed many features “common to a modernizing capitalist society…[which] undermined

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the KMT’s institutional capacity for mobilization and control” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 8-10). Economic development was necessary for KMT legitimacy, but it also promoted democratization by changing the social structure and values of the populace and its interaction with the rest of the world.

Interestingly, the populace experienced local democratic participation during this period of KMT dictatorship. Economic reform dramatically affected rural politics, “bringing grassroots democracy to Taiwan” (Copper 1996, 4). The new middle class had the economic and intellectual clout to form civic associations and demand political rights.

In truth, Green Island Prison Camp quickly filled with political prisoners, but the KMT concurrently allowed the cultivation of a civil society contrary to the conditions of Martial Law (Keating 2006, 69). The KMT believed that local politics was “faction ridden and undemocratic” thus not a threatening factor, utilizing local elections to divert the public’s attention from a lack of national elections (Copper 1996, 182). Nonetheless, they turned out to be quite democratic and a good training ground in constitutionalism and democracy (Cooper 1996, 182). Furthermore, the efficiency of the local 2009

government satisfied the majority of the public with their level of political participation, believing, like Sun Yat-sen, that democracy must come slowly and in stages (Copper 1996, 182). This was important for the KMT, since “Delegates to the national elected bodies of government could not be chosen by the people of China, since most of China (the mainland) was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Changing status quo would be tantamount to declaring a two-China policy” (Copper 1996, 182-183). Martial Law delayed meaningful national elections, but the KMT’s support of civil society fostered a political culture that would eventually challenge its appropriateness.

Despite the KMT’s control over Taiwan’s internal affairs, it could not control international relations as easily due to the tenuous China-Taiwan relationship. In 1973, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations in favor of mainland China under the one-China policy. Even though the US withdrew official diplomatic relations, its continued support and security, in particular the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, allowed for the first competitive national elections in Taiwan (Copper 1996, 129).

Furthermore, there is the often unmentioned subject of the Republic

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of China’s ability to tell allies “that it could privately live with a two China settlement, but did not want to let this policy known back in Taiwan” lest it lose its claim to legitimacy and dictatorship (Keating 2006, 59). Taiwan’s status as a top exporter compelled continuing relationships with the majority of the western countries. Its cosmopolitan culture was consequently not only penetrated by western commerce, but also cultural understanding of the capitalist-democratic relationship and the “international pressure to improve its human rights record and to put into practice the democratic rights in its constitution” (Copper 1996, 130). Within this context, the KMT could not deny such demands lest an impacted economic trade also influence its legitimacy with the people.

with few excuses left, could Taiwan resist democratization any longer?

The preconditions which had served to delay the transition process had also served to familiarize the public with a certain level of western democratic culture. As the viability of an authoritarian regime is in large part a function of its society, the KMT government could no longer ignore the gap between ideology and practice (Huntington 1991, 64). However, full democratization would require “a fundamental transformation of the ruling party from an entity closely intertwined with the state apparatus to an independent political organization competing equally for electoral support” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2).

By the early 80s, the rules in Taiwan had changed. Although the KMT still dictated the actions of the government, its legitimacy was eroding under the pressures from civil society, a growing opposition (to be explained below), international actors, and even from within the party itself.

Taiwan’s political development model had always placed preconditions to democratization, including security and socioeconomic stability, but it had never refuted democracy. Now that it had achieved its desired levels,

How did the KMT react to the pressures for democratization? In its position as an authoritarian one-party system, the KMT could have cracked down and removed the internal pressures; however, that would have openly flaunted its own party ideology, destroyed its international relations, and left the problem unsolved.

The other choice would be to modify its position within the party, even if that meant democratizing.

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Emergence of Reformers Reasons for the emergence of reformers within an authoritarian party remain unclear, but reform is ultimately seen as a desired and necessary outcome. A growing and educated middle class was able to bring western organization and mobilization techniques to the opposition (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 10-11).

Their demands centered upon the full implementation of the constitution and Sun Yat-sen’s principles, questioning the KMT’s martial law, the legitimacy and competency of the “Long Parliament” (frozen into the administration since 1949), and domestic society. The KMT showed initiative by reversing agricultural policy, subsidizing rural economies, and recruiting Taiwanese elite into the party and government, but it became increasingly “difficult for the ruling party to define the terms of political participation unilaterally” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 11-12).

The older, more conservative party cadres were dying out, and the new Taiwanese recruits joined with the younger members of the KMT to form a more moderate faction within the party. Many scholars point to the Kaohsiung Incident on December 19, 1979 as a decisive moment in Taiwan’s democratization. The 2009

Human Rights Rally planned in Kaohsiung set the stage for both opposition and KMT to prove their point.

For the opposition it drew attention to the KMT’s human rights abuses and for the KMT it proved the opposition’s threat as a communist force (Keating 2006, 21, 72). The bloody riot and ensuing trials drew domestic and international attention, forcing both sides to reassess towards moderate methods. Within the KMT, the younger reformers and the older conservatives reached an agreement to “gradually ‘normalize’…political process while maintaining various constraints on the activities of the opposition” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 13). The costs of maintaining power had become too high for the KMT and the party needed to reduce the risks of losing legitimacy and liberalize.

Acquiring Power The KMT’s reaction in the Kaohsiung Incident largely reflected the influence of Chiang Ching-kuo who had assumed the presidency in 1978, shortly after the death of his father, longtime ruler Chiang Kai-shek. According to Huntington, “authoritarian rulers could seize the bull by the horns and take the lead in ending authoritarian rule and introducing a democratic system…but it almost

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always first required a change of leadership within the authoritarian system” (Huntington 1991, 57).

When Chiang Ching-kuo assumed power during an increasingly tumultuous period, he had to respond to the momentous changes accordingly.

Although he had proved himself as a loyal and able member of the KMT, he eventually came to understand that continuing the harsh authoritarian ways of his father would be “dangerous to KMT survival and harmful to both his and his father’s personal legacy” (Hood 1997, 84).

Consequently, the KMT needed to accommodate political change now, and he proved that commitment with an anti-corruption drive and the “Taiwanization” of the party (Copper 1996, 78). After the Kaohsiung Incident, the emerging reformist leaders of the party “calculated that democracy was the key and that only competitive national elections would prove that democratization was in progress” (Cooper 1996, 183). Aside from the implications of electoral fallacy, elections are the “principal mechanism through which changes in the social structure that have been brought about by rapid industrialization are translated into a political force for weakening the entrenched authoritarian order and for pushing the democratization process forward” (Hu and Chu 1992, 177). Elections 22

would prove especially meaningful for the KMT reformers by legitimizing their constitutional ideology and government.

Taiwan’s 1980 elections set precedence as the first competitive national elections. New election laws resulted from agreements between both sides, but ultimately stemming from the KMT, to allow independent candidates to organize and compete as an opposition party (Copper 1996, 80, 183). The fact that the KMT still performed remarkably well is proof of Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership and the party’s mass popular support (Cooper 1996, 80). However, in the mid-80s, the KMT suffered a brief “crisis of confidence” which renewed its commitment to reform. In March of 1986, Chiang appointed a special task force within a newer and younger Central Standing Committee to design a plan that would “implement the KMT’s goal of constitutional democracy” (Clark 2000, 27-28). He ordered the task force to study martial law, the ban on the formation of new parties, aging in the National assembly, and ways to improve local government (Copper 1996, 228).

The “centrist path” ensured that the KMT could set the parameters for change and increase popular support with its nonviolence. Chiang’s use of the constitution to determine

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succession furthered popular support by showing the extreme conservatives as unconstitutionally plotting for his seat. In the end, Chiang’s skillful political maneuvering could not maintain the balance of a liberalized autocracy for the KMT, and a decision needed to be made.

early, but illegal, formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on September 28, 1986, for as Chu Kao-cheng, the leader of the motion, said “if we are going to be hung for a sheep, we might as well be hung for a cow” (Keating 2006, 74). Chiang could have crushed this illegal party, but he accepted the DPP as a conFailure of Liberalization testant in the upcoming elections and evaded the potential charges According to Huntington, liberal of subversion under martial law by reformers retain power only briefly, announcing its imminent terminasince they are caught between the tion (Huntington 1991, Foreword xi). desire to change and to preserve, and In reality, Chiang had no alterna“a liberalized authoritarianism is tive option, since blocking the DPP not a stable equilibrium; the halfway would have sent the wrong signals to house does not stand” (Huntington all the observers. Consequently, the 1991, 134-137). Chiang’s actions 1986 National Election was another reflected that of a dying man, who watershed moment in Taiwan’s in his last years orchestrated a numhistory, marking the first two party ber of reforms which seemingly election in a Chinese nation. Acdecreased the KMT’s monopoly cording to some political observers, but overall ensured that his succesthis was “proof that the Republic of sor could carry on the democratizaChina had made the transition from tion process without accidentally an authoritarian political system to losing the party’s legitimacy and a democracy” (Copper 1996, 225). power. The Central Standing Com- Regardless of whether or not this mittee’s special task force proposed was the definitive action, the election that political parties could legally served to advance the political modform given that three conditions: ernization of both the KMT and the 1) to abide by the constitution 2) to Taiwanese government. renounce communism 3) to deny supporting independence (Copper The fact that the KMT still re1996, 230). The opposition was mained in power after the elections determined to not be seen “cooperat- demonstrated that liberalization of ing” with the KMT resulting in the the one-party system would not lead 2009

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to its demise. Further proof of the “failure of liberalization” came with the official ending of martial law on July 15, 1987 after nearly four decades of emergency rule. With the constitution in full effect, the KMT no longer had authoritarian control to detain democratization. Martial law had affected the legal system, allowed military influence in national politics, and served as a psychological deterrent to democratization (Copper 1996, 97). Nonetheless, it is important to remember that political development had occurred before the abolition of martial law, and this was just one of the many steps taken by the KMT to alter the domestic and international perceptions of the party and government. With Chiang’s death in 1988, the power passed on to his Vice-President, Lee Teng-hui, a respected and well educated native born Taiwanese who had been groomed for the presidency. Lee “accepted the inevitability of democracy” and rose as the leader of the moderate faction, changing the image and views of the KMT dramatically and smoothing its path into democracy (Hood 142, Clark 47).

Backward Legitimacy During a transformation, the reform leaders within the party often experience a “two steps forward, one step 24

backward” progression as it struggles to counter opposing forces within, often requiring a “concentration of power in the reform chief executive” (Huntington 1991, 137). Lee Tenghui was officially elected chairman of the party at the KMT’s 13th Party Congress in July 1988, signaling the transfer of power from a native-born Chinese to a native-born Taiwanese (Copper 1996, 135-6). Within the party, a triple alliance formed between moderate and conservative forces, with Lee Teng-hui as President, Lee Huan as Premier, and Hau Pei-tsun as Chief of General Staff (Leng 1996, 22). The Party Congress also agreed upon new rules and policies which enhanced the overall cohesiveness of the party and boosted their morale, and this sentiment was carried through the 1989 elections where the DPP did well enough to be considered a win but not a serious challenge to the KMT (Copper 152, 184). However, in early 1990, senior National Assembly members (“Long Parliament”) meeting to elect a new president took the opportunity to increase its own salary and privileges, sparking a public protest that served as a “necessary catalyst for Lee’s reforms” (Leng 1996, 27). The resulting National Affairs Conference in 1990 was an “unprecedented forum” between party and opposition elites that “[broke] the gridlock”

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and set a timetable for constitutional reform (Clark 2000, 27-9). Most notable was the decision to remove senior members of the national parliament. 1990 also witnessed the split of the KMT. An anti-Lee, conservative alliance headed by Lee Huan challenged Lee’s legitimacy, but Lee was able to manipulate the conflicts within this mainlander alliance by exposing them to public attack and utilizing his status as a native Taiwanese to mobilize support (Leng 1996, 24). Although the split diminished the overall size of the party, and aired internal conflicts to the public, Lee was able to then build a much stronger and cohesive party without resorting to violence. Huntington claims that during backward legitimacy the party “legitimate[s] the new order because it was a product of the old, and it retrospectively legitimate[s] the old order because it ha[s] produced the new.” (Huntington 1991, 138) Thus, throughout the various events, the KMT was able to maintain legitimacy by appealing to Sun Yat-sen’s three principles while also setting itself apart as a new, moderate party representing the interests of the Taiwanese.

Coopting the Opposition Once Lee Teng-hui emerged victorious from this period of backward 2009

legitimacy, he worked quickly to begin the final processes of democratization, reaching agreements between all viable groups. Moreover, as the reformers increasingly “alienated” the remaining conservatives within the KMT, they had to “reinforce themselves by developing support within the opposition and by expanding the political arena” (Huntington 1991, 139). According to John F. Copper, many in Taiwan assumed the superiority of a US modeled two-party system, and the KMT “demanded party competition because it associated it with democracy” (Cooper 1996, 369). The rapid strengthening of the opposition in 80s allowed for the growth of a true competitive democracy. While the organized political opposition gained greater status and legitimacy through elections, it is important to remember that these elections, and the formation of the opposition party themselves, were carefully controlled by the KMT. The KMT had the advantage of setting limits on the debate by committing to the ultimate goal without further defining its commitment and by tying the transition to already scheduled events (Chen and Haggard 1992, 16-17). The opposition on the other hand was able to specify alternative transition paths by raising the “cost of doing nothing,” but in reducing

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the risk of outpacing public opinion it had to further confine itself within the parameters of the “benign nature of KMT rule and prosperity” (Chen and Haggard 1992, 17).

Once the KMT allowed the opposition into the political arena, it had to take responsibility for the types of permissible negotiation. The National Affairs Conference in 1990 provided grounds for such negotiation over the method to select a president, with the KMT supporting an indirect election and the DPP a direct election (Leng 1996, 29). Although Lee Teng-hui submitted to the DPP’s pressure, its willingness to submit served to ally the moderates within the KMT with moderates at large, furthering its general support base and distinguishing the moderates from the conservative faction. With both the opposition and the public on his side, Lee was able to “buy time” before having to finally decide on the issue of popular elections for the presidency and vice presidency. The 1991 and 1992 National Assembly elections oversaw the “stepping down” of senior members of the “Long Parliament” and a full election of all members which silenced criticism over its unrepresentative, and thus undemocratic, nature (Cooper 1996, 184). Consequently, when Lee faced further challenge 26

within by Hau Pei-tsun’s unconstitutional actions to interfere with the powers of the presidency, Lee could ally with the DPP against a common enemy to force Hau’s resignation and minimalize the remaining conservatives (Leng 1996, 31).

The KMT’s 14th Party Congress in 1993 served as a critical moment to match the democratization within the governmental system with the KMT’s own party structure, officially making Taiwan into the “democratic, pluralized society” it had evolved into (Copper 1996, 161). The final transfer of national leadership from the conservatives to the moderates also served as the final consolidation of Lee’s power. Constitutional revisions in 1994 provided for both the direct election of the president and the reduction of the premier’s endorsement power, perhaps as a reflection of the factional difficulties Lee had faced with his two premiers (Leng 1996, 32). The ensuing governor and mayoral elections served as a training ground for the legislative elections of 1995 and presidential elections of 1996. The tense competitive electoral atmosphere fully tested the national democratic system, since the candidates had to campaign at the national level, and it was “bigger and more complicated in many ways than most national elec-

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tions” (Copper 1996, 343). Political democratization had come, and even if it had not always been a linear progression, the skillful reformers within the KMT had always kept it under control, finalizing it with the co-option of the opposition.

monopoly would come to an end in 2000 with the presidential election of Chen Shui-bian from the DPP. The peaceful transition of 2000 and the subsequent 2004 reelection of Chen would prove that democracy had come and Taiwan’s voters were increasingly sophisticated in their Consolidation approach by focusing on the issues of economy, localization, and respect In March of 1996, Lee Teng-hui (Keating 2006, 90). Although the became the first president elected by actual transition process for Taiwan’s popular election. Although many felt political transformation occurred that this election cemented Taiwan’s within roughly the span of a decade, track of democratization, others felt it would not have been possible to that democratization would not be comprehend without looking at its complete until the KMT lost the overall political development. The power of the presidency. Tse Kang- very preconditions that the KMT leng makes the distinction between had set to maintain an authoritarliberalization and democratization ian hold over the island ultimately with “the latter [as] an ‘institutionresulted in the liberalization of the alized’ liberalization” (Leng 1996, party. Following Sun Yat-sen’s ideol19-20). Liberalizations were inogy, the KMT’s economic reform stitutionalized with constitutional led to the modernization of society, reforms. The last major constitusponsoring the many changes which tional change in 1996 occurred at the allowed for a democratic transition.

National Development Conference, When the party realized that the inwhere the powers of the President evitable could no longer be delayed, were increased with a corresponding it decided that it would preempt the decrease in the provincial governopposition but taking charge of the ment (Clark 2000, 31). This also process. By initiating it from the top, reflected a remarkable confidence the elites within the party were able by the KMT in both the powers of to control the process in such a mandemocracy and the party itself. Sub- ner that renewed its legitimacy and sequent elections would demonstrate preserved it in a high level of power. the strength of the democratic proAs a one-party system, the KMT cess, but the KMT’s decades long not only transformed the national 2009

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government but also the party by default. Democracy is the antithesis of absolute control, but the KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for themselves (Keating 2006, 143). Thus, Taiwan has achieved the minimalist definition of democracy, with free, fair, and competitive elections, voting one party out in favor of another.

What lies ahead for this “political miracle” are the societal problems which may serve to break down democracy, but Taiwan may proceed with the assurance that formal democratization, however imperfect, has been achieved.

References 1. Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard.

“Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

4. Hu, Fu and Yun-Han Chu. “Electoral Competition and Political Democratization.”

Political Change in Taiwan. Eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

5. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.

Norman: U of OK Press, 1991.

6. “Foreword.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

7. Hood, Steven J. The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

8. Keating, Jerome F. Taiwan: The Struggles of a Democracy. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2006.

9. Leng, Tse-Kang. The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

10. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi.

Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950- 1990.

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.

2. Clark, Cal. “Major Developments in Taiwan’s Democratization.” Taiwan and Mainland China: Democratization, Political Participation and Economic Development in the 1990s. Ed. Thomas J. Bellows. New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 2000.

3. Copper, John F. The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections and Foreign Relations. Lanham: UP of America, 1996.

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Taiwan Relations Act and the Swinging Pendulum of Power Jiakun (Jack) Zhang Abstract: This paper examines the shift of control over US-China relations away from the Executive branch towards the Legislative branch during the Carter Administration as signified by the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Conditions of low threat, an absence of domestic consensus, a high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, and the bipartisan nature of the issue allowed Congress to be active and pass the TRA with an overwhelming majority. From the perspective of domestic politics, The TRA represented the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy. By holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Executive objections, and requiring Executive decisions to be approved by Congress, Congress effectively checked Presidential power and subjected future Presidential decisions to the Congressional power of the purse. From the perspective of foreign policy, by officially establishing diplomatic relations with China and simultaneously establishing unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States was able to maintain the status quo of Taiwan independence and deny China the concessions it desired.

Introduction

agreements in almost contradictory terms to the normalization agreeIn 1979, monumental US policy ment. The unresolved status of Taichanges were made in East Asia that wan created by the US-China norwould shape the future of the region malization, coupled with the Taiwan for decades to come. In January of Relations Act, left the triangulated that year, President Carter officially relations between the US, China, established diplomatic relations with and Taiwan as a potentially volathe People’s Republic of China, tile source of international conflict. bringing about a normalization of The events of these short months US-China relations that began with illustrate what James M. Lindsay Nixon’s policy of rapprochement. describes as a “pendulum of power” Only a few months later, Congress swinging between the Legislative and would pass the Taiwan Relations Act, Executive branches of the United which would unofficially establish States government (Lindsay 2008).

US-Taiwan diplomatic and security Jiakun (Jack) Zhang is a junior at Duke University majoring in Political Science.

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While foreign policy traditionally rests under the control of the Executive, Congress acted to actively challenge the Carter administration’s weak China policy. The process of drafting the Taiwan Relations Act and language of the legislation represent the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy by holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Executive objections, requiring Executive decisions be approved by Congress and thereby checking presidential power through oversight, and subjecting future Executive decisions to the Congressional power of the purse. It was able to do so due to the relatively low threat level, the relatively high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, the lack of domestic consensus within the Executive branch, and the bipartisan nature of the issue.

great secrecy while slowly preparing the domestic ground for the unveiling of rapprochement (Garrison 2005, 34). The important foreign policy decision to adhere to the One China Policy was made unilaterally through the Shanghai Communiqué without consultation of Congress. The early negotiations and initial trips to China were a secret to all but Nixon and his top aides in order to circumvent Congressional opposition. When he finally announced rapprochement officially, he did so by dramatically framing his China policy as part of “the structure for peace” and using media coverage to boost domestic support (Garrison 2005, 36). The Nixon administration commanded a high degree of power relative to Congress; rapprochement with China proved highly popular with the American public and his China policy received little Legislative opposition. In spite of the success of The Decline of Executive rapprochement, the subsequent norPower Relative to malization would “directly impinge Congressional Power on Taiwan’s interests (and thus members of the Taiwan lobby and their The Nixon administration initiated sympathizers in Congress)” (Gara process of giving the Executive rison 2005, 38). With the death of branch exclusive control of rapMao and Zhou Enlai in China and prochement with China. Due to both the Watergate scandal in the United the politically sensitive nature of a States, normalization was stalled. strategic realignment with China and Nevertheless, diplomatic exchanges its importance to national security, with China increased during the Ford Nixon’s administration acted with administration, even as the Taiwan 30

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lobby stepped up its efforts to undermine normalization.

vigorously by framing his China policy in anti-Soviet terms. When Deng Xiao Ping showed interest in cutting Thus, the Carter administration a deal with the U.S. over Taiwan, the inherited the White House in the Carter administration was ready to midst of a complex China policy, officially recognize China and anunder conditions of growing donounced on December 15, 1978 that mestic opposition and declining the United States and China would Presidential power, and was only begin reciprocal recognition on Janufurther weakened by Carter’s adopary 1, 1979. The process of normaltion of an open advisory structure ization, specifically the unresolved in place of the hierarchical Execustatus of Taiwan, would subsequently tive structure of the Nixon adminallow the exertion of Congressioistration. Secretary of State Cyrus nal power in foreign policy with the Vance and National Security Advisor passage of the Taiwan Relations Act Zbigniew Brzezinski held different of 1979. It would be Congressional policy agendas and beliefs about the rather than Presidential power that possibilities of when and how norwould define US-China relations for malization should be approached years to come.

(Garrison 2005, 48). Though Carter supported the One China Policy, The Expansion of “normalization was not a top priority Congressional Powers for [Carter]. In these circumstances the policy issue was open to differing In the aftermath of the Normalizainterpretations. What began as a col- tion Communiqué, Congress effeclegial advisory system devolved into tively outmaneuvered the President a classic case of bureaucratic politics, to wrest control of US-Taiwanas policy discussions turned into a China relations from the Executive big turf war” (Garrison 2005, 49). and set the tone for these relations Carter’s open advisory system made for decades to come. Congress had competing policy priorities much already begun to actively exercise more open than they had been in the its power before Carter took office.

Nixon administration, making room The amendment to the International for Congressional challenges to ExSecurity Assistance Authorization ecutive power. The Chinese favored Act of 1978 represents a clear exBrzezinski over Vance, and Brzezins- ample of the use of Congressional ki was able to push for normalization oversight to check Presidential power 2009

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by requiring the President to seek “prior consultation” on “any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force” of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (Javits 1981, 55). Congress attempted to limit the ability of the President to unilaterally negotiate any agreements with the Chinese government over the fate of Taiwan. Aware of the potential for domestic challenge to his China policy, Brzezinski advised Carter to emulate Nixon and negotiate secretly and decisively with China in 1978 in a sudden push for normalization (Garrison 2005, 59).

Their announcement of normalization took the public and Congress by surprise.

Congress that China would not be given a free hand to attack Taiwan in the foreseeable future. Thus he was initially happy to allow Congress to strengthen his proposed bill, feeling that China would have fewer objections if the Legislative Branch rather than the Executive Branch dealt with U.S. security relations with Taiwan.

Congress used this opportunity to project its power in this important foreign policy matter, and subsequently held hearings that gave a wide range of China specialists, businessmen, military officers, and government representatives opportunities to criticize and amend the bill.

These hearings allowed Congress to frame public opinion to favor the Legislative rather than the ExecuUnfortunately for Carter, the antive agenda. Congress effectively nouncement for normalization made the bill its own, changing its did not inspire the same degree of name to the Taiwan Relations Act popularity as Nixon’s dramatic visit (TRA) and significantly strengthento China, and in fact his secret neing US relations with Taiwan, ignorgotiations were perceived as an act ing Executive worries that China of cowardice by the American pubmay be angered by elements of the lic. Carter, wanting to adhere to the bill that appeared to contradict the terms negotiated with China while agreement originally negotiated. It responding to domestic criticism also extended direct support by visitthat he was abandoning Taiwan, ing Taiwan over the objections of introduced the Taiwan Enabling the State Department (Tucker 1994, Act, which sought to create informal 153). However, even more effective exchange structures with Taiwan but than this gesture of defiance towards made no provisions for future secuExecutive authority, Congress put its rity arrangements (Garrison 2005, power of legislation to use in the pas59). Carter wanted simply to reassure sage of the TRA to check the power 32

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of the Executive Branch. The operative words they used were clear and contradicted the thrust of the Executive branch’s draft (Bush 2004, 153).

Congress established the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) and created oversight for AIT’s operations.

The TRA set forth a security policy that essentially renewed the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty of Taiwan by allowing the US to maintain capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan” and “directed” the President to report to Congress “promptly” if such a threat was to arise (Bush 2004, 154). Furthermore, it establishes that Congress—not the President—would “in accordance with constitutional processes” determine the appropriate US response. With regard to arms sales in particular, the TRA represents a clear effort of Congress to assert itself in an area traditionally dominated by the Executive Branch.

The TRA made provisions for continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by stating that the U.S. would “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such a quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Bush 2004, 157). According to Richard C. Bush, the wording of the legislation was 2009

originally designed to “constrain the flexibility of the Executive Branch” with many members of Congress desiring to “state explicitly that the U.S. should supply to Taiwan” and “give Congress a voice in determining Taiwan’s defensive arms needs earlier in the decision-making process” (Bush 2004, 158). By creating the mechanism for Executive oversight, Congress also made it easier to exercise its power of the purse on future arms sales with Taiwan, further improving its relative power to the Executive Branch on this foreign policy issue.

With these provisions Congress not only set the tone for US-Taiwan for years to come, but also put the matter in Congressional, rather than Executive, control. As a participant in the Congressional deliberations that led to the Taiwan Relations Act, the late Senator Jacob Javits recalled that the passage of the TRA demonstrated, “the central role of Congress in foreign policy” (Javits 1981, 55).

Why Congress acted – the competitive Congress The political conditions during Carter’s administration largely favored Legislative action according to the theories of Congressional behavior.

President Carter entered office at a time when the pendulum of power

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described by Lindsay was swinging away from the Executive branch and towards the Legislative. Carter’s decision to normalize relations with China occurred in an era of “competitive congress” that was “both active and assertive in foreign policy and thus quite willing to challenge a president’s lead,” according to Hastedt. As Arthur Schlesinger observed in The Imperial Presidency, the Nixon administration reached the highest degree of Executive power, and with the ruin of the Nixon administration in Watergate, Congress had begun to reassert its own foreign policy power. The news of President Carter’s decision to diplomatically recognize China hit Congress on December 15 like a bombshell. Congress was shocked that its “efforts to curb the ‘imperial presidency’ and reassert constitutional checks and balances between Legislative and Executive branches, upset during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, had failed” (Tucker 1994, 135). Congress was therefore eager to renew its efforts to check Presidential power, especially in the arena of his China policy.

The vagueness of the Communiqué regarding the form of future U.S.-Taiwan relations allowed room for Congressional influence. The Normalization Communiqué negoti34

ated by the Carter administration definitively established US-China relations. But it was ambiguous regarding the status of Taiwan: though it reaffirmed the One-China Policy established by the Shanghai Communiqué, it also promised that “the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official representation and without government diplomatic relations” (Javits 1981, 55). The late Senator Javits recalled: Neither on the manner and timing of the decision nor on the substance of the understandings reached had there been effective consultation.

Thus, the situation contained the seeds of possible serious differences between the Congress and the Executive, and the possibility of the U.S. government as a whole not being able to arrive at a coherent ultimate position that would deal with all the elements of the problem…It became very clear quickly that although President Carter was serious about maintaining “extensive, close, and friendly relations” with Taiwan, his Administration had given very little thought to the shape and substance of our future relations and to the legal framework necessary to carry it out. For most of us in Congress, therefore, the acceptability of the ar-

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rangements worked out with Beijing depended upon the establishment of a viable basis for our future relations with Taipei (Javits 1981, 56).

percent of Americans rated Taiwan favorably, while only 30 percent rated the PRC favorably (Garrison 2005, 62). In a climate of public support for Taiwan, Congress was emboldReading between the lines of Javits’ ened to become more involved on statement, it becomes apparent that this issue. Second, there was a lack Congress saw the ambiguity of fuof domestic consensus amongst the ture relations with Taiwan as an experts and within the Executive opportunity to reverse some elements Branch regarding the importance of Carter’s agreement with China of Taiwan’s security. Brzezinski and that ran contrary to Congressional his camp were labeled “China Ziinterests. onists” because they saw China as strategically necessary to balance In accordance to theories of Conan increasingly threatening Soviet gressional behavior, several imporUnion. Vance and his supporters, tant domestic factors at the time of however, did not see the severity of normalization can be identified as the Soviet threat and instead considcentral conditions for the Congresered China an obstacle to improving sional challenge to the President’s U.S. relations with the Soviet Union lead on foreign policy. First, public (Garrison 2005, 62). There was also attention was directed at the Taiwan significant domestic disagreement issue by a powerful Taiwan Lobby. regarding whether the strategic imWhen normalization grew increasportance of China was worth losing ingly likely, the Nationalist governTaiwan as an ally. Finally, no domesment of Taiwan stepped up its lobtic consensus could be reached as to bying efforts in the United States. In the likelihood of mainland invasion 1977, for example, the Nationalist of Taiwan in case the U.S. did step government paid for twelve residents aside. In the absence of domestic from the President’s hometown to consensus, normalization with China tour Taiwan so that they could “refaced challenges from a Congress mind Carter of the friendly people that was more attentive to the doand wealthy ally he was abandoning” mestic support for Taiwan than the (Tucker 1994, 133). These campaigns strategic importance of China. were effective in elevating American public opinion in favor of Taiwan. A Third, as there was relatively low February 1979 poll showed that 60 threat in the climate of detente with 2009

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the Soviet Union, normalization with China was not seen as a pressing national security issue. Despite the Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, the U.S.-Soviet detente would hold for another year. The threat of Soviet aggression would be perceived as low until its Invasion of Afghanistan in December. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of normalization, Carter could not effectively utilize national security to justify his China policy.

Finally, the opposition to Carter’s China policy was bipartisan. Though partisanship could have divided Congress on other issues, on this issue it stood unified against the President.

Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress were outraged that the President did not seek Congressional approval to abrogate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (Garrison 2005, 62). Conservatives especially and some moderates openly criticized the President’s failure to consult with Congress. Barry Goldwater and other conservative Senators even challenged the President in the courts on these grounds but the courts upheld that the President did not need Congressional approval to abrogate the treaty. These four factors spurred Congress to challenge the administration’s agreement with the PRC by passing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on March 13, 1979, with a 90 to 6 Senate vote and a House vote of 36

345 to 55 (Garrison 2005, 62).

Conclusion The Congressional response to President Carter’s decision to normalize relations with China through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 represented a swing of the pendulum of power away from the Executive towards the Legislative. In the aftermath of the Nixon administration and the expansion of Executive power, Congress responded decisively to the weaknesses of the Carter Administration’s China policy and reasserted its own power in formulating foreign policy. Conditions of low threat, an absence of domestic consensus, a high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, and the bipartisan nature of the issue allowed Congress to be active and pass the TRA with an overwhelming majority.

The TRA represented the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy. By holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Executive objections, and requiring Executive decisions to be approved by Congress, Congress effectively checked Presidential power and subjected future Presidential decisions to the Congressional power of the purse. The conditions under which Congress acted, as well as the actions it took, are all in line with

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the theory of the competitive congress established by Hastedt (Hastedt 2009).

As Roy noted, “the TRA makes it possible for [US] agreements with Taiwan, which had been agreements with a sovereign government, to continue in effect even though we no longer recognized Taiwan as a sovereign government. The TRA also provided for a special US office in Taiwan that would be staffed by US government employees who had officially left their government positions.

The American Institute in Taiwan is thus an unofficial organization, even though it is, in effect, a surrogate embassy there. This agreement was a subterfuge, but it is an open subterfuge designed to be consistent with the principle of unofficially dealing with Taiwan” (Stapleton 2003, 113).

A new era of East Asian security, marked by the triangulated relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, began in 1978. By officially establishing diplomatic relations with China and simultaneously establishing unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States was able to maintain the status quo of Taiwan independence and deny China the concessions it desired. However, as an unpleasant consequence of the US “subterfuge”, tension and mistrust remain between 2009

the US and China over Taiwan to this day.

References 1. Bush, Richard C., At cross purposes : US.Taiwan relations since 1942. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c2004.

2. Hastedt, Glenn P. “Congress and Foreign Policy”. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future Seventh Edition. Pearson Education, 2009 3. Lindsay, James M., “The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on American Policy” Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights & Evidence. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2008.

4. Javits, Jacob K. “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), pp. 54-62 5. Stapleton, Roy, J. “Opportunities and Challenges for U.S.-China Relations” US Taiwan Relaions in the Twenty-first century, ed. Christopher Marsh and June T. Dreyer, Lexington Books, 2003.

6. Tucker, Nancy B., Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994

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A Million Voices Against Corruption: The Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan Hsuan Li Abstract: ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ arose out of a synthesis of political and cultural opportunities with resource mobilization. This essay examines the significance of various factors that create and shape social movements through a brief study of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’, the most stirring and audacious phase of the 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan. Though this movement occurred in a particular Taiwanese historical and cultural context, I believe its analysis can offer general insight into how and why social movements in other locales come to be, and how they reflect and impact society.

Introduction

theories involved; as Nick Crossley very astutely asserts, “some social Movements throughout the ages and movements can be explained with around the world have been subject the resource mobilization theory, but to the studies of sociologists who cannot be fully understood without wish to find a coherent explanation considering the cultural side of the of how movements form, expand, analysis”. He goes on to say, “without continue or decline. But as socigrievances of the public and tension ologists have come to comprehend, between the larger society and rulsocial movements are so complex ing class, even a well-resourced and that it is not possible to confine each networked organization would not movement to a certain set of process- be able to mobilize” (Crossley 2002, es and reasoning. In my reflection of 102). That was very true of the antithe 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement corruption movement. With the conof Taiwan, I realized that for this cepts above in mind, I will attempt specific case, a synthesis of resource to explain the formation and decline mobilization and political process of the movement known as ‘A Miltheory was useful for understanding lion Voices Against Corruption,’ and what had happened and why. But my experience as a social protester in those were not the only important high school.

Hsuan Li is a junior at the University of Pittsburgh. She is an international student from Taiwan majoring in political science.

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ful party rotation during which the Democratic Progressive Party (proindependence) seized the presidency from the Kuomintang Party, ending Collective Grievances the latter’s five-decade reign. The “Grievances may do little to explain Kuomintang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, which had relocated the timing of a movement’s emerfrom China after losing to Mao Zegence, but without a grasp upon dong’s communist regime, had long these grievances we would find it been seen by the native Taiwanese as very difficult to make any sense of a corrupt party of non-native elites what the movement was attemptwith roots in China. In contrast, the ing to do or of the moral nature of native party, the Democratic Progrestheir actions” (Crossley 2002, 84). sive Party (DPP) vowed to rid Taiwan The political climate in 2006 was of decades of corruption and bring particularly auspicious for mass mobilization in terms of both politi- power to the people. To demonstrate its commitment, in 2000 the party cal context and public grievances. established an anti-corruption invesPrincipally, the country underwent a surge in crime and unemployment tigation unit in the government (Freedom House 2008). Thus, the exposés rates starting from the late 1990s of corruption committed by those after the Asian Financial Crisis; this in the chief executive household, in was difficult for a society that had addition to discoveries of widespread experienced decades of wealth and social stability. Moreover, the nation’s corruption in the DPP itself, disillusioned and angered the Taiwanese pro-independence president was public, driving them to become open constantly infuriating the People’s to mobilization.

Republic of China across the strait and antagonizing the United States (Taiwan’s biggest ally) in the process. Political Context The Administration’s anti-China 2006 marked the nineteenth anniverpolicies not only hurt the economy sary of the abolition of martial law but caused widespread unease as in the Republic of China (Taiwan). well, for it is widely acknowledged Taiwan experienced nearly forty that China has a legion of missiles years of strict adherence to martial aimed directly at the island of over law from 1949 to 1987; throughout twenty million people. Finally, it that period, “residents of Taiwan was six years into Taiwan’s successPolitical and Cultural Opportunities

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were not permitted to organize, assemble or march publicly in support of social causes that were not officially endorsed by the ROC government.” In Hsiao’s words, “the lifting of martial law and the establishment of the DPP… gave popular forces a great opportunity to influence the legislature and the people’s representative”; it also “legitimized and legalized” street protests by the revision of the Civic Organization Law (Hsiao 2001, 169). This fostered a good environment for social mobilization efforts, for the public now had open and legalized access to the government. The absence of repression ushered in two decades of social change prior to the 2006 anti-corruption campaign.

Tactical Lessons from Precedents Since the early 1980s, Taiwan has experienced waves of social welfare movements which all had moderate to high degrees of success. Three waves of social movements brought issues ranging from disabled persons rights to child prostitution to the foreground and concluded with the maintenance of newly established programs and centers operated by movement organizations and the government (Hsiao 1996). How did they achieve these results? All forms 40

of lobbying, petitioning, fundraising were used, but the most conspicuous symbol of public support were the staged street protests, including street marches and sit-ins that existed in every successful case — these acts ensured media attention and sympathy that transgressed to the public via television and newspaper. This certainly served as precedents to the biggest street protest Taiwan would see in 2006.

Resource Mobilization Leadership and Elite Support According to James Jasper, leaders serve both as the symbols of organizations and movements, which means in each case the public looks to them to get a grasp of a movement’s intentions, power, tactics — and to a great extent — legitimacy (Jasper 2007, 91). The movement entrepreneur at the center of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ campaign was Shih Min-Teh, who was the former chairman of the DPP and a long-time political dissident.

With his credentials as a champion of democracy, he was able to garner supporters from constituents of both parties, but especially the KMT party supporters and middle-of-theroad voters who had shifted towards the KMT during Chen’s increasingly

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disappointing presidency. As to the elite, many KMT party members could not publicly endorse him with respect to party alliance, but some maverick legislators went as far as to publicly support and participate in the protests. Shih caused uproar within his own DPP party; the party split was between those who wished to show solidarity with the president and those who were ready to disown Chen. I think elite support was fundamentally essential to the organization’s mobilization efforts. Unlike the Civil Rights Movement in America, which relied heavily on the organization and networks of the black churches, ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ lacked a default support system for mobilization (Morris 1984). Thus the movement welcomed prominent politicians and celebrities to partake in the sit-ins and speak on its behalf to increasingly solicit the public to join the protests.

Overall, Shih and his movement benefited from good elite backing, even if some of it was clandestine.

Against Corruption,’ the movement’s message was simple enough that it was hard to misrepresent it. Regardless of Shih’s motives for deposing the president, the movement’s aim was uniformly transmitted to the public as an anti-corruption campaign with the ultimate goal of overthrowing Chen. However, because “media organizations have their own interests and routines that influence their coverage,” there was still a discrepancy in the collective action frames of the movement and the media (Staggenborg 2008, 39). For instance, the media began to portray the movement as a party battle between the constituents of the DPP and the KMT. This was a frame that the movement neither crafted nor endorsed; nevertheless, it became the main focus of the media, and thus a major focus of the people (Zu 2006). Moreover, some critics complain that other news was given, if any, lukewarm attention — even the incident regarding a policeman who had died of exhaustion from greatly overextended on-duty hours due to Mass Mobilization and the the protests (Wu 2006). Viewers also Zealous Media became tired of the subject, a result of watching broadcasts of similar Not only do movement organizations protest scenarios week after week on frame issues, but the mass media also television. I think it is plausible that plays an active role, often distortthese issues, to an extent, contributed ing the messages of movements in to the premature end of the movethe process. In the ‘Million Voices ment.

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Despite these shortcomings, the movement would never have taken off without the help of the media; its initial success was made possible by media attention (Smith and Fetner 2007). talk about the need of organizing effort to channel a sustained flow of resources and energy into the movement; the campaign headquarters did just that, while the media served as the most effective form of promotion that Shih knew it would be. On August 12, 2006, Shih held a press conference in Taipei announcing his intentions and the establishment of the ‘Million Voices Against Chen Campaign.’ He pleaded for every citizen to each donate 100 NTD to the cause, a mere equivalent of 3 USD; the goal was to accumulate a hundred million NTD to symbolize the support of a hundred million people. Within ten days, the movement headquarters halted the collection: the combined sum in the three bank accounts that accepted the donations far exceeded the asked amount (Hwang 2008).

Most adherents to the anti-corruption movement became constituents, simply because it was virtually effortless to become one. People were not required to make donations; and physical participation involved going to scheduled sit-ins or marches that were announced on television. Moreover, the sit-ins appealed to people, 42

whether they were KMT sympathizers, opposed to Chen, or opposed to corruption in general. Oliver explains ‘…how events are understood (as successful or not, as promising, as fun) influences whether they are likely to be repeated” (Jasper 2007, 95). And the demonstrations were indeed perceived as fun and low-risk by the viewers, as they flocked to the scenes in red to join the protesters. Live broadcasts overlooked the sea of red supporters as they sang movement songs led by celebrity musicians, and enjoyed free food and drinks, courtesy of the enthusiastic movement supporters. The success of the sympathetic media brought out crowds that filled the seats, curbs, and pavilions at all times of the day: the housewives and the elderly who sat-in during the daytime, and students and workers who arrived in the evening to join the social event.

The goal of the movement could not be reached: Chen simply refused to step down. This was clear by midOctober when the campaign came to an abrupt halt after two months of rigorous protests. The movement’s lack of a steady default mobilization base and inability to convince all sectors of society that deposing Chen was both “urgent and subject to change” was central to the failure (NOW News 2006; Jasper 2007, 29).

The corporate community had re-

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fused to participate in the proposed work strike; the majority of the public refused to disrupt the international airport as the Red Shirts in Thailand’s protest against had done; the legislators refused to support the impeachment of Chen and the DPP legislators that refused to support the government. But those were only external factors. There were internal questions of how the $111 million that the campaign collected was spent and conflict within the leadership that separated Shih and the key Red Shirts at the campaign headquarters.

pleaded guilty to embezzlement and fraud. In the years subsequent to the movement, Taiwan has elevated its government transparency and accountability, perhaps owing much to the awareness and mass-scale animosity towards corruption that the movement aroused within the people.

Conclusion

‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ was a culmination of political and cultural opportunities that were shaped into a force of social change, made possible by the leadership of prominent political figures and their Outcomes organization of all the resources that became available to them once the Despite the inability of the moveplea was made for caring citizens to ment to unify both supporters of the take to the streets. Mass mobilization DPP and KMT to rally against Chen would not have been possible withfor a prolonged period of time with out the degree of public resentment, fresh tactics and successful developwhich included much of the elite, ments towards the movement’s goals, geared towards the government and the campaign has, in effect, incited a especially the president; underscoring new wave of anti-corruption activity. the significance of political and culIn 2008, the DPP lost footing both in tural opportunities and its synthesis the legislative elections and the presi- with resource mobilization in social dency; KMT won by a landslide, and movement theory. is currently under the same degree of scrutiny by the opposition and the References media (and thus the public). Chen 1. Crossley, N., 2002. Making Sense of Social and his family were indicted for all Movements. Buckingham: Open University Press. their corruption crimes, and have been on trial since; his wife, son and 2. Freedom House, 2008. Freedom in the other members of his family have World – Taiwan, [Internet], 2 July. Available 2009

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from:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country ,,FREEHOU,,CHN,,487ca262c,0.html [Accessed 21 Mar 2009].

3. Hsiao, H.H., 1996. Social Movements and Civil Society in Taiwan. In: The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. Available: http:// www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/society/ edown/chart/chart-3.htm [Accessed 19 Mar 2009].

4. Hsiao, H.H., 2001. Taiwan’s Social Welfare Movement Since the 1980s. In: Aspalter, C., ed.Understanding Modern Taiwan: Essays in Economics, Politics, and Social Policy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 169-204.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

11. Wu, Z.P., 2006.

Liberty Times, [Internet], 4 Oct. Available from:http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/ new/oct/4/today-o1.htm [Accessed 29 Mar 2009].

12. Zhou, J.W., 2006.

Liberty Times, [Internet], 18 Sept. Available at:http:// www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/sep/18/ today-fo10.htm [Accessed 29 Mar 2009].

5. Hwang, Y., 2008. A Resistance? The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan. Available from:http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/7/4/9/p267496_index. html[Accessed 18 Mar 2009].

6. Jasper, J.M., 2007. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements. In: Klandermans, B. and Roggeband, C., ed. Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines.

New York: Springer, 59-110.

7. Morris, A.D., 1984. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organization for Change. New York: The Free Press.

8. NOWnews, 2006. . NOWnews, [Internet], 15 Sept. Available from: http://www.nownews. com/2006/09/15/185-1991634.htm[Accessed 21 Apr 2009].

9. Smith, J. and Fetner, T., 2007. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements. In: Klandermans, B. and Roggeband, C., ed. Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines. New York: Springer, 13-57.

10. Staggenborg, S., 2008. Social Movements.

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Disentanglement: A Case to End U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Jiakun (Jack) Zhang Abstract: Despite the increasing level of interdependence between the United States and China over the past two decades, the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan continues to be a contentious issue in Sino-American relations. This paper urges the U.S. to abandon its policy of arms sales to Taiwan because arms sales create a destabilizing arms race with China, embolden the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment, and create incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties. I first outline the strategic aims of U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait and the potential areas where these aims may conflict. Next, I elaborate upon the consequences of U.S. arms sales to American foreign policy. Finally, I argue for the abandonment of regular arms sales to Taiwan as part of a comprehensive East Asian diplomatic strategy and discuss the implications of this policy reversal.

I. Introduction The Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States may be drawn into an armed conflict with an existing nuclear power. Though it is in the U.S. national interest to reduce the possibility of armed conflict with China and thereby reduce the risk nuclear escalation, U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan will not yield stability in the Taiwan Strait in the long term.

Since the abrogation of the formal defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, the U.S. has continued to sell arms to Taiwan under the guidance of the Taiwan Rela-

tions Act (TRA), an act that serves as a de facto defense treaty (Austin 2002, 35) U.S. arms sales to Taiwan play a defining role in this post-1979 defense agreement. Section 2 of the TRA requires that the United States provide Taiwan with the necessary defense assistance to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability (Bush 2004, 155). The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s dissatisfaction with the terms of the TRA spurred the Reagan administration to issue the 1982 Joint Communiqué which reassured that: The United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang is a junior at Duke University majoring in Political Science.

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sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution (Marsh 2004, 120).

of these negative consequences while not compromising U.S. strategic aims in East Asia.

II. U.S. Aims and the Policy of Arm Sales

The United States has adopted the policy of arms sales to Taiwan, as part of its China strategy, to achieve three major strategic objectives in the Taiwan Strait. Deterrence Theory Despite the reassurances of the guides the policy of arms sales to Joint Communiqué, U.S. presidents Taiwan. The United States is a naGeorge H.W. Bush and George W. tion of credible military capabiliBush have greatly elevated, rather ties that has clearly communicated than reduced U.S. arms sales to Tai- its willingness to use force to “resist wan. McClaran reflects, “The conany resort to force or other forms of tradictions between the TRA and the coercion that would jeopardize the Joint Communiqué have thus been security, or the social or economic revealed as a major source of PRC system, of the people on Taiwan” ire toward the U.S…[placing] the (Bush 2004, 155). Specifically by U.S. squarely in the middle of what committing to Taiwan’s defense, the the PRC leadership believes is an un- United States practices deterrence by settled issue of civil war” (McClaran denial, elevating the cost of action so 2000). With the growing cooperation much as to deter China from seizing and exchange between Taiwan and Taiwan by military force. mainland China, the time is ripe for the United States to reverse its prob- Most specifically, U.S. seeks to deter lematic policy of arms sales to TaiChina from attempting to reunify wan. The U.S. policy of arms sales Taiwan by military force. The U.S. to Taiwan escalate an arms race with has maintained a steady resolve over China, entraps the United States in the past fifty years that it will not Taiwan’s defense, and creates the in- tolerate the forceful reunification of centive for Taiwan to shirk its defense Taiwan. By providing Taiwan with responsibilities. Reversing the policy modern weapons, the U.S. effectively of arms sales would ameliorate many raises the cost of attack by China 46

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and makes it less likely that they will be able to accomplish their goals.

More broadly, the United States wishes to protect the democratic institutions and the free market economy of Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the “Asian Tigers” and is the eighth largest trading partner of the United States (Needham and Tkacik 2006).

Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has repealed martial law and democratized. Therefore, it is central to U.S. interest to maintain both Taiwan’s economic and political structure.

In addition, the United States seeks to prevent China from becoming a hostile rival in the Pacific. This complicates its two other aims in the Taiwan Strait, however, because while it wishes to protect Taiwan, the U.S. is also dedicated to avoiding war with China, a nuclear power. Thus, the policy of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan becomes a classic case of the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait. On one hand the U.S. wishes to provide Taiwan with weapons to deter Chinese aggression; on the other hand, these efforts are perceived as a U.S. attempt to divide China and result in greater arms buildup in China.

The consequence is an even more unstable Taiwan Strait with a greater accumulation of weapons on both sides. The U.S. aim of deterrence 2009

through arms sales therefore produces severe consequences and security challenges.

III. China’s Aims and Response to Arm Sales The People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan as a threat to its national sovereignty and prestige. The PRC perceives U.S. efforts to arm Taiwan as an attempt to undermine China’s sovereignty. From Beijing’s perspective, “Taiwan is the last unresolved territorial issue (after Hong Kong and Macao) dating back to the pre-communist period of China’s national weakness and territorial dismemberment” (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 72). Most Chinese agree that reunification is a central national objective. As such, the Taiwan issue has become a rallying point for Chinese nationalism. Thus, “anything that occurs on Taiwan that suggests permanent separation from China and any U.S. policy that could be construed as aimed at this outcome, in essence, becomes a severe security threat to Beijing and what remains of the compact between the regime and its citizens” (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 72). Given the domestic consensus on the Taiwan question, the cost of capitulation for the PRC in the event of Taiwanese indepen-

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dence would be very high and thus shift the balance of resolve away from the United States. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s asymmetrical military modernization program signals of its resolve to risk war with the U.S. over Taiwan. The PLA has invested in submarines, Sovremennyclass destroyers, as well as medium and short range ballistic missiles that are area denial weapons designed to destroy the power of U.S. aircraft carriers (Austin 2002). These weapons would effectively raise the costs of deploying a carrier group in the Taiwan Strait and act as area denial deterrence.

the cause of Taiwan and has demonstrated willingness to use asymmetrical warfare. Thus, in the collapse of the “One-China” consensus, the policy of arms sales places Washington uncomfortably in the middle of Beijing and Taipei and may draw the U.S. into an unwanted war with China.

The U.S. policy of arms sales creates a Chinese security paradox paralleling the U.S. security paradox. “The PRC’s motivation to push Taiwan onto a path toward unification increases in direct proportion to the degree to which Beijing perceived Taipei to be drifting away. To deAdditionally, U.S. arms sales to Taiter that drift’s reaching the point of wan represent a challenge to China’s independence, the PRC increased its sense of national prestige. As China’s military projection…this, of course, economy grows, “Many of Taiwan’s induced Washington to enhance its traditional arms suppliers have own deterrence” by pushing Taiwan stopped out of respect for China’s to accept more U.S. weapons (Lampposition and the prospects for more ton and Ewing 2002, 72). lucrative commercial trade with the mainland.” The report continues, IV. Consequences of Policy of “This has effectively isolated the Arm Sales U.S. as a major threat to China’s national prestige and sovereignty, In recent years, the United States and hence made it the de facto focus seems to be caught in a foreign policy of the PLA’s strategic and military dilemma. On one hand it wants to modernization effort” (Kan 2009). preserve its security agreements with China’s aims in the Taiwan Strait Taiwan while on the other it wants to are reinforced by a greater balance avoid provoking the PRC. The U.S. of resolve than those of the United policy of arms sales to Taiwan as States. China is more committed to outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act 48

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(TRA) lies at the crux of its security dilemma. The policy of arms sales produces three major consequences for the U.S. First, it creates a destabilizing arms race with China. Second, it emboldens the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment.

Third, it creates incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties.

The Arms Race Problem The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan empowers PLA hardliners and creates a destabilizing arms race across the Taiwan Strait. “U.S. arms sales to Taiwan significantly reduce Beijing’s options in dealing with Taipei and greatly increase the prospects of military confrontation.

The net effect is that these arms sales have become the single biggest obstacle to establishing fully normal relations between the U.S. and China and narrow the options for both sides to either conflict or cooperate” (McClaran 2000, 639) The policy of U.S. arms sales reinforce Beijing’s suspicion that separation is Washington’s scarcely concealed agenda (McClaran 2000, 628). This is because U.S. weapons in Taiwan undermine the credibility of China’s threat to use military force in response to Taiwanese independence.

Thus, it induces China to modernize 2009

its military to continue to make credible its threat of military force. This security dilemma gives the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strong political influence over the PRC’s Taiwan Policy, allowing hardliners more sway within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bush 2000, 155). These hardliners have pushed for Chinese military modernization in order to challenge the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese modernization in turn provokes the U.S. to approve of even larger arms sales to Taiwan. According to the spiral model of arms races this will increase tensions across the Strait as the build up in arms increases mutual hostility and fear. This nascent arms race, if continued, could lead to greater instability in the Taiwan Strait and lead to war between the U.S. and China.

The Entrapment Problem While U.S. arms sales to Taiwan may deter the use of military force

by China in the short run, it also makes the U.S. vulnerable to entrapment in the long run. McClaran writes, “With the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress came within a micron of committing the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense” (McClaran 2000, 628).

The role of arms sales in U.S. commitment to Taiwan were outlined

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when the TRA ensures that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with weapons it deems necessary for “defense”.

However, since 1979, a number of Taiwan’s procurements have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked credible links to its real military needs (Austin 2002). A major portion of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 were primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the U.S. domestic arms industry and for political gains. From Taiwan’s perspective, this indicated an increased level of U.S. support for its de facto independence. This perceived deepening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense compromises U.S. strategic aims in the Taiwan Strait by creating the problem of entrapment. Arms sales that go beyond Taiwan’s real defense needs may encourage Taiwan to pursue an aggressive foreign policy objective such as independence. In this event, China will be forced to retaliate with military force as it has committed itself to do, and the United States would be drawn into the war due to its defensive commitment to Taiwan.

The U.S. came dangerously close to being entrapped by Taiwan when China made its outrage over Chen Shui-bian’s campaign for diplomatic and U.N. recognition of Taiwan known through military exercises.

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Chen deviated from his campaigned platform of 2000, in which he pledged the Five No’s (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76), because he perceived strong U.S. support in 2001 when President Bush approved the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992.

The strong support of Taiwan by the Bush administration was capitalized upon by the Taiwanese president to adopt otherwise overly ambitious foreign policy objectives with impunity.

The Shirking Problem The Bush administration entered office with a more pro-Taiwan Policy than any of his predecessors. He sought to reverse the policy of strategic ambiguity in regards to Taiwan and was in favor of “declar[ing] unambiguously that [the U.S.] would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan”(Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76). The logic was that this would clarify America’s commitment to protect Taiwan, decrease the potential for miscalculation by Beijing, and reduce Chinese interest in military conflict over Taiwan. President Bush significantly reduced U.S. strategic ambiguity by stating that the U.S. will “do whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 75). In 2001, the Bush administration coupled its rhetoric

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with action by approving the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992, a package which included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 ASW aircraft, and 4 Kidd class destroyers (weapon systems designed to offset the Chinese superiority in submarines). Though this may have heavy-handedly achieved its intended goal of reducing Chinese miscalculation, it also created room for Taiwanese politicians to shirk in their own defense.

In 2001, Taiwan’s defense budget would suffer a reduction from $12.9 billion to $8.0 billion and continue to be reduced to $7.5 billion in 2003.

Taking advantage of the guarantee of American support provided by the Bush administration, the Taiwanese legislature sought to shirk defense spending, to the great frustration of U.S. policy makers. In 2004, Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, made it clear to Chen Chao-min, Taiwan’s vice Defense Minister, that Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense” (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 75). The Bush administration recognized the problem of shirking produced by their arms sales. The fear was that Taiwan would be unwilling to adequately provide to its own defense and thus shift the burden of 2009

deterring Chinese aggressing to the United States. In 2004, the rhetoric of the Bush administration reversed almost completely. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly clarified U.S. policy by making it clear that the U.S. “does not support” Taiwanese independence, that it would be “irresponsible” to treat the PRC’s statements as “empty threats” and that U.S. efforts to deter the PRC “might fail” if Beijing is convinced that Taiwan is embarking on a course of independence and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped (Kan 2009, 40). President Bush had seemingly put a freeze on Taiwan’s arms requests in 2006 and delayed notifying Congress of eight pending arms sales (Kan 2009, 38).

V. Alternative Policy The policy of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan generates instability in the long run: sparking an arms race across the Taiwan Strait, while at the same time enabling Taiwan’s shirking of its own defensive responsibilities and making the United States vulnerable to entrapment. Taiwan’s aggressive diplomacy may provoke a Chinese response and draw the United States into a war that it wishes to avoid. Ceasing annual arms sales with Taiwan would eliminate the consequences of the policy without

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necessarily endangering U.S. aims.

It would actually create a new opportunity that may enable the United States to achieve more of its aims in East Asia such as the disarmament of North Korea.

ment of Taiwan and its free market would not be jeopardized by ending arms sales. Taiwan is now the biggest investor in China, trade across the strait have grown and will continue to grow with the Three Links (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76). The PRC Ceasing regular arms sales does not has stated that it is more than willing mean eliminating the U.S. deterrence to allow Taiwan to maintain its own against a Chinese attempt to unify way of governance as a democracy if Taiwan by force. In fact, it should it was to become reunified with Chibe coupled with a reiteration of U.S. na (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76). commitment to defend Taiwan if It has also made clear that Taiwan China seeks a military solution. The would be allowed to keep its own conventional strength of the U.S. defense force in the event of unificanavy serves as a powerful deterrent tion. Chinese conduct in Hong Kong for China not to invade Taiwan. makes this promise credible. The Additionally, China and Taiwan are return of Hong Kong to China has making great diplomatic progress not resulted in the collapse of Hong through the Three Links, which Kong’s democratic government and make Taiwan and China even more economy. interconnected and decrease the risk of armed conflict in the Strait. In Most importantly, the U.S. objective other words, China would have no to avoid the rise of a hostile power incentive to change the status quo in the Pacific will be realized if arms even if the U.S. ceased arms sales to sales to Taiwan end. China’s ecoTaiwan because it can more effecnomic growth and consequent power tively entice Taiwan towards reunifi- cannot be wished or ignored away; cation economically. In fact, a reiter- they are realities that the United ation of the 1983 Joint Communiqué States is living with and will continue would be a gesture of goodwill that to live with. The key for U.S. foreign could enlist Chinese cooperation on policy therefore should be to pretough issues in which it also has a vent China from becoming a hostile stake, such as North Korea. power.

Along the same lines, the U.S. aim to preserve the democratic govern52

Some would see ceasing arms sales to Taiwan as a form of appeasement

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for China that will result in Chinese “salami slicing”. These fears are largely unfounded; the reunification with Taiwan will end China’s “Century of Shame” and most likely force it to address festering internal problems. A military solution to Taiwan is highly unlikely, given the success of China’s diplomatic and economic overtures to Taiwan. Additionally, if the U.S. ends arms sales on the condition that China toughens up its policy towards North Korea, regional allies will be placated. South Korea and Japan’s concern over North Korean nuclear program dwarfs their concern over the security of Taiwan.

The overture to end arms sales can be part of a tit-for-tat bargaining strategy with China to enlist its help with the otherwise unsolvable problem of North Korea. If China fails to cooperate, then the U.S. would still have the freedom to resume arms sales in Taiwan. In the spirit of the 1982 communiqué, a halt of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would allow all three U.S. objectives in the Taiwan Strait to be achieved without any of the consequences.

The major obstacle facing arms sale reduction is US domestic politics.

The TRA places the issue of arms sales to Taiwan in the jurisdiction of Congress. The Taiwan lobby is a powerful force in Washington and 2009

among its advocates are large U.S. weapons contractors who may be forced to cut production even further in this state of the economy.

In fact it has been clear since the 1980s that “Taiwan does not need more arms form the U.S…. the U.S. must shift its policy from providing arms overtly to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and rationalize Taiwan’s force structure with its military objectives”(McClaran 2000).

Nevertheless the policy of arms sales continued because contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon make massive profits from this unique form of trade with Taiwan.

Even though the policy of stopping U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation on North Korea is a sound foreign policy, it will face significant opposition in Washington.

VI. Conclusion Ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation with North Korea is consistent with American aims in the region. Arms sales simply are not a sustainable long term policy, impetus for change should come sooner rather than later.

The current climate of cooperation between the PRC and Taiwan reduces Chinese reliance of military coer-

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cion and offers a unique opportunity References to end U.S. arms sales at the lowest 1. Austin, Kevin Cox, Sr. “U.S. MILITARY possible cost internationally. Taiwan’s ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN: DETERsagging economy means that the RENCE OR PROVOCATION”, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Thesis, 2002.

Taiwanese military budget is under pressure domestically and demand 2. Bush, Richard C., “Scared Texts” of United for U.S. arms is low. Additionally the States –China- Taiwan Relations”. At Cross Purposes- U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942\ belligerence shown by North Korean’s ballistic missile testing means 3. Lampton, DM and Ewing, RD, “U.S.-China that South Korea and Japan are Relations in a Post-September 11 World” more eager acquiesce to a deal where Nixon Center. ending arms sales to Taiwan would 4. Kan, Shirley A, “Taiwan: Major Arms Sales increase Chinese pressure on North since 1990” Congressional Research Service, Korea. This policy reversal sacrifices 2009 none of the major U.S. goals in the 5. Marsh, Christopher and Dreyer, “Appendix Taiwan Strait and eliminates all the 1”, U.S-China Relations in the Twenty-First unpleasant consequences. The U.S. Century. would avoid escalating the arms race 6. McClaran, John P, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwith China and at the same time protect itself from Taiwanese entrap- wan: Implications for the Future of the SinoU.S. Relationship” Asia Survey, 2000 ment and shirking. The U.S. will be much freer to maneuver diplomatically in East Asia as a result and even have the potentially opportunity enlist China’s cooperation in other major objectives such as counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

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Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reformist Policies and the Ensuing Legitimacy Crisis Soyoon Sung Abstract: Post-Mao China experienced unprecedented improvements in economic and social conditions: the standard of living drastically improved and the Chinese people now had open access to foreign markets. The opening of the economy led to the integration of the Chinese economy into global markets, and ushered in the introduction of new cultural and political ideas.

Surprisingly, political reforms did not accompany this widespread liberalization of economic policies. This created dissatisfied elite on opposite sides of the spectrum, with conservatives in opposition to the economic liberalization and with intellectuals in opposition to the lack of political reforms. This led to a legitimacy crisis in that the party-state leadership may not have had the consent of its two most important constituent parties. Without the consent of the governed, the legitimacy of the government deteriorates. Fortunately, the legitimacy crisis did not lead to the deterioration of the Deng regime because, although Deng did not satisfy all the desires of either elite group, he still managed to gain a substantial amount of support.

In an attempt to regain control of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution following the disastrous power struggles and party infighting that characterized the Great Leap Forward.

Instead of regaining control, however, the revolution spurred social and political chaos. The decade of horror shattered the Chinese people’s faith in championed ideology and left them questioning the verity of Marxism. It was this fear of unpredictable change and ideological politics that ultimately provided the basis of legitimacy for the Deng era.

Deng embraced his rise to power by implementing economic reforms that would push China towards global integration and greater economic prosperity. The gradual decline of communist institutions in many economic areas and the ascendance of market-economy policies, however, did not deter continued party-state domination. This dual policy of encouraging economic reform while preventing political reform nearly precipitated a legitimacy crisis from both the ruling and intellectual elites.

Justifying this policy in the eyes of both the ruling political elite and the

Soyoon Sung is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (International Relations).

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increasingly powerful intellectual elite proved increasingly difficult as interests began to clash and tensions began to increase. Nevertheless, Deng’s success in satisfying the interests of most of his constituents led to the institutionalization and ultimate success of his policy reforms.

ing the country out of isolation and into the modern world economy.

The goal of Chinese economic reform was to generate the surplus needed to finance the modernization of the mainland Chinese economy.

Previous attempts to generate this required surplus failed: neither the Economic Reform, Political socialist command economy favored Stagnation by conservatives nor the Maoist attempt at a Great Leap Forward from In the late 1970s when Deng and his socialism to communism in agriculallies returned to office, the country ture succeeded in developing this sufwas in a state of total political and ficient surplus value. Deng sustained economic crisis. Politically, major Mao’s legacy to the extent that he sectors of Chinese society still lived emphasized the need to prioritize in the shadow of the great terror of agricultural output and advocated Maoist “class struggle” campaigns. decentralization of decision makEconomically, the urban population ing in the rural economy teams and suffered from declining income and individual peasant households. Howshortages of essentially all kinds of ever, he deviated considerably from consumer goods. Deng’s program to Mao’s policies in opening China to undo many of the Maoist economic the outside—Deng argued that this policies and to reopen China to the measure was necessary to admit the outside world was inconsistent with new technology and capital that Mao’s policies of self-sufficiency and would spur the development needed market closure—Deng and the reto generate the required surplus for formers openly argued that market the economy. China, he said, was in liberalization and reliance on foreign the primary stage of socialism and help were vital to stimulate growth. the duty of the communist party was Under his leadership, the governto perfect “socialism with Chinese ment extricated itself from a legacy characteristics.” This policy, which of massive economic problems and was essentially a redefinition of many began a sustained program of ecoof the terms and theories of Marxnomic reforms that initiated a period ism to accommodate China’s new of explosive economic growth, bring- open economic system, transitioned 56

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socialism from an economy based on public ownership of means of production to an economy that allowed for the simultaneous operation of publicly and privately owned enterprises. To Deng and the reformers, any economic means were acceptable as long as “public ownership” remained dominant. Thus, a variety of market mechanisms flowed into the Chinese economy—these included quasi-private farming, “special economic zones,” joint ventures and foreign-capital businesses, and market pricing. The greatest push toward market allocation occurred when local municipalities and provinces were allowed to invest in industries that they considered most profitable.

These reforms shifted China’s development strategy to emphasize light industry and export-led growth (Shen 1993, 412).

The early stages of economic reform gained wide support around the world for Deng and his allies.

The Western world was delighted with China’s introduction of new liberalizing reforms and some analysts even speculated that China had abandoned Marxism altogether.

Deng was honored twice as Time Magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1978 and 1985, and even Gorbachev’s government in the Soviet Union looked to China as a model 2009

of reform (Kluver 1996, 71). This level of support, however, was not experienced at home. Hard-line conservative leaders, many of whom had been displaced by the reformers as part of Deng’s reform policy, complained about the intrusion of negative influences from the West, while citizens and intellectuals sought more far-reaching reforms in the political system. To the students and intellectuals, the economic reforms had substance only if they were accompanied by far-reaching legal and political changes.

The widespread economic reforms were not accompanied by political changes, however. Deng’s movement to “emancipate the mind,” which was launched in the late 1970s, was one of the few political reforms implemented during his regime. The movement encouraged the de-ideologization of public life and opened Chinese society to the outside world by increasing exposure to foreign current events. Many Chinese began to compare their own institutions against those of other nations, especially those of Taiwan. Seeing the freedoms associated with a democracy whetted the appetites of Chinese intellectual elites and encouraged them to pursue greater political reforms within the Deng regime (Ding 1994, 114).

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Unfortunately, greater political reforms were not granted. Those in the mainstream of the post-Mao ruling elite refused to carry out parallel reforms in government and refused to open up the political system in spite of allowing quasi-capitalistic economic reforms. The ruling elite argued that all reforms should be executed under the party committee’s organization and leadership and that the CCP must hold a monopoly over all political power in order to ensure order and stability. While the intellectual elite used horizontal comparisons between China and other nations to support its arguments for greater political reform, the ruling elite used favorable vertical comparisons between contemporary China and the past to prove how well communist China was performing without the political reforms.

Legitimacy Concerns Having witnessed the failure of the Maoist method, which was to enhance productivity through class struggle, Deng reinstated experts to former positions to carry out professional activities. After being disillusioned by the party’s discriminatory and destructive policies during the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals reemerged as a force and believed that they had a responsibility to the 58

Chinese people for taking back the rights they had been deprived of by the party-state during the tumultuous decade (Ding 1994, 78). With their reform objectives being rejected by the communist leadership time and time again, Chinese intellectuals increasingly saw themselves as an “independent socio-political force engaged in competition and confrontation with the ruling Communist party elite” (Shambaugh 1993, 462).

This change in perspective regarding their own role within Chinese government and society transformed intellectuals from being “repairers” of the existing system to being antagonists to the system as a result of the lack of legitimate political means of opposition within the communist system.

The increasing tension that arose between the ruling and intellectual elite was exacerbated by Dengist reforms—while the ruling elite disapproved of the liberalization of the economy, the intellectual elite pushed for further political reforms to follow economic reforms. Because both constituencies were dissatisfied with the Deng regime and posed threats to it, a legitimacy crisis ensued in which consent of the elite was questioned. The primary goal of Deng’s reform policies was surely to receive and maintain the consent of his

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constituents as he strove to maintain harmony between economic pluralism and communist dictatorship.

Despite the cries from the intellectual elite for greater political reforms, Deng was left with little choice in his options of creating or pursuing such reforms, hence leading to the adoption of a contradictory reform policy.

Political restructuring meant abdicating some power and sharing it with others. Abandoning the commitment to “public ownership” was unacceptable because it would surrender the reason for Communist rule. If this principle were abandoned, the legitimating foundation of communist rule would crumble with it—Deng was not ready to abdicate this power.

Thus, he pursued a “dual-traffic policy”: anti-Stalinist in economic issues, anti-liberalization in political ones.

In the face of the legitimacy crisis generated both by Mao’s cultural revolutionary policy and the postMao reform program, the communist regime under Deng attempted to win support from different political and social groups by making various appeals to them. Instead of garnering support, however, these appeals created the political space for the intellectual elite to make opposing arguments against the government, deepening the regime’s legitimacy 2009

crisis and accelerating the potential for political instability. The intellectual elite was angry about Deng’s retreat from the commitment to “material civilization” and protested that the preservation of “social uniqueness” would only stifle the growth recently generated through economic openness. To the politically conscious groups, the Deng regime had to justify its legitimacy as a government acting in the interests of the people in order to secure their conformity and cooperation and to prevent possible opposition and rebellion.

Meanwhile, privileged groups in the party-state were offended by the widespread liberal economic reforms—they believed that the liberalization of the economy and the commercialization of Chinese society opened up too much room for “incongruous practice and incompatible elements” that would undermine the party-state’s control of the population and degrade the uniqueness of Chinese communism (Shambaugh 1993, 470).

When a democratic system experiences a legitimacy crisis, it can renew itself through the process of elections. Because authoritarian regimes do not have similar institutions to renew politicians and policy makers, the legitimacy of its regimes rests almost entirely on performance. If

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politicians within an authoritarian regime fail to deliver what they promise, there exist no mechanisms of self-renewal, and the regime will face the deterioration of its legitimacy.

Realizing this impending danger, the party leadership began a campaign of “building socialist spiritual civilization” in order to counteract the challenge to its legitimacy. The program was designed to deemphasize the issue of performance in regime legitimation by excluding political and moral spheres from analysis and change. Deng wished to keep the delicate balance between the changes he pursued in the economic domain and the continuity he wished to preserve in the political domain by matching the “material civilization” with “socialist spiritual civilization” (Shambaugh 1993, 475).

The socialist China we are building should have a high level of material civilization as well as a high level of spiritual civilization. When I speak of high level of spiritual civilization, I refer not only to education, science, and culture (which are of course indispensable) but also to communist thinking, ideals, beliefs, morality and discipline, as well as a revolutionary stand and revolutionary principles, comradely relations among people, and so on. – Deng, 1984

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Once again, this device of maintaining regime legitimacy and stability in a changing environment proved extremely difficult to implement. Tension arose once more between those placing emphases on the political dimensions of “spiritual civilization” and those stressing the importance of the educational and cultural dimensions of the same notion. Hard-line conservatives wanted to keep China a Maoist state with strict party-state control of society, no economic liberalization, no global contact, no professionals in government ranks, and no freedom for intellectual life. Intellectuals and professionals wanted to push China in the opposite direction toward more money enterprise freedom, enhancement of intellectuals’ and professionals’ social statuses, social autonomy, and unrestricted personal and intellectual exchange between China and the capitalist world.

The Dengist campaign of building two civilizations was introduced as a compromise measure, but instead of being pacified, each group championed their own ideas beyond what Deng had hoped. Because of the separate ideologies of the two influential elites, the communist government under Deng had to fight a two-front war to win legitimacy. Popular belief would indicate that an authoritar-

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ian regime only need to respond to the ruling elite. The dilemma typical of communist regimes in transition, however, is that the regime has to solicit not only the traditional power centers for recognition and support but must also gain the support of the other influential groups in society for recognition and cooperation.

Despite having to fight a two-front war to gain the recognition and cooperation of two elite groups, the legitimacy crisis did not lead to the collapse of the Deng regime. Instead, the post-Mao reforms led to a legacy of great expansion and growth. This success stemmed from the fact that although the Dengist regime was not able to satisfy the fundamenIntellectuals accepted the legitimacy tal desires of either elite group, the of the economic reforms but quespolitical and economic climate was tioned the continuing ability of the undoubtedly far better than under CCP to lead the nation toward more Mao’s regime. “If we focus attenfar-reaching reforms. Those on the tion on only the upper echelon of left did not question the leadership or the CCP establishment, we will see the abilities of the Party but instead that, although legitimation difficulties questioned the legitimacy of the existed within that circle, the leadreforms—to appease the conservaers could overcome these difficultive constituency, reformers had to ties, reach agreements, and achieve reaffirm their commitment to the institutional integration at their level principles of Marxist political cenmost times and on most important tralization and communism, which issues” (Ding 1994, 18). Deng’s reled to louder criticisms as intellectugime also succeeded because he was als called for more political openness. far more consensus-oriented than his As Roderick MacFarquhar noted in predecessors and because his deci“Deng’s Last Campaign,” “The crux sions were taken more collectively. of the Chinese political argument Deng never sought the absolute has been over whether or not there is authority that Mao possessed and a ‘contradiction’ between Deng’s two wielded because he was convinced basic points: will economic change that Mao’s dictatorial style and cult solidify or pervert Party leadership of personality were the principal reaand other Communist values?” The sons China endured economic and Party was legitimate or the reforms political crisis for much of the period were legitimate, but it seemed incon- after 1957 (Chan 2001, 285). Instead, sistent that both could be so. as evidenced through policies that aimed at maintaining harmony be2009

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tween economic pluralism and Communist dictatorship, such as “building socialist spiritual civilization,” Deng focused on trying to appease both groups—his goals of appeasement, particularly to the intellectual elite, were sometimes impeded, however, by the need to maintain the legitimacy of the communist regime.

Nevertheless, no one could dispute the great economic and social transformation that had taken place under Deng’s regime and thus, although the ruling and intellectual elite groups often listed their grievances to the party leadership, neither took actual action to undermine its authority.

Politician,” The China Quarterly, 135 (Sept., 1993), 462.

7. Felix E. Oppenheim, “’Facts’ and ‘Values’ in Politics: Are they Separable?,” Political Theory, 1 (Feb., 1973), 54-69.

8. John McMillan & Barry Naughton, Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

References 1. Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture,” The China Quarterly, 135 (Sept., 1993), 412.

2. Raphael Shen, China’s Economic Reform (Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), 39-75.

3. Kluver, Alan R., Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 71.

4. X.L. Ding, The decline of communism in China: Legitimacy crisis, 1977-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 114123.

5. Alfred L. Chan, Mao’s Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China’s Great Leap Forward (Oxford University Press), 285.

6. David Shambaugh, “Deng Xiaoping: The

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Letter to the Editor

Taiwan: Ma Ying-jeou and the Revolutionary Status Quo Muyan Jin

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory on March 22, 2008, defeating Democratic People’s Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieu and ending eight years of DPP rule over Taiwan. His victory has largely been attributed to two closely related campaign planks—(1) improvement of Taiwan’s stagnant economy and (2) increased economic and cultural ties with the mainland. However the strength of Ma’s victory belies the existing tensions within Taiwan itself. Ma’s political platform is diametrically opposed to the DPP’s values of national identity and Taiwan independence over economic gains. These tensions leave Ma little room for error as he navigates the fine line between internal and external dangers.

Three societal rifts in Taiwan make Ma’s job exceedingly difficult: the Mainland-Taiwanese rift, the economic and developmental North-South rift, and the ideological (and generational) reunification-independence rift.

As one can imagine, these rifts are interrelated and, in most cases, inseparable—for example, most aboriginal ethnic Taiwanese live in the comparably underdeveloped South, and of these, most support independence and the DPP. Yet, although overlap is expected and prevalent, lines of distinction are not so clearly drawn. Although many urban Northerners may not have roots in the South, they make up a substantial portion of the independenceminded political constituency. At the same time, these urbanites may shift to a more moderate KMT position in times of economic difficulty or during a period of corrupt governance, both characteristics of the Chen Shui-bian era. Thus, Ma’s political “mandate” of easing tensions along the Taiwan Strait may not be as powerful as hoped by either Beijing or Washington.

Muyan Jin is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (International Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).

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Consequently Ma’s Taiwan Strait policy of “three no’s”—no to unification, no to independence, and no to military action— is more of a throwback to the 1992 China-Taiwan agreement of a constructively ambiguous One-China than a progressive, revolutionary step toward a new era of reconciliation. The warm welcome given to Ma from Beijing is largely a byproduct of a collective sigh of relief—relief that the 2008 Olympics won’t be used as a staging ground for Taiwan independence. The true test begins after the Olympics, as goodwill becomes less of a valued political commodity.

Similarly, the U.S. praise comes at the heels of the inflammatory and gaffe prone Chen—praise that, closely examined, points to less and not greater support from an overburdened superpower wishing for the status quo.

When President Ma Ying-jeou is inaugurated on May 20th, the regional and international community can expect a honeymoon period where many of Ma’s Taiwan Strait policies will reap economic and political dividends—direct flights allowing 650,000 Taiwanese businessmen living on the mainland convenient travel, increasing mainland tourism in Taiwan to a million visitors per year, and the creation of an economic market for ChinaTaiwan trade. However, loftier goals set by the hopeful media, including a peace treaty officially ending the civil war between the CCP and KMT, will be difficult if not impossible to meet, barring drastic domestic and international changes. Even correctly implemented, Ma’s policies will do much to restore the status quo circa 1992 but little to move beyond it. Hopefully these evolutionary and not revolutionary steps will be enough to fulfill the promise of such a heralded new leader.

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Letter to the Editor

What Taiwan’s Closer Ties with China Means to Me Herng Lee

I’m going to be frank—I don’t have any elaborate theories lined up.

Instead, I hope to offer a perspective or two from my own experiences.

Having grown up in Taiwan and received the bulk of my education there, there is no doubt that I view Taiwan as my country, and China as a related yet distinctly separate entity. UN Recognition or not, I grew up in a democratic state that functions just as well/badly as any other one. Unlike earlier Taiwanese generations who may have had roots in the mainland, my generation possessed much more similar experiences as we all grew up in a distinctly Taiwanese context where we were persistently reminded that our national identity was being challenged.

Of course, my generation was educated under a framework that was less politicized, that was more realistic and rational about China-Taiwan relations. For example, my parents grew up in an era where mainland Chinese people were referred to as “gong fei”—or “Communist bandits” literally— and their textbooks never lacked propaganda that reminded them how “recovering” mainland China was just a matter of time. I have trouble recalling any of those overtly hostile themes appearing in any of my textbooks, and gone are the days where it seemed like war could happen any given day. I don’t think it’s too far-fetched to claim that Taiwan is less disillusioned about China than it used to be.

However, as Taiwan has become much more open and democratic over the past 20 years, so have the stark contrasts between the two political systems across the strait been further augmented. I will be the first to admit that the Taiwanese government is anything but perfect; nonetheless, like any Taiwanese citizen in my generation, I grew up enjoying a certain set of Herng Lee is a junior from Taiwan majoring in Economics at Duke University.

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rights, and it is not hard to see why I or anybody in my shoes would not react vehemently if such rights were to be muted. For that very reason alone, I find it hard to picture China, given its current political structure, attempting to intrude on Taiwan’s de facto independence in any way without expecting great, great turmoil.

This is not to say that I am so naïve as to be fully disillusioned about the possibility of Taiwan being less and less autonomous in the long-run; with cross-strait economic relationships swiftly developing and tensions easing, I can certainly see how Taiwan’s gradual reliance on Chinese markets may slowly lead to more and more concessions on Taiwan’s behalf. But to what extent will this reliance distort the status quo, and how long will it take?

Given the experiences of the current Taiwanese population, I highly doubt that any form of internal political autonomy will be traded off for some economic benefits in the near future, as there are certain sentiments that are difficult, if not impossible to subdue. We continue to experience exclusion from major international bodies, we observe our Olympic athletes being unable do don our own flag, and most importantly, we are constantly reminded why.

We have family or friends who sacrificed their lives to promote democracy and human rights during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, and those memories and values will continue to live with us as we cherish the political freedom we possess today. I can’t (or perhaps I’d rather not) imagine the current Taiwanese population easily letting go of such experiences and forgetting what a long way we’ve come. To claim that closer ties with China will obliterate all of that, in my opinion, not only seems fairly unrealistic, but also somewhat cheapens the Taiwanese experience.

Therefore, like most Taiwanese people, I am of course more or less apprehensive about Taiwan’s new relationship with China. However, knowing what makes us unique and what values we treasure, I am not so worried as to fear that Taiwan’s current relationship with China will inevitably lead to the total submission of Taiwan by China. Yet what about the possibilities in between, such as the frequently cited Hong Kong model? Again, notwithstanding issues of national pride and culture, the mere notion that a nondemocratic nation will have some sort of reign over another one—especially one whose values center around its remarkable transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy—is enough to call the most apathetic Taiwanese 66

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citizen to action. I am not trying to be dramatic—I just don’t see how the average citizen, who has enjoyed his rights for so long and seen them as inherent, can feel comfortable with any proposal that does anything less than fully guaranteeing the continuation of those rights. The Taiwanese people want autonomy (whether via the status quo or full independence), and not “granted autonomy”—especially when the potential granter could easily flipflop given its overwhelming power.

Note that my views predicate upon the assumption that China maintains its current political structure. Will Taiwan’s stance against China affect the Chinese and spur other waves of changes in the Mainland? Could China’s political system eventually change so as to reduce the many negative connotations that inevitably accompany the notion of being a part of China?

Will the Taiwan issue still be China’s priority then, assuming such changes?

I don’t know for sure, and your guess is as good as mine. I do know, however, that we need to keep talking about these issues and, even more importantly, make sure that we also listen. There will never be a shortage of opinions and interest regarding the China-Taiwan issue, but we will always need more people that are willing to do away with prejudices and to really listen.

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Book Review

Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000 Andrew Cheon Abstract: In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions: 1) whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198) and 2) why Chinese foreign policymakers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooperate in multilateral security institutions (37). First, I summarize Johnston’s chapter on mimicking, discuss the theory’s inability to address states’ decisions to join international institutions, and derive from his empirical work a hypothesis that an increase in demand for mandatory information by international institutions may generate domestic “sunk costs” potentially conducive to cooperation. Second, I provide an overview of Johnston’s chapter on social influence, question whether China is a “hard case” for socialization, and cite the popularization of the term “responsible major power” as evidence that material reality may actually aid socialization. Third, I summarize Johnston’s work on persuasion, question whether international institutions are attracting multilateralists rather than persuading skeptics, suggest an alternative method of assessing how participation in international institutions may be influencing Chinese discourse on “cooperative security,” and finally, employ the power transition logic to question whether China will remain bound to international institutions when it approaches parity with or dominance over the United States.

Introduction

In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions. The central theoretical question concerns whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198). The empirical question concerns why Chinese foreign policy makers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooperate in multilateral security institutions (37). Though Johnston’s questions seem to spring from his perceived limitations of the rational choice framework employed by realists and institutionalists, it is notable that Johnston also finds existing social constructivist explanations to be unsatisfactory.

Andrew Cheon is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (International Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).

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In fact, Social States is Johnston’s systematic attempt to address the variance in state behavior left uncaptured by the cost-benefit framework emphasized by rational choice theorists and the internalization of pro-social norms emphasized by social constructivists. Between these “end[s] of the spectrum,” Johnston believes, exists a vast amount of important pro-social behavior, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion (22). Johnston employs these three micro-processes, which he labels “socialization,” to analyze Chinese foreign policy behavior within international institutions—where material conditions of anarchy and pro-social norms and discourses of multilateralism are said to present divergent observable implications (29).

Johnston’s method of analysis is primarily qualitative, as he processtraces select cases to illustrate how socialization operates. His criteria for case selection are the presence of relative power concerns and the absence of other material incentives (40). For evidence, Johnston relies on data from a wide range of sources—scholarly works by regional specialists, papers written for NGO conferences, documents circulated in international institutions

by Chinese actors, and some internal circulation documents. A constraint, Johnston concedes, is China’s policy of “asymmetric transparency,” which restricts access to data on security issues (40). Nevertheless, Johnston has conducted over 120 interviews with diplomats and arms control experts from China and various countries, most of whom had exposure to Chinese foreign policy processes (42). Johnston claims to account for interviewees’ potential incentives to misrepresent with careful attention to their positions in the policy-making process and other surveying techniques (42).

Mimicking: Overview

Johnston describes mimicking as a process by which the agents of a new signatory state, in order to cope with the uncertainty and technical demands of joining an international institution, mechanically adopt its procedures and work habits. This may involve creating domestic agencies to better develop and articulate national interests within the institution as well as adopting the institution’s behavior routines and discursive practices (51).

Interestingly, Johnston labels mimicking a “path-dependent lock-in” process, where it becomes increasingly costly for the actors to back out, ignore, or defect from the norms of the institution (51). Analyzing China’s involvement 2009

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in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1980, he observes that the CD arm of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) expanded from a small division in 1982 to an Arms Control Disarmament Department in 1997 (55). Johnston also observes the formation of an interagency process involving the MOFA, a community of weapons scientists, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to aid Chinese diplomats within the CD (62). He supplements his analysis by graphically comparing an increase in the number of working papers Chinese diplomats submitted to the CD and a similar increase in the number of studies conducted by China’s weapons scientists from the 1980’s to 1994 (65). He also presents some evidence of changes in Chinese discourses.1 Critical Engagement First, it is notable that mimicking, as a micro-process, cannot explain a state’s initial choice to join an international institution. Because Johnston claims to limit his “units of analysis” to the interactions between “international institutions” on the one hand and “individuals and small groups” on the other (27), states leaders’ decisions to join an institution in the first place—and the preferences therein—are essentially exogenous to the mimicking framework.

Thus, in his empirical analysis, Johnston falls back on ideas from his next chapter, “Social Influence,” to argue that China’s decision to join the CD “seems to have been a spillover effect” from joining other UN agencies. Chinese leaders believed that as a “great power,” China should join this institution (53). Since this is beyond the scope of his mimicking theory, it seems fair that he provides little evidence for this prediction.

In my view, it may be interesting to ask how much agency state leaders enjoy over mimicking and its consequences. In other words, mimicking of agents may be a product of conscious choice on the part of the principal. Why did state leaders choose to place diplomats within the particular environment in the first place? To what extent did Chinese leaders foresee the growing expansion of their arms control community and the changes in discourses prior to joining the CD? In other words, it may be interesting to investigate the accuracy with which state leaders make ex ante calculations about not only the initial costs and benefits of joining an international institution, but also the potential costs and benefits of staying in it. One would begin by obtain70

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ing data on state entrances to international institutions and then identifying cases where no material incentives or sanctions were present. The latter step simplifies calculations of costs and benefits (since issue linkages can be complicated) and controls for the role of coercion in states’ decisions to join.

Having identified such a limited set of cases, one could then turn to primary and secondary sources to qualitatively assess the accuracy of state leaders’ ex ante calculations of potential costs and benefits of joining an institution.

Second, it seems that Johnston’s work uncovers another potential cooperative effect of the mandatory exchange of information within institutions.

Johnston limits the observable implications of institutionalist theories to “side payments, sanctions, reputational gains or losses linked to other issue areas, and information that indicates the costs of cooperation were lower than expected” (40). Setting aside this “market-failure” definition of information for the moment, it seems that the Committee for Disarmament is an environment where an increase in demand for mandatory information forces actors to invest more heavily in the institution or the issue area. Such information may include technical annual declarations, mandatory presentations, or even working papers. From this perspective, one could argue that China expanded its arms control division within the MOFA and brought in a scientific community into its policymaking to process the increasing amount of information required for participation in the CD. Though data may be difficult to obtain, one could potentially conduct a cross-national study of the extent to which an increase in demand for information by an international institution affects states’ domestic spending in that particular issue area. Ideally, one would identify a large group of “novice” states within the same institution whose domestic structures are similarly unsophisticated to deal with the increased demand in information. A good place to start may be within international institutions whose issue areas are relatively new or require substantial research and development. This is to minimize the number of leading states in the issue area, whom we should drop, and maximize the number of “novice states,” whom we can proceed to test. The goal is to control for any exogenous variable that gives any state a competitive edge, i.e. reduces the amount of spending necessary to adapt to the increased demand for information. With this square circled, we can proceed to investigate under what conditions an institution’s increase in demand 2009

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for information leads (or does not lead) to an increase in states’ investment in that issue area. The next, but separate, question is whether these “sunk costs” actually bind states to these institutions.

Social Influence: Overview Johnston’s theory of social influence begins with the assumption that actors in world politics value image and status as ends in themselves and that they often make difficult trade-offs between status and material power or wealth (76). From this angle, he argues that normative pressures, such as backpatting and opprobrium, can induce cooperative behavior. For these pressures to operate, however, there must both be a normative consensus on “good behavior” and a forum that makes such behavior observable (86). Given these conditions, an increase in the size of cooperating audience should, ceteris paribus, increase backpatting benefits if the actor cooperates, and increase “shaming markers” if the actor free-rides (91). For this chapter, Johnston seems to blur the distinction between the principal and the agent by assuming that state leaders and publics take criticism and praise of the state within institutions personally (96).

For his empirical analysis, Johnston process-traces China’s participation in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations within the CD from 1994 to 1996.2 Fearing that its nuclear capability would be frozen in inferiority (99), China initially insisted on two “treaty killers,” No First Use (NFU) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) (104). China also insisted that all 8 nuclear powers sign before entry into force (EIF) (106). After the Chinese language on PNE came under heavy criticism of 20 states in March 1996 (104), China abandoned its NFU and PNE positions in May and abandoned its position on EIF in August (106). The realist explanation, which Johnston rejects, is that the CTBT was costless to sign anyway because China had finished testing its second-generation warheads by July (107). Johnston argues that forgoing tests was costly to relative security (107) and that China did so because mounting accusations of “moral hypocrisy”—for not upholding its commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the CTBT—jeopardized its image as a “responsible major power” (114). On a separate note, Johnston graphs China’s voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to illustrate its fear of public isolation (136).

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Critical Engagement First, Johnston states that China is a “hard case” for socialization due to the prevalence of realpolitik views within the country (33). This is a valid claim.

Since Johnston makes no assumption of unitary states, their internal features should “matter” to the extent that they influence the behavior of his units of analysis, “individuals and small groups.” However, there may also be other cultural factors within China actually coexisting with realpolitik views. Though I make no claim to explain its origins, the concern for one’s own image may be one such cultural factor. For example, the Chinese word “mianzi”, meaning “face,” figures quite prominently in Chinese discourses.

In conversations, Chinese people often say “ni bu gei wo mianzi” to convey that one has lost face because of something another person has said or did.

Closing the black box for the moment, it seems worthwhile to ask whether there may be variance in states’ sensitivity to status concerns. To be sure, this possibility does not undermine the logic of social influence theory. It does open up the possibility that China may not be a hard case, and thus lend only limited support to the theory.

In fact, I found the same UNGA graph Johnston uses to support his social influence theory to be instructive in this regard (See Figure 3.8 from Social States reprinted below). Given that the UNGA employs roll calls as a voting procedure, Johnston predicts that China’s tendency to abstain should vary with size of the yes majority on resolutions it does not support. Indeed, the difference in rates of abstention when the majority is 1/2 or less and when the majority is more than 2/3 is inordinately high. In fact, Johnston calls China on this graph a “clear outlier” (136). My first question concerns whether there is variance in states’ starting positions (in terms of their sensitivity to self-image) when they enter an international institution. If data is available, we could plot voting behavior similar to Johnston’s for each state in its first year of participation in the UNSC. My second question concerns whether social influence affects all states evenly over time. If we were to compare states’ UNSC voting behavior in their first year and say, five years later, would we observe similar movements in the residuals? Both these suggestions point out the limitation of this graph, which simply aggregates voting behavior from 1989 to 2000. One would need to disaggregate the data to capture the potential dynamic elements of social influence.

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Second, in explaining China’s decision to drop its positions on NFU and PNE, Johnston states that condemnations of China’s nuclear tests from 1993 to 1996 by most developing states and middle powers stressed themes that had negative resonance with Chinese leaders’ increasing self-identification as a “responsible major power” (113). In support of this claim, Johnston uses line graphs to show an increase in frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in People’s Daily and academic journals (147).

Indeed, Johnston is right that these terms have significance, since they represent a new feature of Chinese foreign policy, a concept related to image, and a concept associated with participation in multilateral institutions (149).

However, the words “major power” also imply that certain material conditions have already been met for this actor to actually care about this particular status marker. This may be indicative of a change in normative consensus as to what constitutes a major power (87), but the fact remains that its material capability allows this particular actor to place a premium on this status marker in the first place.

This question becomes more interesting when we consider whether similar discourses exist for middle powers or small powers. Using the same criteria Johnston uses to judge that “responsible major power” is a significant term (new feature of foreign policy and associations with image and multilateralism) (149), if Johnston can provide evidence of increasing frequency in the 74

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use of similar terms in discourses of non-major powers, then he could plausibly claim to have removed the significance of “major” from the “responsible major power.” In other words, the goal is to demonstrate that normative markers that only international institutions reward can have meaning even divorced from realpolitik notions of prestige. Another interesting line of inquiry is whether the popularization of the term “responsible major power” may itself be a product of material conditions of anarchy. Consistent with the soft-balancing literature, it may be possible that middle and small powers are using such discourse to further bind and constrain major powers to international security institutions (See Pape 2002).

Persuasion: Overview Johnston views persuasion as the internalization of norms (22). He theorizes that persuasion works in an environment where a persuadee is highly cognitively motivated, autonomous from principal, exposed to the argument repeatedly, or has few prior or ingrained attitudes. It also helps if the persuader is an authoritative member of a high-affect group the persuadee wants to join (159). According to Johnston, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and related Track II activities (which provide new ideas and filter controversial issues for the ARF) are fairly conducive to persuasion on these counts and embody “counter-realpolitik ideology” such as “cooperative security” (164-166).

On the other hand, China is said to have been deeply ingrained in realpolitik norms when it joined the ARF in 1994 (167). Johnston observes an increased interest in “cooperative security” among Chinese officials from 1996 on, expressed through papers, unofficial channels, commissioned studies, public speeches, and references to the Five Power Treaty on Confidence Building Measures (a more intrusive and formal security institution) as a model for the ARF to follow (170-171). Johnston supplements his analysis with graphs showing increases in references to “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily and an increase in references to the ARF in articles (168).

The argument is that the ARF and the Track II led to an emergence of a constituency of Chinese policymakers and analysts who internalized the norm of multilateralism (179).

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Critical Engagement Granted that realpolitik preferences and practices are changeable, what I consider is the possibility that persuasion within institutions may not be doing all of the explanatory work. In fact, there may be other variables informing the preferences of Chinese policymakers before entering these international institutions.

First, Johnston assumes that the composition of the staff at the Comprehensive Division of the MOFA in charge of ARF activities remained constant over the years (179). This is to be expected, since persuasion, which takes time, cannot take place if there is a regular turnover of actors (179).

Moreover, it seems intuitive that there may be greater transaction costs associated with regularly replacing staff, since diplomats would be forced to spend the time and the energy they could otherwise have spent on negotiations on adjusting to new institutions. However, Johnston’s empirical analysis in the mimicking chapter also provides evidence to the contrary. From 1980 to 2000, Johnston tells us, the MOFA rotated 60 ministry officials through the CD delegation to acquaint them with multilateral negotiations. Including personnel from the Chinese military and other research institutions, the figure is as high as 110 (54). If China was willing to experiment with such rotations in its delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, an institution that often requires highly technical knowledge, one could predict that similar turnovers happen during the ARF negotiations as well.

Thus, it seems plausible to argue that Chinese diplomats and analysts, already favorably disposed toward multilateralism, may have gradually selected themselves into the ARF negotiations over time. What we arrive at is an endogeniety problem. It seems unclear whether the ARF is creating a so-called multilateralist constituency within China or whether a pre-existing multilateralist constituency is selecting itself into and driving the ARF. Since Johnston interviewed many who are close to the policymaking process in China, acquiring data on rotations may not be difficult. If borne out by empirical evidence, this would mean that there is little by way of persuasion that takes place within the ARF itself, since the preferences of Chinese diplomats are shaped and formed elsewhere. Some candidates include formative experiences, favored scholarly works (as I will suggest later on), cultural bonds 76

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with other nations, and other international institutions (which would support Johnston). This would explain the Chinese ARF diplomats’ ready willingness to adopt the “mutual security” discourse (170-171). If multilateralists had selected themselves into the ARF and related processes, we would not be very surprised to find that they indeed favor regional security.

Second, the causal link between participation in the ARF and an increase in references to multilateralism is less than conclusive. Johnston writes: “From the mid-1990s on, however there were some noticeable changes in the discourse” (167). Johnston further develops this claim with two graphs showing “exponential increases” in the mention of “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily and a third graph showing an increase in the frequency of articles with references to the ARF (168). The causal implication is there, but not very convincing at first (See Figures 4.2 and 4.3 from Social States reprinted below). The ARF was established in 1994, but the frequencies of articles on “multilateralism” only take off in the early 2000’s. More convincing is the small, but similar increase in references to the “ARF” in the early 2000’s. However, it is still possible to argue that there could have been some exogenous shock near the 2000’s, which increased references to both multilateralism and the ARF.

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In addition, the breadth of the term “multilateralism” makes it more difficult to argue for a direct causal linkage between an increase in references to the ARF and an increase in references to “multilateralism.” For example, the increasing use of the term “multilateralism” starting in 2000 could be a product of an increase in publicity enjoyed by economic institutions and their influence on the Chinese economy. It could also have to do with an increase in publicity enjoyed by multilateral security efforts conducted outside the ARF framework. Last but certainly not least, one could legitimately argue that the anticipation for and the publication of Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony in Chinese, ba quan zhi hou (2001), caused the observed increase.3 To strengthen Johnston’s causal argument, then, one could utilize similar documentary methods to measure the frequency of references to “cooperative security” (instead of “multilateralism”) in Chinese journals and People’s Daily, which would more readily associate itself with ARF, a regional security institution. If Johnston is right that the concept of “cooperative security” is a relatively new one for policymakers in China, our findings should reflect this. The references should gradually increase from 1996 (or soon afterwards) when the ARF policymakers and analysts are said to have begun writing on this concept (170). If we indeed observe such a trend, we would be more likely to accept Johnston’s causal argument that it was the ARF at the forefront of this trend (179), since this institution is one of the few directly involved in the so-called “cooperative security” issues. As it stands, however, a causal link 78

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between an increase in the talk of “multilateralism” and an increase in that of the ARF remains weak.

Third, “material conditions,” as expressed through the power transition logic, may have aided the “persuasion” of Chinese policymakers. When setting up observable implications for his competing theories, Johnston’s account of realism suggests that in a “unipolar world” we should observe “candidate poles,” such as China, “trying to balance against the United States, eschewing arms commitments that might place constraints on relative power capabilities” (37). This is a fair articulation of one realist prediction. Another interesting realist prediction, initially entertained (but soon discarded) by AFK Organski, is that a “wise challenger, growing in power through internal development,” may “hold back from threatening the existing international order until it had reached a point where it was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies” (Organski, 333). In this light, international security institutions may serve as vehicles for China to keep other states at bay, while continuing its own internal buildup. Thus, it may actually make sense for China to uphold “cooperative security” within the ARF, since China’s current priority is maintaining stable conditions for its economic growth and development. It seems that “material conditions” may have actually aided China’s rhetorical turn toward multilateralism.4 It is important to note, however, that the power transition logic remains agnostic as to whether institutions impose independent constraints—social or material—on state behavior. For example, joining an institution and subjecting its diplomats to pro-social processes, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion, may be costly for the state and its relative security. It may still make sense to join if the costs of joining at the time are outweighed by the perceived benefits, such as the potential avoidance of a “preventive war” launched by the dominant power (Organski, 333). Thus, a more rigorous test of Johnston’s socialization theory may rest on whether the social benefits of cooperation and social costs of defection within a security institution are sufficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or dominance over the current hegemon. Another interesting test may ask whether an increase in the number of diplomats who have “internalized” norms of a security institution will be sufficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or dominance over the current hegemon. I do not mean 2009

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to imply that these institutions will somehow prevent states from ever engaging in military disputes or wars. Nonetheless, it seems socialization will have worked if it makes defecting costly enough for China to remain in an international security institution even after reaching material dominance.

Closing Remarks Overall, Johnston’s Social States is a successful effort to systematically analyze socialization, an understudied phenomenon in World Politics. This book helpfully outlines how three important processes—mimicking, social influence, and persuasion—may operate. During the process, Johnston has also led me to ask several interesting questions. How accurately do leaders of states calculate not only the initial but also the future costs and benefits of joining an international institution? Can an increase in demand for information by an international institution affect a state’s domestic spending in that issue area? Does China present a special case for socialization in its unusually strong concern for national self-image? To what extent is this concern for self-image grounded in the material reality of the international system?

Do international institutions teach participating diplomats the inherent value of multilateralism, or do they simply attract multilateralists in the first place?

How has participation in a security institution influenced China’s domestic discourse on “cooperative security”? Last but not least, can socialization continue to bind a rising power to an international institution after it reaches parity with or surpasses the dominant power in capability? By directing our attention to and laying the groundwork for further theorizing about international institutions and their socializing effects, Johnston has undoubtedly made a novel contribution to the field of World Politics.

References 1. Angell, Norman. 1913. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons), chapter 3.

2. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2008. Social States: China in International Institutions: 1980 – 2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 3. Pape, Robert. 2002. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30 (1): 7-45

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Footnotes 1. For example, he graphs changes in the ratio of Chinese statements on superpowers to statements on arms control issues within the CD to suggest that the Chinese adoption of the CD’s discursive practices forced them to tone down their anti-Soviet rhetoric (68, 69).

He also draws from primary sources to argue that previously “Western” terms, such as “verification” and “arms control,” entered the Chinese discourse through the CD over the 1980’s (70).

2. He actually presents three cases, though I review only the first. As his second case, Johnston analyzes China’s participation in negotiations to revise the landmine Protocol of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1981) from 1995 to 1996. Despite the PLA’s reservations that further restrictions on landmines would undermine security of sparsely manned borders and lucrative transfers/exports of dumb mines (123,125), China not only announced a moratorium on exports on dumb mines in April, but also signed the revision in May due to an emerging anti-landmine “bandwagon” that threatened China’s image (128, 129). The third case is the Ottawa Treaty of December 1997, which sought a de-facto ban of landmines (138). Despite overwhelming support within UN, China never signed because of PLA’s reservations (137). Instead, Canada and China struck a deal—Canada would not pressure China to join and China would not pressure Asian states to oppose the treaty (139). China also sent an observer to Ottawa to minimize criticism (140) and abstained from UN resolutions demanding non-signatories to accede the treaty (140).

3. This is a representative work of political science on the importance of multilateralism and international institutions.

4. In Johnston’s ARF case study, it seems that Chinese diplomats have indeed “internalized” the instrumental value of multilateralism, but not quite its normative value. This helps explain Johnston’s finding that Chinese multilateralists, who strongly support regional cooperative security, actually oppose the expansion of US-Japanese security cooperation (177).

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Understanding China-Taiwan Relations Muyan Jin

The history of China and Taiwan begins in the Republican Era (1910s-1920s). In 1927, Kuomintang (KMT) General Chiang Kai Shek’s attempt to purge Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members sparked civil war shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Civil War, interrupted by World War II and Japanese invasion, lasted until 1949 when the KMT was defeated and fled to the island of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. As the PRC moved to invade Taiwan and eliminate the KMT in 1950, the Korean War broke out and PRC strategic focus was diverted away from Taiwan by its intervention on behalf of communist North Korea.

Shortly after the end of the Korean War, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 ensued. Because the stated goal of the KMT was to reoccupy the mainland and overthrow the CPP, Chiang Kai Shek sought to take advantage of heightened U.S. animosity toward the CCP to begin military occupation and fortification of two islands between mainland China and Taiwan: Matsu and Quemoy. As Taiwan fortified these islands and called on U.S. support to re-invade the mainland, Premier Zhou Enlai of the CCP announced bombardment of Matsu and Quemoy. Thus, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted, with the U.S. threatening to use nuclear weapons to destroy CCP military potential. Upon China’s failure to gain assurance from the Soviet Union to also use nuclear weapons if the U.S. did so, both the CCP and KMT backed down—the PLA stopped bombardment on May 1st—although no issues were resolved.

Muyan Jin is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (International Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).

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In August of 1958, bombardments across the Taiwan Strait began anew. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, much like the first, was a test of the resolve of the United States to oppose an invasion of Quemoy and subsequently Taiwan. Again, a stalemate followed, although this time bombardment continued, with the CCP and KMT bombarding on alternate days until 1979. In total, approximately 450,000 shells were fired on Quemoy.

Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the United States and much of the world recognized the KMT government on Taiwan as the sole representative of China, and Taiwan held China’s seat at the United Nations. However, a growing rift between China and the Soviet Union was becoming more and more apparent, and the Soviet’s seemingly unstoppable edge in the Cold War prompted a realignment of powers. Thus, with Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, the PRC found its seat at the UN and with Nixon’s visit in 1972, Taiwan’s quest for reinvasion of the mainland went from a distant goal to an unattainable fantasy. In the aftermath of US-China rapprochement, Taiwan had to struggle for its diplomatic survival against the political gravity of its mainland neighbor.

After formal U.S. withdrawal of diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan remained in political limbo and the status quo remained relatively unchanged as China was content to adopt a “wait and see” attitude while focusing on its own economic development. After the…and Taiwan began its ascent into the economic powerhouses of East Asia along with its movement to democratize. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the first opposition party to the KMT, forcing the KMT and its successive President Lee-Teng Hui to reform. On the international stage, Taiwan began to switch its policy, becoming more politically flexible and not requiring other nations to recognize it over the PRC.

In 1995 and 1996, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was much different from the first two. Sparked by Lee’s visit to Cornell in 1995, in which he described Taiwan as “sovereign”, the Crisis consisted of PRC missile tests off the coast of Taiwan, followed by the sending of the U.S.S. Nimitz aircraft carrier to the strait by the U.S. Later, in 1996, on the eve of Taiwanese elections, China again conducted missile tests. The economic and political

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cost to Taiwan was great, but the third crisis also showed U.S. willingness to protect Taiwan, as well as increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In 2000, the DDP candidate for President, Chen Shui-bian won election in Taiwan, a sign seen as ominous by the PRC. Chen Shui-bian is seen by many as an independence-leaning politician. In 2004, Chen was re-elected amidst strong condemnation by the mainland, which passed the Anti-Secession Act, authorizing the use of force against Taiwan or any province which declares independence. Chen’s presidency has seen increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a higher international profile, and a greater discourse among Taiwanese for independence.

Sovereignty and Strength

To the PRC and Chinese on the mainland, the role of Taiwan as a province of China should be a given. The fact that in reality this is not a given is seen as yet another challenge and humiliation to China’s national integrity posed by an imperialist and hegemonic West, particularly the United States, as well as regional interlopers, particularly Japan. To an established country with a government that has run relatively smoothly for over two hundred years, the idea of such measures to save face may seem absurd; however, for a country newly emerging from over a century of strife and weakness, the loss of Taiwan would be not only symbolically and ideologically ruinous to China’s projected strength, but also poses a very real threat to the domestic stability of China. Furthermore, on the foreign front, the loss of Taiwan would be a disastrous national security failure, as Taiwan serves not only as a stronghold for the United States in the Pacific, but could ally with both the U.S. and Japan to create an offensive coalition hostile to Chinese interests.4

China’s strategy to engage Taiwan is twofold, and is easily recognizable to any purveyor of history. China uses incentive and coercion in step to tempt and force Taiwan’s return, or what China expert Suisheng Zhao calls “peaceful offense” and “coercive strategy”.5 In 1979, China first began with accommodation, offering a “one country, two systems” solution, which would allow Taiwan to keep its autonomy in all respects save name. Further84

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more, China engaged in the “three links, four exchanges” system, attempting to bridge the Taiwan Strait through commercial, postal, and travel links and academic, cultural, economic, and sports exchanges.6 The incentives to Taiwan were great—China’s vast low-tech market is perfectly suited to Taiwan’s high tech economy. Because Taiwan’s cultural ties to China are so great, cultural exchange would help to enrich both countries and lessen hostility. The incentive system of China’s attempts to woo Taiwan were meant to allow for Taiwan to naturally re-integrate into the mainland, and attempt that, for all purposes, failed in 1996.

With the more adventurous statements of Lee in the 1990’s, as well as policy actions to remove mainland influence in Taiwan (disbanding of National Yuan and National Assembly of mainland constituents), China became ever more desperate, as Taiwan was not drifting further toward the mainland, but rather further away. Strong showings of force reaffirmed the PRC pledge to use force if necessary, prompting a new stalemate in which both the PRC and, ironically, the U.S. wished for a continuation of the status quo, whereas Taiwan, under Chen, sought more room to maneuver for independence.

Struggle for Recognition

Taiwan’s struggle throughout its short lifetime has not always been for independence in the political sense, although this has manifested itself quite prominently recently, but rather recognition as a state unto itself, along with its astonishing record of achievement despite overwhelming odds. Taiwan’s goal is not lost to China, yet it is a goal China cannot accept. Thus, Taiwan must play a game of acquiescence to a much more powerful mainland, yet at the same time draw on support from reluctant allies.

To counter China’s incentive strategy of “three links, four exchanges”, Taiwan used its own “lenient out, strict in” policy. In short, exchange to the mainland was accepted and even encouraged, but any exchange into Taiwan was kept to a minimum (from 1988, 50,000 mainlanders visited Taiwan as opposed to 7 million visits by Taiwanese to the mainland).7 Also, whatever exchange did occur was kept officially non-political, frustrating the PRC efforts to build political rapport with the ROC officials.

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Internationally, it is no secret that Taiwan relies almost exclusively on U.S. support to back its policies, although the United States nominally supports the “One-China Rule” as named in the Shanghai Communiqué. Much has been made of the Taiwan lobby in Washington and its donations of millions of dollars, and also of Taiwan’s “money diplomacy” to gain recognition of other countries by monetary means.

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Recommended Works: Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. Coming conflict with China. New York: A.A. Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 1997. Print.

Bush, Richard C., At cross purposes : US.-Taiwan relations since 1942. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c2004.

Hunt, Michael H. Genesis of Chinese Communist foreign policy. New York: Columbia UP, 1996. Print.

Javits, Jacob K. “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), pp. 54-62 Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China from revolution through reform.

New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. Print.

Spence, Jonathan. “The Search for Modern China” New York : W.W. Norton & Co., c1990.

Stapleton, Roy, J. “Opportunities and Challenges for U.S.-China Relations” US Taiwan Relaions in the Twenty-first century, ed. Christopher Marsh and June T. Dreyer, Lexington Books, 2003.

Tucker, Nancy B., Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994 Zhao, Suisheng. Across the Taiwan Strait Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.

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