Duke East Asian Nexus 3.1 by Duke East Asia Nexus

DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS Policies Against Obesity in China A Visa For President Lee Females in Zhang Yimou’s Films The Iwakura Embassy in France The Modern Chinese Dynasty Japanese Politics and Kishi Nobuske Relation Between PRC and Religion Commentary on Taiwan’s Elections

The People’s Great Firewall: The Internet and Chinese Democracy HAOXIAOHAN HELEN CAI

A Veiled Truth: The U.S. Censorship of the Atomic Bomb JIYOON LEE

China’s Energy Future After Fukushima: Challenges and Opportunities PAUL HORAK

Beyond the “Fake Smile”: Ai Weiwei’s Vision For Individual Rights in China LIA VIVIAN MONTI

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DUKE EAST ASIA nexus Paul Horak President Kkot Byoul Hannah Yi Editor-in-Chief Jack Wagner Managing Editor Yavuz Acikalin Chief Programming Officer/Treasurer Haoxiaohan Helen Cai Director of Conferences Editorial Board Tenzing Thondup Jose Lamazares Ainan Liu Alexis Morton Jeff Liu Adam Roth Hoel Wiesner Board of Directors Linda Zhang, Jack Zhang, Andrew Cheon, Alice Ren Board of Advisors Richard Brodhead, Dominic Sachsenmaier Simon Partner, Bai Gao Special thanks to James Wong for the original DEAN logo design, Vice Provost Gilbert Merckx, and Dean Stephen Nowicki for their generous support. Copyright ÂŠ 2011 by Duke East Asia Nexus (DEAN) at Duke University DEAN receives support from the Asian Pacific Studies Institute and from the John Spencer Bassett Memorial Fund. DEAN publishes full-length academic papers related to East Asia. The journal is released biannually. DEAN also publishes continuously on its website: 2

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UNDERGRADUATE CERTIFICATE IN EAST ASIAN STUDIES The Asian/Pacific Studies Institute (APSI) at Duke University is pleased to announce a new undergraduate East Asian Studies Certificate program. This certificate provides students with the opportunity for interdisciplinary, in-depth study of historical and contemporary East Asian societies and cultures. In addition to offering courses and a certificate on completion of the requirements, the APSI also sponsors lectures and films and offers multiple scholarships for study abroad in East Asia. Undergraduates will also have the opportunity to publish their academic work for the certificate in the student-run Duke East Asia Nexus Journal. Questions about the EAS Certificate? Contact Faculty Advisor, Professor Dominic Sachsenmaier (dominic.sachsenmaier@duke.edu) or Outreach Coordinator, Karla Loveall (karla.loveall@duke.edu). EAS CERTIFICATE REQUIREMENTS: •

Students must take at least six courses from the APSI designated East Asian certificate course list (Note: language courses are NOT included in this list).

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Students must take courses across at least two departments or programs.

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No more than three courses in any one department or program.

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One of the six courses must be from the list of approved introductory courses for the certificate.

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One of the six courses must be an approved capstone seminar course.

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At least four of the courses must be at the 100-level or above.

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No more than two of the courses may also be used to satisfy the requirements of any major, minor, or other certificate program.

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In addition to the six courses taken for the certificate, students must either complete two years of a Duke language program in Chinese, Japanese, or Korean, or they may demonstrate equivalent competence by passing a proficiency test.

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Students are required to complete an e-portfolio that reflects their accomplishments 3 in the certificate program. DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS

Duke East Asia Nexus Volume 3 Issue 1 2011

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Table of Contents Essays Kishi Nobusuke and A Dualistic Japan Paul Horak 4 Policy Recommendations for Rising Levels of Obesity in China Alice Yen 13 Exploring Interbranch Politics and Political Processes: A Visa for President Lee Danni Lin 22 China’s Energy Future After Fukushima: Challenges and Opportunities Paul Horak 31 Beyond the “Fake Smile”: Ai Weiwei’s Vision for Individual Rights in China Lia Vivian Monti 42 A Veiled Truth: The U.S. Censorship of the Atomic Bomb Jiyoon Lee 51 The Use of the Female Body as a Vehicle for Social Commentary in Zhang Yimou’s Films Miyuki Baker 63 2011

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The Current State of Religion in Mainland China: Relations between the People’s Republic and Religion Baron Eldra Laudermilk 72 The Iwakura Embassy in France: Patterning Japan after France Rene Bystron 86 The Modern Chinese Dynasty Michelle Phillips 94 The People’s Great Firewall: The Internet and Chinese Democracy Haoxiaohan Helen Cai 106 Opinion A Commentary on the Ma and Tsai Taiwanese Elections Jiakun Jack Zhang 119

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Kishi Nobusuke and a Dualistic Japan Paul Horak Abstract: Japan was the first country in East Asia to industrialize. Its state-control based industrial policies have now been implemented in many other countries to great success. Many see the post-World War Two era as the time where Japan began to engineer its “economic miracle.” In reality, the rise of Japan in the late-20th century had its foundations in the prewar era when the Japanese government was searching for the best way to militarize itself. Kishi Nobusuke oversaw both the war effort and the bountiful industrial policies in the war’s aftermath. In his work he has been called everything from a war criminal to a national hero, but few dare to call him unsuccessful.

“It is much harder to nullify the results of an economic conquest than those of a military conquest.” ----Takashi Korekiyo (Johnson 1982: 156) There are few figures in Japan’s modern history who generate as much controversy and as little understanding as Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987.) It is not hard to understand why. At one time or another Kishi was the Japanese leader of Manchuria; the head of Japan’s Ministry of Munitions; a suspected Class A war criminal; one of the leading architects of Japan’s “economic miracle;” and the Prime Minister of Japan (Kurzman). Kishi is perhaps the most startling example of the continuity of leadership that followed Japan’s defeat in World War II: the same men who led the war effort also led Japan’s recovery from it. Although he was by no means the single most important figure either during or after the war, his thoughts and activities have had a long-lasting impact on the Japanese economy, most especially his development

of industrial policy. As we will see, Kishi’s wartime experiences explain a lot of his— and by extension Japan’s—post-war success. This paper will seek to answer how Kishi’s experiences during the Second World War affect Japan’s post-war economic experience. In answering the above question we will come closer to understanding the complicated legacy of one of Japan’s most controversial 20th century leaders, and in so doing, also come closer to understanding Japan’s complicated World War II legacy, for the two can’t be understood without each other. There was much more than biographical continuity among many of the wartime and post-war leaders of Japan— there was also a remarkable degree of institutional continuity as well (Gordon).

Paul Horak is a junior at Duke University, majoring in Japanese and Economics. He is the President of Duke East Asia Nexus. 2011

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The most important post-war ministry was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, also known as MITI which was established in 1949. Its predecessors, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) and the Ministry of Munitions (MM), grew in importance during the war effort despite barely existing before it. The MCI was brought into being in 1924 after the split of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and it is where Kishi Nobusuke got his start in the bureaucracy (Johnson 1982). Its recent origins made the MCI a marginal player in the Japanese bureaucracy, but its influence would grow in step with Kishi’s ambitions. By the time 1930 rolled around it was in charge of running Japan’s economy, a testament to the severe economic crises of the late 1920’s and the ability of its leaders to address them. By the time, Kishi was still a junior-ranking bureaucrat. However, Yoshino Shinji, his senior mentor, was most responsible for the economic policy that came out of MCI at the time. Yoshino was the Vice Minister of MCI from 1931 to 1936, and his and Kishi’s dominance of economic policymaking in the 1930’s has often been called the “Yoshino-Kishi Line” (Johnson 1982: 66). The two men are the inventers of industrial policy, whereby the state intervenes in markets to allocate resources to certain strategic industries and to see to it that they develop in line with larger national interests (Gao). The development of industrial policy may be the most important legacy 8

of Japan’s tragic war effort. In 1930, it was a consequence of Japan’s own economic crisis and a much larger crisis of capitalism that had resulted in a global economic depression. That year, at Yoshino’s recommendation, Kishi left Japan for Germany, where he would spend seven months studying the experiments in state control of the economy that were already underway there (Johnson). In July, he wrote to Yoshino of the German devotion to “technological innovation in industries, to the installation of the most up-to-date machines and equipment and to generally increasing efficiency” (Johnson 108). He noted how the German government had set up trusts and cartels to promote production and employment, both of which had suffered huge setbacks in the hyperinflationary 1920’s. When Kishi and Yoshino reunited in late 1930 they charged themselves with creating an economic policy that would serve as an antidote to Japan’s economic ills, which were not all that different from Germany’s. In 1931, with the conflict in Manchuria escalating and the Depression lingering, Yoshino and Kishi collaborated to pass the Important Industries Law, which gave Japanese companies the power to cartelize, using temporary treaties, in order to boost their production. That it was a slight modification on Kishi’s 1930 statements reflects the influence of Yoshino’s personal philosophy, which differed slightly from that of his protégé. Yoshino believed that companies could control their own cartelization and

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that relaxing competition—coupled with state subsidies—would allow them to boost production in the national interest. Kishi was in favor of something closer to the German model where the state had control over cartelization and oversight of production (Johnson). He would later employ this strategy as the head of MCI in the early 1940’s. At the time, both Yoshino and Kishi thought that the only way to boost production was to deemphasize competition. The Important Industries Law sought to address some of the lagging concerns of the late 1920s’ and pave the way for a more productive decade in the 1930’s. Japan at the time was plagued by a “dual structure” in the economy: on the one hand, huge zaibatsu had inefficient monopolies over most means of production, while on the other hand, the small and medium firms—which paled in productive capacity to the zaibatsu but employed more workers—were engaged in cut throat competition to supply basic goods and service to the Japanese population (Gao). Workers in small and medium firms made a fraction of what their counterparts in the zaibatsu were earning, and their prevalence in the population meant much social unrest and potentially destructive consequences for Japan’s government. By allowing the cartelization of industries, Kishi and Yoshino took the profit principle out of the corporate governance equation and replaced it with a concern for the public interest or koueki (Gao). Their law also benefited some 2011

companies more than others, in particular the heavy industries, which required more capital, manpower, and expertise than others. Following 1931, and for the rest of Yoshino’s tenure as Vice-Minister, MCI emphasized the development of the heavy and chemical industries in Japan. As Yoshino put it, “industry needs a plan of comprehensive development and a measure of control” (Johnson 108). This was consistent with Japanese military actions in Manchuria, and larger Japanese security concerns about the potential military threat from the United States. Japan in the 1930’s was even more tumultuous than it had been in the 1920’s. While politicians and businessmen were largely failing to handle the situation largely because both groups failed to get public trust, industrial nationalist bureaucrats like Kishi managed the economy. These kakushin kanryou, or “reform bureaucrats” (Gao 77), were committed to Japan’s military pursuit during the war and its economic “conquests” after the war (Johnson). They mistrusted the zaibatsu and had faith in the state’s ability to manage the economy and the war effort. Kishi became directly entangled in Japan’s war effort in 1936 when he was appointed the head of Japanese economic operations in Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet regime in Manchuria. After five years of occupying Manchuria, the Japanese had made only modest economic footholds. Their only source of real economic power was in the management of

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the South Manchurian Railway Company, headed by Kishi’s longtime friend, Matsuoka Yousuke, also from Yamaguchi Prefecture. Matsuoka was the Foreign Minister for Japan in 1940 that sealed the deal on the Tripartite Pact, forming the axis alliance. While working under Yoshino at MCI, Kishi also sent many of his most able-minded protégés to work on industrial policy in Manchukuo, making his eventual tenure there something of a reunion. In addition to working closely with Matsuoka, Kishi was also reunited with his great friend and future Vice-Minister at MCI, Shiina Etsusaburo (Johnson). The 1940’s and 1950’s were often referred to as the “Kishi-Shiina line” because of their shared dominance of economic policymaking (Johnson 131). Their ideas are still relevant to understanding Japan’s economy today. Much of the policy that they enacted over the between 1940 and 1960 was at least partially borne from their experiments with industrial policy in Manchukuo from 1936 to 1939. Manchukuo was the perfect starting ground (they also referred to is as the “proving ground”) for their ideas: the government was supplying them with plenty of capital free of political or bureaucratic entanglements, and the military engagements in the region put constant pressure on the productive capacity of the region, prompting Kishi and Shiina to adopt top-down statemandated policies. (Johnson 132) While the Yoshino-Kishi line of the early thirties was about “self-control,” the Kishi-Shiina line that would followe was about “state-con10

trol.” Tojo Hideki, the Commander of the Kwangtung Army in Manchukuo and eventual Prime Minister of Japan, who had first requested Kishi’s presence in Manchuria, again selected Kishi as the Minister for MCI later in 1941. His Vice-Minister was Shiina; together, Kishi and Shiina would bring their practice of industrial policy to the heart of the Empire and in so doing put themselves at the heart of the war effort. The Kishi-Shiina line replaced the Yoshino-Kishi line of the 1930’s, but not surprisingly there were many similarities between the two especially concerning automobile acts (Gao). Yoshino and Kishi’s last act before resigning as heads of MCI was to pass the Automobile Licensing Law, which made it mandatory for automobile manufacturers to get MCI licenses for production. Kishi granted licenses to only two firms: Nissan and Toyota. Nissan, the bigger of the two at the time, was one of the major economic forces behind Japan’s efforts in Manchuria. The law not only gave both companies clear advantages because they were the only legal producers of automobiles, but also signaled a new direction for industrial policy: now the state, not companies, was in control (Johnson). Later, in 1938 while Kishi was in Manchuria, the Japanese government passed the National General Mobilization Law, which was in the spirit of Kishi’s state-controlled industrial policy and in some ways a modification of his and Yoshino’s 1931 Important Industries Law. The new law gave the state power over

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management and production to ensure that all resources of the nation were employed for the national interest. The cartels that the government put together were called Control Associations. The move was also seen around the world as a kind of declaration of Japanese hostility and preparation for war (Gordon). In fact, Japan was already so mired in a war in Manchuria. When Kishi and Shiina took charge at MCI in 1941 they inherited an economy that was grossly inefficient and unprepared for the coming struggle in the Pacific against the United States. The National General Mobilization Act was partly to blame. It allowed the state to organize cartels but provided little oversight over what was produced. Although there was political incentive to shift production from consumer goods to military ones, there was as of yet no economic incentive or logic for doing so. Kishi and Shiina worked to fix this. They passed the Enterprise Readjustment Act, which was geared at helping producers to transition their lines of production from consumer goods to military ones. Officials from MCI were assigned to factories to ensure that “adjustments” were made, and within 18 months of the passing of the Enterprise Readjustment Act, most producers were reined in and contributing to the war effort (Johnson). The difference between this Kishi-Shiina intervention and that of the Yoshino-Kishi years was the state’s heavy hand in ensuring production for the public 2011

interest. Competition was still relaxed and the profit principle virtually non-existent, but the transition from “self-control” on the part of companies to “state-control” dominance of industry was complete. Not surprisingly, the transition from “self-control” to “state-control” hurt consumers. Consumer goods were virtually impossible to find by the time war with the United States rolled around because they had been substituted out for military goods (Johnson). This transition partially reflected Kishi’s own personal belief in the preeminence of the state and mistrust of big business, but it was probably due more to the state of economic crisis and necessity that prevailed on the eve of war with America. As before, economic policy and innovation were motivated by crisis (Gao). Kishi’s 1931 Important Industries Law was an attempt to balance zaibatsu interests with the public interest—namely the livelihoods of owners and workers in small and medium-sized firms. The law was only partially successful in achieving this, but it did supply the country with consumer and military goods to satisfy the country’s growing demands. Most of its successes were erased by the consequences of the Enterprise Readjustment Act, which ironically empowered the zaibatsu and disenfranchised the consumer. In the short-term, the move was an attempt to support a hopeless war effort: companies and markets could not effectively allocate resources to the battlefields but the state could (Gao). Kishi and Shiina succeeded

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in bringing the country to a state of “total war,” where every able- bodied man or woman was working in factories to produce munitions for Japan’s deteriorating war cause (Gordon). In the long run this led to the erosion of light industries in Japan, which had been replaced by the heavy industries during the 1940’s (Johnson). Silk and textile mills were converted into aircraft and shipbuilding plants—Kishi’s and Yoshino’s earlier goal of a heavily industrialized country was finally realized. But at a huge cost: just two years later Japan would surrender in World War II and its prospects for future prosperity were necessarily bleak.

don). Throughout most of the war effort his peers and the public revered Kishi as a man of unmatched intelligence and foresight despite the fact that most of his successes extended the war and the country’s misery (Kurzman). Now the country was in utter ruin and Kishi a marginalized figure of the wartime elite.

The American victors quickly established their supremacy in Occupation era Japan. They dismantled and changed many of the institutions and practices that Kishi had promoted as Minister of Munitions. They replaced an Empire with an American-style democracy and a Naval Of Kishi was still supportive of the war ficer Prime-Minister, Suzuki Kantaro, with effort in 1943, when he and Tojo took the an anti-war conservative, Yoshida Shigeru final step toward complete state domination (Gordon). Shigeru would become, along of industry with the creation of the Minwith Kishi, one of the founding fathers of istry of Munitions (Johnson). MM was the the “1955 system” in Japan, but they hardly direct successor to MCI and would eventu- liked each other. Shigeru was suspicious of ally be transformed into MITI during the Kishi’s activities during the war, especially Occupation. It was the leader in a hopehis heading the Ministry of Munitions less war effort, and Kishi began to realize (Johnson). Shigeru worked with the Amerisuch starting in 1944. When Japan finally cans to try and reinvigorate Japan politidid accept defeat in August of 1945, Kically and economically. Kishi’s industrial shi, along with Tojo and dozens of others, policy came under fire. In 1949, the Presiwas imprisoned in Sugamo Prison to await dent of Detroit Bank, Joseph Dodge issued trial by the International Military Tribua set of policy recommendations—known nal for the Far East (Kurzman). Tojo was as the “Dodge Line”—that attempted to hanged in 1948 but Kishi was never tried, inject many neo-classical ideas into Japan’s despite being suspected of Class A War post-war economy. In particular, Dodge Crimes. His non-trial is probably more a recommended the cessation of state subsitestament to the American change of heart dies to industry and the eradication of the toward Japan in 1947—called the “Reverse Reconstruction Finance Bank, which was Course”—than any absence of guilt (Gorgiving loans to fledging businesses uneco12

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nomically in Dodge’s view. Shigeru and his followers in the bureaucracy, who had filled the vacuum in Japanese politics left by the American Occupation, implemented Dodge’s plan in 1949 (Johnson). But it was only a temporary measure. By 1951, the Japan Development Bank was created and continued the role of the Reconstruction Finance Bank. Despite Shigeru’s attempts to populate the bureaucracy with officials loyal to him and not Kishi, he could not prevent Kishi’s idea of industrial policy from sticking. Nor did he necessarily want to; despite their political differences, Kishi and Shigeru were still devout nationalists and wanted to see an independent and economically viable Japan once more. After the reverse course, the broad goals of the American occupiers were necessarily narrowed: to make Japan a bastion against communism in the East, the Japanese would need a modest remilitarization and a substantial economic renaissance (Gordon). The only way to achieve high growth in the short-term would be to have the state intervene in markets to once again effectively direct resources toward production for the public interest. Ikeda’s launch of the People’s Finance Corporation and Council for Industrial Rationalization in 1949 was a token of Kishi’s philosophy winning out, even among Yoshida’s closest followers (Gao). The advent of the Korean War in 1950 woke up Kishi’s production machine as the Japanese began to fulfill American 2011

orders for munitions and battle supplies and started what would become the “highgrowth era” in modern Japanese history— the start of Japan’s post-war economic miracle (Johnson). Ironically, it was Ikeda’s MITI, the reincarnation of Kishi’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, that led the economic mobilization of Japan’s resources after the war, just as Kishi’s MCI and MM had led the military mobilization during the war. By 1952, MITI was to come full circle: Ikeda was forced out due to a disparaging remark about the sacrifice of small and medium-sized firms, and Kishi, who was finally allowed back into public life, was placed at its helm (Johnson). The stunning continuity of leaders and institutions before, during, and after the war was a great contributor to Japan’s post-war economic success. The war, a tragic experience for all, was not necessarily useless: young and old leaders ambitiously pushed the envelope. The country’s meteoric economic growth in the 1950’s and 1960’s was a function of that ambition fitted to a new economic and political environment. In 1952, Kishi and his followers at MITI adapted their industrial policy to a new economic climate by passing the Enterprise Rationalization Promotion Law (Johnson). By 1952, Japan and parts of Western Europe were again on their feet, supported and even propped up by the United States part of a new international order that promoted peace and the free exchange of goods and ideas (Gordon). The

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industrial policy of the 1950’s was a product of this environment and differed from its earlier “self-control” and “state-control” iterations. The newest iteration was a synthesis of the previous two, a middle ground of sorts: they were balanced out by kyouchou, or “cooperation” (Johnson). This new philosophy was less about international cooperation, which was limited by Japan’s need to protect its infant industries, and more about cooperation among big business, the government, and bureaucracy.

up-to-date machines and equipment and to generally increasing efficiency” (Johnson). The theory may have existed before the war but Kishi’s experiences running the economy during and after it put that theory to the test. Those experiences weren’t just important for Kishi; they were also essential to dozens of other future leaders, including Sahashi Shigeru, Ikeda Hayato and Satou Eisaku. Kishi, Ikeda, and Satou (who was Kishi’s biological younger brother) would serve as Japan’s Prime Ministers from 1957 to 1972—all former wartime bureaucrats Kishi left the bureaucracy in 1957 to (Gordon). Sahashi was confined to the become Prime Minister, but left a long and bureaucracy by his controversial opinions enduring legacy inside MITI. From 1952 to on the war and extreme nationalist views. 1970, Kishi and his followers effectively ran Kishi, who was similar to Sahashi in these MITI, and by extension the booming Japa- respects, broke the confines of bureaucracy nese economy (Johnson). The best example but experienced only modest success as is Sahashi Shigeru, called “Mr. MITI,” who Prime Minister. took over at MITI in 1966 after more than two decades of service under Kishi. (John His involvement in the war effort son) Sahashi worked with Kishi and Shiina was never forgotten. Often remembered at MCI and was brought to MITI by Kishi as the “ghost of the Showa Era,” no matin the early 1950’s. At MITI he headed the ter how much important Kishi’s wartime Enterprises Bureau, which was responsible experiences may have helped his—and for making long run economic policy, and Japan’s—post-war success, there was always later the Heavy Industries Bureau, which a great deal of public mistrust about him. was in charge of promoting Japan’s many The bureaucratic ambitions that he realnascent industries including transistors, ized while working behind the scenes durautomobiles, television and steel (Johnson). ing the war did not translate well into the His philosophy perfectly mirrored the one political spotlight (Packard). Kishi’s Prime Kishi had developed after visiting Germany Ministership probably received more scruin 1930 before the war had started. Japan tiny than any other in the post-war error in the 1950’s and 1960’s was known for its and was undoubtedly subjected to some of devotion to “technological innovation in the greatest pressure in modern Japanese industries, to the installation of the most politics (Gordon). It all came to a head in 14

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1960, when Kishi unilaterally pushed the controversial extension of the US-Japan Security Alliance through the Diet on May 19. Yoshida Shigeru worked out the original security deal in 1951, but it called for an optional continuation in 1960. Kishi, eager to cement his legacy and tighten his grip on power, defied the public in passing the extension (Packard). Protests enveloped Tokyo and precipitated Japans’ greatest democratic crisis to date—Kishi was the subject of much antagonism. As a professor at Tokyo University put it at the time, “the pent up resentment and jealousy toward all bureaucrats exploded against Kishi, whose insolence typified the worst aspects of prewar bureaucracy” (Packard 246). Kishi’s miscalculation—some say the only one of his life—cost him his political career. He resigned on June 21, 1960 (Packard). The reaction of ordinary Japanese toward Kishi’s dictatorial passage of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security highlights an ever-present dualism in modern Japanese history. It simultaneously showed how little and how much Japan had changed since the Second World War. Japan’s post-war economy was a product of the industrial policy borne from economic and political crises during the war years (Gao). Ironically, the same nationalism and determination that fueled the Japanese war machine also fueled its phoenix-like economic recovery. The same institutions and people led the country before, during, and after the war (Johnson). Kishi was prob2011

ably one of the most important people who were in charge of one of the most important institutions during that time span. That he was loved during the war and hated after it is not just a product of his complicated personal legacy; it is a product of Japan’s even more complicated war legacy. There is no doubt that the war was a tragic experience for the Japanese. However, it is equally clear that 1945 was not the “birth” of a new Japan, as many then and now believe. Kishi Nobusuke is the perfect example. References Gao, Bai. Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print. Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa times to the Present. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print. Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1982. Print. Kurzman, Dan. Kishi and Japan; the Search for the Sun. New York: I. Obolensky, 1960. Print. Packard, George R. Protest in Tokyo; the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1966. Print.

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Policy Recommendations for Rising Levels of Obesity in Urban China Alice Yen Abstract: Changing lifestyle patterns have led to increasing levels of obesity in China, particularly given great economic gains in urban regions. As a result, dietary choices have shifted toward heavy protein-based foods and trends toward energy-dense Western fast foods. Technological advancements have also enabled this drastically growing economy to resort to sedentary activities for entertainment. Without policy interventions, the Chinese government could be accountable for high levels of diet-related, non-communicable diseases in their population, where the WHO estimates the Chinese will lose $588 billion between 2005 and 2015 due to mortality and morbidity rates arising from weight-related health concerns. Though the Chinese government has sought out potential solutions, there is still opportunity for further development.

Background

concern the Chinese government must address to prevent disastrous consequences.

The obesity epidemic is a major threat to China as a rising economic power. Historically, China has primarily focused on solving problems of undernutrition and malnutrition. However, the infiltration of dietary trends from the West has led to overabundance and thus massive increases in overall calorie intake as well as meat and sugar consumption, particularly in urban regions. While Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s overall obesity rates for adults stand below 5%, many cities in China are reaching levels of approximately 20% (WHO). As such, over 200 million Chinese citizens are overweight or obese (Levine). There are still many areas in China where hunger remains a large problem, but rising levels of obese citizens is a

Changing diets and patterns of physical activity have resulted in considerable increases in the levels of obesity in China. Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first nutrition and health survey was finished in 2002, revealing that over 60 million Chinese citizens had become obese between 1992 and 2000 (Levine). Since then, rates have only increased. With the influence of globalization, urbanization, and technology, Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy has flourished, reaching an annual GDP growth of over 9% for the past several years (BBC News). As a result Chinese lifestyles have shifted, giving rise to the degenerative disease stage of the nutrition transition, where growing incomes have led to increased

Alice Yen is a Duke junior studying Public Policy and Markets and Management. She has conducted fieldwork research focused on global health and food policy in China and India.

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spending on unhealthy foods (Popkin). Urban areas are of particular interest, as on average 8% of Chinese children in cities are obese compared to the 3.1% of children in rural regions (Sean). Drastic weight increases in both children and adults brings attention to the obesity epidemic aimed at urban China.

ments, and as a result their dietary patterns changed. Beginning in 1988, the Chinese government no longer rationed meals (Du, Mroz, Zhai, and Popkin). The end of rationing, which had enabled the government to control the dietary habits of its people, allowed Chinese citizens to eat more freely and according to their own preferences. With options shifting toward With shifting trends in diet and more western-oriented products, Chinese exercise, obesity levels in China have been consumers responded by demanding more on the rise. Although China’s categorienergy-dense foods. As certain portions of cal weight cutoff points are lower than the China’s population grew richer, Chinese World Health Organization’s norms, racial diets became more westernized. As a redifferences must be accounted for. In Chisult, people consumed fewer grains though na, BMI over 24 is overweight and over 28 they remained a substantial portion of the obese compared to the WHO’s 25 and 30, diet. On average, vegetable intake has acrespectively (Wu). These distinctions are tually decreased even further (Du, Lu, Zhai, accounted for by the impact greater weight and Popkin). Patterns of animal products, gain has on the health status for those of sweets, and fruit consumption, however, Asian descent compared to other racial have increased substantially. The average groups. Between 1985 and 2000, the freChinese person ate nine times as many eggs quency of overweight or obese children in- and over six times as much fish in 2003 creased 28 times in children ages 7-18 (Wu). as in 1961. Sweet intake from sugars and Based on current trends, China could posweetened beverages almost quadrupled tentially reach the extreme levels of obesity (IIASA). seen in the United States by 2025 (Popkin et al.). The livestock sector has expanded in China such that the nation produces Influencing Factors and the second-highest amount of poultry in Determinants the world. Prices of these commodities have fallen with higher levels of produc Before the 1970s, the Chinese diet tion, allowing for greater accessibility to was primarily composed of cereals and meat by even the lowest tiers of China’s starches with low levels of meat, sweets, socioeconomic classes (Delgado, 1999). As fruits, and vegetables. In the 1980s, howincomes have increased, more people have ever, China made vast economic advanceeaten chicken, beef, and mutton, with the 2011

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latter two meats showing the most significant increases (Du, Mroz, Zhai, and Popkin). Meat and milk consumed per capita doubled between 1983 and 1993 (Delgado). Because consumption of meat is signified with richness, easy access to these products encourages overeating within the Chinese population. The distribution of energy from carbohydrates, proteins, and fats shifted from primarily carbohydrates in the 1960s to significant increases in fats by the 2000s (Du, Lu, Zhai, and Popkin). In addition to modifications within the Chinese diet, the levels of calories consumed increased over time as well, particularly given changes in rationing policies by the Chinese government. As China lifted restrictions and opened trade with the world, it soon became inundated with Western influence as businesses rushed to capitalize on this large untapped market. Globalization brought in new products and ideas. McDonaldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among many other Western fast food chains, have been upheld in China as a new standard, positioning themselves as high-class establishments in the eyes of the growing population. Although more energy-dense foods are being consumed, fewer calories are being expended, as many moved to urban areas and previous blue collar occupations were replaced by stationary desk jobs requiring little if any physical exertion (Du, Lu, Zhai, and Popkin).

Technology advancements in trans18

portation and leisure in addition to the effects of globalization have contributed to these changes in energy intake and expenditure as well. The quantity of cars and motorbikes in China has increased substantially over the past few decades as the country has flourished with economic success. Televisions, computers, and the internet have encouraged sedentary entertainment activities, further promoting an inactive way of living. With urbanization and Western influences spreading throughout China, rising trends of obesity appear inevitable unless intentional action is taken. Potential Consequences Without taking action, the Chinese government is threatened by chronic health care costs in its population arising from its heavier citizens. Diet-related, non-communicable diseases (DR-NCD), including cardiovascular diseases and diabetes, are likely to result from these changes, costing the Chinese in human capital and needed health care (Du, Lu, Zhai, and Popkin). Stroke mortality due to obesity has also increased, and 92.4 million Chinese adults currently have Type 2 diabetes (McDermid; Gale). The health costs of inaction are not limited to lost lives but also societal costs of lost productivity and monetary expenditures. In 2003 alone, the total medical cost of overweight and obese Chinese citizens was $2.74 billion (Zhao, Zhai, Hu, Wang, and Yang). The WHO estimates the Chinese will lose $588 billion between 2005

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and 2015 due to deaths related to excessive weight gain if they do not take preventive measures. Given such extreme circumstances, action must be taken. Policy Solutions Undertaken

tives for the farmers of healthy crops. The Chinese government has laid down a foundation to address current cases of obesity and aims at prevention through the promotion of healthy lifestyles.

While the Chinese government has In the past, the Chinese government taken action, there are great possibilities for has been primarily concerned with the expansion. The Chinese Nutrition Society undernourished and those who did have ac- and the Institute of Nutrition and Food cess to food. With such a large population, Hygiene at the Chinese Academy of Prethe objective for decades was to make sure ventive Medicine created dietary guidelines the hungry were fed. Little attention was in 1997, including eight key values and a paid to what it was they were eating. Grain Pagoda (Appendix: Figure 3) similar to the production was therefore encouraged in United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; food guide pyramid (Zhai, agricultural planning and unbalanced diets, Fu, Du, and Chen). skewed toward certain food products but not others, surfaced as a result. Previously, The eight principles, as written in the few governmental investments were purofficial handbook for Chinese citizens are: sued on the nutrition front, though some 1. Eat a variety of foods, with cereals as the action was taken by research institutes on staple; 2. Consume plenty of vegetables, the ground. fruits and, tubers; 3. Consume milk, beans, or dairy or bean products daily; 4. Con The Chinese government has recog- sume appropriate amounts of fish, poultry, nized that obesity threatens the health of its eggs, and lean meat. Reduce fatty meat people and has taken action to address the and animal fat in the diet; 5. Balance food issue with the hopes of preventing greater intake with physical activity to maintain a levels of obesity. The National Plan of Ac- healthy body weight; 6. Choose a light diet tion for Nutrition was set-up in 1997 to ad- that is also low in salt; 7. Drink alcoholic dress these concerns from the health level. beverages in limited amounts, if at all; 8. In 1998, its implementation was under the Avoid unsanitary and spoiled foods (Zhai, responsibility of the Department of Disease Fu, Du, Ge, and Chen). Control (WHO). In 2001, a national day was also established to recognize the impor- Although standards have been creattance of nutrition (WHO). Developments ed, access and distribution of this material on the supply-side of the market have also to the general public has not been initiated been pursued by seeking to provide incenon a large scale. In addition to creating 2011

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dietary guidelines, the Chinese government has also attempted to change cultural norms. Societal pressures have tended to promote academic achievement, encouraging many schoolchildren to sit and study rather than spend time doing heavy-duty tasks that are often associated with labor workers (Cheng). The government has responded, however, by shortening the length of national exams to lessen academic pressures. All of these initiatives, however, have room for growth. Intervention Program to Address the Threat of Obesity Citizens living in urban areas of China are at particular risk for obesity, as their way of living provides easy access to eating out and requires little physical exertion due to advancements in technology and transportation. Given previous circumstances where undernutrition was widespread and plumpness signified wealth, cultural norms encourage the Chinese to finish what is on their plates, often lending to habits of overeating. Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s notorious one-child policy, which is particularly enforced in cities, also leads to parents often spoiling their single child. As a result, many of these children are heavier than those with siblings, though confounding factors in this study may be debated (Dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Arcy). Given that the one-child policy is more stringently enforced in urban areas, cities tend to have higher rates of obesity. 20

When an individual lives in an urban area, they are likely to consume an average of 5.8-9.3 more kilograms of animal products per capita (Huang and Bouis). The reasoning behind this finding is debatable, ranging from changes in food prices to rising incomes. As such, in large cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, on average 8% of 10- to 12-year-olds are obese and another 15% overweight (MacLeod). The intervention program developed will therefore focus on urban cities in China, particularly concentrating on prevention and weight loss to slow and hopefully lower current rates of obesity. Nutrition Education in Schools and the General Community Public awareness campaigns have been used to promote the Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents and the Balanced Diet Pagoda, created by the Chinese Nutrition Society. Similar to the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; food guide pyramid, these recommendations promote balanced eating habits (Zhai, Fu, Du, Ge, and Chen). The obesity rate of children in China as a whole is currently at 10%, an increase of 47% compared to 2000 (Wei). Nutrition education, however, does not currently have an effective infrastructure to ensure broad reach. Thus, by using schools as a means, the Chinese government can inform and educate its citizens about obesity and general healthy eating.

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Fast food restaurants such as McDonaldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;sTM and Kentucky Fried ChickenTM have a strong presence in the cities of China, and raising awareness about the health consequences these diets hold is necessary to promote changes in lifestyle norms (MacLeod). While it has been found China currently has low levels of fast food intake, these comparisons are made relative to countries such as the United States (Popkin). The trends moving toward such circumstances must be prevented.

since school schedules often allot time for daily morning exercises. China has already moved toward a program requiring daily physical activity in schools countrywide called Sunny Sports China that is currently in its pilot stage (Indiana University Newsroom). Schools in urban areas of China should also invest in sports equipment to promote activity for schoolchildren. Initiatives to place slightly less emphasis on academics have been taken in favor of more time for physical exercise.

Media campaigns both in the schools and local communities must be coordinated to push for greater awareness of leading healthy standards of living, encouraging family involvement to account for the times of day children are not in school (The George Institute for International Health). Whether it is flyers or television announcements, these methods will target schoolchildren and the greater community. In urban China, children do not typically bring lunch from home. Instead, the school typically provides already-made lunches, consisting of traditional Chinese fare. Because these meals are regulated through the school, nutritional content can be controlled for and may be used as a means to introducing nutrition education.

Urban planning must also encourage greater levels of exercise by allowing areas for open green spaces. In 2000, there were only 6 million cars being driven in china, but by 2006 this number had increased to 20 million (NaturalNews). Pedestrianfriendly city planning to promote walking or biking from one place to another rather than driving an automobile could also advance such goals as increased reliance on easier and accessible modes of transportation has been correlated with trends of obesity (Bell, Ge, and Popkin). Regulations to Encourage Consumer Choice

Urban Planning and Investments to Promote Physical Activity In China, cultural norms currently encourage some forms of physical activity, 2011

The Chinese government should institute regulations on restaurants and food industry companies. Food labeling policies for chain restaurants and processed foods must also be initiated and enforced, encouraging visibility and increased knowledge for purchasing consumers. Doing so may

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also lead these companies toward offering healthier options. Food advertising has increased substantially with the influx of new technologies in the past few decades. As such, the number of television users in China has increased threefold, and the content being watched has been skewed more greatly toward marketing (Popkin). Marketing campaigns should be prohibited from directing their advertisements toward children, who are most susceptible to these tactics, and the nutritional content of certain foods should be regulated to ensure healthy options are available. In conjunction with public awareness campaigns, increasing the amount of readily available information to consumers is pivotal to successfully influence dietary choices.

Caution must also be taken when attempting to decrease the levels of fatty foods for the rich through the use of taxes and subsidies to ensure the poor are still able to access sources of protein, which may also be high in fat (Guo, Popkin, Mroz, and Zhai). Agricultural policies should also promote dietary goals (IIASA). Currently, the government uses subsidies to promote vegetables and the soybean industry rather than fatty animal products (Zhai, Fu, Du, Ge, and Chen). Such methods must be utilized across the board to ensure effective results. Suggestions for the Future

Although the Chinese government has attempted to take action, there are Increasing Accessibility to Healthy various measures they have yet to pursue Foods Using Taxes and Subsidies that could potentially prove advantageous to their cause. Nutrition programs and Certain food prices must be coninfrastructural modifications to encourage trolled to encourage healthy eating habits. such curriculum are pivotal. Prevention Lu and Goldman (2010) found when the programs are also of importance to slow price of cooking oil decreased, Chinese down or even stop the drastic increases of citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; intake increased. Because Chinese overweight and obese Chinese children and values often promote stinginess and savings, adults while rates are still relatively low. price sensitivity is a key characteristic that Urban planning and investments to encourmust be capitalized upon. Currently, local age physical activity must be used in congoods such as vegetables typically used in junction with encouraging healthy eating. Chinese dishes are cheaper than Western options (Gao, Griffiths, Chan, 2008). So The population distribution in China cietal norms, however, must shift to ensure presents various challenges that must be the latter are not held up as a standard of addressed with appropriate caution. While quality. obesity is on the rise, undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are still preva22

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lent, particularly due to the large income divides between the very rich and the very poor. These divides were especially common in urban areas (Doak, Adair, Bentley, Zhai, and Popkin). Policymakers with the intent of addressing rising levels of obesity in China must be wary of indirectly influencing other segments of the population. Instead, by taking a wide view of the people as a whole, Chinese policymakers can address the nutritional extremes in both circumstances to reach a middle ground. References Bell, A. Colin, Keyou Ge, and Barry M. Popkin. “The Road to Obesity or the Path to Prevention: Motorized Transportation and Obesity in China.” Obesity Research 10.4 (2002): 277-283. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Cheng, Tsung. “Obesity in Chinese children.” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. 97.5 (2004) Web. 27 Mar 2010. “China growth forecast raised by 9.5% by World Bank.” BBC News. 17 Mar. 2010. Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8571647.stm>. “China.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization, n.d. Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://www.wpro.who.int/internet/resources.ashx/ NUT/chn.pdf>. D’Arcy, Melissa. “The Move towards Obesity: the nutrition transition in China.” University of Michigan. Ford School of Public Policy. Apr. 2006. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Delgado, Christopher. Livestock to 2020: The Next Food Revolution. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999. Print. Doak, C., L. Adair, C. Monteiro, and B. Popkin. 2000. “Overweight and underweight coexist within households in Brazil, China, and Russia.” Journal of Nutrition 2011

130: 2965–71. Du, Shufa, Bing Lu, Fengying Zhai, and Barry M. Popkin. “A new stage of the nutrition transition.” Public Health Nutrition 5.1A (2002): 169-174. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Du, S., T. Mroz, F. Zhai, and B. Popkin. 2004. Rapid income growth adversely affects diet quality in China— Particularly for the poor!” Social Science and Medicine 59: 1505–15. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2010. FAOSTAT. <http://faostat.fao.org/> (accessed March 30, 2010). Gale, Jason. “China Tops India on World Diabetes Ladder as Boom Spurs Obesity.” BusinessWeek 24 Mar. 2010: n. pag. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Gao, Yang, Sian Griffiths, and Emily Y. Y. Chan. “Community-based interventions to reduce overweight and obesity in China: a systematic review of the Chinese and English literature.” Journal of Public Health 30.4 (2008): 436-448. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Ge, Keyou, and Kristen McNutt. “How the Chinese link dietary advice to their national plan of action for nutrition.” Journal of the American Dieteic Association 100.8 (2000): 885-887. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Guo, X., B. Popkin, T. Mroz, and F. Zhai. 1999. Food price policy can favorably alter macronutrient intake in China. Journal of Nutrition 129: 994–1001. Huang, J., and H. Bouis. 1996. Structural changes in the demand for food in Asia. Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 11. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). 2010. Can China feed itself ? <http://www. iiasa.ac.at/> (accessed March 30). “IU professor to help China provide daily physical activity for school children: “Sunny Sports China” to reach 320 million youth.” Indiana University Newsroom 17

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Jun. 2008: n. pag. Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/8427.html>.

Wei, Wang. “Beijing fights obesity with tape measures.” China Post 23 Jan. 2010. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

Levine, James A. “Obesity in China: Causes and solutions.” Chinese Medical Journal 121.11 (2008): 1043-1050. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

World Health Organization. World Health Organization, n.d. Web. 29 Mar 2010. <http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/media/en/gsfs_obesity.pdf>.

Lu, Yang, and Dana Goldman. “The Effects of Relative Food Prices on Obesity — Evidence from China: 1991-2006.” NBER Working Paper Series w16720. (2010). Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548778>.

Wu, Yangfeng. “Overweight and obesity in China .” BMJ 333. (2006): 362-363. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

McDermid, Eleanor. “Obesity impcating stroke incidence, morality in China.” Medwire News. Medwire News, 26 Feb. 2010. Web. 27 Mar 2010. MacLeod, Calum. “Obesity of China’s kids stuns officials.” USA Today 09 Jan 2007. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

Zhai, Fengying, Dawei Fu, Shufa Du, Keyou Ge, and Chunming Chen. “What is China doing in policy-making to push back the negative aspects of the nutrition transition?.” Public Health Nutrition 5.1A (2002): 269-273. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Zhao, W., Y. Zhai, J. Hu, J. Wang, and Z. Yang. “Economic burden of obesity-related chronic diseases in Mainland China..” Obesity Reviews 9.s1 (2008): 62-67. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

“Obesity skyrocketing in China as the Chinese adopt western diets, lifestyles.” NaturalNews. NaturalNews, 18 Aug. 2006. Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://www.naturalnews.com/020042.html>. “Parents and schools, major factors in China obesity boom.” The George Institute for International Health. The George Institute for International Health, 2007. Web. 27 Mar 2010. <http://www.thegeorgeinstitute.org/ events/latest-news/latest-news-archive/parents-andschools-major-factors-in-china-obesity-boom.cfm>. Popkin, Barry M. “Global nutrition dynamics: the world is shifting rapidly toward a diet linked with noncommunicable diseases.” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 84.2 (2006): 289-298. Web. 30 Mar 2010. Popkin, Barry M. “The Nutrition Transition in the Developing World.” Development Policy Review 21.5-6 (2003): 581-597. Web. 27 Mar 2010. Popkin, B.M., S. Kim, E.R. Rusev, S. Du, and C. Zizza. “Measuring the full economic costs of diet, physical activity and obesity-related chronic diseases.” Obesity Reviews 23 Mar. 2010: 271-293. Web. 27 Mar 2010.

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Exploring Interbranch Politics and Political Processes: A Visa for President Lee Danni Lin Abstract: Since the normalization of relations with China in the 1970’s, the US has affirmed the “One China” policy, agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, and upheld a seventeen year policy of barring visits from high-level Taiwanese officials. However, in May 1995, the US deviated from nearly twenty five years of public policy statements and reassurances to China by issuing a visa to President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC of Taiwan. The interbranch politics model, supplemented by the political processes model, elucidates an ostensibly surprising course of action by focusing on executive-legislative relations: President Clinton’s decision to grant a visa to President Lee did not reflect a considered analysis of American interests but rather White House acquiescence to strong pressure from Congress (Allison,22-33). Following an analysis of the decision-making process and theoretical application of the model to the case study, the paper concludes with a brief analysis of the aftermath of the situation, particularly its negative effect on cross-strait relations.

strait negotiations (Thies 562). The later decision to approve a visa for President Since the normalization of relations Lee was not the consequence of a “rational” change in the Clinton administration with China in the 1970’s, the US has afbut disagreements between policymakers firmed the “One China” policy, agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, and upheld a in a political environment. Therefore, the seventeen year policy of barring visits from interbranch politics model supplemented with the political processes model, rather high-level Taiwanese officials. However, in than the rational actor model, elucidates an May 1995, the US deviated from nearly twenty five years of public policy statements ostensibly surprising course of action by foand reassurances to China by issuing a visa cusing on executive-legislative relations and the politics surrounding it. President Clinto President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC ton’s decision to grant a visa to President of Taiwan. Initially, the Clinton adminisLee did not reflect a considered analysis of tration sided with the State Department, American interests but rather White House which was rightly concerned that granting the visa would disrupt not only growing re- acquiescence to strong pressure from Conlations with China but also the rise of cross- gress (Allison 22-33). I. Introduction

Danni Lin is a senior at Duke University, majoring in Political Science with a Chinese minor. 2011

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acted the Taiwan Relations Act, agreeing to The Clinton administration and the maintain “official” or substantive relations State Department staunchly opposed exwith Taiwan. In 1982, the US government tending a visa by taking into consideration signed a third communiqué to re-affirm its the tenuous diplomatic history between the commitment to “One China” and promUS and the PRC: US government officials ise to reduce arms sales to Taiwan over were concerned that China would view a the coming years (Hickey 287). Because of visit by Taiwan’s highest-ranking political such precedents, as late as April of 1995, official as legitimizing the ROC indepenUS Secretary of State Warren Christopher dence movement and implicating the US as reassured Chinese Foreign Minister Qian a co-conspirator. I then explore the explan- Qichen that issuing a visa for Lee would be atory background of the interbranch poli“inconsistent with [its] unofficial relationtics and political processes models in prepa- ship” with Taiwan and against the Clinton ration for a theoretical application to the administration’s “fundamental policy” on case study in the third and fourth sections. Taiwan (Ross 91). In consensus with the After a detailed look at the various ways the National Security Council, on May 16, 103rd and 104th US Congresses pushed 1995, the State Department submitted a retheir pro-Taiwan agenda, it is evident that port to the Chinese Foreign Ministry stating strong Congressional support for issuing the that despite the efforts of US Congressmen visa ultimately overrode the policy decision to push a “One China, One Taiwan” polof the executive branch. icy, changing the current policy of barring travel in the US for Taiwanese politicians, II. Executive Branch Perspective: whether the visit was official or private, Opposition to President Lee’s Visit would be impossible considering the foundations of Sino-American relations (Zhao From the outset, the State Depart116). Indeed, when the visa was issued, the ment insisted that issuing a visa would be PRC warned that if President Lee were to inconsistent with US policy, which dictated make the visit, the consequences would sethat the relationship between the US and riously harm relations between China and Taiwan was unofficial and would thus the US (Carpenter 66). exclude normal diplomatic customs. In 1972, the US government signed a second The foundations of Sino-American communiqué with China stating that there relations were based on what Winston is only one China (the PRC) and Taiwan Lord, Assistant Secretary of State and is part of that China. In 1979, the US and former Ambassador to China, called a China established full diplomatic relations “balancing act” between Beijing and Taipei with each other; Congress, however, en(Rothberg). The US provided reassurances 26

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to the Chinese that there is only “One China” while maintaining friendship and some unofficial ties (such as arms sales) with Taiwan. A State Department spokesman said that because Lee is the President of Taiwan, the visit would be seen by China as “removing an essential element of unofficiality in the United States-Taiwan relationship” (Greenhouse). Upsetting this balance was precisely what both the Clinton administration and the State Department were concerned about: President Lee’s visit might galvanize the Taiwan separatist movement which the PRC would then interpret as US support for Taiwan’s de jure independence (Thies 562). Looking back, these predictions were well calculated.

the US as an opportunity to gain political attention and international support for an independent Taiwan. Before his visit, President Lee proposed a donation of $1 billion to the UN in exchange for a seat in the world body. Although this offer was perhaps unrealistic, such dramatic action gained widespread press. Upon arriving at LAX, he was greeted by around 150 separatist supporters waving Taiwanese flags. He was further greeted by several high-profile Republican Senators, including Senator Jesse Helms, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who traveled to New York to greet him before his speech at Cornell (Benest).

President Lee’s visit to Cornell was President Lee requested a visa to further politicized by the content of his travel to the US in June of 1995 because speech at Cornell University, which fueled he had been invited to speak at the 1995 China’s fear that Washington might soon commencement ceremony at his alma change its policy towards Taiwan. During mater, Cornell University. Not surprishis speech, he repeatedly used the phrase ingly, the seemingly “unofficial” quality “Republic of China on Taiwan,” implyof his visit was immediately questioned ing that Taiwan was a separate country. because of Lee’s history of traveling with The content of his speech also played to a political agenda contrary to that of Beithe “notion of a small liberal democracy jing (Rothberg). In 1993, much to China’s facing against all odds a larger more powerdismay, President Lee began pushing for ful and tyrannical adversary” (Carpenter two separate sovereign states, the PRC on 67). Needless to say, the PRC was enraged the mainland and the ROC on the island by the apparent official recognition of of Taiwan. Part of this campaign involved President Lee, his separatist tone garner“vacation diplomacy” (Carpenter 65) which ing American public support for Taiwan would allow Lee to put a human face on independence, and the resulting demonizathe Taiwan independence issue by meeting tion of China. Although the exact nature with leaders while on “private vacation.” As of Lee’s visit and the seriousness of the expected, President Lee viewed his trip to military confrontations that followed could 2011

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not have been predicted, the Clinton administration and the State Department had functional understanding of the risks. They were well aware that a visa issuance would jeopardize not only the US’s relationship with China but also cross-strait relations. President Lee’s visit only confirmed their concerns. III. Explanatory Models The rational model actor states that, given the known risks of deviating from the unofficial relationship with Taiwan, a unitary and rational “black box” state would reject the visa request after an assessment of the two options (to grant a visa or to not grant a visa) and the consequences of each action. The Clinton administration and the State Department behaved in just this manner, opposing the visit based on a risk-benefit calculation. However, the rational actor model fails to capture the realities of this case—why the visa was granted— precisely because it assumes the state is a unitary actor, reacting to “external factors” (Allison 256-258). On the other hand, when we take “internal” factors as determinants of state behavior, the decision to extend a visa can be understood as a result of many different domestic actors acting on behalf of their own competing interests. The interbranch politics model, first posed by Robert Pastor, is particularly effective at explaining this case because it assumes that foreign policy is the product of “sometimes forceful or conflictual, [but] always interactive 28

processes between the Executive [branch] and Congress” (Pastor 53). Furthermore, supplementing the interbranch politics model with the political processes model provides a better explanatory framework for understanding the decision to grant President Lee a visa. The political processes model, as first developed by Roger Hilsman, assumes that decisionmaking on foreign policy is routinely subject to similar political costs as is domestic policy. Therefore, even though its concern was mainly one of international relations, the Clinton administration was subjected to pressures and trade-offs in the domestic realm because it shared political power with Congress (Hilsman 23). When decisionmaking is a product of interactions between a host of influences as expected in the interbranch politics model, it is only natural that internal politics comes into play. Although the Clinton administration showed purposeful continuity on its China-Taiwan policy, it lacked a clear vision for the future of the US’s relationship with both countries. In the absence of strong leadership from the White House, the pro-Taiwan Congress was able to actively steer US policy towards the direction favorable to them (Lindsay 531). Even the Chinese noticed the differences in ChinaTaiwan policy between the Congress and the Clinton administration. Xinhua News published a commentary separating the “sensible” Clinton administration and the

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American “hegemonists,” implicitly referring to Congressmen pushing to elevate US’s relationship with Taiwan in order to spread democratic values (Sutter 87). In an era of relative security, defiant Congressmen repeatedly applied pressure on the White House in the form of legislation (which I will elaborate on in the next two paragraphs), coercive communication with White House officials, provocative interviews with the media, and even personal letters to Taiwanese officials. In the end, the Clinton administration was unable to bear the political costs of ignoring the majority opinion of Congress (Thies 562). IV. Legislative Branch Perspective: Support for President Lee’s Visit In the first two years of the Clinton administration, Congressmen regardless of political affiliation were highly critical of the US policy banning official contact with Taiwan, claiming that it did not serve the economic nor political interests of the US. In April of 1994, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. In that act, Section 508 demonstrated Congressional support for US high-ranking appointees to visit Taiwan and official recognition of a bi-lateral relationship. In early May of 1994, the author of Section 508, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK) continued to call out the White House, demanding exchange of official visits; he almost got his wish (Yang 192-194). In 1994, President Lee, en route to Costa Rica, was granted permis2011

sion to land in Hawaii to refuel at a military base. Adhering to long-standing policy, the US refused to issue President Lee a visa to stay overnight and did not send any government officials to greet him. The Congressional version of the story claimed that the US government barred him from disembarking, although in actuality he refused to do so because he believed the US reception in the transit lounge of the base was particularly “spartan.” Regardless, members of Congress were outraged and accused the Clinton administration of appeasing the PRC by refusing to allow President Lee to stay overnight in the US. Longtime critic of China, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) called the American treatment of a “democratically elected leader… an insult” (Rothberg). Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) called the “grudging” reception for President Lee a violation of Section 508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Strong Taiwan supporters in Congress took advantage of the fallout in Honolulu to further their agenda (Congressional Record). Despite facing repeated opposition from the State Department and Clinton administration, Congress continued to push for legislation affirming US support for Taiwan. In June 1994, the Senate adopted S. Res. 148, which already had 40 co-sponsors, to show Congressional support for Taiwan to be readmitted to the UN and to open cabinet-level exchanges. House Speaker Newt Gingrich also spoke out for Taiwan to be readmitted to the UN. In

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August 1995, the Senate unanimously approved the re-introduction of the “visas-forTaiwanese-officials” amendment to H.R. 4606. The amendment was supported by influential pro-Taiwan Senators in the Foreign Relations Committee including Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC), Charles S. Robb (D-VA) and Frank Murkowski. The amendment, however, was eventually dropped from the conference report most likely to avoid a presidential veto of the bill. This core group of pro-Taiwan supporters reintroduced the amendment for H.R. 4650, but again the amendment was dropped. Nevertheless, the conference report still included notes indicating strong support for the visas for Taiwanese officials (Yang 195196). Congress’ pro-Taiwan stance was matched by intense lobbying efforts. In October 1995, President Lee hired a Washington lobbying firm, Cassidy and Associates, for a three-year fee of $4.5 million, ten times more than any past lobbying contract for Taiwan, to push for his visa to be approved (Ross 122). In collaboration with the Taiwan Studies Institute, the firm launched a government affairs and public relations campaign on “the merits of engaging Taiwan and its leaders” (Cassidy and Associates). The Taiwan government complemented the “on-the-ground” campaign by inviting journalists, think tanks, and opinion leaders to Taiwan and sending lower-level officials to Capitol Hill to make the case for 30

better treatment of Taiwan (Sutter 68). Against this dramatic backdrop, it seems inevitable that in May 1995 the 104th Congress voted nearly unanimously—indicating strong bipartisan consensus—in support of issuing a visa to President Lee. On May 2, the House passed H.Con.Res. 53 by a vote of 360-0 in support of the US welcoming President Lee to visit his alma mater. Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) said, “It seems to me illogical not to allow President Lee on a private basis to go back to his alma mater” (Roos). On May 5, the Senate passed a nearly identical version of the bill, S.Con. Res. 9 by a vote of 97-1 (Congressional Record, Thomas Database). Only one Congressman spoke out. Senator J. Bennet Johnston (D-LA) agreed with the State Department and the Clinton administration. A vague policy towards Taiwan would threaten the already delicate relationship with China (Ross 98). V. Revisiting the Models Within the framework of Pastor’s interbranch politics model and Hilsman’s political processes model, Congress’s repeated insistence that the US allow President Lee to visit Ithaca forced Clinton to make a foreign policy decision that was ultimately swayed by the consideration of political costs in the domestic sphere. By continuing to reject President Lee’s visa, Clinton appeared to be appeasing the PRC, an image

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that he was desperately trying to shed in Congress after extending “Most Favored Nation” trading status to China despite their many human rights violations. Clinton also faced pressure not to confront Congress on a relatively “small” foreign policy issue while the legislative body was trying to downsize the State Department in an effort to cut the budget (Mann). With Congress threatening to pass mandatory resolution which would force the US to issue President Lee a visa, the Clinton administration had to grapple with the idea of extending the visa as pre-emptive action so as to thwart any “visa-for-Lee” resolution in Congress that would also upgrade American-Taiwanese ties (Greenhouse). Finally a Democratic meeting at the White House led by Senator Robb convinced Clinton to placate constituencies and issue President Lee a visa. On May 22, the Clinton administration conceded to Congress, overruled the State Department’s decision, and granted President Lee a visa (Mann). VI. Lessons Learned In hindsight, Charles Freeman, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Bush and Clinton and the interpreter for Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, said that the decision to grant the visa did “not speak well for the clarity, vision and strategic purpose of US diplomacy” because it ultimately contributed to disrupting growing cross-strait relations (Carpenter 67, 156). During the congressional hearings in 1996, James Lil2011

ley, the former US Ambassador to China under George H.W. Bush, testified that the tensions were indeed partly “advanced because of inept handling of President Lee Teng-hui’s visa to visit his alma mater” (Hickey 284). Before the crisis, cross-strait negotiations were improving: China developed a peaceful reunification proposal, the two countries scheduled a meeting to discuss the topic, and the US supported a diplomatic negotiation. However, when the US approved President Lee’s visit to Ithaca, PRC President Jiang Zheming and Foreign Minister Qian were deeply embarrassed and concluded that their conciliatory policy towards Taiwan had failed. Over the next year, Beijing made it clear that they would not retreat from preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity as one China under PRC even if it meant the use of force (Thies 562). When the US intervened to provide a bulwark against the military escalation in the strait, Taiwan seemed convinced that its independence movement would be backed politically and militarily by the US. Although the Clinton administration privately countered this assumption, the Taiwanese still felt triumphant because they believed congressional pressure would continue to override an unwilling White House (as evidenced by the extension of the visa). The Taiwan Strait Crisis contributed to cross-strait tensions because it elevated China’s commitment to ensure that Taiwan does not establish independence and illusorily boosted Taiwan’s confidence in its independence movement (Chen 1056). The

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global implications of extending the visa, and Taiwan. which served as the catalyst for the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, illuminate the Clinton administration and the State Department’s reluctance to grant President Lee a visa and also show how influential and far-reaching Congress can be in dictating foreign policy. The interbranch politics and political processes models provides an explanatory perspective for understanding why the US granted President Lee a visa because it acknowledges the interactive executivelegislative relationship and the role that politics—the interaction and bargaining between government groups with competing preferences—play in decision-making. This case provides an example of how foreign policy is shaped not by a unitary rational actor but by a multitude of interests. In particular, a defiant Congress, many of whom favored Taiwan over China, was able to assert its foreign policy making influence on a weaker White House that eventually accommodated the strong provisa majority despite their initial opposition. The issuance of President Lee’s visa ended up tacitly affirming the rising voices of Taiwan separatists, setting off a series of increasingly provocative Chinese military exercises and missiles tests within 30 miles of Taiwan’s coast and forcing the US to intervene by dispatching two aircraft carriers (Ross 109). In analyzing this case through the lens of interbranch politics, we come to understand how important it is to build a national consensus on policy toward China 32

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Economic Policy, 1929-1976. Univ of California Pr.

References Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1971. Print. Benest, S. “Senators Fete Taiwan’s Lee.” Courier-Mail 10 Jun 1995, n. pag. Print. Carpenter, Ted G. America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course Over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan, Print. Chen, Qimao. “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions.” Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. Ed. Shizheng Zhao Routledge, Print. Freeman Jr., Charles W. “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan and Beijing.” Foreign Affairs. 77.4 (1998): 6-11. Print. Greenhouse, Steven. “Clinton Rebuffs Senate on Letting Taiwan President Visit U.S..” New York Times [New York] 11 May 1995, n. pag. Print. Hickey, Dennis V. 1999. “Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Implications for US Security Policy.” Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. ed. Shizheng Zhao. Routledge. Hilsman, Roger. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, c1987.

Ross, Robert S. 2000. “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force.” International Security 25 (2): 87-123. Rothberg, D. M. 1995. “Administration Criticized for Refusing Visa to Taiwan President.” The Associated Press. February 9, 1995. Sutter, R. G. 1998. “Domestic Politics and the USChina-Taiwan Triangle the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Conflict and its Aftermath.” After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations.. ed. R. S. Ross and M.E. Sharpe Inc. Sutter, R. G. 1998. US Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups. Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. Thies, W. J., and P. C. Bratton. 2004. “When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait.” Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (4): 556-84. Wu, Joshua Su-Ya. 2009. “Economics, Lobbying, and U.S. Congressional Support for Taiwan: Buying American Support, 2002-2006.” Asian Survey 49 (2) (Mar. - Apr.): pp. 380-402, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/25488402. Yang, Jian. 2000. Congress and US China policy, 19891999. Nova Science Pub Inc.

Lindsay, J. M. 2003. “Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33 (3): 53046. Mann, J. 1995. “How Taipei Outwitted US Policy.” Los Angeles Times. June 8: 242-3. Nathan , Andrew J. 1995. Editorial. Daily News (New York), May 31, 1995. Pastor, R. A. 1982. Congress and the Politics of US Foreign 2011

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China’s Energy Future after Fukushima: Challenges and Opportunities Paul Horak Abstract: The Fukushima tragedy of 2011 has given Chinese energy policy makers pause to ponder on the

sustainability of their own expansion plans. A nuclear disaster due to an earthquake is a distinct possibility given China’s geographical conditions. This paper provides a survey of the safety standards of China’s current nuclear power plants and the viability of the various alternatives. Nuclear power is land-efficient but relies on large supplies of water for its operation. As a result, China’s nuclear power plants are disproportionately concentrated on the eastern coast, leaving behind the country’s western inland regions. Furthermore, China’s sluggish adoption of safer, more advanced reactors may subject it to similar risks that confronted Japan during the Fukushima disaster. Solar power generation is uneconomical in terms of its extensive use of land and the costs of transmitting its output over long distances. Onshore wind farms that require a large supply of wind and land are viable in China’s remote northwestern regions but are subject to high transmission costs to the eastern regions where most of the demand lies. Offshore wind farms are more efficient due to the greater availability of wind and proximity to the eastern coast (if they are situated off the eastern shore). However, the corrosive forces of the sea may increase the cost of maintenance of such generators. The complex interplay between central planning imperatives and local government priorities distorts the motivations for energy projects, further complicating China’s energy challenges.

Introduction China’s energy plans have always been a function of demand and technological innovation, which are both growing rapidly in the country. But the recent tragedy at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan has introduced a new variable into China’s energy-planning function: safety. The nuclear fallout at Fukushima was caused by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami — both distinct possibilities in earthquake-prone China (Lester). For that reason, the Chinese government suspended the construction of

new nuclear power plants near its coastal cities and started a process of inspection of all its nuclear power-generating facilities. (IAEA) China’s nuclear ambitions have been put on hold, but probably not for long. China’s current nuclear ambitions are extraordinary. If things progress as planned, China will construct more nuclear power-generating facilities than the rest of the world combined over the next twenty years (Lester). It has not placed all its eggs in one basket either: China is already the world leader in the production

Paul Horak is a junior at Duke University majoring in Japanese and Economics. He is the President of Duke East Asia Nexus.

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of solar and wind technologies. Its growing energy needs have forced it to become a global leader in developing sophisticated energy technologies, a rarity for a developing country. This paper will focus less on China’s growing energy demand and more on its burgeoning energy supply, that is, its greater planned capacity for power generation. Although nuclear power has long been touted as the answer to China’s environmental and energy crises, recent events at Fukushima have cast doubt on its future viability as a source of clean, safe power generation. Will China choose to sacrifice its nuclear ambitions? Will it redirect its investments to other clean energies? Probably not, but its government will have to face the risk of a repeat of the Fukushima disaster.

China’s Accelerating Energy Demand China’s accelerating energy demand has global implications. It surpassed the United States as the world’s largest carbondioxide emitter in 2008, despite using about 80 percent less energy per-capita (Joerrs et al.). China’s high carbon-dioxide emissions can be attributed to its heavy reliance on coal as the major source of power-generation. More than 80 percent of the country’s power generation comes from coal alone; clean power-generation by contrast accounts for just 3 percent of the total. (World Nuclear Association) China’s reliance on coal—which accounts for approximately 30 percent of its emissions—has translated into severe environmental degradation

China’s Energy Demand 1978-2009

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and public health problems. (Joerrs et al., 2009) Its rising affluence may not moderate these negative effects, as has been the case in other rapidly developing countries. For example, just seven out of every 1000 Chinese drive an automobile—compared with 120 per every 1000 in the rest of the world (in the developed world this statistic is even higher). If Chinese levels of automobile usage were to rise to global levels, its CO2 emissions would rise dramatically (as would oil prices) (Joerrs et al.). This is perhaps one of the reasons the Chinese Government has invested so heavily in high-speed rail technology in recent years. China’s Clean Energy Plans

Despite its high dependence on coal

and huge coal reserves, China has invested relatively little in clean coal technologies (BP). It has instead funneled its investments into clean energy sources, namely hydro, nuclear, wind and solar power. Approximately 16 percent of China’s current electric power is generated through hydropower; 2 percent through nuclear; and the remaining 1 percent split between wind and solar (World Nuclear Association 2011). However, a 2010 report by McKinsey and Company estimates that if China’s current investment trends in clean energy continue, the country’s share of power generated through hydro, nuclear, wind and solar power could exceed 50 percent by 2030 (Woetzel et al.). This estimate speaks to China’s clean energy ambitions and desire to diversify its energy portfolio, as outlined

China’s existing and planned nuclear power plants

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in the country’s 10th, 11th and 12th FiveYear Plans. Nuclear The McKinsey Report estimates that nuclear power generation may account for approximately 16 percent of the country’s power generation by 2030—a significant increase from its modest 2 percent share as of 2010 (Woetzel et al.). Nuclear power holds several advantages over wind and solar power. Although it is capital intensive, nuclear power generation requires a relatively small use of land and is easily connected to already existing power grids. Wind and solar power, by contrast, both require the extensive use of land and can

only be harnessed in remote areas where the wind and sun are more concentrated. Consequently, most wind and solar power generation occurs thousands of miles away from centers of demand. (Kong). China’s energy demand is far from evenly distributed: all of China’s nuclear plants are concentrated in the most developed parts of the country along the eastern coast. (World Nuclear Association). This not only reflects the need for energy in the coastal areas, but also the fact that nuclear power generation requires large amounts of water, which can only be attained from the sea or large rivers (IAEA). Even the more sophisticated nuclear power plants require lots of water, reducing the likelihood of

Westinghouse’s AP1000

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adopting nuclear power generation as the solution to future demands for electricity in China’s interior. Wind, solar and coal will have to suffice there. Most of the nuclear power plants under construction in China employ Generation II (Gen II) nuclear reactors (World Nuclear Association). These Gen II reactors are largely the products of Chinese design and innovation, but in order to move up to Gen III and Gen IV reactors, China will need to cooperate with foreign governments and tech firms. It is already doing so with the construction of four Gen III plants in Sanmen and Haiyang by the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, which are slated for completion by 2015 (World Nuclear Association). The government acquired the Gen III reactor technology being used in the Sanmen and Haiyang plants from Westinghouse, a leader in the development of nuclear electric power generation. The decision to import foreign technology in this case was a departure from previous practices of using only domestic nuclear technology in the majority of its operations (China is capable of producing about 70 percent of the parts needed in Gen II reactors). However, it reflects the Chinese government’s desire for cleaner and safer nuclear technologies. The Westinghouse AP 1000 Gen III reactors being built at Sanmen and Haiyang are estimated to be 100 times safer than their Gen II predecessors. (IAEA 38

2011) Many of the reactors at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant were Gen II reactors. Originally commissioned in 1971, the Fukushima reactors were scheduled to be decommissioned at the start of 2011, in line with the standard 40-year life span of Gen II reactors. But improvements made to the reactors—in step with global nuclear technology enhancements and improved standards—permitted 10 more years of power generation at the plant. (Lester). The life spans of nuclear reactors are indeed long; most of the Gen II reactors (also called Gen II+ reactors because they are outfitted with the latest technology enhancements) being built in China are expected to be in operation 60 to 70 years after their original commission date. (Lester). This means that China’s use of just a few safer Gen III reactors will not cancel out the much higher safety risks posed by its use of many Gen II+ reactors. If China’s current Gen II+ reactors were to be subjected to Fukushima-like forces, they may be unable to cool properly, which was the root of the tragedy at Fukushima. The AP1000 model employs a passive containment cooling system that does not require electric input to cool down (IAEA). When the tsunami destroyed Fukushima’s back-up generators, the electric power supply to the cooling system was lost and nuclear fuel rods began to overheat. The resulting attempts to cool the fuel rods were what eventually cast radioactivity into the atmosphere, not the breach of any of

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the reactors’ containment chambers (Lester). Fukushima proves that current safety standards that require nuclear fallout to be contained within the plant’s facility do not guarantee that radioactivity will not escape to larger areas. There is always a risk in using nuclear power, even if it steadily diminishes with the advent of new technological innovations.

mirrors to focus sunlight on large tanks of water to generate steam. The Chinese government has authorized the establishment of a gigantic CSP facility in Central China where the sunlight is the most intense. Transporting that energy to the coastal cities will depend on the successful development of UHV lines (Liu).

Photovoltaic (PV) solar power is Solar another option in addition to CSP. It does not necessarily require the develop China is already the world’s largment of UHV lines, but instead requires est producer of solar technologies (Li). Yet vast amounts of land in order to produce despite this, the country receives less than a enough energy for it to be worthwhile. (Li, percent of its total power generation from 2009) PV solar power is the more convensolar sources. This is a testament to the tional type of solar power—photovoltaic relative youth of the industry, but also to so- cells are the light absorbing components of lar power’s limited viability in China today. solar panels. Finding large amounts of unSolar power will become more viable with utilized land around China’s eastern cities is increased westward expansion and constant a difficult task; not to mention that buying technological upgrades. In fact, McKinsey enough land to make PV cells work would estimates that solar power could account be very expensive. Despite its obvious limits for as much as 8 percent of China’s total to domestic use, the Chinese have invested power generation in 2030 (Woetzel et al.). billions of dollars in PV solar cell technology. Expected improvements in PV cell tech Adopting the use of solar power as nology are expected to contribute to huge a major generator of electricity will dereductions in cost, and could induce an pend in large part on Chinese investments export market for the technology. (McKinin the use of ultra-high-voltage (UHV) sey). (Using PV solar power in China today transmission lines (Li). UHV lines transmit is about 500 percent more expensive than electricity over long distances without lossimply burning coal, but should only be 50 ing much voltage, but they are extremely percent more expensive by 2030.) Regardcostly to build and maintain (Winning). The less of the future of a substantial market for development of UHV lines is essential to PV solar cells in China, it is likely that there the future success of Concentrated Solar will at least be demand for such goods from Power (CSP). CSP involves the use of large the United States or Europe—both well 2011

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behind China in solar technology. Wind In addition to investing heavily in solar technology, the Chinese are also pouring money into the development of more advanced wind technology. McKinsey estimates that electricity generated from wind power could account for up to 12 percent of China’s total power generation in 2030—a substantial increase from less than a percent today (McKinsey). But wind power like solar polar is also subject to considerable limitations. Onshore wind generation facilities require lots of land and wind—both of which are only available in large supply in the northwestern China, the least developed part of the country. Western wind farms could be connected to eastern centers of demand via UHV lines, but this would probably be more costly than the CSP case since the distance the electricity would have to travel would be greater. Onshore wind power is limited by its remote sources. Offshore wind farms, located in the sea, do not suffer from such limitations and are known to produce more energy (there’s more wind). The Chinese have started to build offshore wind farms off the eastern shores of the country but such projects are complicated by the unpredictable corrosive powers of the ocean. Building and maintenance fees are 35 percent higher for offshore wind farms than they are for onshore 40

ones (McKinsey). Those added costs might currently dwarf the costs of transmitting energy over thousands of miles from the west, but there is also speculation that China’s green future could be redeemed by an inevitable demographic trend: migration to the west. The soaring property prices in eastern China are forcing producers to move their production elsewhere, where land and labor costs are lower. China’s central and western territories—the hubs for CSP solar power and onshore wind power generation—are alluring targets for lowcost production. Challenges China is undoubtedly experiencing a green revolution. But contrary to popular belief that revolution is not the product of some well-developed plan on the part of China’s Central Government. (Ahrens). Energy projects in China are not driven by national policies, but instead by narrow corporate and local interests (Lester). In fact, China’s Central Government has never really had much success in dictating national energy policy. Today, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is in charge of planning long-term energy strategy, setting energy prices, and approving potential energy projects. Established in 2003, it is the direct successor to two failed initiatives by the Central Government to play a more proactive role in controlling energy policy implementation: the State Energy Commission (SEC) in the early 80’s

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and the Ministry of Energy (MOE) in the late 80’s and early 90’s. (Brookings, 2008) Both the SEC and MOE suffered from a lack of manpower and direct control. The NDRC has more of both but is operating in a much more complicated environment: while the number of decision makers has expanded, the power of regulatory bodies and policy centers like NDRC has declined. This may have serious consequences for the development of China’s cleaner technology industries.

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This is especially true in the nuclear

power industry. Some of China’s biggest State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are involved in the development of nuclear power generation. China has 3 major enterprises devoted to the construction of nuclear power facilities and the development of new nuclear technologies: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) and the small but well-connected State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). (World Nuclear Association). These three companies compete for new nuclear projects and are largely responsible

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for the spike in the number of planned nuclear power facilities. They do not receive the capital for their projects from the central government. Instead, they receive loans from state banks or equity investments from municipal or provincial energy development corporations—both of which are controlled by local, rather than national, officials (Brookings). This illustrates a more serious problem in China: the growing tensions between the central government, which makes policy, and local governments, which implement it. The disconnect between regulators at the national level and investors on the local one may lead to greater safety risks. Chinese SOEs may actually construct too many facilities for regulators and engineers to handle. If China’s nuclear ambitions are realized, the number of regulators and engineers needed to staff the new plants will have to more than quadruple. (World Nuclear Association). It is easy enough to build a nuclear power plant that satisfies all safety regulations, but the most important element to nuclear safety is constant and consistent maintenance (Lester). It takes between 4 and 8 years to train a nuclear engineer or regulator and even longer to develop a culture of constant and consistent maintenance. Current trends have not been optimistic (IAEA). In fact, the NDRC has recommended that the Chinese strive for 70GeV of electric power generation from nuclear power facilities by 2020 but current corporate estimates show that that num42

ber is expected to exceed 80GeV. World Nuclear Association). CNNC is expected to invest $120 billion dollars in nuclear energy projects by 2020. (Ahrens, 2010) CGNPG, the most active of the three major nuclear companies, is expected to operate or construct 32 units new units by 2020—many of them already under construction (World Nuclear Association). The Central Government is indirectly to blame for some of this corporate excess. By mandating that developed provinces like Guangdong maintain high growth rates, pressure is put on local leaders to stimulate growth, sometimes with inefficient energy projects. Conclusion China’s energy future may be heading towards disaster. The country may be home to more nuclear facilities than it can handle. The Central Government’s emphasis on supplying new energy to meet rising demand does not make a nuclear accident any more forgivable. If a massive earthquake were to strike coastal China, the social outrage would easily outweigh that of Fukushima or Sichuan. The social costs would also be much higher, and could have political consequences for the staying power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). All indicators point toward China’s persistence in its nuclear program. Constant technological innovations will increase safety, but they will fail to reduce the risk of a disaster if there are insufficient personnel to provide maintenance. It is also worth

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remembering that the majority of nuclear References reactors being built in China today are Gen II—comparable to Fukushima—and that Ahrens, Nathaniel. “Innovation and the Visible Hand: China, Indigenous Innovation, and the Role of Govthey benefit from few of the technological ernment Procurement.” Carnegie Endowment. 1 July innovations mentioned above. China’s nu2010. Web. 1 May 2011. <http://www.carnegieendowclear ambitions run the risk of self-inflicted ment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=41125>. tragedy. Wind and solar technologies are hardly perfect substitutes. Their development is attributed primarily to the interaction between corporate and local interests rather than the prescriptions of national priorities. The politics of China’s 5 major grid companies are not well understood, but it is at least clear that they impede progress in developing a smart grid. Each year China adds the equivalent of the United Kingdom’s power grid to its repertoire, gradually eroding its ability to implement a smart grid capable of connecting the country’s incredible energy potential. Ultimately, China’s long-term energy development decisions are made by corporate and local actors with neither the incentive nor the ability to see the big picture.

British Petroleum. “BP’s Energy Outlook 2030.” British Petroleum. 1 Jan. 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http:// www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/ globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/ statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_ assets/2010_downloads/2030_energy_outlook_booklet.pdf>.

Brookings Institute. “Energy Security Series.” The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China. 1 Jan. 2008. Web. 28 May 2011. <http://www.brookings. edu/fp/research/energy/2006china.pdf>. “Nuclear Power in China.” World Nuclear Association. 2011. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www.world-nuclear. org/info/inf63.html>. Joerrs, Martin, Jonathan Woetzel, and Haimeng Zhang. “China’s Green Opportunity - McKinsey Quarterly - Economic Studies - Productivity & Performance.” McKinsey Quarterly: Online Business Journal of McKinsey & Company. Business Management Strategy - Corporate Strategy - Global Business Strategy. McKinsey and Co., 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Chinas_green_opportunity_2364>. Kong, Bo, and SAIS. “Assessing China’s Energy Security.” Johns Hopkins University, Energy, Resources and Environment Program, SAIS, 26 Oct. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://csis.org/files/attachments/102610_Bkong_0. pdf>. Lester, Richard K., Edward A. Steinfeld, and Edward S. Cunningham. “Greener Plants, Grayer Skys?” Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1 Aug. 2008. Web. 25 Apr. 2011. <http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/ pdf/08-003.pdf>. Lester, Richard K. “Richard K. Lester: Why Fuku-

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shima Won’t Kill Nuclear Power - WSJ.com.” Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street Journal - Wsj.com. 6 Apr. 2011. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://online.wsj. com/article/SB1000142405274870380630457624449 2633730376.html>. Li, Dai. “China’s Solar Power Sector.” London Research International. 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 1 May 2011. <http:// www.londonresearchinternational.com/Pu09_China_ PV_Final.pdf>. Liu, Coco. “China Rebuilds Its Power Grid as Part of Its Clean Technologies Push.” The New York Times. 20 Apr. 2011. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www. nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/20/20climatewirechina-rebuilds-its-power-grid-as-part-of-its-72213. html?pagewanted=2>. “PRIS Home Page.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Earthquake in Japan. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/>. Winning, David. “Going the Distance - WSJ. com.” The Wall Street Journal. 27 Apr. 2009. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB124050430247148607.html>. Woetzel, Jonathan, Martin Joerss, and McKinsey and Co. “China’s Green Revolution.” McKinsey. 1 Jan. 2010. Web. 26 Apr. 2011. <http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/greaterchina/mckonchina/reports/china_green_ revolution_report.pdf>.

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Beyond the “Fake Smile:” Ai Weiwei’s Vision for Individual Rights in China Lia Vivian Monti Abstract: Chinese art celebrity and human rights advocate Ai Weiwei’s powerful, appealing petitions for personal freedom in China come from his multilayered, politically nuanced moral and cultural critiques, which are best exhibited in the work Fairytale. This paper delves into the political overtones of Ai’s art and aims to exhibit how he developed an artistic voice between stark western individualism and the dominant rebellious identity of artists in China. It begins with an introduction to notions of Chinese perspectives of personal freedom, followed by a look at how Ai uses the notion of authorship to explore an individual voice in “Authorship, Subjectivity, Authenticity and value in Modern China.” This section also explains how Ai uses pieces such as Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn, to document the violence against the past in this dialect of art and politics in China, as opposed to subversive purposes. The third section, “The Fairytale of Individual Chinese identity,” evaluates Ai Weiwei’s project Fairytale where in addition to two large installations, Ai brought 1001 Chinese citizens of all ages and backgrounds to Kassel, Germany. The final section, “#So Sorry: Blogs, Twitter, and Politics” describes how Ai’s more politically charged installations actually end up being less thought provoking than works like Fairytale.

worker and promoting the cult of Mao Zedong. Thanks to the relative liberalism Although he is presented as a maver- at the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era, ick by the western media, the artist-activist members of the Stars were able to explore Ai Weiwei is really just representative of the the modes of western traditions and react to the more recent oppressive styles by culminating frustrations of Chinese intelexpressing their individuality through imlectuals concerning personal expression in China. Soon after the Chinese Communist pressionism, surrealism, and cubism. Still, they quickly learned that borrowing from Party rose to power in 1949, all artistic the west was not enough to produce works movements were subsumed by the soviet culturally resonant for the people weary socialist style. By the time the Ai and the of meaningless communist propaganda in Stars Group made their debut in 1979, all China. Ai Weiwei, deeply concerned with remnants of the old traditions were rejected, and artistic endeavors were reduced this notion, created paintings in the style of the father of impressionism, Cezanne. He to mere propaganda pieces glorifying the Introduction

Lia Monti is an East Asian Studies and Art History major at Wesleyan University. She gained an interest in East Asian Studies while living in Okinawa, Japan. Lia is currently studying abroad at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. 2011

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suggested they start by taking the basic ideals of the western movements and combining them with their Chinese consciousness. However, after Deng Xiaoping eliminated the Democracy Wall in 1979, and the most prominent member of stars Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to 15 years in prison, Ai decided to move to America. If one place could nurture this fearless provocateur with abundant examples of scandalously audacious art, it was New York City. Yet even directly after he returned home to Beijing in 1993, his contribution to the “Fuck Off ” catalog (co-curated with Feng Boyi) showed his moderate position and understanding of the complex history of personal expression in China. He positioned himself between two quotes attributed to Mao and Duchamp: “Those comrades who are firm and determined in today’s ideological struggles and those who no fear of power and no compromise with vulgarization will be the hope of tomorrow’s new culture.” -Mao “It’s just my own game. Nothing else.” –Duchamp (Merewether) In the context of these greater artistic tensions, Ai Weiwei’s most resonant messages advocating for personal freedom in China come from his multilayered, politically nuanced moral and cultural critiques such as Fairytale, rather than his less aesthetic, overtly political statements that perpetuate Maoist doctrine of rebellion.

Historical Context: China and Freedom Ai Weiwei and his artist-activism can be rightfully appreciated only when one understands what freedom means in the Chinese historical and ideological context. The dissolution of West-East notions of freedom due to globalization contributes to the extremely complex definition of freedom in China today. According to L. H. Taylor, freedom only has meaning in a particular context, which partially explains why pure European enlightenment ideals are not completely reconcilable within Chinese History. Despite the starkly different historical background of Chinese, however, its unique multidimensional views of freedom were not necessarily in total opposition to western enlightenment ideals during some points in history. The idea of individual freedom in China evolved in such a way that it is much too complex to be reduced to the simple tension between the interests of collective society above the individual. In light of the different historical circumstances affecting the Chinese personal-collective power struggle, one great Chinese thinker Hu Shi began to consider the relationship between the individual and the collective state (i.e. the collective self) as an organic, developing interaction (Fung 459). In Traditional China, the rights of the people were provided for by the moral rule of the heavenly mandated emperor. According to Confucian statesmen such as

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Mencius, however, a tyrant who abuses his power could lose the mandate of heaven, be reduced to a mere criminal, and be rightfully overthrown by the people (1B:8). In Modern China, rebellion imperialism, tyranny, bourgeoisie thought, and exposure to some western philosophy all greatly shaped Chinese conceptions of freedom and liberty. During the May fourth and nationalist movement, Chinese viewed freedom in the context of citizenship and liberation. Yet, the May Fourth produced different versions of liberty than the Enlightenment because they were set in opposition to countless repressive institutions such as filial controls, feudalistic ritual, and intellectual monism and only defined as a negation of these ideas (Fung 460). This definition by negation grew into the idea of freedom as citizenship or loyalty to the nation and failed to draw a distinction between the public and private forms of freedom. In the early years of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-Sen’s notion of freedom, democracy, and human rights took precedent over others. When conditions worsened after his death, the war ravaged, and destitute Chinese populace were unable to concern themselves with these ideals, for they lacked the basic necessities. The CCP then quickly rose to power with the promise to rehabilitate the nation by placing the condition of the entire populace over just a few individuals. The idea of the “collective self ” was not new; it is an idea that existed in even in ancient China and is actually very similar to Rousseau’s social contract. 2011

This rapidly became a platform for the suppression of all personal, spiritual, and cultural freedom. The Cultural Revolution and subsequent era of Deng Xiaoping began as movements toward individual autonomy, self-determination, and self-mastery, but movements like these are continually forced to capitulate to control of government that claims oppression is necessary to maintain order for collective Chinese citizenry. The omission of captions containing phrases like ‘universal human rights’ in the current exhibit on the Enlightenment in the National Museum of China captures zeitgeist of Communist repression of individualism still characterizing Chinese politics today. Authorship, Subjectivity, Authenticity, and Value in Modern China Like most Chinese artists, Ai Weiwei experimented with subjectivity and the role of authorship in relation to cultural authenticity and value from an early point in his career. Just as he searched for ways to express his individuality at 1980s Stars exhibitions, he continuously attempted to simultaneously produce something with relevant cultural significance. Ai became obsessed with the concept of the readymade after much exposure to Pop Art and Dadaism in New York City. The ‘readymade’ is a artistic medium popularized by Marcel Duchamp that challenged accepted notions of visual art by taking an object and modifying only slightly. Soon after he arrived

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back in Beijing in 1993, he produced two readymade works commentating on Chinese cultural heritage and the role of the individual (artist) in the new market-driven state: Han Dynasty Urn with Coca-Cola Logo (1994) and Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn (1995). In Han Dynasty Urn with a Coca-Cola Logo, Ai focuses on examining the impact of commodity based culture on the aesthetic values of China. Chinese culture embodied by the urn is covered by the symbol of western materialism, the bright red Coca-Cola logo. The formative elements of the readymade juxtaposed with the inherent cultural assumptions about the urn’s origin express how western commodity culture literally subsumes Chinese culture as the logo wraps around according the natural curvature of the urn. Furthermore, the opposite side containing the slogan ‘the real thing’ challenges the authenticity of symbols of Han Chinese identity, as well as the way culture is redefined by branding.

just as the ideas it embodies dissolve and stop constricting progress. Ai’s expression throughout the entire sequence is consciously understated— his resolute, unsurprised face allows the viewers to formulate their own opinions about the statement it makes. His look also emphasizes that Ai’s intentions are not destructive or antagonistic in nature but removed while documenting the violence against the past in this dialectic between art and politics in China.

Later works such as Colored Vases (2003) and Color Test (2006) extend Ai’s readymade technique in order to discuss the Chinese government’s inclination to whitewash history. According to Ai, “you cover something so that it is no longer visible but is still there underneath, and what appears on the surface is not supposed to be there but is there” (Tinari). In these instances, he takes Ming and Qing Vases and temple ruins and covers them in gaudy bright hues in the same way the Chinese government positively covers up their er Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn can rors. There are places where the original be considered a follow up to the Cocapiece is visible from uneven dipping and Cola Logo urn, since this photo triptych scratches in the paint to illustrate current documents the relationship between ideas problems that the Chinese government of cultural history and aesthetic values in cannot keep covered up, such as the Three Modern China. The first photo in the series Gorges Dam. In the spirit of the Color depicts Ai holding an urn representing the field movement, the paint also gives the preserved construct of collective Chinese previously dynamic artifacts a flat uniforidentity. As he drops the urn in the second mity reminiscent of manufactured goods photograph, he lets go of these aspects of that lose their individual significance. His tradition and is perceived as an individual. most extensive exploration of the state of In the third photograph the urn inevitaindividuality came a few years later in his bly hits the ground and smashes to pieces 48

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Fairytale project.

tension between individuals in the common space exhibited the possibility of retaining The Fairytale of Individual Chinese an ordered society when people have the identity freedom to pursue individual paths. The people chosen for the project range from Fairytale, the multilayered piece cre- rural peasants to art students from Beijing ated for the Documenta X11 exhibition with different intentions about participatin Kassel, Germany, epitomizes Ai’s most ing in Fairytale. One writer tells the camera effective use of art as a platform to critique in the documentary that this could be his Chinese socio-political challenges to indirebirth: “I’ve painted myself into a corner. vidualism. Ai called the piece an invasion I’m no longer in control of my own fate.” of the West to showcase Chinese culture. Apart allowing extreme subjectivity in his The piece involved three major layers that art, Ai shows how reciprocity with China comprehensively encapsulated the complex- is possible through contact with Chinese ities of Chinese identity “beyond the physi- people: “The whole West-East imaginacal limitations of place” (Merewether 125). tion or fear will be under the moon, across The first involved the organization, prepa- the street: they will meet…there area lot of ration, and realization of sending 1,001 fantasies and concerns about this country. Chinese citizens to Kassel in order to obI think that now it’s time all these fantasies serve and be observed. The logo “1=2001” about life and art can meet” (Merewether that appears as an F and a number one 126). emphasizes the personal experience, individual status, and distinctive imaginations The second layer of the work inof each individual were the focus of the volved 1,001 Qing Dynasty Chairs, which piece. Meticulous detail was paid to every were scattered around the exhibit in clusters aspect of the organization to emphasize to make spaces for individual and collective each individual journey on the trip within places for people to lounge and meet. He the communal aspects of the voyage. Every also exposes a tension between appropriatparticipant’s story was captured individued visual forms representing the continued ally through film, photography, and interappropriated forms of Chinese material views. They all received uniform luggage culture (the chairs) and the conversant that with a unique fabric pattern designed by Ai stops to interact with them. Each chair reon the front along with specifically designed ceived the same individual attention as the t-shirts and colored USB bracelets labeled 1,001 visitors with pronounced difference with the 1=001 logo. Within the common every other in the work. The cultural and living space, Ai designed every bedspread to historical significance paired with the sheer be distinctive from one another. The lack of magnitude and attention to detail on these 2011

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projects make them the crown jewel of Ai’s readymades. At their core, these are symbols of Chinese authenticity because they represent the last remnants of traditional Chinese culture that were demolished in the 1911 revolution. Still, the Chinese tendency to sit upon these ideas of authenticity to rebuild China and to legitimize the subsequent political institutions is literally expressed in the form of the chair. According to Philip Tinari, “it is in the poetry of this relational move—from gesture to appeal, from exposition to exhortation—that Ai Weiwei’s vision of a self-conscious modernism begins to bloom.” Template, the third part of the Fairytale installation, is a five-layers-thick structure constructed out of 1,001 Qing dynasty windows and doors. The negative space in the center forms the silhouette of a traditional Chinese temple, further augmenting his message through the 1,001 Visitors and chairs; salvaging the past does not only involve hoarding relics and placing them in museums, but rather learning from history and taking it to produce something new. The negative space shows how one cannot rely solely on the past because then new structures cannot exist, although there is no denying that the past always influences the present. The past should only mold and support present endeavors not constrict them. Ai was ecstatic when the piece, already deemed structurally unsound by the Documenta crew, collapsed in on itself during inclement weather, an event, which 50

he thought made the piece drastically more interesting. He was convinced this would show how institutions like these built on the past could not survive the natural passage of time. The combined presentation of these parts of Fairytale epitomizes the perpetual themes that Ai is obsessed with— the “interrogation” of artist expression and the role it should play in relation to China. Through Fairytale, Ai encapsulated and addressed almost all aspects of the complex dialectic between individual and collective identity in China today. He was adamant in interviews that he had no specific standpoint concerning the nature of the piece and was interested only in watching the contradictions that naturally emerge (Ambrozy 124). This multidimensional approach and the freedom, with which each part was allowed to develop individually, ultimately gave Fairytale the power and significance that made it arguably one of the most important effective works of the 21st century. #So Sorry: Blogs, Twitter, and Politics Ai Weiwei departs from his profound philosophical commentary visible in Fairytale to overtly political protests in his more recent work, which culminated in his arrest on April 4, 2011. For the “So Sorry” Exhibition, at the already politically charged Third Reich propaganda center Haus der Kunst, Ai used around 9,000 children’s backpacks to spell out the words of a

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mother who had lost a child in the Sichuan Earthquake, “she lived happily for seven years in this world.” His message may still be along the same lines of his earlier works as he wrote on his blog on May 22, 2008, “the emptiness of collective memory, the distortion of public morality, drives people crazy,” but here visual presentation is extremely one-dimensional. His “Citizen’s Investigation” and protest overshadow his art, especially the more potent moral, artistic critiques inside the exhibit. Contrastingly, the formal structure of the Bird’s Nest stadium, which he designed for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, employs unique, unrepeated curving structures into its design, which meant to give each spectator the feeling that they have the best vantage point. These elements described by the design team as “organized chaos” are recognizable symbols of a tolerant, democratic society. The significance to this permanent contribution to the skyline of Beijing, however, was dwarfed beneath Ai’s protest of the Olympics on his blog. Ai’s online writing sparks an entirely new debate in the art world concerning the artistic worth of his blog. Curator and Critic Karen Smith claims his online contributions to online public space should be considered artwork as brilliant as “any church or grand piazza was in High Renaissance Italy” (Osnos). One thing is certain; these sites definitely played a large part in expanding and publicizing Ai’s activism. During an interview with NPR, 2011

Ai told a reporter that “activism is art; the two are inseparable.” Ai’s blog, which he spent about 8 hours a day on, ran from 2006 to May 28, 2009 when authorities shut it down. This gave Ai the opportunity to experiment with Twitter, where he now has 83,593 followers in a country where public networking sites like this are still illegal. Unfortunately, in terms of his artistic development, these networking sites not only stole time from his art, but also caused his activism to become the starting point for much of it. Once his ideas became more publicized on the Internet his activism began overshadow his art. As Ai Weiwei has been transformed more and more into the poster boy for freedom of expression in the international media, the art world in China has both lamented and attacked his increasingly politicized style. Artist Yu Gao for example called him a “traitor” whose extreme methods (such as the Ch’ang Avenue protest) ruin “the platform for discussion” with the government (Osnos). Moreover, art critic Philip Tinari, while reviewing Ai’s display of backpacks from the “So Sorry” Exhibition, perceptively stated how the intensity of Ai’s more recent works exhibit a combination “where art and politics, seem uncomfortably mixed, to the benefit of neither.” The Artist Xu Bing,Vice President of the Central Academy of Fine Arts and also former colleague of Ai Weiwei, explains why not everyone can embrace the methods of Ai: when that happens, China will never

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develop. Since a pure Cold War-distinction between democracy and communism no longer exists and is much more ambiguous, China will need to develop in its own way. Ai’s response to these ideas is that they are excuses for artists afraid to do their duty to create change. In an interview about the Birds Nest before the Olympics, he told reporters, “‘reform’ is the changing of ugly habits, ‘opening up’ is the introduction of other modes of thought and technology. This process will inevitably be painful” (Ambrozy 167).

piece Zodiac Heads, which just opened in New York City during his detainment. The piece consists of enlarged versions of heads that once belonged to Qianlong meant to admonish collectors for trying to purchase these national treasures. Ai blogged in early 2006, “to speak of beautiful dreams and grand ideals is safe—you could go on forever. But to realize them through action is dangerous” (Ambrozy 13). The arrest of Ai Weiwei and other outspoken citizens like him exhibits how China continues to take two steps backward for each step forward just as they did during the eras of both Conclusion Mao and Deng Xiaoping. Only when the Chinese government learns to treasure criti Ai’s detainment, however, is evidence cism as a mechanism for cultural improvethat China still has a long road ahead bement, will China be sincerely able to call fore it can call itself an open society. Alitself modern. though his art loses much of its dynamism when it becomes overly political, Chinese models of personal freedom from Mencius to Hu Shi would consider Ai’s right to express his dissatisfaction with obviously corrupt government systems legitimate since it is in the best interests of the collective. Critics of Ai who consider him a rabble-rouser and anarchist or even a celebrity constructed by the western media should take a critical look at his own words from his blog and twitter. It is obvious that Ai Weiwei successfully found the voice between Mao and Duchamp in his art and remains committed only to the idea of China where individual rights are not constantly compromised. His commitment and love for his country is further illustrated in his first public sculpture 52

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References Aloi, Daniel. “Ai Weiwei: Smashing China’s Traditions in Art and Architecture.” World Literature Today 81.4 (2011). Print. Commentary. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 2009. Print. Fung, Edmund S.K. “The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited:Plural Conceptions and Dual Responsibilities.” Modern China 32.4 (2011): 453-82. Print.

Kunst.” Art Observed. 23 Oct. 2009. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://artobserved.com/2009/10/go-see-munich-ai-weiwei-politically-charged-so-sorry-at-haus-derkunst-through-january-17-2010/>. Tinari, Philip. “A Kind of True Living: The Art of Ai Weiwei.” Artforum, 1 June 2007. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://philtinari.com/writing/a-kind-of-true-livingthe-art-of-ai-weiwei/>. Tinari, Philip. “China Power and Chinese Power.” Fused Magazine, 8 Oct. 2006. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://philtinari.com/writing/batterseas/>.

Johnson, Ian. “At China’s New Museum, History Toes Party Line.”Http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/ world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 3 Apr. 2011. Web. 4 Apr. 2011. Mencius, and Norden Bryan W. Van. “The Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Merewether, Charles, and Weiwei Ai.” Ai Weiwei: Under Construction. Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2008. Print. Osnos, Evan. “Letter from China: Does Twitter Matter in China?” The New Yorker. 20 May 2010. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/ evanosnos/2010/05/does-twitter-matter-in-china. html>. Osnos, Evan. “Letter from China: Is Ai Weiwei a Patriot? An Answer from Our Archives.” The New Yorker. 2 June 2010. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://www. newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2010/06/ is-ai-weiwei-a-patriot-an-answer-from-the-new-yorkerarchives.html>. Osnos, Evan. “The Chinese Artist and Activist Ai Weiwei.” The New Yorker. 24 May 2010. Web. 11 May 2011. <http://www.newyorker. com/reporting/2010/05/24/100524fa_fact_ osnos?currentPage=all>. Ringier, JRP. Ai Weiwei Works 2004-2007. Print. Ter-Grigoryan, Manan. “Go See – Munich: Ai Weiwei’s Politically Charged “So Sorry” at Haus Der 2011

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A Veiled Truth: The U.S. Censorship of the Atomic Bomb Jiyoon Lee Abstract: This paper examines how the U.S. censorship of the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was reflected in the U.S. media from 1945 to 1952, when censorship was officially lifted with the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Specifically, this paper observes and analyzes photographs and their captions from Life magazine and various other publications. Many photographs and captions trivialized the destruction and the suffering at the bombed sites, glorified the power of the atomic bomb, and portrayed the U.S. government as a heroic figure rather than an aggressor. Moreover, the U.S. media published articles that deliberately distorted account of the bombings and used derogatory language to refer to Japan and its people. As a result of censorship, American public highly approved of the use of the bomb and believed that the U.S. decision to drop the bombs in Japan was justified. The paper also observes that after censorship was officially lifted, publications such as Life uncovered shocking, gruesome accounts of the aftermath of the bombings. Therefore, the photographs and captions support the idea that the U.S. government wanted to avoid domestic and international criticism for the brutality of the bomb that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

“Hiroshima does not look like a bombed city. It looks as if a monster steamroller had passed over it and squashed it out of existence,” described William Burchett in his September 5, 1945 article “Atomic Plague” in the London Daily Express, after witnessing the tragic aftermath of the atomic bombing (Pilger). Fifteen days before the publication of Burchett’s article, Life magazine also started to cover the stories of bombed cities, or rather, the stories of “a new era” (“The Atomic Bomb”). Photographs in the August issue provided a distanced aerial shot of the cities, but neglected to show the moaning victims, the crowded hospitals, or any other indication of the devastation left behind by two of the most destructive explosions in human history. It took Life seven years to tell what

Burchett had told the world; articles in the September 1952 issue called the victims of the atomic bombs the “Walking Dead”, and shocked its readers with graphic pictures of radiation-burns on young children and the gruesome wrecks left by the bombings (“When Atom Bomb Struck”). One inevitably asks the question, ‘Why had it taken a well-known publication like Life so long to reveal the truth?’ The answer, it would seem, lies mainly on the shoulders of the tough U.S. censorship policies that were enforced from the beginning of WWII to 1952, the year the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or in Japanese, the “Treaty of Peace with Japan,” was signed (De Lange). The United States government imposed censorship on issues surrounding the atomic bomb in order to avoid domestic and in-

Jiyoon Lee is a Duke sophomore from Seoul, Korea. She plans to major in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (AMES) with concentration in Japanese.

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ternational criticism for the brutality of the bomb that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This paper explores how photographs and captions in periodicals such as Life and others published from 1945 to 1952 exemplified the strong-armed U.S. censorship policies through their trivialization of the bombs’ devastating aftermath, glorification of the U.S. military, and the distortion of factual accounts to suit their purposes. Life was only one of the many publications and media outlets that the U.S. government censored. The government’s apathetic attitude towards the suffering and destruction wrought by their hands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to such heights of censorship that for example, 16 hours after the bombing of Hiroshima, President Truman told the press that Hiroshima was merely an “important army base” without any mention of victims or damage done to the city, implying that the decision to drop the bomb was justifiable (Dedaic and Nelson).

(Source: Los Angeles Times, August 12th 1945, p.1)

people were subjected to.

Foreign journalists who visited Japan were also subject to restriction of movement and censorship. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were strictly “off-limits” to the foreign press after the visits of journalists such as the Chicago Daily News’ George The media portrayed the bombings Weller and the London Daily Express’ Wilas the “continuation of conventional warliam Burchett resulted in the publication fare” by leaving out details regarding the horrific consequences of radiation exposure of accurate first-hand reports of an utterly destroyed Nagasaki (“Nagasaki Bomb Acin humans (Doss). On August 12th, 1945, the Los Angeles Times published an aerial counts”). However, some journalists were granted permission to report on the atomic photograph of Nagasaki, with what the bomb, but only on the condition that they caption described as a “devastating” view would report on it in a favorable light. In from above; it essentially left the readers addition to this, the U.S. government seoblivious to the terrible condition that the 2011

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cretly hired and paid journalists like William L. Laurence to publish reports on the atomic bomb (Groves). A writer for the New York Times, Laurence was allowed to visit various test sites including the one in Alamogordo and to even witness the bombing of Hiroshima firsthand in an observation plane (Groves). He conspired with the U.S. government in blindfolding the eyes of the public. In his notorious September 1945 article, “U.S. Atomic Bomb Site Belies Tokyo Tales,” Laurence argued that Japanese were “continuing their propaganda” by saying that “radiations were responsible for deaths even after the day of the explosion” (Laurence). He also claimed that consequently, Japanese propaganda was “creating the impression that we [the U.S.] won the war unfairly” (Laurence).

Together with the distortion of facts, the layout of articles and photographs were used to contribute to the growing antiJapanese sentiment that seemingly justified U.S. actions and distracted public attention from more sensitive issues. On August 25th 1945, The New York Times published an article entitled “Japanese Stress ‘Hiroshima Horror’” which categorically denied the release of radiation by the atomic bomb and falsely accused the Japanese government of spreading propaganda in a bid to “win sympathy” from other countries. Noticeable in the layout of the paper is the complete lack of photographs of Hiroshima or Nagasaki published with the article juxtaposed with the half-page photograph of a damaged American battleship under the provocative title “American Battleship

(Source: Associated Press, The New York Times, August 25th 1945, p.3)

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(Source: Life, August 20th 1945, p.27-28)

Damaged by Japanese During Peace Talk.” In addition to the deliberate distortion of events, this article achieved the intentional comparison to an anti-Japanese article in an attempt to reinforce the American public’s negative views of Japan. Photographs and captions published in the U.S. media not only vilified Japan, but also portrayed the U.S. military and the

government in a heroic light. In the August 20th, 1945 issue of Life, the two articles seen above entitled, “Hiroshima: Atom Bomb No. 1 Obliterated It” and “Nagasaki: Atom Bomb No. 2 Disemboweled It” were published. The sensational and imposing titles ultimately caption the two photographs and reflected the heroic mentality of the American bombers. According to the article, the crew of the B-29 reported, “My Photograph of scientists and workmen (Source: Life, August 20th 1945, p.91)

2011

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God, there was a terrific flash of light, even in the daytime” (“Hiroshima”). The glorifying tones of the articles and captions as well as the complete lack of victims support the pro-bomb message delivered by the photographs. In the same issue, a photograph of scientists and workmen whose backs are toward the explosion at the Alamogordo test site was published alongside an article called “Manhattan Project: Its Scientists Have Harnessed Nature’s Basic Force.” The flash released by the atomic bomb lends a mysterious and phenomenal atmosphere to the photograph rather than a threatening one. The fact that this photograph was printed along with the photographs of the bombed sites drew attention away from the pain and destruction that the bombings brought to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

(Source: Life, November 19th 1945, p.107)

Similarly, in the November issue, a color photograph showing the same explosion was again described majestically as “the great luminous cloud which zoomed into the stratosphere after the first brilliant flash.” Despite having captured a momentous scientific breakthrough, photographs such as these neglected to show readers the dangerous potential of the atomic bomb just as the articles they accompanied failed to mention. Blindfolded by the media’s distorted portrayal, the public was left woefully ignorant of the havoc wreaked in the name of the American people in Japan. The result of a poll taken in December 1945 by Fortune Magazine showed that the majority of the participants favored the use of the atomic bomb; 53.5% responded that the U.S. should have “used the two bombs on cities,

(Source: Life, October 8th 1945, p.34)

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(Source: Life, September 1, 1947, p.41)

just as we [the U.S.] did.” 22.7% responded that the U.S. should have used “many more of them.” 13.8% responded that the second bomb should have been dropped only if the Japanese “hadn’t surrendered after the first one.” Only 4.5% said that the U.S. should not have used “any atomic bombs at all” (The Fortune Survey).

at Pearl Harbor dulled the impact of such damaging information on the reader.

Moreover, underneath photographs taken at the Peace Festival in Hiroshima in August of 1947, captions say “Dead friends and relatives while a memorial bell tolls at the exact hour of the blast. A moment later they dried their eyes to watch a parade,” and “Soon after solemn memorial services Even when the humanizing aspects of the victims were reported, captions often Hiroshima was filled with a carnival atmosphere.” The captions not only trivialize sought to downplay the scale of the huthe depth of trauma experienced by the man tragedy being acted out in the wake victims but also misrepresent the true spirit of the bombs. We see this clearly in the photograph of a mother and her child who of the Peace Festival: to promote world was burned by the bomb (above) captioned peace and understanding, rather than to simply celebrate like at regular carnivals. “Photographer Eyerman reported their injuries looked like those he had seen when Another example of where a caphe photographed men burned at Pearl Harbor.” Where the deliberate comparison tion downplays the gruesomeness of the of the bombs’ victims to those who suffered situation is shown below a photograph that 2011

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displays the houses and buildings rebuilt in Hiroshima.

The caption of the photograph claims without evidence that “most [of the newly built structures] are as flimsy as their predecessors,” suggesting that the extent of

the damage by the bomb was compounded by the Japanese lack of talent or effort in construction. Media publications also sought to communicate the arrogant idea that Americans were superior to the Japanese through captions of pictures in an apparent attempt to justify the bombings in the minds of the public. For example the photograph above shows an American shop in Hiroshima is captioned “In the Hiroshima of the future the American influence will play a large part.” The article goes on to support this idea by claiming that Japanese were reconstructing Hiroshima by “copying” American “morals” and way of life (The City is Being Rebuilt). The article further claims that “U.S. dollars can help fill empty bowls,” suggesting that U.S. is playing the role of a philanthropic volunteer when it contributed to the cause of the “empty bowls” in Japan (The City is Being Rebuilt).

(Source: Life, September 1st 1947, p.40)

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(Source: Life, September 3rd 1945, p.27)

Another way in which captions illustrated the governments’ scheme in turning the eye of the public was in endorsing the idea of America’s greatness. This can be seen in the article “Japanese Mind in Defeat” in the September 3, 1945 issue of Life, in which a photograph of the “short Jap General Kawabe enter[ing] conference alongside tall American General Willoughby” appears. The caption not only makes use of the term “Jap” in reference to the Japanese in a derogatory manner, but also intentionally mocks the difference in heights of the two men who are each the representatives of their respective country. Dark humor employed in this manner contributed to the idea that Americans were physically and mentally ‘superior’ and therefore the subordination of the ‘inferior’ Japanese through the use of the atomic bomb was justified. 2011

The same mentality of heroism and glory is portrayed through the photograph showing General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, surrounded by a big crowd in front of the headquarter. Describing MacArthur as the Japanese people’s “national hero,” when he came to Japan to direct U.S. occupation of Japan. However, neither the photograph nor the article gives support to the claim made by the caption. Also, the article does not provide reasonable, factual evidence to why MacArthur would be considered a hero to the Japanese people. Nevertheless, the article states that the Japanese are “a receptive race” that acknowledge their defeat

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at the hands of their “superiors” (“A Report on Japan”). The photograph, the caption, and the text again reinforce the U.S. government’s idea that the atomic bombings were reasonable and that the Japanese were calm and tolerant of the bombings. Life continued to depict the U.S. government as a heroic figure with the use of captions, as seen in the December 12th, 1949 issue. An article called “The A-Bomb’s Children: Study of Half a Million Japanese Reveals the First Delayed Effects of Atomic Radiation” was published, showing the struggles and suffering of the victims with their photographs (“The ABomb’s Children”). However, photographs and captions focused more on the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC)’s

work rather than the actual victims themselves. For example, the captions below the photograph of a nurse checking up on a baby tells that “ABCC’s study must cover all the survivors and their children.” The caption provides somewhat irrelevant, extended information with a strong and a somewhat conceited tone. Another caption tells that the “ABCC’s director is Lieut. Colonel Carl F. Tessmer, a brilliant young pathologist,” clearly portraying ABCC in a favorable way. Furthermore, the caption, “Hiroshima’s children patiently wait for their turn for a complete and detailed physical examination in ABCC’s temporary laboratory and clinic,” uses adjectives such as “complete” and “detailed” in describing one of ABCC’s works. For many other photographs, the word ABCC was repeti-

(Source: Life, December 2, 1946, p.105)

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(Source: Life, December 12, 1949, p.60-65)

tively included in their captions, such as “pregnant woman describes her location when bomb exploded as ABCC worker plots position on map of Hiroshima” and “Hatsue’s eyes are examined by ABCC doctors.” The photographs, with the aid of captions, served to highlight the work done by the doctors and scientists that the U.S. government sent. It is ironic that ABCC was portrayed as a philanthropic organization because it also heavily cooperated with the U.S. government, refusing to share its research on the atomic bomb with Japanese scientific communities (Braw). Established in 1946 in Hiroshima, the ABCC focused on “obtaining some first-hand technical information” and “making a detailed report pertaining to the opportunities for a long-term study of atomic bomb casualties.” (“Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission”) Its objectives did not include researching for or providing medical treatment. Even more surprisingly, the results of the studies were directly sent to the U.S. (Braw). Therefore, Japanese 2011

scientists and doctors, who most needed the information to help the patients, did not have access to the results (Braw). This American censorship impeded medical treatment for the survivors, because the Japanese government struggled in its effort to collect data for the organized treatment of patients. When the Japanese government finally executed two surveys of the survivors of the bomb in 1965 and 1975, it received much public disapproval because the data collected was highly incorrect as a long

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(Source: Life, September 29, 1952, p.22)

Jiyoon Lee

had been suppressed by jittery U.S. military censors through seven years of the Occupation” (“When Atom Bomb Struck”). Captions referred to the victims of the two cities as the “Walking Dead,” while photographs revealed the gruesome, shocking reality that had been contained by the U.S. government for over seven years (“When Atom Bomb Struck”). Dead bodies were scattered everywhere and the survivors hopelessly waited for aid as they saw their surroundings completely demolished by the blast. One photograph showed a girl who eventually died after drinking her first and last sip of water after the bombing (“When Atom Bomb Struck”). Another photograph showed a scarred mother breastfeeding her baby, whose face was noticeably burnt by (Source: Life, September 29, 1952, p.22) the flash. Compared to that of the previperiod of time had already elapsed after the ous issues, the photographs published in the bombings (The Committee on the Damage September 1952 issue focused heavily on caused by the Atomic Bombs). the individual victims and their sufferings. Such focus would have allowed viewers to Only after Japan signed the San realize that atomic bombs were not simply Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and foran easy and effective way to end a war, but mally renounced its position as an imperial rather an inhumane, irreversible way of power, the U.S. censorship on media began destroying lives of ordinary people. to lift. To illustrate, on September 19th, 1952, Life magazine published a striking “un- Photographs and captions that were censored” record of the atomic bombings chosen to be published in popular media in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (“When Atom reflected U.S. censorship with their miniBomb Struck”). It was five months after the mal coverage of the truth and their biased San Francisco Peace Treaty went into efperspectives. The atomic bombs that the fect. Life justified why it was uncovering the U.S. government used on Japan were porwhole truth only then, by stating that “pic- trayed as necessary, inevitable tools that tures taken by five Japanese photographers ended World War II, rather than weapons in the first hours of terror after the blasts of terror that caused irreversible, inhumane 64

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consequences as seen in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. censorship on media and publication was successful in that it led to a generally positive American perception of the atomic bomb. However, it failed to recognize a human society larger than the U.S. itself by prioritizing national interests of image building over individual human rights and the global common good.

Pilger, John. Tell Me No Lies. New York: Avalon, 1945. Print.

References

“The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” The Impact of the A-Bomb. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985. 15. Print.

“A Report on Japan”. Life 2 December 1946: 105. Print. “Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission”. January 1947. National Academies. Document. 1 March 2011. <http:// www7.nationalacademies.org/archives/ABCCrpt_Pt1. pdf>.

“The A-Bomb’s Children: Study of Half a Million Japanese reveals the First Delayed Effects of Atomic Radiation.” Life 12 December 2949: 59. Print. “The Atomic Bomb: Its First Explosion Opens a New Era.” Life 20 August 1945. Print. “The City is Being Rebuilt.” Life 1 September 1947: 40. Print.

“The Fortune Survey.” Fortune December 1945. Print. “When Atom Bomb Struck - Uncensored.” Life 29 September 1952. Print.

“Hiroshima”. Life 20 August 1945. Print. Braw, Monica. The Atomic Bomb Suppressed. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1991. Print. De Lange, William. History of Japanese Jounalism. Richmond: Japan Library, 1998. Print. Dedaic, Mirjana N. and Daniel N. Nelson. At War with Words. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003. Print. Doss, Erika. Looking at Life Magazine. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001. Print. Groves, Leslie. Now It Can Be Told. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962. Print. Laurence, William. “U.S. Atomic Bomb Site Belies Tokyo Tales.” The New York Times 12 September 1945. Print. 1 March 2011. Nagasaki Bomb Accounts Published. 20 June 2005. Electronic. 1 March 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/ pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4110598.stm>.

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The Use of the Female Body as a Vehicle for Social Commentary in Zhang Yimou’s Films Miyuki Baker Abstract: Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou is renowned for his focus on the undying spirit of Chinese people in face of insurmountable hardships. His use of the female body as a means of social commentary is also particularly notable in his frequent casting of actresses Gong Li and Zhang Ziyi. Yimou’s depictions of these women serve to exemplify the importance of Chinese femininity as a multitude of symbols, but especially as the quintessence of the Chinese nation. An examination of Yimou’s films reveals how both actresses convey the objectification of the female body in a male-dominated society. Yimou’s female characters are often strong-willed and tenacious, yet they face prejudice from being among a different social class, while having to face overwhelming adversity from the higher male oriented society. These portrayals of the defeat of an independent and resilient woman, through Yimou’s usage, address a series of more social conflicts at the national level. This paper analyzes how the actresses’ personifications of the female characters in Zhang Yimou’s films serve as instruments of social commentary for China in a Post Mao Zedong era, and also gives insight into the historical aspect of how the female body has become the expression of Chinese nationalism.

With over twenty films and thirty years of experience as director, producer and actor, Zhang Yimou has made quite the name for himself both domestically and internationally. While he has directed films in nearly every type of genre, he is most famous for incorporating themes of the resilience of Chinese people in the face of hardship into his films. Inextricably tied to the fame of Zhang Yimou and his films, however, are the two actresses who have starred in nearly all of his films, Gong Li and Zhang Ziyi. Starting in the late 80s when he “discovered” 22-year-old Gong Li and gave her the powerful role of Jiu’er

in Red Sorghum, Gong Li has played countless female leads in Zhang’s films. In 1999, Zhang Yimou offered another young actress, Zhang Ziyi her first role in The Road Home who has since then played the lead in Yimou’s internationally acclaimed wuxia films, House of Flying Daggers and Hero. The rise of Gong Li and Zhang Ziyi has been sensationalized as mutually beneficial for the actresses and Zhang Yimou. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of Zhang Yimou’s films have strong female leads, and thus a question must be asked: What does Yimou achieve by filming these

Miyuki Baker is a senior at Swarthmore College, double majoring in Arts and Asian Studies with a Chinese minor

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strong-headed, passionate women in the context of his cultural, political and historical commentaries of China? In past interviews, Yimou has expressed that Chinese “women express [oppression and confinement] more clearly on their bodies . . . because they bear a heavier burden than men” (Lu 110). What are the implications of such an understanding of femininity and how does it affect his films? Are the messages he tries to convey moral, political, historical, feminist or a combination of these and more?

change or tradition, or as embodiment of the nation” (Kloet 196).

This paper examines the image of women in four of Zhang Yimou films, The Story of Qiu Ju, Shanghai Triad, Curse of the Golden Flower, and House of Flying Daggers, and the ways in which he uses the female body as a vehicle for social commentary in post-Mao China. The continued employment of Gong Li, a beautiful and assertive star, to frame women as either “a victim of class oppression or a beneficiary of national liberation” (Marchetti xi) and to conflate Cinema is a highly visible site for female identity with various discourses of popular media, in which a variety of ideas nationalism also plays an important role –most notably those about gender and the social commentary that Yimou aims to identity, can be transmitted and formed. As convey. Given China’s complicated history the feminist scholar Judith Butler explains, with feminism in the context of socialism gender roles are performative, “the action and communism, the historical implications of gender requires a performance that is re- of using the female body to achieve more peated” (114). Daring and passionate, Gong than gender equality will also be parsed out Li has established a unique and new type in this paper. of femininity in Yimou’s film that extends outward to the real world of film audiences. Whether it is in his documentary (i.e. Beyond simply adding her perspective to The Story of Qiu Ju) or aestheticized and styland renewing female sexuality, Gong Li’s ized approach (i.e. Ju Dou), or folklore film characters make the female body a narra(i.e. Curse of the Golden Flower, House of Flying tive site for the projection of national and Daggers), the women in Zhang Yimou’s films societal commentary. In today’s China, sex are always headstrong, stubborn or powersells, and the “body is increasingly preful. However, a common characteristic that sented as a site of consumption and a site Yimou adds to these females characters is a of pleasure” (Kloet 210). Yimou’s gendered complicated layer of socio-economic class. and cultural portrayals of women thus For example, in The Story of Qiu Ju, Gong underscore the fact that “Chinese” feminin- Li’s stubborn character markedly stands ity “remains an important signifier, be it as out as female and lower class. To heighten commodity, as fetish, as symbol of either our sense of Gong Li’s femininity, Yimou 2011

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uses visual cues such as pregnancy and the color red. But more indirectly, Gong Li’s lack of presence at home because she is too busy fighting for an apology at each level of bureaucracy, calls attention to womanhood, or a woman’s role in society. In another scene, the motel keeper advises her to dress in more Western-looking clothes after a taxi driver scams her in the city, so that she is not targeted again. Her bulgy and awkward Western suit that nearly covers the traditional Chinese clothes underneath further emphasize her lower class In post-socialist China, the “legacies of both socialism and feminism, with their emphasis on the emancipation of workers and women, still play a distinct role” (Kloet 201) and thus Gong Li’s embodiment of these two identities further enforce such legacies. But to further complicate this relationship, in The Story of Qiu Ju, Gong Li’s gender identity is used to invite sympathy towards her character, and anger towards a bureaucracy that fails to help her. Not only is Gong Li the lone female main character among a sea of men, but she also epitomizes womanhood through her emphatically pregnant body. As if to call attention to her singularity, the long opening scene focuses on Gong Li walking towards the camera on a crowded street, despite the many other people in the shot. She seems to have purpose in her walk, but only because she is walking towards the viewer. The story line of the film is similar in that Gong Li is constantly walking on the road, jostled by 68

the all-male world of authority in search of justice, but her stubborn determination in spite of repeated failure makes us question what exactly it is that she wants. Indeed, despite each character assisting Gong Li along the way, ultimately she does not succeed in her quest. What is left is an even greater sense of loss because it seems that in spite of all the good intentions along the way, the problem is systemic and remains. Whether the audience decides to see this ultimate failure as a criticism of the patriarchy, the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government or something else, Yimou’s use of a lower class woman to challenge the “system” effectively uses Gong Li’s body to address a multitude of nationalistic issues. Similar to the false hope that we get in The Story of Qiu Ju as Qiu Ju is encouraged to strive for justice at the next level, Jinbao’s character (also played by Gong Li) in Shanghai Triad and her expectations for her relationship with the Boss epitomize Yimou’s highly favored theme of what is promised versus what actually happens. Though she is a confident woman, the male characters around her look down upon her every move. In one particularly revealing scene, Jinbao is singing in the nightclub and Shuisheng’s uncle is introducing her to 14-year old Shuisheng for the first time. He smiles and claps at Gong Li’s performance, calling her a whore–his voice seething at the sight of her. Likewise, it is apparent

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throughout the film that Jinbao is only tolerated because she is providing the Boss with sexual companionship. Predictably at the end of the film, the Boss and young Shuisheng betray Jinbao, leaving audiences with a bitter aftertaste of women’s objectification and victimization by men. Besides the use of defeated strong women to depict disparity, Yimou also tends to portray his male characters in opposition to the female character. A good example is the polarization of characters between Shuisheng and Jinbao. Much like in The Story of Qiu Ju, Shanghai Triad plays on the heartstrings of its viewers by presenting both Shuisheng’s naive country ways and Gong Li, who is victimized and ultimately killed when the Boss decides to replace her with Aijiao. By placing Shuisheng as our eyes and ears, he literally spies throughout the film; through this perspective, Yimou sets up an interesting perspective for viewers to see Jinbao, whose femininity is frighteningly unwieldy and incomprehensible.

knew all along that she would be discarded eventually. Although Yimou directed Shanghai Triad only three years after The Story of Qiu Ju, the female characters in his films appear to be more conscious of their victimization in the later film, and reach full articulation of women’s rights in House of Flying Daggers. The all-male and violent gangster world of Shanghai Triad had a certain sense of believability in regards to Jinbao’s objectification and victimization, but in Curse of the Golden Flower, during the Tang Dynasty in 928 A.D., Gong Li’s victimization seems even more natural as Zhang himself says that “the story represents a time when men dominated society. Women were oppressed…and [the empress] is the central victim” (“Secrets within”). Therefore, despite the highly dramatic Oedipus Rex story line in which incest and adultery are considered commonplace, the emperor’s terrible treatment of Gong Li’s character seems completely plausible.

Similar to Jinbao in Shanghai Triad, Unlike Qiu Ju, who is stubborn but the empress has a high level of self-awareconfused by the inequalities of society, Jin- ness with regards to her victimization. bao seems much more aware of her predic- This adds to the film’s sense of impending ament. She plays society’s games in order to doom, but in the meantime, the empress’s move from the countryside into the city of outwardly obedient, yet actually rebellious Shanghai, where she uses her sexual apnature both politically and sexually keeps peal to seemingly wrap the Boss around her audiences entertained. For instance, the finger. When Shuisheng tells her that the oedipal complex that seems to haunt all of second brother and his men are planning her sons and the sadistic love of her husto kill her, she looks unsurprised as if she band complicate her character as a woman. 2011

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The relationship between parents and children is also further distorted when the emperor assures Prince Wan, “I know it is not your fault. It is she who seduced you all along,” when he discovers the prince’s relationship with the empress. Looming persistently as an object of desire although she is sick and a constant victim of the emperor’s tyranny, Gong Li is placed in the stereotypical female dichotomy of the Madonna and the whore. However, Gong Li plays into many other dichotomies as well. Through her performances of gender, she reiterates the “sexed binary in which female and male bodies are constructed as opposites”’ (de Kloet 119), and yet she also embodies the polarized characteristics of both male and female. She is the quintessential phallic mother whose elaborate plan to overthrow the emperor’s government is supported by other phallic symbols such as her long finger ornaments and her high phoenix coronet (Huang 46). Equally flashy are her markers of femininity which are embodied in her motherhood and the yellow chrysanthemums which flood the palace. At the end of the film, the failed coup d’état is represented by the emperor’s soldiers who crush the yellow chrysanthemums underfoot and the blood of the empress’s soldiers staining the bright yellow flower petals. While audiences can choose to interpret such an epic defeat in the context of history and warfare in ancient 70

China, when the emperor violently snatches Gong Li’s flower off of her dress after the coup, it is unavoidable to read the sequence as a semiotic representation of gender inequality or a battle of the sexes. This kind of explicit awareness and articulation of the female predicament is also exercised in the costume choice for the women in the film. Rather than simply objectifying the female characters with their actions, the “sea of bosoms overflowing from [the women’s] gaudy bodices,” (Huang 44) are so much of a spectacle that they shamelessly reveal man’s desire. Women in this film are objectified as in any other Yimou film, but it is so blatant that it confronts woman’s erotic role ‘to-be-looked-at’ in not only the realm of film, but also in society. It is as if the film turns its lens on the voyeuristic male gaze of itself and the audience. Of course, Yimou’s films never just have one objective, and although the portrayal of women’s objectification is quite effective in Curse of the Golden Flower, the telling of a tragic story of the annihilation of a royal family has multiple implications. The old Chinese saying, “Gold and jade on the outside; rot and decay on the inside,” seems fitting as one is curiously reminded of present day China’s “shimmering facade of modernization,” under which “there exist a variety of social problems that renders China schizophrenic and threatens its stability’ (Huang 47). Thus Zhang’s render-

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ing of a dysfunctional marriage and family is allegorical to governmental corruption and societal instability in the face of rapid modernization and development.

her empowerment and symbolic of the new age woman who can stand up for herself and for other women.

Now that we have looked at the In one of Yimou’s later films, House portrayal of women in the films in multiple of Flying Daggers, featuring Zhang Ziyi, the eras, from the Tang Dynasty to the 1930s tone of feminism feels distinctly different and the 1990s, it would be beneficial to exeven from the feminism of the previous two amine the actual history of women’s issues films which featured strong and aware, but and feminism in China. In the Maoist proultimately helpless women who were suppaganda poster, the caption says “In order posed to be hated, then loved and pitied. to participate in the country’s industrializaZiyi, who is reputed to be less political and tion, we will construct with pride;” the ‘we’ blunt than Gong Li, still rises to the job of most certainly being women, as the main a master martial artist in the film, but her figure is of a woman dressed in gender sexuality feels less threatening than Gong neutral clothes wielding a soldering tool. Li’s. Ziyi plays the blind Mei, whose blind- Like many of the other propaganda postness, a common trope in wuxia films that ers, the poster’s persuasiveness comes from signify a master in disguise, renders her a the depiction of ‘common’ people working powerful character, but also one that she together and looking happy. The figure’s must rely on Jin to protect her. Like Jinbao rosy cheeks and confident stance are reflecand the empress’s character, Mei is aware tive of the positive caption written in bold of a woman’s sexual contract to men as can red letters. be seen in the bathing scene where she tells Jin that she thought she would let him look In fact, women’s roles changed drasbecause he saved her life. Unlike in previtically after the founding of the People’s ous films where the female protagonist did Republic of China in 1949 with two major not articulate her own predicament, Mei is trends: to “politicize household work and to vulnerable yet outspoken. transform ‘women in the household’ (jiating zhong ren) into ‘women in society’ (shehui In one particularly memorable scene, zhong ren)” (Zhang 210). By participatthe head of the House of Flying Daggers ing in productive labor, as opposed to rescolds Leo, who is trying to have sex with productive labor, women were encouraged resistant Mei that he “must not force a by the socialist society to realize gender woman to do what she is not willing to do.” equality. In stark contrast to China prior to The head of the House is a woman too, 1949 when Confucian ethic rules dictated and her protection over Mei is indicative of women’s social standing and their sense of 2011

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‘selfhood,’ the different political campaigns created new roles for women in the PRC (Zhang 210). But unlike in Western countries, there has never been a women’s movement independent of national and social movements in China because social awareness came before individual awareness and thus the category of woman has always been subsumed under nationalist political agendas. The socialist and communist ideal as well as political correctness for women was one of “the de-feminization of female appearance and its approximation of male standards of dress,” by “keeping their hair short and using no make-up” (Zhang 212). Of course, it never occurred to the men that they too would take up a more androgynous look. Furthermore, although Mao Zedong proclaimed that, “Time has changed. Whatever men comrades can do, women comrades can too,” suggesting that women’s participation in productive labor was the key to women’s emancipation, he was also exploiting women’s physical strength for the revolutionary cause (Zhang 211). The common misconception is that “China has had an epic and long-fought revolution for national and social liberation in which changing women’s place in society was high on the agenda” (Kloet 201), but with women’s roles susceptible to change with the slightest shift in national interests, they were far from being able to truly take ownership of their own liberation.

With the understanding of the Chinese government’s abuse of the so-called liberation of women, Yimou’s cinematic use of the female body and the female story in order to represent national issues begins to look less favorable. Yimou has been criticized in the past for being an opportunist who “sells out” to whomever he feels he needs to please at the moment. Due to the fact that he often rewrites history and creates false traditions, his films often offend Chinese nationals who criticize him for being an Orientalist. But how then do feminists and women view his films? Is it problematic that Zhang Yimou, a man, uses the female body and women’s issues to address societal, moral or political issues? First taken up by the Communist Party, “the female worker or peasant, mistreated by capitalists or feudal landlords, became the embodiment of the promise of the Party to overcome class oppression” (Marchetti 131). Therefore already established as an allegorical figure, the woman’s body continued to function as an emblem of “China” in the post-Mao era as seen with Yimou’s subjects. Although Gong Li sets up an important “empathetic spectatorial identification,” one cannot observe her characters without a sense of their eroticization and fetishization as “Oriental beauties” (Marchetti 129). Furthermore, because a straight and male director is presenting them, their eroticization cannot be untangled from straight male spectatorship. As Berry exclaims, “a patriarchal idea of

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natural femininity has become entrenched” in post-Mao Chinese cinema (156) and in her essay ‘Desire in Narrative’, Teresa de Lauretis argues that “what Freud’s question really asks is ‘what is femininity - for men?’”(111). Do Yimou’s strong female leads further invest in the patriarchy, simply because Yimou does not know what femininity is for women? Although “exhibitionism is actually a way of problematizing the state’s all-pervasive gaze” and “a subversive way of engaging with political authoritarianism” (Blum 435), it is fundamentally wrong for Yimou to use women’s bodies to project national trauma especially because of China’s precedence with such methodology. Additionally, what happens when women’s erotic and or maternal bodies are the only ones that can embody a nation’s issues? While the positioning of men and women to structure hierarchy in traditional China was common –“Men plant, women weave” or “Men are in charge of outside affairs, and women of inside affairs”, much of China’s cultural image domestic and abroad has been through women and Yimou’s films are no exception. What happens when a country cannot be expressed through its entire people? In a society in which gender is all too often conflated with women, masculinity has come to be defined by what it is not, especially when its representation in the media is always oppositional to that of women, and relies heavily on men’s objectification of women. 2011

In China, the censorship of film is still an issue that filmmakers must take into consideration if they wish to reach domestic audiences. So although there are many contemporary Chinese filmmakers (i.e. Zhang Yuan with East Palace, West Palace) who play with the gender binary in revolutionary ways, their films are almost always banned. Yimou certainly has a history of his films being censored as well, but his use of the female body to indirectly address and embody national issues has precedence, and thus his films are usually able to be approved eventually. Film has the power to affect the masses, and societies may very well achieve a deeper understanding of gender if directors were more aware of the ways in which gender socialization helps to shape other identities such as nationality, ethnicity, or social class. In the meantime, audiences can appreciate the many assets of Zhang Yimou’s films such as his use of color and composition, but we must be able to look more critically at his use of the female body in the context of Chinese history.

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References Berry, Chris. Women Through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema. 52. Australia: The Chinal Journal, 2004. Print. Blum , Susan. D. Women Through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema. 47. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Print. De Kloet, Jeroen. Gendering China Studies: Peripheral Perspectives. Central Questions. 22. China Information , 2008. Print. Huang , Yiji. Weaving a Dark Parody: A Psychoanalytical Reading of Zhang Yimou’s Curse of the Golden Flower. 6, 4151. 2010. Print. Marchetti, gina. “Women Through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema” (Review) China Review International, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2003, 129-131, University of Hawai’i Press Zeng, Li. “Transgression-Obsessed: A Cross-Cultural Reading of Judou and Curse of the Golden Flower.” Virginia Review of Asian Studies, XI, 63-72 (2008) Zhang, Jeanne Hong. “Gender in Post-Mao China” European Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 209-224 (2003) Academia Europaea, United Kingdom

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The Current State of Religion in Mainland China: Relations between the People’s Republic and Religion Baron Eldra Laudermilk Abstract: A historical analysis of religion in China—Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Daoism, local communal religions—is utilized to understand the present relationship between religion and the Chinese state. Since 1979, the Chinese Communist Party-state has increasingly attempted to deregulate its institutional ties to religion and allow freedom of religion to flourish. However, insight into the Tibetan monks recent fallout with the PRC, the underground Christian churches shut downs, and ethnic and religious battles between the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang with the ethnic Hans in 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that the Chinese state will not be truly granting religious freedom in the near future.

In this overview of the current state of religion in China, I will attempt to answer the following questions: “What kind of relationship does the Chinese government have with the various religions in the state?” “Does a look into China’s history allow one to predict how this relationship will develop in the future?” And, “does the government interact with religions differently depending on their ability to act as a whole?” I will argue that although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has created formal protections for religious practices, the state has, and still does consistently oppress, regulate, and monitor the mass organization of religion. The history and actions of the PRC indicate that it currently does not have any intention to allow

the freedom of religious practice. Though the PRC constitution grants freedom of religious belief, the state regulates and monitors religion through political institutions; it requires all groups with more than 200 members to register with the Public Security Authorities, and detain religious figures it feels are threatening, and in the process crushing religious factions that may pose a threat to its notion of social harmony (globalsecurity.org). I have separated this essay into three sections. The first describes the PRC’s official stance on religion, discussing the documents in which the PRC formally states its position on religion. I also describe the formal institutions the PRC has implemented to control religion, as well as a few of the

Baron Eldra Laudermilk is a student at Ohio State University double majoring in Political Science and Chinese Studies. 2011

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Baron Eldra Laudermilk

PRC’s top leaders’ statements on the state’s relationship with religion. In the second section, I will review the history of China’s past relations with religion. In the third section, I will look at the recent history of relations between the PRC and religions in China up until May 2011. Finally, I propose that the threat religions have historically posed to the state has caused the PRC to grow wary of strong, organized religions. The PRC’s Official Stance on Religion The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), states that religion in China is protected by the state and that the government may not discriminate against religious practices (Article 36 of the Constitution of the PRC). The state defines religion in the constitution in the following way: Religions have universal characteristics, including a rational theology, scriptures, a professional clergy, and permanent religious sites (Ashiwa, Yoshiko, and Wank 9). The most important document regarding the PRC’s stance on religion is entitled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period,” a.k.a “Document 19” (1982). Point Six states that “Preaching and missionary work by self-styled preachers and other illegal missionary work must be firmly curbed.” In short, the State officially recognizes the practice of religion; however it also highlights the need of the state to control religious practice, and in particu76

lar proselytizing (Cox 371-426). Despite the formal protections granted to religious practices, the PRC’s highest leaders have failed to support the freedom of religion clearly stated in their official documents. In 1993 Jiang Zenmin, former President of the PRC, released his philosophy on religious leaders in his “Three Sentence Speech.” He publically announced that the PRC should restrict and control religion, ensure that it does not challenge the Party’s interest, use religion to bring economic gains for the country, and encourage and implement socialism (Vala 126-150). The state has incrementally attempted to replace religion with its own philosophies, Marxism and Confucianism. In 1979 a program called God-Free (精神文明) was launched in schools that taught values such as family, loyalty and diligence. The writings of Karl Marx and Confucius were used so they would be followed as religious figures, replacing the five official and popular religions (Jaime FlorCruz and Joshua Cooper 1999). Due to the influence of Marxist and Maoist philosophies, the Communist government claims to be an atheist body. However, statistics calculated by Global Security.org show that in various localities approximately 25% of Communist Party members participate in one or more religions. Many scholars believe that this figure is much higher, but because of the political ramifications, people tend to deemphasize their beliefs (globalsecurity. org).

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In 1997 the PRC issued their biannual White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief, reaffirming the right to freedom of religion. The “Regulations on Religious Affairs” (RRA) promulgated by the PRC in 2005 are a set of statues that grants religious communities more authority to manage their affairs, engage in activities, and own religious property. In the RRA, there is no clause that states that religious groups need to be patriotic or support the PRC. In fact, it officially states that religious communities do not need government approval to conduct religious activities outside registered religious places. Most significantly, religious groups are granted the same legal protections as corporate and civil originations; therefore they formally have the power to appeal government decisions and take the PRC’s decisions to court (Tong 860, 862, 866, 2009).

progress (Hays). However, in an interview with the journalist Fareed Zakaria, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao again emphasized that religions must not contravene state polices, especially religions which the state does not approve like Tibetan Buddhism.

In 2008 Chinese President Hu Jintao called a special Politburo session to endorse religion. He allowed himself to be photographed for the China Daily shaking hands with one of China’s main Christian leaders. In a speech at a recent study session Hu said, “We must strive to closely unite religious figures and believers among the masses around the party and government and struggle together with them to build an all-around moderately prosperous society while quickening the pace towards the modernization of socialism.” The overall message seemed to indicate that religion can be harnessed for economic and social

The White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief lists the five officially recognized religions in China: Buddhism, Islam, Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Daoism. Anyone who wants to start a church within one of the five stateapproved religions must go through extensive training and register with the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council and PRC’s United Front Work Department. Each religion in China has a specific institution directed at the highest levels of government, which carefully oversees and audits its actions, lectures and the church body. Popular religions which are ubiquitous in

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In many places all over the world, the Dalai Lama keeps preaching about the idea of a so-called autonomy in the greater Tibetan region. And actually, the so-called autonomy that he pursues is actually to use religion to intervene in politics. They want to separate the so-called greater Tibetan region from the motherland. And many people in the United States have no idea how big is the so-called greater Tibetan region, the so-called greater Tibetan region, preached by the Dalai Lama, actually covers Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Gansu -- altogether five provinces. (Zakaria)

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rural regions and even metropolitan areas are not considered religions by the state.

of elaborate Buddhist monasteries which were spreading foreign ideas to the masses threatened Wuzong’s power (Reischauer Buddhism and the State 1995, .221, 22).The fourth persecution occurred during the Taiping Rebellion (1850 According to the reasonably accurate 1865). The leader of the Taiping Rebellion, Chinese 2000 national census, Buddhism is Hong Xiuquan, ordered all temples and China’s largest religion. There about 100 monasteries burned down because they million Buddhist in China. More liberal did not fit with his ideal of Chinese society. sources such as China.daily.com, estimate The final persecution was during the CulBuddhist populations could be as high as tural Revolution (1966-1976). Buddhism 21-23% of the population, almost a quarwas considered to be one of the “four olds” ter billion people (Jiao). In 1986 the China that Mao thought were holding China back Daily reported that of the 3,500 Buddhist from becoming an innovative, industrialtemples destroyed during the Cultural ized nation. Buddhist monasteries were Revolution, more than 2,400 have been disbanded, and Buddhist practitioners were restored. persecuted (Wank 183, Encyclopedia Britannica). In ancient China, Buddhists faced persecution and much hostility from the Besides the four major Buddhist Imperial Court. Between the fifth and persecutions, other factions who wanted twentieth century, five major Buddhist per- control over China saw Buddhism as barsecutions occurred. In 567 CE, Emperor rier to achieve power. In the early 1900s, Wu Di [reigned 561-578] of the Northern the Nationalist Party led by Chiang KaiZhou Dynasty attempted to abolish Budshek, launched the “Convert Temples to dhism. In 574 and 577, he had Buddhist Schools” movement, followed in the 1920s images and temples destroyed, and ordered by the “Smashing Superstition” movement the monks back to disrobe. He believed that (Ashiwa 49). The party leaders claimed all the temples had gained too much power religions, including Buddhism and Daoand were undermining his authority. In ism, were pre-modern and superstitious 845, a third persecution was initiated by and therefore could not be coordinated the Tang dynasty Emperor Wuzong called with science and technology. They believed the “Great Anti- Buddhist Persecution” people who followed “pre-modern” reliwhich was designed to rid China of forgions could not understand how to create a eign influences. One of the main reasons modern, powerful China. They destroyed Wuzong attempted to eliminate Buddhism thousands of temples, shrines and statutes was monasteries were tax-exempt. The rise in order to eliminate Buddhism. The lead78

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ers of the Nationalist Party believed they could in this way draw the people away from false religions and direct them toward science, rational thinking, and democracy. Furthermore the smashing of the temples undermined the authority of landowners who owned these temples for generations (Ashiwa 2009). The “Smashing Superstition” movement and the “Convert Temples to Schools” movement occurred simultaneously. The “Convert Temples to Schools” movement was supported by many intellectuals of that time who pushed for China to adopt Western ideals and technology. They also encouraged local governments to expel clergy and temple workers. The discrimination against Buddhist, especially monks, was widespread (Ashiwa 2009, 50-51). Since 1979, the practice of Buddhism has steadily increased in China. For the most part, people are free to enter Buddhist temples and worship as they please. In fact, the PRC has aided the rise of Buddhism by funding rebuilding as well as the training of monks and nuns. (Ashiwa 48-49). With the PRC’s change in its policy towards religion, intellectuals and government officials made efforts to reform Buddhism and reshape it as a modern religion. The China Buddhist Association has mediated between leaders in the Buddhist community and government agencies. This organization is responsible for setting policies, collecting funds, distributing resources, and representing Buddhist interests to the government. It has regional branches in large 2011

cities, and its employees are mostly monks and nuns (Birnbaum). In 2007 there were protests against mining in the mountains because they housed temples and images of the Buddha. In June of that year, hundreds of Tibetans took to the streets to protest the destruction caused by the mines of Yala Mountain. The protestors destroyed equipment and attacked miners. In a second protest, a group of monks signed a letter to the provincial religious association demanding reparations and the passing of laws prohibiting mining on sacred mountains. The State quietly suppressed these protest and arrested the elders, but in late 2007, the PRC banned all forms of mining on sacred Buddhist Mountains. By illegalizing such mining PRC demonstrated that although it needs energy for its growing economy, preventing social unrest and harmonizing society are higher priorities (Reuters). Although the Buddhist temples have gained much autonomy since 1979, they are still regulated and monitored. Islam and the State Although the Chinese Muslim population is relatively small compared to the number of Buddhists or followers of local communal religions, more Muslims live in China than in Malaysia or any nation in the Middle East, other than Egypt, Turkey and perhaps, Iran. According to the 2000 national census, there are approximately

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20 million Muslims in China, about a 40% increase from the 1990 census. The majority of Chinese Muslims are minority groups including: Hui (9,816,805); Uyghur (8,399,393); Kazakh (1,250,458); Dongxiang (513,805); Tatar (4,890).

men. Although Muslims during the Qingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rule did daily business with the Chinese, the Chinese Muslims felt alienated from the Han majority, leading to the creation of very close knit Muslim communities. Throughout mosques and Islamic households, the values of Islam were reinforced Muslims in China have always posed by daily worships (Israeli 305-309). a challenge to the government, occasionTensions between Muslim communities and ally escalating to a threat to public order. the Chinese State persisted under the PRC. Muslims have experienced forced resettleDespite the fact that there were numerous ment, religious discrimination, and constant documents drawn up that were supposed to efforts by the Han Chinese majority to improve race relations, such as Article 50 of assimilate them. Yet, Chinese Muslims have The Common Programme of the Chinese not just survived this harsh political climate, Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Political Consultative Coherence, but they have managed to thrived (Newby the Muslim community nevertheless suf923 and Israeli 296). fered continued stigmatization and discrimination. I will not go into the details regard In the early 1720s, the Qing impleing the atrocities that occurred during the mented policies to assimilate the Muslims Cultural Revolution, it suffices to say that in Xinjiang. The two main goals were to the majority of the Hui rebellions were replace the native tribal system with Chiharshly suppressed (Newby 936-938). nese authorities, and to promote Confucian ideals in the indigenous populous. This pe- Christianity (particularly riod saw strict limitations on their freedom Protestantism) and the State to worship, and even Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca was prohibited (Israeli 296-298). According to China Aid, a TexasDuring the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), a based human rights group, the number of series of Muslim rebellions created chaos in Christians in China has increased 100-fold the north and southwest of China over two since 1949. A poll of 4,500 people condecades (1850s-1870s). Despite the fact that ducted by professors at Shanghai University the Chinese succeeded in suppressing the estimated that there are 40 million Chrisrebellions, the Muslims did not adopt Chi- tians: between 12-14 million Catholics and nese culture. roughly 23 million Protestants. The twenty three million Protestants registered with the They were often depicted by Chinese state attend state-approved Churches (Vala). as savages, aggressive and greedy tribesAmongst the numbers of unofficial Protes80

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tants who worship in unregistered churches in rural and urban areas, the estimates go as high as sixty million people. Practicing Protestants in China fall into two distinct groups: Those who attend state registered churches, and those who participate in unofficial, or informal churches which are not known to the state. There are many reasons why Chinese people prefer unregistered churches (Vala), I shall discuss their motivations after describing the network of official churches. The Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) was initiated in 1951 by a Cantonese Christian named Y. T. Wu with the authorization of the PRC (Johnstone 2001, 164). This organization was temporarily disbanded during the 1960s, but was reauthorized during the 1970s. The organization’s main function is to register, regulate, and monitor Protestant churches and their functions. It is quite evident that PRC uses the TSPM to expand economic gains and maintain a “harmonious society”, by making the registered Bible schools highly competitive, selecting the candidate for the pastoral office of a TSPM church, and determining the material the pastors shall preach (Vala). The TSPM seeks pastor candidates who will implement “patriotism” (爱国主义) and protect PRC’s leadership, by “obeying China’s laws above religious laws.” The state funds 24 national and regional bible schools and each of them accepts only a 2011

miniscule fraction of the thousands applicants. The small number of official Bible schools is likely due to PRC’s unease about the number of pastors in China. The more official pastors there are, the more difficult it is for the government to monitor them, so the government keeps the numbers relatively low so that they can closely oversee the pastors’ actions (Vala). TSPM churches are expected not only to perform their religious duties, they are also responsible for bolstering the economy by building schools, houses for the poor, farms, and bridges, and by tending to sick children. TSPM churches are directly influenced by the state’s demands because they are subsidized by the government. This gives the state a direct say in how Protestantism will be conducted in China, giving it the authority to initiate or remove classes it sees necessary (Vala). The road to becoming a TSPM pastor is strenuous, but even after a student completes the three year course; there is no guarantee that he or she will find a job in an official TSPM church. In “Pathways to the Pulpit”, Carsten T. Vala states that even after approval by the Religious Affairs Bureau and the TSPM, a church to which an applicant is applying may not accept the candidate. Many pastors cannot work in their hometowns because of the lack of employment; a spouse may have to relocate because a pastor is assigned to a different area. While it is true that the unofficial Protestant churches in China have auton-

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omy which TSPM churches do not have, people in these churches are always susceptible to government harassment, fines, labor-reeducation, criminal proceedings and even prison sentences. These churches take a major risk practicing without registering with the government.

and temples became more extravagant and elaborate. During this period many Daoist priest scholars produced of texts in immeasurable numbers. Buddhist and Confucius ideas were incorporated to enrich and deepen Daoist thought. The Tang Dynasty was a high point for the propagation of Daoism. The Tang emperors claimed that Daoism and the State they were descendents of Laozi, and honored him as the highest “Emperor of Mys Daoism can be said to be both the terious Origin.” Massive temples of Laozi most widely practiced religion in China and were constructed in the two capitals, and the least practiced. This is because there Daoist priests were appointed to the shrines is a great deal of overlap between Daoism (Yu XXX-XVII). and local communal religions. Many people who practice Daoism also practice a com During the Song dynasty several munal religion or another world religion. emperors, most notably Huizong, actively The definition of the follower of Daoism promoted Daoism by publishing editions of is broad. A person is considered a Daothe Daozang (Robinet 213). The Quanzhen ist practitioner regardless if they practice school of Daoism, which is particularly another religion. Daoism differs from other concerned with longevity and immortality, world religions because it lacks a formal was founded during this time. The Song dystructure. According to the Encyclopedia nasty also saw the integration between elite Britannica, “Daoism,” is estimated to have Daoist traditions and local traditions of 200-400 million adherents. Minority ethfolk religion. This led to the establishments nic groups in China also practice Daoism. of a new group of ordained ritual experts The Mulan, who also practice Buddhism known as fashi. Aspects of Confucianism, (207,352); Maonan (107,166); Primi or Daoism, and Buddhism were synthesized in Puni who also practice Lamaism (33, 600); what became the Neo Confucian School, Jing or Gin (22, 517); who also practice which eventually became an imperial orBuddhism (Chui). thodoxy for the state’s bureaucracy ( Kohn 415-418, 423). Under the Ming dynasty During the Sui (589 AD - 618 AD), (1368-1662), Daoism split into two schools. Tang (618-907) and Northern Song Dynas- The first is the Total Perfection (Quanzhen) ties (960–1279), Daoism found a niche in school; the second is known as the Zehngi royal courts. Temples flourished across the Heavenly masters, which had been passed land and the architecture of the shrines down from the Han dynasty (Lai107). 82

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Daoism gradually lost state support from roughly the mid-Ming Dynasty to the People’s Republic of China. The Qing emperors preferred Buddhism and restricted, monitored and controlled Daoism. Emperor Qianlong (1736-1796) took away the priest’s ability to ordain new Daoist priests and limited the sect’s jurisdiction to the Long-Hu Mountain. Emperor Daoguang (1821-1851) ended the practice of holding an annual audience with the head of the Orthodox-Unity sect. Between the fall of the Qing in 1911 and the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China was ruled by weak and ineffective governments which allowed religious practice to be somewhat freer (Goldman 3). The state ceased recognizing the Orthodox Daoist sect. Nationalist Party leaders attempted to embrace science, Western culture and modernity, so they converted temples into public buildings, and attempted to control traditional religious activity (Yu XIX-XX).

many of the destroyed temples. Since 1982, 17 of the twenty most well known temples have been rebuilt and opened to the public. The National Daoist Association has expanded its efforts to rebuild temples all over China from rural areas to cities (Lai 109, 110). According to the official numbers disclosed by the National Daoist Association, 400 Daoist temples were reopened in 1992, 1,200 in 1995, and 1,600 in 1998. The State and Religion: Tensions & Conflicts Today Events over the last three years suggest that tensions between the state and religious organizations are growing. The tensions between Tibetan monks and the PRC have long persisted since the PRC suppressed the 1959 Tibetan Uprising (Teslik). In general, the relationship between the Tibetan monks and the PRC has been unstable and violent.

Before China’s grand opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, protest flared up in During this period, folk Daoism Tibet’s capital, Lhasa, resulting in armed flourished at the peasant level, which can riots, looting, destruction of Han Chinese be seen in the secret societies and other reli- owned businesses, and the death of fourgious organizations that thrived at this time. teen people. A correspondent for the EconAfter the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiomist, who was the only Western journalist aoping allowed people to engage in Daoist in the region during the uprising, explained practices as long as they were not doing that Tibetans were enraged for three reaanything that would be considered “super- sons. First, the Tibetans were angry that stitious.” The National Daoist Association, Han Chinese controlled a huge part of the originally founded in 1957, was re-authoeconomy while they were still economirized. One of their first tasks was to rebuild cally and socially marginalized. Second, the 2011

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prices of basic food and other commodities had skyrocketed. And finally, and probably the most important is the PRC policy promoting the mass Han Chinese migration into Tibet (Economist). According to the same Economist correspondent, the violence was also fueled by rumors of killings, beatings, and detention of Tibetan monks a week before the incident. There were also rumors that monks had been shot dead outside the Jokhang temple, the holiest shrines in Tibetan Buddhism (Economist). Approximately a month after the protest in Tibet’s capital, the PRC launched the “patriotic” education campaign in Tibet. According to the Taipei Times, the program was meant to “strengthen relations between Tibetans and local PRC officials. The campaign requires monks to denounce the Dalai Lama and declare their loyalty to the PRC” (Taipei Times).

monks flared up again when Chinese authorities sealed off Kirk Gompa, a significant Tibetan monastery in Sichuan Province, after a young monk set himself on fire to protest the CCP’s oppressive policies in Tibet. Hundreds of monks were arrested, two older laypeople were killed, and books that were not approved by the authorities were burned (Banyan, May 17th 2011). A report released by The International Campaign for Tibet said “All movement of monks is restricted and monks are even being prevented from burning incense for religious rituals (Banyan April 2011)”

Xinjiang’s Muslims have also experienced numerous clashes with the Han Chinese and have rebelled against the PRC’s policies regarding the region. The Uyghur are Turkic speaking Muslims who share physical characteristics that are more European than Han Chinese. Like the Tibetans, the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang feel that they are being economically, socially and The patriotic campaign failed, and politically dominated and marginalized by the PRC’s actions continued to be hostile ethnic Hans (Roberts, Rudelson, Ramzy towards monks whom they consider rebel2009, and Wu 25-39). However, the Uyghur lious and threatening to the Communist community is divided by religious conflicts Party’s agenda. On June, 2009, the Office within the community between Sufi and of Religious Affairs sent representatives and non-Sufi practitioners in addition to territopolice to Amdo Jaqung monastery in Qing- rial loyalties (Gladney 457). hai to expel Lobsang Tsultrim for “persuading the monks to be faithful to the Dalai In June 2009, Uyghur Muslims Lama rather than to the PRC.” The Chifought with Han Chinese in the streets of nese media said that Tsultrim was unable to Xinjiang’s capital. Ethnic and religious teneducate the monks (Asia News). sions erupted when two Uyghur men were On April 21, 2011, unrest amongst Tibetan killed by a group of Han Chinese factory 84

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workers. The Uyghur people were upset that none of the Han perpetrators were arrested and the authorities did not act to stop the fight (Wong 2009, BBC News 2010 Lawrence). Instead the state executed the Uyghur it thought organized the riot, censored information on the web, and reinforced local governance to prevent future outburst (Wu 25-39). In May 2011, after the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the PRC attempted to link separatists in Xinjiang, who are demanding an independent state, to international Islamic terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaida. The PRC called on the international community to help root out its terrorist problem. However, the Uyghur community states that there is no connection between al-Qaida and the Uyghur separatist movement. Sharon Hom, Human Rights executive director in China, observed “One of the concerns raised by China’s reactions to the death of Osama Bin Laden is they have used this as an opportunity to both link terrorism, international terrorism, with separatism, that is the domestic concern about separatism in Xinjiang” ( Ho). Protestants in China have also faced repression by the Chinese state. On April 24 2011, Chinese authorities detained hundreds of congregants from the Shouwang Evangelical Church, one of the largest house churches in the capital, when they attempted to hold Easter services in a public 2011

square. Earlier that month, the government had the church evicted from its rented quarters. The authorities also stymied the church’s attempts to lease or buy space for services. Some church members said that they were confined to their homes by agents to keep them from joining Easter services (Jacobs). In late April 2011, a 28 year old member of the Shouwang church, who identified herself as Waters told a CNN correspondent that she feels that if she practices Christianity she will be harassed by the authorities. “Personally I don’t know how long I can last because the pressure is pretty intense, because they try to harass your family, your workplace and your landlord. They want to control you” (Kent). Conclusion In this paper I have attempted to answer these three questions: “What kind of relationship does the Chinese government have with the various religions in the state?” “Does a look into China’s history allow one to predict how the relationship will develop in the future?” And, “does the government interact with religions differently depending on religious peoples’ ability to organize and act as a whole?” The Chinese government has demonstrated that its relationship with religions in its state is complicated and difficult to describe. Religions have caused the Chinese

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government to establish government agencies to monitor and regulate the growth and actions of all religions. This indicates, at a very minimum, that the government finds almost all religions threatening to its power. A study of Chinese history does allow one to formulate an educated guess about China’s future relationship between government and religions. In Chinese history, religions have always posed a challenge to Chinese rule. The Muslims in Xinjiang have historically been opposed to Chinese rule. The Qing dynasty saw massive rebellions in the north and southeast for two decades, and currently, the situation in Xinjiang is still unstable. The CCP has taken radical measures to ensure that the Muslims silently accept their “harmonized” state.

tians and Muslims have historical books, culture and traditions that unite them, they are able to organize and take action more swiftly than religions that have diverse cultures, traditions and books. After this study, I have concluded that religion will continue to pose a threat to the Chinese state as long as the state continues to heavily oppress, regulate and monitor its religions.

The Chinese government clearly finds foreign religions, specifically Christianity and Islam, more threatening than internal religions, such as Buddhism, Daoism and local communal religions. Muslims and Christians have directly attempted to demolish the Chinese government. The Muslim rebellions in the 1890s, and the Taiping rebellion from 1850-1864, were initiated for many reasons, but mainly to overthrow the Chinese government. Buddhist, Daoist, and local communal religions, have had their own historical precedents that indicate they can pose a threat to the state, but not nearly at the same degree we have seen from Christians and Muslims.

Ashiwa, Yoshiko. “The Positioning of Religion in Modernity: State and Buddhism in China.” Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, ed. Yoshiko. 2009.

It seems possible that since the Chris86

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Ashiwa and David. L. Wank, 126-150. Stanford University Press. 2009.

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Iwakura Embassy in France: Patterning Japan after France Rene Bystron Abstract: The following paper addresses Japan’s attempt to westernize the political, social, educational, and economic aspects of their society during the Meiji Restoration. In order to become more like their rivaling hegemonic western super powers, Bureaucrat Iwakura Tomomi and his men set out on a two-year journey known as the Iwakura Embassy. Visiting the United States, Europe, and other parts of Asia, the Embassy gathered valuable Intel on the many facets that caused these societies to thrive. While it is true that the Embassy’s intent was to use the retrieved data as a model for Japan to strive towards, the individuals were well aware that Japan had to maintain its core foundation. Along the mission, Iwakura’s secretary, Kume Kunitake, kept a diary documenting the similarities and differences between western civilization and the isolated Japan. The diary illustrates the group’s fascination with many of the European States’ social and political structures, and the necessary changes Japan would have to undergo in order to achieve similar success. Eventually, the embassy finds France to be the perfect model to imitate; and through Kume’s perspective, the world sees the necessary changes Japan induced to make the perfect syncretism. However, the challenge for the Japanese was to find the perfect blend of western influence without losing the traditions and cultures unique to their society.

On a bright winter’s day late in 1873, the Iwakura Embassy opened a new chapter in its exploration of the West. On December 16th 1872, the Embassy crossed the English Channel and embarked on an epic journey through continental Europe, a journey that started in France and lasted for several months (Kume). Having failed to renegotiate unequal treaties with the American and British governments, the embassy members focused all their energies on learning more about “the ways of the West.” The mission shifted from negotiating with the West to discovering the West - “wherein the success of the West lay, and which components of that success could be translated to Japan” (Thomas). Luck-

ily, the mission diarist, Confucian scholar, Kume Kunitake, left behind an extensive description of the mission’s journey, the so-called, True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation through the United States of America and Europe. Kume’s report on the embassy’s voyage to France provides valuable insights into Japan’s perception of the Third Empire at the beginning of its era. It portrays France as a superior nation that ought to be imitated. Although certain aspects deemed worthy of imitation were completely discarded by Japanese government, and vice versa, France captivated the Japanese imagination more than any other country. In the eyes of the members of the

Rene Bystron is currently a senior at Yale University, double majoring in East Asian Studies and History.

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mission as well as the Meiji leaders, France was “the quintessential glory of Europe,” Japan’s City Upon the Hill (Kume). The Iwakura Embassy’s exploration of France exposes much about Japan’s past, offers insight into its present, and glimpses into its future. And as such, Kume’s report shows how the Embassy’s journey to France changed the way Japan saw the world as well as the way it saw itself.

diary and its author in the historical and literary context. First, Kume was a not a Western intellectual but a Confucian scholar. His comments on the French society were deeply rooted in his Confucian education and in the values such education emphasized. As a result, “Kume’s contribution,” as historian W. G.Beasley suggests, “was a more a matter of literary skill than of knowledge and analysis.” The Diary’s structure is equally mesmerizing. General A group of Japanese oligarchs surveys of each visited country, including headed by one of the most powerful politi- an outline of its history, politics, geography, cal figures in Japan, Iwakura Tomoni, the economy, religion and education, are folIwakura Embassy, toured the world sailing lowed by somehow completely unrelated from Yokohama on December 23, 1871 thought pieces that cover a great range of and returning on September 13, 1873.6 topics from Japan’s role in the world to the The mission stretched to far corners of the meaning of history (Kume). Entertaining world including the United States, United dialogues follow long dry passages. The Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherdiary reads as an encyclopedia, philosophilands, Russia, Prussia, Germany, and other cal treatise and a theatre play. Nonetheless, emerging European and Asian powers. although Kume excelled more as a literInitially, the embassy hoped for a renegoary figure than a socio-political analyst, his tiation of unequal treaties with Western “True Account” still offers priceless insights powers – an attempt, which was met with into the nature of the French-Japanese relalittle or no success. As a result, the members tions at the opening of the Meiji era. concentrated on their originally secondary goal: to learn about the West in order to The interaction between France and assure progress Japan – political, economic, Japan during the Tokugawa period as well social, and cultural. as a rising French presence in Asia did not leave much space for admiration and re Kume’s account of the journey spect on the side of the Emissaries. On the proves crucial in reevaluating the significontrary however, the traveling oligarchs cance of the Mission. However, to fully held France in much disfavor before emcomprehend the diary’s standing as an barking on their journey. There were two important revelatory tool of the embassy’s reasons for their mistrust of French politics. experience in France, one must place the First, France played a crucial role in sup90

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porting the Ancien Régime in Japan. In fact, the French directly interfered in the Meiji Restoration, financially, militarily and politically by supporting the shogunate (Ward, Burks). France followed the Netherlands in helping to maintain the power of the old administration, by building the Yokosuka shipyard and arsenal (Ward). Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the Meiji restoration viewed France as an endangering element that once attempted to undermine their efforts to overthrow the shogunate. Second, the oligarchs feared the French imperialist expansion in Asia. They blamed France, that was “making steady inroad into the countries of south Asia,” for Japanese political and economic instability (Thomas). Firmly convinced in the French attempts to undermine the authority of the Japanese government in Asia and, consequently, in Japan, the members of the Iwakura Mission regarded France with a sense of mistrust and suspicion. The state of France in 1872-73 did not add much to its reputation. In fact, France in the second half of the nineteenth century experienced tumultuous times that severely damaged its image abroad. The France the Iwakura Members encountered, once they arrived to Calais, was a strange amalgam of glory and humiliation. First, France faced serious unrest at home. Kume often remarked on the riotous state, from which France just emerged, bitterly commenting on the Western civilization in general: “Internal revolt against the gov2011

ernment flared up in the shape of the Paris Commune and brought chaos to the city […] however civilized Western countries may appear from afar, this certainly did not extend to the manners of the common classes” (Kume). Furthermore, after its defeat during the Franco-Prussian War, France had lost its hegemony in continental Europe. Several decades after Bonaparte’s epic military campaign, France had found itself humiliated by a novice in European power-politics, Bismarck’s Prussia. Not only did French national pride suffer from the defeat, the French economy was heavily burdened by war reparations, while at the same time the French government was losing much of its authority both at home and abroad. The France that the Emissaries encountered was, indeed, a sad relic of a once powerful nation. Surprisingly, however, France’s weakened position did not diminish the members’ sense of admiration. After more than two years of travels in the West, the Iwakura emissaries were as impressed by France as if they had encountered it at the peak of its cultural glory. Interestingly, there were many similarities between France and Japan at the time of the mission’s visit. First, as historian Carol Gluck suggested, both countries were experiencing the “colonization” of the provinces. France from 1870 to 1914 - the years corresponding almost exactly to the Meiji period – saw a dramatic politicization

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of the provinces. In the process of “converting peasants into Frenchmen,” various regional communities were included in the national project; they were all embraced by the Parisian elite as members of the same nation. Eugen Weber portrayed the process of the colonization as Paris civilizing the unruly provinces and “instilling a national view of things in regional minds.” In the same period as the language, gestures, and perceptions of national politics penetrated the French countryside, the local elite in Meiji, Japan learned “the political lessons, demanded the fiscal trade-offs, and otherwise began to act on behalf of local interests within the national political scene” (Gluck 37). Like in France, the politics in Japan entered local life. The Japanese provinces became colonized and colonize-able. In the same way as Marseille became less of a Marseille and more of a “French” city, many Japanese provinces, under the pressure of national government, found their new identity – not as self-governing units, but as pieces of a national monolith called Japan.

lieved that “it [was] the accumulation of knowledge over hundreds and thousands of years which [gave] rise to the light of civilization” (60). The emissaries recognized that even though change played an important role, it was imperative for the new nation to build on the accomplishments of the past. French inclusion of the past into the politics of the present represented an important feature of national consciousness that the Japanese found crucial for their own agenda.

Third, closely related to the “profound love” for the past was the French ability to imitate others - to adopt foreign customs and to shape them, according to their own formula. Shortly after the Franco-Prussian war, France was able to imitate certain aspects of Prussian society, and as such, it was in line with Japan’s efforts to imitate the West while conserving its identity. Kume often mentioned the willingness of the French to learn from Germany. He claimed that although “formerly the French had never imagined copying,” they understood that if they did not do so, “France Second, France’s glorification of its might not be able to remain France” (Nish past struck much chord with the ambas74). In imitating Bismarck’s Prussia – its sadors who were aware of the need to military and economic organization – preserve Japan’s unique character. Leaders France appeared as a great example of a of the Meiji government were all too connation, like Japan, that borrowed from othscious of the importance of learning from ers while preserving its own identity. the past to progress in the present: as Kume Last but not least, the members of wrote, “at the root of the march of progress the Iwakura mission found similarities bein the West is a profound love of antiquity.” tween the French secularism and their own He and many of his contemporaries beefforts to eliminate religious discussions 92

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from the sphere of politics. In France, they found a form of Christianity that intruded less in everyday life than in United-States and Britain. Kume specifically asserted that “religious faith is as weak in France as it is strong in America” (89). Lukewarm religious sentiments in France did not only strike chord with the emissaries’ belief in the separation of the church and state, but they also enabled a much warmer welcome in France. Whereas in the United States and Britain, the mission faced harsh admonishing for Japanese treatment of the Christians on the Japanese soil, in France, the emissaries encountered little or no criticism for their religious policies. Importantly, the fact that the French had no interest in promoting religious freedom in Japan gave the Emissaries “some reassurance that Christianity was not quite the insidious vanguard of Western power that they had suspected” (Nish 83).

healthy [ and that ] it had a rich reservoir of talented men, especially in the fields of economics and commercial law” (74). They admired that, unlike Britain and the United States, the French found the right balance between the “machinery and manual labour,” which enabled France to attain both quantity and quality in its manufacturing. In the field of commerce, all throughout the third volume of his diary, Kume paid particular attention to Paris, which he portrayed as a marketplace of the world’s manufactured goods as opposed to London’s standing as a centre for raw materials (Kume). Furthermore, the emissaries had much respect for Paris’ status as a capital of style and delicate craftsmanship, since they believed that its dominance in “style and craftsmanshiop” helped France to accomplish its dominant position in Continental Europe. Perhaps most noticeably, Kume praised the French economy for its reliance on “the refined technical ingenuity,” craftsmanship and education: Whether it is on a large or small scale, the French are fully accomplished in their craft work and technology (Kume 30).

Based on these similarities, there were four aspects of the French civilization that the Meiji leaders deemed most worthy of replication: France’s economic and education systems, its military organization, and its foreign policy. The praise for the French economy was deeply rooted in the Japanese fascina In terms of the French economic tion for the French education system. On structure, the Japanese extolled several their visit to France, the Iwakura Mission features of the French industry, commerce, spent a large portion of the two months visand banking. As Kume wrote, they believed iting Parisian institutions of higher learning that the fast speed, at which France paid off – attempting to discover the foundations of the reparations, confirmed that “France’s the “knowledge-based” economy. Having financial and commercial position was visited several universities and professional 2011

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schools, the members of the Iwakura Mission concluded that the French education system presented a paragon of a successful organization of national schooling and was worthy of imitation. There were two aspects of the French education system that fascinated the Iwakura embassy. One was practicality, that is, the inclusion of subjects which would help those who studied them to earn a living. The other was patriotism; teaching which would reinforce “awareness of the nation and the citizen’s duties to it” (Beasly 95). The Iwakura Embassy’s interest in French education was immediately followed by subsequent education reforms under the Meiji government.

Prussian model,” the Army Academy was still kept close to the French system, which, according its advocates, placed much value on the moral of the officers (Morley 12).

Besides their interest in French economy, education and military, the members of the Iwakura Embassy paid much attention to French policy abroad. More specifically, they were interested in, what we would now denote as French imperialism. As Ian Nish claimed, one of the lessons that the mission might have learned was “the desirability of acquiring a colonial empire” (76). The members were mostly interested in the economic advantages of holding possessions abroad, describing them as “impor Like the education system, the tant sources of raw materials for manufacFrench military organization proved equally turing.” Interestingly, Kume saw a parallel appealing to the leaders of the members of between France and Japan in their respecthe Iwakura Mission and those of the Meiji tive efforts to colonize other countries. Era. The Emissaries observed that the He suggested that “Algeria’s geographical French military organization stood at the position vis-à-vis France resembled that of root of French military successes abroad. Korea towards Japan” (Kume). Because They believed, Kume wrote, that “when a of this, it was only a matter of time until general of military genius emerges to spur Japan, like France, would attempt to assert them on, their might is so invincible that its imperialistic power over weaker states. they cast ravenous eyes over the whole of Europe” (22). As a result, the French mili Despite an overwhelming fascinatary organization was deemed worthy of tion and praise for everything French, it imitation. In Meiji Japan, the government must be said that there were a few aspects invited a French military advisory group to of the French civilization that the members help re-model the Japanese military accord- of the mission found unsuitable for Japan. ing to the French system. And although in Ironically, however, these aspects were March 1884 Acting Army Minister Saigo often adopted by the Meiji government as “authorized the patterning of the Army well; many features of the French civilizaWar College after the highly professional tion deemed inappropriate were eventu94

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ally embraced through a series of reforms by the Meiji administration. For instance, Kume criticized the French legal and judiciary system, claiming that the introduction of French laws and regulations to Japan would be “like trying to square [a] block of wood into a round hole” (135). He saw two major problems that would arise in the introduction of the French legal system in Japan. First, he believed that the system relied much on the people who are trained as professional lawyers, suggesting that “no one is sufficiently familiar with the study of law” in Japan (134). Second, he saw differences between the Western and the Eastern moral codes, maintaining that in Japan, unlike in the West, “it is considered a virtue not to reveal other people’s affairs, so disclosing information frankly is regarded with distaste” (135). Paradoxically, however, Kume’s fellow citizens disagreed diametrically with his critique of the French legal system, and were eager to adopt it in its entirety. The Meiji Government appointed Misukuri Rinsho to translate all five French law codes, which were viewed as so suitable for Japan that Eto Shimpei suggested that “[they] merely translate the French civil code verbatim, call it the ‘Japanese Civil Code,’ and promulgate it immediately” (Wakabayashi 41). As the enthusiastic adoption of the French legal system proved, even the features of French civilization deemed unsuitable by Kume were often embraced by the Meiji Government. 2011

Undertaking a Vernesque Tour du

Monde in less than three years, the Iwakura Embassy played an important role in shaping Japanese perceptions of the West, as well as changing Japan itself. Kume left a fascinating account of the mission’s travels in the West, exposing much about the Embassy’s goals, aspirations, and accomplishments. The ultimate accomplishment of the Iwakura Embassy, however, seemed to lie in its ability to learn, to filter and then to adopt, an ability elegantly summarized by a new national newspaper, Nihon, published on the day the Japanese constitution was announced: We recognize the excellence of Western civilization. We value the Western theories of rights, liberty, and equality; and we respect Western philosophy and morals. We have affection for some Western custom. Above all, we esteem Western science, economics and industry. These, however, ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; they ought to be adopted only if they can contribute to Japan’s welfare (Pyle 94). Short yet precise, the announcement epitomizes all that the Iwakura Mission stood for – the search, not for a civilization, as a monolithic entity, but for an assemblage of parts, selected for their potential contribution to Japan’s welfare. As such, the Embassy represented an important aspect in the Japanese culture in the past and in the present – a careful cultural syncretism. Syncretism, in which, foreign cultural imports have undertaken a quasi-independent development in Japan, in which foreign

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ideas and products have been rethought, References reshaped, and reformulated to fit the JapaBeasley, W. G. Japan Encounters the Barbarian : Japanese nese context. France had long played an Travelers in America and Europe, 1860-1873. New Haven, important role as a source of inspiration for CT: Yale University Press, 1995. the Japanese syncretism. Starting with the Gluck, Carol. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Embassy’s fascination for France in 1870s, Meiji Period. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, through the popularity of the French New 1985. Wave among Japanese filmmakers in the 1960’s, the French-dreaming was, is, and ---. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. will be alive and well in Japan. It might thus Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985. come as little surprise that a major Japanese Kume, Kunitake, Graham Healey, and Chushichi Tsucultural import of today carries a telling zuki. The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73: A True Account of the name – Comme des Garcons. This JapaAmbassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation through the United States of America and Europe. 1st nese fashion label, that became one of the ed. Chiba, Japan; Princeton, N.J.: Japan Documents; most recognizable names in the industry, Distributed in North America by Princeton University imitates and reshapes the aspects of peasPress, 2002. ant style traditionally associated with rural Morley, James William. Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868-194; a France. In doing so, Comme des Garcons Research Guide. New York: epitomizes Japanese syncretism in its purest Columbia University Press, 1974. form; in doing so, it relates, perhaps unconNish, Ian Hill. The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: sciously, to the old tradition of borrowing from the West as established by the Iwakura A New Assessment. Vol. 6. Richmond, Surrey U.K.: Japan Library, 1998. Embassy on its quixotic journey around the World; and in doing so, it changes the way Pyle, Kenneth B. The New Generation in Meiji Japan; Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895. Stanford, Calif.: Japan sees the world, and the way Japan Stanford University Press, 1969. sees itself. Thomas, J. E. Modern Japan: A Social History since 1868. London ; New York: Longman, 1996. Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Modern Japanese Thought. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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The Modern Chinese Dynasty Michelle Phillips Abstract: Scholars have for decades marveled at the changes the Chinese Communist Party was able to implement across the entire country. After its “century of shame,” China was ready to take charge of its own destiny again, and the Communist Party leaders fanned the nationalistic, anti-imperialist fervor into flame, using it to bring themselves to power. However, upon closer study, the rise of the CCP cannot be explained solely in terms of the changes the Party promoted. In fact, many scholars have been surprised at how closely the Communist rise and rule resembles that of China’s ancient imperial dynasties. Rather than promoting strict Marxism, the CCP astutely modified Communism to suit the specific situation of the Chinese people, and to do so often unconsciously blended traditional values into their ideology. In many ways, the Party relied on traditional Chinese values as their foundation, and combined them with radical changes in certain areas in order to engender a strong sense of nationalism in the Chinese people. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party found a way to do this without appearing contradictory, because traditional Chinese thought was actually already very compatible with Communism to begin with.

When addressing China in late 2009 on his tour of Asia, President Obama made a noticeable point of departure from his predecessors: he did not predict that the Communist Party would fall. Though all the Communist regimes around it have fallen one by one, the Chinese Communist Party has retained a firm hold on the country. Resorting to force or adaptation as the situation demands, the Party has defied all predictions of its fall, and appears ready to lead China into the 21st century. Modern China cannot be completely understood without a firm grasp on the development of the Communist Party; and yet the functions of the Communist Party in the present day, several scholars have argued, cannot be understood without referring back to the

rituals and practices of the dynasties of imperial China. In fact, some comparative analysis suggests that many of the Party’s governing tactics are closely related to imperial methods – perhaps more closely related than they would like to admit. Considering the nomenclature of “Communist Party” and its past slogans of “Destroy the old world; Forge the new world,” such a tie to the past seems both paradoxical and controversial. However, as the Party begins to exult the glories of China’s past and draw their own authority as a continuation of the great dynasties, some striking parallels have come to the surface. In its very attempt to be the modern, “liberating” government of contemporary China, the Communist Party has not been

Michelle Phillips is a senior at Rice University, triple-majoring in English, Anthropology, and Asian Studies.

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able to avoid the patterns of China’s past. In fact, it has relied upon them and utilized them to forge an identity that distinguishes China and sets the country apart from the Western world. Consequently, the Chinese people’s experience of modernity has been an ever-changing but consistent hybrid of traditional societal norms and nationalist sentiments – the synthesis of which is what makes the Communist Party so enduring. When the Communist Party was first founded at Beijing University in 1921, its mantra was to cast off all old traditions and hindrances to make way for a new China. Given the turbulent political and international climate of that time, such sentiments made perfect sense. China had been carved up and kept under the thumb of various Western imperial powers (and later a Japanese invasion) for decades, while the government could do nothing about it – often termed China’s “century of shame and humiliation.” Foreign domination aroused a great deal of indignation, culminating in the May Fourth Movement. The primary focus at this time was national freedom and rejuvenation, seeking to “make the state the pivotal and sovereign center of collective action” to defend China from further exploitation at the hands of the Western powers (Zhao, 26). Anti-foreign sentiments were easily linked to a hatred of the imperialism or capitalism of the Western nations (Zhao). Thus, a state that would be most able to restore China, naturally, would be one whose ideologies were antithetical to those of the West. The recent success and 98

growth of the USSR naturally brought Marxism to the forefront. To many intellectuals, the only way to redeem China’s honor was to cast off the traditional ways, which the Communist Party promised to do. The Communist Party was composed primarily of intellectuals at the time of its founding, and in their eyes, the cause of China’s shame was its 落后的样子 luohou deyangzi “backwardness.” The only way for China to grow to the level of its Western oppressors, they thought, was to stop clinging to outdated systems – hence the appeal of Marxism was particularly strong. From the start, the Communist Party indeed promised a completely new era of freedom that obliterated the old forms of China. Ironically, what the Party most championed as it marched across the countryside was “a democratic revolution” and the instigation of “the people’s democratic dictatorship” (Daniels 57, 132). These promises drew Chinese from all walks of life to give their lives for the Party and its radical ideology that stood in such stark contrast to the fallen dynastic order. The Communist Party named most traditional ways “backward,” and was intent on seeing China ushered into the 20th century. What Chinese intellectuals truly wanted was the chance to be proud of their country again, and to regain the strength needed to assert independence from foreign powers (Zhao). The old ways were condemned because they had left China vulnerable to those powers. In this way, the Communist Party

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tried to instill a nationalism in the Chinese people that despised history and looked only to the future. However, after decades of following this ideology to tragic extremes, Party leadership began to acknowledge that it was not sustainable. The country had reached a point where the people and leadership were no longer certain what they stood for, and those in power could manipulate the ideology to suit their own ends (as seen in the horrors of the Cultural Revolution). Consequently, the Party began harnessing the authoritative appeal of ancient cultural traditions to grow China into a strong competitor in the global system, particularly in the two past decades. Among other things, they have sponsored a revival of the Confucian school of thought, and in many of their propaganda campaigns portray a clear attempt to regain the glories of the ancient dynasties. From a Communist point of view, this is self-contradictory; but from a nationalist point of view, such an appeal to history makes all the sense in the world. The Party leaders realize that “a complete negation of national traditions entail[s] a negation of the nation itself ”; so instead, these leaders have not only chosen to make traditional values and history an integral part of the national identity, they have also used these references to China’s past to legitimize their standing as the rulers of China (Zhao, 137). The propaganda highlights the “patriotism” of the power of the Tang dynasty and numerous legendary he2011

roes as a “tradition” the Communist Party has “inherited and carried on” (Zhao, 227). Hence, supporting the current regime and feeling pride for the great achievements of China’s past become intertwined, as if the China of the past and the China of today are a single, unchanging entity that demands continuing loyalty. By fusing its progressive, “liberating” image with ancient history and old traditions, the Communist government has paved the way for a violent resurgence of nationalism and patriotism. Not surprisingly, the Communist government initiated the movement in the wake of the 1989 tragedy in Tiananmen Square to shift the national focus from the Communist Party to the powers oppressing China. The propaganda disseminated by the Communist government recalls the ancient glory of the Tang and Han dynasties in order to consolidate the Chinese identity (Zhao). The Party utilizes such imagery to motivate its people to regain the power ancient China held in the world order over a millennium ago, and thus makes any country or business that would hold China back into an enemy. One of the most interesting movements this nationalist campaign has led to in recent years is the fenqing, or “Angry Youth.” A large website composed of mostly urban, educated young adults, the fenqing have had no qualms about loudly voicing their dissatisfaction, especially in criticism of the West. Members interpret any interference of foreign powers – especially human rights

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claims – as attempts to oppress and muzzle China. They often respond with hacking and vitriolic retaliation, and are beginning to have a more profound impact on international politics than governments will admit. What has made this social movement gain so much momentum, however, is its highly nationalistic character – the fenqing are pro-China, not just pro-Party. Although not strictly a Party movement, the CCP has been happy to capitalize on this nationalistic fervor in both domestic and international politics (O’Brien).

consistent modern nationalist sentiment; for the nation to be conceived of as an isomorphic whole to which the people may dedicate themselves, a narrative of unified national development must be created, however incomplete such a historical narrative may be.

In the case of the China, the Communist Party has wisely avoided linking itself unequivocally to everything the Chinese dynasties were. Instead, the current government has maintained a distance between themselves and the imperial rule, Of course, such pride in China itself insisting on an identity as the culmination was only made possible by a tailored retell- of the nation’s history – which has heighting of China’s ancient history that highened nationalist sentiment exponentially. lighted certain parts and downplayed or hid To continue to name itself the Communist others. Ernest Renan has aptly described Party requires the distinction of enlightnational memory as a “selective amnesia”: ened rulers with something new to offer a nation must choose what to remember – China. There has been much talk, espeand what to forget – in order to legitimize cially recently, of “the great socialist cause” its position. The undesirable aspects of the Party is promoting, as they attempt to history will be systematically suppressed, unite Marxist-Leninist thought with Deng and the parts that support the nation’s cur- Xiaoping’s infamous euphemism, “socialrent position will be pointedly emphasized. ism with Chinese characteristics” (english. Michael Herzfeld and Ana Maria Alonso people.com.cn). The Party must negotiate observed such a state in both Greece and its claim to be “the vanguard of the proMexico, when a single point in national his- letariat” while wielding absolute authority tory (specifically, the Greek city-states and over its people through a correct constructhe Aztecs) was used to engender national- tion of the national story (Daniels 53). So ist sentiment, at the expense of all the rest far, the CCP has primarily experimented of history. Benedict Anderson has named with appeals to historical China. The marthese “the shrunken imaginings of recent riage of socialist ideology with nationalism history,” which allows the nation to make is a “fragile construction” at best, overitself into an “eternal” entity (7, 12). Such looking the negative aspects of the ancient methods are the only way to construct a dynasties as well as downplaying the Party’s 100

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original dedication to complete revolution (Zhao 209). Nevertheless, it has given the CCP enough legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people to allow the Party to maintain their rule over China to this day.

how closely bound they were to the Chinese situation and the peasants’ values. Once that rapport was established, the Communist Party was able to rally a great number of the country to its cause. In the midst of change, the Communist Party was careful It would be a great mistake, however, to maintain certain ideological consistencies to assume that this traditional-modern nawith ancient China, almost as a foundation tionalism is an entirely new invention of the on which to build their revolution. Chinese Communist Party, invented only out of necessity at the end of the century. All this is not to say that the ComRegardless of the image that the Communist Party did nothing but continue the munist Party tried to promote, closer study line of imperialism. Indeed, the changes reveals that the CCP has always thrived that Communist victory and CCP leaderoff this fusion of Marxism and nationalship brought to the struggling nation were ism ever since its inception. At its core, the staggering. Ever since the May Fourth appeal the Communists made to the ChiMovement in 1919, there had been a strong nese was nationalist. Mao Zedong himself anti-traditionalist sentiment among the did not cling to a strictly Marxist ideology, intelligentsia in China, and the Communist but instead became interested in “adapting Party carried that fervor. As an example, the universal principles of Marxism to the their practices of land reform and debunkpractical needs of the Chinese revolution” ing the landlords completely disrupted (Zhao 96). The Communist Party leaders, the social order that had been in place for especially Mao, were aware that China was thousands of years, and as far as the peasin a completely different economic position ants were concerned “revolutionized ways than what Marx had envisioned. As such, of thinking” (Schoppa 305). The Party the Communist Party chose to take advan- and the class struggle replaced the family tage of both old grievances against Western as the primary defining aspect of people’s exploitation and the recent Japanese invalives, a shift many scholars have regarded sion to awaken a sense of nationalism in the as remarkable. The struggle to displace masses (Schoppa, Zhao). Communist Party landlords and to grant women equality in members presented their ideology as “a the countryside reveals this upheaval best; Chinese doctrine based on Chinese history it took some time for the poor peasants and incorporating a large part of Chinese to gain the courage to use the power the culture” (Zhao, 99). Indeed, the Commugovernment had given, but once they did, nist Party could only win the trust of their life in the villages was turned upside down people over the local landlords by showing (Schoppa). 2011

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changes, the Communist Party actually re The Party also managed to instill lied a great deal on China’s ancient culture an unprecedented level of nationalist senand traditions, implicitly and almost uncontiment at the grassroots level. Once the sciously appealing to them for legitimacy. peasants were assured that the Communist Furthermore, it managed to do so without Party was truly in control of China, they even appearing contradictory. Several felt safe to accuse those who had oppressed scholars have argued that the Party could them for generations, because their first not have gained the support it did without loyalty had shifted to the national governappealing to some ancient values of Chiment. It has been suggested that the term nese culture. Zhao and Schoppa mention for “country” in Chinese, 国家 (guojia, several times the “intellectual attractiveness state-family), reflects an “ancient Chinese of Marxism-Leninism” to the Chinese, as concept of the state as a large family,” but it it “seemed to many intellectuals to answer was in fact Mao and the Communist Party so many questions about China’s plight” that brought such a concept to the fore of (Schoppa 179, 303). Part of its appeal lay nationalistic fervor (Rubin 2). The reason in the ideological similarities between Imthe Party gained such widespread supperial China and Marxism (and even more port came in “fleshing out its claims with so in the Marxism Mao espoused). The the kind of action that made the people principles of socialism and Communism believe that the party cared about them” were far easier for Mao and the Party to (Zhao 108-109). In her infamous novel adapt to China’s needs at the time than Wild Swans, Jung Chang’s mother remem- the individualistic imperialism of the West. bers how whenever the Communists came Hence, the CCP was able to turn back through, they would be incredibly friendly to traditional values and methods of rule and trustworthy, all the while insisting, “We without undermining their own message. are your army.” This was indeed the first time that petty locals and peasants concep- One point of convergence between tualized themselves as part of the Chinese Communism and Chinese culture is the nation rather than simply accepting as 命运 emphasis on society at large. China has (yunming) “fate” their role as subjects, shift- always been a culture primarily focused on ing in Anderson’s pattern from a centerthe good of society. What happens to the focused to a flat image of the nation. individual himself is of secondary importance to the harmony (和, he) between However, it is impossible to explain individuals. In the Chinese understanding, the rise of the Communist government identity is not individual, but is determined merely in terms of the anti-imperialist revo- by the social relations a person has. The lution it oversaw. Despite these momentous concept of 关系 (guanxi), or connections, 102

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has always been an inescapable aspect of life in China, “tying Chinese to each other with far greater strength than mere friendship” (Schoppa 8). Every person, no matter their individual status, maps out his life by his various relationships. This core of Chinese society the Communists were happy to continue. The Marxist focus on class is easily translatable into a focus on society in general, or the good of the people; the end goal of the proletariat revolution for the Chinese Communist Party was a “New China,” not the liberation of individuals (Daniels 83). To the Chinese mind, “the Marxist principle is that the interests of the individual are subordinate to the interests of the party,” and given Marx’s emphasis on world liberation, this interpretation is not wholly unfounded (Daniels, 79). And such a concept dovetailed nicely with the importance the Chinese already gave society.

and given to the peasants who tilled it, there was technically still a landlord over the land: the Communist government. And the local officials were the ones the peasants turned to for courage when denouncing their previous landlords, now that the Communists had taken the place of power (Schoppa). Additionally, even though the original relationships throughout the country were completely turned on their heads, the concept of guanxi was as strong as ever – simply carried on in the government itself. Schoppa notes an incredible similarity “from the bureaucracy of the traditional state to the bureaucracies of the Communist state” in the connections each engendered in the people (9). In some senses, it was only the people who were replaced in the system.

The Communist government also borrowed from imperial social structures as it began rebuilding the country. A similar Aside from the simple ideological example to the one above is the system of similarities that the Communist Party (per- the 单位 – danwei or worker units – that haps unconsciously) capitalized on so efthe Communist government instigated. fectively, the Red Army and the Party were Although it arose out of the very particular also astute in maintaining a certain amount circumstances of the time, many scholars of practical continuity for the people. Land have noticed clear similarities between the reformation was an unthinkable change at danwei and the “long-standing Chinese the time, and caused a lot of social upheav- practice as exemplified in the baojia houseal; the Communist government could only hold registration system of imperial days” fully implement it once it came to power in (Lü 4). While not identical, the intent of 1949. But despite the radical shift in the both was the same: to divide the country structure of the local society, parts of that into smaller, more manageable chunks, structure remained intact. Even though and thereby centralize control. The baojia the land was taken from the rich landlords would group several families together, who 2011

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would answer to the government regarding taxes and giving a certain number of military men; the danwei, likewise, was responsible for keeping track of all its members and reporting to the central government (Lü). In many things after the Communist takeover in China, the people were replaced and the names were changed, but the underlying systems remained relatively untouched.

was “strengthening the power of the ruler over the people” through social obligations (Rubin 59). The CCP fell squarely into this pattern. In championing that “the responsibility of leadership in China’s revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party,” the Party was reiterating the ancient Chinese justification of an authoritarian state (Daniels, 67; Zhao). The hierarchy of the Chinese social order was maintained through all the The CCP’s ideology and rule did not promises of change, just with the Commujust mirror general societal values, however: nist Party on top. Such a system has deit also rested on the ruling ideologies of the fined Chinese life for millennia, and it probimperial dynasties. However contradictory ably resonated with the people on several it was to the original Marxist philosophy, levels – both in their desire for a new era of the hierarchical nature of Chinese relation- dignity, and for a purely “Chinese” society ships was easily hijacked by the Communist that they all could recognize. state. Marx’s phrase, “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” and his depiction of the One of the most blatant parallels Party as the true carrier of the people’s between Communism and ancient Chiinterests, were easily reinterpreted to mean nese values and ideology, however, was in the leadership (and hence domination) of fact the manner in which dynasties were the Communist Party over China (Daniels). overthrown and new ones were instated. Although the Party began its path by emThroughout the millennia of China’s many phasizing the camaraderie of the Chinese dynasties, it was almost always a revolution and its identification with the people, this of the common people, under the leaderrapport only paved the way for the people ship of a former politician or a peasant, to be “willing to accept its leadership” that toppled a ruling dynasty (Spence). (Zhao 109). In ancient Chinese thought, Some ancient Chinese philosophers, in it was always hierarchy, not equality, which fact, declared it impossible that “Heaven led to harmony. Although in ancient Con- would allow a single man to act arbitrarily fucian thought relationships were meant to towards [the people], give free reign to his be reciprocal, the dynasties of China alwhims and not take into account the nature ways downplayed this reciprocity to instead of Heaven and Earth” (Rubin, 3). Thus, foreground the duty of those under au“the right of the people to exile a cruel and thority. The goal of the dynastic emperors unjust ruler” was established in China very 104

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early in its history, and the people claimed this right time and again to dispel corrupt dynasties (3). The outcome of such revolutions was 天命 (tianming), most commonly translated as “The Mandate of Heaven.” Simply put, it stated that the fall of a dynasty was fated to happen, and whoever next rose to power was similarly fated to rule by Heaven. Such a system of thought bears a striking resemblance to Marx’s theory of the proletariat overthrowing the exploitative bourgeoisie, and the inevitable nature of this revolution. Although the Chinese Communist Party never explicitly mentioned such a connection, the idea was obviously not foreign to the Chinese people. It was also a right they had recently exercised in ousting the Manchu dynasty barely a few decades ago; so like other ideological links, the right of the people to revolt was a straightforward aspect of Chinese culture to which Marxism could connect (Spence). Although the precise connection was never drawn, the Communist Party utilized many of the sentiments previous revolutions had aroused in the Chinese people.

tory workers, every uprising was invariably crushed by the Guomindang army (Zhao). As the Party was recovering, Mao began to push for a different approach to the revolution – one that took into account that the country was primarily composed of peasants. Although Marx believed peasants to be nothing more than a “sack of potatoes,” Mao found in the peasants his greatest supporters. Historians have long been impressed by the mass mobilization Mao was able to launch. In the countryside the Party lived with the peasants, earned their trust and a solid base of control through the redistribution of land, and encouraged them to continue the revolution under their own leadership. Mao termed the peasants the “semiproletariat,” the closest friend and “backbone” of the Communist Party’s struggle for revolution (Daniels 130-131). This is surprisingly consistent with Chinese history, in which “the peasantry of China had shown their ability to work hard and survive even [during] extreme deprivation” (Spence 14). Those seeking to overthrow an incumbent dynasty in the past had often found their first support among peasants, The way that the Communist Party along with the strength to establish a new gained support across the country also dynasty. Elements of both the old and the seems like a historical replay. Although the new were in a constant interplay in the Chinese Communist Party began among CCP’s nationalist appeal, even if unconintellectual circles, its primary support actu- sciously. ally came from the grassroots of the country. Here, again, the CCP displayed a great The impact of the Communist inamount of innovation based on China’s digenous movement went far beyond the ancient history. When Party leaders tried CCP’s reach in many areas because of their to follow Marx’s model of rallying facuse of dynastic patterns. The Party was 2011

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well known for being scattered and dispersed, but because their propaganda had such a wide reach, similar movements also sprang up where the Party had had little to no presence before. Under threat from both the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek’s extermination campaigns, the Communist Party primarily operated through underground methods, spreading their message through any medium available and encouraging the people to keep fighting. This way of calling the people to the government’s cause was not new to China; many Chinese emperors, including Yongzheng of the Qing dynasty, consistently sponsored propaganda justifying their rule. “Serious and thorough attempt[s] at nationwide indoctrination” had been attempted before, with or without success (Spence 85). Communist propaganda often used traditional forms (like the traveling opera and spoken drama peasants had listened to for centuries) to convey a new message. According to Schoppa, “the Communist party was very adept at using [all mediums of propaganda] to promote ideas of socialism,” thus continuing a dynastic pattern (270). The Communist Party was happy to support “mass associations” of peasants led by lowly cadres and self-started nationalistic movements, even those with which they were not directly involved, because it showed that their propaganda was working. Mao himself often referred to the May 30th movement, which he claimed “demonstrated the nationalist sentiment of the Chinese peasantry” (Zhao 97). A nearly all-inclusive ap106

proach made the CCP many friends, both among the peasantry and higher classes. Although it took on a new name, the Communist revolutionary fervor was indeed reminiscent of all other dynastic rises in China. The Communist Party won the hearts and minds of the Chinese people dramatically in the first few decades of its existence, and was able to call countless people to give their lives for the new China. Even if the association was not intentional, Spence recalls “how often the Chinese people… seized their own fate and threw themselves against the power of the state” (xxi). In the 1920s and 30s, the way for the Chinese to seize their fate as a nation appeared to be becoming a Communist. Through painstaking efforts and many tactical decisions, the CCP “had successfully amalgamated communism and nationalism by systematically reinterpreting Chinese history” even long before they came to power (Zhao 115). The Chinese people were most often open to the reeducation and propaganda campaigns the Party instigated, perhaps because of the economic benefits they could gain from land redistribution. The Party’s message that the people “are fighting for themselves” once they joined the ranks of the Communists was enough to “[attract] thousands of educated Chinese who… traveled thousands of miles… to join the communist guerilla forces” (Daniels, 56; Zhao 105). The promises of Communism inspired a fire of rebellion in Chinese people just like the revolutions of their history.

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More than 60 years later, many of these original claims of Communism have been recanted. The radical reforms of its early years are being reversed in favor of a more capitalistic system in order to spur China’s economic growth, and the CCP no longer claims to be headed toward a communistic society. They still hold to their tenet of socialism, claiming their authority to lead the people, but have maintained a primarily nationalist story for pragmatic purposes. Certain pragmatic decisions in recent history show that Beijing is “increasingly disposed to lean on a conservative version of Chinese tradition as the best guarantor of the status quo” (Zhao 228). Indeed, the Communist Party now more than ever bears a striking resemblance to a dynastic rule. Like the legalistic form of government in the ancient dynasties, the CCP state has “selected certain Confucian values such as hierarchy and stability… to encourage Chinese people to be loyal and obedient to state authority” (Zhao 229). A Chinese article in 1986 even complained about this aspect of the ruling Communist Party:

against individualism, Marxism is interpreted as anti-individual-interests in China. (Zhao 134)

Certainly, as this writer lamented, the dynastic forms of rule are being resurrected all over the country. Barry Naughton has observed a recent trend toward recentralization in the ranks of the Party, tightening the Party’s control over the nation. The democracy the Party promised at its inception has taken the form previous centuries of dynastic rule have meticulously perfected: bureaucracy. And to enforce its rule on the people, the government is not shy of using the People’s Liberation Army, demonstrated brutally in the June Fourth Incident in Tiananmen Square, 1989. Since coming to power, the Communist Party has handled all these instances just the way an ancient dynasty would have. Several scholars have argued that the Communist Party simply inherited the Mandate of Heaven after a few decades of turmoil, as did all imperial dynasties before it. As such, the Chinese people have lived in a world of hybridity on a day-to-day basis ever since the Communist government began recruiting the peasants from the countryside. Melding Because Chinese culture emphasizes the teaching of a modern, anti-foreign nationalism with ancient cultural values and the traditional classics and worships them as the ultimate truth, Chinese Marxism is worshiped as the ultimate truth status quo has allowed the Communist Party to create a modern Chinese dynasty. and thus cannot be renovated. Because Chinese culture respects authority, Marxism is distorted into an authoritarian system. Because Chinese culture is used as a political instrument, Marxism becomes a political instrument in the power struggles in China. Because Chinese culture emphasizes collectivity 2011

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References Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Ed. Xiaobo Lü, Elizabeth J. Perry. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c1997. A Documentary History of Communism and the World: from Revolution to Collapse. Ed. Robert V. Daniels. Hanover: University of Vermont, Published by University Press of New England, c1994. O’Brien, Robert D. “How China’s Angry Youth Use the Internet to Magnify Their Voices and Impact International Relations.” China Elections and Governance 3 (2009): 30-39. Schoppa, R. Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, c2002. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton, c1999. Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.

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The People’s Great Firewall: The Internet and Chinese Democracy Haoxiaohan Helen Cai Abstract: I will explain the conditional success of the internet as liberation technology in China by breaking the paper down into two sections. The first section addresses the often counter-productive nature of the internet in promoting liberal democracy in any country through depoliticization, and the counter-ability of autocratic regimes to masterfully manipulate the internet, perhaps even more than their citizens can. The second section inquires into China’s specific internet conditions, including the state of its netizen (net-citizen) population, its traditional philosophy’s indifference and aversion to liberal democracy, and the success of the CCP’s extensive censorship in deterring liberal democratization. Two questions arise: will Chinese netizens enjoy a free internet in thirty years? Given that Chinese internet becomes uncensored, will that free internet lead to democratization? This article will establish that the answer to both questions is ‘no.’

What is often neglected in the advocacy for an open, free cyber-space is that the internet does not necessarily promote democratic ideals or give rise to democratic revolution. On the contrary, the expansion of the internet simultaneously allows for greater user-access but also gives authoritarian regimes the necessary cyber-tools to control its subjects on a brand new medium. The use of the internet as ‘liberation technology’ only works in certain countries, and under certain circumstances. In this paper, I examine the People’s Republic of China’s virtual Firewall and its attempts to modernize and globalize its population without allowing seeds of liberal democracy to take root. I will conclude that a free internet has not, and will not lead to an erosion of power in the Chinese Com-

munist Party (CCP) or grassroots demands for democracy, largely because the efficacy of liberation technologies in promoting democracy is minimal, and that limited efficacy is dependent on socioeconomic pressures, native political and social philosophies, and the quality of the internet provided under the autocratic regime. Definitions Here I will define a few concepts that are contested in this paper. A netizen is a “cyber-citizen”, or any person that regularly accesses the internet. The internet shall be considered open when the level of transparency is high and there is “no evidence of filtering”, as evaluated by the OpenNet initiative. When the political structure “de-

Haoxiaohan Helen Cai is a sophomore at Duke University, majoring in Public Policy and minoring in Political Science. She is the Director of the annual Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit. 2011

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mocracy” is used, it refers to a procedural, liberal democracy practiced in places such as the United States, Iceland, Canada, and South Korea. When a ‘democratic revolution’ is mentioned, it is referring to a rapid, massively popular grassroots demand for democracy.

nor the European Union have been able to do… [it is] a huge threat to the Iranian regime – a proliberty movement being fomented and organized in short sentences.” – Ross Kaminsky, Human Events

During Iran’s Green Revolution in 2009, the free internet and social networking sites were credited with enabling the Section 1: The Internet is not Neces- Iranian youth to pour into the streets and pursue democracy. “’The Revolution Will sarily a Democratizing Force Be Twittered!’ began the first of a series of triumphant blogs published by The Atlan The first section, focusing on the tic’s Andrew Sullivan a few hours after the internet as a liberation technology and news of the protests broke” (Morozov 1). its efficacy in spreading democratic ideas and enabling revolutions, explains why the Word that Twitter had enabled the mointernet cannot be regarded as an effective mentary fragmentation of Iran’s autocracy democratizing force in general, and not just infiltrated the American blogosphere and subsequently leaked into the rhetoric of inin China. First, the myth that the internet has already been a pivotal force for spread- fluential pundits. Sullivan’s plug for technology’s instant democracy was shortly echoed ing democratic revolutions and gathering in the Wall Street Journal, the New York strong opposition sentiments will be deTimes, on TED.com, and eventually even bunked. Further scrutinized is the media on the Christian Science Monitor. Western attention heaped upon the role of the internet in recent social unrest, and how that government officials and news sources congratulated the internet for democratizing praise negatively effects the availability of Iran. Mark Pfeifle, former deputy national free internet in autocratic regimes. Finally, security advisor, moved to nominate Twitter the dark side of internet expansion is unveiled: autocratic regimes no longer need to for the Nobel Peace Prize. blare propaganda over loudspeakers since However, upon investigation it was they can now insert pro-party messages in revealed that a grand total of 60 Twitthe sidebars of the most popular socialnetworking site instead. We start the section ter accounts were actually active during by examining the so-called ‘cyber-victories’ Tehran’s “Twitter-powered Revolution”, a rise-to-rebellion where tens of thousands of recent times. of people were supposedly called to the False Claims of Democratizing Success street by clever tweets (Woodward). Yet these revolutionary tweets were nowhere “Twitter had accomplished what neither the U.N. 110

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to be found. Sullivan’s claims were subsequently found to be uncorroborated, and labeled sensationalist. Despite this lack of concrete evidence that a free internet leads to revolutionary gathering and demands for democracy, many scholars in the West unwaveringly advocate the power of such “Liberation Technologies”. Thomas Keating, a democratic Representative, persisted in offering rationale for the liberation technology: “the Internet is going to be a terrific tool for democracy” (Lakshaman). Such statements by prominent politicians (Hilary Clinton included) created media buzz-storm around the Green Revolution that not only unearthed a pro-internet phenomenon but forced autocratic regimes to reinforce virtual censorship.

Green Revolution (MacKinnon 34). Since 2005, Chinese bloggers have complained that excessive focus by Western media on their blogs as a vehicle for political dissent was counterproductive to attaining internet freedom in China. In a similar critique of this fixation, David Rieff of CBS charged the Western media of confusing Western conditions (reliance on social technology, computers, and methodically planned revolutions) with autocratic realities. This belief was almost codified into law in America. In 2006, Congress attempted to pass a piece of legislation called the “Global Online Freedom Act”. The act sought to “support the idea that as long as the Internet is not subject to political censorship, it can be a source for democratic change” (Viner 366). Designed to protect American Western Fixation on Internet Democcompanies overseas against self-censorship racy – Counter-Productive to democra- requirements from the autocratic nations tization they service (especially China) by insisting that American websites cannot be made In reaction to the Green Revolution to self-censor content, the act’s underlying internet hype, China, fearing the alleged philosophy reveals that democratic nations instability that the internet yielded, subseattribute revolutions and democracy to an quently clamped a death grip on internet open internet. Although there is no causal access in Xinjiang. Unsurprisingly, the CCP relationship between internet use and delegitimized the action by accusing America mocratization, autocratic regimes perceive of propagating unrest in Iran through liberation technology as inherently destaonline warfare via YouTube, Twitter and bilizing because of Western portrayals of Facebook, websites that are still blocked its liberation capabilities, and subsequently in China as of 2011 (Morozov 13). The censor content more harshly (MacKinnon trend of Western fixation on the internet 34). as a liberation technology has caused negative repercussions for netizens in autocratic In the wake of the Egyptian revocountries starting much earlier than the lution of 2011, this counter-reaction was 2011

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especially true. Internet activists in China were detained in record numbers, and internet control was heightened (Ramzy). After Egyptians were allegedly incited to riot through Facebook, Bill Bishop, a Beijing-based investor who watches the China Internet commented: “How can [this kind of claim] possibly help Facebook’s efforts to come into China, if they were going to have a problem even before they were cited by everybody as being a catalyst to a revolution” (Chao)? No matter how much a website company tries to distance itself from the user-generated posts, authoritarian governments won’t cease being alarmed at the possible implications of allowing it to operate within its borders. In some cases, the only companies that are allowed to operate are the ones that autocratic regimes can operate to their advantage.

Allowing East Germans to watch American soap operas on West German television, for example, seems to have acted as a form of pacification that actually reduced people’s interest in politics.”

While citizens can access forums and post opinions in an expansive internet, so can the autocratic regimes that govern them. Propaganda is still very much potent in this age: in fact, American government propaganda has created myths about Barack Obama’s missing birth certificate, 9/11 being an inside-job, and the left’s death panels (Morozov 116, 136). In cyberspace hosted by autocratic regimes, unwitting netizens believe they are encountering ordinary netizens on the net, while they may be instead speaking to a governmenthired propaganda-ist working in exchange for free internet access and monetary comWired Governments: Depoliticization and pensation. A high exposure to government Cyber-Propaganda propaganda in online forums and news sources will invariably still exist in a free Autocratic governments can use the internet and will desensitize people to the internet to detract from other ideologies existence of cyber-propaganda. China’s and to promote theirs by allowing depoliti- specific internet propaganda methods will cization and generating cyber-propaganda. be discussed in section two. We now move Allowing entertainment sources to flourish on to discuss China’s realities: its demoon the internet may in fact lead to more ne- graphics, its political beliefs, and its current tizens watching “Scrubs” than researching censorship program. the evolution of liberation movements. According to Morozov, this trend is precisely Section 2: The China Condition what can depoliticize a population. “In fact, “Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppresauthoritarian regimes can use the internet, sor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.” as well as greater access to other kinds of - Martin Luther King media such as television to their advantage. 112

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In the last six decades, the Chinese populace has enjoyed immense improvements in its standards of living. Since the China Communist Party unified China in 1949, conditions of extreme poverty, shoddy sanitation, gross income inequality and a low life expectancy have been greatly rectified. Since 1949, the CCP has provided free public education (including post-secondary schools), free housing, and guaranteed jobs. In a survey published by the Cambridge Journal, Chinese citizens rate their satisfaction with the CCP at 3.58, while Americans rate their satisfaction with their government at 3.16. In fact, out of citizen attitudes surveyed from Japan, Australia, China, America, Russia, India, only Australia surpassed China in terms of citizen satisfaction with their government (Wang 62). Since Chinese citizens are generally happy with the government, it is highly unlikely that there will be widespread, grassroots demands for a liberal democratic revolution. If demand for democracy within the country isn’t already prevalent, then it is unimaginable that a liberalization of the internet would catalyze that change. The rest of the paper will outline the unique aspects of the Chinese internet in terms of censorship, culture, and demographics, and how those factors will ensure that a democratic revolution through a liberalized internet will not be on China’s horizon within the next thirty years.

2011

Limited Chinese Demands for Democracy Internet aside, both historical and modern attributes of China indicate that it is less than likely that its people will seek liberal democracy, with or without any liberalization technology. Traditional Chinese philosophy preaches against individualism and tends towards substantive democracy, which equates to being represented by the government, but not necessarily involving direct electoral rights. Liberal democracy hinges on procedural democracy, or the idea that the will of the people must be reflected in elections (Pei and Shi). Since the Chinese government has done a considerable job in providing for most people, the demand for liberal democracy is made relatively low. In regards to modern response to CCP rule, a large swath of the Chinese middle class appear content without democratic reforms because their recently acquired wealth is most stable under the status quo. The growing bulge of the Chinese middle class, who are by and large the largest group of Chinese netizens, are allying themselves with the CCP. The middle class is most likely to support the CCP because it has a financial interest in the CCP’s stability (Ursillo). This examination of traditional and modern Chinese values answers an earlier question: Given that Chinese internet becomes uncensored, will that free internet lead to democratization?

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As the historical implications and contemporary trends reveal, even if the internet becomes uncensored, democratization is not a sure result. The Chinese reality, its cultural framework, and its current opposition to regime change, cannot be ignored in evaluating the possible effects of a free Chinese internet.

cess to the telephone and every township has access to the Internet” (OpenNet Initiative). The CCP’s incentivization of internet access, combined with an inevitably human attraction towards new forms of digital media, has crowned China as the most connected country. As of 2011 is home to over 380 million netizens, and accounts for 31% of all global internet users (Diamond 73). The Commercial Internet: InformatiMost of the net informatization the CCP zation versus Democratization authorizes lies in product and service advertizing. That includes online games, China’s flourishing internet owes online-order products, social networking much of its expansion to the CCP’s encour- sites, and music distribution. As has been agement and regulation. In the last decade, noted, sites like these are principally used the CCP has incentivized virtual connectfor entertainment, and not for rousing demedness in China. To the CCP, a saturation ocratic movements or spurring on controof net information (or, informatization) versial discussions. To further understand would support “broader socialist-market the impact of the leisure-seeking internet economy principles of political control and culture, we must examine Chinese netizen global economic progress” (Weber and Jia demographics. 772) and promote consumerism in a country previously conditioned to manufacturChinese Netizen Demographics and ing. The rationale is that informatization Culture produces a more knowledgeable population that desires to consume more goods. The The internet was introduced to CCP seeks a modern and efficient economy China in 1994. Since then, it has spread through the use of its digital sphere but also around the nation like wildfire. Initially, instrives to control informatization so that it ternet use in China was considered a luxury will not lead to democratization and the and mostly headed up by research institueroding of party power. China calls this tions, but access has become increasingly process ‘strategic commercialization’ (Weaffordable to all. The penetration of the ber and Jia 774). internet is uneven, reading 10% in sparsely populated rural areas and up to 60% in Strategic commercialization is rewell-developed metropolitan centers. A surflected in the CCP’s 2010 policy goal for vey done by the Boston Consulting Group internet availability: “every village has acin 2010 reveals that the Chinese value the 114

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internet above newspapers, TV, mobile devices, and radio in terms of media preference. Next, a glimpse into how these six major netizen groups use their time on the internet: Teenagers with access to the internet cite “fun and study” (6.8% of total Chinese population); University Students, “friends and study” (2.85%); Young Entertainers, “excitement and personal achievement” (7.54%), Young Professionals, “work and career” (2.76%), Active Middle-Agers, “practical information” (3.6%), and Passive Middle-Agers, relaxation and leisure (4.18%). This study elucidates the nature of how the majority of the most denselypopulated netizen groups spends its time: on work-related information and leisurely entertainment. In realizing that China’s internet is largely recreationally based, we ask the next question – how strong is Chinese netizen desire to be well connected to global internet? The answer is, not terribly strong. The Chinese Internet is Sufficient for its Netizens On a surface level, the website www. renren.com can almost pass for www.facebook.com. The Chinese social networking site features profiles, status updates, picture albums, video feeds, much like the American original. Chinese netizens today surf thousands of Chinese websites that have been adapted for Chinese use, without 2011

needing to get a proxy to access the western counterpart. Chinese netizens are generally pleased with the functioning of their popular sites: of the 15 top sites accessed by Chinese netizens, only two are non-Chinese: Google and Yahoo!. The other 13 sites all resemble western sites; there’s a Chinese eBay, a Chinese YouTube, a Chinese AIM. There is very little need for the majority of Chinese citizens surfing the net to seek anything beyond the Chinese Firewall. Repercussions of Leisure-Oriented Netizenship The immensely youth-dominated netizen demographic of China holds interesting implications for the spread of democratic ideals. Historically, cries for democracy in autocratic regimes resonate from youths (often educated) who are experiencing income inequality and other instability. The majority of those rebelling youths are also expected to be male (Collier et al 4). In China, the internet offers an attractive alternative to young men: the average online gamer (66% of total online gamers in China) is male, 18-30 years old, and has most likely completed secondary school. That is the precise demographic that has been historically most likely to rise for democratic revolt. If that demographic consists mostly of listless youth playing games in internet cafes, where would a grassroots call for reform arise? In addition, due to the nature of the internet Chinese netizens can access, not only would those

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youths hypothetically have difficulty searching for information on democracy, reforms, and international politically-sensitive news, but they would be deterred from accessing that information because of possible repercussions. The chart above demonstrates the recreationally-based internet culture in China. These research findings contrast the percentage of Chinese and American netizens in their usage of the internet. The top three internet applications used by Chinese netizens are for music, online news (CCP-friendly sites either directly controlled by the government, or at least statesanctioned), and instant messaging portals, which are invariably linked to online gaming. These trends veer towards a hedonistic 116

internet culture that is in part driven by the CCPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s propagating of consumerism online (Angelova). As discussed earlier, the internet as an entertainment source only further depoliticizes the population and detracts from meaningful discourse. The CCP is aware of the dual relationship between informatization and democratization and is eagerly promoting entertainment information over political dissemination to keep the populace content. Whereas Americans tend to use the internet more for personal finance and career-related purposes, Chinese netizens are more socially-oriented. China has the highest concentration of blogs (boke) and forums (in the form of BBS boards) in the world, a phenomenon which erupted in

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2005. That year was known as China’s Year of the Blog. In January of 2005, estimates placed blog count at half a million, but by July, as many as 5 million were floating around in the Chinese blogosphere. (MacKinnon 35) The CCP meticulously monitors online activity, and was careful in allowing blogs and forums to proliferate in 2005, finally buying the argument from the most prominent blog-site entrepreneur Fang Xingdong “that a blog is like a person’s home, and very few people would put something inappropriate in their home” (MacKinnon 35). A proponent of ‘liberation technologies’, Larry Diamond writes that, under certain conditions, “liberation technology enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, scrutinize government, and expand the horizons of freedom” (Diamond 70). Blogs should foster netizen discussion, and promote criticism of the government’s shortcomings. However, in China, for every democracy-sponsoring comment, there are two replies pushing pro-party propaganda. This is because CCP hires an estimated 500 million online hacks to roam the Chinese cyberspace and to prowl for dissenters and radical opinions arguing against the government (Diamond 74). These are not favorable conditions for discussions of democracy, nor will they naturally become favorable without internet reform removing the formidable censorship firewall.

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Methods of Censorship The OpenNet Initiative, a project that documents global instances of internet surveillance and information censoring, says of Chinese censorship: “China operates the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world” (Viner 373). The CCP primarily employs two modes of censorship: direct intervention and instruction of self-censorship to internet companies. Direct intervention is codified in the Golden Shield Project. The Golden Shield Project was devised in 1998 and implemented in 2003; its purpose is to block websites that promote democracy, prevent access to websites of outlawed or suppressed groups (Falung Gong, Taiwanese Government, Dalai Lama supporters, free speech advocates), and to monitor dissident activity and promote national stability (Shi). The project succeeds in both measures. Through direct intervention, the government can IP block whole websites, terminate the packet transfer of blocked word searches, and reset connections if the content is deemed subversive to PRC stability. For example, if “Tibet protest” or “Marxist” or “Tiananmen 1989” is entered into a Chinese search engine, either no results will appear or the screen will display the website as under construction. The Golden Shield Project also hires netizens to serve as whistle-blowers of forums and blogs and to post messages favorable to the government

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in response to authentic criticisms (Shan). The whistle-blowers alert the CCP or the web company of the infraction and the post is most often deleted. For extreme virtual transgressions, online activists have been arrested after surveillance and were detained for incitement to riot. In the wake of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, an estimated 100 anti-government activists were found through the internet and arrested for trying to stage a protest (Branigan).

sign the Pledge because they do not want to be excluded from the market possibilities of doing online business in China. They dutifully remove ‘flagged’ and ‘inappropriate’ content according to criteria that the CCP sets as acceptable types of discourse. Unfortunately for Chinese net activists, this framework does not allow for hosting companies to spread their message without closing the website, and does not allow for democratizing dialogue.

Yet the most effective censoring mechanism by far is self-censorship. Selfcensorship is a contract between the CCP and a larger, commercial-based website that is held accountable for all content it displays (MacKinnon 37). The supposedlyvoluntary contract was codified in the 2002 “Public Pledge on Self-discipline for China’s Internet Industry” that serves two dual purposes: informatizing China (and therefore creating a larger market for technology-based goods) and concurrently repressing democratization (for promoting national stability) (Weber and Jia 774). If a company doesn’t adhere to the Pledge, it is at great risk of being expunged from the Chinese hosting network, which the CCP controls. Accepting the Pledge puts the website at high alert for aberrant netizen behavior: the Pledge prohibits websites from hosting illegal information including superstition, calls for reform, obscenity, anti-government speech, and rebel religions. Large commercial websites like MSN, Google, Yahoo, Sina, and Boke (China’s premier blog site)

At first sight, it may be surprising to believe that even the gargantuan, powerful, freedom-loving Google adheres to these regulations given its wealth and power. However, Google has been extremely prudent in adhering to the Pledge: although its annual revenue in China amounts to only $600 million, it has much to lose in terms of future earnings and possibilities if it doesn’t comply --- it would be cut off from both the rapidly exploding Chinese and Hong Kong markets. As witnessed in 2010, Google decided that it cannot afford to lose the Chinese market. It ultimately backed away from challenging the Pledge and continues to function as China’s 2nd most popular search engine. A deciding factor in Google’s choice to adhere to the Pledge is that the Pledge actually provides business security for compliance: “the self-regulatory rules for conduct potentially limit the perception of risk for foreign investors, who can feel more confident in forming workable and profitable strategic relations with domestic media corporations.” Alterna-

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tively, the CCP allows the penetration of foreign companies onto the Chinese netsphere because “the self-efficacy dimension of the Pledge is an acceptable trade-off for media that is more responsive to market forces” (Weber and Jia 783).

governments to recognize democracy. However, countless cassette tapes, copy machines, VCRs, DVDs, internet connections, and many supposed ‘liberation technologies’ later, China remains heavily censored, undemocratic in the liberal sense of the word, and boasts a contented, That Western and Chinese compaupwardly mobile people. The opening of nies alike abide by this Pledge answers the China to western businesses since the 1978 question: “will the Chinese internet become opening reforms (internet companies in‘free’ in the next 30 years?” If websites are cluded) has not challenged the formation of hosted for profit, if companies want to do a CCP-loyal middle class: “this approach so exponentially profitable business in China far ensured that the rise of a new commerin the next thirty years, then the answer is cial class was not accompanied by political no. The internet will still be censored, in change” (MacKinnon 32). This paper highlarge part because companies will self-cen- lighted why the Internet could not and will sor and pay the ethical costs of doing busi- not affect democratic reforms in China. ness in China. In order for democratic reforms Conclusion to happen, there must be abundant societal problems and clamors for democracy The epigraph of Chapter 9 in Fran- within the populace. In China, the transicis Fukiyama’s “The End of History and tion from closed economy to an open one the Last Man” is a quote by Deng Xiaoping was accompanied by massive improvements in 1982. “Not a single country in the world, in standards of living and satisfaction with no matter what its political system, has ever CCP, and though activists demand democmodernized with a closed-door policy.” racy, they are by no means the vast majorFukiyama intended to use this quote by the ity of Chinese. Additionally, traditional Chinese premier (at the height of China’s Chinese philosophy does not naturally tend Open Door policy) to illustrate China’s towards individualistic, liberal democracy acknowledgement that the market, whether but towards a collective pursuit of the best socialist-capitalist or free, was a force that for China, often from a socioeconomic and inevitably would lead to regime change. Fu- stability-focused perspective. Procedural kiyama argues that the change was directed democracy of CCP members deciding the towards liberal democracy, and that even good of the country as a whole is valued unintended liberation technologies purmore than any claims of the individualistic chased through an open market will force right to substantive democracy of any par2011

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ticular Chinese citizen. Further scrutiny of the Chinese netizen demographic also reveals that a majority uses the internet for entertainment, and that young male Chinese netizens in particular are heavily engrossed in gaming. The average Chinese netizen is depoliticized because of the large amounts of internet information and leisure, drawn into consumerism and not particularly attached to demanding democracy. Even if politically inclined, it is extremely risky for netizens to be open in criticisms of the Chinese government online, thanks to the Golden Shield Project and the Pledge for self-censorship. Given that it is absurd to assume that all corporations will break from the pledge and uncensor content for democratic reform, the prospect for a free Chinese internet in the next 30 years is idling on low.

an already existing trend for democracy. However in China, the vast majority of people is quite content with the Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Great Firewall existence, and is distracted from trying to dig it up at its foundations by the distracting virtual opportunities on the screen.

Finally, when we take a step back and assess the efficacy of so called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;liberation technologiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, we see that there is very little evidence that free internet leads to demands for democracy, or the actually manifestation of liberal democracy. In fact, the depoliticization of netizens through modes of advertising and entertainment-based websites coupled with the government manipulation of cyberspace may in fact act negatively upon the spread of democracy. In any other corner of the world, the internet might have been a tool to facilitate 120

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References

China: the Cultural Logic of Controlled Commodification.” Media, Culture & Society 29.5 (2007): 772-89. Print.

Branigan, Tania. “China Detains Activists after Online Call for Protests | World News | The Guardian.” Guardian. 20 Feb. 2011. Web. 2 Apr. 2011. <http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/20/chineseofficials-detain-activists-protests>. Chao, Loretta. “Egypt Cracks down on Uprising Chatter.” Wall Street Journal 14 Feb. 2011. Print.

Woodward, Paul. “Social Media and the Internet as an Arena for Revolutionary Fantasy — War in Context.” War in Context. 16 Jan. 2011. Web. 26 Mar. 2011. <http://warincontext.org/2011/01/16/social-mediaand-the-internet-as-an-arena-for-revolutionary-fantasy/>.

“China | OpenNet Initiative.” ONI Home Page | OpenNet Initiative. Web. 12 Mar. 2011. <http://opennet. net/research/profiles/china>. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. “2010 Speech on Internet Freedom.” Internet Freedoms. Washington DC. 25 Apr. 2011. Speech. Lakshmanan, Indira A.R. “Clinton to Support Facebook Freedom, Fight Censorship - Bloomberg.” Bloomberg. 16 Feb. 2011. Web. 13 Mar. 2011. <http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-15/clinton-topromote-technology-to-ensure-global-internet-freedom. html>. MacKinnon, Rebecca. “Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship And civic Discourse in China.” Public Choice 134.1-2 (2007): 31-46. Print. Morozov, Evgeny. The Net Delusion: the Dark Side of Internet Freedom. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011. Print. Ramzy, Austin. “Chinese Authorities Arrest Activists, Censor the Internet and Barracade a Beijing Protest Site to Block Pro-Democracy Demonstrations - Global Spin - TIME.com.” Global Spin. CNN, 26 Feb. 2011. Web. 1 Mar. 2011. <http://globalspin.blogs.time. com/2011/02/26/chinas-fear-of-a-jasmine-revolution/>. Viner, Nellie L. “The Global Online Freedom Act: Can US Companies Scale the Great Chinese Firewall at the Turn of the 20th Century?” Iowa Law Review 93 (2007): 363-91. Print. Weber, I., and L. Jia. “Internet and Self-regulation in 2011

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OPINION A Commentary on the Ma and Tsai Taiwanese Elections Jiakun Jack Zhang The Taiwanese legislative and presidential elections to be held in January 2012 are likely to be highly competitive but trends indicate that the incumbent KMT president Ma Yingjeou will likely defeat DPP challenger Tsai Ing-wen to remain in office. With Tsai’s campaign appears to be gaining momentum, she announced former DPP general secretary Su Jia-chyuan (former Premier Su Tseng-chang) to be her running mate and will be making a much anticipated US tour next week. Speculations also abound that PFP chairman James Soong may enter the presidential race again after his 2000 candidacy swung that election in favor of the DPP. However, the Taiwanese public favors continuity over change at the present juncture, a fact reflected by the polling data. Despite their low approval rating and in the absence of a more coherent DPP agenda, Ma and the KMT should be able to capitalize on their successful management of Taiwan’s economic recovery and stem off the rising DPP challenge next year.

Analysis Many media organizations have released a flurry of inconclusive polling data in recent months. Early opinion polling is a notoriously inaccurate predictor of election outcomes; however, aggregated polling data show Ma gaining a distinctive lead in the race. The polling numbers for both candidates have been increasing as their campaigns gain momentum, but Ma has been able to maintain or widen his lead against Tsai in all polls. According to a Journalist poll, the margin between Ma and Tsai has widened from 5.3% to 5.5%; 45.7% of all respondents expressed support for Ma while only 40.2% expressed support for Tsai. Similarly, a TVBS poll, show Ma leading Tsai 46% to 39%, maintaining 7% margin in July and August. Global Views poll show Ma and Tsai neck to neck at 39.6% and 38.1% respectively, but shows that Ma’s lead widened from 0.1% to 1.5%.

Jiakun Jack Zhang is a 2011 Duke graduate. He is the former Editor-in-Chief of the Duke East Asia Nexus journal, and is on the Board of Directors of Duke East Asia Nexus. He is currently working as a researcher for Eurasia Group.

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The margins presented by these polls are subject to fluctuation; however, the underlying dynamics in Taiwanese public opinion all point to a victory for Ma. Despite the KMT setbacks in the 2010 mid-term elections, low approval ratings of Ma and the KMT will not prove decisive in 2012. Ma remains dominant in his party and will not likely face a KMT challenger; Tsai has won the close race against Su Tseng-chang for the DPP nomination but her party will likely stand united behind her in 2012. Thus, as was the case with the 2008 elections, both the KMT and the DPP can be expected to successfully mobilize their core voters to support their candidates. The KMT will also enjoy a slight advantage in 2012 because they have a larger electoral base to draw from than the DPP. The Global Views poll reveal that 33% of voters self-identify as KMT, 27% as DPP, 30% independents, and the remaining 7% evenly divided between pan-blue and pan-green parties. The 2012 elections will likely parallel the 2008 contest and will hinge on independent voters and the economy; factors that should favor Ma and the KMT. The expected low voter turn-out due to the absence of contentious issues favor the Pan-blue camp, whose supporters represent around 37% of the electorate while the pan-green only account for 30%. Ma has been successful in delivering economic campaign promises that appeal to independent voters. Ma and the KMT will remind the electorate of the economic 2011

failures of the previous DPP administration, highlight Taiwan’s economic recovery under KMT governance, and take credit for stabilizing cross-strait relations. The politically contentious Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed by China and Taiwan in 2010, was a gamble for the Ma administration but is proving to be a successful one. ECFA has shown results and the tide of public opinion has shifted directly to maintaining positive relations with the mainland. Taiwanese exports to the mainland boomed as a result of the ECFA, increasing 142% in the first half of 2011. The unemployment rate dropped to a new post-recession low of 4.27% in May and the GDP expanded by 10.8%. The economic success of the ECFA is recognized by the public, 43.9% of respondents to the July Global Views survey approve of Ma’s cross-Strait policy while only 35.1% disapprove. Additionally, 58.1 of respondents believe that Taiwan’s economy would be impacted negatively if cross-strait relations worsen or economic exchanges cease. The July Journalist poll shows that Ma now leads Tsai in all regions except for the DPP strongholds of Tainan and Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan, areas that have not benefited as much from trade with China as northern Taiwan. Because public opinion favors exchanges with the mainland, it is certain that Ma and the KMT will claim credit for their cross-strait policy, while Tsai and the DPP have been repeatedly criticized for not having a clear stance on crossstrait relations. Tsai’s moderate stance on

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cross-strait relations makes her platform indistinguishable from the KMT championed status quo. Additionally, the DPP ten year policy plan released in August has failed to gain much traction with the public and has been criticized by voices within the DPP as “insubstantial”.

Links and passage of the ECFA, Ma must now avoid missteps in his dealings with the mainland lest they trigger the explosive national identity issue domestically. The need for Ma to distance himself from mainland China explains his recent calls for F-16C/D sales from the United States. The 2012 contest will also be more difficult than in 2008 PFP Chairman James Soong recently because it will be more difficult to blame indicated his interest in entering the 2012 the DPP for Taiwan’s economic woes and presidential race; whether or not he will because the memories of DPP corruption ultimately run will depend on the outcome scandals will have faded from public conof a 45-day signature campaign that begins sciousness. Tsai will announce her running on September 22. This move by Soong mate on August 28th, but, barring major has infuriated the KMT leaders, who bitchanges in the Taiwanese political landterly recall how Soong divided the Panscape over the next six months, the incumBlue camp and allowed Chen Shui-Bien to bent president Ma Yingjeou and the KMT become the first DPP president. However, will likely defeat Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP it is unlikely that the elderly Soong will find in the 2012 elections. enough support for his candidacy even after this publicity stunt. An September ERA poll shows that only 11.2% of respondents indicated that they would be willing to participate in Soong’s signature drive while 66.6% said that they would not. The same poll showed that in a three way race, 35.2% support Ma, 28.6% support Tsai, and only 14.3% support Soong. Therefore, with little to gain with another unsuccessful presidential bid, Soong is expected to support Ma in exchange for KMT support of PFP candidates in the concurrent legislative elections. Ma must be careful not to be a victim of his own first-term success and be perceived as “selling out” Taiwan to China. Having successfully established the Three 124

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