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DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS Kawabata and the Canon Economics of Chinese Exports Book Review: The Sacred Edict Hukou Policy in China Korean Female Identity Lu Xun and Chinese Literature Patriarchy’s Decline

China’s Surging Internet Growth MICHAEL MA

Japan’ s Bout with History: Kawabata and Absences in the Canon Paul Horak

Defining Herself: Aging and the Korean Female Identity WONNIE SONG

China’s Internet Policy

“Left-behind Children” in Rural

Globalization in Film and Culture

Karmel Wong

China

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DUKE EAST ASIA nexus Vol 1 Issue 2 Linda Zhang President Jack Zhang Editor-in-Chief Alice Ren Graphics Editor Mario Parks Secretary Angela Ryu Chief of Public Relations Pablo Vasquez Chief of Member Management Editorial Board Paul Horak Shuya Dong Veronica Ray Bruce Xu Sarah Smith Advisors Ralph Litzinger Bai Gao Yan Li Anne Allison Alumni Review Board Andrew Cheon, Muyan Jin, Xiameng Sun, Mai Li, Soyoon Sung, Neinei shirakawa, Yue Yin, Yi Xiang, Paul Zhao, Roxanna Goudarzi Special thanks to James Wong for the original DEAN logo design, Vice Provost Gilbert Merckx, and Dean Stephen Nowicki for their generous support. Copyright Š 2010 by Duke East Asia Nexus (DEAN) at Duke University DEAN receives support from the Asian Pacific Studies Institute and from the John Spencer Bassett Memorial Fund. DEAN publishes full-length academic papers related to East Asia. The journal is released biannually. DEAN also publishes continuously on its website:

www.dukenexus.org.


Duke East Asia Nexus Volume 1 Issue 2 2010


Thank you for picking up a copy of the second issue of Duke East Asia Nexus! We are pleased to present the written work of Duke students exploring various topics related to East Asia. I would also like to honor the students in our organization who were involved in putting this journal together and who dedicated themselves to DEAN’s mission as an academic organization. In addition to releasing this issue, one of DEAN’s major accomplishments this Spring semester was to establish a community of students interested in East Asian topics. For instance, within our organization, we held a leadership retreat to welcome our newest members. In the Duke community, we collaborated with the Perkins Library and the Nasher Museum to hold “Candid China: Demystifying China’s Rise.” The event featured Professors Tianjian Shi (Political Science) and Alex Roland (History) speaking about contemporary Chinese politics and foreign policy. We are honored that such esteemed professors came to speak at our event and that so many students were able to actively engage in the discussion. One of our goals for next year is to continue holding events where students will find an outlet to explore their curiosity for the region of East Asia. As a dynamic organization, DEAN aims to expand and hold new events each year, so we welcome suggestions from our fellow Duke students about what topics they would like to explore at our future events. Come see what we are doing by finding our Facebook Page (Duke East Asia Nexus) and our Twitterfeed at DukeNexusDEAN! Linda Chen Zhang Trinity College 2011 President of DEAN

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Table of Contents Essays Globalization and the Market Economy in Film and Culture Alex Zhang 6 Japan’s Bout with History: Kawabata and Absences in the Canon Paul Horak 15 “a madman” on literature Sharon Mei 23 Spatial Mobility and Patriarchy’s Decline in Su Tong’s “wives and Concubines” Linda Zhang 30 “Left-Behind Children” in Rural China Karmel Wong 38 Defining Herself: Aging and the Korean Female Identity Wonnie Song 47


Reasons Behing the Increase in China’s Exports of Electrical and Electronic Products Chen (Alice) Ding 63 The Rising Tide: China’s Surging Internet Growth and the Resulting Policy Repercussions Michael Ma 82 Book Review The Three Remnants of The Sacred Edict in Contemporary China: Traces of the Informal Institution Sophie Jiseon Lee 68

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Dear Reader, Thank you for reading the second issue of the first volume of Duke East Asia Nexus. The essays featured in this issue reflect the breadth of content DEAN promotes. While our last issue featured in-depth coverage of one particular region, Taiwan; we seek to highlight the diversity of East Asia in this issue. You will find essays that study China, Korea, and Japan. The academic interests covered by these essays are as diverse as their geographical coverage. In this issue, you will find essays dealing with film, economics, culture, literature, media, and social policy. The spectrum of work displayed here reflects the balanced approach DEAN takes towards encouraging scholarship in both the humanities and the social sciences. It is our sincere hope that all quality content dealing with East Asia will find a home in our journal. As part of the broader mission to promote East Asian studies at Duke, DEAN has been involved in the campaign to establish a certificate in East Asian Studies since 2008. We believe that undergraduate course work on East Asia should be recognized and accredited at Duke. I am proud to announce that the East Asian Studies (EAS) Certificate was approved by the Arts & Sciences Council in April 2010 and will be offered in the fall. The EAS Certificate is an interdisciplinary program consisting of six credits and a foreign language requirement. For more information about the certificate, please contact Karla Loveall at karla.loveall@duke.edu. We hope that the participants in the certificate will find in DEAN a community of scholars. DEAN hopes to continue to serve all aspiring East Asian scholars by providing them the opportunity to read and publish high-quality peerreviewed work. All of the articles of this issue along with many other essays on East Asia can be found on our website: www.dukenexus.org. Thank you for reading this edition of Duke East Asia Nexus. Jiakun (Jack) Zhang Trinity College 2011 Editor in Chief

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Globalization and the Market Economy in Film and Culture Alex Zhang Abstract: With the spread of market capitalism came the emergence of the “global city,” a nucleus of centralized headquarter operations and financial power. The establishment of these large multinational centers has ultimately resulted in the denationalization of these cities and their citizens from their surrounding regions. The resulting loss of identity has had major implications on the cultures of these cities, a phenomenon that has also been reflected in modern film. This paper intends to explore the effect of this growing sense of alienation as it is represented in two iconic Chinese films: Peter Chan’s Comrades, Almost a Love Story (甜蜜蜜) and Wong Kar Wai’s Fallen Angels (堕落天使). Through the focus on particular economic actors in both films, their relationship to their city illuminates how citizens ultimately reflect the global city’s loss of identity as well as its growing emphasis on the market economy.

Globalization, a phenomenon fueled by market economics and technological innovations, has influenced almost every facet of our world including film. While often studied in the context of Saskia Sassen’s, “the duality national/global,” it is equally important to conceptualize globalization in terms of the “global city” (Sassen, 205). In terms of economics, Sassen’s approach highlights the decline in influence of the national economy as a unit in lieu of globalization and it allows one to analyze the impact of globalization upon individuals rather than upon masses in a society. This is particularly useful in the study of how the

growing importance of the market economy has impacted film culture. In Peter Chan’s Comrades, Almost a Love Story (甜蜜蜜) (2004), the main plot revolves around a love story between two migrant workers, yet the impact of globalization and the subsequent emphasis on the market economy pervades the film. Within the backdrop of the film lies what Sassen describes as “the overvalorization of corporate capital and the further devalorization of disadvantaged economic actors” and the topic of migration within and between nations (206). As a result, the main conflict of the film revolves around two migrants’ attempts to balance

Alex Zhang is a Trinity junior, Class of 2011, majoring in BIochemistry and Cultural Anthropology.

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their economic aspirations with their personal desires. Wong Kar Wai’s Fallen Angels (堕落天使) is another film that explores the market economy’s ability to alienate individuals within the metropolis through the portrayal of two contrasting individuals, Wong Chi-Ming, a contract killer who upholds the careful balance of the market, and He Qiwu, a free-spirit who manages to transcend the confusion and impersonality of the city. Ultimately, these two films serve to illuminate the metropolitan man’s struggle with the market economy and the pursuit of personal identity and satisfaction. As globalization established itself as the new world order, certain cities became centralized hubs of commerce -- providing services and sites for headquarter operations among other things. These and other factors differentiate the global city from other cities in the region. While cities are typically embedded in the economies and cultures of their regions, global cities “tend … to become disconnected from their region and even nation” (Sassen, 212). Inevitably, the other cities “become increasingly peripheral” in terms of culture and economy. A further consequence of globalization is its effect of “denationalize[ing] national territory” which is ultimately 2010

disorienting for the metropolitans (Sassen, 214). The resulting transformation of the world economy towards “one dominated by financial centers, global markets, and transnational firms” has ultimately placed a great emphasis on the success of individuals participating in the market economy. As global cities become central locales for the global market, immigration and migration to these global cities increases. These cities become “the terrain where people from many different countries are most likely to meet and a multiplicity of cultures come together” (Sassen, 217). Eventually, all these forces impact the citizens’ psyche to the point where globalization’s effect on cities is mirrored in the individuals themselves. The stressed importance of the financial market forces a highly impersonal “how much?” mentality that alienates people from one another. There is also a greater psychological and cultural distance between those who are considered a part of the new global market order and those who remain outside of it. Subsequently, the process of denationalizing national territory and the concentrating diversity within a compact area disorients, alienates, and perplexes citizens. At the very beginning of Fallen Angels, Wong Chi-Ming, the contract

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killer, states “the best thing about my profession is there’s no need to make any decisions” (Fallen Angels, 2004) He essentially becomes the individual that Simmel argues is “a mere cog in an enormous organization of things and powers which tear from his hands all progress, spirituality, and value” (Simmel, 422). In Ming’s case, his role is firmly established in the money economy of the city. The very basis of his job requires him to reduce men to numerical values, a process that only serves to alienate him further. His side-job as a debt collector reinforces his role in upholding the integrity of the market economy, an entity so complex that “without the strictest punctuality in promises and services the whole structure would break down into an inextricable chaos” (Simmel, 412). Yet after being shot in the arm, he decides to end his partnership, though he admits it is perfect from a business standpoint. It appears that the act of being shot results in his acceptance of a blasé attitude, one that Simmel argues “results … from the rapidly changing and closely compressed contrasting stimulations of the nerves” (Simmel, 414). In his case, the act of being shot is one of the most brutal and jarring ways to stimulate one’s nerves. However, before he retracts completely, he meets Blondie, a young woman desperately 8

seeking her own individuality. But it is not her personal quest for differentiation that convinces Ming, but rather her chance encounter with his former partner that allows them to meet for the first time. In doing so, he decides to forsake his business partnership and chooses to fulfill his former partner’s personal favor. Ultimately, this action carries massive implications as it not only leads to his death, but it also represents an act of defiance toward the economic model he had previously been responsible to maintain. Unfortunately, he is unable to alter the carefully constructed system of payment for any rendered service and as a result, reduces his own life to a numerical value to maintain the fragile balance. In direct opposition to Wong Chi-Ming’s stoic support of the market economy, He Qiwu, through his insights into the nature of the city, embodies the level of free will that everyone in the city desires. The nature of his character is actually in direct defiance of Simmel’s description of the metropolitan citizen. He Qiwu’s decision to be his own boss stems from his inability as a mute to function normally in both market and social aspects of the city. However, he fulfills his business aspirations by breaking into other people’s shops after hours and forcing “custom-

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ers” to obtain services or goods that they clearly do not want until payment is offered to leave them alone. This act clearly defies the traditional relationship between the customer and the vendor. Yet his success is important as it allows him to maintain a role in the market economy, while simultaneously transcending its highly neutral and impersonal “how much?” mentality. The use of force is actually quite necessary to jolt his customers from their protective shell and reengage their senses. Granted, he is only successful on one occasion, but that speaks to the effect that the metropolis has on its inhabitants. He describes his mentality by saying: “We rub shoulders with many people every day. Some may become your friends, or even confidants. That’s why I’ve never given up these chances. Sometimes I’d rub till it hurts. No big deal, as long as I feel good.” While He Qiwu does indeed find the loophole in the global city’s conundrum of personalizing the market economy, he does not alter the system in any way. Such an endeavor would ultimately translate into the effort on the part of one man to go against the city, which has been transformed into a much greater global construct by globalization. As opposed to Wong Chi-Ming, He Qiwu simply tries to carve out a personal niche. His actions are not 2010

the acceptable norm and as a result, there are many scenes in which his advances are rejected, sometimes with violent force. Yet he manages to find his own happiness in a city where monetary gain is emphasized over personal desire, which is far greater than what many metropolitans are able to accomplish. In Chan’s Comrades, Almost a Love Story, the struggle between success in the global market economy and the pursuit of personal happiness provides the context for the love story between XiaoJun Li and Qiao Li. In doing so the film explores many of the consequences of globalization that Sassen details in her work. Chan immediately establishes the differing levels of familiarity with the money economy displayed by XiaoJun and Qiao. XiaoJun, after he initially arrives in the city, primarily narrates through the many letters he writes to his girlfriend, Xiao-ting, back home. As a result, the separation between Hong Kong, the global city, and Wushi, a peripheral city, is established. This disparity is particularly emphasized throughout the beginning of the film. In one particular letter, he states that his monthly salary of two thousand dollars is more than that of the mayor of his hometown, which illuminates the significant economic gain that a

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city attains when joining the global economic order. Another example is when XiaoJun says that he will “go to a place where Wushi people have never been,” and then the scene slowly cuts to the McDonald’s logo, a universal symbol for all the multinational corporations that initiated and fueled globalization. Particularly, the lack of a McDonald’s in Wusih is a strong indicator that it is a peripheral city. Once the difference between global cities and peripheral cities is clearly established, the focus is shifted to the particular market economy in Hong Kong. One of the first lessons on money that Qiao Li teaches XiaoJun is about the ATM card. She describes it as “a card for cash withdrawal. You put it into the computer. The computer spits out the money” (Comrades, 2001) Her simplistic description does not fully reveal the complexities of the market, nor does it even hint at the most basic truth: the exchange system. The ATM machine is used many times throughout the film to demonstrate Qiao’s economic state, which also indirectly mirrors the economic state of the city. As she is seen with an increasing balance, the economic prosperity of the city is implied. However, when the stock market crashes and XiaoJun comments that the regulars of his restaurant stopped going due to the economy, her balance reflects 10

the rapid decline after dropping from 32,000 dollars to only 89 dollars. Qiao, who is also a mainlander like XiaoJun, is a very goal and moneyoriented individual. Along with her many jobs, she receives a commission for introducing people to an English tutoring school. This act represents her forceful attempts to establish herself in the market economy. The jobs that she holds however are considered among Sassen’s lower economic roles in the global city. Yet she desires to escape the roles set aside for the marginalized individuals of the city and gain influence through the acquisition of money. As a result, the very basis of Qiao and XiaoJun’s relationship is formed through business partnerships in her entrepreneurial excursions. Qiao’s experience and XiaoJun’s ineptitude in dealing with the market economy is most evident during a scene in which he forgets his pin number and has his card retained by the machine while Qiao debates investing her wealth in the stock market. By forgetting his pin, XiaoJun essentially forgets one of the most important sequences of digits in a numerically based society. On the other hand, Qiao begins to think about the stock exchange, which epitomizes the accessibility of the market economy. She states that “if you want to be rich in Hong Kong, you must buy stock[s] and shares.”

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The acquisition of stocks is thus seen as an investment in the global economy and a requirement for any attempt to gain status in Hong Kong. While XiaoJun does eventually gain a greater knowledge of money management, he never achieves the level of success that Qiao ultimately attains.

of nervous stimulation” and is one that the metropolitan man is unable to maintain without eventually being uprooted by an overstimulation of the senses (410). Hong Kong citizens also disdain the attitude of mainlanders. As a result, upon meeting with Qiao, XiaoJun lies about not being from the mainland. She displays a strong desire to separate herself Globalization has led to the from any non-Hong Kong associamass migration of people from rural tion. Yet in an attempt to take advanareas to global cities, as well as the tage of the large migrant population, migration between global centers. she tries to sell Teresa Tang cassettes, Yet as one transitions from a periph- which allegedly only mainlanders eral city to a global metropolis, one enjoy. She is unable to sell a single must decide between either retaincassette, however, because she did ing their old identity or alienating not account for the migrants’ desire oneself from one’s past to successto cast away the mainlander image. fully assimilate into the new global The greatest irony of the film comes society. Comrades, Almost a Love Story in Qiao’s revelation that “actually begins with a train packed full of all Hong Kong people came from migrant workers traveling to Hong the mainland.” As a result, the true Kong. XiaoJun is seen wide-eyed, desire is to attain the global ideal attempting to take everything in by and renounce the regional culture, a looking everywhere as he makes phenomenon that mirrors the motiawkward steps toward the escalavations of the city. For the most part, tor. As he ascends up into the white the global ideal is one that is heavily light, it is akin to a journey to parainfluenced by western culture. Qiao dise, with Hong Kong representing stresses the importance of learning such an ideal. There is an extended English in the city to XiaoJun by scene with him skipping and jumpstating that he “can work anywhere ing around with a massive grin on his if [he] know[s] English.” The usefulface. He stops to watch people play ness of knowing English, the global video games and joins dancers in the language, in Hong Kong is due to streets. His energized behavior is one globalization. Western culture also that Simmel calls “the intensification presents itself when Qiao’s aunt tells 2010

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him to call her only by her Western name, Rosie. Subsequently, in a conversation about the difficulties of moving to Hong Kong, Qiao states, “if you work at it, anything is possible here.” The quote is a reworking of the American Dream, which has spread as far as China. Economic forces and attempts to distance themselves from their mainland roots influence the basis of XiaoJun and Qiao’s relationship throughout the film. XiaoJun’s bicycle proves to be a recurring symbol for one’s attachment to one’s roots. The scenes in which XiaoJun delivers food on his bike show his ability to sense the surrounding stimulation, and it is at these moments when he appears happiest. When he offers a ride to Qiao, he states that when he is riding, it is as if he is “back in Wusih.” The ride prompts them to both sing happily as they pass through the busy metropolitan street. As the city noises are silenced and replaced with music, their sheer happiness becomes a critique on the busy lifestyle of the inhabitants influenced by the necessities of the market economy. However, eventually XiaoJun finds himself becoming increasingly embedded within the goals of economic globalization and his ties with his hometown gradually weaken. Simultaneously, the empha12

sis on money in XiaoJun and Qiao’s relationship steadily increases. The tension amplifies dramatically when Qiao loses most of her money in the stock market crash, while XiaoJun retains most of his wealth because he did not invest. A scene in a jewelry store exemplifies the collision of economic forces that had been slowly fomenting. When XiaoJun and Qiao shop for his girlfriend’s birthday present, Qiao comments that the shop workers will look down on them because of the way they are dressed. Yet he states, “But I have money. I’m really buying. … Money in my pocket gives me confidence.” Possessing money immediately brings one legitimacy and assurance. However, when XiaoJun reveals that Qiao is working as a masseuse, she immediately becomes embarrassed in front of the shop worker. Though both work in the service sector, there still exists a hierarchy of respectability in the global economy. XiaoJun shows that despite having time to acclimate to the city, he still retains certain ineptitudes about the social and economic system. He asks if the complimentary chocolates were for sale and tries to get a discount on the bracelets for buying more than one. The entire interaction reveals that XiaoJun will never be able to fully immerse himself in the global society. However, Qiao, distraught over her

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lack of money, is one who has come to require the security of money to remain within the global economic order. When Qiao confronts XiaoJun about their intentions to come to Hong Kong, they remind themselves that they initially migrated to achieve economic success. Their decision to separate to pursue their economic ambitions only further emphasizes the demands the money market puts on its citizens. As time passes and XiaoJun’s bicycle gradually falls into disrepair -- thereby symbolizing his withdrawal from his roots -- Qiao and XiaoJun eventually succeed in achieving their goals: XiaoJun is able to bring his girlfriend to Hong Kong, and Qiao becomes a successful business entrepreneur. Yet, when they talk about their success, there exists an undertone of sadness in their speech. Qiao reveals that though she finally built a house in her hometown, her mother passed away before its completion. XiaoJun notes how the stresses of his job keep him from spending time with his wife. Qiao mentions how he was very talkative in Wushi and how they would go on bike rides. Ultimately, globalization’s emphasis on an economic ideal forces them to forgo their personal desires and slowly lose their human relationships. Despite this however, when XiaoJun sees Teresa Teng, he runs over for an autograph while 2010

Qiao remains in the car. His excitement reveals that he still has vestiges of feelings for the world outside of the global city, whereas Qiao, who is much further engrained in the globalized economy, does not easily act atypical of the metropolitan citizen. Yet, since she is conflicted, she eventually reunites with XiaoJun because of Teresa Teng, who develops into a recurring symbol for a tie to one’s roots. Globalization is a de-personalizing, but highly personal process. It gives rise to great cities of commerce that house multinational corporations and increasingly diverse populaces – populaces that are made up of millions of individuals, each in their own way affected by the economic climate around them. As the “global city” becomes increasingly isolated culturally and economically from its surrounding region, its inhabitants follow suit, abandoning their roots and losing their heritage. As the city gains diversity but loses its own national identity, its individuals lose their own sense of identity. The market economy facilitates the adoption of an impersonal mode of exchange, where numbers and money come to govern people’s motivations and relationships.

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References Comrades, Almost a Love Story (甜蜜蜜). Dir. Peter Chan. Perfs. Leon Lai, Maggie Cheung, Eric Tsang. 2001. DVD. Tai Seng, 2001. Fallen Angels (堕落天使). Dir. Wong Kar Wai. Perfs. Leon Lai, Michelle Reis, Takeshi Kaneshiro, Charli Yeung, Karen Mok. 1998. DVD. Kino, 2004. Sassen, Saskia. “Whose City Is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims.” Public Culture 8 (1996): 205-223. Simmel, Georg. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Trans. Kurt H. Wolff. London: Free Press, 1964.

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Japan’s Bout with History: Kawabata and Absences in the Canon Paul Horak Abstract: Yasunari Kawabata was Japan’s modern master—a literary giant whose works earned him Japan’s first Nobel Prize for Literature. Born in Osaka in 1899, Kawabata’s childhood was marked by the deaths of all his closest bloodlines. Perhaps the sorrow of his works had its origins in the intense grief of his childhood. Nevertheless, Kawabata went on to participate in many literary movements and was the father of many others; by the time he had reached his forties he was already regarded as Japan’s most promising writer. For decades he compiled works of unrivaled beauty and unassuming majesty. In 1972—less than four years after winning his Nobel—Kawabata was found dead, presumably by his own hand. His works remain some of the most revered in Japan today—a testament to his artistic consistency. This paper examines some of the consequences of Kawabata’s writings: primarily their tendency to exclude Japanese-Koreans, expatriates, and the colonized and colonizers alike. Regardless of Kawabata’s intentions when writing his works, their canonization has led to a denial of shared histories in the East Asian context—a reality that is particularly important to come to terms with today.

Yasunari Kawabata’s desolate, beautiful, and flowing prose, sometimes compared to the traditional Japanese Zen woodblock print, has been called beyond understanding, and above critique. His art for art’s sake approach, which simultaneously brings together the old and the new, has distinguished his works and aided in their elevation to a special place in the Japanese literary canon. In his article “Writing out Asia: Modernity, Canon and Kokoro,” James Fujii establishes the critical and public reception of works, the publication and translation of works, and the

formation of a national identity as the three main factors contributing to an author’s canonization (Fujii, 178). By examining Kawabata’s Snow Country and Old Capital, two of the three works cited by the Nobel Committee upon awarding Kawabata the prize, and the glaring absences in those works, we can come to better appreciate the denial of shared histories between East Asian countries that the canonization of Kawabata has affirmed. The goal of this paper is not to attack Kawabata for the absences in his works; rather, it is to better understand how the process of

Paul Horak is a Trinity freshman, Class of 2013, interested in Japan.

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canonization contributes to historical absences and omissions.

Japan’s presence on the Korean peninsula and later its involvement in mainland China. The themes and Snow Country is considered even the setting of Snow Country by many critics to be Kawabata’s more than likely helped to reinforce masterpiece (Phillips, 423). It tells the the popular image of a venerated, story of a tragic love affair between a noble and isolated Japanese society at mountain geisha and a Tokyo dila time when that image could serve ettante. In his introduction to the political and war room agendas. novel, which was first serialized in the Snow Country thus was an “art for Asahi Shinbun between 1935 and art’s sake” composition that would 1937, translator Edward Seidenstick- easily support an ideology complicit er writes: “The hot springs, one of with imperialism. which is the locale of Snow Country, also have a peculiarly Japanese signif- “It would become a relatively icance” (Kawabata, vi). Another of common experience for Japanese the novel’s peculiarly Japanese traits writers to experience first hand the is its writing style, which resembles Japanese occupational presence in that of the 17th century “haiku.” Asia, without letting it touch his/ Even today, Kawabata’s works are her literary production,” Fujii stated seen in this light -- as having clear in his “Writing out Asia: Modernity, origins in venerated Japanese poetic Canon and Kokoro” (Fujii, 174 ). traditions such as haiku, and sharing Kawabata was no exception. He the themes of loneliness and paswas good friends with, and at times a sion that prevailed during the Heian creative partner to, Yokomitsu Riichi, Era, considered Japan’s Golden Age a revolutionary author forgotten by (Mathy, 212). In the mid -1930’s the history but nevertheless important in traditional themes explored in Snow his own time (Phillips, 422). While Country would have helped to define Kawabata was writing Snow Counthe “Japanese” nation as one that try, Yokomitsu was busy adding to was unique—perhaps even pecuhis already considerable number of liar— and possessing a special and works. In 1935, the same year in beautiful tradition. This in turn may which Snow Country was first serialhave contributed to the development ized, Yokomitsu published Shanghai, of Japanese ideas of superiority that an account of the experiences of were present in the Pre-War Years, Japanese expatriates in the sprawlwhich were often used to justify ing metropolis of Shanghai. In the 16

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novel, which would have undoubtedly attracted Kawabata’s attention, Yokomitsu seeks to define what it means to be Japanese outside of Japan. While Yokomitsu dabbled in many different styles, Kawabata remained sensitive to the unique styles he had been exposed to as a young writer, and whereas Yokomitsu would explore Eastern Asia looking for different settings for his works, Kawabata refused to. One thing true of all of Kawabata’s works is the unity of settings: every story takes place in modern Japan. In Snow Country, as in his other works, Kawabata strives to define the Japanese identity in the modern world through bridging the past and the present, tradition and modernity. However, the absence of Japanese living abroad as either colonizers or expatriates betrays the historical reality of a Japanese population with a considerable presence outside of Japan, especially in Korea and China. If one were to read Snow Country as a representative work of the 1930’s in Japan, Japan’s legacy abroad would be missing from the picture. Kawabata’s “print” would be as advertised: what is omitted is just as important as what is included. What is omitted is actually a shared history between China, Korea and Japan: a history that Kawabata seems to be content to ignore.

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Though Kawabata’s works focus only on the Japanese struggles with modernity, it is important to remember that Kawabata did not view himself as an imperialist. He may not have perceived Japan as an imperial power at all, and the glaring absences in his works are as readily attributed to his desire for a pure and traditional Japan as anything else. Perhaps he did not intend to paint a realistic and accurate picture of the Japanese, but rather purposefully altered his portrayal. The ambiguity of Kawabata’s works, the result of these nuances, is what makes Kawabata’s works both compelling and inscrutable. Many scholars have claimed that the neglect of Korean and Chinese struggles with modernity in his works may have been a consequence of his obsession with Japanese Tradition (Brown, 375). In 1938, he wrote to a friend that, “I had gained a full awareness that I was a writer of Japanese traits, and that I would carry on the beauty of the Japanese Tradition” (Kawabata, 22). Kawabata was an artist who desired to find harmony between man, nature and emptiness. But to see his works as only pieces of art, above the criticism of scholars, degrades the value of his works because it devalues his great mastery of traditional forms and intense thought (Phillips, 420). Though no author intends for

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his work to be canonized (and admittedly he plays a very limited role in its canonization), canonization nevertheless occurs and literary works like those of Kawabata reach large audiences, influence popular perceptions, and ultimately become “representative.” In 1940 there was an instance in which Kawabata revealed his knowledge of colonial affairs and the occasional imperial whim -- the competition for the Akutagawa Prize. Kawabata knew about events outside of Japan, even if he did not reference them in his works. The Akutagawa Prize is named after Ryonosuke Akutagawa, a successful writer of the 1920’s, and is still considered the most prestigious Japanese literary award today (Kwon, 6). In 1940, the eventual runner-up was the Koreannational Kim Sa-ryang. Kawabata praised his “Hikari no naka ni,” a story about finding identity and growing up in colonized Korea, as a great achievement in contemporary Korean Literature. Though Kim did not win the prize that year, Kawabata was rumored to have favored his work, if only because he had sympathy for Kim’s being a Korean; this serves as an indicator of Kawabata’s patronizing attitude toward Korean writers, though the work imitated some of the features of the uniquely Japanese “shishosetsu” and was written in Japanese. This was probably 18

an attitude shared by many Japanese writers at the time. Kawabata was still at this time a fairly young writer, and many of his greater works were still to come, but none of his later works would address the “Korean Problem” cited in Kim’s “Hikari no naka ni” (Kwon, 8 ). The story also suggested a Japanese problem—that of being both Korean and Japanese—but Kawabata’s prose fails to address (unlike Kim’s) the JapaneseKorean identity, another absence in the his works. It has already been established how Kawabata’s connections to Japan’s traditions helped give his works unique connotations. His works helped to construct an image of the Japanese as a pure people with a two thousand year-old tradition of beauty and singularity. This is exactly the image to which the Japanese government of the 1930’s dedicated vast resources trying to achieve. In composing this image, Kawabata passively promoted Japanese justification of colonialism. As Donald Keene wrote of Kawabata: “He was esteemed by the militarists even though he had done nothing to ingratiate himself.” (Brown, 379). The absence of Japanese-expatriates, Japanese-Koreans, and the Japanese colonizers and the colonized themselves also contributed to a denial of shared histories

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and an indifference to imperialism. The works of Kawabata also subtly affected the imperial movement in Japan by highlighting the East-West struggle that had preoccupied Japanese writers for decades. Though he would not take the East-West struggle as far as his protégé, Yukio Mishima, Kawabata nevertheless expressed his antagonism toward Western thought. In 1938 he noted, “I have never experienced such bitter grief and anguish as belong to the West. I have never found that nihilism and decadence which are Western” (Kawabata, 22). This is similar to the view of Japanese imperialists, who realized Japan’s imitation of the West, but were nevertheless eager to free themselves from Western entanglements. To again bring up Yomokitsu’s Shanghai, there were a number of people in Japan, China and Korea who wanted a united Asia strong enough to fend of the West. Some asianists (as they were called) hoped that Japan, being the most modern and technologically advanced country in East Asia, would colonize Asia and bring its people under one banner (Yokomitsu, 66). Kawabata, on the other hand, was a believer in Japan’s sacred heritage and would have been against Japan’s involvement in an initiative that sought to bring all of Asia together. To Kawabata, who in Snow Country reflects on loneli2010

ness and isolation, an integrated Asia is a far cry from the ideals of Japanese Tradition. However, politicians in 1930’s Japan were seeking to redefine Japanese Tradition, and the ambiguity of Kawabata’s works allowed for varying interpretations, some of which were complicit with imperialism. Kawabata’s works had a wide governmental, public, and critical appeal, and it is important to remember that a nation’s identity is largely formed through the interplay of these spheres (Fujii, 178). It is entirely possible that the many readers of his works were able to draw near opposite conclusions, with some in favor of traditional isolation and others bent on colonization of the East to save Japanese tradition from the onslaught of Western thought. For decades now, Kawabata’s works have enjoyed large audiences in both Japan and the West. Both the Japanese and their western counterparts read Kawabata for the same reason: the ability of his works to communicate universal themes while also glorifying tradition. Kawabata has been a bridge-builder of sorts when it comes to linking Japan and the West (Mathy, 211). Thanks in large part to the attentions of Donald Keene and more especially Edward Seidensticker, two revered Japanologists, Kawabata enjoys great reverence in the English-speaking world as

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well as his home country. It is important to realize the great influence that scholars such as Keene and Seidensticker had on the canonization of Kawabata’s works. Canonization is an evolving process, and the way we read works will change as society changes. Keene and Seidensticker provided readers with the first interpretations of these novels, and they remain the most authoritative. Their critical acclaim for Kawabata’s works elevated his literature to a higher plane where the traditional themes of Kawabata’s works, coupled with their own preoccupation with traditional themes, worked together to create an image of a Japan free of imperial entanglements. The Japanologists Seidensticker and Keene gave Western audiences an impression of Japan that was appropriately passive at the time considering that there were still American misgivings about the Japanese after World War II; today, however, that popular image of a Japan without an imperial legacy only contributes to the denial of historical fact.

neseness” greater, or the desire to understand his antagonism toward the West better displayed than in the Nobel Presentation Speech: In common with his older countryman, Tanizaki, now deceased, Kawabata has admittedly been influenced by modern western realism, but, at the same time, he has, with greater fidelity, retained his footing in Japan’s classical literature and therefore represents a clear tendency to cherish and preserve a genuinely national tradition of style. In Kawabata’s narrative art it is still possible to find a sensitively shaded situation poetry which traces its origin back to Murasaki’s vast canvas of life and manners in Japan of about the year 1000. He has experienced his country’s crushing defeat and no doubt realizes what the future demands in the way of industrial go-ahead spirit, tempo and vitality. But in the postwar wave of violent Americanization, his novel is a gentle reminder of the necessity of trying to save something of the old Japan’s beauty and individuality for the new. (Brown, 375)

In awarding Japan its first Nobel Prize in Literature, the Commit The ultimate result of Seiden- tee brought worldwide attention to sticker’s efforts to translate Kawabata the works of Japan’s premier modern and Keene’s mission to bring Japawriter and also to the classical works nese classics to the West was Kawaof Japan that he incorporated into bata’s Nobel Prize (Brown, 375). his writings; works that they stated Nowhere is the praise of Kawabata would help to “preserve a genuinely higher, the obsession with his “Japa- national tradition of style.” Three 20

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works were cited by the Committee as demonstrating Kawabata’s mastery of the traditional Japanese traits of melancholy, loneliness, nature and poetry. The most perfect among them was The Old Capital, the work that Kawabata called his “abnormal product.” The story takes place in Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, which Kawabata brings to life with descriptions of its summer-time festivals and camphor tree lined parks. The city is a symbol of Japan, a cultural and historical center that Kawabata subtly suggests is undergoing major transformations (Brown, 378). It is interesting that the Nobel committee selected this work, which includes an elegiac testament to Japan’s traditional city and a compelling case for its evolution, as Kawabata’s best. However, it is not altogether surprising. The Committee has served as an agent of canonization, and its endorsement of a work attesting to the Japanese Tradition and warning against Western transgression into Japanese culture affirms and strengthens the denial of shared histories in Kawabata’s works. The Committee effectively placed greater emphasis on Japan and the West, and in so doing diverted attention away from the imperial legacy of Japan. The Old Capital was Kawabata’s “gentle reminder” to the Japanese to reflect on the effects of the “violent 2010

wave of Americanization” that were causing the erosion of traditional values and practices. In 1968, the year Yasunari Kawabata won the Nobel Prize for Literature, only three of his works had been translated into English; Snow Country, Thousand Cranes, The Old Capital, all of which were cited by the committee as qualifying Kawabata for the award. In the fifties, Donald Keene introduced his Anthology of Japanese Literature to English-speaking audiences. Naturally, readership of the Japanese poetry and Heian period Classics that he included in his volumes went up and prompted a higher demand for Japanese authors. The authors that were translated, namely Soseki, Kawabata, Tanizaki and the relative newcomer Mishima, were chosen for their great literary talent as well as their connection to the classics that Keene had introduced. For years, the only available books by Japanese authors were those by such masters, and so the translators, who also had a hand in affecting the decision of the Nobel Committee, steered Japan’s literary canon in a direction away from writings that addressed a Japanese imperial legacy. Only recently, have the works of the likes of Kim Sa-Ryang, Lee Sang and Yuasa Katsuei—colonial writers—garnered

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serious scholarly attention. It may be much longer still before they reach the mainstream, and with such denial of shared histories present over all of East Asia there are doubts as to whether the works of colonial writers ever will receive the recognition that history warrants them.

References Brown, Sidney D. “Yasunari Kawabata (1899-1972): Tradition versus Modernity.” World Literature Today 62.3 (1988): 37579. Print. Fujii, James A. “Writing Out Asia: Modernity, Canon, and Kokoro.” N. pag. Print. Kwon, Nayoung Aimee. “Empire, Nation, and Minor Writer: ‘Colonized I-Novel’ and the Conundrum of Representing the Colonized.” Kawabata, Yasunari. “A Thematic Study of the Works of Kawabata Yasunari.” The Journal-Newsletter of the Association of Teachers of Japanese 5.2 (1968): 22-31. Print. Kawabata, Yasunari. Old Capital. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006. Print. Kawabata, Yasunari. Snow Country. New York: Vintage Books, 1996. Print. Mathy, Frank. “Kawabata Yasunari : Bridge-builder to the West.” Monumenta Nipponica 24.3 (1969): 211-17. Print. “Nobel Prize in Literature 1968 – Presentation Speech.” Nobelprize.org. Web. 03 Dec. 2009. . Phillips, Brian. “The Tyranny of Beauty: Kawabata.” The Hudson Review 59.3 (2006): 419-28. Print. Riichi, Yokomitsu, and Yokomitsu Riichi. Shanghai A Novel (Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies, 33). New York: University of Michigan, 2001. Print.

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“A Madman” on Literature Sharon Mei Abstract: Often called the father of modern Chinese literature, Lu Xun debuted with his short story “A Madman’s Diary,” a chronicle of the delusions of a clinically insane man in early 20th century China. Paranoia of being eaten is the madman’s primary symptom and his ability to discern the words “Eat People” from ancient texts preaching “Virtue and Morality” is an allegorical critique of society’s use of tradition to justify the cannibalistic nature of Chinese feudalism. The story is traditionally understood as a component of the May Fourth movement, a revolution aiming to abolish the stratified societal structure then in place. Scrutiny of the short story’s allusions to literature reveals its advocacy for literary reform as the specific means of achieving the needed social change. Lu Xun’s personal commitment to literature is prevalent in the text and his ultimate intention is to persuade younger generations to “save” themselves from the oppression of Chinese feudalism by rejecting traditionally accepted patterns of writing in favor of a modern vernacular literary style.

Its historical context and its author’s literary induction yield “Madman’s Diary” as an emblem of both the then imminent New Culture revolution and Lu Xun’s literary identity. The story’s political message is clear, as the metaphorical use of cannibalism to represent Chinese feudalism is none too subtle, but its role in promoting literature as a means to evoke social change requires an involved analysis of Lu Xun’s use of unconventional narration devices and deliberate emphasis on literature’s importance within the short story. By tracing Lu Xun’s

selection of narrator and use of literary devices, it becomes obvious that “Madman’s Diary” is Lu Xun’s declaration of his intent to “save the children” through his literature. While more commonly contextualized within the framework of the May Fourth movement aiming to democratize China in the early 20th century, “A Madman’s Diary” serves the additional purpose of christening Lu Xun’s entry into the literary sphere and departure from his previous medical background. Despite this occupational shift, Lu Xun’s

Sharon Mei is a Trinity junior, Class of 2011, majoring in Public Policy and Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).

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first short story is heavily steeped in medical discourse. J.D Chinnery of the University of London quotes Lu Xun claiming that in writing “Madman’s Diary,” he “drew exclusively on the hundred odd foreign works [he] had read and a certain amount of medical knowledge. Apart from this [he] had no other equipment” (Chinnery, 310). This quote reminds us of Lu Xun’s endeavors in the field of medicine, which leaves their traces on “Madman’s Diary.” Chinnery asserts that the accurate portrayal of the madman’s paranoia symptoms suggest that “his reading of medical theory played a part in the conception of the story” (Chinnery, 312).

past profession. Ultimately, however, as the madman achieves prominence as the main narrator of the story, Lu Xun’s personal allegiance with this madman rather than with the medical researcher reader-narrator reflects his revelation that the spiritual awakening of the Chinese people needs to be stimulated through literature rather than through medicine and his conscious choice to participate in the former collective.

In addition to its allusion to his past occupation, the introduction’s classical writing style is noteworthy, given the vernacular style of the remaining majority of the story. The dynamic between the reader-narra Remnants of Lu Xun’s abantor’s introduction and the musings doned medical career are combined of the Madman retain a seemingly with stylistically innovative writing to competitive nature, each contendhighlight the importance of literature ing for the reader’s confidence. As that the story underscores in both the madman’s revelations about the Chinese literature and in Lu Xun’s failures of feudalism, consistent with personal life. This combination is modern day readers’ egalitarian most evident in the introductory pas- sentiments, are conceived in his versage, which introduces two indepen- nacular diction, readers are encourdent narrators, the madman and the aged to shed their reliance on classideliverer of the diary. “The writing cal writing when seeking truth and to was most confused and incoherent… seek clarity, instead, in the literature and I have copied out a part to serve of the coming new era. as a subject for medical research” (Lu, 8). Grounding the diary’s pur The reader-narrator’s status pose in medical research suggests as a reliable narrator is further dithat even as he writes his first short minished by the distance between story, Lu Xun is still flirting with his him and the readership that results 24

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from the literary choice to modify the Lu Xun’s glorifying conception of narration of the story through this the madman that marks his deviation “copier” of the diary. from tradition. Throughout history, madmen have always been portrayed I have not altered a single illogicality in the as tragic self-perpetuating prophediary and have changed only the names, even cies; cursed with an impaired mental though the people referred to are all country state, the madmen have ideas wildly folk, unknown to the world and of no conse- different from generally accepted idequence. As for the title, it was chosen by the als and their consequent conclusion diarist himself after his recovery, and I did that their digression from normality not change it. (Lu, 9). marks intellectual superiority results in their societal alienation (Chinnery, Inherently cautionary, the introduc317). Despite the historically negative tion invites suspicion on the part of portrayal of madmen in literature, the readers to be wary of the truth madmen have consistently been the content of the reader-narrator’s source of innovation. Lu Xun takes statements. The suspicion is further a traditionally deprecated character underscored by the reader-narrator’s and glorifies him for the exact reason demonstrated need to affirm the va- he was previously denounced. “A lidity of his contentions, unintention- Madman’s Diary” effectively praises ally inviting further misgiving. His the eccentricity of the madman as use of classical Chinese language im- the mechanism uniquely enabling plicitly condemns the reader-narrator him to see Chinese feudalism, a set as a perpetuator of the tyrannical of beliefs encouraging the strong to society the story criticizes (Xu, 88). systematically prey on the vulnerable, for its actual cannibalistic nature. In addition to the haze that is cast by Lu Xun’s use of a reader Lu Xun’s escalation of the narrator, the story’s narrative relistatus of the “madman” in literature ability is further questioned by the led to the elevation of the symbolic mental state of the protagonist. Lu madman in society. Much as Lu Xun Xun chooses to employ a madman intended, revolutionaries of the May as the voice of his political disconFourth era praised the madman as a tent, an additional pioneering aspect “paragon of spiritual rebellion” and of “A Madman’s Diary.” The use of used his revolt against social conventhe madman as subject matter is not tions as a model for their efforts (Xu, revolutionary (Chinnery, 321); it is 64). Consequently, after the success 2010

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of the Communist regime’s political takeover, the madman was again read and praised as the “forerunner of the revolution” (Xu, 64). In “Madman’s Diary,” Lu Xun takes an atypical Chinese character prototype, modifies the framework in which we conceive him and reestablishes him as the role model of revolutionaries and effectively rescues him from the social alienation he had previously been subjected to. The summation of the madman’s incapacitated mental state and the various levels of narration ought to cause the reader to doubt the reliability of the short story rather than absorb and condone its underlying message. However, we find that the novel has the unlikely effect of convincing readers of the validity of the madman’s assertions despite Lu Xun’s warnings. Even though he backhandedly cautions readers about the subjective nature of the diary entries available for our viewing and boldly labels his primary narrator as a “madman,” Lu Xun still effectively delivers his political discontent and call for action. This use of irony in “Madman’s Diary” is credited as one of the most prominent characteristics of Lu Xun’s fiction. Jian Xu’s essay in Modern Chinese Language and Lit26

erature describes the literary tactic as “the ability to call forth truth content with consciously mobilized disunifying forces that rupture the formal harmony of narration and thus give the lie to the semblance of truth inherent in fictional art” (Xu, 89-90). Hanan goes as far as to say that this ironic tone is even more effective in obtaining the readers’ trust than if Lu Xun were to frame the story as a reliable account by a sane narrator (Hanan, 80). This use of irony to convey the truth content of his stories is often called the quintessence of Lu Xun’s fiction. The use of irony and unique narrative choices indicates an additional degree of self-preservation on the part of Lu Xun as a social participant. Not only do the various levels of conflicting narration distance the readers from the events of the story, they also create distance between Lu Xun and his subject. Hanan suggests that Lu Xun’s courageous venture into unexplored literary grounds leaves him to be vulnerable to both the possibility of failure but also to his own evident moral rage and passion (Hanan, 96). If writing is simultaneously able to provoke social reform and shield its practitioners from possible psychological damage, then “Madman’s Diary” definitively suggests that the power of writing is

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limitless. Subtle mentions of literature aggregately convey Lu Xun’s belief that rejection of classical forms of literature is the first necessary step in evoking social change. I remember when my elder brother taught me to write compositions, no matter how good a man was, if I produced arguments to the contrary he would make that passage to show his approval; while I excused evildoers, he would say: “Good for you, that shows originality.” (Lu, 10). The derogatory tone employed in describing the madman’s brother’s literary education is consistent with the critical conception of his other attempts to teach the madman cannibalistic tendencies. However, this attack on traditional Chinese writing is alarming in its explicitness. Lu Xun is blatantly condemning the backward nature of Chinese traditional literature, in which the degradation of “good men” and the praise of “evil” are encouraged. Lu Xun’s sentiments are apparent in the madman’s rejection of ancient texts. In ancient times Yi Ya boiled his son for Chieh and Chou to eat; that is the old story. But actually since the creation of heaven 2010

and earth by Pan Ku men have been eating each other, from the time of Yi Ya’s son to the time of Hsu Hsi-lin, and from the time of Hsu Hsi-lin down to the man caught in Wolf Cub Village. (Lu, 14) When rationalizing with his brother and persuading him to give up his cannibalistic operations, the madman indicates to his brother that he understands that following behaviors outlined in ancient texts is apparently easy and seemingly sensible, but it is necessary to abandon these “old stories.” By urging the termination of the use of these texts to justify current behavior, the madman contends that we should no longer rely on ancient texts to guide us in our choice of moral standards. The two previous citations could be understood as an advocacy to abandon literature and writing altogether. The madman’s repeated reliance on written histories to prove the validity of the existence of the cannibalism he has witnessed eliminate this possible conception of Lu Xun’s attitudes towards literature. “What am I talking about? They are eating men in Wolf Cub Village, and you can see it written all over the books, in fresh red ink” (Lu, 13). The madman’s citation of books indicates his belief that, despite the faults of ancient texts, literary works serve

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the purpose of recording truth and documenting history. This documentation of history serves an important role in the progress of society; cannibalistic behaviors need first to be acknowledged in the written form before dismissed through critical evaluation of the texts that condone them. The madman’s third diary entry contains the most prominent mention of books in the story; this passage strengthens the notion that writing’s function in recording history is essential to societal progress. Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it. In ancient times, as I recollect, people often ate human beings, but I am rather hazy about it. I tried to look this up in history, but my history has no chronology and scrawled all over each page are the words: “Confucian Virtue and Morality.” Since I could not sleep anyway, I read intently half the night until I began to see words between the lines. The whole book was filled with two words—“Eat people.” (Lu, 10) The written words “Virtue and Morality” cannot alone prove the virtuous nature of activities depicted in books if a more invested reading reveals that the book is actually filled with the words “Eat People,” an amoral act. Tang recognizes this 28

segment as one that is primarily dealing with the rewriting of history, a search for meaning and a reorganizing of social space (Tang, 1228). By boldly equating the esteemed values of virtue and morality with the act of eating people, the madman asserts that the Chinese people have been hiding their cannibalistic tendencies behind the name of Confucian values. Thus, the madman’s personal reading method captures the new critical attitude toward language and scrutinizing approach to reading that Lu Xun encourages. Only through this methodology of close reading can an objective account of history be created and subsequently maintained. The short story’s ending is cryptic and an immediate dissection of the story does not imply a unique and apparent message. “Perhaps there are children who have not eaten men? Save the children…” (Lu, 16). This plea for the rescue of the younger generation can be comprehended as either a call to save the children from being eaten or an urging to save the children from being spoiled by the cannibalistic traditions of Chinese feudalism (Tang, 1232). Judging from Lu Xun’s persistent urge to reform the entire set of traditions and values that not only tolerates but advocates “cannibalism,” the

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madman’s cry to “save the children” is an urgent plea for the younger generation to save themselves from being conditioned into accepting the existing moral standards. “A Madman’s Diary” is Lu Xun’s deafening plea for the younger generation of Chinese citizens to abandon the ways endorsed by traditional Chinese philosophy and belief systems. Lu Xun’s intentional emphasis on the art of writing and the importance of literature within the short story itself reflect his belief in literary reform as the necessary and preeminent means of altering societal behaviors. The madman respects literature as the source of evident truths but is trying to obtain true wisdom through the creation of this novel literary. As cannibalism is metaphor for the unfeeling nature of Chinese feudalism, the madman is Lu Xun’s ideal persona. Furthermore, Lu Xun embodies his own ideals through his career choice to pursue writing in an effort to bring about the spiritual awakening that he believes the Chinese are in need of. Ultimately, Lu Xun effectively positions himself as the “madman” and revolutionary of modern Chinese literature.

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References Chinnery, J. D. “The Influence of Western Literature on Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman,’” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Afican Studies 23 Pt. 2 (1960): pp. 309-322. Chou, Ying-hsiung. “Identity, Gaze, and Homecoming.” The Humanities Bulletin 4 (1995): pp. 65-76. Hanan, Patrick. “The Technique of Lu Hsun’s Fiction,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 34 (1974): pp. 53-96. Lu, Xun. “A Madman’s Diary.” The Columbian Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature. Ed. Joseph S. M. Lau & Howard Goldblatt. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Tangm Xiaobing. “Lu Xun’s ‘Diary of a Madman’ and a Chinese Modernism,” PMLA (Journal of Modern Language Association of America) 5 (1992): pp. 12221234. Xu, Jian. “The Will to the Transaesthetic: The Truth Content of Lu Xun’s Fiction,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 11 (1999): pp. 61-90.

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Spatial Mobility and the Patriarchy’s Decline in Su Tong’s “Wives and Concubines” Linda Zhang Abstract: In the early 20th century Chinese household created by Su Tong’s novella, “Wives and Concubines,” the main characters - four wives and their patriarch – grapple with issues of power, space, and gender. This paper explores how the text and other analyses illustrate these issues through the theme of mobility – the lack or presence of it also translates into the respective sexual freedom, agency, and dominance among the characters. Although they are confined physically in the household and restricted by the traditional patriarchal system, Su allows the female characters to defy these restrictions and find alternative forms of mobility via symbolic constructions in the narrative. These constructions allude to a greater sense of freedom, such a “Well of Death” that is associated with a community of females, or a flute that recalls past lives with greater agency. Simultaneously, Su’s novella gives evidence of the patriarch’s decline: the crumbling financial status of the family, the impotency of the patriarch, and the ambiguous sexuality of his first son. This paper explores how in “Wives and Concubines,” the women’s defiance in finding alternative modes of mobility causes masculine anxieties and plays a significant role in the decline of the patriarchy.

of the house. The wives, including the fourth wife and main character, The mobility of a person, indi- Lotus, spend most of their time in cating the physical ability to move at the household and do not possess a great deal of mobility; the restriction will, invokes ideas of independence of their movement reflects the corand agency - the capacity to act responding restriction of their power and make choices. In the early 20th and agency. Meanwhile, the males of century Chinese household created the household, such as the patriarch, by Su Tong’s novella, “Wives and Chen Zuoqian, and his first-born Concubines,” where the main charson, Chen Feipu, possess a great deal acters include four wives and their of mobility in the case of Zuoqian patriarch, the presence or lack of spending different nights with the mobility also calls upon the respecwives and in the case of Feipu leavtive ranges of sexual freedom and ing and returning to the house at dominance among the characters I. Introduction

Linda Zhang is a Trinity junior, Class of 2011, majoring in Biology and Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).

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will. I will explore issues of mobility and how it affects the relationship of masculinity and femininity in “Wives and Concubines.” In relation to the concept of mobility, Hsiu-Chuang Deppman, professor of Chinese at Oberlin College, explores ideas about space and power in both Su Tong’s novella and Zhang Yimou’s film adaptation of the story, Raise the Red Lantern (Deppman). In her analysis of Su’s novella, Deppman asserts that “Wives and Concubines” allows for more imaginative space than the film for the women in his narrative through particular physical details, such as the construction of a well. The well, an execution site for female adulterers in the Chen family, allows at certain points in the plot for Lotus to escape into an almost “defiant fantasy” of connection with the ghosts of the executed women (Deppman, 143). This term, “defiant fantasy,” indicates that Lotus’s visits to the well allow for a type of out-of-body mobility that cannot be restricted by the means of the patriarchal system, such as the physical confinement in the household, yet she does not achieve true physical mobility. However, Deppman indicates that such acts represent the “transgressive potential of these women who threaten to bring down the house” – in other 2010

words, the women possess a defiant, challenging, and threatening force against the patriarchal system inherent in the household (Deppman, 135). Thus, in Deppman’s reading, Su’s novella gives a wider berth for the women to break free of the constraints of their household through the narrative. I will also look at other examples of unconventional mobility, such as female characters who possess seductiveness and sexual aggression, challenging their constraints through their sexuality. Tonglin Lu, professor of Chinese and Comparative Literature at the University of Montreal, explores the idea of the femme fatale figure in “Wives and Concubines” through the characters of Coral and Lotus, the two youngest wives of Chen. The femme fatale, translated as “disastrous woman,” usually possesses attractiveness and seductiveness and speaks to male fears about female sexuality. Both of these wives, particularly Coral, display a type of “uncontrollable female sexuality” that almost equates sexual freedom to mobility and agency (Lu, 139). Simultaneously, Su’s novella gives evidence of the patriarch’s decline: the crumbling financial status of the Chen family, the impotency of

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Spatial Mobility and the Patriarchy’s Decline in Su Tong’s “Wives and Concubines”

Chen Zuoqian, and Feipu’s ambiguous sexuality and apparent inability to lust after women (Su, 90). Feipu’s personal statement of being “afraid of women... especially afraid of the women in [his] family” points out a connection between the decline of the patriarch and the male anxieties over women (Su, 90). The male anxiety over women also indicates the threatening potential power implicit in the wives as a group. From this, I argue that the various ranges and modes of mobility allowed to the women give them a threatening potential that pushes for the Chen masculine crisis and the subsequent decline in the patriarchal system.

as a concubine of “lower status;” Deppman notes that this framing shows “Lotus immobilized by both the camera and the circumstances of her life” (Zhang, Deppman, 133). In the wedding scene, where Lotus sits upon her bed and waits for Master Chen, the “pattern of [her] colorful wedding gown… correspond[ing] to the pattern of the bed frame and thus confirm[ing] the structural bondage between her body and the Chen property” (Deppman, 134); the concept of “bondage” suggests a condition of slavery and the inability to control one’s own fate. I contend that with words such as “immobilization” and “bondage,” Deppman’s words add another layer of meanII. Issues of Mobility ing to her analysis of space – that the women are neither able to move Containment of movement nor negotiate a sense of empowermost evocatively draws the associament once they have entered into tion between mobility and agency the concubine system and the rules by emphasizing the lack of either. of the patriarchal household. This Zhang Yimou’s film adaptation, Raise becomes particularly apparent when the Red Lantern, best illustrates the one contrasts the condition of the Chen women’s deficiency in mobility women to the condition of the men and lack of agency within the physi- of the Chen household. cal constraints of the household. Deppman’s analysis of space al The relatively greater mobility lowed to the women in Zhang’s film and self-autonomy of the men, Chen similar, yet distinguishable concepts Zuoqian and Chen Feipu, draw of mobility. For instance, the openattention to the importance of the ing of Zhang’s film shows a close-up house’s walls in containing the womof Lotus’s face as she talks to her en. In both Su and Zhang’s versions stepmother and concedes to her fate of the story, the women spend most 32

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of their time confined inside the house and within their own quarters, while the men can go back and forth between the women’s quarters and leave from the house as they please. In “Wives and Concubines,” Chen Zuoqian demonstrates this in his capacity to visit any wife he chooses; for instance, when Lotus and Zuoqian have a dispute after Lotus discovers that Zuoqian burned her flute, Zuoqian retorts, “I will go then; thank God I still have three other wives!” – showing the power and mobility he holds within the household as the patriarch (Su, 42). Zhang Yimou’s film adaptation reestablishes this patriarchal mobility with the visual imagery of the red lanterns; the lanterns of the wife the Old Master chooses to stay with that night are lit, and if he leaves, the servants take down the lanterns and relight them in whatever quarters he goes to next, as if the lanterns themselves reflect the patriarch’s movement (Zhang, 1991). Feipu, on the other hand, prefers to leave the house whenever possible in an escapist fashion, complaining that “[he] want[s] to get out of the house…,” which he does several times for business trips. While Feipu possesses the capacity to leave whenever tensions arise in the house, Lotus and the other wives do not have that mobility.

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Although the patriarchal system outwardly confines the women and restrains their movement through the medium of the house, particular narrative constructions such as the “Well of Death” and Lotus’s bamboo flute provide a type of alternative mobility for Lotus. Both the well and the flute provide connections to outside worlds; as an heirloom from Lotus’s father, the flute provides a connection to her previous life before marrying into the Chen family, while the wisteria vine near the well causes Lotus to remember a wisteria vine from her school, another connection to her past (Su, 22). Furthermore, in a scene where Lotus looks into the well and sees a hand, she hears a voice, presumably the voice of a drowned concubine from the past, calling her to “come down here, Lotus” (Su, 54). Commenting on this scene, Deppman declares that this moment exemplifies “a sign of defiance…a continuous search for an escape from an oppressive reality. In return, the well offers her a vital link to the underground female community” (Deppman, 141). Building on Deppman’s analysis, I contend that Lotus, in connecting with this nether world of the female community and escaping from her surroundings, also succeeds in creating an imaginary mobility that enables her to defy the constraints of the patriarchal system.

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Spatial Mobility and the Patriarchy’s Decline in Su Tong’s “Wives and Concubines”

By “escaping” the patriarchal household through the well, Lotus challenges her status of confinement; likewise, Coral, the third wife, also challenges her lack of mobility by expressing herself sexually and in effect creates another version of a “defiant fantasy” or an unconventional mobility that in the end results in her death. Like Lotus, Coral’s life before entering the Chen household alludes to a history of greater freedom and agency, as she was a former traditional opera singer of a traveling opera group with geographical mobility and the ability to resist ties to any one place or person. Lotus, on the other hand, was a former college student whose education suggests social mobility and modernity. When Zuoqian talks about his courtship of Coral, he says “one thing led to another, and she just came along with me” (Su, 30); Zuoqian’s words suggest that Coral left her mobile life for one of perhaps greater financial stability but also with physical ties to the Chen house. Despite this, Su’s language compels the reader to believe that Coral’s character still often “escapes” the confinement of the house. For instance, in describing Coral as she sings Peking Opera one morning: Those mornings Coral put on her theatrical robes and renewed her career under the 34

wisteria vine. Every gesture and every note of her arias and dialogues were done very professionally; the people in the garden saw Coral’s long sleeves flowing in the wind, the shadow of her dancing body resembling an enchanting apparition. (Su, 71) Su not only summons images of Coral’s opera past where she was relatively mobile, but he also describes her as a “shadow” or “apparition” that nearly makes to fly away from the Chen household. Indeed, Lotus comments that “[her] soul will fly away” after listening to Coral sing, showing that the other characters also feel Coral’s free spirit as she sings (Su, 71). Coral’s affair with the family doctor clearly demonstrates her defiance of the system that restricts her agency, particularly her sexual freedom. For example, the relationship itself involves some physical mobility on her part, as Coral leaves the compound to see the doctor and says, “as long as I can be happy, I’ll go out...” (Su, 94). Her words, in addition to displaying the physical freedom of leaving the house, also express a willingness to pursue her own happiness and sexual freedom. A clear correlation between sexual freedom and agency is particularly evident when Coral exclaims to Lotus that she would “look for a bedmate” if

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Chen Zuoqian stays away from her place too long and that “he has to work hardest where [she was] concerned,” expressing that she was not afraid of him (Su, 58). In her speech, Coral exemplifies a woman who does not abide by nor fear the rigid patriarchal rules that attempt to restrain her sexual aggressiveness.

dicating that the patriarchy attempts to maintain its constraints on women and their sexual freedom (Lu, 139). III. Crises in Masculinity and Patriarchy

On the surface, the reaction against Coral as a femme fatale - her execution - seems to be a mere reas Tonglin Lu’s exploration of sertion of the patriarch’s control over the femme fatale, the “disastrous” his wives, a power that generations woman who seduces men and brings of the Chen patriarchy have passed about their ill fates, suggests that a down by tradition. However, the exwoman such as Coral, a typical femme ecution also indicates the traditional fatale, threatens patriarchal systems patriarchy’s underlying anxieties and inspires fear about female sexu- that Su gradually reveals across the ality. Lu asserts that symbols such as course of the plot of Wives and Conthe “Well of Death”, where the femme cubines. Su achieves this through the fatale of the Chen family is executed, details of the Chen males’ inability “represent excess and uncontrollable to fulfill traditional and patriarchal female sexuality” (Lu, 139). Not only norms of masculinity. For instance, does this analysis reveal the associaduring Lotus’s wedding night when tion between female sexuality and she first sees Zuoqian’s body, Su’s their freedom within the household, words draw attention to how it looks but it also highlights an important “bony and skinny,” a physical indicaanxiety about female sexuality on the tion of his delicate masculinity (Su, part of the patriarchy. The “uncon69). In fact, Zuoqian responds to trollable” element of the femme fatale’s Lotus when she asks him about his character suggests a certain dangerthin frame with, “They’ve worn me ous and threatening force that results out,” suggesting that the other wives from her sexual freedom, to the point have contributed to his tired body where the patriarchy must crush and the degradation of his sexualfemale sexuality to ensure its own ity (Su, 69). Other indications in the perpetuation. “In the linguistic sysstory of Zuoqian’s gradual decline tem of patriarchy, there is no room into impotency particularly reveal for female sexuality,” Lu writes, inZuoqian’s decreasing ability to keep 2010

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Spatial Mobility and the Patriarchy’s Decline in Su Tong’s “Wives and Concubines”

up sexually with the women in the household, particularly his younger wives. In the scene when Zuoqian becomes impotent, Su illustrates that Zuoqian’s “voice becom[es] timorous and weak…his body…ripped apart and gone upper limp” as if the patriarch, in losing his sexual ability, also loses something essential to his power over the women in the household (Su, 69). Thus, his impotency reveals a tension between failing masculinity and the relatively abundant female sexuality that threatens to overwhelm the patriarch.

Mama Song, a servant of the Chen household, recounts the waning opulence with each successive marriage Zuoqian has, emphasizing that the first wife, Joy, received a large gold medal for her wedding while Lotus, as the last wife, received no jewelry (Su, 81). In addition to the decline in lavish wedding ceremonies as an indicator of the Chen’s financial status, Feipu proves to be a lamentable businessman. Once again, he cannot attain masculine ideals expected of the “future head of the Chen household.

Su presents Zuoqian’s son, Chen Feipu, as a character of ambiguous sexuality who cannot respond to Lotus’s advances and maintains a deep relationship with his childhood friend, Young Master Gu. In terms of his sexuality, Feipu fails to fulfill traditional masculine norms, which he admits: “Heaven is punishing me; generations of Chen men have always lusted after women, but when it came to me, I just couldn’t do it” (Su, 90). These words posit a concept of crumbling masculinity in terms of generations, as if uncontrollable fate punished the Chen men and allowed for Zuoqian’s impotency and Feipu’s lack of traditional masculinity. Su also puts forward this idea of declining masculinity through the visible financial failure of the Chen family.

Feipu illustrates the connection between the combined force of Chen women and the Chen masculine crisis best in his words, “I’m afraid of women. I’m especially afraid of the women in our family” (Su, 90). While the femme fatale, as an individual, exposes some anxieties of the male patriarchy, the women as an entire group incite more urgent fears on the part of men. Feipu admits that his fear extends to all the women in the family, and in the same breath explains that he cannot lust after women, which suggests a relationship between the two. As Deppman explains, “the sheer number of the concubines instills a fear in both Chen and his androgynous eldest son, Feipu,” (Deppman, 135). I push this reading further in that it under-

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lines the potential power the women possess as a group, which does not manifest in the plot yet still presents a menacing force against the men and also contributes to the masculine crisis. Deppman is not alone in noting the potential in the women as a group; Suzie Fong, in analyzing Zhang Yimou’s film, finds that the family menu system, allowing for the woman currently in favor with the patriarch to choose the meal, “prevent[s] them from congregating politically – from colluding with each other to conspire against him” (Fong, 15). Fong’s analysis suggests the male anxiety of a female uprising against him, should they become allies. IV. Conclusion Tonglin Lu, speaking of the femme fatale, writes that “she is not the subject of feminism but a symptom of male fears about feminism” (Lu, 13). In the case of Su’s Wives and Concubines, the decline of the Chen patriarchy and the masculine crisis appear to be symptoms of another struggle: the feminine endeavor for mobility. Traditional masculinity, which becomes synonymous with patriarchal systems and rules, attempts to restrict women physically and sexually, essentially cutting off their conventional mobility. The female defiance and force exhibited by 2010

Lotus’ “fantasies” through the well, the threatening sexuality of Coral as a femme fatale, and the intimidating potential of the women as a group elicits a response from the men manifest in the masculine anxiety and a decline in patriarchal control. In this sense, the decline in the Chen patriarchy acts as a symptom of the underlying struggle of the female condition and its urgency to escape and break free of the constraining patriarchal system. References Deppman, Hsiu-Chuang. “Body, Space, and Power: Reading the Cultural Images of Concubines in the Works of Su Tong and Zhang Yimou.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 15, 2 (Fall 2003): 121-153. Fong, Suzie Y. “The Voice of Feminine Madness in Zhang Yi Mou’s Da Hong Deng Long Gao Gao Gua (Raise the Red Lantern).” Asian Cinema; a publication of the Asian Cinema Studies Society 7 (1995): 12-23. Lu, Tonglin. “Feminity and Masculinity in Su Tong’s Trilogy.” Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism and Oppositional Politics: Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction. By Tonglin Lu. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 129-54. Raise the Red Lantern. Dir. YiMou Zhang. Perf. Gong Li. DVD. 1991. Su, Tong. Raise the Red Lantern : Three Novellas. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.

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“Left-behind Children” in Rural China: The history and consequences of the Hukou policy and migration Karmel Wong Abstract: In rural China, millions of children are growing up in households where one or both parents have migrated away indefinitely to find work in the cities. This paper explores an important Chinese administrative policy—the hukou system—that may have contributed to this increasing number of children left behind in the countryside. By examining the history, consequences and implications of this policy, this paper will argue that it has prevented migrant workers from accessing the same services as registered city residents, thus discouraging them from bringing along their families. Significant attention must be paid to the hukou system—not only because of the profound ways in which it has altered the social and economic fabric of China’s contemporary society—but also because it has re-emerged today as an incredibly hot topic for reform and discussion among Chinese government officials and international media outlets.

Introduction [Her] parents have worked in Beijing for many years. She is eager to live with her parents. But they lead a laborious life and they have to take care of her younger brother at the same time. Her parents had to leave her with her grandmother. Her father took her to Beijing once, but she could not be enrolled by Beijing schools because the tuition fee was as high as several thousands Yuan, which is an astronomical figure to their family. She had to be sent back…(China Agricultural University, 23)

The above vignette is unique but also just one story out of several million. In rural China, many children are growing up in households where one or both parents have mi-

grated away indefinitely to find work in the cities. There has been growing public concern about the welfare of these children - known as the “liushou ertong,” or “left-behind children” - not only in terms of physical safety but also in terms of psychological, emotional, and social development. The situation of these children has also begun to receive attention from the government and policymakers, who are now recognizing that the outcomes experienced by this present generation of children will also influence the future picture of the entire Chinese society.

Karmel Wong is a Trinity senior, Class of 2010, majoring in Psychology.

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To consider what has contributed to today’s phenomenon of ‘left-behind children’ in rural areas, this paper will explore the Chinese hukou system—an administrative measure that registers households according to place of origin—including its history, present sociological consequences, and future policy implications. It will argue that this system has prevented migrant workers from accessing the same services as registered city residents, making it unfavourable for them to bring along their families, and hence contributing to the growing number of children left behind in the countryside. Discussion The children in China who are growing up in incomplete families, where one or both parents have moved away to the cities, represent a remarkable proportion of the population; estimates place the number of such children between 13 and 26 million (Yeoh & Lam, 4). Migrants are not only attracted by the lure of urban life or more opportunities to amass wealth, but are also frequently desperate to pay medical bills and repay financial debts. Their children are then taken into care by other guardians, such as elderly grandparents or kin, and often become responsible for taking care of them2010

selves and their own siblings. The deepening trend of such arrangements raises the question: Why do so many children have to stay behind in the countryside, rather than following their parents to the cities? Writers across many academic and media sources that grapple with this issue often refer back to one important institutional factor—the hukou system. The hukou (or household registration) system is a stateadministered scheme of citizenship under which every individual in China has to have a formal recording of residence, whether urban or rural, made at his or her local office (Cheng & Selden, 644). Besides serving the primary purposes of state identification and monitoring, the hukou system also regulates the resources available to each Chinese household and shapes the citizens’ participation in civic life. Being registered according to residence affects a household in almost all domains of life, from “food, clothing or shelter… employment… school” and marriage (Cheng & Selden, 644). In essence, this single policy has extensive bearing on human activities. Even while the hukou influences multiple domains of life in Chinese society and families, it itself has been influenced by many broad forces.

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The following section will look more closely at the background of the hukou system—its historical origins and purposes—to see how it came about, in order to better understand how it is now still shaping the situation of many children in rural China.

From the sociological standpoint, the hukou system exerted a significant role. It served to monitor and regulate human movement within the country for purposes of population control. Not long after the collectivization of agricultural land, hukou restrictions tightened as a response As chronicled in detail by to rural residents seeking to leave the Cheng & Selden (1994), the hukou land they had been assigned under system was implemented at a time of collectivization. The system did not transition to socialism, when many allow rural residents to easily leave aspects of the economy such as their villages for the cities. People agriculture and metal-making were who desired to even leave their rural being collectivized for the common places of residence in 1958 needed good. It was conceived by the Chito obtain certification from urban nese Communist Party in the 1950’s authorities through near-impossible and modeled after the ancient baojia bureaucratic processes (Cheng & system, a method that was used for Selden, 663). Of course, undocuthousands of years to assign housemented incidences of rural-urban holds into different collective group- migration still occurred, even with ings and to facilitate central control the knowledge of the state; but the over a vast nation. The hukou system central government sought to confound its initial basis within the 1954 tinue restricting this process by imConstitution of the National People’s posing new regulations to encourage Congress, which stipulated that rural workers to migrate alone, and citizens should be allowed “freedom by providing incentives and even of residence and freedom to change pressures to make sure that these their residence” (646), so long as workers would return to their place they remained within the bounds of of their registered hukou after a short state regulations that aimed to main- period of time (661). tain “social peace and order” (649). However, tension between ideals and From a social perspective, the practice began to manifest itself in a original hukou system already had the variety of outcomes brought about characteristics of the present-day by the hukou system. state policy that still confers different services between urban and rural 40

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areas. In the 1950’s, however, even the provision of food and grain was rationed according to a household’s hukou status (Cheng & Selden, 658). The urban areas were prioritized by the government, which believed that the collectivized agricultural communities were virtually self-sustaining. The differential welfare entitlements based on hukou registration initiated a long-standing and growing discrepancy in the resources available between the rural and urban areas. Up to this point, the internal movement of any citizen was highly restricted—and so there was little opportunity for children to be separated from their parents as a result of labor migration. However, the hukou system began to evolve in the 1980’s, as a result of strong social and economic forces pushing for increased internal movement. This was at the end of the Communist era, and as the government began to become less centralized, the state began to loosen its control through the hukou system, granting more freedom for internal migration (Zhan, 15). In 1984, the state formally sanctioned the movement of workers from one place to another, albeit temporarily and under continued regulation (18). That is, the hukou system changed from the “urban” versus “rural” classification, to “permanent” versus “temporary” 2010

residence statuses; temporary hukou permits were available for people working outside their place of origin for more than three months (Amnesty International, 5). While workers were gaining more freedom to migrate within the country, economic forces were also increasing the supply and demand for migrant labor in the cities (Fang et al, 4). Agriculture was becoming a less and less viable source of income for farmers, in such a way that rural dwellers had to begin looking for new ways to provide for their families (Ping, 3). Market reforms that began in the 1970’s also then began raising the prospects of attaining wealth, particularly within Chinese cities, at the same time as urban industries were seeking to employ more and more rural workers for low-wage labor (4). In conjunction with these rapid social and economic changes, the loosened hukou policy had important consequences. Before, rural areas contained the majority of China’s population; however, due to massive migration from the countryside to the cities, particularly major ones such as Beijing and Shanghai, there has been a demographic shift—with rural-to-urban migrants numbering from one to two million in the 80’s

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to over 100 million today (Zhu, 65). In addition, there has been an economic push, with China’s rapid GDP growth currently owing almost 16% to the presence of migrant workers engaging in construction or factory work in the cities (Zhan, 13).

the ones that are available are usually quite expensive relative to the workers’ low-paid incomes. For example, housing is only subsidized for permanent residents, and so the costs of living are very high for migrants who do not have that certification (15). Health care is also very costly; In light of these changes and according to Amnesty International’s consequences, it is appropriate to report, only 6.7% of migrant worklook at the current state of the hukou ers have access to subsidized social system, and how it may be interactinsurance (16). ing with the high incentives for ruralto-urban migration to contribute A particularly important urto the unexpected situation where ban service to consider while discussmigrant workers have to leave being hukou, family migration and child hind their children and families. The welfare is education. City schools paradox is that although internal are generally held responsible only migration is unabashedly encouraged for providing education for children in the interest of economic growth, of registered permanent residents; migrants are still denied essential for all others, they will charge “temsupport and resources once they have porary schooling fees” (Amnesty moved to the city for work. Legally, International, 32). These fees not it remains difficult or impossible for only include non-subsidized tuition a migrant worker—even one that fees but also expensive and often has been working in the city for a arbitrary ‘sponsorship’ payments long time—to switch to an urban that together often amount to more hukou, or present the necessary certhan the monthly income of migrant tification to obtain certification of workers (Yan, 2). There are also varipermanent residency. This difficulty ous other bureaucratic measures that is compounded by the fact that most migrant parents have to negotiate in services in the cities are only availorder to help their child gain access able for people who have permanent to state-funded schools, which usually urban hukou. As documented by prove to be too expensive or compliAmnesty International (2007), there cated. In some cases, even children are few services provided by the of migrant workers are expected to government for migrant workers, and attend the schools where their fam42

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ily is registered; that is, back in the rural areas from which they have come. Indeed, it is not a surprising statistic that “more than 80% of migrant children are unable to attend middle schools in China” (Fang et al., 9)—which may not actually be so shocking given China’s investment in education, estimated to be a mere 2% of the country’s GDP (11). This paradox—where migration is encouraged but the hukou system continues to be a barrier for services available to migrants—has far-reaching implications. The most striking (and common) result is that because costs of living are high and access to education is a challenge, migrant workers often decide that it is best to migrate alone, opting instead to send remittances back home to provide for the families they leave behind. An immediate consequence of this is that migrant workers are able to earn wages from their city jobs, and thus raise the incomes of their household, and perhaps also the standard of living of their family in the countryside. Most workers, however, become part of a “floating” population that goes back and forth from countryside to city. With the emergence of this population in the past decade, there is concern about the urban-rural divide being perpetuated rather than diminished 2010

(Chan, 1996, Solinger, 1999, as cited by Zhu, 66). With children being separated from their parents through migration, the traditional concept of the family unit is being disrupted (Yardley). Community-based studies by institutions such as the China Agricultural University (2005) have investigated the impact of this disruption, raising and echoing popular concern that these children may actually be at risk for a variety of poor physical, psychological and social outcomes. It may be that the stress of being separated from familiar caregivers—of having to redefine attachments and readjust to new family relationships and roles—is compounded by the difficult conditions in villages, which include poverty, lack of social support and infrastructure, and natural disasters like flooding. With migration continuing to be pushed along by China’s economic expansion, but the current hukou policy limiting the services available to families, the outlook is not promising: the population of children left behind in rural areas may continue to grow and experience chronic difficulties in their day-to-day lives. These present concerns are beginning to take hold of future-oriented policy work, and the following sec-

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tion will analyze what measure have been taken, and what gaps (if any) remain. Since the hukou system has been described thus far as a determining factor to whether single individuals or whole families migrate from the countryside to cities, it is expected that changes to the hukou policy itself may be an important step in addressing the challenges of a large left-behind population. Reform of hukou policy began officially in 1997, and led to “both significant changes and remarkable continuities” from the past system (Wang, 115). For example, the government abolished some of the hukou-linked quotas set to limit the number of migrants in the bigger cities. Although these have made it more feasible and acceptable for more people to move to those areas for work, it does not address the gaps in service provision that have existed and that have led to the separation of families. One interesting aspect of reform occurred in 2001, when the Chinese government reduced requirements needed to obtain a temporary permit for staying in some small cities, and even allowing some individuals to qualify eventually for permanent hukou—which would allow them to obtain the necessary 44

urban services for themselves and their children (Zhan, 25). However, the “entry conditions” for this are still very difficult to meet: the state still uses hukou measures to regulate migration by requiring the workers to fulfill a set of criteria that most regular migrants cannot meet—for example, by providing certification of sources of income, as well as evidence of a stable place of residence (Wang, 120). The consensus in Chinese policy circles is that the hukou system will not be able to be abolished immediately; in the meantime, efforts have also focused on providing the services that have traditionally been inaccessible to migrants because of that system. For example, the government has been drafting several documents to bring attention to the conditions of migrant workers and emphasize the provision of education, health care, and other basic services. In terms of education, the government has enacted the Compulsory Education Law, which according to Amnesty International (2007) posits that children should have access to education wherever their parents are working (32). However, these pledges have yet to be fully enacted in practice to guarantee education for migrant children in the cities. For example, measures

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such as allowing migrant children to attend state-funded schools with tax exemption have limited impact, since certification is required in order to obtain that exemption, and involves a complicated and hard-to-fulfill process akin to obtaining the permanent hukou permit itself. Conclusion The increase in internal migration across China has been spurred by broad social forces over several decades. If barriers to public services such as education continue to exist for migrants in China’s cities as a result of the residual hukou system, then migrant workers will continue to face the decision of having to leave their children behind. In order to address the problem, some scholars and policymakers suggest abolishing the hukou measures completely. However, the feasibility of this option is unclear. Rather than simply allowing as many rural-dwellers as possible to move to the cities with their families, the greater issue for the national and local governments is to address the rural-urban divide that threatens to drive internal migration at such a great rate. The deeper reality is that while cities expand and receive more funding from the national govern2010

ment for all sorts of social services, conditions and opportunities for families in rural areas are not improving nearly as quickly. The Chinese government should continue to fulfill its commitment to education by increasing investment in both rural and urban schools, paying attention to rural development while also addressing the discriminatory attitudes towards migrants that affect their treatment in the urban public sphere, including the provision of key services. Most pressingly, since internal migration will continue at a fast rate while policies like the hukou system have yet to catch up in terms of reform, it is imperative to find effective interim measures to deal with the ongoing physical, social, emotional, and psychological challenges faced by the population of left-behind children.

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References Amnesty International. (2007, March 1). People’s Republic of China - Internal migrants: Discrimination and abuse, the human cost of an economic ‘miracle’. Retrieved November 03, 2007 from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170082007. Chan, K.W. & Buckingham, W. (2008). Is China abolishing the hukou system? The China Quarterly, 195, 582-684. Retrieved April 5, 2010, from http://faculty.washington.edu/ stevehar/Chan%20and%20Buckingham.pdf. Cheng, T. & Selden, M. (1994). The origins and social consequences of China’s hukou system. The China Quarterly, 139, 644-668. Retrieved November 03, 2007, from JSTOR. China Agricultural University. (2005). Impact study on rural labor migration on left-behind children in mid-west China. Plan International Publications. Retrieved October 6, 2007 from http://www.plan-international.org.cn/english/ resources/E-files.jsp?wbtreeid=279. Fan, M. (2007, February 18). Rural Chinese families feel migration’s strains. The Washington Post, p. A20. Retrieved October 18, 2007 from http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/17/ AR2007021701473.html. Fang, R., Miller, E., Trieu, H., & Yang, X. (2006). Migrant labor and social welfare policy. Retrieved November 03, 2007 from http:// www.umich.edu/~ipolicy/china/11)%20Migrant%20Labor%20and%20Social%20Welfare%20Policy.pdf. Hong Kong Liaison Office. (2007, May 15). Society and welfare: International day of the family. Retrieved October 20, 2007 from http:// www.ihlo.org/LRC/SW/190506.html.

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Ping, H. (2003). China migration country study. Asia Regional Migration Conference. Retrieved November 03, 2007 from http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/Dhaka_CP_3.pdf. Wang, F. (2004). Reformed migration control and new targeted people: China’s hukou system in the 2000s. The China Quarterly, 177, 115132. Retrieved November 05, 2007, from PAIS International. Yan, F. (2005). Education problems with urban migratory children in China. (Electronic version). Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 32(3), 3-11. Retrieved November 05, 2007 from Academic OneFile. Yardley, J. (2004, December 21). Rural exodus for work fractures Chinese family. (Electronic version). New York Times. Retrieved October 25, 2007 from http://www.nytimes. com/2004/12/21/international/asia/21china. html?_r=1&oref=slogin. Yeoh, B. & Lam, T. (2006). The costs of (im) mobility: Children left behind and children who migrate with a parent. Regional Seminar on Strengthening the National Machineries for Gender Equality to Shape Migration Policies and Protect Migrant Women. Retrieved October 18, 2007 from http://www.unescap.org/ esid/gad/Events/RegSem22%2D24Nov06/ Papers/BrendaYeoh.pdf. Zhan, S. (2005). Rural labour migration in China: challenges for policies. UNESCO. Retrieved November 10, 2007 from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0014/001402/140242e.pdf. Zhu, Y. (2007). China’s floating population and their settlement intention in the cities: beyond the hukou reform. Habitat International, 31, 65-76. Retrieved November 10, 2007 from Elsevier.

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Defining Herself: Aging and the Korean Female Identity Wonnie Song Abstract: This paper offers a glimpse at contemporary Korean popular culture, revealing a much more exaggerated version of the American woman’s quest for aesthetic perfection. South Korea has been dubbed the cosmetic surgery capital of Asia and this moniker is well deserved. The Korean obsession with beauty extends beyond surgery and cosmetics and into everyday items such as mainstream foods and beverages. Do Korean women experience a more intense identity crisis at a younger age? Is aging a greater nemesis for Korean women that it is for American women? I propose that aesthetic decline poses less of a threat to Korean women’s sense of self and as such, aging is a less frightening experience for Korean women than American women.

A quick glance at contemporary Korean popular culture reveals a much more exaggerated version of the American woman’s quest for aesthetic perfection. South Korea has been dubbed the cosmetic surgery capital of Asia and this moniker is well deserved. In 2005, it was reported that 50% of South Korean women in their 20s had had some form of cosmetic surgery (Scanlon, 1). New York Times article reported that in 2008 alone, an estimated “30 percent of Korean women aged 20 to 50, or some 2.4 million women, had surgical or non-surgical cosmetic procedures, with many having more than one procedure” (Fackler, 1). The Korean obsession with beauty extends beyond surgery and cosmet-

ics and into everyday items such as mainstream foods and beverages. Soonbaekcha, 17 Tea, and Thera Tea are just a few examples of the bottled tea varieties that promise weight loss, whiter, more radiant skin and firmer bodies. Indeed, as Park Sang Un observes, new words, such as eoljjang (“face king,” a person with a handsome face), momjjang (“body king,” a person with a nice body), and ssaengeol (a pretty face without any make-up), have been introduced into the Korean language to facilitate discussion of the ideal body (Park, 55). Do Korean women experience a more intense identity crisis at a younger age? Is aging, and its bodily manifestation, a greater nemesis for Korean women than it is

Woonie Song is a Trinity junior, Class of 2011, triple majoring in English, Chinese, and Arts of the Moving Image. 2010

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for American women?[1] One of the new terms that Park notes is dongan (a young looking face), which shows that youth plays a large part in the Korean ideal of female beauty as it does in its American counterpart. Indeed, the parameters of youth could be said to be even narrower than those in the US. For instance, the average age of FHM’s “Top 10 Sexiest Women of 2008” was 24.1 years old and the average age of People Magazine’s “Top 10 Sexiest Men Alive in 2008” was 31.2 years old. By contrast, the average age of the 10 most searched musicians on a given day in 2009, on the Korean search engine Naver, was 20.6 years old.[2] While Miley Cyrus might be considered a child star in the US, a Korean singer of the same age, such as Sohee of the overnight sensation, Wonder Girls, has received very little attention because of her age. Many scholars have asserted that physical appearance is important to a Korean woman’s sense of self. Indeed, sociologist Woo Keong Ja states, “[A]ppearance is one of the important factors that constitute women’s identity in Korea” (Woo, 66). In her article “Instant Repulsion: Decrepitude, The Mirror Stage, and The Literary Imagination,” American scholar Kathleen Woodward argues that we fear aging because 48

it is evidence of our own mortality. Watching our bodies, the physical signifier of ourselves, decay with time reminds us of our inevitable fate that our identities, the signified, will decay with them. She hypothesizes that, because we are afraid of this evidence of our own mortality, “we increasingly separate ourselves—what we take to be our real selves—from our bodies” (Woodward, 55). If we assume Woodward’s theory to be correct and universal, aging should be a more imminent threat to Korean female identity because youth not only plays a large role in defining a woman’s identity, but also because the standard of youth she must meet is even more stringent. Is she not more likely to disassociate herself from her body at a younger age? I believe the answer to this question lies in the re-evaluation of what comprises Korean female identity. The extent of Korea’s obsession with beauty has led many to assume the assertions that the body has become a primary resource for the construction of self-identity for Korean women hold true throughout a woman’s lifetime (Park, 42). However, I propose that physical beauty plays a much smaller part in defining Korean womanhood than an analysis of the beauty industry would lead us to believe; it is not the most crucial

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factor in forming a woman’s identity. I further argue that the importance of beauty is expected to decrease over the course of a woman’s life and hence, aesthetic decline poses less of a threat to Korean women’s sense of self. As such, aging is a less frightening experience for Korean women than American women.

desire is not a Korean woman’s primary criterion for self-identification. It can further be inferred that in Korean society, gender and sexuality are not interchangeable concepts and sexuality does not completely determine gender identity.

Indeed, although sexuality does play a part in defining a Korean Korean femininity is not dewoman’s identity, a huge component fined by sex appeal. A study conof it is defined by her relationship ducted in 2005 found that South to her family. As a direct point of Korean women’s magazines typically comparison to the previous example, featured very little sexual advertising let us consider the results of a 2006 content. The study compared the de- study of gender role portrayals in adgrees of sexuality in advertising with- vertising. The study found that “the in seven national editions of a single majority of Korean women were issue of Cosmopolitan magazine. An depicted in family and recreational arbitrary numeric value was assigned situations, while most US advertisers to the level of nudity in each of the featured women in decorative roles.” advertisements in the magazines. The study concluded that, “considerAt 1.08, the South Korean edition ing the central role that family and had one of the lowest mean scores home play in the role of Korean of nudity—1 being defined as “sexy women, this finding was not surprislips/subtle sexual nuance”—and was ing” (An and Kim, 199). Similarly, second only to the Chinese edition in a study entitled “What Makes (Nelson and Paek, 378). As marketing Koreans Happy?” researchers at campaigns seek to encourage conHoseo University, Korea, found that sumers to identify with the subjects relationships with children, parents of their advertisements, if women and siblings, and spouses ranked first, are not portrayed as sexual objects to second and third, respectively, as facthe same extent as they are in Amer- tors of happiness. The authors write, ica, we can infer that Korean women “It is worth to note that relationship are less eager to identify themselves with children was rated the most imas sexy women. The study suggests portant factor of Korean happiness. that being the object of male sexual This result seemed to reflect cultural 2010

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values of Korea…In Korea, most parents invest a lot of psychological and material resources in their children” (An et al., 284). Further, as Woo Keong Ja remarks, the trends in Korean cosmetic surgery reveal that even the aesthetic a Korean woman seeks is less sexual than the aesthetic an American woman might desire: Even in today’s reality, where the consumerist images of women’s appearance are packaged as sexual, provocative and pleasurable, Korean women express a preference for the type of face and body that seems obedient and is expected to bring good fortune to their husbands and children (Woo, 60). These examples suggest that a Korean woman’s primary identification is as a mother, not as a wife or lover. A more concrete instance of this can be seen in the vernacular that still persists in contemporary Korean interactions: upon the birth of a child, a woman’s friends and family-in-law will usually address her as “someone’s mother” rather than using her own name (Park, 50). Only those who know her in a professional context or those within her uterine family will address her by name. I propose that if motherhood is so definitive of her identity, a Korean woman will naturally be willing to move on from maidenly youth to ma50

tronly mother—without fear of the negative connotations that accompany the latter descriptor; motherhood, which can only come with age, completes her. The Confucian family ideal thus allows women to relinquish their youth with more ease than American culture does. Historically, Korean women have eagerly transitioned from maidenhood to motherhood. Rather than eventually being forced to disassociate herself from her aging body, a Korean woman would voluntarily switch the primary physical signifier of self from her own body to her child’s. The benefits of associating her identity to her son’s body would be twofold in traditional patriarchal Korea: her new embodiment would not only be younger, but also male. In an article published by the George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research, Myung-Hye Kim writes that “… during the Yi Dynasty, the son was a medium of self-expression of the mother,” and she extrapolates: South Korean mothers have a strong sense of inseparability from their children, especially their sons, and identify themselves with sons. Late-industrial capitalism endorses the filiocentric self-identity of married women and their attainment of full adulthood through motherhood (Kim, 187).

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Instead of struggling to hold on to a disembodied sense of self later in life, a Korean woman can point to a tangible body as a vessel or signifier of her identity—a child. This can explain, perhaps, the notion that Korean parents frequently derive a vicarious happiness through the success of their children (Kim et al., 284). Automatic rejuvenation and potential empowerment through masculinization aside, another advantage of this Confucian approach to aging lies in the longevity of the tradition. This intergenerational function is paradigmatic by now and guarantees mutual respect between mother and child. In an article published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology, Kyu-Taik Sung writes, “Parents too devote themselves to children. Thus, the system of filial piety resembles a mutual exchange. It appears that respect for the aged in particular is the key element which can maintain the status and integration of the aged in the industrialized society of modern Korea” (Sung, 442). Indeed, Howard Giles concurs that “It is possible that the ethic of filial piety means that young people in Asian cultures feel obliged to be respectful to elders— regardless of whether that respect is earned, and regardless of young people’s own feelings” (Giles, 22). 2010

This is clearly reflected in contemporary Korean culture. For example, the South Korean government runs a Campaign for Respect of the Elders, Respect for the Elderly Week and a Filial Piety Prize System, whereby citizens are nominated and acknowledged by the President for their devotion to their parents. The protocol and etiquette surrounding hwanghap, a celebration of a person’s 60th birthday, is equally demonstrative of this unquestioned respect. Children plan and finance a huge celebration for each parent and during the ceremony, must take a full bow to the floor before the celebrant to show their respect (Chin, 146). Similarly, in Korean wedding ceremonies, the groom will give his mother and then his bride a piggy-back ride to symbolise his acceptance of his obligations to both his mother and wife. An and Kim’s cross-cultural comparison of advertising also found that “many Korean companies engage in branding efforts and advertising campaigns that emphasize family orientation and harmony” (An and Kim, 348). The guarantee of intergenerational respect and exchange, which has long been an unchallenged concept that underlies much of Korean customs, can buffer or ease the transition a woman makes from maidenhood to motherhood.

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Finally, there is, of course, the intrinsic comfort of constancy to be found in an intergenerational relationship. In her article about the relationships between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-laws, Myung-Hye Kim argues that “women who consider motherhood as life employment continue to intervene in both familial and personal matters of their sons even after their sons marry” (Kim, 12). Time, or aging, does not challenge an identity as defined by intergenerational relationships in the way that it challenges an identity defined by a male-female dyad. The difference is biological: in the case of the former, the bond is eternal and no subsequent event can change a mother’s relationship to her child. However, in the latter case, the relationship is changeable. There is an inherent sexual component to a dyad, and where sexuality is involved, we must leave room for eventual change because the body, through which sexuality is expressed, must face what Woodward so frankly describes as the “biological fact of decay” (Woodward, 49). Furthermore, the relationship between a mother and child is exclusive—a mother is irreplaceable, biologically speaking—but a sexual partner can be replaced. The patriarchy of both American and Korean societies means that the threat of this reality affects women more than it 52

does men. In short, a woman whose primary identification is through motherhood is less likely to feel her identity threatened with the passage of time and, therefore, less likely to be defensive or insecure about aging. Thus, even when a Korean woman ages, her sense of identity is not threatened in the way that an American woman’s might be. A Korean woman can maintain her “cult of self ” at any age because an aging body does not challenge her identity in the same way. This is because Korean society makes a greater distinction between sexuality and gender identity than American society does. Instead, Korean femininity is defined by motherhood; the collectivist nature of Korean society allows women to identify with a body outside of their own and thereby rejuvenate and empower themselves as they age. The maternal bond is guaranteed and preserved both by social paradigm and by biological truth. The stakes of this argument are huge, theoretically at least. Korean women’s attitudes toward the aging process draw attention to the fact that American women’s fear of aging is socially induced. The idea that old age necessarily leads to a loss or crisis of identity depends on the premise that female identity is

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consistently and primarily derived from a woman’s sexuality; American womanhood is defined in relation to manhood in the context of a dyadic yet unilateral relationship. The Korean model presents a fundamentally different alternative. However, it would be rash and naïve to conclude that the Korean model is any less patriarchal—Korean women are no less objectified. The objectification is simply of different nature. Korean femininity is eroticized to a lesser degree but it is still defined in terms of another’s masculinity. Only when a woman mothers a son does she become an individual of worth. Indeed, MyungHye Kim writes: The daughter-in-law was a semi-member of her husband’s patrilineal family, and became a full member only after her death as an ancestor of the son she bore. When she bore a son, the daughter-in-law was freed from her first obligation in the husband’s family, namely, perpetuating the family, and was treated better by family members (Kim, 187). Further, as the obsession with beauty evinces, a Korean women does rely upon her sexuality to some degree in her youth. However, rather than hoping to be an object of sexual desire her whole life, a Korean woman seeks to be an object of sexual desire 2010

in her youth and then refocuses her ambitions to be the perfect mother; the male gaze to which she caters shifts from her husband’s to her son’s. I would argue, though, that this is the lesser of the two evils as the power dynamic of a mother-son relationship is more flexible and bilateral than that of a husband-wife relationship. We have seen that a different relative definition of identity makes aging an entirely different process for Korean women. One question I would like to further investigate is whether the situation Korea will change as women’s lives are increasingly defined outside of the home and domestic arena. This status quo may be generation-specific and the mentality I have discussed may only apply to the generation of women to whom aging is currently an issue. Many scholars have noted that there might be a generation of women who might suffer a double loss (Giles et al., 2003; Myung-Hye Kim, 1996; Oh, 1996). These women might have submitted to the authority of their mothers-in-law, traditionally the most powerful role a woman can have, yet will be unable to exercise the same sort of control over their own daughters-in-law due to the reluctance of younger generations to subscribe to traditional values. Already there

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are signs that Korean family politics are changing rapidly. For example, the New York Times reported that the Korean divorce rate increased by 250% between 1993 and 2003, in keeping with women’s rising social status (Onishi, 1). What sort of ramifications will these changes have upon the Korean female aging experience? Will the young women of today, who have invested so much time, money and blood into looking perfect, have a harder time letting go of their youth? Footnotes 1. The scope of this paper does not allow me to fully consider the intricacies of what might comprise womanhood in either nationhood (such as the interplay of socioeconomic factors, ethnic background and so on). I will, therefore, operate on the assumption that the overall discrepancies between Korean and American women overshadow intra-national discrepancies enough to warrant my discussion of them as two blocs. 2. I could not find a comparable “sexiest” list in Korean magazines. I would argue that Korea’s music industry is very image-oriented and that a musician’s popularity is a more accurate indicator of their sex appeal than their musical ability. although “sexiest celebrity” and “most popular musician” are not exactly parallel search parameters, there are grounds for comparison.

References An, Daechun and Sanghoon Kim. “Relating Hofstede’s Masculinity Dimension to Gender Role Portrayals in Advertising: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Web Advertisements.” International Marketing Review 24.2 (2007): 181-207. Barak, Benny, Anil Mathur, Keun Lee and Yong Zhang. “Perceptions of Age-Identity: A Cross-Cultural Inner-Age Exploration.” Psychology & Marketing 18.10 (2001): 1003-1029) Chin, Soo-Young. “Korean Birthday Rituals.” Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 6 (1991): 145-152. Fackler, Martin. “Economy Blunts Korea’s Appetite for Plastic Surgery.” New York Times 1 Jan. 2009. 14 Apr. 2009 <http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/business/ worldbusiness/02plastic.html?fta=y>. Giles, Howard. Kimberly A. Noels, Angie Williams, Hiroshi Ota, Tae-Seop Lim, Sik Hung Ng, Ellen B. Ryan and Lilnabeth Somera. “Intergenerational Communications Across Cultures: Young People’s Perceptions of Conversations with Family Elders, Non-Family Elders and Same-Age Peers.” Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 18 (2003): 1-32. Kim, Myung-Hye. “Changing Relationships between Daughters-in-Law and Mothers-in-Law in Urban South Korea.” Anthropological Quarterly 69.4 (1996): 179-192. Kim, Myung So, Hye Won Kim, Kyeong Ho Cha and Jeeyoung Lim. “What Makes

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Koreans Happy?: Exploration on the Structure of Happy Life Among Korean adults.” Sung, Kyu-Taik. “Family-Centered InforSocial Indicators Research 82 (2007): 265mal Support Networks of Korean Elderly: 286. the Resistance of Cultural Traditions.” Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 6 Kim, Taeyon. “Neo-Confucian Body Tech- (1991): 431-447. niques: Women’s Bodies in Korea’s Consumer Society.” Body & Society 9.2 (2003): Sung, Yongjun and Spencer F. Tinkham. 97-113. “Brand Personality Structures in the Naver Popular Searches: Singers. 14 Apr. United States and Korea: Common and 2009. Naver Search Engine. 14 Apr. 2009. Culture-Specific Factors.” Journal of Con<http://searchc.naver.com/pw/index. sumer Psychology 15.4 (2005): 334-350. nhn?where=people&section=0> Nelson, Michelle R. and Hye-Jin Park. “Cross-Cultural Differences in Sexual Advertising Content in a Transnational Women’s Magazine.” Sex Roles 53.5 (2005): 371-383.

Yun, Rebecca J. and Margie E. Lachman. “Perceptions of Aging in Two Cultures: Korean and American Views on Old Age.” Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 21 (2006): 55-70.

Onishi, Norimitsu. “Divorce in South Korea: Striking a New Attitudes.” New York Times 21 Sept. 2003. 14 Apr. 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/21/ world/divorce-in-south-korea-striking-anew-attitude.html?pagewanted=1>

Woo, Keong Ja. “The Beauty Complex and the Cosmetic Surgery Industry.” Korea Journal 44.2 (2004): 53-82.

Park, Keong-Suk, Voonchin Phua, James McNally and Rongjun Sun. “Diversity and Structure of Intergenerational Relationships: Elderly Parent-Adult Child Relations in Korea.” Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 20 (2005): 285-305.

Woodward, Kathleen. “Instant Repulsion: Decrepitude, The Mirror Stage, and The Literary Imagination,” Kenyon Review 5.4 (Fall 1983): 43– 66.

Park, Sang Un. “‘Beauty Will Save you’: The Myth and Ritual of Dieting in Korean Society.” Korea Journal 47.2 (2007): 42-71. Scanlon, Charles. “The Price of Beauty in South Korea.” BBC News 3 Feb. 2005. 14 Apr. 2009. <http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_ correspondent/4229995.st> 2010

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Reasons behind the Increase in China’s Exports of Electrical and Electronic Products Chen (Alice) Ding Abstract: In the late 1990s, the percentage of “sophisticated” products, such as electronics and machinery, in China’s total exports has begun to increase while the percentage of goods with lower technological requirements in production, such as apparel, has begun to decrease. This paper explains the two reasons that contribute to the increase in China’s exports of electrical and electronic products from 1993 to 2008: processing trade and industrial upgrading. Data on China’s trade with other East Asian countries and foreign direct investments from these countries show that processing trade is the more influential factor; Chinese government policies during this period have helped induce such FDI-led processing trade. Industrial upgrading has occurred in rare cases of technological spillovers from foreign firms with a presence in China and in cases of state-sponsored research and development in various local Chinese firms. Although both factors have contributed to this change in China’s export structure, the increase in the volume of processing trade is the more dominant factor.

Introduction It is a well known fact that China’s exports have increased drastically since the beginning of the 1990s. From $91.7 billion in 1993 to $1.4307 trillion in 2008, the increase is staggering (United Nations Statistical Division). However, it is not simply the dollar value of the exports that has changed, but also China’s export composition. In the late 1990s, the percentage of “sophisticated” products, such as electronics and machinery, of China’s total exports has begun to increase while the percentage of goods with lower technological requirements in pro-

duction, such as apparel, decreased (Cui and Syed 9). There are many potential reasons behind this phenomenon, and the existing literature on this subject provides many different interpretations. In the existing literature discussing the factors that have changed China’s export composition, there are two main camps of opinions. One group believes that the change in export composition is due to China’s industrial upgrading. The most prominent voice in this group is Dani Rodrik, who specifies that government policies create economic environments that are conducive to

Chen (Alice) Ding is a Trinity junior, Class of 2011, double majoring in Economics and International Comparative Studies

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shifting the export structure toward high-tech products. In other words, “factor endowments and ‘other economic fundamentals’” cannot fully explain this phenomenon of industrial upgrading (Rodrik, 4). His argument is based on the assumption that in a developing country, investors considering entry into “new, non-traditional activities face considerable uncertainty about the costs of operation” (Rodrik, 5). These early entrants bear all the costs of failures. On the other hand, if they succeed, they will provide technology and information spillovers as other firms emulate these early investors. As a result, innovative investments must be prompted by non-market forces, namely, the government. Once the first entrants succeed, new firms will enter immediately. Thus, according to Rodrik, strategic government policies have prompted the increase in more sophisticated exports. The other group believes that the change in export composition is not caused by a change in the export production structure. Rather, the trends of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflow as well as those of exports and imports to China suggest that no significant industrial upgrading occurs; the increased sophistication in China’s export bundle is due to the fact that multinational corporations export sophisticated compo2010

nents from their home countries to China, which then assembles these components to be exported to other countries, such as the U.K., France, Germany, and the U. S. (Liang, 108). In other words, China ends up in substantial processing trade in export production, focusing on the laborintensive steps that do not require sophisticated technology (Liang, 106). Like Rodrik, experts of this opinion point to the Chinese government’s policies as an influential factor contributing to the current export structure; specifically, this situation is caused by China’s policies on imports and on FDI, which end up encouraging FDI-led processing trade. For example, some intermediate inputs are imported duty-free (Liang 107). Before this duty-free policy, although imported materials used in production by foreign invested enterprises (FIE) had been taxed, tax exemptions and rebates can be used on exports that utilize these imports. This policy has directly promoted an environment favorable to processing trade (Liang, 107). Exports of Electrical, Electronic Products Exports of electrical and electronic products, the dependent variable in this paper, take up a significant portion of China’s sophisticated

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exports and have increased percentage-wise from 1993 to 1998. Two independent variables help explain this increase; the more important contributing factor is the increase in processing trade, and the less influential variable is industrial upgrading. These two factors directly influence the increasing percentage of electronics in exports, but it must be noted that each factor is a situation created by numerous other factors, which in turn have their own causes, resulting in a chain of causations. Thus, the two main factors are in actuality two chains of causations. The data on electronics is retrieved from the UN Comtrade database. The commodities are categorized according to two-digit HS1992 codes. Out of the 97 categories, three categories have always been in the top-four in terms of percentages of total exports from years 1993 to 2008; these categories are “electrical, electronic equipment,” “articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet,” and “articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet” (United Nations Statistical Division). The two categories of apparel are combined into one because, for the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to distinguish knit apparel from non-knit. First, I have compared the percentages of apparel in total exports to the percentages of electrical and electronic equipments 58

(“electronics” for brevity) over the years 1993 to 2008. It is important to compare the export trends of electronics to those of apparel because both categories are prominent in China’s exports. Figure 1 suggests that before 1995, apparel was slightly more dominant than electronics, but in the following years, electronics have grown at a much faster rate than apparel although apparel certainly has continued to grow. Shown as percentages of total exports in figure 2, the contrast between apparel and electronics is glaring. The percentage of electronics exhibits a continual upward trend while the percentage of apparel exhibits a downward trend. Why do exports of electronics increase much faster than exports of apparel while both are top categories of export commodities? To answer this question, I draw on insights from the existing literature by combining the opinions of the two camps. Chain I: Processing Trade The increase in processing trade (in dollar value and percentages) is the main reason for the increase in the percentage of electronics in total exports. While China is exporting an increasing amount of electronics, it does not participate in much valueadded production. In fact, China’s

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overall processing trade increased both in dollar value and in percentage of total trade (Liang, 110). In table 1, processing exports increased from 40.9% of total exports in 1990 to 54.7% in 2005. Granted, there is a possibility that the trends in overall processing trade may not apply to the category of electronics. However, the increase in processing trade with little value-added production can also be interpreted through the relationship between high-tech imports and exports in figure 3. As shown, the imports and exports of high-tech products display a nearly perfect correlation although in recent years, from 2003 or so, exports have grown faster than imports. The reason for this pattern of processing trade and the correlation in imports and exports of sophisticated products is the Asian production network. More specifically, the countries of the Asian production network are increasing their FDI in China. Foreign invested enterprises (FIE) over all make up over 70% of the total processing trade in China while countries or regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore claim approximately 60% of all FDI to China from the late 1990s until 2008 (Liang 110, United Nations Statistical Division). For comparison, the U.S. contributes less than 5% of the total FDI that China receives (United Nations 2010

Statistical Division). Most of the firms from these Asian countries are efficiency-driven; the products that are assembled in China are eventually exported to other countries, mainly Western European countries and the U.S (Liang, 108). Electronics are particularly prominent commodities. Unfinished electronic or electrical components dominate the top-ten commodities exported to China from the Asian countries (Lee et al., 4). Unfinished products imply a future step of assembly into finished products in China. These Asian countries have sharply increased their FDI into China particularly after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (figure 4). For instance, Hong Kong, the largest contributor of FDI out of these Asian countries, doubled its FDI between 2005 and 2008, seen in figure 4. The reason for the increase in FDI is that after China joined the WTO, China has become more integrated into the global economy, and Chinese goods can enter more markets. Taking advantage of this condition combined with Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cheap labor costs, efficiency-driven foreign Asian firms create subsidiaries in China through joint ventures with domestic firms or as wholly foreign-owned firms.

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upgrading should theoretically occur through two channels, though both are related and influence each other. The second reason that reOne is through government policies. sults in higher percentages of elecThe second is through technology tronics in exports in recent years is spillovers unguided by government industrial upgrading. Although not prevalent, some industrial upgrading policies. The first reason is differenhas occurred. As seen in table 1, the tiated from the second in that the former intentionally transfers knowlvalue-added rate in China’s over all edge to domestic firms and market processing trade has increased from while the latter may be unintentional 17.8% in 1993 to 34.2% in 2005, or driven purely by market forces. which means the expansion of the processing trade also correlates with However, due to the monopolizing behaviors of wholly foreign-owned value-added production. However, in the case of electronics production enterprises, the first reason, government policies, has far more real for exports, industrial upgrading is effects on industrial upgrading while far less influential than the increase in processing trade because industrial the so-called spillovers effects are not upgrading is still rather limited. This prominent. is mainly due to the fact that FIE’s, The Chinese government’s “particularly wholly foreign-owned policies aiming to induce industrial enterprises, monopolize high-tech upgrading target two groups: the production and generate little spilldomestic firms and foreign invesover to their local counterparts” tors. To help purely domestic firms, (Liang, 110). It also does not help the government pours money into the domestic industry when wholly R&D. While the majority of stateforeign owned enterprises “tend sponsored firms fail, some do achieve to adopt higher-level technologies success, notably Lenovo (Rodrik, 14). than joint ventures” (Xu, 8). This means that whatever technology that This method of helping domestic firms is highly inefficient since most spreads to domestic firms may not investments are wasted on failed even be the latest technology. However, this does not mean that no tech- operations, and industrial upgrading nology transfers to the domestic firm achieved through this method is not at all. It merely suggests that the pro- widespread at all. However, efficiency cess through which the technology is of state sponsorship is unrelated to the topic of this paper; the result of transferred is inefficient. Industrial Chain II: Industrial Upgrading

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state sponsorship is what matters. In face of prominent brand names like Lenovo and Haier, one cannot deny that some industrial upgrading has in fact occurred through state sponsorship. As for foreign investors, the central government and the local governments use both carrots and sticks in attracting FDI, such as giving tax breaks and requiring foreign investors to enter into joint ventures with domestic firms. (On top of such requirements, government policy has also promoted the proliferation of economic and technological development zones, and high-tech industrial zones. Their share of China’s exports “has risen from less than 6% in 1995 to about 25% in 2005 (Wang and Wei ,226).) For instance, in consumer electronics, fully foreign firms are rare in China. Instead, the industry is mostly composed by joint ventures, followed by non-FDI domestic firms (Rodrik, 14). The government has made recent changes to export and import policies to discourage processing trade, which in turn promotes industrial upgrading. For instance, a regulation passed in September 2006 removes export tax rebates for a list of prohibited products under processing trade; such products are “primarily low-value-added, high-energy consumption, and high-pollution products” (Liang, 114).

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Conclusion Given the current data, it is clear that processing trade is the dominant reason for the increase in percentage of electronic product exports in the past 16 years. Increasing FDI from such East Asian countries goes toward low-value-added production in China instead of contributing to industrial upgrading. The strong correlation between imports and exports of sophisticated products demonstrates that China imports unfinished sophisticated parts from other East Asian countries, and then it simply assembles the parts without adding much value in this portion of the production chain. Very little industrial upgrading has occurred because technological spillovers from foreign firms are rare, and because the Chinese government’s method of inducing sophisticated research and development is highly inefficient. While industrial upgrading is not very prevalent currently, the trend is increasing. Over time, one may see less processing trade between China and other Asian countries and more sophisticated production in China. However, we must wait a few years to see new developments, particularly because of new policies aimed to restrict processing trade.

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Reasons behind the Increase in Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Exports of Electrical and Electronic Products

Figure 1

Figures

Data collected from UN Comtrade Database.

Figure 2

Data collected from UN Comtrade Database.

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Figure 3

Source: Sachwald, F. 2006. “China, High or Low Tech Power? The Contrasted Picture of China’s Scientific and Technological Capabilities.” 2006 Tokyo Club Macro Conference.

Figure 4

Direct Source: Lee, H. Y., and C. A. Ding and J. Liu. 2009. “The Impact of the Asian Production 2010

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Network on Chinese Exports to the U.S.” Duke University.

Figure 5

Direct source: Lee, H. Y., and C. A. Ding and J. Liu. 2009. “The Impact of the Asian Production Network on Chinese Exports to the U.S.” Duke University.

Table 1

Source: Liang, Y. 2008. “Why Are China’s Exports Special?”. The Chinese Economy 41, no. 6: 110.

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References Amiti, M., and C. Freund. 2007. “China’s Export Boom.” Finance & Development 44, no. 3: 38–41.

Xu, B. 2007. “The Impact of Foreign MNEs on Export Sophistication of Host Countries: Evidence from China.” China Europe International Business School.

Cui, L., and M. Syed. “The Shifting Structure of China’s Trade and Production.” IMF Working Paper. Lee, H. Y., and C. A. Ding and J. Liu. 2009. “The Impact of the Asian Production Network on Chinese Exports to the U.S.” Duke University. Liang, Y. 2008. “Why Are China’s Exports Special?”. The Chinese Economy 41, no. 6: 99-118. Rodrik, D. 2006. “What’s So Special About China’s Exports?”. NBER Working Paper No.11947 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). Sachwald, F. 2006. “China, High or Low Tech Power? The Contrasted Picture of China’s Scientific and Technological Capabilities.” 2006 Tokyo Club Macro Conference. United Nations Statistical Division. (2009). Data retrieved December 2, 2009, from http://comtrade.un.org/ Wang, Z., and S. Wei. 2008. “The Chinese Export Bundles: Patterns, Puzzles and Possible Explanations.” ICRIER Working Paper No. 226.

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The Rising Tide: China’s Surging Internet Growth and the Resulting Policy Repercussions Michael Ma Abstract: Since its inception, the Internet has been an immense nexus for data transfer and global communication. Though the People’s Republic of China was relatively late to embrace the Internet phenomenon, a tremendous amount of web development has occurred in recent years. Despite the potential benefit of the Internet to its billion-plus denizens, the Chinese Communist Party has created one of the world’s foremost web sentry systems – the Golden Shield Project. Parisian-based Reporters Without Borders, an international non-governmental organization, has ranked China 163rd out of a total 169 countries in terms of freedom of the press. Mounting external pressures, as well as increased investments in Internet accessibility and surging cyberspace traffic, will prompt the CCP to reexamine its Internet policing regulations. Priority in this paper has been given towards the historical buildup of Internet technologies in China, diagnosis of present Internet use in China through empirical data, and realistic public policy recommendations for China’s future. Recent transgressions, such as Google’s wavering decision to remain in China despite lackluster performance and looming cyber-security threats – will also be examined in detail.

political weather and unscrupulous media coverage. Priority in this paper In this paper I will analyze the has been given towards the reflection on the past buildup of internet contemporary internet situation in technologies, diagnosis of the present the People’s Republic of China, a internet use through empirical data, nation that is quickly polarizing the and social policy recommendations globe as an eminent second superfor the future. I have tried to minipower contender, through the lens mize unnecessary political commenof sociology. I hope that the use tary or expression of personal atof social science methodology can titudes wherever appropriate. In this overcome biases of contemporary discourse on this topic, which is often paper, I will address the core issue of censorship of the Internet in China, spurred on by the unpredictable strategies that can be explored by Introduction

Michael Ma is a first-year humanities master’s student who is concentrating in Sociology.

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government officials, and finally, realistic recommendations that China can adopt in the 21st century. Issues Although a relatively recent invention, the Internet has revolutionized the way people obtain information and communicate around the world. Its original use was for file sharing, but today, it is used for numerous rationales including email, the World Wide Web, streaming media, and collaboration. It is estimated that as many as 1.4 billion people have used the Internet, proving the ubiquitous nature of its existence (Noguchi, 2008). Thus, the growth of the World Wide Web has possibly been the single greatest trend in the incorporation of a digital lifestyle for the average human. Even more recent to the use of the Internet has been China. With the rapid growth of its economy Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s desire to use the Internet liberally has grown. However, the Chinese government has produced one of the most extensive internet censorship networks in the world, in accordance with the values of their culture and their government officials. Reporters Without Borders, a non-governmental international organization that advocates freedom of the press, publishes a Worldwide Press Free2010

dom Index each year. According to this prevalent index, China places 163 out of 169 for freedom of press (Grenzen, 2008). As a comparative barometer, the United States is 48 on the list, and Russia is 144. Since the onset of the Internet in China, the government has been policing the Internet, choosing what its citizens can and cannot see. The main reason for this policy is that the Chinese government is trying to protect the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interest and it feels as though the Internet could provide a potential threat to its existence. Thus, the Chinese government has invested billions of dollars to develop matrix systems to censor content and limit personal freedoms on the Internet. The issue of censorship in China is a fairly recent one, as China was late to pick up on the use of the Internet. As Asia was quickly engulfed by the internet in the past ten years, China was forced to take action regarding censorship, and recent studies have shown that China has 94 million internet users, half of whom have broadband access (Esther, 2005). The sheer size of Internet usage in China proves the robust job that the Chinese government faces when trying to regulate the Internet. Censorship in China is conducted under a variety of laws and administrative regulations developed

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by the government throughout the years. This is done largely through the existence of an Internet police task force that is in charge of both developing the technological software used in censoring, as well as ensuring that adherence to the rules occurs (Kahn, 2006). In order to spearhead the initiation of a program directed towards censoring content on the Internet, the Ministry of Public Security created the Golden Shield Project. Started in 2003, this project had the desired goals of constructing a communication network and computer information system for government officials to improve their capabilities and efficiencies in policing the Internet. This culminated in the creation of the “Great Firewall of China,” which uses all of the complex technological hardware and software to censor content. The next few paragraphs will serve to discuss the ways in which China has been so prolific in censoring content on the Internet. Although China has spent billions of dollars implementing technology used for censorship, including the reportedly $800 million Golden Shield Project, China has created the largest firewall in the world. One reason why this is possible is because China has rewired the fiber optic cables to only enter the country in one of three points: Beijing-Qingda68

do-Tianjin in the north, Shanghai on the central coast, and Guangzhou in the South where it comes from Hong Kong (Fallows, 2008). By doing so, they essentially limited the number of places where they have to monitor and control content. At each of these three international gateways, China has installed tappers, which is a new technology that can mirror every packet of data going in or out, including lightly encrypted caches. Information travels along fiber-optic cables as little pulses of light, and as they travel to these international points, numerous tiny Chinese mirrors bounce reflections and separate the data, which then gets analyzed by Golden Shield computers that decide whether or not the content should be flagged. The Golden Shield computers are programmed to detect and stop information and do so according to four different pieces of technological software. The first is the DNS (Domain Name Service) block, which in laymen terms, is the telephone directory of Internet sites. Each Web address coincides with a number sequence such as 38.1456.555, and if the number sequence matches the number sequence of a website on the forbidden list provided by the government, then the DNS will give back no address. This is how the Chinese government prevents citizens from going to specific websites,

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such as <www.freetibet.org>.

tual contents of each page. Although the exact software coding utilized is The second piece of technolnot directly known, engineers have ogy they utilize is the connect phase. developed a way where the tiny senAfter allowing the web address to sors can actually scan the content on be processed, the computers can every page, judging page-by-page the still prohibit the connection to this website’s accessibility. Whenever surwebsite and will interrupt the transveillance systems flag an IP address mission and prevent it from going or see prohibited content within the through. This scenario applies as an mirrors, authorities have developed early deterrent to ‘harmful’ e-mails technologies that can pinpoint the sent by China’s internet users, espeorigination of that search. Thus, cially if the e-mail server is located there is a good chance that the auwithin national boundaries. The thorities know what registered user/ third barrier that the Golden Shield address is sitting at the computer and project possesses is the URL keyword where the terminal is located. Within block. Although the numerical Inter- a short duration of time, sometimes net address that one is trying to reach less than half-an-hour, authorities might not be on the blacklist, the can be at their door threatening words in the URL might include for- imprisonment, or they can readily bidden terms. If this is the case, the find the address of the home or café computers are designed once again in order to mandate fines and further to pick up on this, and the connecrestrictions on Internet usage. An extion will be reset. An example of this ample of this was the story of jourmay be a website that is not prohibnalist Shi Tao who had used a Yahoo ited by the government, but contains email account to post pro-democracy the word ‘Falun Gong’, which is in materials online. Within a week, local fact a search term prohibited by the authorities searched his residence, government. This will be picked up arrested him on suspicion of acting by the computational mirrors and against the government, and jailed prevented from being patched or him for months. Using the new techtransmitted. nology of page-by-page scanning, the computer systems picked up Tao’s The final protective barrier blog and the pro-democratic comthat the Chinese government has is ments that he wrote, and rerouted perhaps the most sophisticated and warnings to the proper officials of secretive of the four: scanning the ac- the crime. This example shows how 2010

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serious the Chinese government is about upholding the regulations that they have in place regarding Internet usage. The censoring of content by the Chinese government has had a great effect on the population of China. This includes not only the general population, but also the academic world as well. The majority of China’s population does not have direct access to the Internet, so the use of Internet café’s in China is extremely popular. These internet cafés are called Net Bars, and over 50,000 of them exist throughout all of China. Net Bars have been particularly hard to regulate, so from October to December of 2004, Chinese authorities closed over 12,000 Net Bars and implemented more stringent laws regarding Internet usage, providing a further inconvenience for the general population. Not only is it extremely hard to get internet access in your own home, which mostly only the wealthy are fortunate enough to afford, but Net Bars now have their own guidelines that they must follow in addition to the typical Golden Shield protocols. In 2005, China implemented new rules banning children under the age of sixteen from Net Bars and required that business owners keep detailed logs for 60 days of Internet usage and 70

the pages visited by the customers. In addition, people must sign in with specific identification cards before they are granted access to the Internet. Firstly, this vastly limits the way children are able to access the Internet. With many homes not having Internet connections, children often must rely on computers at school to access the Internet, which severely limits their capabilities to communicate and obtain relevant information. This stringent Chinese control also has large effects on academia; it is becoming increasingly hard for researchers and scholars to obtain necessary and harmless information that is crucial to their studies. For example, Professor Chu Huongqi of Beijing Normal University commented that if a Chinese researcher, or any researcher for that matter, wanted to study the Tiananmen Square “situation,” they could not simply put that into Google China and come up with adequate results. Rather, a study at the Beckman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School found that the only results obtained when entering Tiananmen Square related to tourism and the travel industry (Zittrain & Edelman, 2005). They did conclude, however, that China is by no means static, and the list of prohibited sites is updated daily and

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sites are blocked and then unblocked arbitrarily. However, this still suggests that researchers have trouble accessing relevant information because of technological software that China has developed which censors and prohibits specific content.

As the Harvard Law Study concluded, there is inconsistency within Mainland China as to what is censored and what is not censored. During the course of the empirical study at Harvard, specific news sites such as CNN and Slashdot were blocked and unblocked in the course The uneven implementation of a week. Researchers concluded of policy that the Chinese governthat news sites with sensitive content ment has enacted is quite surprising. do not appear to take long to be For example, none of the censorship blocked, but are taken off the proseen throughout Mainland China hibited list with similar expediency. is seen in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Thus, it is not explicitly known what Macau. Rather, these regions have criteria is used to evaluate which sites essentially free Internet, and most are to be censored and which sites internet restrictions do not exist in are not to be. Specifically, pornogthese territories. In Taiwan, their raphy is considered to be one of the own municipal government regulates most heinous crimes on the internet their internet and has done so more in China next to blogging about the liberally than the Chinese governgovernment; yet during the course ment had previously. In Hong Kong, of the Harvard Study, only 13.4% of a lot of the same laws do exist, but the sample of well-known sexually there are virtually no consequences explicit sites seemed to be blocked for violating the rules vis-a-vis blogfrom access by the government (comging or using external servers to alpared to 86.2% of the same sites low sites (Kahn, 2006). Even pornog- blocked in Saudi Arabia). Nevertheraphy is de-regulated in Hong Kong less, sites dealing with such generic and is fairly accepted by mainstream concepts as democracy or massacre society. On the other hand, the Chi- are almost always prohibited by the nese government is much stricter government. Thus, the Chinese incensoring Tibet because of its past ternet policies are by no means static, history with the region, and comand there is a great deal of dynamic puter systems are even more limiting inconsistency within the regulation as to what they allow and what they of policy itself. donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t allow.

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The increased global attention of censorship within China has resulted in the creation of a number of devious ways by which people sidestep the restrictions and are able to get the information they need or want. Although it was previously believed that only businesses (especially those based offshore) were capable of sidestepping the restrictions via private cache reserves and encrypted data packet streamlining, recent research has indicated that the general population has the capability, given enough technical knowledge and effort, to get around the censors. The first way that people get around the firewall is through a proxy server. A proxy server in essence is a way of connecting a computer inside China with another computer outside out China, allowing it to retrieve information from American or Japanese servers and transferring it to Chinese ones. This is a cheap way to get around the regulations, which makes it popular among students and hackers. Using proxy servers does, however, make Internet usage very slow, so more businesses choose to use VPN’s, or Virtual Private Networks. The VPN basically creates your own private, encrypted channel to run alongside the normal Internet and can transfer information from 72

a server outside China to one inside China. VPN’s only cost $40 per year, but for the average Chinese worker who makes a little over a dime a day, this cost is too exorbitant and cannot be used (Fallows, 2008). Although this problem is easily correctable by the government, the bottom line is that every bank, every foreign manufacturing company, and every retailer needs VPN’s to exist, and the Chinese government could not survive without the survival of these firms. Thus, although certain individuals are now exploiting the loopholes in the system, the Chinese government currently has little choice and must allow some exceptions to its control if it wants the economy and its culture to remain intact. Since there are currently loopholes within the censoring system, it is evident that the Chinese government needs assistance by various companies and organizations throughout China and the rest of the world. It is simply not reasonable for China to police the internet by themselves, so they have adopted policies to garner help from others. The Internet Society, which is a state-owned ISP, recently enacted laws requiring that domestic internet providers, as well as content creators, sign a pledge that they will self-filter. Though somewhat flimsily dependent on self-

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governance, this is the first line of defense for the government. By having the domestic Internet providers such as Baidu self-filter, they eliminate a great deal of work that they would otherwise have to do on their own. It also shifts some of the costs from the government to the corporations. This also applies to search engines in China such as Google. There was a lot of public outrage in America that Google entered the Chinese market knowing that they would be censored, calling it un-democratic and anti-American. However, Google was faced with only two live options: enter and comply with Chinese internet procedures or ignore the Chinese market altogether (Ghitis, 2006). There was no third option for Google of entering the Chinese market and refusing to comply with state-imbued policies.

even those that pledge to make large direct investments in technological infrastructure and software improvements. Not wanting to miss out on an exponentially expanding consumer market, most foreign firms are willing to sacrifice some or their organizational morals and typical protocols to take share in some of the burgeoning profits. Google is only one of the countless examples of foreign firms (including Cisco Systems, who allegedly helped create the mirror software that the Chinese government employs) that have succumbed to the pressure of the Chinese government in order to gain profit from this new emerging market. Policy Alternatives

In line with the other powerful nations on the planet and the rest of the world as a whole â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the internet is Not entering the Chinese becoming an ever-increasingly difmarket would have extensively dam- ficult entity to monitor. The act of aged the potential economic success trying to contain this phenomena for the company, and Google was not from conducting its course becomes ready to sit back and allow competi- a difficult, if not impossible, decision tors compete for valuable internaaltogether. Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stringent internet tional market share. A series of unpolicies and strict codes of conduct yielding transparency requests from are becoming harder and harder to the search engine Altavista back in enforce, especially as the number of the early 2000â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hindered its entrance Chinese internet users and younger to the Chinese sector. This proves generations familiar with computer the power that the Chinese governsystems increases (Kahn, 2006). After ment yields over foreign companies, much analysis of the current situa2010

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tion and outlook on China’s internet system, a total of three feasible solutions were conceived to represent realistic and ‘live’ options for the ruling party. First, China could decide to restrict internet even further than they are currently doing in order to demonstrate the concept of protecting the ‘security’ of the state and elevating it way above the rights of the individual. All inbound and outbound e-mail would be filtered and flagged for sensitive information, while intense server notification systems would alert authorities over potential ‘trouble-makers’. More ‘illegal’ websites would be blocked from Chinese users, and the list of internet offenses would be updated on a constant basis. What this means is that the Chinese government would have to invest heavily in upgrading existing technological monitoring systems and establishing a larger budget portion (currently unknown) to pay the increased hike in the recruitment of additional ‘internet police’. Of course, labor in China is not very expensive, and with the esoteric design of the current system in place, China would not have to radically alter anything. It can be expected that some protests would break out amongst the population internally, but nothing radical (i.e. Tiananmen Square) 74

would be expected. Note that this choice is hardly discussed among academic critics or political figureheads of the Western world – many believe that China’s current system is already acceptable as it is and do not entertain the thought of it getting any worse. But for fairness’ sake, this presentable option must be included into the list of all possible choices for the CCP. Second, the Chinese government could open up the internet by increasing users’ freedoms within Chinese-governed provinces. The mobilization towards such a move would be simple; the Chinese government could choose to literally do nothing. All existing internet security personnel would be redirected towards other jobs in the government, and the current firewalls and filtering systems would all but become obsolete by the year’s end. In this regard, the actual mechanism of the choice is a passive one – increased internet freedom generally means a lower rate of governance and an increased expectation on personal discipline, which should not be a problem for many Chinese. However, the strain on the Chinese government in making this decision is actively opening up the possibility that China’s state rule will be suspect to revolutionary change in its functional role as the

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authoritative government. Individuals within China might see this slack in policy as the catalyst for China to slide down that slippery slope into eventual democracy. While many external nations and organizations would like to see this progressive change within China, it is not clear how well China will take any significant alterations to its rule. The economic, social, and political impacts would be entirely impossible to accurately predict from within Chinese Communist Party rule, much less a limited Western perspective. If Russia’s transformation to democracy is any example of what a communist state must go through in order to reach true democratic ideology, then the option of reducing control on citizens becomes unappetizing.

tions if China stays on course. This would give the CCP an unbiased and clear head to think things through, with the possibility of testing minor technical policies or regulatory techniques along the way.

Keep in mind that, for all of the three choices listed, there is very little actual public involvement in this policy. The unique setting of the dominant Chinese government gives it ultimate reign in matters like these, which are considered quasi-issues of national security. As such, the ramifications of a potentially wrong choice are almost internally (within China, that is) nonexistent, save for a few localized incidents or minor protests. In other words, no matter what policy China chooses, all will be considered to be superficially ‘correct’ Third, the Chinese governby the Chinese population because ment may decide to play it by ear there will not be any public dissent and maintain the current system un- tolerated. Thus forth, it is extremely til it reaches a critical point at which difficult to accurately gauge the level it is forced to confront the two above of agreement that the majority of options. Waiting it out would give the Chinese internet users will have with Chinese government more time to any of the policies selected above. consider all possible risks and benefits All quantitative or qualitative data associated with either of the above may be skewed in favor of a rather choices. In addition, there should not ‘nationalistic’ mindset, rather than be much increased negative publicity to reflect a true, discerning common on China’s current practices as long perception (Abrams, 2008). as they maintain the status quo – that is, things should not get much worse Let us consider, without inin the public spotlight of Western na- cidental bias, the effects of other 2010

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highly restrictive internet systems in the world, as rated by prevailing beliefs in the modern era. Kim Jong Il’s North Korean regime has some of the world’s toughest internet regulations, but it is a ridiculously harsh state in which citizens living in Pyongyang need a permit just to leave the city. Iran’s new Ahmadinejad-led government has recently cracked down on the accessibility of particular regions to photojournalists, but how similar is Iran’s geo-political climate in comparison to China’s internet landscape? The internet security of Myanmar (formerly the Union of Burma) is one of the globe’s most stringent, but a causal comparison between Myanmar’s population and the amount of Chinese internet users reveals how such a prolific control is possible for a relatively encumbered few. A picture is beginning to manifest that, not surprisingly, China is a unique example of a large, influential global power still holding on to its preventative early communist roots. Even if internet regulatory techniques are similarly contrasted between China and other countries – the history, culture, and sheer volume of China’s people are an overwhelmingly difficult and unique population to govern. As with much of the past five thousand years in which China isolated itself in times of crises, a policy originating 76

from within China might be the best solution once and for all (Grenzhen, 2008). Eventually, there will be a critical ‘bottleneck’ point – the proverbial fork in the road where China will have to decide which path to follow. Until that juncture, China may maintain its current status quo by playing a balancing act between strong censorship and individual license to browse. The dilemma still exists, though, as to when China will have to choose a single road. The CCP cannot maintain this constant juggling act forever. Consideration and planning today for that future decision could have a vital effect on whether or not China successfully deals with the thriving Asian technological boom. From an economic standpoint, China has a great deal to benefit from ‘opening’ up the internet. The sanctioning of unlimited online action would have tremendous consequences for the business and economic world. Companies from all over the world would not have to rely on a few privately monitored servers anymore; instead, numerous servers and hosts would replace the need for the slow and inefficient process of screening incoming and outgoing emails or invoices. (Pan, 2008) In fact,

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the possibility of outside proxy servers and foreign IP addresses all accessing China’s mainframes without harassment raises the potential for increased business communication within China.

‘open’ the internet are far greater than to ‘close’ it even further.

In addition, the average consumer would benefit from an opening in China’ internet security with fewer restrictions communicating with the ‘outside world’. A flurry of new possibilities in academic and institutional exchanges can come about if China is willing to relax the austere principles which govern her internet policies. With the impressive statistic that over 60% of China’s internet users view media files (i.e. video, music, pictures) online on a daily basis, lessening the restrictions can be seen as releasing the floodgates of freedom to the mounting frustrations regarding the slow bandwidths and connection speeds in relation to large media files (Zittrain & Edelman, 2005).

As much as this might seem like a ‘cop-out’ option, suspension of judgment is probably the best choice for China at least until the end of this calendar year (2009), if not a few years farther. This option is the closest we have to a pseudo-compromise, one that will partition both sides of the argument for China’s internet security to be further developed before a move is made. With consequences of an enormous magnitude, this difficult choice represents a model on which to potentially base other media decisions on later. The Olympics last summer served as an excellent starting point for such trial periods in which the freedoms and limits of internet use would be tested by the CCP. Cumulative user and access data from all over the country was collected, but none of it has yet to be revealed (Pan, 2008).

From a personal perspective, the technological landscape in China seems to be changing at a volatile pace. As the world’s leading country in economic growth the past few years (close to 10% GDP annual increase), why would any bureau or organization seek to slow down the boom by way of clandestine technical matters? Economic incentives to 2010

Future Strategies Suspension of Judgment

There is a wide range of opinions regarding the moves that China should make in terms of changing its internet policies. Why not narrow that range and focus on small steps, one at a time? In all of its 5,000 year

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history, China has not been known for making wide-sweeping policy changes under government rule or kingdom domain – only drastic measures have been taken to displace current administrations or dynasties. Experimentation will likely appease, in minuscule portions, both staunch conservative advocates of China’s internal security and liberal demonstrators for its freedom. At worst, this decision would prolong the agony of waiting for a definitive clause regarding internet policies, but it would also minimize the risk of deciding on a potentially devastating choice. It is important that China makes this decision (even if the citizens are not involved with the actual process), and that it is not made for China. A single person deciding the policy within the CCP is better than a thousand individuals planning China’s program from the outside, as the CCP must maintain autonomy and a reputable sense of control if any of its policies are actually going to be implemented successfully. Only proof-positive conclusions from an internally-generated decision will be effective in the long run. Furthermore, as seen through prior demonstrations and riots, the CCP does not respond particularly well to mounting external pressure. Diplomats, trade relations, private corpo78

rations, and international events may all contribute to China’s decision, but it ultimately has to be made independently (Noguchi, 2008). An honest and candid self-examination of China is the only sufficient option. Visibility In any case, no matter what strategy China employs, it must be made visible. What this means is that the typical citizen can be expected to know at least the basic premises of such a policy – pleas of ignorance, even if discarded before by the governing bodies, should lessen drastically in volume as every tech user becomes aware of his or her limitations in cyberspace (if any at all). The increase in visibility regarding China’s future internet policies should not be limited to inside sources. Rather, an international understanding (and even possible approval) by foreign entities would be best for everyone (Fallows, 2008). Education is a key component here. Internet users, while annually growing by the millions, are becoming younger and younger demographically. In order to raise substantial awareness about this issue, goals should be set to teach children at a young age the rules and regulations governing China’s evolving internet policies. Questions regarding certain procedures

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or protocols should be directed to a single source (read: information hotline or authority) that is both easy to find and commonly accessible. No shrouds of visibility should haunt the ‘borderline Democratic’ blogger uncertain about the consequences of his or her actions. Contact information regarding technical problems should be routed to multiple sources with as little political red tape in between as possible. After all, the approach that was taken to analyze the current situation in China believed it to be a public policy issue – something that, while maybe not entirely decided by the public, is consistently practiced and accepted by the public. Knowledge is power – China must educate its masses instead of issuing seemingly random punishments (Zittrain & Edelman, 2005).

again, are the ideals of freedom to which we are so accustomed to entirely presentable to the Chinese masses that have never seen the likes of unadulterated democracy? Is China’s current system ready for such a sweeping reform or liberated internet communications? More questions than answers prevail.

It is easy to jump on the bandwagon of popular Western thought and believe that China should and will democratize – but how paradoxically close-minded is this process of thinking? Trying to view China’s issues from China’s perspective, while socially and politically difficult, is at least cognitively beneficial towards considering all sides of the issue. There are risks and rewards in all choices, and the consequences of a policy directing over a billion people Conclusions are of high priority. The question, thus, remains: “What would be All in all, the course of China’s best for China?” Conversely, we are internet security and preventative forced to ask ourselves if what is systems measures reflect on the forgood for China – is also good for the mat of policy decisions within China. rest of the world? While few governmental policy shifts can be labeled as ‘easy’ so-to-speak, choices involving China’s freedom of expression and government censorship are of particular importance, since they dictate (no pun intended) the paradigms by which the entire communist charter operates. Then 2010

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References Abrams, Steven. “Censorship in China.” Amnesty International USA. 19 Mar. 2008. <http://www.amnestyusa.org>. “China’s Internet Censorship.” CBS News 03 Dec. 2002. 09 Mar. 2008. <http:// www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/03/ tech/main531567/shtml>. Fallows, James. “The Connection Has Been Made.” The Atlantic (2008). 11 Mar. 2008. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/ print/200803/chinese-firwall>. Grenzen, Ohne. “Press Freedom: Changed by Day.” Reporters Without Borders 08 Mar. 2008. <http://www.rsf.org/article. php3?_article=240525>. Kahn, Joseph. “China Has World’s Tightest Internet Censorship, Study Finds.” The New York Times. 4 Dec 2006. 04 Mar. 2000. <http://newyorktimes.com/ china/204567_censorship>. Noguchi, Yuki. “Internet Frims to Defend Policies.” The Washington Post 15 Feb. 2006. 09 May 2008. <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/article/2006/02/14/ AR2006021>. Pan, Esther. “China’s New Internet Restrictions.” Council on Foreign Relations (2005). 09 Mar. 2008. <http://cfr.org/publication/8913/>. Zittrain, Jonathan, and Edelman, Benjamin. Empirical Analysis of Filtering in China. Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Harvard Law School. Boston: OpenNet Initiative, 2005. 80

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Book Review: The Sacred Edict

The Three Remnants of The Sacred Edict in Contemporary China: Traces of the Informal Institution Sophie Jiseon Lee The Sacred Edict provides an answer to this question. The author K’ang hsi (康熙帝) was the third In the midst of economic emperor of the Manchu-led Qing disparities and the decentralization policy in China, certain local govern- Dynasty (Schiprokauer, 234-235). [1] He wrote the sixteen sections of ments perform better in providing public goods than others. This inter- The Sacred Edict to promote certain values and legal guidelines by esting phenomenon was discussed which people should abide. Most by Lily Tsai in Accountability Without chapters in the book talk about the Democracy. According to her, those justification for certain rules and communities with successful perforthe punishment when those rules mance established informal institutions under which public officials are are breached. The book was writbound by powerful moral obligations. ten in an attempt to achieve social stability by promoting the followAs opposed to the informal instituing values: collectivism (Chapter II: tions, she defines formal institutions Clan Relationships and Harmony, as “supervision of lower offices by the higher ones” (Weber, 957) or hav- Chapter IV: Farming and Mulberry Culture, Chapter XIII: Sheltering ing the leverage to eliminate “lackadaisical bureaucrats” (Mill, 229-230). Deserters), hierarchical relationTsai argues that the informal institu- ships based on seniority (Chapter tion alone can provide accountability I: Duteousness and Subordination, (Tsai, 17). This brings us to the ques- Chapter IX: Courteousness), education (Chapter VI: Schools and tion: how do we establish the inforAcademies, Chapter XI: Education mal institution? of the Young), tolerance (ChapI. Introduction

Sophie Jiseon Lee is second-year PhD candidate for Political Science.

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ter III: Keeping the Peace, Chapter XVI: Making up Quarrels), rule of law (Chapter VIII: Rule of Law, Chapter XV: Wards and Tithings), perseverance (Chapter X: Abiding in One’s Vocation), stringent life style (Chapter V: Thrift and Economy), honesty (Chapter XII: Prevention of False Accusations), orthodox Confucian belief (Chapter VII: Heretical Sects), and duly payment of taxes (Chapter XIV: Payment of Taxes).[2]

dation for the key components of Chinese culture today including the informal institution that Lily Tsai explored. To prove my point, I will first review established literature claiming The Sacred Edict represents the work of ancient philosophers that sufficiently influenced contemporary Chinese society. Second, I will next explore the three remnants of the norms portrayed in The Sacred Edict: 1) hierarchical social order, 2) collectivism, and 3) informal in In The Sacred Edict, K’ang hsi stitutionalism. The first two are the does a good job of portraying his pre-conditional basis for the informal ideal hierarchical and collective soci- institution to work. Finally, I will conety, which reflects Confucian values clude by discussing the importance (Johnson, 325). Based on his affection of studying ancient culture in underfor the traditional Chinese values, he standing modern China. succeeds in harmoniously combining foreign Mongolian philosophy from The book represents what the pre-Qing Dynasty with Chinese defines traditional Chinese thinking. philosophy (Smith, 139).[3] Accord- The values and norms emphasized ingly, K’ang hsi is considered one in The Sacred Edict stemmed from of the greatest emperors in Chinese Confucius (Brians, 1999). The similar history because he paved the road for form and the content of the Sacred the Qing Dynasty’s most stable and Edict are found in other works from prosperous period for the next cenprevious times as well. The Ming tury (Smith, 2). Dynasty’s Six Maxims [六渝] is one of the examples (Johnson, 327). II. The Three Remnants of The However, the Qing Dynasty’s The Sacred Edict Sacred Edict more justifiably and comprehensively represents the ancient In the following section, I will Chinese culture. Richard Smith, for argue that the philosophical teachexample, argues that the Qing Dyings and the behavioral guidelines nasty in many ways “epitomized the found in this book provide a founbest of China’s cultural tradition” 82

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(Smith, 3). Scholars attribute the realization of the traditional Confucian ideal of the unity of state and knowledge being consolidated during this period to the third emperor of the Qing Dynasty, K’ang hsi (Kessler, 169; Ho, 193; Smith, 139). In fact, the emperor strategically employed the Confucian philosophy to facilitate the Qing Dynasty’s success. William Rowe, in China’s Last Empire, states that Qing’s implementation of the neo-Confucian ideology in governance contributed to its prosperity and stability (Rowe, 32). Thus, traditional Chinese philosophy was enforced top down, which in other words, it was more comprehensively prevalent than ever before. Sufficient evidence buttresses the argument that these norms created by literati elites of Qing successfully instilled the Confucian ideas in the minds of civilians at the time. In fact, the book was to be read aloud twice a month in every village and town (Brians. 1999). Given that the literacy rate during the Qing Dynasty reached 45 percent among men and 10 percent among women, the influence of the book’s teaching can easily be overwhelming (Smith, 231). The teaching of the book was even played on stage which served as a more popular and effective educational channel (Smith, 232). Fur2010

thermore, the punitive mechanism associated with the norms surely accelerated the implementation process. For the people who breached the rules, punishments such as beating, striking, and the death penalty were given, which could effectively regulate people’s behavior with the Confucian ideas. The practice of giving and attending lectures about how to interpret The Sacred Edict was still in use even after 1900 (Brians. 1999). This ancient thinking still affects the way Chinese people think and view the world today. The revolutions and reforms that the modern Chinese state went through made it “sacrifice the integrity of its inherited culture” (Kuhn, 1). Yet, like the scholars who elaborate on cultural continuity, Kuhn also admits that the key components of traditional Chinese culture remain largely influential even after the modern Chinese state was established (Kuhn, 24). Therefore, it is safe to say that The Sacred Edict represents traditional Chinese Confucian values, and its impact on the Chinese society is significant. Not surprisingly, the traces of the informal institution are found in The Sacred Edict. First, K’ang hsi emphasizes establishing and main-

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taining strict hierarchical relationships in families, clans, and society. For instance, the first chapter discusses the importance of duteousness and subordination. It says “Duty to parents (孝顺) is a self-evident principle of nature, and the root of virtuous conduct of man” (K’ang hsi, 2) thus “… in the sixteen sections of The Sacred Edict, duteousness and subordination (孝弟) are first in order” (K’ang hsi, 1). Also, chapter two solemnly cites “let the residents in each community rank according to their ages: and whoever transgresses this order shall receive fifty light blows” (K’ang hsi, 38). The book forbids the young to “bring a charge against a senior relative, even though it (may) be substantiated.” According to him, those who breach this rule will be beaten one hundred heavy blows. I argue that this hierarchy is the fundamental basis for the informal institution because in a strict hierarchy, the constituents are less likely to challenge the authority. Hierarchy serves as a constraint of provocation even in contemporary China. For instance, the Chinese people tolerate the current authoritarian government (Shi, 402). Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimension model also demonstrates that Chinese people accept and expect a shockingly high level of inequal84

ity in power and wealth distribution even compared to other Asian countries (Hofstede, 105). This, I argue, is partly because subordination in the hierarchical order is explicitly encouraged in The Sacred Edict. [4] Authoritarianism refers to the principle of blind submission to authority, as opposed to individual thought and action, although a limited level of freedom is allowed. [5] The Chinese government falls under this category as the regime lacks a meaningful electoral process to reflect people’s demand. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party trains political leaders in the system and promotes only the approved leaders.[6] Second, one of the significant features of Chinese national culture is “collectivism” or “low individualism,” which is also encouraged in The Sacred Edict (Hofstede, 91). K’ang hsi stresses collectivism throughout the chapters. In the second chapter, he says “ [if] you wish to live in harmony, just aim at reflecting honour upon your ancestors and do not have divided interests” (K’ang hsi, 24). Also, the book recommends “not to go [to] extremes to out-do [everybody else]” in funerals and partying (K’ang hsi, 61). The way that criminals are punished also reflects the importance of collective values that K’ang hsi highlights. Those who crossed the

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line that the state set up are ousted. The ones who shelter these ousted criminals are considered accomplices and severely condemned. The author even spends a whole chapter talking about community values. The strategy of never giving criminals a chance to be reintegrated into society powerfully functioned as an incentive for constituents of a community to live by the rule.

ciples are not always consistent with the degrees and methods of punishment, the discussion itself is meaningful in that a medieval sage several hundred years ago already tried to establish a fair and just institution.

Interestingly, however, K’ang hsi discourages people from relying on formal institutions in three ways. First, he looks down on lawyers and accuses them of mastering the Finally, upon these pre-condi- law only to take advantage of other tional foundations of hierarchy and people (K’ang hsi, 111). Although collectivism, The Sacred Edict attempts he admits that the society needs to build informal institutions. K’ang “hangers-on at law courts,” he says hsi’s kingdom established a strong they “completely lost to shame, and constitutional state with strict penal only scheme to make money for prescodes. It is, in fact, surprisingly mod- ent advantage” (K’ang hsi, 111). By ern the way the emperor set punitive actively putting down the legal pracprinciples. For example, Chapter titioners, the society could maintain VIII discusses the purpose of the law, only a small number of them, which which is to achieve justice by rehabil- in turn discouraged filing legal cases itating the wrongdoers, and protect- in general. Second, the emperor ing the innocent people, but to never orders not to sue an elder even if the taking revenge on criminals. The pu- case can be substantiated (K’ang hsi, nitive system also takes proportional- 38). As discussed earlier, suing an elity into consideration, condemning der was not only prohibited but also recidivism and allowing different severely punished. The ban on bringdegrees in sentences according to ing charges against the elderly shows the severity of the crime (K’ang hsi, that K’ang hsi’s teaching puts more 88-91). The process of appeals from weight on seniority as a guideline for the lower court through the higher social order than the legal system. court is also evidence that K’ang hsi’s Third, K’ang hsi specifically says not thoughts on the legal system were to “become a frequenter of the law very similar to that of modern demo- courts” (K’ang hsi, 142). The book, cratic countries. Although the prininstead, discusses how to avoid quar2010

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relling by emphasizing tolerance (K’ang hsi, 41; 102; 105). K’ang hsi emphasized informal intuitions because he saw the world without formal institutions as a utopia, because it would mean that “the punishment will not need to be used” (K’ang hsi, 98) as no one causes problems. I believe that his philosophy stemmed from the view that formal institutions are ex-post instruments that are to redress administrative inefficiencies or injustice as he emphasized the punitive side of institutions. Informal institutions, on the other hand, were seen as preemptive tools as they regulate people’s behavior in the name of morality and provide checks and balances without punishing anybody. III. Conclusion Many political scientists argue that China’s foreign policy cannot be explained simply by looking through the rational or materialistic lens that Western academia has developed, thus normative values must be considered in analyzing its behavior (Kim, 55). The Sacred Edict, as a representative work of Confucian teaching, is valuable because it allows us to identify what in modern Chinese culture has remained a conundrum to Western academics. For one, this 86

book review focused on the aspect of informal institutionalism. The Sacred Edict hints clues as to how the informal institution in China has been implemented. We learned that Informal institutions were enforced to facilitate centralized governance during the Qing Dynasty. To do so, K’ang hsi utilized the punitive mechanism on the firm foundation of hierarchy and collectivism. Although this review focuses on Chinese institutions, other phenomenon observed in modern Chinese history can also be traced in The Sacred Edict. Scholars probe overseas Chinese people’s business as well as traditional Confucian values as supporting evidence to the claim that Chinese society is deeply capitalistic (Redding, 2). Not surprisingly, The Sacred Edict concerns individual wealth, and it recommends for everyone to save money when the economy is good, in preparations for bad times (K’ang hsi, 58). It praises wealth, and that passing on inheritance is not only justified but also encouraged. Chapter V, discussing thrifty life style and economy, states that “wealth is obtained with much labour in order to pass on a little happiness for their descendants to enjoy” (K’ang hsi, 61). As seen above, by studying more about the cultural roots of China, we

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can understand more about interesting phenomenon such as informal institutions and the failure of communism. In this sense, K’ang hsi’s The Sacred Edict provides abundant useful information that is relevant particularly in studying Chinese institutions. Footnotes 1. He can be viewed as the fourth emperor of the dynasty, depending on whether the dynasty’s founder, Nurhaci, who used the title of Khan but was posthumously given imperial title, is to be treated as an emperor or not. (Schiprokauer, 234-235) 2. This categorization of the chapters neither exclusively nor exhaustively fit. Some chapters are about more than one theme. Yet, this categorization gives a rough idea about the book. 3. The pre-Qing Dynasty was the Yuan Dynasty (元朝), the continuation of Mongol empire founded by Jenghis Khan. (Prawdin, 22-24) 4. This, however, does not mean that Chinese culture is automatically authoritarian. For instance, Niou (2010), in “Local Self-Governance with Chinese Characteristics”, shows examples of democratic features in Chinese history such as Lu Family Community Compact. 5. Authoritarianism, Encyclopædia Britannica 6. Communist Party of China, China Today.

References Authoritarianism. 2010. Encyclopædia Britannica. Last access on Mar. 13, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/44640/authoritarianism Brians, Paul. et al. 1999. Reading About the World, Vol. 2, 3rd edition, Harcourt Brace College Publishing. Last access on Mar. 12, 2010. Retrieved from http://www. wsu.edu/~wld civ/world_civ_reader/world_civ_reader_2/kang_hsi.html Communist Party of China, China Today. Last access on Mar. 16, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.chinatoday.com/org/ cpc/ Ho, Ping-ti. 1967. “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 26. No. 2. (February, 1967). P. 189-195 Hofstede, Geert. 1993. “Cultural Constraints in Management Theories”, Academy of ManagementExecutive, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.81-94. --- 1980. Cultural Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. CA: SAGE Publications. Hsi, Kang. 1924. The Sacred Edict. Translated by F.W. Baller. Limited Fascimile Ed. 1979. The National Poetry Foundation, Orono, MI: University of Maine at Orono. Johnson, David. et al. 1985. Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California

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Press.

Comparative Politics. Vol. 33, No. 4 (Jul., 2001). pp. 401-419

Kessler, Lawrence. 1976. K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 1661-1684. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kim, Samuel (Editor). 1998. China and the World – Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium. 4th Ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kuhn, Philip. 2002. Origins of the Modern Chinese State. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Mill, J. S. 1951. “Considerations on Representative Government.” Utilitarianism, Liberalism, and Representative Government. London: Dart

Smith, Richard R. 1994. China’s Cultural Heritage The Qing Dynasty, 1644-1912. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tsai, Lily L. 2007. Accountability Without Democracy : Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max. 1978. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und gesellschaft). Vol. 1. Edition. 1. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Niou, Emerson. 2010. “Local Self-Governance with Chinese Characteristics” Computer printout, Department of Political Science, Duke University. 2010. Prawdin, Michael. 2005. The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy. New Jersey: Rutgers University. Redding, S. G. 1990. The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism New York, NY: W. de Gruyter. Rowe, William T. 2009. China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Schiprokauer, Conrad. 2006. A Brief History of Chinese Civilization, Thompson Wadswoth. Shi, Tianjian. 2001. “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.” 88

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