Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model by Disruptor Institute

UnderstandingPoliticalRadicalization:TheTwo-PyramidsModel

ClarkMcCauleyandSophiaMoskalenko BrynMawrCollege

Thisarticlereviewssomeofthemilestonesofthinkingaboutpoliticalradicalization,as scholarsandsecurityofficialsstruggledafter9/11todiscerntheprecursorsofterrorist violence.Recentcriticismoftheconceptofradicalizationhasbeenrecognized,leadingtoa 2-pyramidsmodelthatrespondstothecriticismbyseparatingradicalizationofopinionfrom radicalizationofaction.Securityandresearchimplicationsofthe2-pyramidsmodelare brieflydescribed,endingwithacallformoreattentiontoemotionalexperienceinunderstandingbothradicalizationofopinionandradicalizationofaction.

Keywords: radicalization,terrorism,violentextremism,2-pyramidsmodel,lonewolf

Aftertheshockofthe9/11attacks,securityofficialsinthe UnitedStatesstruggledtounderstandtheprocessbywhich individualsandgroupsmovetoterrorism.Thehopewasto “gettotheleftoftheboom”—topredictand,ideally,to preventfutureattacks. Radicalization cametobetheword usedtorefertothehumandevelopmentsthatprecedeterrorist attack.Thisarticleaimstoprovideanoverviewofthinking aboutradicalization.

Theenormousandstillexpandingliteratureonradicalization cannotbefullyrepresentedhere.Thefirstsectionofthearticle reviewsmilestonesinterrorismresearchsincethe9/11attacks. Milestonesweredeterminedonthebasisofcontributionto psychologicaltheorizingofradicalizationandsaliencetoU.S. securityofficials.Saliencewaslargelydeterminedfromthe authors’experienceatacademicandgovernment-sponsored conferences,wherecertaincontributionsseemedtoresonate morewithsecurityofficials.Owingtolimitationsofspaceand knowledge,thearticlefocusesonradicalizationtojihaditerrorism,leavingasideimportantworkonright-wingandleftwingterrorismintheUnitedStates(e.g., Freilich,Chermak,& Gruenewald,2014; Taylor,Currie,&Holbrook,2013).

Editor’snote. Thisarticleisoneinacollectionofarticlespublishedin aspecialissueof AmericanPsychologist titled“PsychologyofTerrorism” (April2017).JohnG.HorganservedasguesteditorwithAnneE.Kazak asadvisoryeditor.NeilD.Shortlandprovidedscholarlylead.

ClarkMcCauleyandSophiaMoskalenko,DepartmentofPsychology, BrynMawrCollege.

ThisresearchwassupportedbytheU.S.DepartmentofHomeland Security(DHS)throughtheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyof TerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).However,anyopinions,findings,recommendations,orconclusionsinthisdocumentare thoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectviewsoftheDHS.

CorrespondenceconcerningthisarticleshouldbeaddressedtoClark McCauley,DepartmentofPsychology,BrynMawrCollege,BrynMawr, PA19010.E-mail: cmccaule@brynmawr.edu

Reviewofthemilestonesleadstorecognitionofchallenges totheconceptofradicalization,whichareidentifiedinthe secondsectionofthearticleandaddressedinthethirdsection withpresentationofatwo-pyramidsmodelofradicalization. Implicationsofthemodelforsecuritypolicyandforfuture researchareidentifiedinthelasttwosections.

MilestonesinRadicalizationResearch

TheattacksofSeptember11,2001,producedaspateof researchonterrorism,andthemilestonesbeginfromthisdate. Still,itisusefultoidentifyseveralearlierperspectivesthatset thestageforradicalizationresearch.Mostnotableis Crenshaw’s(1981) viewofthecausesofterrorismthatdistinguishedindividualmotivesandbeliefs,group-leveldecisionmakingandstrategy,andthewiderpoliticalandsocialcontext inwhichterrorismoccurs.Thisthree-waydistinctionofindividual,group,andmassfactorsisechoedinmuchoflater research.

Alsoworthnotingisthedeclineoftheorizingthatexplained terroristsascrazy—assufferingsomeformofdiagnosable psychopathology.Twentyyearsbefore9/11itwasalready recognizedthatpathologyisnomorelikelyamongterrorists thanamongnonterroristsofsimilarbackground(Crenshaw, 1981).Similarly,itwasalreadyclearthatpovertyisnota usefulexplanationofradicalization:Manyterrorists—perhaps mostof1970sterroristswhogrewoutofstudentunrest—came frommiddle-classandprofessionalfamilies(Crenshaw,1981).

“TheStaircasetoTerrorism”(2005)

Moghaddam(2005),in“TheStaircasetoTerrorism,” offeredanearlymetaphorofradicalizationasasix-floor ever-narrowingstairwaytoterrorism.Thegroundflooris perceptionofinjusticeandrelativedeprivation;thefirst floorissearchforoptions;thesecondfloorisangeratthe perceivedperpetratorsofinjustice;thethirdfloorisamoral

engagementthatjustifiesterrorism;thefourthfloorisjoiningaterroristgroup;andthefifthandlastfloorisdehumanizingenemycivilianstomakethemlegitimatetargetsof violence.

Thestaircasemetaphorisastagemodelsetattheindividuallevel:Eachfloormustbetraversedtogettothenext higherfloor,andtheorderoffloorsisfixed.Thedifference betweenjustifyingterrorism(thirdfloor)andjoininga terroristgroup(fourthfloor)isthedifferencebetweenradicalopinionandradicalaction.Thiskeydifferenceappears asjustonemorestepinthestaircasemodel.

ThePsychologyofTerrorism (2005)

Horgan’s(2005) book-lengthtreatmentofthepsychology ofradicalizationin ThePsychologyofTerrorism distinguishedthreepsychologicalissues:thepsychologyofbecomingaterrorist,thepsychologyofbeing(perseveringas) aterrorist,andthepsychologyofdisengagingfromterrorism.Thesecondandthirdissuesarebeyondthescopeof thisreview.Withregardtobecomingaterrorist,Horgan recognizedtheimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenradical ideasandviolentaction:“InNorthernIreland,andevenon themarchesdescribedearlier,thenumberofpeoplewho becameinvolvedinadirectwaywiththePIRA[Provisional IrishRepublicanArmy]wasminimal.Theobviousquestion theniswhy?”(p.101).

Horgan(2005) emphasizedthreeideasintheprogression toterroristaction.First,theprogressiontoterrorismis usuallygradual,frominvolvementinlegalactivismtosmall actsinsupportofterrorism(courier,reconnaissance)to shootingandplantingbombs.Secondis“asenseofdissat-

isfactionordisillusionmentwiththeindividual’scurrent personaoractivity”(p.103)thatmakesanindividualmore opentoinfluence.Circumstancesmakinganindividual moreopentoinfluencecanincludelossoflovedones, work,home,orwayoflife;thesecircumstanceshavebeen called unfreezing insocialpsychology, biographicalavailability insociology,and cognitiveopening insocialmovementtheory.Thirdistheideathatcommunitysupportfor violentactionthataffordsstatustomilitantscanhelpmotivateviolence.

Thesethreeideassaysomethingaboutthetrajectoryto terrorismbutareperhapsyettoogeneraltounderstandwhy activistsandterroristsarefew.Noteveryindividualwho experiencesunfreezinginacommunitythatgivesstatusto militantswillstartdowntheslipperyslopetoterrorism.

RadicalIslamRising:MuslimExtremisminthe West (2005)

Inhisbook RadicalIslamRising:MuslimExtremismin theWest, QuintanWiktorowicz(2005) reportedhisstudyof theMuslimactivistgroupal-Muhajirounanditscharismatic leaderOmarBakriMohammedintheUnitedKingdom (U.K.).Thestudywasconductedin2002,whenreactionto the9/11attacksmadeactivisminsupportofjihadrisky.

Thestudywasnotableforbringingasocialmovement perspectivetounderstandinghowindividualsjoinedalMuhajiroun.Socialmovementtheory(SMT)isnotasingle integratedtheorybutacongeriesofideasthathavebeen foundusefulinunderstandingmovementsforliberalcauses suchascivilrightsandfeminism.SMTincludesattentionto mobilizingstructures,politicalopportunities,framing,and repertoiresofcontentiousaction.

Startingfromtheseconcepts, Wiktorowicz(2005) arrived atafour-stagemodelofradicalization.Firstisa cognitive opening tonewpeopleandnewideasthatfollowsexperienceofpersonaldisconnection(unfreezing),personalgrievance(discrimination),orgroupgrievance(oppressionof Muslims).Second,theseekerconnectswithal-Muhajiroun via personalrelations withactivists,whichmaybeeither preexistingkinorfriendshipconnectionwithactivists,or newconnectionsdevelopedinactivist-conductedstudy groups,debates,anddemonstrations.Third,theseeker comestoacceptOmarBakriastheone legitimateauthority forinterpretingIslam.Fourth,beliefinBakriisfusedwith beliefinBakri’sclaimthatsalvationdependsonsupporting jihad;activistrisk-takingthenbecomesa rationalchoice to attaineternalreward.

Like Moghaddam(2005), Wictorowicz(2005) offereda stagetheoryofradicalizationinwhichindividualsmustgo througheachstageinorder.AlsolikeMoghaddam,Wictorowiczgavelittleattentiontothetransitionfromradical belieftoradicalaction.Thelaststageassertsradicalaction asarationalchoice,butnoteveryonewhoseesmoral

ClarkMcCauley

Moskalenko

behaviorasnecessaryforsalvationdoesinfactcommitto moralbehavior.Morepromisingisthedescriptionofhow OmarBakri’sideologyandhisgroupemergedfromcompetitionwithHizbut-Tahrir,whodonotbelievethatthe timeisrightforjihad.Theinsightthatradicalizationcan happenincompetitionbetweengroupswithinthesame movementisexploredmorefullyby dellaPorta(2013) ina latermilestone.

RadicalizationintheWest:TheHomegrown Threat (2007)

NewYorkPoliceDepartmentanalysts SilberandBhatt (2007) focusedon11jihadistplotsthattookplaceinthe UnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,Canada,Australia, Spain,andtheNetherlandsintheir Radicalizationinthe West:TheHomegrownThreat. Theseplotsareseenas inspiredbutnotdirectedbyal-Qaeda.Theaimoftheir reportwastoidentifystagesofradicalizationpriortoplanningaviolentact.

Stage1:Preradicalization iswheremostWestern-origin terroristsareordinaryandunremarkableindividualsbefore radicalizationbegins.Theyhavelittleifanycriminalhistory.

Stage2:Self-Identification is thephasewhereindividuals,influencedbybothinternaland externalfactors,begintoexploreSalafiIslam,graduallygravitateawayfromtheiroldidentityandbegintoassociate themselveswithlike-mindedindividualsandadoptthisideologyastheirown.Thecatalystforthis“religiousseeking”is acognitiveopeningorcrisis,whichshakesone’scertitudein previouslyheldbeliefsandopensanindividualtobereceptive tonewworldviews.(p.6)

Asalreadynoted,thiskindofopeninghasbeendescribedvariouslyas unfreezing,biographicalavailability, and cognitiveopening.Lossofmeaningandconnectioncanoccurwithdeathofloved ones,lossofjoborromanticpartner,migrationawayfromfamily andfriends,orexperienceofdiscrimination.But SilberandBhatt (2007) didnotspecifywhytheseekerwouldlooktoreligionrather thanasecularideologysuchassocialismornationalism.

Stage3:Indoctrination is“thephaseinwhichanindividualprogressivelyintensifieshisbeliefs,whollyadopts jihadi-Salafiideologyandconcludes,withoutquestion,that theconditionsandcircumstancesexistwhereactionisrequiredtosupportandfurtherthecause”(p.7).Thethird stagedependsontheintensedynamicsofasmallgroupof like-mindedindividualswhohaveacceptedjihadist–Salafi justificationsofviolence.NotethetransitionfromSalafi IslaminStage2tojihadi–SalafiIslaminStage3.Itisnot clearwhyindividualswouldpreferjihadist–Salafiideology overthemorecommonSalafiIslamthataimsforpurityand withdrawalfromacontaminatingworld.Inthisquiescent versionofSalafism,politicsisaworldlydistractionand killingciviliansisforbiddenbytheQur’an.

Stage4:Jihadization is“thephaseinwhichmembersof theclusteraccepttheirindividualdutytoparticipateinjihad andself-designatethemselvesasholywarriors.Ultimately, thegroupwillbeginoperationalplanningforthejihadora terroristattack”(p.7).

Inthismodelofradicalization,theleapisbetweenStages 3and4—betweenradicalopinionandradicalaction.Unfortunately, SilberandBhatt(2007) didnothavemuchto sayaboutthiscrucialstep;theytreatedthecommitmentto actionasanaturalextensionofjihadi–Salafiideology. SnowandByrd(2007) criticizedtheideaofideologyasa cause,pointingtothevariationandflexibilityofideologyin differentIslamicterroristmovements,andtheworkrequiredtoconstructlinksbetweenideas,events,andaction.

Moregenerally,thisisastagemodelsimilartothat advancedby Moghaddam(2005).Inthenextmilestone, Sageman(2008) providesexamplesofindividualswhodeveloparadicalideologyonlyafterjoiningamilitantgroup viakinandfriendshipties.

LeaderlessJihad (2008)

Inhisearlierbook, UnderstandingTerrorNetworks, Sageman(2004) usedopen-sourcematerialtostudy172 participantsinanti-Westernjihad.Asacriminologistmight study“knownassociates,”Sagemanwasabletoshowfamilyandfriendshiplinksamonghiscasesandthattheselinks werekeytounderstandingindividualtrajectoriestoterrorist action.Sageman’sworkechoeswell-establishedfindingsin socialpsychologythatgroupscanexertsocialinfluenceon individuals’decisionmaking(Myers&Lamm,1976),risktaking(Gardner&Steinberg,2005),andimmoralbehavior (Zimbardo,2007).In LeaderlessJihad, Sageman(2008) arguedthatthemainjihadistthreatwasnolongeral-Qaeda

Sophia

butsmallself-radicalizinggroupsofMuslimsinWestern countries—abunchofguysmodelofradicalization.

Sageman(2008) pointedtofourfactorsthatcometogethertomoveMuslimsinWesterncountriestoterrorist violence:seeingworldeventsandthewaronterrorismasa waronIslam;personalexperienceofdiscriminationwhile livingintheWest;moraloutrageinresponsetostories, especiallyvideos,ofMuslimssufferingfromWesternviolence;andface-to-faceorInternetcontactsthatconnectan individualwiththemeansandopportunitytoattack.In discussingthesefactorsSagemanemphasizedtheemotional aspectsofradicalization:competitionforstatusandglory, angerandhumiliationinreactiontoperceivedWestern injusticetoMuslims,andloveforcomradesthatperhaps includesshamefordoinglessthanthosewhodieasmartyrs.

BruceHoffman(2008) famouslydisagreedwith Sageman’s(2008) judgmentthatself-radicalizingWesternMuslimsarenowabiggerthreatthanaretheremnantsofthe al-Qaedaorganization.Onedoesnotneedtodeterminea victorinthisdebatetoprofitbySageman’saccountof radicalizationofWesternMuslims—andtorecognizethat terroristswithskillshonedintrainingcampsassociatedwith al-Qaedaarelikelycapableofmoredeadlyattacks.

RadicalizationasTerrorManagement(2009)

Oneoftheoriginatorsofterrormanagementtheory (TMT)arguedinthisarticlethatbothterroristviolenceand governmentresponsetoterroristviolencearepartofhow humansdealwiththethreatofmortality(Pyszczynski, Motyl,&Abdollahi,2009).The“terror”inTMTisexistentialterror:fearofdying.Agroupidentitycanreducethis fearwiththeprospectofimmortalityforagoodmemberof agroupthatwillgoforwardindefinitelyintime.Threatsto thisgroup,especiallyviolentattacksthatkillingroupmembers,thusleadtoincreasedthoughtsofdeath(mortality salience)andincreasedcommitmenttothevaluesofthe ingroup(culturalanxietybuffer).Theresultisincreased supportforviolenceagainsttheenemythreat. Pyszczynski etal.(2009) citedresearchshowingthatincreasedthoughts ofmortalityincreasedIranianstudents’supportformartyrdommissionsagainsttheUnitedStatesandincreasedU.S. conservatives’supportforusingextrememilitarymeasures suchasatombombstokillterrorists.

TMTisatheorythatspansindividual,group,andmass psychology:Allthosewhoidentifywithagroupwillrespondtoviolenceagainstthatgroupwithincreasedcommitmenttothegroupandincreasedsupportforviolence againstthosewhothreatenthegroup.Itisimportanttonote that Pyszczynskietal.(2009) recognizedthedynamicof actionandreactionthatlinksterroristattacksandgovernmentresponses:

Researchispresentedwhichsuggeststhatmanyofthesame psychologicalforcesthatleadterroriststotheirviolent

actionsalsoleadtocounterterroristpoliciesthatcreate massivecollateraldamage.Thiscollateraldamageappears tofurtherescalatethecycleofviolenceandmayaidthe targetsofthoseattacksinrecruitingpeoplefortheterrorist cause.(p.12)

TheEdgeofViolence:ARadicalApproachto Extremism (2010)

Bartlett,Birdwell,andKing(2010),in TheEdgeof Violence:ARadicalApproachtoExtremism, compared 58al-Qaeda-inspiredterroristswith28nonviolentMuslimradicals.In-depthprofilesofconvictedterrorists “homegrown”intheUnitedKingdom,Canada,Denmark, France,andtheNetherlandswerecreatedfromcourt recordsandnewsreports.Fromthesamecountries,28 radicalprofiles,ofwhom20wereinterviewedindepth, werecreated.Individualsdesignatedasradicalsheldone ormoreofthreeopinions:desireforacaliphate,desire forSharialaw,andsupportforMuslimsfightingWestern forcesinIraq.

Terroristsandradicalsweresimilarinexperiencingsome degreeofsocietalexclusion,distrustofgovernment,hatred forforeignpolicy,andsomedisconnectionfromtheirlocal community.Manyinbothgroupshadsomesortofidentity crisis.ButterroristswereuniqueintheirloathingofWesternsocietyandcultureandhadasimplerandshallower conceptionofIslam.Radicalsweremorelikelythanterroriststohavebeeninvolvedinpoliticalprotest,tohave studiedatauniversity(andstudiedhumanitiesorartssubjects),andtohavebeenemployed. Bartlettetal.(2010) summarizeditasfollows:

Becomingaterroristwasnotalwaysanaturalorlinearprogressionfrombeingaradical.Thosewhoturnedtoviolence oftenfollowedapathofradicalisationwhichwascharacterisedbyacultureofviolence,in-grouppeerpressure,andan internalcodeofhonourwhereviolencecanbearouteto accruingstatus.(p.12)

As Freilichetal.(2014) noted,comparisonofradicals andterroristswiththesamecausecanbeparticularly revealingaboutpathwaystoviolence.Unfortunately,this kindofstudyisrare.Morecommonarestudieslooking backward,seekingcommondenominatorsinthehistories ofknownterrorists. Gartenstein-RossandGrossman (2009) ,forinstance,examined117“homegrown”jihadist terroristsfromtheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom andfoundthatpoliticalradicalization,notreligiousbeliefs,wasthestrongestcommonality.Theauthorsrecognized,however,thatmanypeacefulMuslimsmayshare thefeelingsofgrievanceagainsttheWestthatwere assessedaspoliticalradicalizationintheirretrospective study.

ProtectingtheHomelandFromInternationaland DomesticTerrorismThreats (2010)

Adelmanandcolleagues(2010),intheir Protectingthe HomelandFromInternationalandDomesticTerrorism Threats, providedasubstantial(42contributions,52authors,375pages)compilationofU.S.thinkingaboutterrorisminrelationtothreeissuesrelatingtoradicalization:root causes,dynamicsofviolentnon-stateactors(VNSAs),and ideology.Thedominantmessagefromtheauthorswasthe complexityofinteractionsthatproduceandsustainterrorist violence.

Onekeyinsightresearchershavegainedthroughstudiesof terrorismisthatthephenomenonisinherentlydynamic. VNSAsundergoadynamiclifecycle,individualsundergoa dynamicprocessofradicalization,therelationsbetween VNSAsandtheirstateopponentsareconstantlyevolving,and thenetworksthroughwhichVNSAsoperatearedynamically shifting.(p.13)

Particularlynotablearetwocontributionsusingpolling datatounderstandpopulationsupportforterroristviolence. Rieger(2010; TheAnatomyofaSwamp:PredictiveFactors ofDifferentTypesofRadicalism)usedGalluppollsfrom Muslimcountriestoarguethattherearetwotypesof Muslimswhojustifyjihadistviolence.Onetypeincludes low-incomeindividualswhoseeMuslimsasvictimsof Westernintolerance,andtheothertypeincludesthosewith averageincomewhowantShari’alawtoreplacethecurrent governance,whichisseenasunjustandineffective. Harlow (2010; Audience-CenteredVNSAStrategicCommunications)askedabouttheintendedandactualaudiencesfor al-QaedavideosanddistinguishedMuslimpublics,existing andpotentialmembersofal-Qaeda,Westernpolicymakers, andWesternpublics.

Inthisvolume,attentiontothedynamicsofactionand reactioninconflictbetweenVNSAsandstates,andtothe reflectionofthesedynamicsinmassaudiences,linksmany ofthecontributionswiththesocialmovementperspective of Wiktorowicz(2005) and dellaPorta(2013)

Friction:HowRadicalizationHappenstoThem andUs (2011)

McCauleyandMoskalenko(2011) usedcasehistories rangingfrom19th-centuryRussianantitsaristterrorismto 21st-centuryal-Qaedaterrorismtoidentifymechanismsof radicalizationoperatingatindividual,group,andmasslevelsintheirbook Friction:HowRadicalizationHappensto ThemandUs.

Individual-levelmechanismsofradicalizationincludeangerandrevengeforharmtoselforlovedones(personal grievance);outrageforinjusticetoalargergrouporcause theindividualcaresabout(groupgrievance);participation inprogressivelymoreradicalactsthatculminateinterror-

ism(slipperyslope);helpingafriendorlovedonealready radicalized(love);riskandpowerseeking,especiallyby youngmen(statusseeking);andescapefrompersonalproblems(escape).Finally, unfreezing isalossofsocialconnectionthatopensanindividualtonewpeopleandnew ideas;itisamultiplierofthepoweroftheothermechanisms.

Group-levelmechanismsofradicalizationtoactionincludeextremityshiftinlike-mindedgroups(grouppolarization)andthreekindsofradicalizingintergroupconflict: competitionwithstatepoweraslesscommittedmembersof thegroupfallaway(condensation),competitionforthe samebaseofsupport(outbidding),andwithin-groupcompetition(fissioning).Amultiplierofthepowerofthesefour mechanismsis groupisolation:Cohesionandthepowerof groupnormsarestrengthenedtotheextentthatgroupmembershavenooneelsetoturntoandnoalternativegroup standards.

Mass-levelmechanismsofradicalizationincludebroad publicacceptanceofaviewoftheenemyasinherentlybad andthreatening(hate),mobilizationofopinionandaction byamartyr’sself-sacrifice(martyrdom),andmobilization ofnewsupportforterrorismbystateoverreactiontoterroristattack(jujitsupolitics).

Thethreelevelsofmechanismsarenotastagemodel; rather,themechanismsarenestedsuchthatmass-level mechanismscanaffectindividualsandgroupsandindividuallevel mechanismscanaffectgroupsandmassopinion.Itis possibletobecomeradicalizedtoterrorismbyonly individual-levelmechanisms,asinlonewolfterrorism.

Mostofthemechanismsidentifiedareassociatedwith strongemotionalexperiences,includinganger,shame,guilt, humiliation,fear,love,andhate.Finally,itisimportantto notethattheindividual-andgroup-levelmechanismsare mechanismsofradicalizationtoaction,whereasmass-level mechanismsproduceradicalizationofpublicopinion.

ClandestinePoliticalViolence (2013)

Inher ClandestinePoliticalViolence, dellaPorta(2013) soughtcommonmechanismsofradicalizationtoviolencein fourtypesofundergroundgroups:ItalianandGermanleftists,Italianrightists,Basqueethnonationalists,andal-Qaeda jihadists.Like Wiktorowicz(2005),dellaPortabeganfrom socialmovementtheory,butshefocusedmoreonthedynamicsofcompetitionandconflictbetweengroups:betweenpoliceandmilitantsandbetweenactivistfactionsin thesamemovement.

Themechanisms dellaPorta(2013) identifiedinclude escalatingpolicing (“violencespreadwhenthestatewas perceivedtohaveoverreactedtotheemergenceofprotest”), competitiveescalation (“experimentationwithviolenttacticsemergedfromattemptstooutbidtheother groups”), activationofmilitantnetworks (“Militantnet-

worksdevelopedinsmallandradicalgroupingsinwhich politicalcommitmentandfriendshipmutuallystrengthenedeachother”),and implosion (“Onceunderground, clandestineorganizationsunderwentaprocessofimplosioninwhichinteractionswiththeoutsidewerereduced”;pp.284–287).dellaPortafoundthatsmallcells cutofffromsympathizersbecomemoreextremeinjustifyingandperpetratingviolenceandbecomemorefocusedonpreservingandavenginggroupmembersthan onadvancingtheiroriginalcause.

Thecasemateriallinkingradicalizationwithindividual emotions(microlevel)andgroupdynamics(mesolevel)is veryrich. dellaPorta(2013) citedpollstoaccessthe population(macro)level.Acrossthecomplexlinkagesof levels,thekeyinsightisthatradicalizationoccursinthe dynamicsofactionandreactioninconflictsbetween activistsandpolice,aswellasinconflictsbetween competingactivistgroups.Inthisperspective,radicalizationtoviolenceisanemergentpropertyofescalating conflict,especiallywhennonviolentactivismissuppressedorfailing.

Althoughindifferentlanguage,themechanismsidentifiedby dellaPorta(2013) haveconsiderableoverlapwith themechanismsidentifiedby McCauleyandMoskalenko (2011).Indeed,thepsychologicalnatureofdellaPorta’s analysisatindividualandgrouplevelsissignaledbyher attentiontoemotions,includinganexplicitcommitment(p. 20)totheideathatemotionscanbecauses.Thisideais commoninpsychologybutisrarelyacceptedinpolitical science(butsee Petersen,2011).

SignificanceQuest(2014)

“Thequestforsignificanceisthefundamentaldesireto matter,tobesomeone,tohaverespec t... [including] needforesteem,achievement,meaning,competence, control,andsoon”( Kruglanskietal.,2014 ,p.73).Inthis perspective,morefamiliarterroristmotivationssuchas personalrevenge,groupgrievance,andattachmenttoa charismaticleaderareallspecialcasesofsignificance quest.Whenjoinedwithaterrorism-justifyingideology andsocialconnectionspromotingthisideology,significancequestmovesanindividualtoradicalideasand radicalactions.

Thesignificancequestmodelofradicalizationisintellectuallyambitiousinhypothesizingacommondenominatorofterroristmotivations.Atthislevelofgenerality, itisnotclearhowsignificancequestdiffersfromrelative deprivationtheory,whichpredictsangerandaggression fromindividualsandgroupswhobelievethattheirstatus islessthanitshouldbe(Gurr,1970; Kruglanski,Chen, Dechesne,Fishman,&Orehek,2009,pp.345–346;seealsoin Moghaddam’s,2005,staircasemodel).Forsecurityofficials,itmaybemoredifficulttolookforsignificance

questthanitwouldbetolookforpersonalandgroup grievances,unfreezing,andsocialconnectionwith knownmilitants.

“TheRadicalizationPuzzle”(2015)

Intheirarticle“TheRadicalizationPuzzle,” Hafezand Mullins(2015) aimedtosynthesizeresearchthatcanilluminatehowWesternMuslimsturntojihadiviolence.The authorsbeganbycriticizingseveralterrorismexpertsfor defining radicalization asa“process”(e.g.,“thesocialand psychologicalprocessofincrementallyexperiencedcommitmenttoextremistpoliticalorreligiousideology”).Hafez andMullinsarguedthatcasehistoriesofradicalizationdo notsupportthekindoforderlyandlinearprogressionthat canbedescribedasaprocess.

As TaylorandHorgan(2006) noted,however,“tousea termlike‘process’todescribeactivitiesliketerrorismimplieswhatwedescribeasterrorismtobeactionsofsome kindassociatedwithotheractionsandreactions,oftenexpressedinsomesortofreciprocalrelationship.”Thisview ofradicalizationhighlightsaprocessofactionandreaction inadynamicofterroristattackandgovernmentresponseto terrorism;thetrajectoryofthiskindofdynamicisanything butlinearandpredictable.

Nevertheless, HafezandMullins(2015) recognizedthat fewwithradicalideasevermovetoviolentaction,andthey distinguishedradicalizationofideas(justifyingviolencefor apoliticalgoal)fromradicalizationofaction(fromlegal activismtoparticipationinterroristattacks).Theysuggestedthatfourfactors(“piecesofthepuzzle”;p.939)have tocometogethertoproduceterroristaction:grievance, networks,ideology,andenablingenvironment.Western Muslimshavegrievancesrelatingtodiscriminationand foreignpolicies.Mobilizationtoactionmostoftenoccurs throughfriendshipandfamilyconnections.Ideology,includingreligion,providesatoolkitforconstructingasocial movementframethatjustifiesuseofviolence.Anenabling environmentincludesInternetconnectionsandtraining camps.

Thefourpiecesofthepuzzleadvancedby Hafezand Mullins(2015) havemuchincommonwith Sageman’s (2008) fourradicalizationfactors.LikeSageman,Hafez andMullinsmostlyfocusonradicalizationinasmall grouporradicalizationtojoinanexistingterroristgroup. Thepowerofgroupdynamicsisrecognizedinciting importantworkby Hafez(2016 ,pp.185–204)showing thatthegreatmajorityofforeignfightersgoingtoIraq madethejourneyinsmallgroups.Butneitherofthese four-factormodelshavemuchtosayaboutlone-wolf terrorists,whodonotactaspartofagroupandhaveno connectionswithamilitantgrouporitstrainingcamps.

What’sWrongWithRadicalization (andExtremism)?

Beginningaround2010,anumberofthoughtfulscholars haveraiseddoubtsabouttheusefulnessoftheconceptof radicalization.Thissectionbrieflyrecognizestheseconcernsandrelatedconcernsabouttheconceptofextremism andthenoffersatwo-pyramidsmodelasaremedy.

ElidingRadicalIdeasandRadicalActions

ItisusefultobeginwithanextendedstatementofmisgivingsfromHorgan.

Whenterrorismbecametoodifficulttopredict,weturnedour focustoradicalization.Afterall,alotmorepeopleareradicalizedthanwilleverbecomeinvolvedinterrorism,so,the assumptiongoes,itiseasiertodetectradicalizedindividuals. Rootingoutradicalizationhasbecomeaproxyforpreempting terrorism.

Butthislogic,compellingasitwas,facessomeserious obstacles.Itappearstobegenerallyacceptedwisdomthatnot everyonewhoholdsradicalbeliefswillengageinillegal behavior.Thoughtheconsequencesofterroristatrocitiesare far-reaching,theycontinuetobeperpetratedbyveryfew individuals....

However,amorechallengingissuehasbeguntoemerge. Thereisevidencethatnotallthosewhoengageinviolent behaviornecessarilyneedtopossessradicalbeliefs,anargumentcarefullysupportedbysuchresearchasthatofKilcullen’sthesisonhowcounterinsurgencyandcounterterrorism breed“accidental”guerillas.Alingeringquestioninterrorism studiesiswhetherviolentbeliefsprecedeviolentaction,andit seemstobethecasethatwhiletheyoftendo,itisnotalways thecase.(Horgan,2012,paras.5–7).

Horgancitedconcernssimilartothoseexpressedby GithensMazerandLambert(2010), Sedgwick(2010),and(withregardto insurgency) Kilcullen(2009)

Similarconcernshavealsobeenexpressedby Kundnani (2015) and Patel(2011) inrelationtoU.K.counterextremismprograms.Considerthefollowingexample:

TheDecember2013reportofthePrimeMinister’sTaskForce onTacklingRadicalisationandExtremismillustratesthat thereremainsanassumptionthatal-Qaeda-inspiredterrorism iscausedbyparticularkindsofreligiousideology,whatit callsa“poisonousextremistideologythatcanleadpeopleto violence.”Thereportalsomakesclearthatthegovernment remainscommittedtothedevelopmentofpoliciesthatseekto reduceterrorismbypreventingextremistideologyfromcirculatingandinterveninginthelivesofthosewhohaveadoptedit.(Kundnani,2015,p.11)

Thechallengebeingraisedagainstradicalizationand extremismisthattheseconceptselideideasandaction.A popularimageofthiselisionisthatradicalideologyisa “conveyorbelt”thatmechanicallymovesanindividualon

toviolentaction(Baran,2005,p.68).Asthecriticshave pointedout,seeingideasasthethreatleadstoawaronideas (Leuprecht,Hataley,Moskalenko,&McCauley,2009). Targetingideasislikelytoproduceabacklash,ashappened withU.S.Muslimgroupsrisingtoopposethe(nowdelayed) FBIwebsitedesignedtohelpteachersandstudentsidentify individualsflirtingwithviolentextremism(Goodstein, 2015).Asseveralmilestoneauthorshaverecognized,governmentoverreactiontoterroristthreat(collateraldamage, escalatedpolicing,jujitsupolitics)cancreatenewthreats (e.g., McCauley&Moskalenko,2011).

TheTwo-PyramidsModel

Whatistobedone?Gettingridofthewords radicalization and extremism willnothelp;newnameswouldsoon arisetorefertothemechanismsbywhichindividuals, groups,andmassopinionaremovedtosupportorparticipateinpoliticalviolence.Moreusefulisrecognizingthat radicalizationtoextremistopinionsispsychologicallya differentphenomenonfromradicalizationtoextremistaction.As Borum(2011,p.30)hasargued,“Radicalization theprocessofdevelopingextremistideologiesandbeliefs— needstobedistinguishedfrom actionpathways—the processofengaginginterrorismorviolentextremistactions.”

Researchinsocialpsychologyhaslongestablishedthat attitudesdonoteasilytranslatetoactions.Inaseminal reviewofliteratureontherelationshipbetweenattitudeand behavior, Wicker(1969) noted,“Takenasawhole,these studiessuggestthatitisconsiderablymorelikelythatattitudeswillbeunrelatedoronlyslightlyrelatedtoovert behaviorsthanthatattitudeswillbecloselyrelatedtoactions”(p.65).

Theweakrelationbetweenattitudeandbehaviorisespeciallyevidentwithattitudesrelatingtoextremebehaviors. Inastudyofcollegestudents,about45%reportedsuicidal thoughts,yetonly5%everattemptedsuicide(Rudd,1989). Similarly,mostpeoplehavehomicidalfantasiesatsome pointintheirlives,andasmanyas91%ofallsurveyed collegestudentshavereportedhomicidalthoughts(Duntley, 2005).Yet,mercifully,onlyasmallminorityeveracton thesefantasies.Likewise,angeraboutgroupdiscrimination rarelytranslatesintoprotests(Klandermans,1997).Consistentwithresearchonattitudeandbehavior,thetwopyramidsmodelofradicalizationsrepresentsradicalization ofopinionseparatelyfromradicalizationofaction(Leuprecht,Hataley,Moskalenko,&McCauley,2010; McCauley,2013; McCauley&Moskalenko,2014).

Opinionpyramid. Atthebaseofthispyramidare individualswhodonotcareaboutapoliticalcause(neutral);higherinthepyramidarethosewhobelieveinthe causebutdonotjustifyviolence(sympathizers);higheryet arethosewhojustifyviolenceindefenseofthecause

(justifiers);andattheapexofthepyramidarethosewho feela personalmoralobligation totakeupviolencein defenseofthecause.Thisisnotastairwaymodel:Individualscanskiplevelsinmovingupanddowninthepyramid.

Pollingdatacanputpercentagesonthelevelsofthe opinionpyramid.OverhalfofMuslimsintheUnitedStates andtheUnitedKingdombelievethatthewaronterrorismis awaronIslam(McCauley,2013);thesearesympathizers withthejihaditerroristcause.Atleast5%ofMuslimsinthe UnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomseesuicidebombing ofciviliansindefenseofIslamasoftenorsometimes justified.This5%justifyingviolenceprojectstoabout 50,000adultMuslimsinboththeUnitedStatesandthe UnitedKingdom—underliningthepotentialdangerof backlashintargetingthosewithextremeopinions.

EmpiricalstudiesusingopinionpollsofU.S.Muslims havedemonstratedtheusefulnessoftheopinionpyramid (e.g.,see McCauley,2013 forreview).Plottingalongthe layersofthepyramidthepercentageofrespondentswho agreewithleastradicalstatementstomostradicalstatementsonthesurveyallowsresearcherstotrackchangesin radicalizationofopinioninaparticulargroupovertimeor inreactiontoapoliticalevent(McCauley,2013).

Actionpyramid. Atthebaseofthispyramidareindividualsdoingnothingforapoliticalgrouporcause(inert); higherinthepyramidarethosewhoareengagedinlegal politicalactionforthecause(activists);higheryetarethose engagedinillegalactionforthecause(radicals);andatthe apexofthepyramidarethoseengagedinillegalactionthat targetscivilians(terrorists).Again,thisisnotastairway model;individualscanskiplevelsinmovingupanddown intheactionpyramid.

Researchusingascalethatmeasuresactivistintentions (legal,nonviolentactions)andradicalintentions(illegal, violentactions)hasfoundthattheseweredistinctdimensionsthatcorrelateddifferentiallywithpastactivismand pastradicalism,aswellaswithmeasuresofimportanceof country,ethnicity,andpoliticalparty(Moskalenko&McCauley,2009).Thus,thereissomeempiricalsupportforthe distinctionbetweenthesecond(activists)andthird(radicals)levelsoftheactionpyramid.

Arecentstudyofferedacreativewaytostudytherelationshipbetweenthetwopyramidsofradicalization(Suedfeld,Cross,&Logan,2013).Theauthorscategorized15 extremistgroups,basedontheirhistoryofviolentaction,as activists,radicals,orterrorists.ThecontentoftheirInternet websiteswasthencodedonextremityofopinion.These ratingswereplottedagainstgroups’levelofviolentaction. Resultsshowedlittledifferencebetweenactivistandradical groupsbutasignificantdifferencebetweenradicaland terroristgroupsingreaterpowermotiveandlesscognitive complexityinterroristgroups(Suedfeldetal.,2013).

Asseveralmilestoneauthorshavenoted,jihadistactors arefew—perhapshundredsintheUnitedStatesorthe

UnitedKingdom—incomparisonwith10softhousands withradicalopinions(e.g. Hafez&Mullins,2015; Horgan, 2012; McCauley,2013).Andmanyindividualsmoveto jihadistactionwithoutjihadistideas—forpersonalrevenge, status,escape,orlove.Thewarrantforthetwo-pyramids modelistheobservationthat99%ofthosewithradical ideasneveract.Conversely,manyjoininradicalaction withoutradicalideas:Amongthemechanismsin McCauley andMoskalenko’s(2011) Friction,fourindividual-level mechanisms(love,riskandstatus,slipperyslope,andunfreezing)andthreegroup-levelmechanisms(polarization, competition,andisolationandthreat)canbringradical actionintheabsenceofradicalideas.

Lone-WolfTerrorists

Lone-wolfterroristsareapotentialchallengetothetwopyramidsmodel.Ifanindividualdoesnotjoinaterrorist groupandactswithoutgroupsupport,itmightappearthat lone-wolfterroristsareindeedcaseswhereradicalopinion directlyproducesradicalaction.

Thefirstthingtonoteisthatlone-wolfterroristsarerare andmaybetherareexceptionsthattestthelimitsofthe two-pyramidsrule.Moresubstantively,theremaybetwo typesoflone-wolfterrorist:the disconnected–disordered andthe caring-compelled (McCauley&Moskalenko, 2014).

Disconnected–disordered lone-wolfterroristsarelike schoolattackersandassassins,whoarepredominantlylone actors,inshowingfivecommoncharacteristics:agrievance, planfulratherthanimpulsiveattack,weaksocialties(“loners”),mentalhealthproblems(especiallydepression),and experiencewithweaponsoutsidethemilitary.Aprominent exampleofthistypeistheUnabomber, TheodoreKaczynski. Thesecommoncharacteristicssuggestthatdisconnected–disordered lone-wolfterroristsmaybepartofalargerphenomenonoflone-actorperpetratorsofplanfulviolencewho havelittletoloseinescapingthepainofdepressionand loneliness.Itmaybeonlytheaccidentofhowanindividual describeshisgrievancethatdetermineswhethertheattacker iscalledterroristorassassinorschoolattacker.

Whetherresearchfindsawaytodistinguishthepsychologyoflone-wolfterroristsfromthatofschoolattackersand assassins,thedisconnected–disorderedtypeisconsistent withthetwo-pyramidsmodel.Thistypemovestoviolence notonlyfromradicalideasofgrievancebutfromelements ofunfreezing,escape,andstatusseeking(McCauley& Moskalenko,2014).

Caring-compelled lone-wolfterroristsarenormal,sociallyconnected,andevenidealisticindividualswhofeelan unusualdegreeofsympathyforvictimsofinjustice;their feelingspushthemtowardapersonalmoralobligationto bringjusticetotheperpetrators.Anexampleofthistypeis antiabortionterroristClaytonWaagner,whoshutdown

abortionfacilitiesacrosstheUnitedStates—twice—with anthraxthreats(McCauley&Moskalenko,2011,Chapter 3).InWaagner’scase,themovetoradicalactionoccurred inamomentofstrongemotion,asheheldthetinybodyof hisstillborngranddaughterandthoughtofallthesimilar bodieslosttoabortion.

Individualsofthistypemayberareinhavinganexcess ofwhatisusuallyaccountedavirtue:sympathy.Rareor not, caring-compelledlone-wolfterroristsdorepresenta challengetothetwo-pyramidsmodel,andsympathyinduced outragemaybeonlyoneoftheemotionsthatcan pushradicalopinionstoradicalaction.

Thenextsectionreturnstotheimportanceofemotions. Hereitisimportanttonotethatindividualsmayhave radicalopinionsforalongperiodoftimebeforeturningto violentaction.Humamal-Balawi,thesuicidebomberwho attackedtheCIAbaseinKhost,Afghanistan,wasbreathing jihadistfireontheInternetformonthsbutdidnothinguntil JordanianintelligencesenthimtoPakistan(Turcan&McCauley,2010).Analystsusuallylookatmotivationtoassess riskofterroristactivity,butmeansandopportunitymaybe moreusefulforunderstandingwhyonlyafewwithradical opinionsevergettoradicalaction.

ImplicationsoftheTwo-PyramidsModel

Takentogether,thetwopyramidsareanantidoteto elidingradicalopinionwithradicalactionandtoeliding extremistopinionwithextremistviolence.Ratherthantheorizing“radicalization,”itisnecessarytoseparatelytheorizeradicalizationofopinionandradicalizationofaction.

InFebruary2015theWhiteHouseconveneda3-day SummitonCounteringViolentExtremism.ADecember 2015Googlesearchfor“counteringviolentextremism (CVE)”produced371,000hits,anditisclearthatCVEhas becomethepredominantframingofU.S.responsetoterroristthreats.TheU.S.government(TheWhiteHouse, 2011)defined violentextremists as“individualswhosupportorcommitideologically-motivatedviolencetofurther politicalends”(p.1).Thisdefinitionassumesthatterrorist violenceisideologicallymotivated—emotionalreactions areoffthetable.AmotiveassimpleasrevengeforperceivedWesternhumiliationofMuslims(Khouri,2015)is notconceivableunderthisdefinition.TheU.S.Government definitionalsoconflatessupportforpoliticalviolencewith committingradicalviolence—multiplyingtheenemy,as notedearlier,byahundred.

Inshort,thewordsandconceptsusedbytheU.S.governmenttodescribeextremistsandtoframereactionsto theirthreat—languagenowdominantintheU.S.government—worksagainstseparatingradicalizationofopinion fromradicalizationofaction.Thelanguagethatfocuseson Islamicextremismandviolentextremismastheenemyisa

majorimpedimenttothetheoreticalseparationbetween radicalizationinopinionandaction.

Amodestsuggestiontoforwardthisseparationisso simplethatitmaybepractical:torenamecounteringviolent extremism(CVE)ascounteringextremistviolence(CEV). Inthepagesof AmericanPsychologist itwillperhaps seemoddthatthedistinctionbetweenattitudeandbehavior featuredineverypsychologytextbookhasnotbeenobvious ineffortstounderstandterroristviolence.Thetextbook lessonisthattherelationofattitudeandbehaviorisgenerallyweak—weakenedbythepowerof“othervariables” suchasnorms,habits,andperceptionsofcontrol.Consistentwiththislesson,radicalopinionsareneithernecessary norsufficientforterroristviolence.

SecurityImplicationsoftheTwo-PyramidsModel

Thissectiondrawsoutafewimplicationsofthetwopyramidsmodelforsecurityofficialsresponsibleforcounterterroriststrategyandtactics.

Thereisno“conveyorbelt”fromextremebeliefsto extremeaction. Itisplausiblethatradicalbeliefsinspire radicalaction,butresearchhasindicatedthattheconnection isweak.Badideasarenotlikeadoseofsaltsthatmust producebadactions.

Fightingextremeideasrequiresdifferentskillsthan doesfightingterrorists. Radicalizationofopinionisa phenomenonofmasspsychology,whereasradicalizationof actionisaphenomenonofindividualandsmall-grouppsychology.Fightingthesetwokindsofradicalizationrequires differenttoolsanddifferentskills.Onemightargue,for instance,thattheU.S.StateDepartmentcouldbemore effectiveinthewarofideas,whereasthepolice,theFBI, andtheDefenseDepartmentmightbemoreusefulinfindingandfightingterrorists.

Lesscanbemore. Escalatedpolicingcanproduceescalatedterroristviolenceandescalatedsympathyandsupportforterroristviolence.RespondingtotheNovember 2015attacksinspiredbytheIslamicState,theFrenchParliamentdecreedastateofemergency:“AlloverFrance, fromToulouseinthesouthtoParisandbeyond,thepolice havebeenbreakingdowndoors,conductingsearcheswithoutwarrants,aggressivelyquestioningresidents,hauling suspectstopolicestationsandputtingothersunderhouse arrest”(Nossiter,2015,para.1).ThetargetsofthisescalatedpolicingarepredominantlyMuslims,givingtheIslamicStatethejujitsupoliticsithopeswillconvinceMuslimsalloverEurope—20millionMuslims—thattheir futureiswiththeIslamicState.

Fewerenemiesisbetter. Targetingradicalorextremist ideasisanotherkindofsuccessforjujitsupolitics.Perhaps themostdangerousforceforhostilityanddiscrimination againstMuslimsisthedefinitionoftheenemyas“fundamentalistMuslims.”MarineLePen,leaderofananti-

immigrantpartyinFrance,offeredthistargetinaninterviewwithNPR’sRobertSiegel:“WemusteradicateIslamic fundamentalismfromoursoil”(Siegel,2015).Asnoted earlier,targetingideasratherthanactionsmultipliesthe enemybyahundred.

Lessonsfromcounterinsurgency. Hereitisusefulto notethestrongparallelbetweencounterterrorismandcounterinsurgency.The U.S.Army&MarineCorps(2006) CounterinsurgencyFieldManual givescloseattentionto theinsurgentstrategythataimstomobilizenewsupportby elicitinggovernmentoverreactiontoinsurgentattacks.The needtocounterthisstrategyofjujitsupoliticscomes throughinthefirstfive paradoxesofcounterinsurgency operations (pp.47–51):

1.“Sometimes,theMoreYouProtectYourForce,the LessSecureYouMayBe”

2.“Sometimes,theMoreForceIsUsed,theLess EffectiveItIs”

3.“TheMoreSuccessfultheCounterinsurgencyIs, theLessForceCanBeUsedandtheMoreRisk MustBeAccepted”

4.“SometimesDoingNothingIstheBestReaction”

5.“SomeoftheBestWeaponsforCounterinsurgents DoNotShoot”

Insurgencyandterrorismareformsofpoliticalconflict. Counterinsurgencyandcounterterrorismarethusformsof politicalconflict.MaoZedong’ssloganisperhapstheshortestsummaryoftheroadtosuccessforbothcounterinsurgencyandcounterterrorism:“Politicstakescommand”(Sullivan,2007,p.401).

ResearchImplicationsofthe

Two-PyramidsModel

Separatingradicalizationofideasfromradicalizationof actioncanopennewresearchdirectionsforbothpyramids. Ideasversusactions. Thetwo-pyramidsmodelleads immediatelytothequestionofwhyandhowsomegroups movetoviolentactionwhereasothergroupswiththesame goalsdonot.Anoutstandingexampleofthekindofresearchneededisaprojectthatbroughtmultipleinvestigatorsandmultiplecontentcodingsystemstoacomparisonof therhetoricusedbytwoal-Qaedagroupsandtwononviolentgroupswithsimilarideologyandgoals(Smith,2013). Largerscalecomparisonsofthiskindmaybepossiblewith conflictdatabasessuchasMAROB(MinoritiesatRisk OrganizationalBehavior)thatincludebothviolentandnonviolentgroups.

Behavioraltrajectories. Liberatedfromasupposed commongroundinginradicalideas,researchonradicaliza-

tiontoterroristviolencecanfocusondifferentbehavioral trajectories.Thereseemtobeatleastfivetrajectoriesof radicalizationtoterroristaction:(1)Anindividualcanmove topoliticalviolencealone,withoutgroupororganizational support(lonewolf);(2)anindividualcanmovetoviolence byjoininganalreadyviolentgroup(e.g.,ISISvolunteers); (3)anindividualcanmovetoviolencebyvolunteeringasa suicidebomberforanalreadyviolentgroup(e.g.,alBalawi’sattackontheCIAatKhost);(4)asmalland isolatedgroupcanmovetopoliticalviolence(the“bunchof guys”describedin Sageman’s,2008,book);and(5)asmall groupwithinalargeractivistmovementcanmovetoviolenceaspartofintergroupcompetition(condensation,outbidding,orfission).

Researchmightaimtotestthepossibilitythatthepsychologiesassociatedwiththesefivetrajectoriesaredifferent;itisevenpossiblethattherearedifferentpersonality anddemographicprofilesassociatedwiththesetrajectories. Moreconfidently,onecanpredictthatgroup-levelmechanismsofradicalizationtoactionwillbestrongerforthelast twotrajectories,whichfocusongroupdynamicsandintergroupconflict.

Emotionsinideasandactions. Casehistoriesofterroristshaveshowntheminthegripofanger,outrage, shame,humiliation,andfeelingtheextremeformsofpositiveandnegativeidentificationthatarecommonlycalled loveandhate(McCauley&Moskalenko,2011; Royzman, McCauley,&Rozin,2004).Psychologists,especiallythose familiarwithappraisaltheoriesofemotion(Frijda,Kuipers, &TerSchure,1989),haveaheadstartinseeingthepossibilitythatemotionincludesanimpetustoaction.New databaseswithincreasingdetailaboutindividualoffenders—AmericanTerrorismStudy(ATS),U.S.Extremist CrimeDatabase(ECDB),andProfilesinIndividualRadicalizationintheUnitedStates(PIRUS)—offerthepossibilityoflearningmoreabouttheemotionalexperiences associatedwithdifferentlevelsofbothradicalizationof ideasandradicalizationofaction.Inparticular,itseems possiblethatsimilaremotionsareatworkinmovingindividualstobothlegalpoliticalactivismandterroristviolence.

Pollingresearch. Trendsinpublicopinionrelatingto terrorismalsoneedresearch.Withregardtoseeingthewar onterrorismasawaronIslamorseeingsuicidebombingas justifiedindefenseofIslam,howdoU.S.Muslimsdiffer fromMuslimsinpredominantlyMuslimcountries?Howdo theseopinionsdifferforMuslimscomingtotheUnited Statesfromdifferentorigincountries?Whatdistinguishes theminorityofU.S.Muslimswhoseesuicidebombingas justifiedfromthemajoritywhosayitisneverjustified? Publicopinionamongthosetargetedbyterroristsalso needsstudy.Aninnovativestudyby Back,Küfner,and Egloff(2010) examinedemotionwordsinmillionsofwords oftextssentintheUnitedStatesonSeptember11,2001.

Anger-relatedwordsincreasedthroughouttheday,ending sixtimeshigherthanfear-andsadness-relatedwords.In addition,experimentshavefoundthatU.S.studentsrespondingtoimagesofthe9/11attackswithangeraremore likelytofavoraggressivereactionstoterrorism,whereas reactionsoffearandsadnessarerelatedtosupportformore defensivereactions(Wetherell,Weisz,Stolier,Beavers,& Sadler,2013).

Understandingtheradicalizationofpublicopinionon bothsidesofintergroupconflictcanprofitbygreaterattentiontopsychologicalresearchongroup-basedemotions (Mackie,Devos,&Smith,2000),especiallymoralemotions (Rozin,Lowery,Imada,&Haidt,1999). Matsumoto,Hwang, andFrank(2012) havepointedtothepotentialofthiskindof research,implicatingtheimportanceofanger,fear,shame, anddisgust.StudiesbyMatsumotoandhiscolleagueshave shown,forinstance,thatspeechesbyworldleadersand ideologicalgroupleadersshowincreasedanger,contempt, anddisgustbeforeinitiatingactsofaggressiontowardperceivedenemies.

LookingForward

Althougharationalchoiceframeworkstilldominates researchonterrorism,thereisgrowingawarenessofthe importanceofemotionsandaffectiveexperienceinunderstandingpoliticalradicalization.Psychologistsandpsychologicalresearcharepoisedtobringarevolutioninunderstandingbothradicalizationofopinionandradicalizationof action.

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ReceivedJanuary29,2016

RevisionreceivedAugust26,2016

AcceptedSeptember12,2016