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Falseequivalencies:Onlineactivismfromlefttoright

DeenFreelon1,2*,AliceMarwick2,3,DanielKreiss1,2

Digitalmediaarecriticalforcontemporaryactivism evenlow-effort “clicktivism” ispoliticallyconsequential andcontributestoofflineparticipation.WearguethatintheUnitedStatesandthroughouttheindustrialized West,left-andright-wingactivistsusedigitalandlegacymediadifferentlytoachievepoliticalgoals.Although left-wingactorsoperateprimarilythrough “hashtagactivism” andofflineprotest,right-wingactivists manipulatelegacymedia,migratetoalternativeplatforms,andworkstrategicallywithpartisanmediatospread theirmessages.Althoughscholarshipsuggeststhattherighthasembracedstrategicdisinformationand conspiracytheoriesmorethantheleft,moreresearchisneededtorevealthemagnitudeandcharacterof left-wingdisinformation.Suchideologicalasymmetriesbetweenleft-andright-wingactivismholdcritical implicationsfordemocraticpractice,socialmediagovernance,andtheinterdisciplinarystudyofdigitalpolitics.

Activismisafixtureofcontemporary politics,bothdemocraticandotherwise. Atitscoreisthedrivetoenactorpreventpolitical,cultural,and/orsocial changesbyarangeofmeans.Although nonelitecitizenshaveadvancedactivistclaims againstthepowersthatbeformillennia( 1 ), inthe21stcentury,digitalmediaofferunprecedentedtoolsforactivistsaroundthe worldtohelprealizetheirsociopolitical visions.Inthisreview,whichfocusesonthe UnitedStatesbutalsoincorporatesevidence fromothercountries,wearguethatboththe ideologicalleftandrightusetheadditionalchannelsandlow-costparticipationaffordedbydigitalmediato reachpotentiallysympatheticpublics. However,despitesomesimilarities,recentresearchindicatesthatleftand rightdiffersharplyinhowtheyusedigitalmedia.Whereastheleftgenerally combineson-andofflineprotestactionswithtransmediabranding,anapproachknownas “ hashtagactivism” (2),therighttendstoeschewofflineprotest (notwithstandingafewprominentexceptions),preferringinsteadacombinationof “trolling ” ormanipulatingmainstreammedia,protestagainstandevenstrategicexit fromplatformsownedby “BigTech,” and cooperationwithideologicallyfriendlymediaoutlets.Moreover,availableevidence suggeststhattherighthasinvestedfar morethantheleftindisinformationand conspiracytheoriesascorecomponentsof itsactivistrepertoire,althoughalackofsimilarresearchontheleftmakescomparisons difficult.Theseasymmetrictrendsholdimportantimplicationsbothforscholarship andfordemocraticpractice.

1HussmanSchoolofJournalismandMedia,Universityof NorthCarolinaatChapelHill,ChapelHill,NC,USA. 2Center forInformation,Technology,andPublicLife,Universityof NorthCarolinaatChapelHill,ChapelHill,NC,USA. 3DepartmentofCommunication,UniversityofNorthCarolina atChapelHill,ChapelHill,NC,USA. *Correspondingauthor.Email:freelon@email.unc.edu

Lowcost,highbenefit:Clicktivismand politicalparticipation

Sincethestartofsocialmedia ’ sdiffusion throughoutWesternsocieties,concernshave beenraisedaboutitsefficacyforpoliticalparticipation.Oneprominentearlyobjectionwas that “slacktivism” or “clicktivism,” low-costsymbolicactionssuchassharing, “liking,” changing one’sprofileimage,andgenerallypostingactivistcontentonsocialmedia,projectsan impressionofefficacywithoutactuallybeing effective(3).Thetwoassumptionsunderlying thisobjectionare,first,thatsuchdigitally

“Digital political activities–including low-cost ones–are a complement to, not a substitute for, their offline counterparts.”

mediatedsymbolicbehaviorsaregenerallynot consequentialinandofthemselvesand,second,thattheysubstituteformoreimpactful actionssuchasvotingorofflineprotest.Later, wewillturntorecentresearchonhowdigital activismcanbehighlyimpactfulonitsown, contributingtophenomenasuchasdisinformation.Meanwhile,empiricalresearchhas consistentlyfailedtosupporttheproposition thatdigitalactionsubstitutesforofflineaction (4–6).Thatis,peoplewhoarestronglyinterestedinpoliticstendtoexpressthatinterest throughbothonlineandofflinebehaviors.Digitalpoliticalactivities–includinglow-costones–areacomplementto,not asubstitutefor,their offlinecounterparts.Inversely,thosewhoare uninterestedinpoliticstendtoavoiditboth onlineandoffline.Specifically,Lane etal foundthatsharinginformationaboutpolitics onsocialmediapredictedofflinepoliticalactivitiessuchasattendingpoliticalmeetings, contactingpublicofficials,anddonatingmoney topoliticalcampaigns(4).deZúñiga etal. (5)

foundthattheuseofsocialmediatoaddress communityproblems,whichtheycall “social mediasocialcapital,” predictedthepropensity toengageinsimilaractivitiesoffline.Andametaanalysisof106surveystudiesofyoungpeople's civicandpoliticaluseofdigitalmediain>35 countriesfoundthattheuseofdigitalmediafor politicalpurposeswaspositivelycorrelatedwith offlinepoliticalandcivicengagement(6).

Theunanimityoftheliteratureonthispoint hasledsometodeclarethattheclicktivism debateisconclusivelysettled(7).However, thisconclusionisprematuregivenseveralimportantquestionsthatlacksolidempirical answers.Oneofthemostpressingbegins withtheobservationthatpoliticalengagementisissuespecific:Anindividualcanbe engagedwithoneormoreissuesanddisengagedfromothers.Theclicktivismquestion thenevolvesfromwhetherlow-costdigitalactivitiesexhaustone’sengagementwithpolitics ingeneraltowhethersuchactivitiesmaydoso forspecificissuesthatliebeyondtheperson’s usualinterests.Forexample,whereasliking, sharing,andpostingmemesaboutenvironmentaltopicsmaybejustoneofmanywaysan environmentalistengageswithherpetissue, itmaybetheonlywayshedoessofor,say, BlackLivesMatterwhenthatmovementis trendingnationallyonTwitter.Thepatternofpunctuatedequilibriumthattypifiessocialmovementactivityonsocial mediaimpliesthatsomevariantofthis willbetrueatleastsomeofthetime.To continuewiththeBlackLivesMatter example,astudythattrackedrelated tweetsovera1-yearperiodoverlapping themovement’sbirthshowedafewsharp peaksofinterest(mostprominentlyin August,November,andDecemberof2014 andinAprilandMayof2015)separated bylengthyperiodsofmuchloweractivity (Fig.1)(8).Thisistypicalofsuchmovements’ socialmediaactivityandindeedofsocialmediaingeneral(9).

Logically,theburstsofattentionthatcreate suchpeaksmustbeprovidedbypeople(orbots, anon-negligiblepossibility)whoengagefora shorttimeandthendepart,leavingacommittedcoreofactiviststosustainthebaseline conversation.Whethersuchparticipationis consideredclicktivismismoreaquestionof philosophythanempiricism.Ontheonehand, thedegreeofindividualcommitmentisundoubtedlylow,butontheother,theaggregate crestsofattentiongeneratedbythousandsor millionsofsuchactionscancatapultaprotest movementfromobscuritytointernationalprominence(10).AsFreelon etal.document(8), grassrootsattentiononsocialmediaplayed asubstantialroleinspreadingtheinitialpublicawarenessofBlackLivesMatter’sexistence andgoals,whichwasanessentialprecursor toitswidespreadacceptancebytheAmerican

publicinmid-2020(11).Ourhypotheticalenvironmentalistmaynothaveengagedwith BlackLivesMatteratalliflow-costonline actionswereunavailable;thus,ratherthan substitutingforhigher-coststreet-levelactivism,onlineactionsbroadensymbolicsupport formovements(12).

Ourmainargumentsonclicktivismcanbe summarizedthusly:Thereisacontinuumof onlineactivistparticipationrangingfrompostingandlikingcontenttohigh-leveldecisionmakingasafull-timeactivist.Evenmore,as theremainderofthisreviewclearlyreveals throughthelensofrecentempiricalresearch, low-costdigitalactivitiescansumtosubstantialeffectsrangingfrompublicizing movementsformassaudiencestocirculating disinformationthatunderminesdemocratic deliberationandprocesses.Anumberof Americanactivistmovementshavesubstantiallyfurtheredtheirgoalsthroughdigital meansoverthepastdecade,includingOccupyWallStreet,BlackLivesMatter,#MeToo/ #TimesUp,far-rightanti-immigrationadvocates,andthemens’ rightsmovement.Similarresultshavebeenobservedoutsideofthe UnitedStates(10, 12, 13).Toaddaright-wing exampletotheBlackLivesMattercasedetailedabove,Benkler etal.explainhowfarrightmedia,activists,andsocialmediausers successfullyintroducedtheterm “globalist,” ananti-Semiticdogwhistle,intothejournalisticmainstream(14).Thiseffortbeganwith whitenationalistsitessuchasVDAREand continuedthroughBreitbart(afar-rightsite thatavoidsexplicitwhitenationalism),Fox News,andtheTrumpadministrationafterthe 2016election,finallyendingupasasynonym for “neoconservative” in TheNewYorkTimes. Theonline-onlymediaoutletsatthebeginningofthischainrelyheavilyonsocialmedia sharingtoboosttheirmessages(15).Inthe UnitedStates,thisisthemainwaytheyattract theattentionofFoxNews,whichismoredirectlynetworkedwithmoretraditionalmedia outletsandtheTrumpadministration.Overall,thisexampledemonstrateshowfar-right actorscaninserttheirpreferredterminology andideasintomore “respectable” outletsthat wouldotherwisetrytoavoidsuchassociations.Otherstudieshavedemonstratedthat sitessuchasBreitbart(andtheirEuropean counterparts)servesimilar “bridging” functionsbetweenfar-rightandlegacymedia (16, 17).Intheseandotherways,slacktivism hasbeenaconsequentialcomponentofcontemporarysocialmovementsandwilllikely continuetobesointhefuture.

Theempiricalrecordhasverylittletosay onthequestionofideologicalasymmetriesin slacktivism,mostlybecauseleft-wingprotests havebeenstudiedfarmorethanright-wing protests(18).Basedonwhatweknowabout howmostareasoflifetypicallyworkonline,

wemightexpectthatright-wingactorswould useonlineandofflinemeanstopursuetheir interestssimilarlytothewaythatthoseon theleftdo.Onesurvey-basedstudyfoundthat forAmericanrespondentswithlowpolitical interest, “ easypoliticalbehaviors[suchas likingandcommentingonsocialmedia]can begatewaybehaviorstomoresignificantpoliticalactivities,” butthatideologywasnota significantpredictorofthistendency(19).

Left-andright-wingdigitalstrategies andecosystems

Oneofdigitalmedia’smostimportantcontributionstoactivismishowtheyhaveopened newpathwaystoreachtargetaudiences.Beforethedigitalage,protesterswhowishedto projecttheirmessagesnationallyorinternationallyhadonlyoneviableoption:attracting thenewsmedia’sattention,whichtheyusually didthroughstreetprotests.Mailinglistsand alternativemediaextendedtheirreachonly moderately.Today,digitalmediaaffordactivistsacrossthepoliticalspectrumtwogeneral methodsofpromotingtheircauses.Thefirstis tocircumventthenewsmediaentirelyand appealdirectlytodigitalplatformusers.This methodofferstheadvantageofplacingmessagecontrolmostlyinthehandsofactivists andsympatheticpartiesbutbydefinitionmostly reachespeoplewhoarealreadyplatformusers. Second,activistsusedigitalplatformstoattract journalists’ attention(becausemostusesocial mediaextensivelyasagaugeofpublicopinionandasasourceofstories)(20)inthehopes thattheywillcovertheirmovement.Theadvantagehereisthatnewsoutletscanreachindividualsoutsideofthedigitalsphereswithin whichactivistsoperate,aswellasthosewho arenotdigitallyactiveatall,butmayalsoalter activistmessagesinwaysthatarenotalways favorabletomovements(21).Thesetwomethods arenotmutuallyexclusive;manyofthebestknownactivistmovementsinrecentyearshave usedboth(2, 8, 22).

Althoughactivistsonbothsidesusedigital mediatoreachaudiencesdirectlyandindirectlythroughthenewsmedia,theleftand therighthaveeachevolvedtheirowndistinctstyleofdoingso.Thedominantstyleon thelefthasbeenlabeledhashtagactivism (2, 23, 24)andbearsthreemaindistinguishingcharacteristics.Thefirstandforemostof theseisthecreationofadeclarativehashtag toserveasthemovement’sunifyingslogan;e.g., #BlackLivesMatter,#MeToo,and#Fightfor15 becameshorthandforahostofdemandsand priorities.Thelimitedamountofattention thatmostpeopledecidetoallocatetonewsin generalandactivistappealsinparticularguaranteesthatonlyafewprotesthashtagswill attainnationalorinternationalprominence. Suchhashtagsoftencometothepublic’sattentionthroughnewscoverageofshocking

anddisruptiveevents,suchasMichaelBrown’s deathatthehandsofpoliceofficerDarren WilsoninFerguson,MO(#BlackLivesMatter), thedisclosureofHarveyWeinstein’sdecadeslonghistoryofsexualpredation(#MeToo),and aseriesofAmericanfast-foodworkerstrikes in2012–2013(#Fightfor15).Second,suchhashtagsarebuoyedbythewidespreadengagementofnonelites,ordinarycitizenswhorelate tothehashtag’scoremessageorsimplywantto declaretheirsupport.Thisiswhatcausesthem to “trend” onsocialmediaandtherebytrigger thethirdelement:attentionandsupportfrom elitethirdparties.Mostprominentamongthese aremainstreamnewsoutlets,whichareoften thefirstelitestopublicizeactivisthashtags.Others includecelebrities,businesses,andpoliticians, allofwhomholddisproportionatepowerto directattentiontomovements.Examplesincludehip-hopartistsTalibKweliandCommon (#BlackLivesMatter),icecreamcompanyBen& Jerry ’ s(#BlackLivesMatter),actressAlyssa Milano(#MeToo),andSenatorBernieSanders (#Fightfor15).Althoughmuchhashtagactivism researchisU.S.focused,thephenomenonhas alsobeenobservedincountriessuchasArgentina (25),Bangladesh(26),France(27),andIndia(27). Therightengageswiththesedualpathways verydifferently.Severalfundamentaldifferenceswiththeleftexplainthis.First,American conservatives’ mistrustofthemainstream newsmediahasbeenintensifyingfordecades (28 , 29),apatternthatseemstobecommon ontherightacrossEuropeandIndiaaswell (30–32).Thesensethattraditionalnewsoutletsareirredeemablybiasedagainstconservativesisoneofthedrivingfactorsinthe establishmentofright-wingmediaecosystems, therootsofwhichintheUnitedStatesreach backatleasttothe1930s(33).Second,conservativeshavemorerecentlydevelopedan analogousbeliefthat “BigTech,” apejorative termforthecompaniesthatproduceandmaintaintheinternet’smostwidelyusedcommunicationplatformsandhardware,including Facebook,Google,Twitter,Apple,andAmazon, isalsobiasedagainstthem(34).Thesetwo beliefshaveledtherighttointeractwiththe newsmediaandtechplatformsinmoreradicallyoppositionalwaysthantheleftdespite thelatter’scritiquesofthoseinstitutions.Distastefor(andbeingdeplatformedfrom)Big Techhaspromptedsomefar-rightuserstodecamptoplatformsmoreacceptingoftheir politics,includingTelegram,Gab,andVoat (35).Third,since2016,thecenter-right’spresenceonsocialmediahas diminishedsubstantially(14, 36, 37),leavingthefarrightasthe dominantconservativepresence.Together, theseshort-andlong-termtrendshaveshifted therightintoaworldapartfromtheleftand center,anditsactivisttacticsreflectthatreality.Figure2quantifiesthisphenomenon bydepictingthepercentagesof “fragmented”

Reproducedwithpermissionfrom(8).See(58)forthedataand codeusedincreatingthisfigure.

usersthatretweetedmediaoutletsalongthe ideologicalspectrumin2017.Outletswithpredominantlyfar-rightaudiencesattractednearly fourtimesmorefragmentedusers(thosethat disproportionatelyretweetedwithinonepartition)thanthesecondmostfragmentedpartition. Conservativemistrustofthemainstream mediahasinspiredtwodistinctivetacticsfor interactingwithtwokindsofmediaoutlets. Thosethatlackanexplicitlyconservativeoutlookoftenfindthemselvestargetedbymedia manipulation,anumbrellatermthatrefers toarepertoireofbad-faithtacticsintendedto attractjournalisticattention(22).Oneofthe mostprominentofthese,knownas “trading upthechain,” involvesplantingasensationalistichoax,conspiracytheory,orextreme viewpointinasmallorlocalnewsoutletthat maynotfact-checkit(22, 38).Thisstorymay thenberepeatedbylargeroutlets,eitherbecauseofitscontentorbecauseanelite(such asDonaldTrump)hasendorsedit.Whether theunderlyingclaimispresentedastrueor debunked,thegoalofspreadingitfurtheris fulfilled.Bycontrast,right-wingactivists’ interactionswithideologicallyfriendlyoutlets areunderstandablyfarlesscontentious.What Benkler etal.havecalledtheAmerican “rightwingmediaecosystem” isadenselyinterlinked regionofthemedianetworkthatstandsfar apartfromothermediaintermsofdigital, professional,andideologicalconnections (14, 16).Itsreachonsocialmediaplatformsis extensive,inmostcaseslargerthanitsleftwingequivalent(14).Theostensiblymore journalisticoutletsinthisnetwork,suchas FoxNewsandtheDailyCaller,regularlylegitimizecontentsurfacedbythemoreradical outlets,whichincludeInfowars,Gateway Pundit,andBreitbart.Theright-wingmedia ecosystem’sfavoredtopicsduringtheTrump administrationhaveprominentlyincludedun-

compromisingoppositiontonon-Westernimmigration,theevilsoftheso-called “deep state,” andattacksonthelegitimacyofthe Muellerinvestigation( 14).

Twoothertacticsuseddisproportionately byright-wingactorsarespecifictosocialplatforms.Thefirstisthestrategicmanipulation ofplatformalgorithmstoincreaseattention todesiredmessages.Muchasthegatekeepingfunctionoflegacyjournalismshapedthe norms,practices,andpatternsofnewscoverageofsocialmovements,socialplatforms’ emphasisonuserengagementaffectswhat informationisdisplayedtoindividualusers, forexample,bygivinggreaterreachtoemotionallychargedcontent,videos,andvisual graphicsovertext(39).Thus,successfulonline activistsmustunderstandhowsocialplatformsalgorithmicallysortcontenttoensure thattheirownisgivenpriority.Although bothleft-andright-wingactorsengageinsuch tactics,preliminaryevidencesuggeststhatthe righthasbeenmoresuccessful.Forinstance, platformssuchasYouTubehaverecommended increasinglyextremefar-rightcontentto viewersofmoremoderateright-wingchannels tomaximizeuserengagementwiththesite (40).Similartechniquesincludeoptimizing searchenginekeywor dssothatinterested partieswillmorereadilyfindideologically biasedresults(41)andtheuseoffakeaccounts andbotstoimplywidespreadconsensuson socialmedia(42).Becausejournalistsoften relyonengagementmetricssuchasTwitter’s “TrendingTopics” todeterminewhichstories shouldbecoveredandhowtheyshouldbe framed,successfulalgorithmicmanipulation mayhelptosetlegacymediaagendas(22). Second,inresponsetodeplatforming,shadow banning,andcontentmoderationbyBigTech, someright-wingactorshavemigratedto “alttech” equivalentsthatoffermorepermissive

moderation.Theseincludesocialmediasites dedicatedtoright-wingcommunities,such as4chanand8chan,theTwitteralternatives ParlerandGab,andtheYouTubealternative BitChute,aswellasmoreideologicallyneutral platformssuchasDiscordandTelegram(35). Althoughalt-techplatformsaremuchsmaller thantheirmainstreamcounterparts,theyallowpartisanandfringecommunitiestoexist withoutoppositionfromalternativeviewpoints. Studieshavedemonstratedahighprevalence ofhatespeechon4chan(43),Gab(44),and BitChute(45),whichistypicallymoderated onmoremainstreamsocialplatforms.These spacesallowmoreextremeviewpointsto thrive,whereasmainstreamsocialmediaprimarilyhostlessextremecontentdesignedto reachwideraudiences(22).

Themostrelevantimplicationsofthedifferencesbetweenhowleft-andright-wingactivistnetworksreachtheirrespectiveaudiences derivefromtheirverydifferentrelationships withtheplatformstheyuse.Theleftlargely engagesdirectlywithtraditionalandsocial media,usingthemasprimarycommunication venuestodevelopanddistributeactivistmessages.Theseoutletsandplatformspresent themselvesaswhatCassSunsteincalled “generalinterestintermediaries” (46),information environmentsthatadmitawiderangeofperspectives.Consequently,left-wingideastend toconnectwithindividualsandinstitutions alongamuchbroaderrangeoftheideological spectrumthantheright,includingmuchof thecenter(14).Bycontrast,therighthascreated anduseditsownideologicallyexclusivemedia ecosystemanddigitalplatformsevenasit continuestoengagewiththebest-knowntech platformsandnewsoutletsoutofnecessity. Thesedevelopmentsinturn(alongwithother nondigitalfactors)fuelwhatscholarshave called “asymmetricpolarization,” theproposition

Initial protests after Michael Brown was shot and killed by police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri

Death of Freddie Gray in police custody in Baltimore, Maryland

Decision to not indict New York City police officer Daniel Pantaleo, whose chokehold killed Eric Garner

Decision to not indict Darren Wilson

Fig.1.DailytweetsaboutpoliceviolenceandBlackLivesMatter,June2014toMay2015.

thatconservativeshavegrownmoreextreme overthepastfewdecadesthanliberals(14, 37, 47). Asymmetricpolarization’sbroaderconsequences includelesscommongroundbetweenopposing politicalsides,increasinglyextremepolicies whenconservativesareelected,andmore opportunitiesforideologicallybrandedmisanddisinformationtospreadontheright, whichwediscussfurtherinthenextsection.

Emergingresearchon asymmetricdisinformation

Sincethe2016U.S.andU.K.Brexitelections, scholars,thenewsmedia,andinternational publicshavebecomeincreasingly concernedwiththeproblemoffalse andmisleadingpoliticalcontent (14, 22, 48, 49).Thisgeneralphenomenonhasmultiplevariantswith avarietyoflabels,includingtheubiquitousandambiguous “fakenews,” whichweavoid.Here,wewillfocus ondisinformation,whichwedefine as “allformsoffalse,inaccurate,or misleadinginformationdesigned,presentedandpromotedtointentionally causepublicharmorforprofit” (48). Unlikemisinformation,whichrefers tomisleadingcontentspreadinadvertently,disseminatorsofdisinformation knowtheirmessagesaredeceitful.Actors behindsuchdeceptivecontentseekto spreadconspiracytheories,falserumors, hoaxes,andinflammatoryopinionsto promotetheirideologicalviewpoints, decreasetrustinmainstreaminstitutions,andrecruitotherstotheir causes(22).

Therelevantliteratureoffersthree typesofevidenceinsupportofthe propositionthatdisinformationis moreprevalentontherightthanon theleft,althoughtoourknowledgethishas notbeendirectlytested.First,evidencefrom psychologicalstudiesindicatesthatconservativeindividualsaremorelikelythanliberals topreferthekindsofclosedmediaenvironments(sometimescalled “echochambers”) thatfacilitatethespreadofmis-anddisinformation(50),believeconspiracytheorieswhen cuedbyofficialdenialsofconspiratorialcauses (51),andtoleratethespreadingofdisinformationbypoliticians(52).Second,analysesoffalse newsdiffusiononsocialmediahavegenerally shownatendencyforconservativestoshare suchcontentmorethanliberals(53, 54).Third, themostvisiblemainstreamnewsmediaoutlets,uponwhichtheleftreliesmuchmore heavilyforpoliticalinformationthantheright, havealonghistoryoffact-checkingnorms thatlargelypreventdisinformationfromthrivingthere(14),whichiswhyunderstanding howthenewsindustryoperateshelpsindividualsavoiddisinformation(55).

Existingresearchprovidesnumerousexamplesofconservative-targeteddisinformation, inwhichright-wingmediaecosystemsaround theworldareoftencentrallyimplicated (49, 56, 57).IntheUnitedStates,thealt-right, unapologeticwhitenationalists,andotherson therightmostfringeattractrelativelysmall audiencesandmustrelyonmediaoutletsat higherlevelsoftheecosystemtohelpcirculate theirdisinformationandotherextremeideas broadly(14).Thefringesarenotalwayssuccessful;inparticular,conspiracytheoriesimplicatingaWashington,DC,pizzaparlorasthe centerofaDemocrat-controlledpedophilia

of2020prominentlyincludesright-wingmedia ecosystemmemberssuchasGatewayPundit (@gatewaypundit)andcommentatorsforFox News(@greggutfeld)andInfowars(@libertytarian)(58).Inthisway,theright-wingmedia ecosystemcirculatessensationalisticcontent toanideologicallyfriendlyaudiencefreeofthe sortsofeditorialpracticesthatwouldprevent thespreadoffalseinformation.Thegoal,as withmuchdisinformation,istosupporttheingroupanddenigratetheoutgroup,evenatthe expenseofverifiabletruth.

Fig.2.Percentagesoffragmentedusersretweetingmediaoutlets acrossfiveideologicalpartitions. Thedenominatorforeachpercentageis thenumberofuserswhoretweeted(sharedcontentfrom)atleastone mediaoutletinthatpartition,whereasthenumeratoristhenumberofusers forwhomatleast80%oftheirretweetswereofoutletsinthatpartition (i.e., “fragmented” users).Thisfiguredepictsthebehaviorofthe1.82million uniqueTwitterusersinthedatasetwhoretweetedthreeormoremedia accounts.Thedatasetuponwhichthisfigureisbasedcomesfrom(37)and contains>88milliontweetsaboutsixmajornewsissuesthroughout2017. Mediaoutletsandcorrespondingideologicalclassificationscomefrom (14).See(58)forthedataandcodeusedincreatingthisfigure.

ringandaccusingaleft-wingactivistofmurderingacounterprotesteratthe2017Unitethe Rightrallywerenotendorsedbytheecosystem’supperechelons(14, 38).Theranksof disinformationstoriesthatachievedgreater notorietyincludetheSethRichconspiracy, inwhichaHillaryClintonstafferwasallegedly murderedbecauseofwhatheknewabouther emails.(RichwaskilledinWashington,DC, on10July2016byunknownassailants,butno credibleevidencelinkshisdeathtoClinton.) Thestoryoriginatedamongfringeecosystem usersonTwitterandRedditintheweeksafter Rich’sdeath(14).SeanHannitycoveredthe conspiracymultipletimesin2017onhis eponymousFoxNewsprogram,althoughthe networkeventuallyretractedthestory.More recently,ouranalysisshowsthatthetopranksof theTwitternetworkdiscussingthedebunked 2020documentary Plandemic (whichmakes unsubstantiatedandscientificallyunsound allegationsaboutCOVID-19)inAprilandMay

Perhapsbecauseoftheimplicationsofthe researchreviewedabove,veryfewstudies havedirectlyinvestigatedonlineleftwingdisinformationorconspiracy theoriesatscale.Thestudiesshowingaconservative-leaningasymmetry insocialmediafalsenewssharing largelydrawtheirdatafrombeforethe 2016election(53, 54).Ifliberalshave changedintheirsusceptibilitytodisinformationintheensuingyears,possiblybecauseofincentivesintroduced bystronganti-Trumpanimus,wedo notyetknow.Thiscouldbeacaseof failingtofindthatwhichisnotsought. Theimplicationsofsuchresearchare highlyrelevanttodemocraticpractice: Forone,theywillhelpusunderstand theextentoftheproblem,whoismost acutelyaffected,andunderwhatconditions.Understandingtheideological andpsychologicalantecedentsofdisinformationsusceptibilityisanimportantfirststepintargetinginterventions tocounteractit.Totheextentthatwe ascitizensvalueademocracyfreeof fraudulentattemptsatopinionmanipulation,weshouldinvestigateallcontextsinwhichitmightlurk.

Twoexistingstudies,alongwithour ownanalysisofrecentTwitterdata,offersome evidencethatleft-leaningdisinformationmay notbeasrareastheliteraturesuggests.First, researchpublishedbyBuzzfeedinOctober2016 foundthatalthoughconservativeFacebook pagespostednearlydoubletheproportionof falseorpartlyfalsecontentasliberalpages, suchcontentgarneredmuchhighermedian sharesperpostonleft-wingpagesthanon right-wingones(59).(Weshouldnotethat thisreportonlyanalyzedsixFacebookpages intotal,itsdatawerenotmadepublic,anditis possiblethatfalsecontentonright-leaning pagesaccruedmoresharesintotalgiventhat therewasmoreofit.)Second,arecentstudy foundthattweetspostedbyRussiandisinformationagentsmasqueradingasleft-wing AfricanAmericanactivistsattractedmore attentiononaper-tweetbasisthaneither thosebyconservativeidentitiesornon-Black left-leaningidentities(60).Thisdemonstrates alevelofvulnerabilitytodisinformationon

theleftthatisnotoftenacknowledged.Third, wefindthattweetsmentioningthekeywords “anonymous” and “trump” postedbetween 31May2020(whentheAnonymoushacktivist collectivereleasedacacheofdocumentspurportingtoprove,amongotheraccusations, thatDonaldTrumpwasinvolvedinchildsex trafficking)and2June2020wereretweeted >1.1milliontimes,morethandoublethetotal retweetcountfor Plandemic inouranalysis above(58).Incontrasttothe Plandemic network,themost-retweetedusersonthistopic areoverwhelminglynoneliteswithfewfollowers(exceptfor@youranoncentral,whichis ostensiblycontrolledbyAnonymous),notwellknownliberalsormainstreamnewsoutlets. Weacknowledgethatthesefindingsarepreliminaryandraisepressingvalidityquestions manyoftheattentionmetricsboostingthese storiescouldhavebeengeneratedbybots,for example butweincludethemhereforlack ofmorerigorousresearchonthematter. Takentogether,webelievethattheysuffice tojustifyfurtherinvestigationintodisinformationaimedattheleft.

Conclusionandfutureresearch

Thisreviewoffersthreemainsetsofconclusions.First,peopleparticipateinonlineactivismalongawidespectrumofcommitment levels,fromlikingandsharingcontent,to theback-and-forthofpoliticaldiscussion,to involvementascoremovementleaders.Lowcostonlineactionsdonotharmactivistgoals; onthecontrary,theyhelptoboostactivist topicsandconcernstothelevelsofpublic visibilitynecessarytoenactorpreventchange. Boththeleftandrightbenefitfromthisbasic dynamicofonlineactivism.However,thereis stillmuchtolearnabouthowclicktivismoperates;forexample,westilldonotknowhow frequentlyhashtag-basedconversationsor signal-boostingextremeperspectiveschange people’smindsorbehaviors.Second,theleft andrightgenerallyengageintwodistinct stylesofonlineoutreach:hashtagactivism andonlineadvocacyspearheadedbytherightwingmediaecosystem,respectively.Theisolationofthefarrightfromtherestofthe ideologicalspectrumresultsinasymmetric polarizationandcomplicatestheprocessof governingideologicallydiversepolities.Key areasforfutureresearchhereincludemeasuringtherelativecapacitiesofthesetwo stylesinreaching,persuading,mobilizing,and antagonizingelitesandnonelitesonboth sides.Third,disinformationdistributionappearstobeoneofthekeyfunctionsofrightwingmediaecosystems. However,themarked lackofresearchonleft-wingdisinformation leavesmanyquestionsabouthowitoperates, whoismostatrisk,andhowseriousaproblem itis,makingsuchresearchanurgentpriority. Theverylimitednumberofstudiesonright-

wingonlineprotestandactivisthashtaguse issimilarlyglaring.Movingforward,researchersshouldendeavortodiscoverwhetherour currentempiricalunderstandingofleft-and right-wingactivismonlinerepresentsreality faithfullyorisaproductofsystematicgapsin caseselection.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

WegratefullyacknowledgetheresearchassistanceofK.Adams andM.Reddi. Funding: TheempiricalanalysisshowninFig.1was supportedbygrantno.201600019fromtheSpencerFoundation. TheempiricalanalysisshowninFig.2wassupportedbygrantno. GR-2018-55703fromtheJohnS.andJamesL.KnightFoundation. Authorcontributions: D.F.wrotetheinitialdraftofthisreviewand conductedalloriginalempiricalanalyses.A.M.andD.K.contributedto writingandeditingthereview. Competinginterests: Theauthorsdeclare nocompetinginterests. Dataandmaterialsavailability: Alldata, code,anddocumentationusedtoconducttheoriginalempiricalanalyses inthisreview(Fig.1,Fig.2,andthe plandemic and anonymoustrump analyses)areavailableontheHarvardDataverse(58).

10.1126/science.abb2428

False equivalencies: Online activism from left to right

Deen Freelon, Alice Marwick and Daniel Kreiss

DOI: 10.1126/science.abb2428 (6508), 1197-1201. 369 Science

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