Counter-IED Report Winter 2020/21

ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

Counter-IED Report Winter 2020/21

THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONALIZING INFORMATION FOR BUILDING C-IED CAPACITY MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT AFGHANISTAN – A GLANCE AT THE UNPLEASANT FRIGHTS OF EXTANT IEDs DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION ELECTRONIC INITIATION SYSTEMS FOR MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS - A VERSATILE TOOL FOR SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN INDIA EFFECTIVELY REGULATE EXPLOSIVES? USE OF WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES IN MEXICAN CRIME WAR PALESTINIAN BALLOON-BORNE IED PROGRESSION IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS

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By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report 14

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TRENDING TACTICS, TRENDING TOPICS… THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

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OPERATIONALIZING INFORMATION FOR BUILDING C-IED CAPACITY

By Michael Solis, Resident Program Manager in Kenya, U.S. Department of State

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30

DEMINING AND EOD SEMINAR

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34 8th ANNUAL EOD/IED & COUNTERMINE SYMPOSIUM 35

AFGHANISTAN – A GLANCE AT THE UNPLEASANT FRIGHTS OF EXTANT IEDs

By Shafi Ullah (Ahmadzai) - Head of Quality Management, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

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DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

By Dr. Aris Makris, Ph.D., Vice-President, RD&E and Chief Technology Officer and Dr. J.-P. Dionne, Director of Research Engineering, Med-Eng

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PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) IN COLOMBIA

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63

MILIPOL QATAR 2021

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USE OF WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES IN MEXICAN CRIME WAR

By Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and David A. Kuhn, Small Wars Journal-El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC

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IDEF 2021 - 15th INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY FAIR

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PALESTINIAN BALLOON-BORNE IED PROGRESSION

By Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash, Terrogence Senior CIED Analyst / Author of Mobius reports

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MILITARY ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

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“KILLING ROTARIES”, IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

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FUTURE ARMOURED VEHICLES SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

CAN INDIA EFFECTIVELY REGULATE EXPLOSIVES?

By Colonel H R Naidu Gade – Army Veteran

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD

By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report

A

s 2020 ended it has proved to be the most tumultuous year in living memory. The global pandemic Covid-19 that originated in China in late 2019, by the end of December 2020 had resulted globally in some 1.83 million deaths from nearly 84 million reported cases of the virus. In addition to the impact on the world’s population, the virus has decimated the global economy and that will take years to recover. Most of the world was woefully ill-prepared for the pandemic – in particular, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and France.

From the global security perspective 2020 witnessed the beginning of the final phase of withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and Iraq after nearly 20 years of counter-insurgency operations. The UK was also heavily committed to these operations together with other NATO forces. In Afghanistan, the US and the UK followed the earlier Soviet decade long occupation of the country with similar results – very heavy casualties and massive capital expenditure, but an absence of an end to the conflict. Afghanistan continues to suffer at the hands of the Taliban and NATO recently expressed its concern over the final withdrawal of US military. In Iraq, Iranian backed militias exacerbate the security environment, and this situation is likely to further deteriorate with the December assassination of Iran’s senior nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, and other countries around the globe, the Improvised Explosive Device continues to exact both a heavy death toll and extremely high rates of life changing injuries. It also presents a real challenge to both national reconstruction and economic development.

The West and in particular the UK and the US are now addressing what they see as the main emerging challenge to their security – so called near peer competition from an ever more powerful China and a resurgent Russia under President Putin. The situation was encapsulated by the then US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper in February 2019 at the Munich Security Conference. He stated, “We are now in an era of great power competition with our principal challenges being China, then Russia. We must move away from low intensity conflict and prepare once more for high intensity warfare”. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson recently echoed the US sentiment with the announcement of the largest increase to defence spending since the end of the Cold War. Plans include the revitalisation of the Royal Navy. Additionally, the Office for Artificial Intelligence, the National Cyber Security Centre, and UK Space Agency with an aspiration to launch a rocket in 2022 form critical elements of the future UK defence and security strategy.

Michael Solis with the US Department of State in Kenya in his article on operationalising information for Counter-IED (C-IED) capacity building cogently opines that the critical requirement in this respect is effective information management. Too often bilateral security assistance in terms of C-IED concentrates on the functions of training and the provision of equipment, but such efforts alone do not assist in the critical area of capacity building. Rather they have often resulted in duplication of effort or redundant training from donor nations or organisations. In this respect such assistance addresses the effect whilst ignoring the cause of a hostile IED campaign. The author makes a counteriedreport.com

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FOREWORD

strong plea for C-IED capacity building to be based on internationally agreed documentation and standards.

Following the excellent International Mine Action Standards, the UN IED Disposal Standards contain a chapter devoted to Information Management and an Annex on IEDD Task Reporting Guidelines. A robust information management system relies on timely and accurate reporting, analysis and dissemination utilising a national database. In the past national or organisational sensitivities concerning information sharing have often hindered an effective C-IED intelligence cycle. The three NATO agreed pillars of a C-IED strategy – Prepare the Force, Attack the Networks and Defeat the Device must be based on a foundation of effective intelligence. The combination of training and equipping together with information management, all based on internationally agreed documentation, are critical elements of a national longterm Counter-IED capacity.

Dr Robert J. Bunker, Dr John P. Sullivan and David A. Kuhn, Small Wars Journal – El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC, in their insightful article describe how Mexican criminal cartels have progressed from conventional aircraft through ultralight aircraft and finally to drones for the purpose of aerial narcotics trafficking. Drones have been used in support of cross border trafficking between Mexico and the US since 2010. In April 2019, a cartel ISR drone was used in the El-Paso sector of the border in illegal migrant cross border movement.

The migrants were used as mules to carry illegal narcotics loads. However, during the past three years a significantly more ominous trend has emerged – the use of weaponised or armed consumer drones by the criminal cartels. Such tactics are not new, and the so-called Islamic State has made widespread use of weaponised drones in both Iraq and Syria to deliver improvised, craft-produced, and repurposed munitions to ground targets. In February 2017, some 200 such attacks were recorded during the heaviest fighting in Mosul. The authors document four incidents in Mexico since 2017 in which the cartels have progressed to weaponised drones in an escalation of their criminality.

One incident involved an aerial delivered IED attack against a high ranking Mexican official and the others the pre-emptive discovery of drones, IEDs, firearms and ammunition by law enforcement officials. Each incident involved easy to operate commercial quadcopters and varying IED payloads.

In his thought-provoking article David Parry examines the increasing use of mechanical assets for IED removal, concentrating on humanitarian and commercial operations. The key aim of this trend towards mechanical IED disposal is to reduce the physical risk and time exposure of personnel undertaking such clearance to IEDs. He identifies the fundamental differences between traditional demining and mechanical IED removal. Too often there are attempts to conflate these two operations.

He describes demining as effectively an agricultural process whereby mines are harvested from the ground, whereas mechanical IED removal is more nuanced.

He draws a comparison between the traditional military NATO agreed Counter-IED pillars of activity and the humanitarian and commercial operational framework.

The purpose of this is to identify the differences between these two types of IED removal to better understand the activities that specifically support humanitarian and commercial operations. He examines these activities including financial considerations, operational support, machinery modification, the testing and acceptance process, mechanical IED removal training, tasking procedures and finally safe working practices. He illustrates how these activities fit into the recommended best practice guidance model for humanitarian and commercial mechanical IED removal operations.

Shafi Ullah is Head of Quality Management in Mine Action Coordination in Afghanistan. In an informative article he describes how more than 40 years of continuous conflict have left a deadly legacy of explosive hazards including Explosive Remnants of War, landmines and IEDs. The IED remains the favoured weapon of the insurgents and terrorists and one IED attack in Kabul in 2019 in Kabul resulted in 95 deaths and more than 150 casualties. An ever-

1 Counter-IED Report Spring/Summer 2018, Armament Research Services, pp. 53-63 (https://bit.ly/3oyL1Ns).

12 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

FOREWORD

growing threat is that of the Abandoned Improvised Mine (AIM) – a victim operated, pressure-activated IED which is a de facto anti-personnel mine. The Mine Action Programme Afghanistan has developed a strategy to address the AIM threat by a combination of an extensive education programme for the population, AIM clearance to return land to the civil population and a comprehensive training programme for AIM deminers.

MAPA is the first mine action programme to develop national standards in response to the existential threat of Abandoned Improvised Mines and 2021 will see the AIM clearance programme in Afghanistan accelerate.

In his comprehensive article on the use by threat networks of cyberspace – interconnected digital technology – Lt Col Jose M Rufas of the NATO C-IED COE displays a real depth of knowledge about this increasingly critical topic. The malign use of cyberspace today represents an ever-growing existential threat to the West. Its topicality has been thrown into sharp relief by recent events in the United States, both leading up to and since the presidential election, culminating in the exclusion of the outgoing President from social media platforms. In this professionally researched article, the author examines both the historical context and modern-day hostile usage of cyberspace by jihadists and terrorists – notably, but not exclusively, Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State/Daesh to disperse their toxic propaganda. He charts early activity by Daesh when they were producing hard copy printed magazines. He then examines propaganda posters and professionally produced audio-visual products.

Finally, he opines that despite the requirement to take down these hostile sites and links, security services and researchers need to be able to access them to monitor cyberspace developments by technologically savvy jihadists and terrorists who are only too aware of the propaganda value of their products.

In their highly topical article on bomb suit testing and standardization, Dr Aris Makris and Dr Jean-Philippe Dionne of Med-Eng in Canada, highlight the critical importance of EOD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Prior to 2020 it is likely that relatively few people had heard of PPE, but the global Covid-19 pandemic dramatically changed that situation and

the term became one of the defining acronyms of last year. The authors describe how historically there had been no internationally recognised quality standards for EOD PPE. In 2016 the US National Institute for Justice NIJ 0117.01 standard for Public Safety Bomb Suits addressed the gap in standardized EOD PPE evaluation. The standard outlines a significant list of baseline performance and capability demanded in a bomb suit along with associated testing methods and pass/fail criteria. However, it remains a minimum standard and in selecting a certified suit, end-users must also consider additional features. The NIJ standard covers fragmentation, spine and head impact protection, flame resistance, blast overpressure, together with static and dynamic field of view. In addition to these considerations, purchasing agencies should also take account of requirements beyond the NIJ standard such as increased fragmentation protection, variable suit sizes, CBRNe compatibility, electromagnetic compliance, personal cooling, communications, lighting, and strong customer support. ■

Rob Hyde-Bales biography During his career in the UK Royal Engineers, Rob Hyde-Bales was responsible for landmine clearance in Libya and, more latterly, Afghanistan in the running of the first United Nations humanitarian landmine clearance training programme – Operation Salam. The programme trained Afghan male refugees in landmine clearance techniques, and Afghan women and children in mine awareness and avoidance training. More recently he set up the Caribbean Search Centre in Kingston, Jamaica. The Centre is designed to train security forces across the Caribbean in modern search techniques. After retiring from the army he joined Cranfield University at Shrivenham, near Oxford, and undertook a research project on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence that examined ways to improve the sharing of IED threat information between the military and civilian organisations in hazardous areas. counteriedreport.com

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Energetische Materialien Energetic Materials Elektronische Zündsysteme Electronic Initiation Systems

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14 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

YOUR IGNITION TECHNOLOGY EXPERT

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 1: Map showing the dreamt aim of the Caliphate. (Source – Twitter).

TRENDING TACTICS, TRENDING TOPICS… THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

“Be not angry that you cannot make others as you wish them to be, since you cannot make yourself as you wish...”

(Thomas à Kempis, in his book “The Imitation of Christ”, first published 1427)

A

s a consequence of Syrian Democratic Forces announcing that Daesh had lost its final stronghold in Syria (bringing an end to their so-called caliphate), on March 23rd, 2019, the United States’ Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the “Islamic State’s caliphate” in Syria.

Although and before that operational defeat in Iraq and Syria, the ambitious dream of Daesh was mirrored, trespassed and distributed to different territories all around the world, under the label of external “Wilayats” (provinces)…

But the initially estimated “hybrid” caliphate has progressively allowed space for some sort of predominantly “virtual” caliphate. The digital jihadist

universe which was growing in parallel to Daesh success in order to promote and amplify the terrene central caliphate has progressively taken a connectedbut-separated role.

The “caliphal” strategy has mostly evolved from leading influence and directing operations to decentralizing information warfare and inspiring local activities, while the different lines of conducting violent jihadism (e.g. Al Qaeda style vs Daesh) are currently mixed and exploited by those following both tendencies.

In fact, everything formerly or currently associated to Daesh’s propaganda is sooner or later imitated by similar and divergent threat networks (far-right, Daesh’s rivals, states) in their own influence activities1.

1 See terrorist’s video of the attack in Christchurch NZL or propaganda from conflicts (e.g. Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh), even Al Qaeda’s one...

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 2: Announcement (video format) and covers of the document “‫(”يمالعإلا اهيأ تنأ دهاجم‬Source – Twitter)

‫يمالعإلا اهيأ تنأ دهاجم‬ (Oh media agent, you are a Mujahid too!)

The above is just the title (freely translated) of a book published by “The Al-Himma Library” in April 2015, which highlighted the relevance of propaganda and media activities in the aim of the Caliphate: almost everyone could currently find a link to that publication through…

• Free digital libraries (https://archive.org/details/ MujahdAnt_201803) • Digital publishing platforms (https://issuu.com/ elhimmalibrary/docs/_______________________), • Book download websites (noor-book.com and https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/37424810) • Audio file sharing platforms (https://clyp.it/bwkhdlv4) • Jihadist forums and websites • Cloud-based instant messaging (e.g. Telegram) • Links to file downloading sites shared through anonymous text pasting-sharing tools (e.g. https://justpaste.it/) or text/image sharing platforms (e.g. www.telegra.ph)...

That is a mere example of how flexible and capable the Internet is currently to distribute radical propaganda, and (which is more dangerous…) to provide resilience to that kind of content in open sources.

During 2018, the territorial collapse of Daesh dramatically contributed to reduce their experienced/

skilled human infrastructure dedicated to media and propaganda activities, along with allowing the terrorist group’s loss of financial resources. The banning reaction against terrorist publicity taken by Internet-management companies (e.g. those related to Facebook, YouTube, Twitter…) also multiplied the reductive effect on proliferation of content from violent extremist organizations (VEOs).

Most of the old media agencies from Daesh and Al Qaeda already persist although with relative decrease in relevance and production, so they have let space for a wide umbrella of decentralized agencies managed by jihadist groups’ followers, which release less planned but more intermittent productions… although the quality is sometimes looking worse, that is balanced by a modern design plus a direct and clear message.

The jihadist kiosk: evolution of digital magazines During first years of Daesh, their peak of success even allowed the temporary selling of high-quality printed paperback “DABIQ” issues (produced by AL-HAYAT MEDIA CENTRE) on AMAZON websites.

Those websites listed the publisher of the magazines as “CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform” (AMAZON-owned self-publishing company).

The former jihadist digital magazines2 (e.g.

DABIQ, INSPIRE, RUMIYAH, AL RISALAH,

2 If you want go deeper into jihadist digital magazines’ history, you could always read “A Matter Prompted by Printed Matter: Threat Networks and Digital Magazines” article in Counter-IED Report Autumn 2015 issue, p. 51 https://ciedcoe.org/index.php/reports/external-reports/counter-ied-report/42-0003-counter-ied-report-autumn-2015/file, along with “Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines. Research Guide, Strategic Insights, and Policy Response” by Robert J. Bunker & Pamela Ligouri Bunker and published by US Army War College Press and the Strategic Studies Institute https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3549.pdf

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 3: Front covers of last published issues of “DABIQ”, “INSPIRE”, “RUMIYAH” & “YOUTH OF THE CALIPHATE” magazines. (Source – Twitter) KONSTANTINIYYE, ISTOK, AL FATIHIN, AZAN, AL-SHAMIKHA, DAR AL-ISLAM, AL-MALHAMAH, GAIDI MATAANI, FROM DABIQ TO ROME, KYBERNETIQ…) as published by (more or less) centralized media offices continue being valued and redistributed through all potential ways and means, even some of their respective contents are sometimes embedded into new-style publications.

Of course, the overall design quality, multilingual approach and accuracy in targeted audience of the former publications were higher than the average ones of current digital magazines, with minor exceptions. Nonetheless, the visually attractive and

new publications, through the jihadist multiorganizational contribution, the selected distribution through direct links/encrypted means, and the open invitation to future submissions from readers in the last page.

The most veteran digital magazine is currently “AL NABA” weekly newspaper, which has been permanently showing Daesh’s operations all around the globe and articles about ideology/dogma since firstly published in 2014 by Daesh central office until 266th issue published on December 23rd 2020...

The last months have witnessed the production and online distribution of several digital publications

modern concept of “YOUTH OF THE CALIPHATE” (Shabaab Khilafah) magazine has been guiding

by decentralized media agencies and jihadist groups’ followers, as follows:

Figure 4: Front covers of “ONE UMMAH”, “THUBAT” and “WOLVES OF MANHATTAN” magazines. (Source – Twitter) counteriedreport.com

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 5: Front covers of “VOICE OF HIND”, “ISLAMIC STATE IN PICTURES”, “DABIQ WEEKLY” and “ARKAN”. (Source – Twitter) • With regards to Al Qaeda franchises, and among others, we could remark the publishing of “ONE UMMAH” (4 issues in Arabic and English language by AS SAHAB MEDIA), “THUBAT” (11 issues in Arabic language by THABAT NEWS AGENCY) and “WOLVES OF MANHATTAN” (1 issue in both Arabic and English languages by JAISH AL-MALAHEM AL-ELECTRONI).

• From Daesh’s side, we would select “VOICE OF HIND” (10+3 issues in English language from AL QITAL MEDIA CENTRE), “DAESH IN PICTURES” (4 issues in Arabic language by AL BATTAR), “DABIQ WEEKLY” (one single issue in English by unknown followers), “ARKAN” (1 English issue from ARRUKN CENTER)…

During 2020, all those pdf-formatted magazines have apparently let the leadership of “VOICE OF HIND” and“AL NABA” (Daesh side), and “ONE UMMAH” (Al Qaeda side). The transition of “VOICE OF HIND” (Swat Al-Hind) magazine from a Southern Asian regional approach to a worldwide message has (temporarily?) allowed that publication to spread some sort of a global Daesh message.

The terrorist wallboard: trends in propaganda posters In accordance with Dr. Michael Krona (see the references at the end of this article), the current “Virtual Caliphate” has gained in dynamism compared with the original form of Daesh’s online environment, 18 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

mostly based on its fragmentation with multiple unaffiliated and emancipated media groups and collectives in the digital realm. He bases his analysis in several indicators, as follows: • A more decentralized structure spanning over a large amount and variety of digital platforms, which allows higher resilience, flexibility, concealment, creativity and mobility.

• The message promoting the individual commitment and support with/to religion and culture is substituting those with/to the “Islamic State” itself, as it happened before.

• Independent media collectives and online supporters are replacing the centralized production by creating propaganda focused on specific purposes and target audiences, rather than trying to reach a maximum visibility to the widest of the audiences.

• Open social media platforms are progressively giving pass to encrypted virtual spaces, peerto-peer communication tools, information only accessible through shared links and/or enclosed digital environments.

• Increase in collective engagement and collaborative media practices among jihadism supporters.

• The globalism of the centrally guided caliphate is being replaced by messages a bit closer to the different individuals and groups, just focusing on regional, cultural and national approaches.

THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 6: Samples of jihadist propaganda posters released during December 2020. (Source – Twitter) The referred dynamism is mostly evidenced in the quality, quantity, accuracy and ability/speed to exploit success that the propaganda posters are showing.

The main subjects are mostly based on calls to followers’ commitment, weapons/tactics of choice, target selection and models to follow/admire (e.g. successful attacks/attackers). The reference to the use of arson tactics and techniques against different kind of targets has been a continuum during 2020 too.

Although not absolutely identifiable as jihadist propaganda, and after the elimination of Iranian General Soleimani, it has been relevant to the increase of posters against United States, Israel and Western way of life from any kind of Iranian sources, including officials.

background, sometimes providing the lyrics in subtexts on the screen. There were even specific musical production offices which counted on the collaboration of several relatively famous hip-hop/rap singers providing soundtrack to jihadist videos in the form of modern nasheeds (remember “EXTEND YOUR HAND TO PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE”, “ANSWER THE CALL” or “HAYA ALAL JIHAD” videos from Al Hayat Media Centre), in different languages (lyrics and subtitles in French, English, Arabic…), and giving a shape/style to that kind of chant which makes them much more attractive to youth.

But “anasheed” could not only be discovered behind jihadist propaganda videos, also you can listen and

Caliphate TV: audio visual dynamics The first years of Daesh’s growth saw plenty of extremely well designed and produced videos, which had a relevant effect/impact over recruitment and support in benefit of the living utopia of a global Islamic State.

Daesh used to produce propaganda videos that play a nasheed3 in the

Figure 7: Capture from a multi-translated version of Al Hayat Media’s “ANSWER THE CALL” video. (Source – www.archive.org)

3 Islamic vocal music chant (plural. “anasheed”).

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

download them on the Internet… in fact, Daesh and their followers have focused the subjects of nasheed in jihad (war and fighting) instead of referring to other possible aspects of Islamic culture.

Although the amount, embedded violence, originality and quality of the current propaganda videos is not the same as it was, there are some media agencies still providing high quality videos through the Internet (e.g.

VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD, WAR and MEDIA…), while veterans like AL HAYAT continue producing.

Nowadays the production of videos is mostly supported by regional offices from different Daesh wilayats or by the media offices of Daesh affiliated groups or those related to Al Qaeda (e.g AL-SHABAAB’s AL-KHATAIB MEDIA FOUNDATION, JNIM4’s AL-ZALLAQA MEDIA).

Nonetheless, there was a relative increase in the multi-sourced redistribution of old Daesh videos during 2020. The translation of former videos into different languages to the original is offering an opportunity for lessskilled producers to continue spreading an effective influence, along with their smart reuse of recorded speeches and visually relevant portions from different old video productions to enrich current audiovisual propaganda.

“Khilafah News”, the DAESH’s daily gazette From Summer 2014, Twitter was the preferred means to spread the daily updates about Daesh’s developments, products and operations until the massive suspension and lockdown of jihadist accounts in that social media space in late Summer and early Autumn 2015. Then they trespassed the main distribution of that compilation of news to Telegram channels (led by NASHIR NEWS AGENCY initially under names as “NASHERISLAMICSTATE”, “ISDARAT_ISLAMICSTATE”, and then mirroring with HALUMMU, KHILAFAH NEWS, IS NEWS & KN labels, among others and translated into different languages for widest propaganda).

In fact, “Khilafah News Daily Report” and similar products have mostly been taking their content from “Amaq News Agency” and lately from “Al Naba” newsletter’s content, along with announcements of upcoming jihadist videos, pictures and publications.

Legalprosecution and online security measures have been progressively removing the “Khilafah News” distribution accounts, platforms, websites and forums, which has made them move to alternate means, relatively harder to find by investigators, which already persists, as follows:

Figure 8: Evolving versions of “KHILAFAH NEWS” sources. (Source – www.archive.org, www.pastethis.to & www.telegra.ph) 4 Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen.

20 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

• Digital libraries (www.archive.org).

• PDF-formatted text with fake/hidden naming and metadata (www.pdfhost.io...).

• Anonymous text pasting-sharing tools (www. justpaste.it, www.pastethis.to, www.pastefs.com).

• Anonymous text/image sharing platforms (www. telegra.ph, www.oc2o.com...).

• Webpage archives (www.archive.vn, www.archive.ph, www.archive.md).

• Audio formats just reading the news (mp3).

• Video formats from pictures (e.g. https://files.fm/ u/82v4bgx5j#/view/t666jafnw 30DEC2020).

• Websites allocated in hard-to-ban domains (e.g. www.xxx....in, www.xxx....ng, www.xxx...ml).

• Packages of pictures, compressed files, posting sites (e.g. www.redditinc.com)...

Despite their relative impact over dissemination and access of radical content, those methods are time-consuming, are not too systematic, attempt superficially/ temporarily to solve the problem, and cannot prevent the re-establishment of new accounts or parallel sites.

The threat networks’ reaction/anticipation to the investigator’s activities, digital censorship, closure of accounts and disruption of websites has been mostly based on: • Redundancy of resources.

• Rebuilding of networks.

• Multi-platform approach.

• Encrypted services.

• Use of shortlinks.

• Benefit from non-indexed procedures to store information and propaganda.

Even publications like “DAESH IN PICTURES” and “DABIQ WEEKLY” are merely structured “Khilafah News” …

The resilience and sustainment of propaganda of resources is getting achieved through: • Use of backup-mirror channels for sites and repositories.

• Backup posting on mainstream commercial platforms (e.g. Dropbox, www.archive.org, Google Drive, UStream, Amazon Cloud Services, Microsoft One Drive, OwnCloud …).

• Individual user’s downloading and self-archiving.

• Regular distribution of content through diversified/

“Every time we exterminate a predator, we are in a sense creating a new predator.5” After several banning campaigns against jihadist and other radical propaganda during last two years, the production and distribution of guides, digital news and practical tips for information security has increased in the Internet: Electronic Horizons Foundation (EHF) continues being the most active element after five years of existence. They have been promoting the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), multi-layer authentication, smart devices protection, use of encryption, data protection, utilization of safe platforms, anticipation to counter measures, secure online payment services, and so on.

The techniques and procedures mostly used for disrupting jihadist online activity have been: • Suspension of individual websites and social media accounts.

• Deletion of individual pieces of propaganda.

redundant posting on different sites.

Figure 9: Cover from a report about Telegram disruption impact over Jihadist platforms. (Source – www.crestresearch.ac.uk)

5 David Rains Wallace, in his book “The Untamed Garden and Other Personal Essays”, first published in 1986.

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THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

Figure 10: Captures from video-sharing site accounts with jihadist propaganda. (Source – https://odysee.com & www.nicovideo.jp) From late 2019, the jihadist networks for propaganda sharing and distribution have been trying (with higher or lesser success) to diversify into all kinds of end-toend encryption and decentralised web platforms other than Telegram, as they are Rocket.Chat, Nadbox, Hoop Messenger, TamTam, Mastodon, Blockchain messengers, Wire, Matrix, Minds, Threema, Gab Chat, Pinngle, Hoop, Element (formerly Riot and Vector), Likee, Zeronet, TikTok, Baaz, MeWe, Diaspora, Friendica, Yahoo Together, Viber, Discord…

The propaganda moving through those platforms could be even more difficult to discover when being used in conjunction with VPNs and encrypted email

links easier, and less open to get detected by external searchers. In fact, most of the platforms and contentsharing sites are used as containers of links guiding to URLs which will direct people to propaganda.

providers (e.g., ProtonMail, Hushmail, Tutanota, Mailfence, Zohomail, Mailbox.org…).

As previously said, jihadist extremists are using mainstream commercial platforms to share and stream content. These sites are not searchable, due to content only being accessed with the adequate URL (uniform resource locator), and that kind of online information is stored at the cloud.

In line with the widest benefit from available Internet tools, jihadist propaganda is equally stored at videosharing sites other than Youtube, such as Vimeo, Nicovideo, TikTok, Nicozon.net, Vidyard, Odysee…

With regards to the use of shortlinks, those are shorter URL versions of regular URLs for easy sharing and remembering. Some of the most familiar shortlinks creators are TinyURL, bit.ly, t.co, Pretty Link, goo.gl, SimpleURLs, wp.me… they could make the sharing of

approach, we should understand that the law enforcement and companies’ activities to detect/deny distribution and access of/to jihadist propaganda must be coordinated not only between different platforms, but between different companies too.

It is always much more relevant to anticipate the potential moment for distribution of new content (e.g. online announcement of its close release, reactions to governmental measures, incoming relevant events to target, anniversaries, periodicity of publication…), and then act against the main storage nodes instead of pursuing those sharing the links to that piece of propaganda.

Recent campaigns against jihadist accounts have targeted “good guys”, so the support to those searching and investigating propaganda from the right side should be maintained through identifying and verifying

22 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

Should an updated “digital caliphate” be faced with the same approach as it was?

During 2020, the Telegram app continued to be the main platform used for distributing extremist messages and publications all around the world, but some other decentralized platforms are increasing their preference by threat networks to distribute their propaganda.

In accordance with the extremist multiplatform

THREAT NETWORKS’ TRENDS IN DIGITAL INFLUENCE

them as researchers or analysts (maybe a procedure to register themselves as those?), while maintaining their relative anonymity.

Diversification of search and evaluation languages (other than English!) would strongly support the effort against jihadist propaganda, so the use of Arabic and other local languages/dialects is extremely relevant to take actions against most of the originators of propaganda instead of against the sharing agents: it would even allow to achieve anticipatory effects.

Heavy deletions of sites and/or accounts should get balanced with providing opportunities to access the content and surveil the “evil” members of them.

The support from technology companies is essential, but it should combine their typical fixed protocols, machine learning and automated removal with endstage human analysis and verification, especially when trying to differentiate ideological messages from extremist content, and those from terrorism promotion.

To conclude, it is not highly recommendable to try to delete, cancel or close every content, account or website, as the enemy will always find alternate distribution means we would not know, while our analysts and researchers would lose the capacity to access propaganda products as soon as possible, which could support the necessary anticipatory analysis and understanding of jihadist messages/ audiences/intent: maybe “control” could be better than “prohibition” at medium-term, so just cutting most of the access but maintaining a few of them alive to reduce the number of sites, which could allow intelligence the control of “who” could distribute or access the referred piece of propaganda. ■

“Sometimes, if you want to change a man’s mind, you have to change the mind of the man next to him first.”

(Megan Whalen Turner, in her book “The King of Attolia”, first published in 2006)

REFERENCES (Cohen, Katie & Kaati, Lisa) “Digital Jihad. Propaganda from the Islamic State”, FOI, Stockholm 2018.

(EUROPOL) European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) reports.

(Krona, Michael & Pennington, Rosemary) “The Media World of Isis”, Indiana University Press, 2019.

(Krona, Michael) “Revisiting the Ecosystem of Islamic State’s

‘Virtual

caliphate’”,

Global

Network

on

Extremism & Technology, 2020. https://gnet-research. org/2020/10/21/revisiting-the-ecosystem-of-islamicstates-virtual-caliphate/ (Munoz, Michael) “Selling the Long War: Islamic State Propaganda after the Caliphate”, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point NY, 2018.

(Winter, Charlie) “Daesh propaganda, before and after its collapse”, NATO STRATCOM COE, Riga 2019.

Disclaimer This article would never represent the opinion of any national or multinational organization, so its whole content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. As the whole information has been obtained from open sources, potential mistakes could have been made during the research process. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections and inputs to the author; it would be highly appreciated.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016, and currently holding a post of Chief of Attack the Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his background has been mainly based on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and other C-IED courses. His operational assignments include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3), Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda.

Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

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C-IED CAPACITY BUILDING

OPERATIONALIZING INFORMATION FOR BUILDING C-IED CAPACITY

By Michael Solis

B

ilateral security assistance or capacity building efforts can be diminutively described as an intersection between advancing one’s foreign policy initiatives and “making a discernable difference” by solving a problem for which the recipient nation is ill-equipped to solve independently. The former emanates from a political and strategic opportunity while the latter leaves implementers of security assistance initiatives shackled with the formidable task of effecting quantifiable change on the tactical level.

This divergence results in an operational chasm that does little to solve the problem holistically; instead, the result is an expensive codependent relationship that could endure in perpetuity. In my long experience as an implementer, I can confidently aver that the overwhelming majority of “capacity building” activities include training and equipping partner nations to rectify tactical shortfalls or create parity with internationally accepted standards.

The majority of bilateral activities amount to the delivery of capabilities, but if recipient nations depend on the delivery of training and equipping, then such efforts do not build capacity; rather, they deliver capabilities that might quickly expire once the adversary (of IEDs in this case) adapts to fixed tactics. The common solution or counter to this argument is the inclusion T3 or “Train

the tactical level and diminishes at the same rate as other capabilities that are not institutionally anchored at the operational level and mandated at the strategic level by a coherent strategy or model. Information drives adaptation, especially when the adversary is more agile and less bureaucratically constrained.

The C-IED mission provides an exemplary focal point as one warfighting and peacekeeping function that has received a substantial amount of financial injects; specifically, because training and equipment support the reactive paradigm that dominates the C-IED narrative. The need to act immediately, in favour of survivability, has created a culture of training and equipping a methodology that has dominated the international C-IED capacity building effort. If we accept the premise that the IED is a symptom of the greater terrorism disease then we must provide a more complete or holistic capacity building package, one that demands an understanding of the problem, creates standardized mechanisms to collect information, and adapts to changes in the operating environment so that relevancy does not diminish over time. The Darwinian nature of the C-IED mission demands an understanding of the problem and the ability to not only adapt almost instantly but to predict and counter so that the adversary’s offensive advantage diminishes

the Trainer.” Unfortunately, this capability remains at

over time. counteriedreport.com

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C-IED CAPACITY BUILDING

One of the most debilitating and preventable challenges with so many external actors or donor nations working in the same space is the duplication of effort or the delivery of redundant training and equipping efforts. This is precisely why I argue for the deferential approach to internationally accepted doctrine as the guiding principle of a unified capacity building effort. The Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model (CMM) & Self-Assessment Tool is an example of sound international doctrine that facilitates a comprehensive approach to capacity building within the C-IED mission area. The purpose of the CMM is to assist States in the development of coherent national responses to the threat posed by IEDs.1 It could also help donors assess the likely scale of contributions and the priority of work in enhancing national counter-IED capabilities.2 This document transcends the historical approach to inordinately focusing on the response to IEDs by training and equipping on the tactical level. The coherent approach found in this document demands that attention be given to every level of planning, that is, tactical, operational, and strategic. Furthermore, the document catalogues efforts by reactive and preventative or downstream and upstream. The general premise of the model is that the greater the maturity and effectiveness of upstream measures, the fewer downstream measures are required to counter

by the establishment of a national database or information management system. A plethora of useful information may be gained from the forensic exploitation of recovered components from IED incidents4 as well as contribute to preparing the force through lessons learned. Information collection is predicated on both reporting from the field and an exploitation capability, either level one or two or field or laboratory. The quality of both reporting and exploitation is directly proportional to the quality of the information found in the national database and the ability to leverage the information for investigating attacks, updating tactics, and employing predictive analytics.

The CMM lists one of the Downstream IED CounterProliferation Measures5 as Information Management, that is, the process of collecting, organizing, storing and providing information within an organization.6 Information management is a precursor to establishing a functional C-IED intelligence cycle. Information and intelligence is the foundation upon which a proper and comprehensive C-IED program rests. The UNIDIR CMM divides the C-IED mission between Downstream and Upstream qualities for assessment.

A less sophisticated way of framing the C-IED mission is in terms of defensive or reactive C-IED or offensive or proactive C-IED. Prior to the establishment of the CMM, most C-IED programs leveraged the only other

the use of IEDs.3 The purpose of this article is to propound the value of information management as an operational tool for driving tactical proficiency. If information from the operating environment is not ingested and actioned then the train and equip efforts expire upon completion.

The collection and cultivation of information serves as a bridge between previously referenced downstream and upstream or reactive and preventative measures for countering IEDs. The task of developing a robust information management system consists of reporting and analysis, two activities that should be incentivized

available guiding principles in the limited library of international doctrine, that is, the NATO Allied Joint Publication 3-15, which framed the mission in three mutually complementary pillars to include Prepare the Force, Attack the Networks, and Defeat the Device.7 Anecdotally, I have heard these pillars referenced by partner nations who have a limited understanding of IEDs beyond the emplaced device or how to assess a national program for effective lines of effort. This is the result of the aforementioned habit of donor nations’ efforts to delivery capabilities without building capacity. The C-IED mission has been “hijacked” by a

1 UNIDIR. Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model & SelfAssessment Tool. 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 24.

5 Ibid. 25.

6 Ibid. 27.

7 NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. Edition C Version 1. February 2018. 1-6.

26 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

C-IED CAPACITY BUILDING

stop of operations (or life), as a desperate concession, amounts to an incapacitating defeat. Similar to the C-IED mission and its predilection for data, numbers, and statistics in the form of found and cleared rates, casualties, types of IEDs, switches, main charges, targets, locations etc., the Coronavirus has also inspired a massive amount of data assimilation such as numbers of cases, recoveries, clusters, hot spots, or threat areas.

Similar to the C-IED mission, the Coronavirus response leaned heavily on an equipping response in the form of ventilators, beds, and personal protective Mr. Raymond Kemei, UNMAS, describes the value of data collection during a bomb equipment before exploring database management forum in Nairobi, Kenya. upstream or preventative approaches. Both missions reactive paradigm and an associated dependence on or responses to global threats depend on the accurate technology whilst ignoring or overlooking the value of collection of data to exploit, predict, and manipulate information management as the bedrock upon which a program exists.

The current, global operating environment makes for an apt reference or analogy to which the C-IED mission can be compared. The reaction to what seems like an elusive and invisible enemy, the COVID-19 pandemic, similar to the IED is truly a tactical affliction which has strategic consequences, the most debilitating being a gross stoppage of life as we know it. This is similar to the IED adversely affecting or stifling freedom of movement, demoralizing troops, incapacitating commanders or senior leaders-especially those who lack an adequate understanding of the threat. A full

outcomes. The purpose of this analogy is to demonstrate the demand for the collection of relevant data, sharing of information, and the utilization of data as a guide for policy and practice.

The United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards8 provides a chapter on Information Management9 and an Annex (C)10 on IEDD Task Reporting Format Guidelines. Although the standards provide robust and sound guidance on how to accurately report information and the instrumental value of information in an IED environment, the two challenges are 1) creating a culture of reporting and 2) establishing a national database or repository to which

8 United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Standards, May 2018.

9 Ibid. 88.

10 Ibid. 125.

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C-IED CAPACITY BUILDING

analysts and stakeholders can access for ingestion, assimilation, and action. The United Nations EOD Unit Manual describes reporting as one of the key EOD post task activities and is vital in efforts to achieve an accurate understanding of the IED Explosive Ordnance threat in the area of operations.11 A usable, actionable database is only as good as the reporting from the field or laboratory, that is, both in quality and quantity. Following clearance of IEDs or IED post blast investigations, there should be a requirement for reports to gain information on the tactical and technical construction of IEDs or to investigate IED incidents.12 An accurate threat picture demands knowledge of the threat. For IEDs, the pieces of the puzzle-lost, found, collected, discarded, or washed away are vital for maximizing awareness and enhancing institutional knowledge. Similar to the profuse and widely available information and knowledge on IED construction, a proportional amount of information and knowledge is available for managing a reactive and proactive program. Whether engaged in Peacekeeping, Warfighting, or Counter Terrorism, the aforementioned standards equally apply for achieving the same outcome, that is, the ability to safely, effectively, and efficiently manage a rapidly evolving challenge so as to ensure freedom of movement and survivability for security services and the protection of critical infrastructure; thereby ensuring socioeconomic stability for the citizenry.

Information Management is the foundation of decision making, innovation, adaptation, and ultimately, success or failure in solving a complex problem from a disadvantageous position. The bombmaker and the emplacer always have the advantage in the IED fight, especially if those tasked with response are ill-informed of the most commonly found tactically and technically characterized IED to include the most commonly found main charge or switch type. Humans are creatures of habit who enjoy patterns of success; bombmakers are no different. The more information collected, managed, and actioned, the more off-balanced the bombmaker 11 United Nations EOD Unit Manual, September 2017.

12 Ibid. 22.

28 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

and his organization will become as our ability to adapt will outpace their need for change.

Effective capacity building requires operational tools in order to ensure the longevity and evolution of tactical capabilities. Managing massive amounts of information is a requirement in the current operating environment of life; not just the security sector. The unprecedented connectivity inundates us with information. The process of distillation and management is our responsibility.

Ingesting, filtering, assimilating, cataloguing, and actioning information is necessary for any organization to effectively swarm a problem in a timely and costeffective manner. The reactive paradigm is costly, ineffective, and dangerous. Information and knowledge management provides a pathway to a proactive and offensive C-IED approach. Partner nations should be made aware of the value of reporting and information management as the most effective operational tools.

Donor nations should equally be made aware that the delivery of capabilities should be predicated on accurate, updated, and timely information; thus, assistance in establishing information management, reporting procedures, and systems of dissemination are fundamental prerequisites to the delivery of training and equipment. â–

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Michael Solis is a former Deputy Director of the Africa C-IED Fusion Center at U.S. Africa Command and now a Resident Program Manager in Kenya, working for the U.S. Department of State. He is a former Navy EOD Technician and has served operational and strategic tours in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

He has worked as a C-IED trainer, C-IED consultant, and C-IED analyst in the Pentagon. He has a graduate degree in International Relations and Liberal Studies from Rutgers University.

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MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

By David Parry MC, MSc, Program Safety & Quality Assurance Manager

I

NTRODUCTION

The safe removal of any Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is paramount. Conventionally this has been by human intervention within a range of training, techniques and procedures available to the IED operator. Increasingly the use of mechanical assets for IED removal has become widespread and while organizations have their own guidance, an opportunity to develop best practice operating guidelines has presented itself. This article is intended to generate discussion within the EOD community. The ultimate aim being to reduce the physical risk and time exposure of personnel to IEDs. This does not remove the IED operator from the process but rather offers additional tools in the toolbox. After all, if your only tool is a hammer, every problem is a nail.

Figure 1: Basic Organizational Chart.

30 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

In the traditional demining machine model the three functions of detect, detonate and ground preparation do not fit an IED defeat methodology.

Demining is in basic terms an agricultural style activity in so much as mines are harvested from the ground, whereas mechanical IED removal is more nuanced. Based on previous operational experience a set of findings was identified and these were further developed based on the opinions of IED operators and other interested parties.

The basic organizational chart of those consulted is shown in Figure 1 below and it is expected that generally most organizations follow a similar organizational structure.

MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

OUTCOMES A direct comparison was made between the military Counter-IED pillars of activity (attack the network, prepare the force, defeat the device and the exploit incidence) and the humanitarian and commercial operational framework.

This was in order to identify the differences, to better define the humanitarian and commercial operational framework and to further understand what activities supported this operational framework. The outcomes of this comparison are described below: • Discover the location, the type of IED and the component parts of the IED. This can be achieved by conducting non-technical surveys, receiving information from the local population, past incident reports or other third parties.

• Detect the IED by planned and controlled searching of the suspected hazardous area.

• Defeat the component parts of the IED by blowing in place or using a render safe procedure.

• Dispose of the main explosive charge in a safe manner in order to permanently remove the explosives from use and recover as many component parts from the IED as possible.

• Exploit and Disseminate from the IED sufficient understanding of the construction of the device to improve training techniques and procedures for render safe procedures. Make available to the home nation mine action authority, mine action community and authorities component parts and reports as required.

The activities identified as supporting the humanitarian and commercial operational framework are described below.

• Financial Considerations. Specific and implied Donor requirements should be given due consideration during the selection process of the type of IED removal machinery to be procured, e.g. supporting national manufacturing. The whole life cycle employment of the machine and availability of spares, maintenance or upgrades should be factored in the planning stage. Budgetary constraints versus quality standards and cost of final disposal will no doubt feature in the decision making process.

• Operational Support. All mechanical equipment comes with a maintenance requirement and a mechanical supervisor or technical field manager is a critical position in the mechanical IED clearance operation. Responsible for more than just organizing a maintenance schedule, the coordinating of logistical support, discussing technical support with manufacturers and efficient operational record keeping, there is also training and validation for both machinery operators and IED operators to ensure understanding of employment and capability.

• Machinery Modification. Inevitably there will be a requirement to modify and fabricate machinery and tools to adapt to changing scenarios or improve capabilities. These can either be completed locally under the direction of the mechanical supervisor or modifications can be suggested to the manufacturer as part of their continuous improvement cycle.

Regardless of how the modification is made there must be at least some form of test and acceptance process.

• Testing and Acceptance Process. From the test and acceptance process a number of questions fall out. Arguably one of the most important questions is what net explosive quantity (NEQ) should be tested and how do you know what the NEQ of the IED is?

And how does the construction of the IED affect the application of the Gurney equation?

• Mechanical IED Removal Training. Ideally within the organization there are three groups of project personnel that require to undergo a suitable training course. The machine operators, the IED operators and support personnel. While the requirement for the former is self-evident, this latter group, while not so obvious can save both time and resources by better understanding the capabilities and requirements of the machinery. This group can include searchers, K9 handlers, logistics staff, drone operators, workshop mechanics and any other project personnel who support mechanical operations. Course durations will vary for a whole host of reasons and operational organizations are best placed to consider this matter. counteriedreport.com

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MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

• Tasking Procedure. Rather than the home nation mine action authority tasking procedure, this refers to what is in effect a risk assessment of the possible tasking and asks the following questions: 1. Is the task an official tasking from the recognized home nation mine action authority and agreed by the project chain of command?

2. Is the source of any information about the IED reliable?

3. Has an IED threat assessment been completed?

4. Is the IED assessed to be victim operated?

If the IED is assessed to be command wire or radio control activated then the task must be declined and must be referred back to the home nation mine action authority for further action.

5. What is the estimated net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the IED? 6. Does the NEQ exceed the test and acceptance process rating of the IED removal machine?

7. What is the assessed switch mechanism for detonating the IED?

Figure 2: Best Practice Guidance Framework.

32 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

8. Is the IED removal machine tool appropriate for the switch mechanism?

9. Have any modifications to the IED removal machine or tools been tested and approved?

10. Is the approach and method of transport to the task site secure and appropriate?

11. Is the task site suitable for mechanical operations?

12. Is there any critical infrastructure or humanitarian infrastructure that could be damaged in a high order detonation?

13. Are the standard operating procedures (SOPs) suitable for this task?

14. Have any variations to the SOPs been discussed and approved by the personnel involved in the task?

15. Are all personnel involved in the task correctly trained, suitably qualified, experienced and authorised to perform the task and their roles?

16. Is the IED removal machine correctly serviced, maintained and capable of the task?

MECHANICAL IED REMOVAL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

• Safe Working Practices. As described above, a valid risk assessment must be carried out prior to the task. This risk assessment can be modified to reflect the changing scenarios but must be supported by an IED threat assessment and grounded in the organization’s standard operating procedures.

These supporting activities are shown in Figure 2 to schematically illustrate where they fit within the best practice guidance model.

FURTHER DISCUSSION POINTS Training

suitable. One could argue that mechanical IED removal conducts all three functions of demining machines at once so the existing test and acceptance process is sufficient. However, the suggestion is that this is not the case. The IED removal machine is not designed to detonate the IED although the machine is expected to provide suitable protection to the machine operator.

The one common requirement is that the machine operator is required to be protected from an unintended detonation underneath the crew compartment.

SUMMARY

While the subject of training was briefly mentioned earlier this is an important topic for discussion and development. Like the test and acceptance process there are more questions than answers at the moment.

What should be agreed are the start standards and core subjects to be taught on a course of instruction.

For example, IED operators should be IMAS 3+ and machine operators should have a minimum of 5 years experience and perform a number of practical assessments prior to the training commencing. Core subjects to be taught could include vehicle breakdown and recovery, communications, use of cameras and drones, medical evacuation drills and IED recognition.

Completing the course of instruction should culminate in a number of practical assessments that reflect

No doubt there will be agreement, disagreement with differing ideas and approaches within the EOD community on what has been described, and this is the whole point of the article. ■

the operational environment in which the machine operators will be working.

for 23 years in the British Army and completed several operational tours of Northern Ireland, a year-long operational detachment to Sierra Leone, and an operational tour of the Former Yugoslavia, after which he was awarded the Military Cross. Finishing his career as an Infantry Regimental Sergeant Major.

David has spent the past 14 years as a commercial safety and security project manager working on explosive remnants of war removal, oil and gas, construction and engineering projects in various locations including: Papua New Guinea, Australia, Syria and Iraq.

He has completed a Master’s degree at the University of South Wales, is a member of the Institute of Explosive Engineers and the United Kingdom Emergency Planning Society.

Technological Integration Where does technological integration fit into the mechanical removal of IEDs? Remote viewing platforms be they aerial, machine mounted, or another platform need to be considered in which phases of discover or detect they are used. Not all IED operators make great drone pilots. What happens when the drones crash? How does that affect the clearance?

Will vehicle trackers be fitted for uploading data to the GIS team for accurate plotting?

Test and Acceptance Process The test and acceptance process needs industry discussion in whatever forum and format is most

ABOUT THE AUTHOR David Parry was a member of the project management team for the Syria CWD project from 2017 to 2020 as the project Safety Quality Assurance Manager and Chief of Party.

Previously David had served

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AFGHANISTAN: BATTLE AGAINST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

AFGHANISTAN – A GLANCE AT THE UNPLEASANT FRIGHTS OF EXTANT IEDs

By Shafi Ullah (Ahmadzai) - Head of Quality Management, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

B

IRTH OF A NEW ADVERSARY

Afghanistan, in its battle against explosive ordnance, remains at the brink of uncertainty since it first started responding to the explosive ordnance contamination in 1989. Over the decades, the mine action programme of Afghanistan has continued to grapple with legacy contamination1 and continual littering of explosive ordnance stemming from ongoing conflicts. The programme, albeit faced with backbreaking challenges of access, several parties at conflict, and new contaminations, has managed to succeed in minimizing civilian casualties from the legacy contamination.

It has, however, been introduced to the new, alarming challenge of improvised mines, the largest contributor to civilian casualties currently.

The improvised explosive device (IED), also called improvised mine, was first used in Afghanistan back in 2008 by the anti-government elements (AGEs).

It was, at the time, a new and unique tool availed to gain a strategic advantage in clashes between armed forces of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) and AGEs. The geographical awareness aided the AGEs in masking and strategically placing the IEDs to deter movement and passively attack military convoys. As a result, they were widely planted on roadsides earning them the name minehaye kinaar’e jaada2 initially, meaning roadside mines.

While the legacy explosive ordnance is relatively easier to identify by the affected populations when exposed, the IEDs are made from usual items making them extremely difficult to recognize. This puts forward a threat that blends naturally with everyday objects. It is the primary reason many fail to notice the underlying dangers of IEDs masked as canisters, stones, pressure cookers etc. As a result, the casualty rates have risen dramatically since 2008, the dark year when the IED was first used in Afghanistan.

FROM BATTLEFIELDS TO RESIDENTIAL SPACES The IEDs were easy and cheap to make and the materials required widely available; as a result, the use of IEDs quickly gained pace as it continued to cause significant damage from a distance, restricted movement, and proved near impossible to trace. With it, the motive of using it in battlefields also evolved as the improvised mine found its way to places it does not belong i.e. inside cities where innocent civilians outnumber military presence significantly. The voices of affected populations somehow seem lost in the soul wrenching echoes of never - ending explosions. The magnetic IED has provided the decades long terror with wheels, as it can easily attach to vehicles assisting the AGEs to conduct targeted killings.

1 Pre 2001 contamination resulting from the Soviet invasion.

2 Dari term for roadside mines.

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AFGHANISTAN: BATTLE AGAINST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

Figure 1: Casualty numbers during 2008-2020. 3 Often, the IEDs fail to attract the intended targets and are triggered by innocent civilians – the civilian casualty rates continue to expose this stark yet gloomy reality. Data from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)4 portray the spike in casualties caused by IEDs; during the years 2005-2008, the total casualties recorded are 2,631 with a monthly casualty rate of 54.81 – during the period of 2008-2020, the total

casualties recorded stand at 19,004 (7,903 from IEDs) with a monthly casualty rate of 122.61 individuals. This glaring increase becomes more significant when the clearance and risk education efforts of the MAPA are considered. While the programme has succeeded in reducing casualty rates of legacy contamination down to less than two percent, IEDs continue to mount a massive challenge as the rationale behind using it in public spaces still remains unexplored. Its impact is, however, glaring back from the blood-stained canvas of humanity, riddled with extreme violence.

A testament to the growing menace of IEDs is the number of casualties from a single accident when coupled with other types of attacks; in May 2019, Kabul city witnessed gruesome violence where an IED explosion set the stage for a complex attack resulting in 253 casualties, 95 of which did not get to see the light of day anymore. This quickly became a new approach in the merciless chain of targeted attacks where an IED would remove the obstacles or act as a source of distraction; later that month, on 28th May 2019, another complex attack was launched through an IED explosion resulting in 70 casualties, 20 of whom were killed.

ABANDONED YET MENACING The policy of the Mine Action

Figure 2: A vehicle borne IED coupled with a complex attack killed 95 while injuring a massive 158 innocent civilians.

3 ERW: Explosive remnants of war.

4 Accessed on January 5, 2021.

36 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

Programme of Afghanistan is not to deal with active IEDs, which is in line with the humanitarian principles. The MAPA defines abandoned improvised mines (AIMs) as pressure activated victim operated IEDs located in areas that are not under active conflict. These abandoned improvised mines do not deteriorate in their intended functionality, continuing to pose an identical threat to the active IEDs. The AIMs, therefore, continue to be triggered by innocent civilians

AFGHANISTAN: BATTLE AGAINST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

who are ignorant of their presence and willful mischief by design. The AIMs, similar to the explosive remnants of war, carry more risk of accidents, since the affected populations have no clue of their existence following a prolonged ceasefire.

MAPA’S RESPONSE While the military forces of GoIRA are primarily responsible for responding to active IED threats, the classification into active and abandoned enabled MAPA to start responding to the problem. Through extensive and persistent advocacy efforts, MAPA was able to convince parties at conflict that the abandoned IEDs served no military purpose but continued to take innocent lives.

To launch its response, the MAPA started with risk education as it helped raise awareness among a larger segment, responding to the IED threat in general. New messages that aimed to uncover the ground signs helping the affected populations to identify probable presence of AIMs were developed. These messages were then embedded in the standard explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) materials kit. New materials, including billboards, radio spots, and AIM posters, were also developed to provide visual cues and suggest safe behavior, especially while travelling and finding usual items in unusual places/ unusual items in usual places. In line with the behavior change communication model, the materials were field tested and piloted to ensure their intended effectiveness. This has helped the MAPA to reach a wider audience and ensure the affected populations are aware of the ground signs and risks posed by the improvised mines.

The nature and intended use of improvised mines make it difficult to predict the IED threat and is, therefore, extremely difficult to respond to proactively and with existing Figure 3: AIM posters highlighting usual ground signs of IEDs. counteriedreport.com

37

AFGHANISTAN: BATTLE AGAINST EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

means. The MAPA, therefore, focused on establishing standards of its response to the problem and is the first mine action programme to develop its national standards on improvised mines.

This allowed the programme to safely engage with AIMs ensuring consistent quality in all its efforts. The MAPA started to identify the scale of the problem through non-technical survey (NTS) in areas where improvised mines are present and no active conflict is taking place. This initial survey found that 553 hazards have contaminated an area of 51,236,570 m2 out of which the MAPA has managed to clear 8,393,780 m2 and released it back to the communities for their intended use. A total of 42,842,790 m2 known area is still contaminated by AIMs, which can increase with more survey interventions.

Now that the scale of the problem was partially identified, the MAPA needed to build the capacity of both the national authority and the implementing partners in survey and clearance of AIMs. After extensive and persistent advocacy, the programme was able to acquire funding for a comprehensive training and small-scale equipment. The three months long AIM survey and clearance training course was launched in July of 2020. The training aimed to provide AIM response capacity to the MAPA through basic and advance AIM survey courses, basic, intermediary,

THE WAY FORWARD

and advance AIM clearance courses, and training of trainers (ToT) concerning AIM clearance. The ToT ensures sustainable capacity within MAPA for the coming years.

The MAPA also received small-scale equipment to assist the expansion of its training efforts and the implementing partners to start survey and clearance operations. The following equipment and their associated accessories were part of the training package and will be used for land release of AIMs: VMR3 Minehound dual sensor detector: the detector comes with certain valuable attributes and through its ground-penetrating radar (GPR), it can help detect IEDs. VR1 Wirehound cable detector: suitable for detection of IEDs as this detector can identify wires and cables.

Shafi Ullah (Ahmadzai) leads the quality management department at the directorate of mine action coordination (DMAC), national authority on mine action in Afghanistan. He is a humanitarian with noticeable contributions to the mine action in Afghanistan. In his current capacity, Shafi chairs the Afghanistan mine action standards’ (AMAS) review board, amends AMAS as needed, drafts concept notes and proposals, leads monitoring and evaluations concerning mine action in Afghanistan, and represents Afghanistan in international mine action standards’ review board.

He has a master’s degree in strategic marketing from University of Wollongong and has authored ‘A Tear From the Sand’, a published novella.

38 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

Now that the programme has been equipped with the necessary knowledge and equipment, the MAPA aims to continue building its capacity in response to the growing problem of AIMs. To do so, all implementing partners are currently developing their standard operating procedures (SOPs) which will be reviewed and approved by the national authority (directorate of mine action coordination). The implementing partners are also being assisted in preparing their training areas and delivering the AIM survey and clearance training.

2021 will see the first phase of humanitarian demining response to AIMs – this will leave a significant footprint in the holistic battle against explosive ordnance. The non-technical survey of AIM hazards will continue to be prioritized in order to identify contaminated areas currently not known.

Land release of AIMs will be a top priority for the MAPA for the coming years. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

By Dr. Aris Makris, Ph.D., Vice-President, RD&E and Chief Technology Officer and Dr. J.-P. Dionne, Director of Research Engineering, Med-Eng

I

NTRODUCTION

Historically, bomb suit manufacturers did not have a standard for protection, capabilities, and mobility.

Consequently, they had to borrow standards from adjacent industries, such as standards for motorcycle helmets or small arms ballistic protection, then find a way to apply those to the unique context of protecting against an explosive blast. As a result, test methods were inconsistently adapted between laboratories and many results could not be reproduced or trusted. On occasion, bomb suit suppliers made unsubstantiated claims of their product’s performance or provided questionable test data from laboratories which may not have adhered strictly to approved test methods.

In addition, most end-users or procurement agencies were not sufficiently qualified technically to evaluate the diverse test reports for suitability, adequacy, or accuracy.

The release of the United States National Institute of Justice NIJ 0117.01 standard for Public Safety Bomb Suits [1], in 2016, addressed the gap in standardized EOD Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) evaluation.

This standard is intended to provide objective evidence and confidence in performance of EOD suits once they are officially certified by the accredited authority. The NIJ bomb suit standard outlines in detail a significant list of baseline performance and

capability to be expected in a bomb suit along with associated testing methods and pass/fail criteria. To maintain independence and credibility, NIJ testing and certification can only be achieved through an officially accredited third party, NIJ-approved, certification organization. This organization overviews the entire certification process, including initial and annual testing, as well as audits of the manufacturing facilities where the suits and helmets are built. In addition, the certification organization is responsible for announcing and posting which bomb suit models are currently certified. This extensive and exhaustive independent evaluation and oversight instills confidence in performance claims for certified bomb suits.

However, while a critical step forward for the EOD community, the NIJ 0117.01 remains a “minimum standard”, given that its requirements do not address all the possible protection and functional requirements bomb technicians may require. In addition to selecting a certified suit, end-users must also consider additional features, which may not be currently outlined within NIJ 0117.01. For instance, the current NIJ standard does not include quantitative requirements for blast overpressure mitigation, CBRN compatibility, personal cooling performance, communications, electromagnetic compliance, minimum power requirements, remote counteriedreport.com

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DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

controls, lighting, etc. Furthermore, threats will evolve as does technology available to provide protection against such threats to EOD personnel, requiring a periodic update/upgrade of the standard.

This paper first emphasizes how the NIJ standard can help government agencies in the selection and procurement of EOD PPE, without needing wide ranging technical expertise to assess, evaluate and qualify a bomb suit from all engineering disciplines, i.e., protection against all blast threats, human factors, optics, field of view, electronics, manufacturing quality, labelling, etc. This paper also emphasizes the need to consider other important features beyond NIJ certification, to ensure that end-users’ needs are met.

attenuation test (72 drop tower impacts on 9 different helmets, Figure 2) The impact energies and pass/fail thresholds are customized for EOD operations, recognizing the importance of head impact protection to mitigate the risk of traumatic brain injury, as highlighted through analysis and protection tests[5]. The impact tests are conducted at three temperatures (-10°C, +20°C and +55°C),

THE NIJ 0117.01 STANDARD FOR PUBLIC SAFETY BOMB SUITS In 2016, the US National Institute of Justice released the NIJ 0117.01 standard for public safety bomb suits, which covers a wide range of requirements of direct relevance to EOD threats and operations, such as: • V50 Fragmentation protection (inspired from MIL-STD-662 [2]): Pass/fail requirements are based on three different fragment simulating projectiles (17, 44, 207-grain, Figure 1). The large 207-grain (13.4 grams) fragment permits reliable V50 rating determinations for highly protective areas of the suit. This eliminates the need for questionable V0 ratings, which are impossible to obtain based on STANAG 2920 [3], given the requirement to fire fragments at 1.5 times the estimated V0 velocity (no known laboratory can consistently launch projectiles at such high velocities to obtain proper V0 values for high protection armor levels of the chest and groin of bomb suits).

• Spine Protection: The NIJ standard includes a spine protector test methodology developed specifically for bomb suits with appropriate pass/ fail thresholds, addressing the critical need for blunt impact protection when a technician is propelled by the force of a blast, as highlighted through analysis and protection tests [4].

• Head Impact Protection: The NIJ standard includes a very extensive helmet impact 40 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

Figure 1: NIJ 0117.01 Fragment Simulating Projectiles (17, 44 and 207-grain). The large 207-grain one eliminates the need for V0 tests.

Figure 2: Helmet drop tower testing relevant to traumatic brain injury. 72 drops conducted at 3 temperatures.

DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

Figure 3: High speed video images of the NIJ 0117.01 blast overpressure test (0.567 kg C4 explosive, standoff 0.6 m – kneeling position). Two mannequins used for more data. Tests were conducted at the Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, under the leadership of the Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory and the supervision of Intertek auditors. as EOD helmets must provide protection in all harsh environments bomb technicians are potentially exposed to.

• Flame Resistance: The standard includes flame resistance tests for the suit outer shell materials and the helmet shell, based on ASTM D6413-99.

The pass/fail requirements are customized for EOD applications, ensuring protection against the fire threat from IEDs. • Blast Overpressure: The standard includes the qualitative evaluation of bomb suits against a 0.567 kg C4 charge at a standoff of 0.6 m, with a Hybrid III mannequin in a kneeling position (Figure 3). Many qualitative requirements are included (protection to remain in place, no underlying mannequin parts exposed after a blast, etc.) As the NIJ standard does not currently address quantitative blast overpressure protection requirements, ASTM Working Group WG22759 is defining a standardized test method for bomb suit quantitative overpressure evaluation, complementing the NIJ suit blast integrity test.

An overview of some progress made towards the development of a test methodology for blast overpressure evaluation of bomb suit can be found in two publications [6, 7].

• Static and Dynamic Field of View (FOV): While the bomb suits’ primary objective is to protect from the main blast threats, EOD ensemble designs must also optimize the flexibility and mobility required for bomb disposal operations. As such, the NIJ standard includes stringent field of view requirements. The static field of view test (Figure 4) is conducted with a headform and a laser system,

Figure 4: NIJ Static FOV apparatus – helmet fitted on a headform and tested at various angles. counteriedreport.com

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DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

The NIJ 0117.01 includes additional requirements related to ergonomics, the number of sizes, maximum weight, label legibility, etc. Certification to the NIJ standard thus provides a clear independent bomb suit model evaluation against test methods relevant to EOD. All tests must be conducted by NIJ approved test laboratories selected by the certification organization, thereby saving procurement agencies from having to rely on supplier credibility or being forced to assess diverse test reports and data. Indeed, a single allencompassing third-party test report addressing all standard requirements is provided by the certification organization, once all testing is completed.

BEYOND THE NIJ STANDARD: OTHER RELEVANT REQUIREMENTS The NIJ 0117.01 standard represents a starting point only, so that procurement Figure 5: NIJ Dynamic FOV test – Head and Body motion with volunteer. agencies must consider other requirements when selecting bomb suits. In addition to ensuring objective measurements with thresholds quantitative blast overpressure (discussed above), determined based on actual bomb technician which should be based on sufficient data points and requirements (e.g. downward field of view when involve head acceleration, ear and chest overpressure, manipulating devices, horizontal field of view for other suit features, not necessarily directly related to peripheral vision). The dynamic field of view tests protection, should be mandated. For instance, one (Figure 5) evaluate the appropriate integration could consider that beyond meeting the minimal of the helmet with the suit and protective plates. fragmentation protection requirements from the These tests ensure that the visual field is not standard through controlled laboratory tests, a bomb blocked by suit components, such as the collar suit can be evaluated against realistic fragmentation or frontal plates. Visor optics and visor fogging and blast devices in order to assess how the personal evaluations are also included in NIJ 0117.01. protective equipment holds together and resists 42 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

fragmentation or other damage through dedicated, repeatable and controlled field tests [8].

Fragmentation protection levels to the head may also need to be increased as materials technology permits for enhanced protection to the head (face, helmet) over time.

In addition, there is often a need for personal cooling or ventilation, for technicians operating in harsh environments, given the inherent encapsulating nature of bomb suits. To that end, the ASTM F2371 performance test methodology [9] was developed, aiming at quantitatively evaluating the performance of personal cooling systems using so-called sweating thermal manikins subjected to high temperature (35°C, 50% relative humidity) conditions.

This standard allows for testing of personal cooling systems (see Figure 6) when worn in conjunction with bomb suits, for a realistic and representative evaluation of the expected cooling benefits. This test methodology ensures that selected cooling options offer a true and proven quantitative Figure 6: Personal cooling system tested in conjunction with a bomb suit against the benefit, beyond just a subjective requirements of the ASTM F2371 test methodology. Tests were conducted at the feeling. Test conditions can have Institute for Environmental Research from Kansas State University. such a large influence on the cooling power provided by personal cooling systems, recommended to accommodate at least the 5th that relying on a standardized method is critical for a percentile female to 95th percentile male, based on proper comparison of offered models. relevant anthropometric data.

While the NIJ standard only requires bomb suits In addition to sizing requirements, ergonomics to be available in at least three sizes, no specific should also be evaluated beyond the limited NIJ basic requirements are included to determine the range simulated scenarios. Also, user comfort, while not of body sizes they should accommodate. It is explicitly mentioned in the NIJ standard, is critical. counteriedreport.com

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DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

As an example, user comfort can be significantly enhanced through carefully crafted helmet retention systems that may involve adjustable and inflatable liners for an optimal fit [10] .

Also of great importance, bomb technicians need to communicate safely when downrange near an explosive device. As such, all electronics within the suit and helmet must meet highly stringent military standards for electromagnetic compliance (emissions and susceptibility), as opposed to the less stringent industrial standards. EOD ensembles must provide proper lighting to work in dark areas and may even need to provide video recording options for the purpose of forensics and sharing information with the command post.

Finally, purchasing agencies must ensure that bomb suit manufacturers provide long-lasting, high quality and reliable products, with strong customer support. The NIJ manufacturing facility audit plays an important role for this aspect. Other accreditations of the product, such as CE markings, RoHS compliance and some regional standards may also apply for bomb suits to be procured and used in certain countries.

DISCUSSION The release of the NIJ 0117.01 standard for public safety bomb suits in 2016 empowered government agencies and EOD end-users to have confidence in the suitability of bomb suits they may select. Certified bomb suits according to the standard should meet all relevant protection and performance requirements for EOD. Prior to the release of this standard, one had to rely on reports provided by manufacturers based on how they tested their products. Legacy test methods were not standardized and oftentimes not applicable to EOD scenarios. On occasion, some manufacturers misrepresented the performance of their suit or even manipulated the test data to make favorable performance claims. Such unethical activity jeopardizes operator safety when left unchallenged during the competitive evaluation process.

While NIJ 0117.01 addresses the main blast threats (overpressure, fragmentation, impact, and heat), historical focus has been on overpressure 44 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

and fragmentation, with limited emphasis on impact, especially for the head. Field experience in recent conflicts involving improvised explosive devices has highlighted the need for helmet impact protection to mitigate the very common occurrence of traumatic brain injury (arising from either blast or direct impact [ 11] ). The NIJ 0117.01 standard mandates a stringent set of head protection testing to ensure that EOD helmets provide high impact protection.

Given that the NIJ is a ‘minimum’ standard, purchasing agencies also have to take into account other requirements beyond NIJ 0117.01, such as, quantitative blast overpressure, CBRNe compatibility, electromagnetic compliance, personal cooling, communications, lighting, etc.

Bomb suit certification to the NIJ 0117.01 standard is the only way to ensure fully independent, comprehensive and reliable testing/validation of bomb suit performance against the most relevant EOD threats, and built as per documented manufacturing processes that are audited independently on a regular basis by an officially appointed and accredited organization.

In parallel though, the end-user community, government authorities and industry must continue to improve the standard and test methods, as protective materials and other technologies advance, or threat conditions evolve. The introduction of standard performance requirements and test methods permits for bomb suits to be officially certified, providing a ‘seal of approval’ that the particular product can be trusted to perform according to the standard. One must keep in mind that the NIJ standard is a baseline standard, with some key functional requirements not currently being covered and requiring that they be specified explicitly in procurement requirements. ■

REFERENCES [1] U.S. National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard, NIJ-0117.01, 2016 [2] V50 Ballistic Test for Armor, Department of Defense Test Standards MIL-STD-662F, Dec. 1997 [3] NATO STANAG 2920, Edition 2: Ballistic Test Method for Personal Armour Materials and Combat Clothing, July 31, 2003

DEVELOPMENTS IN BOMB SUIT TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION

[4] Dionne, J.P., Levine, J., Keown, M., Bueley, D., Makris,

[8] Levine, J., Dionne, J.P., Hedge, C., Bueley, D.,

A., Realistic EOD back protector testing vs. standards

Acquavella, D., Makris, A., Fragmentation testing of

requirements, Personal Armour Systems Symposium

bomb suit using pipe bombs, Personal Armour Systems

(PASS), Cambridge, UK, September 2014

Symposium (PASS), Washington DC, USA, October

[5] Levine, J., Dionne, J.P., Bueley, D., Makris, A.,

2018

Realistic helmet blunt impact protection vs. standards

[9] ASTM F2371-05, Standard Test Method for Measuring

requirements, Personal Armour Systems Symposium

the Heat Removal Rate of Personal Cooling Systems

(PASS), Washington DC, USA, October 2018

Using a Sweating Heated Manikin, ASTM International,

[6] Dionne, J.P., Levine, J., Makris, A., Use of Hybrid III

West Conshohocken, PA, 2005, www.astm.org

mannequins for a blast overpressure standard test

[10] Keown, M., Dionne, Makris, A., Accommodating the

methodology, Personal Armour Systems Symposium

target population of single-sized EOD helmet models

(PASS), Washington DC, USA, October 2018

through the use of a multi-fit inflatable sizing system,

[7] Dionne J.P., Levine, J., Makris, A., Investigating Bomb Suit Blast Overpressure Test Methodologies, in Homeland

Personal

Armour

Systems

Symposium

(PASS),

Washington DC, USA, October 2018

Security and Public Safety: Research, Applications, and

[11] Dionne, J.P., Cheng, M., Levine, J., Makris, A., Tertiary

Standards, ed. P. J. Mattson and J. L. Marshall (West

blast injury and the need for impact protection, Personal

Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, 2019), 216–236.

Armour Systems Symposium (PASS), Amsterdam, The

http://doi.org/10.1520/STP161420180045

Netherlands, September 2016.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Aris Makris is VP of Research, Development & Engineering and Chief Technology Officer at MedEng, which is a brand of The Safariland Group. He holds Masters and Ph.D. degrees in Mechanical Engineering, specializing in explosions and protection against blast effects, with over 30 years of related experience.

He has led numerous programs involving the design and development of advanced personal protective systems to protect against IEDs, landmines, and explosive threats. Dr. Makris and his team have also conceived and developed a number of person borne blast sensors to assist in quantifying individual blast exposure under diverse operational circumstances and guide improvements in design, medical understanding and optimization of Techniques, Tactics and Procedures. Dr. Makris has been an active member of several equipment performance standards, including the NIJ Bomb Suit standard, NATO, UN working groups and a member of the IABTI Advisory Board.

Dr. Jean-Philippe Dionne holds a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from McGill University with over 20 years expertise in the fields of numerical simulations of detonations, blast waves and combustion. Since joining MedEng in 2000, he has been involved in numerous projects including explosive tests on demining and bomb disposal personal protective equipment, performance testing of personal cooling systems, blast dosimeters and blast mitigation seats.

Dr. Dionne manages a group of R&D engineers and technologists dedicated to research related to all MedEng products. He has significantly contributed to the development of the National Institute of Justice NIJ 0117.01 standard for Public Safety Bomb Suits and he is currently leading the ASTM Working Group on the development of quantitative blast overpressure test methodologies for bomb suits. During the 2004 Personal Armour Systems Symposium, taking place in The Hague, Netherlands, Dr. Dionne received the Young Talent Award, recognizing his contribution in personal protection against blast.

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TIME CONTROLLED INITIATION SYSTEM

ELECTRONIC INITIATION SYSTEMS FOR MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

By DynITEC GmbH

S

ince 2002, advancing from the heritage of Dynamit Nobel, DynITEC GmbH is a leading producer of energetic materials and electronic initiation systems for military and civil applications and explosive devices for military and police use. The company is working with law enforcement and civil sector organisations in more than 20 countries worldwide.

Considering customers’ needs and feedback, DynITEC has put a lot of thought and effort into its SPG (transmitting and programming device) - a small, lightweight, rugged bi-directional remote firing and

Hybrid (Counter-IED Report Spring/Summer 2018 https://bit.ly/325O8Un), DynITEC offers lasting performance, even in a harsh military environment, for its lightweight bi-directional Remote Firing and programming system Smart BFAS (C-IED Report Autumn 2018 - https://bit.ly/2FeHzWw). It is also made of a solid block of aluminum, with waterproof feature and immersion to 7 meters, rugged to military specification MIL-STD 810. The Smart BFAS System is designed for complex blasting operations for use within the military and police community. The Smart BFAS System

programming device with a rugged, reusable receiver.

The system adheres to military specifications and is already in use in military units of several countries worldwide.

DynITEC team has revisited its time-controlled unit ZAE (Zeitauslöseeinheit); made of a solid block of aluminum, the system can withhold the military’s rough way of handling equipment in harsh conditions. It is waterproof, as well as seawater proof, and suitable for underwater operations. It can also be programmed with a time-delay for a predetermined number of minutes (for example, 19:45h) or set in real-time mode. The system’s time set can be up to 72 hrs and can ignite all standard blasting caps from Class 1 up to Class 3.

Notwithstanding the successes with previous developments, such as the Combifire or HZG

prevents jamming and allows the operator to conduct all actions remotely. The pre-programmed safety time feature allows the operator to set up and retract safely from the danger area because the receiver ignores any command during this safety time.

The programming device has an additional feature, where the time-delay can be programmed by the enduser between ignition groups. For example, between ignition groups 1 and 2 can easily set up a delay of 12.5 seconds.

The Transmitter (SPG) incorporates a safety feature through a safety key that prevents unauthorized use without adaptation, in accordance with the law enforcement blasting regulations. DynITEC intends to provide the community with a system that can help the operators carry out all their missions and initiate anything that could prevent any mission failure. The

counteriedreport.com

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TIME CONTROLLED INITIATION SYSTEM

Time-controlled unit ZAE (Zeitauslöseeinheit). company has created a Transmitter that is rugged enough to be used in all climate zones and temperature ranges with and without gloves. The Transmitter (SPG) can arm and disarm the receiver (FAE AS4-4) remotely and conduct a remote communication, circuit and battery status test of all programmed receivers on request. A tricolor LED indicates all results and can repeat all tests at any time. As an additional feature, the SPG can arm and disarm all receivers as required and offers the possibility to select up to ten firing groups to initiate simultaneously , or set up a programmed delay time or individual groups like group 8. In each group, the operator can program as many receivers (FAE AS 4-4) as required.

Rugged, reusable receiver (FAE AS 4-4), made of a solid block of aluminum, is waterproof and can be programmed to a group of the transmitter (SPG) and individually, either to electric or electronic initiation ESK3. The electric firing output is designed to fire Class 1 to Class 4 blasting caps, cartridges of rocket wrenches and disrupters, cable cutters, or 48 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

pyrotechnics with sufficient output to accommodate the receiver (FAE AS 4-4) and at the same time to keep a safe distance.

The benefit of using and firing Electronic Blasting Cap ESK3 (C-IED Report Spring/Summer 2020 https://bit.ly/2QZGyED) is that it can be used in every

TIME CONTROLLED INITIATION SYSTEM

environment where electric blasting caps are forbidden or cannot be safely used. Designed for law enforcement applications, the electronic blasting cap ESK3 is extremely safe against stray currents, radar radiation, or other electromagnetic interference (EMI) like mobile devices. Therefore, the ESK3 is ideal for C-IED operations at or near railroad tracks or places where electric blasting caps are not fit for purpose. Next to the above, the electronic blasting cap is safe against unauthorized use. Triggering by electrostatic charging, conventional blasting machines, or battery is not possible.

Benefits are visible in terms of economics and weight. For operations where every gram makes the difference, the safety features with electronic blasting caps and even communication systems can be stored and used next to the same device. For underwater operations, the ESK3 is waterproof to 100 meters and available on request as a nonmagnetic version to conduct countermeasures on sea mines.

The ESK3 has been given multiple NSN numbers (Cage Code C8403) through different countries, tested to military specification and introduced in several NATO countries.

Should the operator need to expand the receiver’s capability to be able to use NONEL/Shock Tube systems, this can be achieved by adding the DynITEC FZ Adapter. The FZ Adapter is made from a solid block of aluminum and features easy maintenance in the field. With this add on, connected

Sample of a ZAE Time Controlled Initiation System (TCIS). easily to the Receiver (FAE AS 4-4), the operator can use one system to cover all modern initiation possibilities available on the market (wired electric, electronic and Nonel/Shocktube).

The receiver (FAE AS 4-4) also has build-in batteries and a circuit tester, meaning that no additional circuit tester is needed.

Should additional information be required, please do not hesitate to contact us at eod-ied@dynitec.com or call +49 176 81123643. ■ counteriedreport.com

49

PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) IN COLOMBIA

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, international security analyst

T

he Republic of Colombia is experiencing a new wave of violence across the country which has resulted in a rising number of incidents involving antipersonnel mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), as narco-insurgent movements contaminate the countryside and rural areas with these weapons of war and terror.

Due to this internal security challenge, the Colombian government requested an extension to the State Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction (henceforth the Ottawa Treaty) regarding the removal of mines, IEDs and UXO from its territory. The new deadline is 31 December 2025. However, even this deadline is perhaps too optimistic and ambitious, not because of problems with mine-clearing operations themselves, but because of rising violence.

THE NEW DEADLINE: 2025 In November, the 18th meeting of the State Parties to the Ottawa Treaty met in Geneva. It was during this meeting when the Colombian government presented its aforementioned request, which was unanimously agreed upon by the State Parties. The previous deadline was 31 March 2021.

50 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

A report about the meeting explains that “in granting the request, the Meeting noted that, while Colombia had largely complied with the commitments it had made in 2010, Colombia has an incomplete picture of the remaining challenges.” Moreover, “the Meeting noted the importance of Colombia identifying as soon as possible the precise perimeter of mined areas, to the extent possible, and establishing an updated evidencebased baseline of contamination in the remaining municipalities.” This request is somewhat problematic since, as we will discuss in subsequent sections of the commentary, the violence in the country continues and areas that were previously decontaminated could become contaminated once again as insurgent movements expand their areas of operations.

The report also noted that “Colombia provided implementation milestones for the period of 20202023 and Colombia’s intention to review its work plan in 2023, the Meeting noted that the Convention would benefit from Colombia submitting to the States Parties by 30 April 2023 an updated detailed work plan.” The statement suggests that April 2023 will be the next major deadline for Colombia’s new schedule, at which time the State Parties will get a better idea of how mine-clearing operations in Colombia are going. Since Colombia’s deadline to clear its territory is December

PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

2019 map of contaminated areas published by the Colombian government.

Source: GOV.CO - http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/descontaminacolombia/Paginas/Plan-Estrategico-2020-2025.aspx

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PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

Colombian Navy destroys explosive devices in Bolívar in a controlled manner.

Source: The General Command of the Military Forces - https://www.cgfm.mil.co/es/blog/armada-de-colombia-destruye-de-manera-controlada-dos-artefactosexplosivos-en-bolivar

2025, the April 2023 report is a sort of halfway-point

mines are found so that they can identify these weapons.

meeting to see if the new deadline is realistically possible.

The meeting of the State Parties to the Ottawa Treaty also mentioned how Bogota’s new strategy “is contingent upon stable funding, security, retaining strong partnerships with international stakeholders and other matters creating an environment conducive for implementation.” By “other matters” we can infer that this means the actual situation in the country, namely, ongoing operations to combat narco-guerrillas and other violent movements.

At this point, it is worth noting that the Colombian government has drafted the Humanitarian Demining Operational Plan 2020-2025 with this new deadline in mind. Apart from actually removing the mines and other explosives, the plan also stresses the importance of educating individuals that live in communities where

Moreover, the government stresses once again its commitment to helping victims of these weapons, and government agencies at all levels will continue to work together to “design, implement, monitor and evaluate” mine-removal operations throughout the country. While the latter part of the plan sounds self-evident, given the complexity of the problem, and since Colombia remains a conflict state, it is critically important to continuously monitor and adapt mine-removal strategies depending on the developments on the ground.

The strategic plan has several minor, more localized projects. For example, there is a plan aimed at mine-removal operations in 27 out of 56 natural parks (Sistema de Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia). Additionally the project also highlights the numerous international civilian agencies that are helping the Colombian military in mine-removal

52 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

operations. These include the HALO Trust, Norwegian People’s Aid (Ayuda Popular Noruega), Humanity & Inclusion, and the Danish Demining Group.

DATA According to data published by the Colombian government, a total of 7,557 artifacts (mines, IEDs, UXO) have been destroyed between 2004 and 31 October 2020. This number includes: 6,046 antipersonnel mines; 1,209 unexploded ordnance like munitions; and 302 IEDs. Colombian military personnel and partner entities operate across the country, and data shows that different departments are at vastly different stages of decontamination. As we will discuss, renewed violence will change these numbers, but we will utilize the data provided by Bogota. For example, Antioquia department has a 32.45% percent of decontamination, Meta is at 11.21%, while Caldas is at 10.72%.

Meanwhile Putumayo department, which borders Ecuador and Peru, an area well known for cross-border smuggling, is at 2.66%; while Nariño, which borders Ecuador and the Pacific Ocean, borders at 2.30%. On the other side of the country, Arauca department, which borders the always problematic Venezuela, has been 0.03% cleared.

The Colombian government is optimistic about this new deadline as there have been several positive developments. On 9 December, the Colombian government reported that 432 municipalities are now free of mines. Specifically, 154 municipalities were decontaminated in the first two years of the Ivan Duque presidency. “This represents the fulfillment of 85% of the [administration’s] objective of having 180 territorial entities [decontaminated] by 2022,” the Colombian presidency explained in a 9 December press release.

The newest municipalities are scattered across the country, including the departments of Bolivar (a hot spot for these weapons and violence in general), Cauca, Meta, Norte de Santander, Sucre, among others. The Colombian army announced that throughout 2020, its personnel cleared 17 municipalities free of mines.

The activities were particularly carried out by the military’s humanitarian demining brigade (Brigada

de Desminado Humanitario: BRDEH), the marine infantry’s demining unit (Agrupación de Explosivos y Desminado de Infantería de Marina: AEDIM), and the Halo Trust, among other agencies. Over four thousand men and women are involved in these tasks.

INCIDENTS ON THE RISE The aforementioned data can be better understood if we mention specific incidents involving the removal of these weapons of terror. For example, in late October, the Colombian navy neutralized one anti-personnel mine, which had two kg of explosives inside; and one 81 mm grenade, with 500 milligrams of explosives inside, in El Carmen de Bolivar, Bolivar department.

The explosives were found by civilians, a peasant and an underage citizen respectively. The weapons were deactivated by personnel assigned to the humanitarian demining company No.1.

Weeks later, in late November, two anti-personnel mines were removed and neutralized, once again in Bolivar department. The mines were found by local villagers working the land, who subsequently contacted authorities. Personnel from the aforementioned humanitarian demining company No.1, assigned to the marine infantry brigade No. 1 were in charge of this operation. A press release from the Colombian navy mused that “it is believed [that the mines] were placed years ago due to the armed conflict in the region,” without attributing it to any particular insurgent group.

Nevertheless, it is well known that in Bolivar the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional: ELN) is operational – case in point, 17 members of the ELN’s “Luis Solano Sepúlveda” faction were arrested earlier this year, in said department. Hence it is likely that the aforementioned explosives were placed by this group.

Bolivar is a hot spot of mines and IEDs and the good news is that several areas have been declared free of mines and other explosives. For example, in early November, the Colombian navy, delivered three zones in the El Carmen de Bolivar and Zambrano municipalities, Bolivar department, to civilian authorities.

A total of 4,778 square meters were searched by military personnel starting in late 2019, and one anti-personnel mine was found and neutralized. counteriedreport.com

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PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

Military engineers find anti-personnel mines near a school and three homes in Caldas.

Source: The General Command of the Military Forces. https://www.cgfm.mil.co/es/blog/ingenieros-militares-hallan-minas-antipersonal-cerca-de-una-escuelay-tres-viviendas-en-caldas

Similarly, troops from the army’s mechanized battalion No. 18 and the special forces battalion for urban operations, were tasked with removing three explosive devices that were found “five metres away from a major road” in Arauca department. The explosives sound like IEDs as they contained 20 kg of pentolite, connected via wires that had a length of 200 m. On this occasion, the army has blamed the “Ernesto Che Guevara faction” of the ELN; authorities said that the ELN wanted to activate the bombs by a road that is utilized daily by military personnel and civilians.

Another incident took place in the Tibú municipality, Norte de Santander department, in early October, when army personnel assigned to the engineer battalion No. 50 deactivated an anti-personnel mine next to a pathway that connects two hamlets. Around 54 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

the same time, an IED of undisclosed explosive power, was deactivated in another area.

Anti-personnel mines were also located by two schools in Fronterino, Antioquia department, according to a November 11 article in the Colombian news agency RCN Radio, however at the time of writing it is unclear if the Colombian military or other agencies have neutralized them.

The Colombian military has also been effective at neutralizing insurgents that actually install these weapons. For example, in late November, troops killed six insurgent members of a FARC faction (Grupo Armado Organizado residual E-18) in the northern part of Antioquia. Some of the neutralized insurgents were tasked with deploying IEDs in the area, the army explains.

PROLIFERATION OF MINES, IEDs AND UXO IN COLOMBIA

SADLY, INJURIES AND FATALITIES CONTINUE Unfortunately, not all mines, IEDs and UXO are successfully located and neutralized, since they continue to cause casualties and fatalities across the country. Case in point, a soldier died in Tarazá municipality, Antioquia department, after he stepped on a mine during an operation on 31 October. The Colombian military has accused the narco-movement Los Caparros that operates in the area, of having placed the mine. Months earlier, in July, a corporal and four soldiers were injured when an explosive was detonated during a patrol operation in Cauca department. Unfortunately, the corporal and one of the soldiers perished due to their wounds.

Moreover, civilians continue to be hurt or killed due to these weapons of terror. For example, in August, a man was killed when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine while he, his wife and child were walking by a river looking for food in Antioquia department. The other two members of the family were injured. The Colombian news outlet RCN has reported that four indigenous people have died in the area in recent years due to explosive devices. “This area of Antioquia department was under the control of the FARC, and now is disputed by residual factions [of FARC] and the Clan del Golfo,” explained a 9 August RCN article on the incident.

FINAL THOUGHTS As expected, the State Parties to the Ottawa Treaty have approved Colombia’s request to extend the country’s deadline to remove explosives from its territory. However, the new deadline, 31 December 2025, may still be too optimistic. The main issue with Colombia’s plan is that the country is not a post-conflict state, as the ELN, FARC’s remaining factions and other narco- movements continue to operate throughout the country, and they rely on explosives to terrorize the civilians and attack military and police personnel.

The operations carried out by the Colombian military and its partner organizations are commendable, however it is difficult to believe that 2025 is achievable unless there are massive victories in the war against the country’s violent movements that occur parallel to mine-clearing operations. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an international security analyst who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere and post-Soviet states.

He is a writer for Janes, Shephard Media, DefenceIQ, the Center for International Maritime Security, among other publications. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, Polar Journal, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Perspectivas. He has researched mine-clearing operations in other Latin American countries like Chile, Ecuador and Peru, as well as in the Republic of Moldova. Mr. Sanchez holds a Master’s degree in International Peace and Conflict Resolution from the School of International Service at American University, and he has attended the Institute of World Politics and the National Defense University’s William J. Perry Center in Washington DC. counteriedreport.com

55

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PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS

PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS - A VERSATILE TOOL FOR SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT Vincent Deery of 3DX-Ray talks about the versatility and applications of portable x-ray scanners

F

lat panel portable x-ray scanners long ago established their value as an essential tool for any bomb disposal team and are widely employed in EOD role throughout the world.

Their mobility, accuracy and speed of use gave EOD operators the ability to view what was inside a bag or package in situ, whilst maintaining a safe distance.

This was a game changer for EOD operators. For the first time, they were able to see a detailed image of the contents of a suspect package or bag. They could determine, not only if it was a threat, but what type of threat, without the potentially dangerous business of opening or moving the object, or alternatively, disrupting or destroying it on site, with all the potential collateral damage and associated disruption that would cause.

Once an operator has determined whether or not a suspect package presents a threat, it enables the authorities to make quick decisions to safely evacuate a site but more usually, to avoid the mass disruption to public spaces and transport through unnecessary evacuations.

As the technology is continually developed, colour differentiated scans have been introduced which have made it possible to determine the nature of the

• Orange shows organics, such as explosives, chemicals, and drugs, as well as more innocent items such as foodstuffs.

• Blue is for metals, such as guns, knives, hand grenades, metal pipe bombs as well as IED components such as the power sources, switches, circuit components and metallic fragmentation.

• Green is for inorganic materials like black powders and aluminumized homemade explosives.

• Grey scale is used for recognition of shapes and the form of objects.

But not all portable scanners are created equal, so it is important to note that most portable x-ray systems on the market only use two colour scans and leave out the colour blue. This is because of a lack of understanding about how materials imaging works, which could put operators at a severe and potentially dangerous disadvantage. So, accurate three colour differentiation is essential. Accuracy not only relates to the correct colourisation of the specific object but also to the consistent colourisation across the entire scanned area.

Another key factor when selecting a portable x-ray system is the image quality.

What determines the overall image quality is a

materials being scanned. They are:

combination of both the detector panel and the x-ray counteriedreport.com

57

PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS

ThreatScanÂŽ portable x-ray systems provide high image quality in sub-millimeter resolution.

generator. The focal spot size of the generator and the panel together determine where you will get the best quality image. If the focal spot size of the generator is poor the best image will be right at the panel’s surface. That is why most vendors demonstrate tests close to the panel. The reality is that when you are x-raying a bag, the threat will not generally be right next to the panel, so your image quality needs to be not only good at the panel, but also as you move away.

With a pulsed x-ray, the image quality plummets as you move away from the panel significantly, but with a constant potential generator, it actually improves. So, it is important to select a portable x-ray system with a constant potential generator.

58 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

And finally, when selecting a portable x-ray system, size really does matter. It is important to have a system with a large imaging panel that can scan a large area of a vehicle or an entire case or several objects together.

Though originally designed primarily for bomb disposal officers, it was not long before other security and law enforcement agencies realised the potential of these systems and became early adopters of the technology.

As a result, we have seen a growing number of sales and customer enquiries from a whole variety of agencies as well as private security firms, to use in an ever-widening variety of applications.

PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS

ThreatScanÂŽ-LS1 x-raying through car.

Police forces, in particular, are utilising these systems for numerous applications, including vehicle check point searches, for contraband such as drugs or weapons.

Screening a vehicle for a potential threat can be challenging but with large panel systems you can image a large section of a vehicle very quickly.

Advanced line-scan digital radiography (DR) panels also allow you to re-scan a specific area from the first image without having to reposition the panel.

Software will automatically move the detector array inside of the panel to the exact location you select.

You can then re-scan that specific area and adjust the kV, mA, and Scan time to improve penetration in

that area alone. This feature is incredibly useful and is unique to constant potential generators.

Other applications for law enforcement include temporary security screening at public venues and events, especially at times of heightened security threat. The Italian police have forty systems which are used for mobile baggage checks at major tourist attractions around Rome.

Specialist agencies such as serious organised crime, counter-terror and drug enforcement use portable x-ray systems to rapidly examine and assess threats and suspect items on site, such as bags, laptops and furniture, as well as search for evidence. counteriedreport.com

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PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS

ThreatScanÂŽ-LS1 x-raying through motorbike.

Another advantage is that you do not need to compromise on the penetration and imaging area. You can still get good penetration on thick materials, such as scanning for objects hidden in walls. The systems are also able to help them to locate and identify cameras and surveillance equipment and other electronic devices.

Within the prison community, prisoners have always proved highly innovative and ingenious when it comes to hiding contraband; whether that is weapons, mobile phones or drugs. It is in fact a never- ending cat 60 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

and mouse game between inmates and prison staff.

Portable x-ray scanners provide a quick and simple way of searching for hidden contraband within prisoner’s furniture and personal items, without dismantling them, leading to less confrontational prisoner, staff interactions and helping to reduce tensions in what can be a dangerous and volatile environment. The systems can also be used to scan the many delivery vehicles that enter and leave prisons every day.

VIP protection is another application where these systems have proved invaluable for both secret service

PORTABLE X-RAY SCANNERS

officers and private security companies. VIP security poses some particular challenges, especially when it comes to public meetings, events and travel. VIPs routinely travel a lot and may visit multiple countries on a trip and multiple locations in a single day as a part of their itinerary.

Portable x-ray scanners give security teams the opportunity to set up temporary security zones around their VIP. The scanners are used for security sweeps of vehicles, meeting rooms, venues and hotel rooms.

Security teams are able to control access to the VIP with baggage scans that only take a few seconds, causing minimum disruption and inconvenience. The portability of the system means that it can be carried on a plane, in a helicopter or in the trunk of a vehicle and sent ahead with the advance team to each new location, enabling security teams to carry out a sweep and be ready for screening attendees at the start of the next meeting or event.

Both government and private Technical Surveillance Counter Measures sweep teams are able to locate those elusive electronic devices hidden in secure government buildings, meeting rooms, board rooms, hotel rooms or anywhere else highly sensitive information is being exchanged. This negates the need to dismantle tables, desks, lamps, ornaments etc. to confirm that there is indeed a device.

At the borders, our systems are used to perform vehicle checks by search teams at fixed and temporary crossings. They are ideal for scanning tyres and cavities not visible to regular searches and are especially useful working in conjunction with K9 units, to confirm finds and avoid false positives.

Ports, airports and travel hubs, like train and bus stations, are all areas where we see systems used routinely. In fact, any public spaces where a large throughput of people and left baggage are regular issues, you have the potential for mass disruption.

Within the private sector the list of actual and potential users is endless.

Any large office, or office complex may not have a sufficient threat level to justify fixed baggage screening systems for regular employees and visitors.

But at times of increased threat level, the ability for

office security staff to be able to deploy a portable x-ray system as a part of their access control security, not only increases their actual security but also acts as a deterrent.

Event security such as concerts, sports and festivals where fixed baggage screening systems is not always feasible, portable x-ray systems can be deployed with no need for any infrastructure.

Good portable x-ray systems are what the military would call a ‘force multiplier. They are fast, accurate, portable, versatile and relatively inexpensive. So, in the hands of trained security staff are an incredibly powerful tool.

But that brings me to my final point regarding selecting the right system for your needs. Make sure your vendor offers a first rate after sales service and training support package. That support should include the ability to update and maintain the system in the field because no matter how good the portable x-ray system, if your staff are not properly trained, and supported you will never achieve the best results. â–

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Vincent Deery is Sales and Marketing Director at 3DX-Ray Ltd.

counteriedreport.com

61

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EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

CAN INDIA EFFECTIVELY REGULATE EXPLOSIVES?

By Colonel H R Naidu Gade – Army Veteran

U

NDERSTANDING EXPLOSIVES

INDIA’S EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTION

An explosive substance is a solid or liquid substance (or mixture of substances) which is in itself capable by chemical reaction of producing gas at such a temperature and pressure and at such a speed as to cause damage to the surroundings. As per the theory of mixes, a good explosive mixture must contain two main substances. The first must be rich in oxygen and the second must be able to react very fast so that it changes and multiplies its volume. Some good producers of oxygen are

India produces around 1.5 million tons of explosives a year both in the military and the commercial domain through about 200 licenced manufacturers, and with around 11% compound annual growth rate. There are ninety-eight authorised explosives for production in India as of date. In addition, explosives are home made in large quantities by the insurgents, extremists and terrorists. They use many precursor chemicals frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal

Potassium Chlorate, Potassium Nitrate, Ammonium Nitrate, Potassium Permanganate, Sodium Chlorate.

Some good reactors with oxygen are Aluminium, Magnesium powders, mixture of Carbon and Sulphur, mixture of Carbon and Sugar, mixture of Carbon and Wood, and mixture of Flour and Starch.

Explosive materials may be categorised by the speed at which they expand. Materials that detonate the front of the chemical reaction move faster through the material than the speed of sound, are said to be “high explosives” and materials that deflagrate are said to be “low explosives”. Explosives may also be categorised by their sensitivity. Sensitive materials that can be initiated by a relatively small amount of heat or pressure are Primary Explosives and materials that are relatively insensitive are Secondary or Tertiary explosives.

use. Many other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for Home Made Explosives (HMEs) to be used in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. HMEs made from Ammonium Nitrate (AN) and Fuel Oil, which are freely available, are extensively used by the insurgents/ terrorists in India for making IEDs. Precursors like AN have been banned in many countries, but not in India, since it is the cheapest blast agent used for mining and also in large quantities as a fertilizer in agriculture.

The total installed capacity of AN in India is around a million tons. The manufacturing capacity for converters is around two hundred thousand tons. The capacity for extraction of AN from sludge received from nuclear fuel complexes is twelve thousand tons.

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EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

Global Industrial Explosives Market. Source: Persistence Market Research.

USES OF EXPLOSIVES Explosives

continue

to

have

many

important

peacetime uses in fields like engineering, construction, mining, and quarrying. They propel rockets and space shuttles into orbit. Explosives are also used to bond different metals, like those in coins, together in a tight sandwich. Explosives carefully applied to carbon produce industrial diamonds used for cutting, grinding and polishing tools. Explosives are used for controlled demolitions of huge buildings in cities. High explosives, particularly Nitro-glycerine, have been used in torpedoes for the purpose of shooting oil and gas wells for many years. Today, dynamite is not used as often as it once was. A relatively new type of explosive, “slurry explosives,” are liquid and can be poured into place. One popular explosive for industrial use is made from fertilizers like ammonium nitrate or urea, fuel oil, and nitric or sulfuric acid. This “ammonium nitrate-fuel oil” 64 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

or ANFO explosive has replaced dynamite as the explosive of choice for many peacetimes uses. An ANFO explosion, although potentially powerful and even devastating, detonates more slowly than an

Bulk Mining Explosives. Source: PESO, India.

EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

Explosives Manufacturing Plant. Source: Solar Explosives, India. explosion of Nitro-glycerine or TNT. This creates more of an explosive “push” than a high velocity TNT blast. ANFO ingredients are less expensive than other explosives and approximately 25% more powerful than TNT. Sale of ANFO components were not regulated as TNT and dynamite were. Other

explosive in many terror attacks in the country. Police forces of all the states have been asked to keep a watch on the outlets selling AN. In India, AN is one out of 14 precursor chemicals commonly used by terrorist groups to manufacture IEDs. Therefore, its import and export are required to be monitored to prevent it falling

explosives in use today include PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate), Cyclonite or RDX, a component of plastic explosives, and Amatol, a mixture of TNT and Ammonium Nitrate.

into hands of terrorists or such organisations. While its licit use is in agriculture as fertilizer, but it is also widely used for manufacturing IEDs. Of late the government has relaxed the supply and use of explosives in the mining sector.

EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND SECURITY It has been experienced that some of the commercial explosives have found their way in to the hands of extremists and insurgents in some of the insurgency areas in India. This was possible as most of the mining companies operating in these remote insurgency areas are threatened and forced to part with some quantities of explosives and manipulate their records to show use for legitimate purposes. The increased use of AN, a common fertilizer as an explosive, substantially complicated India’s fight against terrorism and insurgency. Freely available AN has been used as an

Plastic Explosives. Source: Shutterstock.com counteriedreport.com

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EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

Explosives in Coal Mining. Source: Coal India Limited.

Slurry Explosives used in Mining. Source: Solar Explosives, India.

66 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

Explosives in Controlled Demolitions. Source: PESO India.

REGULATING EXPLOSIVES AND PRECURSORS In India, the production, sale and use of commercial explosives are governed by more than a century old Explosives Act 1884 and Explosive substances Act 1908 and Explosives Rule 2008. Ammonium Nitrate (AN) Rules 2012 were promulgated to have control over manufacture, conversion, stevedoring, bagging,

the manufacturers. Hence, the manufacturers and their dealers are required to maintain an accurate record of the purchasers. But there is always a scope for manipulation and pilferage of AN based fertilizers.

Taking into account the present-day situation, setting up a National Explosives Control Bureau

import, export, transport, possession for sale or use.

The Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO) is the body which regulates the explosives in India. Experts point out that though these laws deal with the procurement of the explosives, there is a huge lacuna when it comes to dealing with new-age explosives. Under the AN Rules, assessment of the security provision is the responsibility of the district authorities concerned. At the time of applying for a license, a person intending to manufacture, convert, stevedore, bag, possess for sale or use, transport, import or export AN shall submit a Safety and Security Management Plan to the licensing authority and to the District Authority with the security aspect duly vetted by the police authorities for approval.

The supply of fertilizers to farmers is subsidised by the government, the subsidy paid directly to

Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer. Source: Triveni Chemicals. counteriedreport.com

67

EXPLOSIVES REGULATIONS

(NECB) and permitting the states to enact stringent laws is the need of the hour and it’s high time the government acts on such recommendations. The NECB is India’s best shot at countering terror.

Apart from a team of experts, the bureau should comprise an intelligence wing. Moreover, statistics on all explosive materials should be recorded.

Create a network, which enables the NECB to keep a track on individuals purchasing or selling explosive material, and on movement of explosives in and out of the country. Experts point out that most terror strikes are investigated by the police. But as they try to zero in on the origin of the material used in the blast, they waste a lot of time. This proves fatal to the investigations and before one case is cracked, terror strikes again.

CONCLUSION In a large country like India, it has not been possible that the supply of explosives and the precursors could be regulated effectively. More so when large quantities of precursors are used in agriculture throughout the country. The laws have to be rewritten to cater for the present environment. ■

AN Fertilizer for Agriculture. Source: IFFCO, India.

68 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Colonel H R Naidu Gade - Indian Army Veteran [B E (Civil), M Sc (Defence Studies), M B A (HR)] Commissioned in to the Corps of Combat Engineers.

A Civil Engineer, and Security Professional, with 45 years of rich experience in the field of Combat Engineering, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNe) Defence, Security and Disaster Management and Counter- IED Operations. Is a qualified CBRN and Counter-IED Professional.

Is a former Member International Civil Service while working as Chief CW Inspector 1997-2004 with the ‘Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)’, The Netherlands, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2013. Led teams of international professionals on many verification missions to various member countries, to verify the inventory of Chemical Weapons and monitor their destruction.

Presently, Chief Consultant with ‘CBRNe Secure India’ a ‘forum and a knowledge centre’ for bringing awareness in the general public, government and security entities on the threats arising from the use of CBRNe material and their disastrous consequences A prolific writer and speaker, participated in various international and domestic conferences on CBRN Security, Disaster Management and Counter Explosive Issues and writes articles for professional journals worldwide on these subjects.

WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES

USE OF WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES IN MEXICAN CRIME WAR

By Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and David A. Kuhn, Small Wars Journal-El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC © Copyright 2020-2021

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ACKGROUNDER

The Mexican cartels have engaged in a three-phase evolutionary process of aerial narcotics trafficking, along the US Southern border, progressing from conventional aircraft (both converted airliners and light aircraft) to ultralight aircraft to drones [e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAVs/UAS)]. This process has been prompted by increased US homeland security activities over the course of a number of decades. The cartels are said to have been using drones for such crossborder narcotics trafficking purposes since at least 2010. Between 2012 and 2014, about 150 confirmed cartel drone incursions were documented by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Later, during the 2015 through 2020 period, over another 170 confirmed incidents have taken place per US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters. No publicly available data sets have been released, however, to validate either of these numbers. Further, some captured drones used in smuggling have been determined (per their internal data) to have engaged in hundreds of flights on their own. This has been juxtaposed with actual drone incident data – imagery and text – available in the open press and social media which is relatively sparse and sporadic in nature.

In April 2019, the validated use of a cartel drone for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) took place in multiple locations along the El Paso sector of the border to facilitate illegal migrant entry into the US. The cartels engage in human smuggling both independently and simultaneously (by means of the migrants carrying loads on their backs) with narcotics trafficking. Cartel drone ISR use along and over the border to facilitate narcotics trafficking had previously been reported but was not before confirmed by means of a specific referenced incident. While the cartels have roughly a decade of experience with using hobbyist and consumer drones for cross-border narcotics trafficking, and later load decoy and even ISR purposes, the use of drones as weapons is a much more emergent and ominous occurrence. It is indicative of a broadening of drone usage from solely ‘illicit business purposes’ to ‘military combat capacity’ in some of the cartels’ repertoires.

WEAPONIZED DRONE INCIDENTS To date, four weaponized consumer drone incidents linked to the cartels have been evident in Mexico roughly over the last three years or so:

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Image 1: 3DR Solo Quadcopter with IED and Remote Detonation Switch (Side View).

Source: “Interceptan ¡dron bomba!” AM. 20 October 2017.

Incident No. 1 — Near Valtierrilla, Guanajuato (20 October 2017) This significant incident represents the crossing of a Mexican cartel technology and TTP (tactic, technique,

seized. An AK-47 variant assault rifle, two magazines, thirteen 7.62mm bullets, three smart phones, one texting phone, and three black caps (1 with Guanajuato on it) were also recovered.

and procedure) use firebreak, with drone/UAV/ UAS ‘weaponization’ now taking place. It suggests additional cause for heightened concern related to the evolving Mexican cartel security environment. The IED found with the drone is consistent with recent papas bombas (potato bombs) employment by the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).

Who: Four individuals (Public Ministry IDs: Christian N., Angel N., Eduardo, N., and Marcos, N.) were arrested by Mexican Federal Police/Policía Federal (PF) in a stolen vehicle in what would be equivalent to a ‘felony’ or ‘high-risk’ stop in the United States. CJNG links (probable).

What: In the back of the stolen vehicle, inside the hatchback/rear cargo area, a 3DR Solo Quadcopter in an open case with an IED (‘Papa Bomba’) attached to it with a sling rope and a remote RF detonator was

When: The stolen vehicle was pulled over at dawn

by Federal Police on Friday 20 October 2017.

Where: Near the community of Valtierrilla, along the Salamanca-Moreila highway, in the state of Guanajuato which is about 304 km (189 miles) northwest of Mexico City via roadways.

Why: A weaponized drone/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)/unmanned aerial system (UAS) with a remotely detonated IED allows for a precision strike to take place against an intended target. This form of IED can be utilized against a point target for assassination purposes or against an area target – such as a grouping of individuals – for anti-personnel purposes. In addition to using such a drone/UAS for assassination or tactical action purposes, it also offers ‘narco terrorism’ and/or ‘narco insurgency’ potentials depending on the intent of its use.

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Image 2: Close Up of Attacking Tarot Ironman Drone; Tactical Note Forensic Notations (Green Blanket – Post-Crash Placement – Probable Video Camera Feed Obscurement; 1st IED taped on the left-side; 2nd IED taped on the right-side; White Tube also taped to drone). IEDs Taped to Frame and Analysis with M-67 Fragmentation Grenade Identification.

Original Photographic Source: Courtesy of Zeta.

Incident No. 2 — Tecate, Baja (10 July 2018) While the intent of the attackers is unknown at this time (SEDENA, the SSPE, and PEP have not disclosed the identity of the suspected criminal organization pending further investigation), it is highly probable that the attack was a demonstration of intent or a warning to the SSPE secretary as seen in the CJNG warning to the Tecate police director in late June 2017.

Who: The attack was conducted by a criminal organization – a Mexican cartel – with the ability and willingness to engage in a tactical action in the

contested Tecate segment of the Tijuana plaza against the senior ranking state law enforcement official. The dominant cartels operating in Baja California state are Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS) and remnants of the Tijuana Cartel/Cártel Arellano Félix (CAF) or ArellanoFélix Organization (AFO) which are in the process of reforming under the banner of the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) as the Cártel de Tijuana Nueva Generación (CTNG). Considering past patterns of violence in the Tecate area and the broader Tijuana plaza as well as in Baja California itself, this counteriedreport.com

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attack has a signature consistent with prior CTNG/ CJNG activity and can likely be attributed to a CTNG/ CJNG operational cell.

What: A weaponized drone attack targeting the residence (known as “La Quinta Marina”) of the public safety secretary of Baja California (Secretario de Seguridad Pública Estalal–SSPE) Gerardo Sosa Olachea. This is the first recorded incident in Mexico in which a weaponized cartel drone has both been used (a) offensively and (b) in a coordinated manner with a second mission support drone.

When: The attack took place at 0700-0730 on Tuesday 10 July 2018. The attack was timed while the Baja California public safety secretary was leaving his residence and getting into his vehicle in order to later meet with the new US Consul in Tijuana. According to the Editor-in-Chief of Zeta (the Tijuana news magazine), the timing of attack was closer to 0740.

The fact the public safety secretary was even at home at this time is in direct variance to an official Mexican

governmental release that said the secretary was not a home at the time of the incident and actually lives in Mexicali (some 68.7 miles away).

Where: The residence of the Secretario de Seguridad Pública Estalal (SSPE) of Baja California located in Tecate, Baja California, Mexico in the Colonia Los Laureles subdivision and is well known to the local residents. This border city is 23.7 miles east of Tijuana in the San Diego-Tijuana metropolitan area and has a present population of approximately 75,000.

Why: Based on an ongoing pattern of earlier threats directed at lower level police officials by organized crime – specifically the CTNG/CJNG alliance – and the inoperability (render safe procedures) of the IEDs carried on the attacking drone, this incident can be viewed as a threat, a communication or ‘threat escalation’ meant to intimidate the public safety secretary of Baja California, rather than an actual attack (or attack dry run) in which mission failure took place.

Image 3: Analysis with Imaging for MK-2 Grenade Identification.

Original Photographic Source: Courtesy of Zeta.

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Incident No. 3 — San Andrés Cholula, Puebla (25-26 April 2020)

Incident No. 4 — Tepalcatepec, Michoacán (25 July 2020)

Mexican federal authorities raided three residences in San Andrés Cholula, Puebla state on 25-26 April 2020 resulting from an anonymous tip. Those individuals targeted in the raids – who were not reported to have been captured – were suspected of being linked to recent organized crime bombings in Guanajuato state that have included both improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and crude anti-personnel car bombs (i.e. VBIEDs) used primarily to ward off Federal agents rather than killing or injuring them. An operational cell of one of the perpetrators of those incidents – the Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) – is suspected as being the target of these raids.

Who: Organized crime members – likely a Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) cell but no official announcement from the Fiscalía General de la República (FGR) has been released.

What: Three drones, two controllers, explosives (C4, gunpowder, and mortar bomb fireworks known as ‘chrysanthemums’), seven cell phones, fifty-three SIM cards, three radio communications sets, integrated circuit boards, wiring, documents, two firearms, and ammunition were seized. No detainees were reported as being arrested in the raids.

A weaponized drone a Mavic 2 Zoom quadcopter with an IED payload – was found in a field full of stacks of tires by El grupo de autodefensa en Tepalcatepec forces (a self-defense group) in Tepalcatepec, Michoacán. This resulted in their then discovering an abandoned armored vehicle belonging to Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) operatives. Within that vehicle, a bloody cardboard box containing another Mavic 2 Zoom quadcopter and three more ‘IED payloads’ consisting of clear plastic boxes containing apparent C4 explosives and industrial ball bearings (functioning as shrapnel) was secured. Apparently, the CJNG operatives were involved in an attack upon competing Carteles Unidos (United Cartels) personnel but it is surmised that they were forced to abandon their mission due to their injuries and/or vehicular inoperability.

Who: Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).

What: Weaponized commercial off-the-shelf drone; Mavic 2 Zoom, allegedly armed with C4 (or similar type) explosives and ball bearing type projectiles in

When: 25-26 April (Saturday and Sunday) 2020.

Where: Three addresses in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, Puebla, Mexico were raided.

Why: Searches and seizures were conducted by the Fiscalía General de la República (FGR; Attorney General) along with the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA; Army) as part of an ongoing investigation. These operations were linked to investigations related to earlier bombing attacks in Guanajuato state with the raid of the ‘terrorist Image 4: 2x DJI Inspire, 1x DJI Phantom 2 drones with circuit board retrofits. arsenal’ seized resulting from an Source: Fiscalía General de la República, FGR México (@FGRMexico), Twitter. 3 May 2020, https://twitter.com/FGRMexico/status/1257016365287911426/photo/1 anonymous tip. counteriedreport.com

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Image 5: Five 4-inch professional fireworks mortar shells. Source: Fiscalía General de la República, FGR México (@FGRMexico), Twitter. 3 May 2020, https://twitter.com/FGRMexico/status/1257016365287911426/photo/2

plastic containers attached to the drones with duct tape. Two drones and four IED payloads in plastic containers were recovered.

While the cartels – primarily CJNG – have been experimenting with weaponized drones for a little over three years, little proliferation has yet taken

When: Saturday, 25 July 2020.

Where: Tepalcatepec, Michoacán (Tierra Caliente), Mexico.

Why: Aerial assault; attempted attack on rival cartel.

place among other organized crime groups except for CSRL in Mexico. Still, we may be eventually reaching a tipping point where these systems at some point become institutionalized in CJNG operations. What the immediate future holds for weaponized drone use in the criminal insurgencies taking place in Mexico is unknown. However, the expectation is that, over the longer term, such use will potentially become more pronounced and sophisticated in its operational applications as follows: • This application would be similar to Islamic State weaponized drone TTPs transitioning from single use drones – in which the IED attached to the drone destroyed it as the IED detonated near the intended target – to multiuse drones – whereby the IED was dropped by the drone from a standoff distance above the intended target and then

FUTURE POTENTIALS As highlighted above, the fourth weaponized drone incident once again witnessed CJNG revisiting this technology (See Annex, Table 1). In this instance, the attack was aborted, unlike earlier incidents which saw these systems utilized for direct (yet symbolic) attack purposes and were twice interdicted in raids and highrisk warrant stops. In all of these incidents easy to fly commercial quadcopters have been involved with varying IED payloads – C4 and shrapnel, mortar shell fireworks, fragmentation grenades, and ‘papa bombas’ – being utilized.

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Image 6: Payload attached to Mavic 2 Zoom‘s fuselage. Source: La Silla Rota, used with permission. detonated. Such a capability would be derived from an IED release mechanism (servos and RF receiver) placed on the drone and retrofitted IEDs – likely 40mm grenades with attached

commercial drone’s onboard video camera capability, with the Islamic State best exploiting this TTP. • This application is derived from combined arms

tail assemblies and fusing/safety overrides for impact detonation – to allow for gravity-based bombardment.

• This application leverages the power of social media for propaganda purposes by videotaping a weaponized drone attack and then streaming that event on the internet. To date, the cartels have only streamed the passing out of COVID-19 humanitarian aid to local villagers derived from an overhead drone video (April 2020, Tecalitlán, CJNG) but earlier released a first-person shooter video via a headcam of a raid on an opposing cartel’s safe house (Feb 2019, Valle de Santiago, CRSL vs. CJNG) as they have begun to migrate towards such a capability. From the mid-2010s, jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq frequently videotaped drone bombardment attacks utilizing

integration such as ground units – a cartel commando composed of armored vehicles (retrofitted pickup trucks and SUVs) with mounted machine guns and sicarios (assassins) wearing body armor, tactical vests, and carrying infantry small arms – attacking in coordination with one or more weaponized drones. This is foreseen as a more futures-oriented application with a higher barrier to entry than a cartel utilizing a drone for ISR and/or propaganda (via streaming imagery) purposes in support of a ground attack. The barrier to use stems from utility – the ISR function would have greater ground combat use value in the cartel commando scenario – as well as requiring more complex coordination requirements which even the Islamic State shied away from in their operational approach. counteriedreport.com

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Still, what remains an enigma is the lack of Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS) and Los Zetas and Cártel del Golfo (CDG) remnants interest in fielding weaponized drones, instead yielding this emergent capability primarily to the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. While the CDS may be avoiding such deployment for strategic considerations – in order to not further antagonize the Mexican and US Federal governments – the Zetas

and CDG have in the past been highly adaptive operationally. This begs the question of whether CJNG has indeed become the most operationally sophisticated cartel in Mexico. Increasingly, this can be witnessed by its weaponized drone use as well as a host of other activities including its ability to rapidly project ground combat formations in the crime wars conflict zones through broad regions of that country. ■

ANNEX Date

Cartel

Location

Weaponized Drone(s)

Incident

20 October 2017

CJNG

Near Valtierrilla, Guanajuato

1x 3DR Solo; 1x IED ‘Papa Bomba’

High-Risk Vehicle Stop Conducted

by Federal Police

10 July 2018

CJNG (CTNG Affiliate)

Tecate, Baja

1x Tarot Ironman, 1x M-67 fragmentation grenade (or a foreign copy), 1x Chilean MK2; 1x ISR Drone (Unknown Model)

Direct Attack Against Mexican Official for Threat Messaging Purposes (Live Grenades/Safety Pins in Place)

25-26 April 2020

CSRL

San Andrés Cholula, Puebla

2x DJI Inspire, 1x DJI Phantom 2; 5x 4-inch professional fireworks mortar shells; C4 Reported

Raid by Mexican Federal Authorities on CSRL Safe House

25 July 2020

CJNG

Tepalcatepec, Michoacán

2x Mavic 2 Zoom; 4x IED Payloads (C4 & Ball Bearings)

Aborted Attack Against Carteles Unidos

Table 1: Cartel Weaponized Drone Incidents in Mexico.

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REFERENCES Incident overviews were directly drawn from the following tactical notes: Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, David A. Kuhn, and Alma Keshavarz, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #46: Weaponized Drones (Aerial Improvised Explosive Devices)

Deployed

by

CJNG

in

Tepalcatepec,

Michoacán.” Small Wars Journal. 5 October 2020.

David A. Kuhn, Robert J. Bunker, and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #45: Drones and Explosives Seized in Puebla, Mexico by Fiscalía General de la República (FGR) and Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA).” Small Wars Journal. 21 May 2020.

John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #38: Armed Drone Targets the Baja California Public Safety Secretary’s Residence in Tecate, Mexico.” Small Wars Journal. 6 August 2018.

Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #35: Seized

in

Weaponized Drone/UAV/UAS

Valtierrilla,

Guanajuato

government, and political science and has trained extensively in counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

He has delivered hundreds of presentations – including U.S. congressional testimony – with well over 500 publications across various fields and formats.

Email: docbunker@cofutures.net

with

Remote

Detonation IED (‘Papa Bomba’) Payload.” Small Wars Journal. 23 October 2017.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro and the Director of Research and Analysis of C/O Futures, LLC (https://www.cofutures.net).

An international security and counterterrorism professional, he was Futurist in Residence at the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, VA, Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and has taught at Claremont Graduate University, the University of Southern California, and other universities. Dr. Bunker holds degrees in the fields of history, anthropologygeography, social science, behavioral science,

Dr. John P. Sullivan is a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro and an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC. He was a career police officer and an honorably retired lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, specializing in emergency operations, transit policing, counterterrorism, CBRN response, and intelligence. He is an instructor with the USC Price Safe Communities Institute and has a research focus on the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries. Dr. Sullivan holds a B.A. in Government, M.A. in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis, and a Ph.D. in Information and Knowledge Society. He has hundreds of publications and numerous books published as co-author and coeditor.

David A. Kuhn is frequent Small Wars Journal-El Centro contributor and an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC. He is a subject matter expert in analysis, technical instruction, and terrorism response training related to stand off weaponry (MANPADS, threat, interdiction, aircraft survivability, et. al), infantry weapons, small arms, IED/VBIEDs, WMD, and other threat and allied use technologies. He is presently the principal of VTAC Training Solutions and has a career of supporting governmental operations and corporate initiatives in the fields of homeland security, vulnerability assessment, technical operations, and project management, with additional focus and expertise in areas involving facility threat/risk assessments, underwater operations, and varied engineering technologies. counteriedreport.com

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TÜYAP FAIR CONVENTION AND CONGRESS CENTER Büyükçekmece, ‹stanbul / Turkey

BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

PALESTINIAN BALLOON-BORNE IED PROGRESSION

By Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash, Terrogence Senior CIED Analyst / Author of Mobius reports

D

uring August 2020, terrorist activity resumed along the Gaza border targeting towns in the south of Israel. 25 rockets were fired and dozens of balloon-borne IIDs and IEDs were released toward Israel.

The balloon-borne IIDs comprise small incendiary charges, most fitted with some kind of delay mechanisms, some recycled tear gas and stun grenades, filled with incendiary materials.

The recent balloon-borne IEDs released toward Israel were notable for their fragmentation components, some of which were recycled, others improvised, including IEDs dropped from the air that explode upon impact with the ground, and others that initiated at the conclusion of the delay element, either on the ground, or while still airborne, over populated areas.

On the evening of August 25, 2020, two explosions occurred as a result of balloon-borne IED initiations in the city of Netivot, in southern Israel.

The first initiated in an outdoor basketball court near where some children were playing. The point of explosion of a small IED was documented where the IED initiated.

The other IED initiated a few minutes later at a ceramics factory in the city. The IED initiation was recorded on CCTV, in which a small combustion (probably from the delay fuse) can be seen, followed by an explosion, from which a small crater was formed.

Remains of an IID fitted with an electrical delay mechanism, Kiryat Gat, August 21, 2020. counteriedreport.com

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Similar balloon-borne IID fashioned from a recycled grenade, fitted with a rotating striker fusing mechanism and a pyrotechnic delay fuse, Gan Yavne.

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BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

August 8, 2020 - attached IED fashioned from an improvised mortar round with added fragmentation.

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BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

The components of the IED after it was neutralized – improvised detonator with an adapter, and metal ball fragmentation.

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The basketball court where the balloon-borne IED initiated, Netivot, August 25, 2020.

Close-up look at the crater formed by the blast. counteriedreport.com

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BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

CCTV documentation of the explosion at the ceramics factory.

Point of explosion.

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BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

The release of balloon-borne IEDs and IIDs from the Gaza Strip toward the south of Israel is an attack TTP that has been ongoing since May 2018, and continues intermittently to this day. In the past, when the TTP incorporated incendiary balloons released to create fires, this was considered a mere “nuisance” that only damaged property, a kind of terrorist attack “tolerated” by the Israeli government that did not warrant an aggressive or harsh response from the Israeli government.

Testaments from residents of southern Israeli cities about explosions taking place above the

cities indicates larger numbers of balloon-borne IEDs have recently been released toward southern Israeli communities, most of which initiated while still attached to the balloons and before they landed.

The IEDs are fashioned from standard weaponry items, such as grenade bodies or mortar rounds, or various improvised casings. Most are connected to delay initiation mechanisms, mainly pyrotechnic systems with long delay elements at the end of which, burn fuse connected directly to a detonator is ignited.

Improvised fragmentation grenades with burn fuse. counteriedreport.com

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Assorted IEDs, including a mortar round, PG-2 warhead, and improvised casings, all fitted with burn fuse.

Assorted IEDs. 86 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

IED components.

Some of the different IEDs designed for delivery via balloons are fitted with a rotating striker mechanism.

Rotating striker mechanism connected to a pyrotechnic delay fuse. counteriedreport.com

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Rotating striker mechanism connected to a pyrotechnic delay fuse.

Rotating striker mechanisms were previously documented serving as a source for impact fuses for IEDs released from balloons. In the passing year, 88 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

we have detected the local production of improvised impact fuses similar to the improvised impact fuses used with rockets in the past.

BALLOON-BORNE IEDs

Impact-initiated IEDs, Gaza Strip, November 2019.

Recently, fragmentation IEDs resembling Claymoretype IEDs have been documented attached to balloons.

These are also fitted with pyrotechnic delay fuses.

These IEDs, containing directional fragmentation,

pose a high risk when initiated from height above a populated urban area, as the fragmentation is dispersed downward.

Balloon-borne Claymore-type IED ready for release toward Israel. counteriedreport.com

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Claymore-type IED connected to the bunch of balloons; fragmentation facing downward.

Claymore-type IED showing the delay element, prior to being released attached to a bunch of balloons, Gaza Strip, August 19, 2020.

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The balloon-borne IEDs and IIDs utilize the forces of nature to transport their explosive/incendiary payloads to Israel. The balloons are generally released around midday, taking advantage of the prevailing winds blowing from west to east that move inland from the Mediterranean Sea at noon. The balloon-borne IID phenomenon was first introduced in the summer months, when the fields were dry and the potential for setting fires was high, while in the rainy winter days, no attempts were made to launch any balloons.

Similar to the progression of their rocket attacks, the Gazan terrorist groups are developing other types of attacks employed against Israel, cleverly blurring the red line for an Israeli response by subtly promoting a complacency strategy. At first, their rockets were small and short-range, and were considered by Israeli statesmen “as flying pieces of metal” that caused little or no damage. Later, as the ranges and quantity of explosives in the warheads increased, as long as the rockets landed in open areas and there were no casualties, there was no response to the attacks, until the quantities and size of the weapons became a serious threat to populated areas in the country.

Similar to the rockets, at first, the balloon-borne IIDs were considered a “nuisance” weapon employed between spring until early winter that caused only fire damage, with no loss of life. In keeping with the abovementioned complacency strategy, the transition to balloon-borne IEDs was merely a matter of time. The first balloon-borne IEDs contained no fragmentation and did not cause serious damage or loss of life.

This evolution to balloon-borne fragmentation IEDs, some initiated from the air over populated areas, with others landing in cities or towns before initiating at the conclusion of the delay element indicates a progressive and advanced stage in both the ability to perpetrate the attack in any season, and to cause casualties among the population.

In our estimation, it is only a matter of time until there are fatalities in the next round of balloon-borne IED attacks, based on the progression of the IED development, especially the Claymore-type IEDs rigged to explode over populated areas, which will lead to a severe military response against this phenomenon. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Chief Superintendent (ret.)

Michael Cardash, Senior bomb technician and former deputy head of the Israeli police bomb disposal division, commanded bomb disposal units within the border guards and police during intense terrorist conflicts in Israel. Michael currently is the senior CIED analyst at Terrogence, researches IED’s and authors the Terrogence Möbius C-IED reports analyzing and assessing global IEDrelated technical and tactical intelligence. counteriedreport.com

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IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

Figure 1: Paul Cornu´s “Helicoplane”, 1907. (Source – https://www.jetfly.hu/regi-jetfly/4248-szazeves-a-helikopteres-repules).

“KILLING ROTARIES”, IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “Flight is just a fall that never reaches the ground.“ (Neil Hilborn, in his book “Our Numbered Days”, first published in 2015.)

F

rom the first human (Paul Cornu) reported as flying in a helicopter (his “Helicoplane”) in November 1907 , these kinds of flying vehicles have captured the attention of the Military.

Accordingly, and although the firstly developed and officially issued military rotorcrafts were licensed copies of the “Cierva C30A1” model (e.g. those versions produced by Avro), both the Focke-Achgelis Fa 223 “Drache” V11 and Sikorsky YR-4B were the first military helicopters used in combat for search and rescue missions in 1944.

In addition to initial crew rescue missions, the helicopters were progressively getting used for additional tasks. Rotorcrafts conducted observation-surveillance-

reconnaissance, casualty/medical evacuation, troop transportation, logistic movement of supplies, air assault, communications support, airborne command center role, combat missions as aerial weapon platforms (e.g. close air support, minelaying, anti-tank, anti-submarine, air-toair combat, bombing…), escort, psychological operations, vehicle recovery, boat towing, non-combatant evacuation, mine sweeping, resupply, crop contamination (e.g. in counter insurgency), electronic warfare, humanitarian aid, and even firefighting support…

In parallel with the military use of helicopters, researchers and industry were designing and developing different ways of trying to deny the use of helicopters by the enemy.

1 It was the development of a1920s invention (“Autogiro”) by Juan de la Cierva y Codorníu, who was a Spanish civil engineer, pilot and aeronautical engineer.

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IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

As every advantage has its tax, every means has its threat…

So traditionally, we could identify several methods which have been planned and/or utilized for countering helicopters (or denying their tactical use) as follows: • Small arms fire (SAF).

• Heavy machine guns (HMG).

• Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).

• Ground-to-air rockets.

• Rocket propelled grenades (RPG).

• Artillery rockets and mortars (when helicopter has landed).

• Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW).

• Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

• Armed helicopters.

• Fighter aircraft.

• Infra-red-guided and radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

• Landmines.

• Improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

• Wires, traps and other obstacles.

• Laser weapons.

• Radio frequency directed-energy weapons.

• Contaminated areas.

• Arson…

“Archerfish style”; improvised tactics, techniques and procedures against rotary-wing vehicles Despite some previous and limited use of helicopters in combat, the Korean War (1950-53) was the first conflict to use helicopters on a large scale, mainly in the medical evacuation role. Later, during the Algerian War, French forces were utilizing helicopters in the air assault role, and as weaponized means to suppress ground fire.

Threat Small arms and AAA Fighter aircraft (MIGs) SAMs Destroyed on the ground (attacks on helicopter bases)

Figure 2: British “Z-battery” anti-aircraft rocket system, 1942.

(Source – https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/11/ a4432411.shtml).

The most revealing historical records about helicopter combat losses were made during the Vietnam War (1955-1975), as follows:

Number of helicopters lost 2373 2 7 205

Figure 3: US helicopter combat losses in Vietnam by threat category 1962-1973. (Source – Everett-Heath 1992, Dunstan 2003).

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IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

Figure 4: Counter-helicopter traps used by Vietcong during Vietnam War. (Sources – https://www.tienphong.vn/hanh-trang-nguoi-linh/vu-khi-tu-che-loi-hai-trong-hai-cuoc-khang-chien-801924.tpo & http://slaphead.blog.fc2.com/blog-category-12.html)

For sure, small arms, rocket propelled grenades and air defense artillery achieved the highest number of “chopper” neutralizations in Vietnam, the Vietcong took note of the limited number of potential landing zones

estimated landing zones. Those landmines were equipped with improvised friction fuzes (instead of the usual wire-connected electric one), which could be moved by a couple of folding wings (see figure No 5)

(LZ) in the jungle. Accordingly, the first anti-helicopter tactics consisted in booby-trapping LZs, mostly based on trip wires crossing it connected to fuzes (and those to ordnance and/or explosive charges) andactivated by poles loosely pushed into the ground (which would be moved by the rotor wash).

There was another timely successful technique against helicopters called “hover hole” by crews; it consisted of Vietcong cutting the tall trees in a certain area. But clearance was made in such a diameter, not leaving too much space for the helicopter to maneuver inside in order to avoid any threat or just react against it… that site would be ideal for explosive trapping and/ or ambushes.

Other imaginative solutions were adopted for North Vietnamese DH-10 directional fragmentation landmines: they were hung from the top of trees in

or just through wires connected to tree/bush branches, which were effectively moved by the powerful wind produced by helicopter’s rotors…

Rocket propelled grenades are a real threat to helicopters, especially when they are hovering or just grounded; it was demonstrated firstly in Afghanistan, and then in Mogadishu (Somalia) against US rotarywing means in 1993.

The Afghanistan theatre of operations has traditionally been another challenge for a safe helicopter use in combat, firstly for Soviet forces (about 500 helicopters are estimated have been lost 19791989), and then against Coalition means.

Although MANPADs (e.g. “STINGER”) were an effective Mujahidin weapon against Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan, there are several reports about further use of wire-tethered kites (that sport is quite popular counteriedreport.com

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IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

Figure 5: DH-10 directional fragmentation mine fitted with anti-helicopter fuze. (Source – https://vimeo.com/454467673) there), and even metallic wires mounted on buildings and rooftops. The use of wires/cords in an area would logically deny helicopter landing, but the potential use of wire-tethered barrage balloons (or something more simple and less big/high than those) could be

some kind of real threat to low-level flying (remember the Second World War), especially if connected to explosive charges…

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU “Badr al-Tawhid”), an Uzbek Al Qaeda-linked jihadist group, released a video

Figure 6: Capture from a video published by Islamic Jihad Union showing a weapon reported as anti-helicopter mine, July 2013. (Source – https://ia801902.us.archive.org/30/items/neromantika/neromantika-jihada-badr-tawhid-1434_1500kb.mp4) 96 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

in 2013 with a summary of their operations against Afghan government and Coalition forces in Paktia province; it shows a prototype on an anti-helicopter landmine.

After the utilization of mortar and rocket fires in Vietnam and Afghanistan trying to hit helicopters in landing zones, their use has been reported against Coalition airbases in Iraq to specifically target that kind of aerial vehicle; as the reader most probably knows, attacks with 107 mm rockets shot from improvised launchers are currently quite usual in Baghdad and Bagram.

Unfortunately, it was no accident with the targeting with previously planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against MEDEVAC (Medical Evacuation) helicopters when trying to recover casualties after a complex attack in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Apart from the laying of anti-personnel/anti-tank/ fragmentation landmines in potential (or already

known) landing zones, the specific design for military anti-helicopter landmines (based on infra-red, acoustic and/or radio-frequency radar sensors) has been more or less copied by non-state actors in Iraq. It was done by the use of manipulated radio-frequency proximity fuses from anti-aircraft or artillery munitions as firing switches, in connection to fragmentation charges, along known flight paths.

Although anti-aircraft missiles against helicopters could not be considered as any kind of improvised means or techniques, the current lack of thermal batteries for already available Russian firstgeneration models of infra-red-based passive guidance MANPADs (SA-7/SA-7B or 9K32/9K32M “Strela-2/2M”) is forcing threat networks to find improvised solutions for power sources, so improvised batteries2 …

More recently, we could identify new trends against helicopters in Syrian territory, as they are some sort

Figure 7: Improvised rocket launcher used to counter low-level flight close the Menagh military airport, Aleppo, Syria 2013.

(Source – https://shusharmor.livejournal.com/851147.html) 2 Read “POWERING THE THREAT: IMPROVISED BATTERIES FOR PORTABLE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES” article in Counter-IED Report Winter 2016/17 (https://bit.ly/2KMNCoJ)

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IMPROVISED THREAT AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AGAINST HELICOPTERS

of multiple launchers of improvised rockets equipped pick-up vehicles, aiming to “saturate” aerial space, which is used by low-altitude attack helicopters.

Nonetheless, the respective helicopter crews would always consider any kind of detonation in ground near a flying path as a high threat. That is not only due to the potential direct damage to the aerial vehicle but to the suddenly critical production/expansion of gases near the surface able to affect the flight dynamics, when not causing brusque manoeuvre by the pilot. Accordingly, every IED detonated close to any helicopter is extremely dangerous to such a vulnerable aerial platform.

The easy access to powerful laser devices (blinding!) and pyrotechnics, as flares or fireworks, could provide non-state actors with a way to seriously disturb/affect helicopter flights.

In addition to previous content, the currently fashionable use of commercial-off-the-shell (COTS) drones or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is always a potential source of bad ideas against helicopters, both with or without explosive load/fragmentation, for any threat network’s member… who else!

Helicopters and explosives… it would never be a nice pairing!

In fact, helicopters have evidenced to be quite an effective support to counter-insurgency/guerilla operations, so they could be estimated as a serious opponent to threat networks’ interests.

On the other hand, the use of improvised devices and/or improvised techniques, tactics and procedures is nothing really new, but the high-value and relative vulnerability of helicopters during hovering, landing or take off processes is making the attack on them to be a very cost-effective one.

The use of improvised devices or procedures is not only a potential threat against helicopters in areas of operations, but it is something to protect against in urban and rural areas, so regarding homeland security.

Just compare the relative flying speeds/heights of an airplane and a helicopter when approaching or leaving the airport/heliport; you will evidence some difference in their respective vulnerabilities…■

“Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.3” (Credited to Accursius of Bologna in the 13th Century)

Disclaimer This article would never represent the opinion of any national or multinational organization, so its whole content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. As the whole information has been obtained from open sources, potential mistakes could have been made during the research process. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections and inputs to the author; it would always be highly appreciated.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016, and currently holding a post of Chief of Attack the Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his background has been mainly based on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and other C-IED courses. His operational assignments include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3), Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda.

Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

3 Translatable as “For whosoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to the sky and down to the depths”, it refers to a Roman legal principle of property law.

98 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2020/21

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