USE OF WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES IN MEXICAN CRIME WAR By Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and David A. Kuhn, Small Wars Journal-El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC

USE OF WEAPONIZED CONSUMER DRONES IN MEXICAN CRIME WAR

By Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and David A. Kuhn, Small Wars Journal-El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC

© Copyright 2020-2021

BACKGROUNDER

The Mexican cartels have engaged in a three-phase In April 2019, the validated use of a cartel drone for evolutionary process of aerial narcotics trafficking, along ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) the US Southern border, progressing from conventional took place in multiple locations along the El Paso aircraft (both converted airliners and light aircraft) sector of the border to facilitate illegal migrant entry into to ultralight aircraft to drones [e.g. unmanned aerial the US. The cartels engage in human smuggling both vehicles/systems (UAVs/UAS)]. This process has been independently and simultaneously (by means of the prompted by increased US homeland security activities migrants carrying loads on their backs) with narcotics over the course of a number of decades. The cartels trafficking. Cartel drone ISR use along and over the are said to have been using drones for such cross- border to facilitate narcotics trafficking had previously border narcotics trafficking purposes since at least been reported but was not before confirmed by means 2010. Between 2012 and 2014, about 150 confirmed of a specific referenced incident. While the cartels have cartel drone incursions were documented by the Drug roughly a decade of experience with using hobbyist and Enforcement Administration (DEA). Later, during the consumer drones for cross-border narcotics trafficking, 2015 through 2020 period, over another 170 confirmed and later load decoy and even ISR purposes, the use incidents have taken place per US Customs and Border of drones as weapons is a much more emergent and Protection (CBP) headquarters. No publicly available ominous occurrence. It is indicative of a broadening data sets have been released, however, to validate of drone usage from solely ‘illicit business purposes’ either of these numbers. Further, some captured drones to ‘military combat capacity’ in some of the cartels’ used in smuggling have been determined (per their repertoires. internal data) to have engaged in hundreds of flights on their own. This has been juxtaposed with actual drone incident data – imagery and text – available in the open press and social media which is relatively sparse and sporadic in nature.

WEAPONIZED DRONE INCIDENTS

To date, four weaponized consumer drone incidents linked to the cartels have been evident in Mexico roughly over the last three years or so:

Image 1: 3DR Solo Quadcopter with IED and Remote Detonation Switch (Side View).

Source: “Interceptan ¡dron bomba!” AM. 20 October 2017.

Incident No. 1 — Near Valtierrilla, Guanajuato (20 October 2017)

This significant incident represents the crossing of a Mexican cartel technology and TTP (tactic, technique, and procedure) use firebreak, with drone/UAV/ UAS ‘weaponization’ now taking place. It suggests additional cause for heightened concern related to the evolving Mexican cartel security environment. The IED found with the drone is consistent with recent papas bombas (potato bombs) employment by the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).

Who: Four individuals (Public Ministry IDs: Christian N., Angel N., Eduardo, N., and Marcos, N.) were arrested by Mexican Federal Police/Policía Federal (PF) in a stolen vehicle in what would be equivalent to a ‘felony’ or ‘high-risk’ stop in the United States. CJNG links (probable).

What: In the back of the stolen vehicle, inside the hatchback/rear cargo area, a 3DR Solo Quadcopter in an open case with an IED (‘Papa Bomba’) attached to it with a sling rope and a remote RF detonator was seized. An AK-47 variant assault rifle, two magazines, thirteen 7.62mm bullets, three smart phones, one texting phone, and three black caps (1 with Guanajuato on it) were also recovered.

When: The stolen vehicle was pulled over at dawn by Federal Police on Friday 20 October 2017.

Where: Near the community of Valtierrilla, along the Salamanca-Moreila highway, in the state of Guanajuato which is about 304 km (189 miles) northwest of Mexico City via roadways.

Why: A weaponized drone/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)/unmanned aerial system (UAS) with a remotely detonated IED allows for a precision strike to take place against an intended target. This form of IED can be utilized against a point target for assassination purposes or against an area target – such as a grouping of individuals – for anti-personnel purposes. In addition to using such a drone/UAS for assassination or tactical action purposes, it also offers ‘narco terrorism’ and/or ‘narco insurgency’ potentials depending on the intent of its use.

Image 2: Close Up of Attacking Tarot Ironman Drone; Tactical Note Forensic Notations (Green Blanket – Post-Crash Placement – Probable Video Camera Feed Obscurement; 1st IED taped on the left-side; 2nd IED taped on the right-side; White Tube also taped to drone). IEDs Taped to Frame and Analysis with M-67 Fragmentation Grenade Identification.

Original Photographic Source: Courtesy of Zeta.

Incident No. 2 — Tecate, Baja (10 July 2018)

While the intent of the attackers is unknown at this time (SEDENA, the SSPE, and PEP have not disclosed the identity of the suspected criminal organization pending further investigation), it is highly probable that the attack was a demonstration of intent or a warning to the SSPE secretary as seen in the CJNG warning to the Tecate police director in late June 2017.

Who: The attack was conducted by a criminal organization – a Mexican cartel – with the ability and willingness to engage in a tactical action in the contested Tecate segment of the Tijuana plaza against the senior ranking state law enforcement official. The dominant cartels operating in Baja California state are Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS) and remnants of the Tijuana Cartel/Cártel Arellano Félix (CAF) or ArellanoFélix Organization (AFO) which are in the process of reforming under the banner of the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) as the Cártel de Tijuana Nueva Generación (CTNG). Considering past patterns of violence in the Tecate area and the broader Tijuana plaza as well as in Baja California itself, this

attack has a signature consistent with prior CTNG/ CJNG activity and can likely be attributed to a CTNG/ CJNG operational cell.

What: A weaponized drone attack targeting the residence (known as “La Quinta Marina”) of the public safety secretary of Baja California (Secretario de Seguridad Pública Estalal–SSPE) Gerardo Sosa Olachea. This is the first recorded incident in Mexico in which a weaponized cartel drone has both been used (a) offensively and (b) in a coordinated manner with a second mission support drone.

When: The attack took place at 0700-0730 on Tuesday 10 July 2018. The attack was timed while the Baja California public safety secretary was leaving his residence and getting into his vehicle in order to later meet with the new US Consul in Tijuana. According to the Editor-in-Chief of Zeta (the Tijuana news magazine), the timing of attack was closer to 0740. The fact the public safety secretary was even at home at this time is in direct variance to an official Mexican governmental release that said the secretary was not a home at the time of the incident and actually lives in Mexicali (some 68.7 miles away).

Where:The residence of the Secretario de Seguridad Pública Estalal (SSPE) of Baja California located in Tecate, Baja California, Mexico in the Colonia Los Laureles subdivision and is well known to the local residents. This border city is 23.7 miles east of Tijuana in the San Diego-Tijuana metropolitan area and has a present population of approximately 75,000.

Why: Based on an ongoing pattern of earlier threats directed at lower level police officials by organized crime – specifically the CTNG/CJNG alliance – and the inoperability (render safe procedures) of the IEDs carried on the attacking drone, this incident can be viewed as a threat, a communication or ‘threat escalation’ meant to intimidate the public safety secretary of Baja California, rather than an actual attack (or attack dry run) in which mission failure took place.

Image 3: Analysis with Imaging for MK-2 Grenade Identification.

Original Photographic Source: Courtesy of Zeta.

Incident No. 3 — San Andrés Cholula, Puebla (25-26 April 2020) Incident No. 4 — Tepalcatepec, Michoacán (25 July 2020)

Mexican federal authorities raided three residences in A weaponized drone a Mavic 2 Zoom quadcopter with San Andrés Cholula, Puebla state on 25-26 April 2020 an IED payload – was found in a field full of stacks resulting from an anonymous tip. Those individuals of tires by El grupo de autodefensa en Tepalcatepec targeted in the raids – who were not reported to have forces (a self-defense group) in Tepalcatepec, been captured – were suspected of being linked to Michoacán. This resulted in their then discovering recent organized crime bombings in Guanajuato an abandoned armored vehicle belonging to Cártel state that have included both improvised explosive Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) operatives. Within devices (IEDs) and crude anti-personnel car bombs that vehicle, a bloody cardboard box containing (i.e. VBIEDs) used primarily to ward off Federal agents another Mavic 2 Zoom quadcopter and three more ‘IED rather than killing or injuring them. An operational cell payloads’ consisting of clear plastic boxes containing of one of the perpetrators of those incidents – the apparent C4 explosives and industrial ball bearings Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) – is suspected (functioning as shrapnel) was secured. Apparently, as being the target of these raids. the CJNG operatives were involved in an attack upon

Who: Organized crime members – likely a Cártel competing Carteles Unidos (United Cartels) personnel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) cell but no official but it is surmised that they were forced to abandon announcement from the Fiscalía General de la their mission due to their injuries and/or vehicular República (FGR) has been released. inoperability.

What: Three drones, two controllers, explosives Who: Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). (C4, gunpowder, and mortar bomb fireworks known as What: Weaponized commercial off-the-shelf drone; ‘chrysanthemums’), seven cell phones, fifty-three SIM Mavic 2 Zoom, allegedly armed with C4 (or similar cards, three radio communications sets, integrated type) explosives and ball bearing type projectiles in circuit boards, wiring, documents, two firearms, and ammunition were seized. No detainees were reported as being arrested in the raids.

When: 25-26 April (Saturday and Sunday) 2020.

Where: Three addresses in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, Puebla, Mexico were raided.

Why: Searches and seizures were conducted by the Fiscalía General de la República (FGR; Attorney General) along with the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA; Army) as part of an ongoing investigation. These operations were linked to investigations related to earlier bombing attacks in Guanajuato state with the raid of the ‘terrorist Image 4: 2x DJI Inspire, 1x DJI Phantom 2 drones with circuit board retrofits. arsenal’ seized resulting from an Source: Fiscalía General de la República, FGR México (@FGRMexico), Twitter. 3 May 2020, anonymous tip. https://twitter.com/FGRMexico/status/1257016365287911426/photo/1

Image 5: Five 4-inch professional fireworks mortar shells. Source: Fiscalía General de la República, FGR México (@FGRMexico), Twitter. 3 May 2020, https://twitter.com/FGRMexico/status/1257016365287911426/photo/2

plastic containers attached to the drones with duct tape. Two drones and four IED payloads in plastic containers were recovered.

When: Saturday, 25 July 2020.

Where: Tepalcatepec, Michoacán (Tierra Caliente), Mexico.

Why: Aerial assault; attempted attack on rival cartel.

FUTURE POTENTIALS

As highlighted above, the fourth weaponized drone incident once again witnessed CJNG revisiting this technology (See Annex, Table 1). In this instance, the attack was aborted, unlike earlier incidents which saw these systems utilized for direct (yet symbolic) attack purposes and were twice interdicted in raids and highrisk warrant stops. In all of these incidents easy to fly commercial quadcopters have been involved with varying IED payloads – C4 and shrapnel, mortar shell fireworks, fragmentation grenades, and ‘papa bombas’ – being utilized.

While the cartels – primarily CJNG – have been experimenting with weaponized drones for a little over three years, little proliferation has yet taken place among other organized crime groups except for CSRL in Mexico. Still, we may be eventually reaching a tipping point where these systems at some point become institutionalized in CJNG operations. What the immediate future holds for weaponized drone use in the criminal insurgencies taking place in Mexico is unknown. However, the expectation is that, over the longer term, such use will potentially become more pronounced and sophisticated in its operational applications as follows: • This application would be similar to Islamic State weaponized drone TTPs transitioning from single use drones – in which the IED attached to the drone destroyed it as the IED detonated near the intended target – to multiuse drones – whereby the IED was dropped by the drone from a standoff distance above the intended target and then

Image 6: Payload attached to Mavic 2 Zoom‘s fuselage. Source: La Silla Rota, used with permission.

detonated. Such a capability would be derived from an IED release mechanism (servos and

RF receiver) placed on the drone and retrofitted

IEDs – likely 40mm grenades with attached tail assemblies and fusing/safety overrides for impact detonation – to allow for gravity-based bombardment. • This application leverages the power of social media for propaganda purposes by videotaping a weaponized drone attack and then streaming that event on the internet. To date, the cartels have only streamed the passing out of COVID-19 humanitarian aid to local villagers derived from an overhead drone video (April 2020, Tecalitlán,

CJNG) but earlier released a first-person shooter video via a headcam of a raid on an opposing cartel’s safe house (Feb 2019, Valle de Santiago,

CRSL vs. CJNG) as they have begun to migrate towards such a capability. From the mid-2010s, jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq frequently videotaped drone bombardment attacks utilizing

commercial drone’s onboard video camera capability, with the Islamic State best exploiting this TTP. • This application is derived from combined arms integration such as ground units – a cartel commando composed of armored vehicles (retrofitted pickup trucks and SUVs) with mounted machine guns and sicarios (assassins) wearing body armor, tactical vests, and carrying infantry small arms – attacking in coordination with one or more weaponized drones. This is foreseen as a more futures-oriented application with a higher barrier to entry than a cartel utilizing a drone for

ISR and/or propaganda (via streaming imagery) purposes in support of a ground attack. The barrier to use stems from utility – the ISR function would have greater ground combat use value in the cartel commando scenario – as well as requiring more complex coordination requirements which even the Islamic State shied away from in their operational approach.

Still, what remains an enigma is the lack of Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS) and Los Zetas and Cártel del Golfo (CDG) remnants interest in fielding weaponized drones, instead yielding this emergent capability primarily to the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. While the CDS may be avoiding such deployment for strategic considerations – in order to not further antagonize the Mexican and US Federal governments – the Zetas

ANNEX

and CDG have in the past been highly adaptive operationally. This begs the question of whether CJNG has indeed become the most operationally sophisticated cartel in Mexico. Increasingly, this can be witnessed by its weaponized drone use as well as a host of other activities including its ability to rapidly project ground combat formations in the crime wars conflict zones through broad regions of that country. ■

Date Cartel Location Weaponized Drone(s) Incident

20 October 2017 CJNG Near Valtierrilla, Guanajuato 1x 3DR Solo; 1x IED ‘Papa Bomba’

High-Risk Vehicle Stop Conducted by Federal Police

10 July 2018 CJNG (CTNG Affiliate) Tecate, Baja 1x Tarot Ironman, 1x M-67 fragmentation grenade (or a foreign copy), 1x Chilean MK2; 1x ISR Drone (Unknown Model) Direct Attack Against Mexican Official for Threat Messaging Purposes (Live Grenades/Safety Pins in Place)

25-26 April 2020 CSRL San Andrés Cholula, Puebla 2x DJI Inspire, 1x DJI Phantom 2; 5x 4-inch professional fireworks mortar shells; C4 Reported Raid by Mexican Federal Authorities on CSRL Safe House

25 July 2020 CJNG Tepalcatepec, Michoacán

Table 1: Cartel Weaponized Drone Incidents in Mexico.

2x Mavic 2 Zoom; 4x IED Payloads (C4 & Ball Bearings) Aborted Attack Against Carteles Unidos

REFERENCES

Incident overviews were directly drawn from the following tactical notes:

Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, David A. Kuhn, and

Alma Keshavarz, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #46:

Weaponized Drones (Aerial Improvised Explosive

Devices) Deployed by CJNG in Tepalcatepec,

Michoacán.” Small Wars Journal. 5 October 2020. David A. Kuhn, Robert J. Bunker, and John P. Sullivan,

“Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #45: Drones and

Explosives Seized in Puebla, Mexico by Fiscalía

General de la República (FGR) and Secretaría de la

Defensa Nacional (SEDENA).” Small Wars Journal. 21

May 2020. John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn,

“Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #38: Armed Drone

Targets the Baja California Public Safety Secretary’s

Residence in Tecate, Mexico.” Small Wars Journal. 6

August 2018. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartel

Tactical Note #35: Weaponized Drone/UAV/UAS

Seized in Valtierrilla, Guanajuato with Remote

Detonation IED (‘Papa Bomba’) Payload.” Small Wars

Journal. 23 October 2017.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro and the Director of Research and Analysis of C/O Futures, LLC (https://www.cofutures.net). An international security and counterterrorism professional, he was Futurist in Residence at the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, VA, Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and has taught at Claremont Graduate University, the University of Southern California, and other universities. Dr. Bunker holds degrees in the fields of history, anthropologygeography, social science, behavioral science, government, and political science and has trained extensively in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. He has delivered hundreds of presentations – including U.S. congressional testimony – with well over 500 publications across various fields and formats. Email: docbunker@cofutures.net

Dr. John P. Sullivan is a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro and an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC. He was a career police officer and an honorably retired lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, specializing in emergency operations, transit policing, counterterrorism, CBRN response, and intelligence. He is an instructor with the USC Price Safe Communities Institute and has a research focus on the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries. Dr. Sullivan holds a B.A. in Government, M.A. in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis, and a Ph.D. in Information and Knowledge Society. He has hundreds of publications and numerous books published as co-author and coeditor.

David A. Kuhn is frequent Small Wars Journal-El Centro contributor and an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC. He is a subject matter expert in analysis, technical instruction, and terrorism response training related to stand off weaponry (MANPADS, threat, interdiction, aircraft survivability, et. al), infantry weapons, small arms, IED/VBIEDs, WMD, and other threat and allied use technologies. He is presently the principal of VTAC Training Solutions and has a career of supporting governmental operations and corporate initiatives in the fields of homeland security, vulnerability assessment, technical operations, and project management, with additional focus and expertise in areas involving facility threat/risk assessments, underwater operations, and varied engineering technologies.