17248 panglong treaty

Unravelling the History of the Panglong Treaty

Unravelling the History of the Panglong Treaty

Sao Noan Oo (Mrs Nel Adams)

Sao Noan Oo (Mrs Nel Adams)

Unravelling the History of the Panglong Treaty

© 2025 Sao Noan Oo (Nel Adams)

Published by Nel Adams

The rights of the author to be identified as the Author of this Work have been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

The publishers cannot accept responsibility for errors or omissions, or for changes in the details given. The publishers urge the reader to use the information herein as a guide and to check details to their own satisfaction. Every effort has been made to check the information and ensure that descriptions and places are correct. However, we cannot be held responsible for any inaccuracies in the text.

ISBN: 978-1-5272-094?-?

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Unravelling the History of the

Panglong Treaty

Sao Noan Oo

(Mrs Nel Adams)

Dedications

Unravelling the Panglong Agreement is written in memory of the Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders, each representing their own state, who signed the Panglong Agreement with Bogyoke Aung San representing the Bamar State, called Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma on the Agreement, stating that they would join to form the Federal Union of Burma to ask Britain for independence.

Aung San, Sao Sam Htun, the Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn and six members of the 1947 Constitution Drafting Executive Committee were assassinated. Shan leaders were imprisoned without reason. Some died under suspicious circumstances, one disappeared after being taken to one of the military training camps, at Bahtoo Myo, while others were tortured to confess crimes they had not committed.

Last but not least, this book is dedicated to the memory of relatives and friends and all the men, women and innocent little children who suffered and died in the conflict and war caused by the successive Burmese Army/ political regimes who invaded and ruled over the Shan and other states illegally for the last three-quarters of a century.

It is dedicated to all Tai/Shans, especially the young men and women who one way or another fought for the survival of their ancestral homeland, for freedom and peace.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost my gratitude goes to my husband Brian for his support, and even more for the patience he has shown during the months when all my spare time was devoted to writing this book.

I would like to thank all family members and friends who have encouraged and supported me to write about the Panglong Treaty; although many knew about it, they did not know or understand fully what really happened. Most were not even born when the Panglong Agreement was signed. I would like to thank Khun Hkuen Sai, founder of the Shan Herald Agency for News, for sparing his time to read and edit the manuscript and facts.

I thank Facebook for allowing me to use the platform to connect with relatives and friends; Microsoft for the window and many other uses; and Libra has been very helpful allowing me to use Open Office as a Word document and for pictures. Thanks are also due to Google for some informative articles written by academics and for articles on history etc., especially the Bill of Burma Independence, which I searched and found among its lists of information.

Photo Credits

A few pictures were shared on Facebook; some are from my own collection and the rest, with her permission, are from Sao Sanda Simm’s book.

The Author

Sao Noan Oo (alias Mrs Nel Adams) was born in 1931, in the Shan State, a naturally beautiful area in north-east Burma. It was then a British colony but autonomously ruled by a number of local princes, called Sao Hpa or Sawbwas. Born into a Sao Hpa ruling family, her early life was interwoven into the geography, history and socio-political life of her country.

She was educated at St Agnes’ Convent in Kalaw and St Joseph’s Convent in Maymyo. At the University of Rangoon she obtained a BSc degree in Biology; a BSc (Hons.) in Zoology, with a thesis on the ‘Morphology and Taxonomy of Cestodes on Domestic Fowls’; and an MSc with a thesis on the ‘Rhopalocera of Rangoon’.

As an advanced student she studied at University College London for one year but had to give up due to the trouble in Burma. She obtained a City & Guilds Certificate in Food Science at Liverpool College of Catering and Food Science.

Occupations

University of Rangoon: Demonstrator, Lecturing Demonstrator in Zoology, 1953–1959

In the UK:

Teacher at Long Eaton Grammar School, Derby Girls High School and Mackworth Secondary School, 1963–1970

Research Assistant under Dr Morrow Brown – researching the effects of pollen counts on hay fever sufferers – for a short time before moving to another teaching job...

Assistant Lecturer in Applied Science and Nutrition at Mid Cheshire College of Further Education, 1971–1979, after which she changed her career by becoming the proprietor of a bakery in Helsby, Cheshire.

Following retirement, she now lives with her husband in Sutton Weaver, a district of Runcorn.

She is the author of several other books:

My Vanished World, A True Story of a Shan Princess, which has been translated into Thai and Japanese.

Unravelling the History of Tai Yai: A Subgroup of the Proto-Tai. The Tai people from Northern Asia, Mongolia, dispersed throughout China and settled in Yunnan. When the Mongols destroyed Yunnan, most migrated along the rivers into different parts of S.E. Asia, while the Tai Yai (Shan) subgroup settled on the Shan Plateau.

She is a campaigner (mostly in the form of writing) for the rights and freedom of her birth country, the Shan States and people.

Introduction

The geographical region called Burma (changed to Myanmar) consists of seven independent countries or states – Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayah (or Karenni), Kayin, Rakhine (or Arakan) and Mon – together with the Burma heartland (Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma). The population of Burma Proper, as the British called it, were termed the majority, while those of other states were the minority.

Soon after the Japanese Occupation, we (Lawksawk Sao Hpa’s family) had just returned home after fleeing from being captured by the Japanese. We were excited to be home safe and sound, and thought that our life would now be quiet and normal again.

But this was not to be. The atmosphere and situation in the Shan States had altered. The political revolutionary turmoil going on in Burma Proper, where the majority of the ethnic Burmese lived, had penetrated into parts of the Shan States. They were campaigning for the British to leave the Shan States and the Sao Hpas to abdicate or change their hereditary feudal system of governing. A few of these Shan activists, having been to Rangoon or Mandalay Universities, came into contact with members of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) and under their influence and support also campaigned against the Sao Hpas. In the Shan States they called themselves the SSPFL (Shan States People’s Freedom League).

At the beginning of 1945 the Burmese nationalists in Burma Proper, after backing the Japanese against the British and realising they had bet on the wrong horse, turned against the Japanese and helped the British to drive them out of Burma. The 1944 Japanese Offensive into India through Manipur had failed, and by the end of 1945 Allied troops, led by Colonel Slim of the British Army, Regiment 14, had reopened the Burma Road and captured Myitkyina and Bhamo.

When the British arrived in Rangoon, the Burmans in Burma Proper

were gripped by political tensions causing unrest. The different Burmese political organisations were fighting for supremacy. The AFPFL under the Japanese occupation had many branches all over the country; they were well organised and refused to accept the old politicians who came in with the British Administration from Simla. The British attitude was that the country should be fully rehabilitated before independence was granted. The Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, did not recognise the AFPFL as the government of Burma because the funds and arms were collected by political dacoity.

The Burmese were more advanced in politics than the Shan and other ethnic states, given better education, and by 1920 had more experience in self-governing under the British and the Japanese occupation. In contrast, the Shan, Kachin and Chin were kept insulated and they were content with their states being semi-autonomous with internal self-determination, and to live freely and simply with their own day-to-day lives. Some of their colleagues thought that Britain would protect them forever.

According to some observers, Aung San introduced himself to Colonel Slim as Commander of the Burma National Army [the BNA, previously the Burma Internal Army (BIA)], serving under a provisional government of the AFPFL. With his charismatic, bold and truthful character, Colonel Slim found he was an efficient leader with many followers and agreed to talk with him.

He told Colonel Slim that he was an Allied Commander who was ready to cooperate with the British as an equal but not as a subordinate. Colonel Slim replied that as far as he and the rest of the world were concerned there was only one government of Burma and that was 'His Majesty's Government', acting through the Supreme South-East Asia Command of Lord Mountbatten.

The Burmans claimed that Rangoon was taken by leaders of the AFPFL Government under Dr. Ba Maw, with the help of the BNA, while British and American historians and authors claim that the British won the war

with a small contribution from allied forces and that the claim made by the Burmese was a reconstruction of history by Burmese nationalists adopting inflated views of themselves, unwilling to accept the reality that they had made a mistake in their judgement when they joined the Japanese to fight against the British. The British Government in Burma would have arrested all AFPFL members but for the Attlee Government in London. It would not allow this because the AFPFL members had already filled almost all the Governor's Council and had virtually made themselves the Government in Burma Proper.

Britain had been badly bombed by the Germans during World War II, and the government had a big job ahead of it to put Britain back on its feet. Soon after the war it suited the British Government to get rid of all its colonies and grant them independence as soon as possible. To use force would only create another war and British soldiers had already been through a lot of fighting. Changes were happening very rapidly.

Prime Minster Attlee was now ready to accept anything. He stated, “We do not desire to retain within the Commonwealth and Empire any unwilling peoples. It is for the people of Burma to decide their future.” He invited Aung San and delegates to London.

Britain started decolonising and decided that Burma should be granted independence but had no policy regarding what to do with the Shan and Kayah (Karenni) States which had been accepted as semi-autonomous with their own by-laws and separate administration. The British were in a hurry to get rid of Burma and it seemed would readily throw the non-Burmese ethnic people, the Shan, Kachin and Chin and others, to the mercy of the wolves.

The Sao Hpas barely had time to settle down to a normal life or to think about State work when, through the initiative of Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, Sao Hkun Kyi, Sao Hpa of Hsatung, and Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn, the three most active and prominent members, they were invited to attend a conference to be held in Panglong.

Chapter I

The First Panglong Conference (1946)

The First Panglong Conference was held in the small town of Panglong in Southern Shan States and opened on 26 March 1946, presided over by Khun Pan Sing, the Sao Hpa of Tawngpeng. As the Governor was ill and unable to attend, the Director of the Frontier Areas, Mr H.N.C. Stevenson, represented the British Government. Several guests from Chin, Kachin Burmese and Karens were invited to participate in the discussion concerning the future of the Frontier Areas. The Karens came to observe but did not wish to participate in the discussion as they were already discussing with the British in London. Among the most important Burmese delegates were U Tin Htut, U Saw and U Nu with their followers.

Mr Stevenson on behalf of the Governor opened the conference thus:

“The administration of the Frontier Areas would be under the direct control of the Governor as previously, and continue until the Frontier peoples themselves choose to join Burma Proper. The people of Burma Proper are most anxious to include the Shan States in a fully self-governing Burma and the people of the Shan States should give a serious consideration to the matter. The British Government hoped that the Shan States would one day join Burma Proper with acceptable agreements on both sides.

As regards to the internal administration, a state advisory council had been formed in every state, which we hoped would develop into

fully representative institutions in which the will of the people would be made known and brought to bear on the administration.

The Administration of the Frontier Areas had been reorganised; its top administrator was now in direct contact with the Governor, who is also in contact with the Residents. In place of the former Superintendents there would be a Resident and District Officers to train the state advisory councils to accept the responsibility of taking over different departments concerning local government, and develop into an efficient force.

In the effort of economic development, the Governor planned to carry out geological and agriculture surveys in all the Frontier Areas to find ways of increasing the national income and the capacity to pay for taxes to provide for hospitals, schools, travelling dispensaries and experiment centres for agriculture, forestry, and soil erosion and others.

On its part, the Frontier Areas Administration was considering a detailed plan for educational improvement in the Shan State, providing for technical as well as academic training. For adult education, the training of craftsmen for cottage industries needed attention and encouragement as increased production of minor village industries and improved marketing will increase income.

The state and regional councils should not be limited to political and administrative function, but should build centres for spreading and teaching cottage industries, with technical improvement as well as help to obtain patent rights. There was a need to develop and use to the full the natural self-reliance and inventive ingenuity which was the heritage of the Hill peoples. The aim should be to ask nothing from the administration that could be . To take part in the Burmese Constituent Assembly on a population basis, but no one to be affected in matters of a particular area without engagements of 2/3 of the majority votes of the Representatives of the area concerned

[… according to] one's own skill, brain and energy, so that evidence given would be tenfold valuable. Self-reliance is the real key to national resurgence and national progress.”

Mr Stevenson’s reading of the Governor’s message was followed by speeches from other delegates. The Kachin leader gave an interesting and important speech, while one of the Burmans, Thakin Nu (who later became the Prime Minister of the Federal Union of Burma), lashed out at the British, accusing them of separating the Frontier peoples from the Burmans. The Sao Hpas, Kachin and Chin leaders felt uneasy at this outburst; they thought it was bad taste and ill mannered, and they expressed their displeasure that Thakin Nu had gone too far.

In response to Thakin Nu’s accusation, Mr Stevenson replied:

“We are inclined to think that people who try to make unreal things real and to bluff the public are the ones who are responsible for misunderstanding, suspicion and discord found to be existing between the Frontier and the Burmese peoples. Now this is just one instance in a hundred. We could quote a thousand others. It is therefore an obvious fact – unless the Burmese leaders and people alike change their opinion about the Hill peoples and the treatment to be accorded them, there can be no hope of forming a real Federated Union of Burma.

On the other hand, if the Burmese will realise the situation and try to amend their past faults, we see no reason why there cannot be a real United Federated State of Burma. What we ask the Burmese to do is to be realistic and examine the facts. The British are our friends and their friends. They have done far more for Burma than the Burmese Government of old ever did and now they have promised the Burmese full self-government. We do not see there is anything to be gained by blaming the British for faults which lie in Burmese hearts.

On the whole, we are feeling much happier about the future. We realise the shape and size of the problems which face us and can see our way much more clearly. We realise too there is feeling of good fellowship in Burma only wanting to be released by wise leadership, and we hope that all the peoples of Burma, Burmese and Hill peoples alike, will find and support those wise leaders without delay.

For the Hill peoples the safe-guard of their hereditary rights, customs and religion are the most important factors. When the Burmese leaders are ready to see this is done and can prove how they genuinely regard the Hill peoples as real brothers equal in every sense to themselves, we shall be ready to consider the question of our entry into close relations with Burma as a free Dominion. In the mean time we hope the good work of brotherly co-operation will start at 'Panglong', and will continue under the auspices of United Burma Cultural Association, and we express our grateful thanks to the Shan Sao Hpas for giving the Hill peoples the historic gathering.”

U Saw, one of the Ex-Premiers, gave an elaborate detailed account of how the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma could work together as a united dominion. The people of the Frontier could be granted local autonomy and there would be no interference with their customs and religion. He would take the business and commerce from the British and other foreign firms and place this in the hands of the government-sponsored agencies, with profit to help farmers and cultivators. He thanked the Governor for allowing the Burmese leaders to state their case to the leaders of the Frontier Areas.

In response, Sao Khun Pan Sing complained about the misbehaviour of Dr. Ba Maw and his men towards the Shan when he was President. U Saw publicly apologised to the Shan people on behalf of the Burmans.

This 'First Panglong Conference' brought the Frontier leaders face to face with the Burmese politicians for the first time.

The Shan, Kachin and Chin discussed amongst themselves and decided to draft a manifesto declaring that in no circumstances would they at the moment federate with the Burmans, but instead they wished for selfgovernment on the dominion level in the Frontier Areas. The weak link was the Chin delegation, who felt that they were in no position to talk bluntly to the Burmans, because Chin State depended on Burma Proper for food, but they did not want a union with the Burmans if there was a way out.

The Chin, Kachin and Shan declared they would stick together as a single block, and each should not make a separate decision in the matter concerning the Burmans, prior to consulting amongst themselves. The Shans met often to discuss the future politics of the Shan States; the meeting brought together all the Sao Hpas, including administrators, community leaders, intellectuals and politicians, and leaders of the Kachin and Chin.

At the end of 1946, when the Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, was recalled to London, the Executive Council which was formed during the founding of the Federated Shan States in 1922 was abolished. In place of this the Sao Hpas formed their own executive council, consisting of 14 Sao Hpas and 14 representatives of the people, a first step towards democracy

Another important outcome of this period was the setting up of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP) to deal with the Burmese Power and politicians.

Sir Dorman-Smith was against the British hasty withdrawal. He wished to stick to the Simla White Paper drawn up by the British Government in exile. The Simla White Paper called for a period of rehabilitation and return to the 1935 Constitution, so that in time Burma could become an entity enjoying full equality with the dominions and with Britain

It was also stated that the Shan States and the other Frontier Areas would continue to stay under the rule of the Governor until they were ready to amalgamate with the Burmans. The popular wish of the Shan, Kachin

and Chin was that the British would favour their aspirations for selfgovernment under British protection, or even outright independence. There had been rumours that the British had encouraged the Shan Sao Hpas to oppose becoming part of the Union with Burma. There was also another story that the Shan were given a choice to either join with China, Thailand or Burma; of course this might be just wishful thinking on the part of the British Frontiers Administration and the Sao Hpas of the Shan States.

Chapter II

The Second Panglong Conference (1947)

This conference was organised as a festival in the market town of Panglong, midway between Northern and Southern Shan States. Panglong was a town under the Sao Hpa, Laikha and Sao Noom, who offered to arrange and organise the conference site and the required facilities, and to provide the daily food and refreshments, as well as temporary accommodation (called 'Dawmaw' in Shan) for each of the Sao Hpa's family and guests. These houses were constructed of bamboo and straw, as they were cheap and easy to build as temporary huts. Banquet and conference halls, stages for entertainment and open market stalls for traders were also constructed with the same materials.

All the Sao Hpas arrived in Panglong on the morning of 6 February 1947 and settled in their respective Dawmaw. In the afternoon they gathered to discuss the funding of the festival, the reception, the timetable for lectures and intervals, and the food to be served in the banquet hall.

On 7 February offerings of food and robes were made to the monks, from whom the hosts and guests gathered to receive blessings, through prayers and chanting.

The 11 February 1947 was the day when the Tai/Shan selected their National Anthem and the National Day to be celebrated on 7 February of each year. The National Flag chosen was to have three horizontal bars of yellow, green and red, with a white round moon in the centre: the yellow

bar represented religion, the green the homeland, and the red courage, while the moon signified peace and harmony.

During the first few days of the Conference, the Sao Hpas and the Tai/ Shan discussed mainly domestic affairs like agriculture, forestry, mining, cottage industries, revenue, etc.

The Conference was attended by certain members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all the Sao Hpas, Representatives of the Shan People and leaders of the Chin and Kachin States. Aung San had returned from his negotiation with the Attlee Government just before the Panglong Conference was convened on 8 February. News spread all over the country that Burma was to be granted independence within a year. He brought with him the Aung San–Attlee document, which stated that:

“the Leaders and Representatives shall be asked either at the Panglong Conference to be held at the beginning of next month or at a special conference to be convened for purposes of expressing their views upon the formation of associating with the government of Burma which they think acceptable during the transitional period. After the Conference, His Majesty’s government and the government of Burma will agree upon the best method of advancing with the expressed views of the peoples of the Frontier Areas.”

The Sao Hpas and guests assembled in the Conference Hall to listen to Aung San’s speech. The Frontier leaders, who in the past had dissociated themselves and had had nothing to do with Burmese politicians or governments, were wary of Aung San and his colleagues' intentions.

But it seemed Aung San was unlike other Burmese politicians; he seemed clever and smart without any pomposity. He spoke bluntly and straight to the point. He admitted that the Frontier Areas did not have a square deal from Burma Proper, and in future the Government of Burma, with him as a leader, would give the Frontier peoples all the consideration they deserved.

1. He promised that the non-Burman Nationalities had the right to regain their freedom, independence and sovereign status because they were not the subject of any pre-colonial kingdom. He blamed the British 'divide and rule policy' for keeping the Frontier peoples from coming into contact with his Burmese brethren.

2. He said Burma Proper's independence without the Frontier peoples would be like curry without salt, and without independence the Frontier peoples would forever be in darkness. In any case, whether the Frontier Areas wanted independence or not, Burma would go ahead with it.

3. If the Frontier Areas should decide to associate with Burma's demand for independence, they would never regret it. His exact words were: “If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat”.

4. To prove his sincerity he promised to ask the Governor to appoint immediately a Shan counsellor, assisted by two deputies, and one Kachin and one Chin to sit on the Governor's Council to manage the affairs of the Frontier Areas while the terms for independence of Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas were being discussed, before they become finalised.

5. Should Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas become 'Pyidaung Su' (a Federation), the first President would be a Shan. Frontier Areas would sooner or later have to depend on themselves; therefore unity with Burma was essential, as the standard of living could be raised to a reasonable level after independence.

6. The Hill peoples would be allowed to administer their own areas in the way they pleased, and the Burmese would not interfere in their internal administration.

7. The Shan had the same right to choose their own constitution if they so wished. Burma would never interfere in their affairs.

At the Conference there were very loud noises, shouting and thumping on the table. From our Dawmaw next to the Conference Hall we could hear clearly what was being said and the angry shouting of 'Out, out British, out!' by some Burmese politicians, followed by loud applause. Outside the Conference Hall was a demonstration by Burmese who came in bus-loads from the plains to influence the Shan activists against the British and Sao Hpas.

Out of the SCOUHP a sub-Committee of six members consisting of two Shans (U Kya Bu and the Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn), two Kachins (Sinwa Naw and Zau Lawn) and two Chins (U Hlur Hmung and U Thaung Za Khup) was chosen to negotiate with the Burmese leaders, and having concluded their negotiation with the Burmans they drafted the document of the ‘Panglong Agreement’, as set out below:

“A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by Members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Sao Hpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin and the Chin Hills, decided that freedom would be more speedily achieved by their immediate cooperation with the Burmese interim Government, have accordingly agreed as follows:

i. A representative of the Hill peoples, selected by the Governor shall be appointed a Counselor to the Governor to deal with the Frontier Areas.

ii. The said Counselor shall also be appointed a member of the Governor's Executive Council and given the executive authority to discuss on the subject of Defense and other External Affairs. The Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn was elected to be the Counselor.

iii. The said Counselor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counselors.

iv. While the Counselor in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counselors shall be entitled to attend

meetings of the Council when subjects concerning the Frontier Areas are discussed.

v. Although the Governor’s Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in manners that would deprive the Frontier Areas of the autonomy which they now enjoy in their internal administration; they should have the right of full autonomy.

vi. The separating Kachin State within a Unified Burma is to be relegated by decision by the Constituent Assembly. It is agreed that such a State is desirable.

vii. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy equal rights and privileges which are fundamental in democratic countries.

viii. The financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States should be continued as before.

ix. The financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma also is to be continued.

x. The Shan and Karenni will have the right to secede any time after independence.”

Near the end of the two-week conference, the Sao Hpas and the other Frontier leaders, led by the three most active and influential Sao Hpas, acknowledged that Aung San seemed honest and genuine enough and decided that they would cooperate with the Burmans as joint partners and together ask Britain for independence.

Thus, on 12 February 1947, on behalf of the Burmese Government and People of Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, Aung San signed the Panglong Agreement (agreeing the above ten clauses), with an understanding that the peoples of the Frontier states and the three independent ethnic nations of the Shan, Kachin and Chin States would federally join with the people of Burma Proper State to ask Britain for independence.

Signatories of the Panglong Agreement

The Shan Committee

Hkun Pan Sing, Sao Hpa of Tawngpeng

Sao Shwe Thaike, Yawnghwe

Sao Hom Hpa, North Hsenwi

Sao Num, Laihka

Sao Sam Htun, Mong Pawn

Sao Htun Aye, Hsamongkham

Maung Pyu, representing the Sao Hpa of Hsatung

Hkun Hpung

Tin Aye

Htun Myint

U Kya Bu

Hkun Saw

Sao Yape Hpa

Hkun Saw

Hkun Htee

The Kachin Committee

Sinwa Naw, Myitkyina

Zau Rip do

Dinra Tang do

Zau La, Bhamo

Zau Lawn do

Labang Grong do

The Chin Committee

U Hlur Hmung, ATM, I.D.S.M, B.E.M., Falam, Chin Hills

U Thawng ZA Khup, Tiddim

U Kio Mang, ATM, Haka

Chapter III

Formation of the Shan States Council

With the sudden removal of British power in the Shan States on 21 April, the Shans formed the Shan States Council:

1. It shall be called the Shan States Council.

2. Members should be equally represented in the council: 33 Sao Hpas and 33 popularly nominated peoples’ representatives.

3. For immediate purposes the representatives of the people shall be nominated on an intellectual basis, but election on the population shall be according to the normal rule of election.

4. The nomination of people’s representatives shall be left to the present representatives with power to call in for advice and assistance anybody genuinely interested in the welfare of the Shan States.

5. The council shall be vested with the following powers: (a) Legislative, (b) Executive, and (c) Financial.

6. An executive committee consisting of eight members, four Sao Hpas and four peoples’ representatives, shall be selected within the Council to be in charge of all the departments in the Shan States.

7. The present Executive Committee of the Council of the Shan States together with two representatives of the people shall

carry on the work until such time as the Shan States Council and its executives come into existence as contemplated.

8. The Shan States Federal fund shall be revived and placed within the sole financial control of the Executive Committee.

9. In addition to the above, the Shan States should have a separate High Court within the Shan States.

10. Subjects that cannot be dealt with by the Shan States individually are defence, foreign and external affairs, railway, post and telegraph, and coinage and currency.

Taunggyi, 15 February 1947

Chapter IV

The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE)

The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE) was set up as required by the UK Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to enquire about the Frontiers peoples’ views on what they would require when they cooperated with the people of Burma Proper to form the Union of Burma.

Members of the Committee were as follows:

Chairman:

Mr D.R. Rees-Williams, Labour M.P.

Burma members:

The Hon. U Tin Tut, C.B.E., Member without portfolio of the Executive Council

Frontier Areas members:

The Hon. Sawbwa of Mong Pawn (Shan), Counsellor to H.E. the Governor for the Frontier Areas, and Officers

Members of the Executive Council:

Thakin Nu, Vice-President, AFPFL

Sima Hsinwa Nawng (Kachin), Deputy Counsellor

U Khin Maung Gale, AFPFL

U Vum Ko Hau (Chin), Deputy Counsellor

Saw Sankey, Karen National Union

Mr W.B.J. Ledwidge, Burma Office, Secretariat

U Tun Pe, B.Fr.S., Joint Secretary

Major Shan Lone, O.B.E., M.C., B.Fr.S., Assistant Secretary

Saw Myint Thein, Karen Youth Organization, joined the Committee when it moved to Maymyo, in place of the Hon. U Kyaw Nyein

The Committee started conducting their enquiry in Rangoon but later moved to Maymyo, where several Shan leaders and representatives and witnesses were present. The enquiries were long but seemed very thorough.

The first to be interviewed by the Chairman was Sao Shwe Thaike, President of SCOUHP. The Chairman read out the memorandum and presented to FACE:

1. Leaders and Representatives of the Hill peoples, selected to the Constituent Assembly to be nominated by the Provincial Councils proportionately on intellectual basis irrespective of race, creed or religion.

2. To take part in the Burmese Constituent Assembly on a population basis, but no decision to be effected in matters of a particular area without engagements of 2/3 of the majority votes of the Representatives of the area concerned.

3. To take part in the Burmese Constituent Assembly on a population basis, but no decision to be effected in matters of a particular area without engagements of 2/3 of the majority votes of the Representatives of the area concerned.

(i) Equal rights for all.

(ii) Full autonomy for all Representatives of Hill areas.

(iii) Right of secession from Burma Proper after attaining Freedom.

4. It is resolved due provision shall be made in the future Burmese Constitution that no diplomatic engagement or appointment be made prior to consultation with the Hill States.

5. In the case of common subjects, external defence, telecommunications, railways, coinage, etc., no decision shall be made without the prior consent of the majority of the Hill States irrespective of Burmese votes.

6. The provision shall be made in the Federated Union of Burma’s Constitution that any change, amendment or modification affecting the Hill States directly or indirectly shall not be made without a clear majority of 2/3 votes of the representatives of the Hill States.

7. When opinion differs on the interpretation of the terms in the Constitution of the Federal Burma the matter shall be referred for decision of the High Court consisting of the Chief and two other Justices.

8. The total number of Burmese members in the Federal Cabinet shall not exceed the total number of members of the Hill States.

The next task undertaken by FACE was to interview the representatives of each of the 33 states of the Shan States. In the Shan States where the population consisted of Shan or Tai as the majority, the requirements of the people were plain and simple as they were ready to abide by the decisions made by their leaders, as long as the Panglong Agreement and the Constitution that would be drafted by Aung San and the SCOUHP leaders were safeguarded.

Kengtung; 2. Hsi Paw; 3. Mong Nai; 4. Yawnghwe; 5. Tawngpeng; 6. South Hsenwi (Mongyai); 7. North Hsenwi; 8. Mong Mit; 9. Mong Pai; 10. Lawksawk; 11. Lai Hka; 12. Mawk Mai; 13. Mong Pan; 14. Mong Pawn; 15. Mong Lurn; 16. Kanarawaddi; 17. Samka; 18. Mongkung Myosa; 19. Nawng Warn; 20. Mong Nawng; 21. Mong Sit; 22. Kehsi Man Sam; 23. Maw Nang; 24. Loilong (Panglawng); 25. Hsatung; 26. Wan Yein; 27. Ho Pong; 28. Nam Koke; 29. Sakoi; 30. Mong Su; 31. Keng Lun; 32. Baw Lake; 33. Hsamongkham; 34. Maw; 35. Pwela; 36. Pangtara; 37. Ywa-ngan; Pang Mi; and a few others were sub-states.

Notified areas:

All representatives for the notified areas wanted these notified areas to be returned to the state to which they originally belonged:

• Kalaw Rep (Ko Mya Tun) wanted Kalaw to be returned to its original state, Hsamongkham

• Taunggyi Rep (Ba San) wanted Taunggyi to be returned to Yawnghwe

• Loilem Rep wanted Loilem to be returned to Laikha

• Lashio Rep (Aung Nyunt) wanted Lashio to be returned to Hsipaw

Other areas:

Khamti Long and Sinkaling Khamti Awn, Kokang, Southern Wa and Northern Wa, and the Kachin Minority in the Shan States notified areas.

Khamti Long – according to the representative (U Aung Ba), the Shan formed the majority of the population, with Kachin coming second and a few Lisu. The majority of the population were Tai or Shan, but they had fled to Sinkaling Khamti and other regions when the Kachins caused trouble during their migration.

Thaungdut and Sinkaling Khamti (with U Balin as representative) was surrounded by upper the Chindwin district and mostly Burmese and Chins. Although the majority of the population was ethnic Shan, they had become Burmanised by adopting the Burmese language, but like the Shans they were ruled by Sao Hpas. These Shans were mostly from Khamti Long, who had escaped due to the trouble caused by the Kachins when they migrated along the Chindwin. The message of the people was: “We shall unite with Burma Proper Government but with equal rights and the same privileges as the Burmans. The Burma government shall continue to recognise our Sao Hpa to administer their respective states.”

Homalin also wanted to be a sub-state under the administration of Burma Proper, with the same equal rights and privileges as the Burmese.

Southern Wa (Naw Kham U, Chief Minister of Mong Lurn State; Mong Lurn was one of the 33 Federated Shan States) – the population consisted of more Wa than Shan. “We had been in the Federated Shan States and wish to remain as such and abide by the decision of the Shan States.”

Hsawng Long – the population consisted mainly of Wa and was governed by a British Resident and did not wish to federate with the Shan State.

Kokang (representative Yang Cheje) – Kokang was once a sub-state of Hsenwi. Here the population consisted of Chinese which was the majority, Palaung (Ta-ang), Shan, Chinese-Shan, Myaung, Kachin and Lisu. After the Japanese Occupation, Kokang became a separate state and would like to remain as such.

These enquiries were necessary to obtain a collective view of the people of the Frontier Areas. Since the committee conducted its inquiry after the signing of the Panglong Agreement, during March and April 1947, the evidence they heard was generally in favour of co-operation with Burma but under certain conditions, as stated by the leaders of SCOUHP in the list above.

The population in the Shan States consisted of Shan, Palaung (Ta-Ang), Taung Su (Pa-O), Kachin, Danu, Lisu and Kaw. In all the 33 Shan States the majority population was Shan or Tai. During the Sao Hpa and the British era the diverse people lived peacefully and harmoniously together side by side. They all agreed to follow the leaders of the Shan States Council.

In the FACE report, particularly the right of secession was a must for the Frontier Areas. This was opposed by some Burman nationalists, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein, who earlier refused to sign the Aung San–Attlee Agreement. They accused Aung San of having given up Burman territories, and argued that the Frontier Areas were the creation of the British, by their

colonial ‘divide and rule’ policy. U Aung San dismissed this criticism as historically unfounded and politically unwise. He said, the “Right of Secession must be given, but it is our duty to work and show our sincerity so that they do not wish to leave”.

The above memorandum was presented by the Shan States to the Frontier Areas Commission, to be forwarded to the Attlee and other concerned Governments.

Almost all the recommendations provided by the FACE report have been expressed in the 1947 Constitution, indicating that the British and Burmese policy takes into account the desire of the minority peoples. These accepted recommendations include a federal government, a proposal for the geographical divisions of states and expectations for representation in parliament. The Committee also recommended that the secession policy be implemented in the Constitution.

Chapter V

Drafting the Constitution and the Assassination of Aung San and

Executive Committee Members

Following the signing of the Panglong Agreement, the Constitution Drafting Executive Committee met to draw up the Constitution for the new Union of Burma on 9 June 1947.

It was led by Aung San, with Sao Sam Htun, the Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn, representing the SCOUHP States; Mahn Ba Khaing, a Karen politician; Thakin Mya, a Burmese Minister; U Ba Cho, Minister for Information; Abdul Razak, a Tamil Muslim, Minister for Education; U Ba Win, Aung San’s brother, Minister for Trade; Mahn Ba Khaing, a Karen politician, Minister for Industry; and Ohn Maung, Minister for Transport. (Sao Shwe Thaike should have been present with others but was absent due to illness.)

In keeping with his promise, the Constitution was based on the accepted principles of the Panglong Agreement: the Chin, Kachin and Shan States were separate equal states, each federating with Burma Proper with its own Constitution, controlling its own internal affairs. The right of secession was also drafted into the Union Constitution as “every state shall have the right to secede”.

In July there was a series of important constituent assembly gatherings of Burmese politicians. U Nu, who chaired the meetings, went to London to inform Prime Minister Attlee that at the assembly meeting members had

agreed that they desired to create an independent parliamentary government before the year’s end. The above Constituent Assembly which previously took place at Government House moved to the Secretariat Building where Aung San and his team convened to draft the Constitution for the future Independent Union of Burma.

During the recess Aung San carried out the daily business of drafting the Constitution. Five days into the meeting, he moved for a resolution that the new Constitution would describe an independent sovereign republic called the Union of Burma. To ease ethnic concerns, minority rights were assured and guidelines laid out for the establishment of autonomous states. Aung San gained from the Shan State leaders a constitutional commitment to remain 10 years within the Union, allowing enough time for the implementation of two 5-year national development projects.

On 19 July 1947, while Aung San and members of the Executive Committee were drafting the Constitution for the Federal Union of Burma, a group of terrorists entered the Secretariat in Rangoon and gunned down Aung San, Sao Sam Htun, Thakin Mya, U Ba Cho, Abdul Razak, U Ba Win, Mahn Ba Khaing and Ohn Maung.

U Saw, a prominent politician during the pre-war days and a Minister in the Ministerial Burma Government in the 1940s, was found guilty of masterminding the assassination and was hanged. He was one of the Bamar who did not agree with Aung San that the Shan and Karenni States be given the right of secession. He also did not sign the Aung San–Attlee Agreement that there should be a Frontier Areas Committee Enquiry into the Frontier peoples’ views on joining with Burma Proper.

The death of Aung San was a great shock to the Shan and other Frontier leaders; they had lost the only Burman who they could trust. After Aung San’s death, Governor Sir Hubert Rance appointed U Nu as Head of the Constituent Assembly to take over the job Aung San had left behind, including the drafting of the Constitution for the Federal Union of Burma.

Under U Nu, as a provisional Prime Minister, the Constitution was completed within 9 days, but what came out was nothing like the one Aung San had promised; it was contrary to it. According to Sao Hearn Hkam, Sao Shwe Thaike’s wife:

“there were gaping holes in the Constitution, [and] the new states lacked their own constitution, judicial and administrative structures. The large Karen territory was ill-defined, its fate and its borders entrusted to some sort of future referendum. Worse, the document contained no clear demarcation of federal and state powers. Finally, the role of Burma was confusing. The lowland plain region, which the colonialists called Burma Proper, was not listed among the states. ‘Burma’ referred to a mother government, around which revolved the states as satellites. The national government was given a veto over state laws. It was rather a curious arrangement for a federal nation. On the 24th September the Constitution was passed despite by its shortcomings. When the assembly gave its assent, the members raised their arms and cheered in victory.”

When questioned why the Constitution was contrary to the one Aung San was drafting, U Nu replied that they had to finish the Constitution within a certain time limit to take it to London to present to the UK Prime Minister, and that it was not perfect but could be amended in parliament after Independence.

There was no federal Government because all federal power was invested in the government of Burma Proper. Matters pertaining forests, minerals, oil, etc. were under Union restriction. Burma Proper was represented in the Upper House by 53, while the 5 component states were only 72 members, which meant unequal representation. The Upper House or Chamber of nationalities had no power to initiate a financial bill or reject such a bill passed by the Lower House or Chamber of Deputies.

Whatever the Constitution was, how unequal and unfair, and regardless of how they felt, the Shan and others did not raise any objections at the

framing of the Constitution because they were told this was an interim Constitution, and if changes were required they could be altered after Independence.

After Aung San’s death the Shan had to deal with a new less far-sighted group of Burmese politicians, U Nu, U Kyaw Nyein, U Ba Swe and others who were total strangers to them until 1946.

During the First Panglong Conference, soon after Independence, U Nu was confronted with unrest stirred by the communists and the People’s Volunteer Organisation (PVO), the AFPFL original army. Then came the Kuomintang (KMT; members of the Chinese nationalist movement) and civil war, which drove the whole country into chaos. Aung San understood federalism, but his successors U Nu and AFPFL members who were left to govern the new Independent Burma did not. The members of the Drafting Executive Committee who were assassinated with him and Sao Sam Htun were the country’s most experienced politicians.

Under these circumstances the replaced members’ imperfect document faced obstacles for breaching the Panglong Agreement and for altering the Constitution framed by Aung San and the Executive members.

Ref: The White Umbrella (pp. 185 and 186): a biography of Sao Hearn Hkam, the wife of Sao Shwe Thaike, the First President of Burma; also a member of Parliament at some stage, she narrated her story to the writer Patricia W. Elliott.

Chapter VI

U Nu Goes to London to Present the Constitution to the UK Prime Minister

After the signing of the Independence Act between U Nu and Prime Minister Attlee in London, U Nu returned to Burma. He announced to the nation that Burma would be completely independent on 4 January 1948, with no detailed information of what had gone on in London between himself and the British government – with no mention of the Constitution that the British Attlee Government explicitly expected to be an important consideration in granting Burma’s independence. This was also shown in the letter Aung San brought back from the Attlee Government which stated that there had to be a FACE by a neutral person to ask the peoples of the Frontier and other ethnic areas to express their opinions on how they felt and what form of collaboration they wished to form with Burma Proper in their joint Independence. His Majesty’s Government could then decide the best way to go about it.

Before U Nu went to present the Constitution to the UK Prime Minister, when asked by some members of the Assembly members why the Constitution he had just completed was different from the one Aung San had promised, he answered that it was due to time limits to meet the deadline to present it to the UK Prime Minister and thus the Constitution was done in a hurry. This was an interim Constitution and it could be altered after Independence in January 1948. It seemed to the people of Burma, especially the ethnic minorities, that the UK Prime Minister had accepted U Nu’s Constitution, the faulty one, in favour of the Burmese

majority, with nothing to safeguard the rights of the other ethnic minorities, the Shan and other ethnic nationalities. They had the impression the UK Prime Minister had forsaken them and thrown them to the wolves.

The important players in bringing the Burmese, Shan and other ethnic states together at the Panglong Conference and asking Britain for independence were the Burman leader Bogyoke Aung San and among the Shan leaders Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn, and Sao Khun Kyi, Sao Hpa of Hsatung. Now unfortunately three of them were no longer alive to continue the work they had started. The only person alive was Sao Shwe Thaike, who was elected President of Burma and no longer available to be involved in the Union’s politics. Sao Khun Kyi passed away soon after the Panglong Agreement was signed.

The majority of Sao Hpas were never keen on joining with the Burmans, but after listening to the pros and cons of Aung San’s speech and the three Shan leaders who initiated the Panglong Conference’s explanation, all agreed to follow the leaders.

Since the early 1950s, Sao Hpas understood that the feudal system of government was not suitable for the modern world. They founded the Shan States Council, the first step towards democracy. The Council consisted of 33 Sao Hpas and 33 people representing the people, with an Executive Committee of four Sao Hpas and four people from the Council to be in charge of all departments in the Shan States’ interim Government. Such gradual changes were to meet the requirement of the people, taking democratic practices into consideration. As an ancient culture they were ready to take advice from intelligent Shan Elders, State Ministers, and Town and Village Headmen who were in contact with and chosen by town residents and villagers to be leaders by raising their hands.

The main aim of the Council was to lead the Shan State Government, but after Independence and U Nu’s new Constitution came into force, the Shan States Council and Government came under the legislation passed by the Union Government.

The Shan State was now headed by a Minister of the Union appointed by the President, to be called Head of State, in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Council. Many acts were passed, until the Shan State lost all the rights drafted in the 1947 Constitution: the legislative, executive and financial powers were in the hands of the Union Government, and the Shan States Government was unable to function properly. This was then followed by the Federal Movement and the military coup under Ne Win.

Chapter VII

U Nu, Prime Minister of the Union of Burma

Soon after Independence, when U Nu became the Prime Minister of the Union of Burma, he was unprepared and inexperienced for the job that came with his status. Burma Proper, where the majority of the Burmese lived, was rife with different groups, each competing for power. The Burmese Communists broke away from the AFPFL and again divided into the Red Flag under Thakin Soe and the White Flag under Thakin Than Tun and set up armed bases along the borders of Shan States and China. At the same time, U Nu’s AFPFL own militia, the PVO, rebelled and supported the Communists. The 1st and 3rd Burma Battalions also rose against the U Nu government while the top Burmese Generals were busy weeding out non-Burmese officials: Indians and other non-Burmese ethnic nationals, the Karen, Kachin and Shan, including Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmese. The Burma Rifles left behind by the British were replaced by the Burmese Army, whose members were mainly people calling themselves Thakin, meaning the masters. All these people were from the Thirty Comrades rebels who formed the Burma Independence Army, trained by the Japanese to fight against the British and then joined the British to drive the Japanese out. The Burmese Army, after the first coup, changed its name to the ‘Tatmadaw’. The name and generals have changed several times but its doctrine and mind-set have not altered even today. It is the same Burmese military/political institution, an institution that has illegally ruled over

Burma for the last three-quarters of a century, causing conflict and war against the people of the other seven non-Burmese ethnic national states, using force, fear and terror and later using modern weapons to get what they wanted. The army usurped power from the States’ governments and hijacked their lands and resources. They committed various crimes against innocent citizens, including rape and murder, burning villages, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Outside of Burma Proper, there were uprisings by the Arakans, and also armed insurrection by the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) supported by the majority of Karens. In the Shan State too, a group of Kachins led by Captain Naw Hseng rebelled and Karen rebels and the Pa-O captured several towns in Northern Shan State. The Pa-O were allies of the military. Grievances of these groups were not directed against the Shan people but they wanted to show their bitter grievances against U Nu’s Central Government. While the Government under U Nu as well as the Shan State authorities were working to contain these elements, the KMT fleeing Mao’s Communist victory invaded the Shan States. The fleeing Chinese soldiers stretched along the borders which the Shan State shared with China: Laos and Chiang Rai (Thailand). During this period the Shan Sao Hpas and other SCOUHP members supported U Nu by providing both money and soldiers to the Central Government. The Shan Sao Hpas felt it was their duty to stabilise their country and to make the Union a success. By 1954 although 6 years of external threat had ended, peace did not follow. Eastern and some Northern Shan States had been placed under martial law by the then President, U Win Maung. The anti-Sao Hpa and the Pa-O secretly aided by the Burmese Army were rioting and robbing people of their possessions.

The first column of Burmese soldiers were dispatched into the countryside to disarm the population, search for hidden weapons and disrupt the alleged preparation for the Sao Hpas uprising. In the process, Headmen, important in village society, were tortured and alienated, put in prison, or taken away and disappeared without trace.

By 1953, the Sao Hpas realised that the ancient feudal system which had operated for the last thousand years was out of date and it would have to end and give way to democracy. With this in mind, they announced to the nation through the media that they would be giving up their power in the near future. They still had a lot of work to finish and felt it was their responsibility to see that things were in order before they surrender their power to the Shan State Government in Taunggyi, the capital of the Shan State.

The Burmese power establishment became more and more preoccupied and anxious about Chapter 10 of the Union’s Constitution, which provided the Shan and Karenni with the right to secede after a period of 10 years. This became a great issue for the Burmese Army, since it clashed with their ideas based on ‘one blood, one voice, one command’. To them, autonomy, federalism and equality were a lot of rubbish, tolerated only by Aung San.

With the end of 10 years approaching, the Burmese politicians and the army were convinced that the Shan would secede and others would follow. They became paranoid and convinced they must stop this happening, no matter how long and what it might take. Although according to the Constitution the Shan State had the right to secede, the Sao Hpas had at that time no intention of doing so.

To prevent secession, it became important to them to destroy the credibility, respectability, prestige and authority of the Sao Hpas – this was their rallying point against the Sao Hpas who were portrayed in the media, newspapers, magazines, journals and short stories as despotic, exploitative, disloyal and feudal, who acted and plotted with the KMT, opium warlords, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) agents, American warmongers and British neo-colonialists to destroy the Union. Local anti-Sao Hpas politicians were given ample assistance by both the army and AFPFL leaders. This made the Sao Hpas and their families uncomfortable and to see their people joining the enemies to tarnish their reputation was hard to swallow when they, the majority of Sao Hpas, had governed with their conscience, as noted by British officers who had worked with them.

By the middle of the 1950s and early 1960s, the army under Ne Win had become powerful, with its own political party, the National Solidarity Association, with branches nationwide, run by psychological warfare, businesses, and industries departments. The Defence Service Institute was under Brigadier Aung Gyi and a parallel police apparatus by the dreaded Military Intelligence Service (MIS), controlled by Ne Win. In 1956, human rights violations by Burmese soldiers against Shan citizens in the Shan States became worse.

The anti-Sao Hpa campaigns did not turn out as the campaigners had hoped and there was a backlash. The majority of Shan citizens were conservativeminded farmers and small traders bound to ancient traditions. To them an attack on the Sao Hpas was an attack on Shan State autonomy and culture.

On 24 April 1959, the Sao Hpas surrendered their executive power to the Shan State Government. It was a momentous event for the Shan State post independence. It was the end of the Sao Hpas dynasty, although they still held their titles and remained Members of Parliament and were eligible to work in any department by going through the voting system. They were closely watched by Ne Win’s MIS. Some writers seem to think Ne Win ordered the Sao Hpas to resign and expected them to surrender their power to him, but the Sao Hpas did not. Instead, they surrendered their power voluntarily to the Shan State Government in the capital Taunggyi, where the British Government and the 33 Sao Hpas used to meet for the Durbar annual or bi-annual meetings.

There was a conference in Mongyai attended by some younger Sao Hpas. The Shan youths who felt that they had had enough of Burmese soldiers treating them worse than slaves decided they would form a resistance army, although they were all inexperienced in fighting. They chose Sao Yanda, also called Sao Noi, a native Tai from Mong Wan in Yunnan with some experience of fighting against the Japanese during World War II. On 21 May 1958, Sao Noi with 30 comrades held a solemn ceremony vowing to fight for Shan State independence and formed the first Tai Resistance Army, called Num Seuk Harn (the Young Warriors).

Although the younger generation of Sao Hpas were in favour of rebelling, the elders were not. They had signed a treaty for the Shan States to be a member state in the Federal Union of Burma and they felt committed to make the Union work. They thus tried to save the Panglong spirit just before the Ne Win era.

Chapter VIII

The Federal Movement of Non-Burmese Ethnic States

A conference was held in Taunggyi , where representatives of nonBurmese ethnic states attended, Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karen and Karenni and Mon. The meeting was about the Panglong Constitution which was framed at Panglong and drafted by Aung San, Sao Sam Htun and six other experienced executive members in July 1947.

1. This Constitution was said to contain several clauses to protect the other ethnic nationalities from some unethical persons.

2. After 13 years the condition in these states had not developed as it should because the present Union Constitution was contrary to what was agreed.

3. The Union was not a federal but a unitary one.

4. The States had not enjoyed equal rights because Burma Proper was not a state but was merged with the Union Government and had become one entity, with authority over other states.

5. The States were not autonomous, as all the executive, legislative and financial powers were vested in the Union Government.

The non-Bamar ethnic nationalities felt it was time to restructure the Constitution and have a discussion with U Nu.

Members of the above-mentioned together formed the ‘Inter-States Unity Organisation’ to explain to the Burmese politicians that they were asking for an amendment of the Constitution to be in line with the one Aung San and the SCOUHP representatives had framed.

After all the arguments and wrangling, troublemakers who hated the Sao Hpas so much made another attempt to destroy the Sao Hpas’ reputation, even after they had surrendered power. Unwillingly, U Nu decided to allow the Inter-States Unity Organisation to present their grievances in parliament.

After a long introduction and explaining the topic to be discussed, U Nu continued:

“Our present discussion must be a family discussion. Each of you Gentlemen and each of us who are members of our Union family must put all our views on the table. Of course there will be differences. To ensure benefit for ourselves, our children and our Union we will negotiate till we reach an agreement that will resolve these differences.

On the objectives of discussion, we wish to seek hand in hand with you Gentlemen the best way of ensuring stability, preservation of the Independence and our democracy.

In seeking the best way of preserving our Union, Independence and Democracy I would like to call both the people of Burma Proper and that the States whatever we are seeking it must be according to the principles of ‘Loka Pala’, meaning justice, independence and equality. Let us all try our utmost that our Sovereign independent Union does not revert to the extremely ugly status of a vassal state or slave state.”

Several ethnic leaders and government representatives attended. Sao Hkun Hkio, the Minister for Shan State, acted as Chairman and spoke on the Federal Principles:

Map of the Federal Union of Burma Burma (as agreed in the Panglong Agreement) but after independence there were only seven as Burma Proper was part of the Burmese Union Government which controlled power over the seven states.

Burma proper

State

State (Rakhine)

State

Federated Shan Sates (Seing Mong Tai)

Karenni State (Kaya)

Karen State

Kachin

Chin

Arakan

Federated Shan States

The Shan National Day

The 7th of February was chosen by the Shan Sao Hpas and the people's representatives of the Shan States in 1947 to make it the Shan National Day. It was to be a 'Remembrance Day' when the Shan State become independent from Britain as a sovereign nation in its own right. This was followed by the declaration of the Shan National Anthem and the Shan flag ..

Yellow is for religion (to most people it means Buddhism, because the buddhists are the majority in the Shan States) Green represents the green-ness of the countryside and agriculture. Red represents courage, bravery and resilience. The White Moon represents 'Peace', as the Shans are Peace-loving people.

But unfortunately, this was not to be, because our Leaders made a great mistake in trusting our next door neighbour when they signed a treaty with Ministerial Burma. Ministerial and the Shan, Kachin and Chin were to become co-founder of the Federal Union of Burma. But the latter three ethinc States were lied to, deceived and manipulated by not only the Barnar Ploiticians, but in 1962, the Barnar army invaded the Shan country, put the Leaders in prison, usurped power, and hijacked the homeland and resources. They treated citizens most inhumanely and subjected them to more than sixty years of fear and terror and heinous human rights violations including genocide.

After more than six decades of extreme suppression the Shan Peoples' sense of "national identity" and aspiration to be the master of their own country have not diminished but have grown stronger.

Sitting from left to right: Khin Maung Gale, Thakin Nu, U Tin Tut, D.R. Rees- Williams, Sao Sam Htun, Hsinwa Nawng, Vum Ko Hau, Saw Sankey. Standing in the centre: W.B.J. Ledwidge (Secretary) and one member.

At the handing over ceremony on Burma Independence Day. Sao Shwe Thaike Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe and Governor Sir Hubert Rance. (Yawnghwe family collection).

Nine members of the Constitution Drafting Committee, U Aung San, Sao Sam Htun, Sao hpa of Mong Pawn, U Ba Cho, U Ba Win, Burmese Minister (Name unknown), Abdul Razak, Mahn Ba Kaing, Ohn , and Thakin Mya drafting the Constitution for the Federal Union of Burma to be presented to the UK Prime Minister, Clement Attlee before Burma Independence was granted. On the 19th of July, 194 7, while completing the work, a group of terrorists rushed into the room they were workingand gunned down the nine members one by one. Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn was taken to the Hospital and died there, while others died instantly.

Lady and Sir Hubert Rance saying farwell to friends and staff.

Members of the Executive committee of the interim Shan Government. The Sao Hpas (Ruling Princess) of the Shan States.

Shan chieftians pose for a photo at the 1946 Panglong in Shan State

Sao Hpas (Ruling Princess) of the Federated Shan States at the first Panglong Conference, including U Nu (Chairman of Burmese Party) and his followers came to watch.

Governor Sir Hubert Rance and lady Rance with Government house staff and Burmese staff in Rangoon (1947: Samka Family Private Collection)

Caption??

“The Union of Burma came into being at the Conference in Panglong, Southern Shan States in 1947 through a signed Treaty between the Leader of Burma Proper, Bogyoke Aung San, representing the Bamar people and the Leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin, each representing their own State. The treaty was based on three major principles: equal rights and status; full internal autonomy for the Frontier States; and the right to secede at any time after independence.

After the Panglong was signed, witnesses testified before the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE) as required by the Attlee British Government, through a letter sent with Aung San so that the Union members would be aware of the main requirements of people of the Frontier Areas when Burma Proper became independent.

The flaw of U Nu’s Constitution was a plan to form Burma into a Unitary Union, instead of a multilateral one. The executive, legislative and financial powers were taken away from individual states and were vested in the Central Government of which Burma Proper was merged instead of the latter being one of the states.

In the Panglong Constitution, Burma adopted the principles of pluralism in which all the different diverse racial and religious groups would live together in peace and harmony, but in the present Constitution, Buddhism was made the Union's religion, disregarding the feelings of Chins, Kachins, Karens and other Christians.

We have come to realise that we have not been given the power to work to the full development of our states. The Union instead of representing all the states is representing only the Bamar state, known as Burma Proper. The Shan and Karenni States formed Constituent States but Burma Proper did not.”

On the question of why not reject the Constitution when it was first announced, Sao Hkun Hkio answered:

“the political situation at that time was very confused, the whole Nation was mourning the assassination of Aung San and other Leaders. The struggle for independence had been overshadowed by sorrow and the series of trouble, chaos and instability that followed. After Independence, the people in the states were inspired and were looking forward to jointly working within the Union towards development and progress.

But after 14 years of Independence we have come to realise that we have not been given the power to work to the utmost for the development of our states.

If the spirit of the Panglong Agreement and the directives of General Aung San concerning the equality of all constituent states had been observed in implementing the Union Constitution, the Union Government would be one that represented all states.

Instead of forming a state for Burma Proper, the authorities had decided to make the Union Government as the government of Burma Proper, making the power of the Union and that of Burma Proper as one and the same unit, Burma Proper overlording over other states. The Union being constituted as such would not promote national unity, nor a union of equality.

Comparing the preamble of the present Constitution of the Union of Burma with the Preamble of which it is supposed to be drawn from shows many inconsistencies. In section 222 of the Constitution, Burma Proper is a constituent unit like all other states, but in Section 8 it has the unique privilege to use the Union power.

Such prejudices and inequality have upset and caused great grievances to other ethnic nationalities.

The Union of Burma would be a true Federal Union by:

1. establishing Burma Proper as one of the constituent states;

2. granting of equal powers to the two chambers of Parliament;

3. sending equal numbers of representative from each state to the Chamber of Nationalities;

4. the voluntary granting of certain restricted power to the Union Government and by the states retaining powers agreed at Panglong.”

Duwa Zau Lawn from the Kachin State, Captain Mang Tung Nung from the Chin State, and U Htun Myint from the Shan State spoke in support of Sao Hkun Hkio.

Thakin Chit Maung, on behalf of the National United Front (NUF), opened his speech by saying:

“National races are dissatisfied and the Burmese are also dissatisfied in their own way and no longer can retain their grievances. If the causes of these differences should be tackled first, I believe that the call for the Constitution federal arose out of the general feeling of dissatisfaction. The basis of our dissatisfaction and distrust of one another did not arise recently. It is an evil that accumulated [over] many years, it started from the days of feudalism and colonialism. It is important for us to draw the conclusion that the problem is due to the manipulation of the feudalists and colonialists, in the old as well as the new form, whose policy is to sow seeds of dissension among our natural races, so that we will hate each other like enemies.”

He continued to blame the British:

“Mr Churchill and his henchmen have within a few months of independence [been] able to foment insurgency in all parts of Burma. Since then the nation has lost sight of the enemy and had started to look upon one another as enemy.”

He then turned the blame on U Nu:

“The AFPFL Government was responsible for the 10 years of turbulence during the 10 years insurgency. The government, unable to distinguish between real friends and real enemies, used drastic single-party authoritarian military method to suppress dissidents.

NUF’s view of the Constitution was that the Union of Burma was a Federal Union formed by constituent states, with Burma Proper as a nucleus. In fighting for Independence, the Bamar had always led.

In view of the present situation, internal as well as external, our country will be more like a confederation if we adopt the true federal principle and this will steadily lead to disintegration of the Union.

We acknowledge that during the 13 years after Independence our people in the States as well as in the Union have suffered due to imperialistic machines as well as from misguided actions of our government. We sympathise with the people and every effort must be made to amend the constitution so as to remove the flaws that have led to such suffering, but the amendment must be within the framework of the present constitution.

If we want a Federalism true in form and essence, we must wait until we can march towards a goal of creating a Socialist Republic of Burma.”

U Ba Swe, representing AFPFL views, stated:

“Historically, Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Mon, Kayah, Arakan, Shan and Bamar are a family of national races who had lived in close relationship in the same country. So the question might be asked, why was the sovereign state developed on a federal and not on a unitary [basis] after independence? The answer is clear: our family

had lived under the British colonial rule, quite literally divided. We were not only physically divided but also by policy encouraged to distrust and suspect one another. When we are together and formed a new state we are like strangers. We created a Federal State although we were inclined towards a unitary one. Many nations in the world started with a federal union and had progress but later moved towards a unitary one. I am ready to accept for Burma Proper to form a state, but I do not believe that it is logical. Therefore, I would like to urge Burma Proper not to be made into a state but remain under direct control of the Central Government. It is larger and more highly developed than other states and could assist in developing the underdeveloped states. If Burma Proper was to be one of the states, it would not be able to lead and could become selfish and make the union government ineffective. If there should be any misunderstanding it should be solved within the family and with family spirit.”

Dr. E Maung spoke on behalf of U Nu’s Union Government:

“The Union Party in view of its objective to promote democracy and stability of the Union cannot accept the proposal known as the Federal principle put forward by the Chairman of the States Unity Organisation because:

a. It differs radically from the principles embodied in the Constitution of the Union of Burma, as laid down with wisdom and foresight by General Aung San and leaders from Burma Proper and from the states.

b. It contains elements opposed to the principles of democracy the leaders of Burma Proper and of the states, in their wisdom, had wished to nurture and promote.

c. It contains elements that could lead to the breaking up of the Union, and is [against] the concept of promoting stability and durability of the Union, desired by General Aung San and leaders of Burma Proper.

d. The Union is already doing its utmost in a family spirit to assist the states wherever it was appropriate.”

All members of the political Institute were unwilling to compromise on the amendment of U Nu’s Union Constitution as requested by the Inter-States Unity Organisation led by the Sao Hpa of Mong Mit. All the Burmese political parties blamed everything that was going wrong on the British colonialists and the Tai Sao Hpas’ feudalism.

Chapter IX

The Burmese Military Army Under Ne Win Stage a Coup

The second day of the National Conference of the Federal Principles came to an end. The army unit from Mingaladon entered Rangoon at midnight, and on 2 March 1962 they had occupied all government departments. The army arrested ministers of the Union Government, the President, the Chief Justice, Heads of Constituent States and all the Sao Hpas. Guarded by soldiers with guns, they were sent to prison for 6 years and on house arrest in Rangoon for the rest of their lives.

When the seven states of Shan, Kayin, Kachin, Chin, Mon, Karenni and Arakan called for constitutional reform, Ne Win and his army took it as a threat to national unity. Even U Nu was not spared, based on their suspicion that he was giving in to the Shan and other minorities. Ne Win seized power and staged a coup d’état and became a general whose ruthless rule bankrupted Burma’s economy during his 26-year rule.

It was the first military coup authorised by Ne Win, and this was the end of freedom and the beginning of hell for all the non-Burmese ethnic nationalities – a life of fear and terror, fear of being killed, imprisoned, tortured, raped, killed or murdered individually or in groups.

Under Ne Win, the Shan States were completely cut off from the outside world, with a large part made into a 'no go' zone for foreign journalists, while his officers and soldiers committed crimes against Shan citizens

behind closed doors. The Shan States became a dark dungeon, in which the people were imprisoned in their own homeland, movement was restricted, and people in one side of the country did not know what was going on in the other side. The Shan population lived in fear and terror every day of their lives. This went on for decades and has never stopped.

Countless people amongst the educated and elite who were able to flee secretly through the jungle from their homeland/country left everything behind. Most used Thailand as a temporary refuge, and later went to America, the UK, Canada, Australia, France and Germany, wherever they could find work.

In 1982, while guerrilla insurgencies mounted, Ne Win relinquished the Presidency of his political Burma Socialist Programme Party (the BSPP) and transferred the party to San Yu. In 1988, in the Burma heartland there was a huge uprising, led by university students, which spread to the whole of Burma, including the Shan States. Many thousands of people were killed.

Ne Win's party later created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which introduced martial law and changed the name Rangoon to Yangon.

Ne Win stepped down after the insurrection. Saw Muang took control, and Than Shwe moved into a high cabinet position due to "his ability to make everyone submissive”.

Chapter X In Defence of the Sao Hpas (by the Author)

After World War II the Sao Hpas had realised that their feudal system of government was not suitable for the modern world, but their intention was not to go too hastily in changing from one system of government to another; they thought it should be a gradual process for the people to be able to take over the responsibility of governing and to learn about the relation between those who would govern and those being governed.

The British brought law and order to the Shan States, which were granted internal autonomy and were able to keep their by-laws, religion and culture as long as they did not contradict with that of British Law. To modernise and improve the Shan States in their economy and infrastructure in 1922 the 33/34 states were united to form the Federated Shan States.

Any conflict between the Sao Hpas and the Bamar was not due to the British, as accused by the Bamar politicians; it was the Sao Hpas who requested that they should not be amalgamated with Burma Proper. The Shan people disliked the Bamar Kings and their officers interfering in their internal affairs.

The British officers who had worked with the Sao Hpas commented that they, the Sao Hpas as a class, realised their responsibility for good administration of their states and advancement of their people. During British rule, the Shan States enjoyed relative peace and tranquillity with an

absence of state-directed violence against the local population. The British introduced law and order and the Sao Hpas governed with their conscience.

None of the Sao Hpas was as rich or as pompous as described by the Shan activists and the Burmese AFPFL; in fact their way of life was rather moderate, and nothing compared to that of the Maharajahs of India or the noblemen in western countries. The Sao Hpas did not have absolute power, they were subjected to the cultural and customary law, and ministerial advice limited their power. A Sao Hpa who bypassed custom faced removal or was chased out of the state for his misrule.

The Sao Hpas’ feudal system of governing involved the remains of ancient small towns and villages created during the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC) in China. Each of these districts was governed by a hereditary leader, similar to that of the Sao Hpas, each ruling over a state or Mong. These numerous small districts were in danger of being amalgamated into the Qing Dynasty (221–206 AD) and Tang Dynasties (618–906 AD); to survive they founded the Nan Zhou or the Nanchao Kingdom in Yunnan, which was eventually destroyed by the Mongols. Many of them migrated south and settled in different parts of South-East Asia, including Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and on the Shan plateau. They called themselves Tai and their area Mong Tai; the British called them Shan and the area Mong Tai, from the Burmese word Shan meaning area, with Shan Byee meaning Shan Country.

Geographically, Burma Proper is situated in the Central Plain, drained by the Irrawaddy River and its tributaries and the Chindwin River. This was the homeland of the Bamar ethnic group. Surrounding this rich area in the west were other ethnic groups: the Chin in Chin State, the Rakhine (Arakan) in Chin and West Mon, and the Karen along the peninsula and in the north. Once the British had won the Anglo-Burmese Wars, the different areas surrounding Burma Proper in the Central Plain, because of their geographical situation, became known as Burma, although they were recognised as different national states, each with its own boundary.

No country wants to be colonised by another country. Just before the British arrived in the Shan States the Sao Hpas were having trouble with the Burmese King, Thibaw, to whom the Shan paid tribute. Some Sao Hpas had fled to Kengtung and some abdicated because they were being constantly pressurised by the Burmese King to collect more tax from Shan citizens and send men and women to fight against the British, which was never enough to satisfy his rapacity, besides interfering in the Shan States’ internal affairs. The arrival of the British was a welcome change for the Sao Hpas and their people.

The Burmese politicians had always wanted the Shan States to be incorporated into Burma Proper, and they accused the British of preventing the Shan and pulling the Burmese apart. The truth is that the Shan having had bad experiences in dealing with the Burmese Kings, the Sao Hpas requested to the British Administrator that they would rather be free from the interference of Burmese politicians.

The British and the Sao Hpas worked well together due to their mutual respect for one another and the understanding of ‘give and take’, which the Burmans would never understand.

Chapter XI Analyses

Unravelling the Panglong Treaty involves looking for the cause of the longest conflict and war between the Shan and the Burmans, which started soon after Independence and still continues today. In finding the root cause we have to understand their past history and how they came to be associated with each other.

Until the 10th century AD, the Arakan and Chinese knew that the Central Plain area of Burma was occupied by the Pyu, who later were replaced by the Burman or Bamar ethnic race, the majority of whom had lost their footsteps . The Bamar were ruled by successive kings, who fought against the Mon, the Shan, the Arakan and the British.

The ethnic Shans and ethnic Bamar, although they geographically lived in the area called Burma, were two separate independent nations, each historically, socially and culturally different from one another and each with its own distinct language. They were from different eras, and their outlook, vision and ideology were distinctly different.

The Tai or Shan were descendants of an ancient race and the Shan State had been their home from time immemorial. It had a distinct political, national, cultural and language entity throughout history and into the present.

During British colonisation, Burma Proper was governed directly by the British until 1933, while the Shan States were under indirect British rule

– the original Princes or Sao Hpas were allowed to rule over their own people and enjoy internal autonomy.

The Shan came face to face with the Bamar politicians for the first time at the First Panglong Conference. During his speech, Thakin Nu accused the British of keeping the Shan apart from the Barman.

On hearing that Burma Proper was to ask Britain for Independence the Sao Hpas decided to hold another conference, called the Second Panglong Conference, to discuss the future of the Shan States. They did not want the Burmese politicians to make any decisions on their behalf. They sent a telegram to the London British Government Office that they would like to make their own decision and not have it made by others. Thakin Nu interfered and encouraged an anti-Sao Hpa activist to counter-send a telegram to say the people would like Aung San to speak for them.

The three statesmen with leaders of the Kachin and Chin were able to negotiate as equals with General Aung San, leader of the AFPFL, at the Second Panglong Conference in 1947, signifying that the Burmese accepted the Shan, Kachin and Chin as equals and with their homeland as separate entities.

There was an agreement that a Constituent Assembly would be set up as an interim government, and the final Constitution document would be sent to the British Parliament for approval.

In early January 1947, Aung San and delegations went to London to meet the UK Prime Minister to discuss Burma’s Independence. With U Tin Tut, the most experienced and educated Burmese politician as his deputy, Aung San soon made progress. He was pleased – his dream to make his country an Independent nation was within sight.

By 27 January there was an agreement between the UK Prime Minister and Bogyoke Aung San that:

1. The interim Government would be accepted as a full dominion government and would control the army as soon as all allied forces were withdrawn.

2. A Constituent Assembly would be elected as soon as possible.

3. The final Constitutional document for the future Union of Burma would be presented to Parliament for approval.

4. A portion of this Assembly would become the Burmese Parliament and would decide whether or not to remain in the Commonwealth after Independence. Britain would nominate Burma for membership in the United Nations.

[The River of Lost Footsteps by Thant Myint-U (grandson of U Thant, United Nations General in the 1960s)]

Aung San accepted the Prime Minister’s requirements and a document of agreement was signed between the two.

In addition, another document, a report of the Frontier Area Committee Enquiry (FACE), was to be implemented to identify what the Frontiers would require when they cooperated with Burma after Independence. The pre-war Prime Minister U Saw and some other delegates refused to sign the documents.

Aung San arrived at the Panglong Conference on 8 February. After meeting with the UK Prime Minister he was assured that independence was within his reach. He realised that although Burma Proper and the Hill States were both geographically in Burma, politically they were not. If Burma Proper was to achieve Independence on its own it would be short of natural resources and progress in development of the economy and infrastructure would be slow. He had a wider vision of co-operation with the Shan, Kachin and Chin and other ethnic states, not only as geographical but as one political bloc. Union with the Shan and other States would give a better future for both the Bamar and other states concerned. Burma would be better equipped to become a sovereign nation of the modern world.

Aung San was in good spirits, the British were no longer a problem, and his vision for Independence became clearer, but back home the Communist parties were stirring up trouble, warning of a sham independence that would leave the country to the mercy of British commercial interests and Anglo-American military domination. From the right, U Saw was doing the same. Aung San’s closest colleague, Than Htun, and others also left the AFPFL party.

Aung San’s next challenge was to convince the people in the Hill Areas to join with Burma Proper to ask Britain for Independence. He was on a mission and arrived at Panglong on 8 February, where a Conference was ongoing. At one of the conference sessions Aung San gave an impressive speech. At first the Shan were sceptical, but after Aung San’s speech they thought he was direct, open and seemed genuine without any pomposity. The leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin, agreed to federally cooperate with Burma Proper to ask Britain for Independence.

Thus, U Aung San joined the three Shan leaders, Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn, and Sao Khun Kyi, Sao Hpa of Hsatung, to become the four Unifiers and the founders of the Federal Union of Burma and the Panglong Treaty, based on the Panglong Agreement signed on 12 February 1947.

The Constituent Assembly previously had its meeting at the Government House, but on 9 June moved to the Secretariat Building where Aung San and his team were drafting the Union of Burma Constitution. When the former assembled at the Secretariat for the first Session Aung San moved for a resolution that the Constitution would describe the new independent sovereign nation as the Republic Union of Burma. To ease the concern of the minority, their rights were assured and guidelines were laid out for the establishment of autonomous states. The Shan and Karenni States had the right to secede after 10 years. This was accepted by the Shan and Karenni representatives. Aung San and his team had more or less completed the Constitution required by the UK Prime Minister.

On 18 June 1947 the Assembly recessed to carry on with the job they were working on. Thakin Nu was nominated Chair of the Constituent Assembly. As Chair, Thakin Nu went to London to inform the UK Prime Minister that the Burma Constituent Assembly Committee members would like independence to be granted before the year ended.

Aung San and his Constitution Drafting Executive Committee members were going over the Constitution, which was framed according to the Panglong Agreement. The team had been working since the beginning of June and it was now 19 July. Sao Shwe Thaike, one of the team members was ill in bed. The Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn visited him and was late arriving at the meeting. The men were settling down to work when a gang of terrorists rushed into the room and cold-bloodedly gunned down the eight members of the Committee.

Those interested in a detailed account of the trials surrounding the assassination of Aung San may like to look at the book Burma: The Curse of Independence by Shelby Tucker, p. 139.

U Saw was said to have master-minded the assassination and was hanged. He strongly resented Aung San for agreeing to the Shan and Karenni States being given the right to secede from the Union after a period of 10 years. He thought it would break up the Union and others would follow.

There was a conspiracy theory linking British Officers to the assassination, but an enquiry by Governor Sir Hubert Rance resulted in a report to his Senior Officer that U Saw himself had admitted stealing the guns from the British army depot. After reading the report the Senior Officer filed it away and forgot about it until after the assassination. U Nu was told of this but

Note: the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution Drafting Executive Committee were two different groups: the former were members of the interim Government and the latter was a group drafting the Constitution required by the UK Prime Minister.

Ref: The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma, Thant Myint- U, p. 255).

decided not to reveal the facts to the Burmese public, as this would have demanded retribution.

Soon after Independence and the assassination of Aung San, the Shan had lost two most important leaders to challenge the Burmese politicians. Although Sao Shwe Thaike was alive, he was elected President of the Union of Burma and Speaker of the House (1952–1961). The Sao Hpa of Mong Mit was made the Foreign Minister, travelling from place to place. By 1958 all the Hpas had relinquished their power and the whole of Burma was in turmoil. In 1958, with Sao Hpa of Mong Mit as Speaker for all the ethnic groups of the Federal Movement, they tried to amend the Constitution to that of the original 1947 Panglong Constitution. In 1962, while the discussion was ongoing, the Burmese Military under Ne Win stage a coup. The Sao Hpas were imprisoned for 5 years, and then were under house arrest in Rangoon until most passed away.

Thus the three Bamar protagonists involved in the making and breaking of the Panglong Treaty (Agreement) were Aung San, U Nu and Ne Win. In their younger days, after university the trio were expected to lead and influence the Burmese in future politics. At the top was Aung San, the charismatic unifying force, the man with a vision. Thakin Nu and Ne Win were diametrically opposed to one another in character. Neither enjoyed Aung San’s ability to listen to other people’ viewpoints or understood his idea of a multi-ethnic federal state (The White Umbrella, p. 184).

In place of Aung San, Governor Rance appointed Thakin Nu as Leader of the Constituent Assembly, the future Burma interim Government, and U Nu as interim Prime Minister.

The Assembly Session reopened on 15 September as a provisional Government. Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, was elected President. His wife, Sao Hearn Hkam, pleaded with him not to accept the post, as the Shan people needed him in the Shan States.

Thakin Nu and his Constituent Assembly’s next job was to continue the most important work that Aung San had left behind – drafting the Constitution required by the UK Prime Minister for approval before Independence was granted. It took the Assembly under the leadership of Thakin Nu just 9 days to complete the Constitution. When it came out, it was pleasing to the majority of the assembly members but a shock to some. It was totally different from what Aung San had promised.

In U Nu’s Constitution the right of secession of the Shan and Karenni States was mentioned, but by plebiscite after 10 years. The Chins were given something called special division. There were gaping holes (as previously mentioned).

On 24 September, U Nu’s Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly members despite its shortcoming. Aung San understood federalism but his predecessor did not. The men who died with Aung San included the country’s most experienced politicians, including the Karen leader they had hoped would bring the Karen people into the Union. When the Constituent Assembly gave its assent the members cheered and raised their hands in victory. They had made it to the London deadline and Thakin Nu would be going to London to present the required Union of Burma Constitution to the UK Prime Minister.

It is now obvious there were two versions of the Constitution for the Union of Burma, one drafted by Aung San and the other by members of the Constituent Assembly under U Nu’s supervision. (It was known by many that U Nu had ordered the Attorney General, U Chan Htun, to redraft a new Constitution different from that of Aung San’s, to be used for the independent Union of Burma.)

Knowing there were two different versions of the Burma Constitution, there are questions to ask and answers to be found: which version of the Constitution did U Nu present to the British Attlee Government – his own version or the one Aung San and his team drafted, based on the principles of the Panglong Agreement?

If he presented his own redrafted version, did the UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee not notice that the Constitution he received from U Nu did not contain the clauses listed in the memorandum sent to him by the FACE? Was the UK Prime Minister too eager to be rid of Burma that he did not read the Constitution properly, and accepted and approved U Nu’s redrafted Constitution.

A letter I received from the British Foreign Office in 2000 suggests differently. It says:

“In preparing for Burma Independence the UK wanted to leave behind a stable state with equitable arrangements for all its citizens. Britain fully supported efforts at the Panglong Conference in early 1947 and thereafter, to ensure that the interests of the ethnic minorities were heard and taken into account in the drafting of Burma’s independence constitution. This came into force when the British withdrew on 4 January 1948, and provided for the formation of ethnic states with a wide measure of local autonomy and the right to secede after a period of ten years. We have encouraged successive governments, including the present regime, to work for national reconciliation of all of Burma’s ethnic groups. We shall continue to do so. The Government has reiterated its deep concern about the refugees and internal displaced people.”

(The letter was written in 2000 in reply to my letter about Ne Win’s military coup and imprisonment of all Shan leaders.)

From the above paragraph and contents of this letter, I question which of the two versions of the Burma Constitution did U Nu present to the UK Prime Minister? The people in Burma were made to believe the UK Prime Minister had received U Nu’s flawed Constitution and had approved and granted independence to Burma without any consideration for the wellbeing of other ethnic nationals.

Looking for books and academic papers written about the 1947 Burma Constitution presented to the British Attlee Government has not been successful. Papers and articles written by foreign students and authors on the Burma Constitution were only regarding U Nu’s version. Has the Panglong Constitution been destroyed or hidden? From 1948 to 1962 there were very few books written about the Panglong Treaty. According to a Japanese writer, Kikuchi Taihei, in an article entitled ‘Shan Sawbwas Requirements in the Independence Period of Burma/Myanmar, 1946–1947’, “the quantity and quality of the Panglong narrative by Burmese writers have [received] many changes as time passes”.

After a long search online, finally I found various UK Government papers printed by Hansard on the ‘Burma Independence Bill’ (see Appendix 1 for extracts).

On 17 October Attlee and Thakin Nu concluded an agreement which provided for the creation of the Republic of the Union of Burma as an independent sovereign state outside the Commonwealth Nations, from 4 January 1948.

As previously mentioned, the ethnic nationalities were confused and had the impression that the UK Prime Minister did care about their well-being and had approved of U Nu’s Constitution that had disregarded their rights and protection of their status.

The Shan leaders felt committed to the Panglong Agreement, and as they and Aung San had founded the Union of Burma together, they would try to amend the Constitution. This led to a Federal Movement by all nonBurmese ethnic states and called for parliament to assess and discuss the need to alter the Constitution as U Nu had promised, so that the Shan and other ethnic state governments could perform their work more efficiently.

But the discussion was not allowed to continue. General Ne Win staged a coup and put the Shan Sao Hpas and other ethnic leaders, including Thakin

Nu, in prison. Ne Win thought U Nu was getting soft to allow the Shan and other groups to secede and disintegrate the Union. This was followed by military force taking full control and ruling over the other ethnic states, even until today.

The miscarriage of justice and other grievances caused by U Nu’s Government and the Burmese Army affected the new Union of Burma and gave rise to an unnecessary conflict and war after independence in 1948.

Aung San did not live to fulfill his ambition of making the Federated Union of Burma into a modern, prosperous multinational state or experience the independence based on the Constitution that he and his team had drafted. Many innocent citizens instead suffered under the flawed Constitution which U Nu and his team had drafted.

U Nu used his redrafted Constitution as the Union Constitution throughout his term as Prime Minister, most inappropriate for a country of multiethnic societies. It is hard to believe that he, who many thought of as a staunch Buddhist and well respected by most Burmese, would deceive and mislead both the UK Prime Minister and the people of Burma. The Shan leaders trusted him to lead the people of the new Union of Burma and treat all partners fairly and equally. He betrayed the people of the Frontier states who supported him when his own AFPFL fractured and deserted him. The squabbling among the leaders broke the AFPFL and made governance impossible. U Nu had to invite the army to step in as a caretaker government in 1958. Aung San had been gone not more than a few months when the Panglong Treaty was dishonoured and the principles were destroyed.

Every time U Nu was worried or under pressure he would go to the monastery to pray, meditate and give up drinking alcohol. Besides his belief in the Buddhist doctrine, he was equally devoted to the Thakin ideology of Unilateral Burma: one race, one language and one voice.

Dr. Ba Maw, ex-President of Burma during the Japanese Occupation, had this to say about him:

“U Nu tried to replace politics with religious faith, and all sorts of superstitious observances. Politically it has to be very short sighted and disastrous. It defied the law of history especially during the revolution period. Thus, all post war plan has failed.”

Ref: History of the Shan State: From its Origins to 1962, Sai Aung Tun. The Military take over in Burma. A comment by Dr. Ba Maw, Appendix 42.

Chapter XII Conclusion

Margaret Macmillan, winner of the Samuel Johnson Prize for her book The Uses and Abuses of History, says that “History is useful when used responsibly, to understand why we behave and act in a certain way. But it is also susceptible to manipulation and distortion. Nationalists tell false or one-sided stories about the past, whilst dictators suppress stories because it undermines their claims to omniscience and authority.” She goes on to say that “we cannot help invoking the past when we try to shape the future, but should use it with due caution and humiliation”.

During the process of researching and writing about the question I wanted to ask of the past – “What was the root cause of the conflict and war between the Burman and the Shan and other ethnic people in Burma that has lasted more than three-quarters of a century?” – I at first felt I would never find the answers; but as always, if there is a will there is a way.

The conflict between the Burmans and the Shan started soon after the Panglong Agreement. The principles of the original Agreement were based on openness, equality, honour, truth, justice and freedom. However, U Nu disregarded and replaced it with his own redrafted version, deceiving and misleading the UK Prime Minister. He failed to follow Aung San’s vision to make the new co-operated states a federal, multinational union, with equal rights and status and the right to secede for the Shan and Karenni States after 10 years. He betrayed the Shan leaders who supported him when many of his league members deserted him, damaging relations between the

Burmans and the Shan and other ethnic nationalities, who expected him as Prime Minister to treat them with respect and equality.

The Federal movement called by the Shan and all ethnic leaders was to have a peaceful discussion in parliament to amend U Nu’s redrafted Constitution. However, several Bamar political parties were against this movement. On the second of day of the discussion, in 1962, Ne Win ordered soldiers with guns to remove Shan leaders one by one to prison without any explanation. This angered the Shan people, and youths fled into the jungle, armed themselves with guns and formed resistant armies.

This was followed by Ne Win’s coup d’état and declaration of war against the Shan people, invasion of the Shan States by the armed forces, usurpation of power from the Shan States Government, and hijacking Shan homelands and resources. This was an act of foreign aggression against a peaceful independent nation.

It can be concluded that the root cause of the present war between the Bamar and non-Bamar ethnic states was U Nu’s Government and military miscarriages of justice against the leaders who signed the Panglong Agreement.

Both the U Nu Government and the military were committed to the idea that other ethnic groups should join Burma Proper, and that all the other states had to be incorporated into the Bamar state by surrendering their identities, becoming assimilated into the Bamar race, treating the Union as one nation, one Bamar race, one blood, one culture, one voice and one religion. ‘Federation’ was a word invented by the British, adopted by Aung San and the Sao Hpa feudalists. The Union had to be unilateral, permanent and solid: it “must not disintegrate the Union, must not disintegrate national solidarity, must perpetuate national sovereignty”. These three phrases became their institutional, ideological threat to those who dared break the rule. The Panglong Agreement had to be destroyed before it destroyed their institutional ideology. The people who agreed and signed the Agreement were thus regarded as their enemies.

The Burma military/political institution became the most notorious regime, causing fear and terror with continuous human rights violations, forced relocation, forced assimilations and genocide, a great deal of which went unreported and understudied outside or even inside the country. It inflicted an enormous cost on the life of ethnic minority groups. Tens of thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced either inside or over its borders. It is the longest conflict and war in the world. Generations of ordinary citizens have suffered unnecessarily and been killed or imprisoned without reason. Things going on in Burma never reached the outside world; under this Institution, Burma was/is the most unsafe place for journalists, and the news they receive through their contacts was/is ill-informed, untrue or exaggerated. Many tourists and foreign authors regard the conflict and war in Burma as a civil war and pay little interest, although in reality the war was/is between two or more different independent nation states.

The whole world needs to know what and why they went wrong, and lessons should be learned so that such horrific human suffering never happens again in Burma or any other country. This was/is an unnecessary war –cruel and evil as experienced by the minorities and indigenous people of Burma, the Shan, Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon, Karen and Arakan, caused by those who usurped them and misused power without the mandate of the people to get what they wanted by institutionalising their ideology and making the Union of Burma into a unitary country.

It was the Panglong Agreement that created Burma as a sovereign Nation State, the Republic Union of Burma. It was through the Constitution drafted by Aung San, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn and six other members of the team that Britain granted Independence to Burma. The U Nu Government and Military then, by their own actions, nullified both the Panglong Agreement and the Constitution, making the Union of Burma and Independence of Burma void. The Shan and other non-Bamar States are still now in their status quo before the Panglong Treaty came into being.

Since 1962, by lies, deceit and manipulation, the Shan and other States became victims of the rule of a self-appointed illegal government of the

Burmese Military regime. In other words, non-observation and violation of the core of the Panglong Agreement by the Burmese Government and the Military and not readopting the 1947 Union Constitution mean, by their own actions, they excluded the territories of the Panglong Agreement’s signatories and nationalities and their fellow minorities from the Union of Burma, and so denied them the right to establish their respective sovereign independent states in their respective definite countries.

The Shan do not want revenge or retribution, they do not want to fight, but they do want:

1. justice, peace and most of all freedom from the illegal Burmese military regime;

2. to revert to their original status quo of an independent federated Shan States;

3. lands and resources hijacked by the regime to be returned to their owners.

It is not going to be easy, but if the whole country works together and with the willing support of western democratic countries it could be achievable.

The problem involves legal, moral and criminal issues. There are no viable alternatives but to request from the UK Prime Minister, the President of the United States and other democratic super-powers, especially the United Nations and International Criminal Court of Justice, immediate action to address these very complicated issues, according to international moral code, laws and the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XZ), 1960. It could save the lives and prevent the suffering of millions of Shan and other ethnic citizens, and bring peace and democracy to millions more.

The Shan States is at present a broken country, a battlefield between the Bamar military and some undisciplined and unruly revolutionists. There is

no law and order, no government to govern, especially along the borders of Northern Shan States and China. Ordinary citizens are those suffering most; they weep for the old days when the Shan States was once a most peaceful country, when all the ethnic groups lived harmoniously together. Once a naturally beautiful country, it is now a land of many addictions to alcohol, drugs and gambling, and a land of many scam organisations engaged in cybercafé culture where they advertise for young girls to come and work for them, which sounds genuine enough but when they arrive they are used as prostitutes or slaves.

After three-quarters of a century, some of these Burmese political/military generals and their victims have passed away, but the institution with the same ideology is still functioning today.

Min Aung Hlaing, the present ruling Burmese General, threatens those he classifies as enemies, stating everyone “must abide by the policy of nondisintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of national sovereignty”.

Burma Independence was granted by the British based on the strength of the 1947 Panglong Constitution, not on the flawed Constitution of Thakin Nu’s version which he used as the Union Constitution. Is the legality of Burma Independence not also questionable too?

According to the 1947 Constitution, the Union of Burma comprises the whole of Burma – all the territories governed by his Britannic Majesty through the Governor of Britain, who recognised that all the territories of indigenous nationalities, including the Kayah, Kachin, Chin and Shan States, were not under the rule of the successive Kings of Burma or were ever an integral part of Burma. It was the Panglong Agreement and the 1947 Constitution that created Burma as a State, and the documents in Appendix 1 bound the different territories to become the Republic Union of Burma. It is thus illegal for the Burmese Government or the Military to force-rule over them.

The most violent and daring fighters against the Burmese regime are presently the following:

• Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA): the majority before Independence lived in Tawngpeng, one of 34 Federated Shan States.

• Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA): once a small area called Kokang under the administration of the Sao Hpa of North Hsenwi, it became a Special Area during the Burmese Military regime. The majority of the population are Han Chinese, Tai/Shan and a few other ethnic groups.

• Kachin Independent Army [of the Kachin Independence Organisation KIO)]: a moderate, small group living in North Hsenwi. (During the FACE, they were asked whether they would like to join the Kachins in the Kachin State; they decided to stay in Hsenwi.)

• The Wa people, once known as the Wild Wa or the Head Hunters: although geographically in the Shan States, they were governed separately by a British Officer. During the present Burmese regime they were classified as a Special Area. They have the largest army and receive weapons and other commodities from China, which they sell to other members of their group – the Federal Political Negotiating and Consultant Committee (FPNCC) – to negotiate with the Burmese Government. Each individual group gets help with weapons and other commodities supplied by the largest member of the group, the Wa-State Government or the Wa-State, a close ally of China. Although geographically in the Shan States, the Wa-State is more like a Chinese State, as every aspect of their everyday life is influenced by China. At present the Wa have entered Northern Shan States at the request of China to keep an eye on the smaller groups so that they do not go astray and so that Chinese businesses there are safe and secure.

After the 2021 coup, four years on, the situation in Burma has deteriorated further. The Burmese Military, the self-named Thatmadaw, is on the verge of losing military bases on the ground to revolutionary forces who obtain their weapons directly or indirectly from China through the Wa-State Administration.

Protagonists Who Played a Part in the Panglong Treaty

Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe

Yawnghwe is one of the 34 states of the Federated Shan States. Born in 1894, he was nephew and heir to the ruling Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, Sir Sao Maung. He enlisted and served in the British Army under the British administration for 20 years. First President of the Union of Burma; Speaker of the House 1952–1960. He was imprisoned during the coup under Ne Win and died in Insein Prison in November 1962 under suspicious circumstances. According to custom, his body was taken back to Yawnghwe and cremated with pomp and splendour.

Sao Khun Kyi, Sao Hpa of Hsatung

One of the three Tai/Shan statesmen who united the people, he was an advocate of unity. He married Nang Aye Thant, daughter of a wellestablished and prosperous Tai /Shan merchant from Yawnghwe, who later moved with his business to Thaton and Moulmein. Sao Khun Kyi and his wife moved from Thaton in Lower Burma to the Shan States, where he became a Myosa of Hsatung. As an engineer he was able to improve his town and villages by helping farmers build canals and dams with his own money; he also built a cinema and shops in Taunggyi. He was well thought of by the British Government. In the 1930s he served as secretary to the Federal Council of Sao Hpas under the British Commissioner of the Shan States. His early thoughts were how to improve the Shan States.

He was the most liberal-minded Sao Hpa and understood what the young Shan activists wanted: progress and modernisation. He had two allies –Sao Shwe Thaike, Sao Hpa of Yawnghwe, and Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn – who had the same ideas.

Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn

One of the three Sao Hpas together with leaders of Chin and Kachin who founded the SCOUPH. He was much respected for his simplicity, kindness and friendliness to his people. At the Panglong Conference in 1947, he was elected Councillor for the Frontier Areas of the interim Cabinet, was knowledgeable in Government affairs, and chosen as the best upcoming modern politician for an independent Burma. Like Aung San, he was one of the eight Constitution Drafting Executive Committee members assassinated at the Secretariat in Rangoon on 19 July 1947. It was a great shock to the people of the Shan States that they had lost one of their great leaders.

Aung San

At University, Aung San was elected to the Executive Committee and was editor of the Student Union Magazine. He had a passion for politics and in 1936 had his first conflict with the British authorities when he refused to name the student who had written an inflammatory article about the University Principal entitled ‘Hellbound at Large’. He was expelled, which led to a student all-out strike and the authorities had to back down. He was a voracious reader even at an early age and a great thinker.

By the 1940s the Thakins had become politically active and were targeting the British with campaigns and slogans. Aung San was one of the two 30 Thakins who escaped from being caught by the colonial police. He escaped to China, but eventually arrived in Japan. He and his comrades were trained by the Japanese as soldiers to fight against the British. They were sent to Thailand to collect more men. While in Thailand the 30 Comrades slit their

fingers and pooled blood, swearing oaths of loyalty. In May 1941 they arrived back in Mandalay, joined the Japanese soldiers and marched with them from Mandalay to Rangoon.

His assassination was a complete shock to the whole country, and he and the team were a great loss to democracy, his promises of equality, justice and fairness all dying with him.

Thakin Nu-U Nu (or Thakin Nu)

U Nu was born in the Irrawaddy Delta in the town of Waekma, son of a small shopkeeper, educated at the University of Rangoon. Both he and Aung San were active in student politics.

He was the First Prime Minister of the so-called Union of Burma, known by many as a quiet but complicated man. He was imprisoned by the British regime for sedition, and once again by his own Thakin AFPFL colleague, General Ne Win. Prison life seemed to have affected him deeply, and this was shown in a biography of U Nu written by Hans Bernd Zöllner. After the assassination of Aung San, power was unexpectedly thrust upon him. In his novel Man, The Wolf of Man, U Nu portrays himself as a writer, politician and Buddhist, who chose politics although out of the three he found it the least interesting.

Unlike Aung San, he did not understand the words Federation, equality and the right of self-determination.

Dr. Ba Maw

A politician and lawyer of Burmese–Armenian descent, he was educated in Britain and gained political prominence in the 1930s, serving in the Government Executive Council. Unlike the older Burmans, he was in touch with the younger generation of Thakins. Aung San and U Nu chose him as Head of State during the Japanese Occupation.

Dr. Ba Nyan

A doctor in medicine and Shan native of Hsipaw, he was one of the earliest advocating modern Shan nationalism. He founded several youth and patriotic associations during the Japanese period. He served as Chief Health Officer in the Shan States Government. He was active in promoting Shan literature, arts and culture. Like all prominent Shans from all walks of life, he was imprisoned during Ne Win’s military coup in 1962 without charge or trial. His son, Khun Thawda, joined the rebel Noom Serk Harn movement in1959.

Commodore Tommy Clift

A Shan Burmese who joined the Burmese Air Force before World War II. After Independence he joined the new Burmese Air Force and became its Chief until the 1962 coup, when with his family he fled to Thailand and then to Australia.

Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith

The pre-war Governor of Burma, 1941–1946. When in exile for 3 years in Simla in India he drew up a plan for Burma to have self-rule. When he arrived back in Burma, Aung San and the AFPFL were already in control and planned for immediate independence of Burma. Britain, under the Labour Government, was not interested in holding onto Burma. After a talk between Aung San and Lord Louis Mountbatten, a Commander who favoured the decolonisation of Burma, Dorman-Smith’s Simla plan was disregarded.

Sao Hearn Hkam, Mahadevi of Sao Shwe Thaike

First Lady (Mahadevi) to her husband Sao Shwe Thaike, First President of the Union of Burma. She was a Shan native of Hsenwi, the youngest daughter of Khun Sang Tun Hung, a well-known rebel, and the sister of Sao Hom Hpa (see below). She was a student at St Joseph’s Convent, Maymyo, and St Agnes’ Convent in Kalaw, and in the mid-1950s was an

outspoken Shan nationalist. In 1956 she was elected to the Union and at the same time was a member of the Shan State Council, with legislative power for the Shan States. Her criticism of Burmese politics made her a prominent figure.

Sao Hom Hpa, Prince of Hsenwi

He was the son of Khun Sang Tun Hung. At the request of U Nu’s Government he raised many levies to fight various insurgents in Shan State. He was appointed Special Commissioner of Northern Shan States by the Shan Government at Taunggyi. Recognising the full strength and power of the Army, he managed to cultivate the goodwill of the Army Chiefs. During the caretaker Government he was appointed Head of Shan State 1958–1960. He died of cancer in the late 1960s.

Sao Hso Hom

Eldest son of Sao Sam Htun, Sao Hpa of Mong Pawn, he was one of the eight members of the Constitution Drafting Executive Committee assassinated with Aung San in July 1947. He was a brilliant student at the University of Rangoon. After graduating, he served as Secretary to Sao Khun Khio, Mong Mit Prince and Head of Shan States (the First Foreign Minister), later joining the Shan Minister. He was a member of the Constitutional Reform Committee of the Shan Government before being detained in prison in 1962. After being jailed for 5 years without trial or explanation, he was employed at the UN Agency for another 5 years.

Appendix 1

Extracts from British Parliamentary Readings on the Burma Independence Bill (from Hansard)

HANSARD 1803-2005→1940s→1947→November 1947→5 November 1947→Commons Sitting→ORDERS OF

THE DAY

BURMA INDEPENDENCE BILL

HC Deb 05 November 1947 vol 443 cc1836-961

Order for Second Reading read.

3.33 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee)

I have it in Command from the King to acquaint the House that His Majesty places his Prerogative and interests, so far as concern the matters dealt with by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament.

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The purpose of this Bill is to give effect to the will of the peoples of Burma as expressed by their elected representatives that their country should become an independent State, should cease to be part of the British Commonwealth of Nations and should no longer form part of the King's Dominions. Henceforward the relationship of this country and Burma will be based on a Treaty and on the friendship between the two nations which, I am glad to say, is stronger than ever today. The departure from the British family of nations of one of its members must be an occasion for deep regret. It was the hope and desire of the Government that the people of Burma would recognise the great advantages which accrue from

membership of the Commonwealth—a membership which, as one of the Dominion Prime Ministers said, is not a derogation from independence but an addition to it. But they have decided otherwise. In our view, nations have the right to decide on the nature of their own government. The British Commonwealth of Nations is a free association of peoples, not a collection of subject nations. When, therefore, after due consideration the elected representatives of the people of Burma chose independence, it was, I believe, the duty of His Majesty's Government to take the necessary steps to implement this decision.

We had the further duty of seeing to it that minorities for whom we had a special responsibility were given due position under the new Constitution and were safeguarded in their rights. This, as I shall show, has been done in the new Constitution. We had also to make provision for the winding up of the old régime, for compensation of officers who served Burma very well in the past, and for regularising the future relationship of our two countries in relation to defence and trade. These things have been effected in the Treaty which I signed with the Burmese Prime Minister a few days ago. Although, as I have said, it is a matter of keen regret that Burma should be leaving the Commonwealth, it is a source of great satisfaction to us all that the negotiations have been conducted in a spirit of the utmost good will and co-operation.

Before I turn to the provisions of the Bill, I should like to give a very short survey of the course of events which have led up to it. Our earliest connections with Burma derive from the activities of the East India Company. Burma at that time was a kingdom, and a very disturbed and troubled country; and, except for a short period, our relations with the rulers of Burma were difficult. Eventually, as the House knows, the whole country was annexed in 1886. Effective British rule over the whole of Burma has lasted just over 60 years. We came to a country that had suffered from gross misrule, and under British rule much progress was made—moral, material and in every respect. The geographical propinquity was responsible for Burma being made a unit of the Indian Empire. Yet the Burmese differ from the Indians in race, language, religion and temperament, and actually until the late war there were no communications between India and Burma by land. Yet Burma was treated as part of India, and administered under the Government of India Act.

I recall very well visiting Burma as a member of the Simon Commission

in 1929, and we were all struck by the great difference between India and Burma. In our Report we emphasised this fact, and we recommended its separation from India. This was accepted by the Government of the day in 1931, and was effected by the Burma Act, 1935.

It is important to recall what was said in 1931 by the Secretary of State in Parliament. He said: …The prospects of constitutional advance held out to Burma as part of British India will not be prejudiced by this decision, and the constitutional objective after separation will remain the progressive realisation of responsible Government in Burma as an integral part of the Empire."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th January, 1931; Vol. 247, c. 29.] That statement has always been relied upon by Burmese political leaders as a pledge to the people of Burma that whatever advance should be conceded to India should equally apply to Burma. In the Act of 1935, owing to Burma's having an unitary and not a federal constitution, she obtained a greater measure of self-government in 1935 than did India. This state was, in effect, reaffirmed by the Governor of Burma with the authority of His Majesty's Government both in 1939 and in 1940. Therefore, I must emphasise that the offer made to India, generally known as the Cripps offer, whereby India was to be free to choose her own future within or without the British Commonwealth is held by the Burmese to give the same right to the people of Burma.

We all know, and it is not necessary for me to repeat, the tragic story of the over-running of most of Burma by the Japanese, of the heroic retreat conducted by Lord Alexander, and of the ever memorable exploits of the forces under Admiral Lord Mountbatten which led to the freeing of the country. These events had, naturally, a profound effect on the people of Burma. They gave increased impetus to the already strong urge of the peoples of Asia for self determination that had been growing ever since, in fact, the Russo-Japanese War. I remember we noticed it in the Simon Report. Therefore, many young Burmans, when the Japanese invasion took place, took at their face value the professions of the Japanese that they came to liberate Burma from the British and the show of independent Government that was set up. But experience soon convinced most of them of the hollowness of those attempts.

As the House knows, under the leadership of the late U Aung San, a movement was set on foot by which the independent forces of Burma jointed up and took their share with the Allies in expelling the Japanese. It

is as well to remember that some Burmans and a great many men from the hill tribes did good service throughout that campaign. The end of the war found the country disturbed and full of arms; and—there is great danger in a country like Burma of dacoity—there has been a good deal of armed dacoity. The whole of the economy of the country was gravely impaired, partly through what was done by the Japanese forces, partly by the actual fighting, partly by the effect of the destruction which we ourselves had to do in order to hamper the enemy.

In May, 1945, a statement of policy was issued by His Majesty's Government. It envisaged the drawing up of a constitution by representatives of the Burmese people with a view to full self-government. In October the civil administration was restored, and Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith took over the government with an executive council on which there were a number of representatives of the older school of Burmese politicians. Meanwhile, the more vital forces of the Burmese people were organised in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League under the leadership of U Aung San. They were impatient of delay, and they were very impatient of the older politicians. The House will recall that Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith retired through ill-health. The new Governor Sir Hubert Rance was faced with a very difficult situation. There was danger of widespread disorders, many strikes, dacoity, and the rest. I should like here to bear testimony to the very great services rendered by Sir Hubert both in administration and in securing the co-operation of the Burmese people. His wisdom and his sympathy with the aspirations of the Burmese people have guided the country through a most difficult period.

There followed, as the House knows, the formation of a Government under U Aung San, elections to a Constituent Assembly in which the party of U Aung San obtained a very large majority, and a series of meetings between this country and the Burmese leaders. One of the most difficult problems in framing any constitution for Burma was the position of the tribes of the hill country, the Chins, the Kachins, the Shans of the Shan States, and the minority community of the Karens. The House knows that these hill tribes occupy the highlands and central Burma, and that they have been administered under separate administration. Under the Act of 1935 they were not brought into ministerial Burma.

These problems of the relationship between these tribes and Burma proper have been resolved, thanks, I think, in the first place, to the

broadmindedness and desire to give full rights to minorities exhibited by U Aung San, Thakin Nu, and the other Burmese leaders. It is a difficult position. A series of meetings was arranged. The House will recall that the frontier areas and Shan States were separately administered by their own rulers, the Sawbwas. The Karens were partly included in ministerial Burma, partly in the excluded areas. My hon. Friend the Secretary for Overseas Trade attended the Panglong Conference at which representatives of ministerial Burma and of the hill tribes met together, and rendered very valuable service in bringing them together. So also did my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies who was then a Private Member.

My noble Friend the Secretary of State for Burma paid very recently a visit to Burma and was able to help in smoothing out the differences between the Burmese and the Karens. As a result the new constitution has been approved by the representatives of these various communities, and it provides for a generous degree of autonomy. There are still some groups of the Karens who are not wholly satisfied, but, so far as we are able to ascertain, the great majority of the communities have accepted the provisions of the constitution, and the three Karenni States, which occupy a position analogous to that of the Indian States, are adhering to the new Union of Burma. Let it be noted that the provisional President of Burma is himself a member of a minority community. He is the Saohpalong Yawnghwe.

During this transitional period when, as the House will remember, the Government of Burma has been treated in practice as if it were a Dominion Government A Shan Sawbwa was appointed Counsellor for the Frontier Areas with a Kachin and a Chin deputy-Counsellor. I should add here, as I know some hon. Members are interested in the point, that the Anglo Burman community took their part in the framing of the constitution, and it has not been the policy of the community to seek for special privileges. They have thrown their lot in with the rest of the people of Burma, and I believe that they have a contribution to make to the future of Burma. The Government of Burma has welcomed their presence there, and stated that it was their policy to provide fair opportunities for employment for them.

The House will recall the tragic events of 19th July when Aung San and six of his colleagues in the Cabinet were brutally murdered. I have already in this House paid a tribute to those leaders. I should like today to bear witness to the courage with which Thakin Nu and his colleagues stood up

to a testing situation, and the wisdom and co-operative spirit which they have shown in all the negotiations which we have had with them. In August last, a Defence Mission, led by the then Under-Secretary of State for War, now the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, visited Burma; as a result of his labours a satisfactory Defence Agreement has been arrived at, and that is annexed to the Treaty. In September and October a Finance Mission from Burma, led by U Tin Tut, came to this country, and the outstanding financial questions were settled. On 17th October, the Treaty between the United Kingdom and Burma was signed by myself on behalf of His Majesty's Government and by Thakin Nu on behalf of Burma, and it will come into force on the date of ratification, the appointed day under this Bill. Its provisions will be known to the House, for it was published on 27th October.

I turn to the broad provisions of the Treaty. Burma is recognised as an independent State, and Burma takes over the responsibilities hitherto binding upon this country. Provision is made to enable persons to divest themselves of dual nationality, the details of which I will deal with later when I come to the Clauses of the Bill. We agree to provide and contribute to the cost of a Military Mission, and Burma undertakes not to receive a Military Mission from any other country. We are also helping Burma over military equipment and training, and we secure the right of landing on Burmese airfields. This agreement was come to between ourselves as two equal States. Under Article 5, Burma undertakes the obligation to meet the Service payments, which are mainly civil. Article 6 embodies an all-over financial settlement. Provision is made for the repayment over a period of years of £27 million due to us, and of the amounts received by Burma for the sale of surplus stores. Article 7 provides for the taking over by the new Government of the contractual obligations of the old, while Article 8 provides for a standstill arrangement in respect of trade, pending the conclusion of a regular commercial trade treaty. I do not think any other article calls for special notice.

(Before coming to the provisions of the Bill I should like to say a few words on the Burma Constitution. The production of this constitution and its adoption without dissent by the Constituent Assembly within a period of less than four months is, I think everybody will agree, a very remarkable achievement. Very few Constituent Assemblies have worked so quickly. The constitution has been described to me by experienced constitutional

lawyers as being a remarkably able document. Its general principles embody the practice of Western democracies, and in particular those which obtain in the British Commonwealth. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet must all be members of one or other of the two legislative chambers, one of which consists of directly elected members on a population basis, while the other is called the Chamber of Nationalities and provides for considerable weightage in favour of minorities. In fact, it is remarkable that in the constitution of the Upper House the minorities collectively have more seats than the majority race of the Burmese.

The structure of the new State called the Union of Burma has certain federal features. There are three States within the Union, Shan, Karenni and Kachin. Each of those will have exclusive legislative and executive authority over a substantial field, and they will enjoy certain sources of revenue. In addition to that there are two special regions, one for the Chins and another for the Karens of the Salween district, where a certain measure of local autonomy has been set up. We are all aware that the success of constitutions depends less on their actual provisions than on the way they are worked out and worked by the members. But if the spirit of cooperation that has been shown between the various communities in all these negotiations is exhibited in the future, I think that future should be bright.)

Mr. Gammans (Hornsey)

There are many hon. Members who have not had an opportunity of being able to see this constitution, because copies could not be obtained in the Vote Office.

The Prime Minister

If it is not in the Vote Office I will have it put there. I thought it had been published pretty widely.

I now turn to the actual provisions of the Bill. Clause 1 embodies the principle of the Bill, and lays down the date of its coming into operation, which date has been chosen in consultation with the Burmese. The House knows that some days are better than others for embarking on important undertakings in the East, and it has now been proved, on our latest advice, that 4th January instead of 6th January would be more convenient from the point of view of the Government of Burma. Therefore, in Committee, we propose to move an Amendment with regard to the date. Subsection (3)

makes provision for the termination of suzerainty over the Kerenni [sic] States.

Clause 2 must be read in conjunction with the First Schedule, and is, I am afraid, very complicated; but then it deals with a very complicated and difficult subject—nationality. There will be a full opportunity of exploring its detailed provisions during Committee, when my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Air and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General will be prepared to deal with particular points. However, as I retired from practice at the Bar more than 30 years ago I will content myself with trying to give the broad provisions of the Clause from the point of view of the layman. The broad principle of the Clause is that the persons specified in the First Schedule—that is to say, persons whose British nationality is derived solely from their connection with Burma— shall cease to be British subjects. Subsection (2) provides that persons who come under the provisions of Subsection (1), but are domiciled or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom or any of its Dependencies, may, within two years, exercise an option to remain British citizens.

It will be observed that Subsection (1) does not apply to those resident in the Dominions. The reason is that it is for the Dominions themselves to make their own nationality laws. However, Subsection (4) provides for the recognition by the United Kingdom as a British subject of any persons who are given, by law of one of the self-governing Dominions, a similar right of electing to remain British subjects. Subsection (3) is put in for extra precaution, and gives a right of election to persons who may find themselves stateless. We do not think there will be many of those, but there may be some. I should add that by Article 3 of the Treaty, persons who find themselves dual nationals and are resident in Burma will have the opportunity of divesting themselves of their Burmese nationality. Therefore, it is hoped that the joint effect of the Bill and the Treaty will reduce the number of persons with dual nationality to a very small number. Subsection (6) prevents the exercise of the right of election from voiding retrospectively something done before the exercise of that right. Someone might have had a deportation order made against him, but he cannot get out of it by subsequently opting for a different nationality.

I now wish to say a little on the Schedule. The general effect of the Schedule is that any person who can claim that his British nationality, or

the nationality of his father or his paternal grandfather, rests on something otherwise than his connection with Burma remains a British subject. Hon. Members particularly interested in the position of the Anglo-Burmese will realise that many of them will, under this, remain British subjects. They can, if they desire, under the provisions of the Treaty, divest themselves of their Burmese nationality and remain British subjects. It should be noted, for the purposes of this Schedule, that the Burma referred to is the Burma of today, and not the Burma as it existed, either at the date of birth of a particular individual or of his father, or of his grandfather, where he wants to carry back his right to British nationality further. The House will remember that Burma was split up, in part under the Kingdom of Burma, and in part under British rule. This is to give the most extended rights to all to remain British subjects.

Clause 3 is, I think, self-explanatory. It is the transitional provisions pending the conclusion of a trade treaty. Clause 4 deals with legal proceedings. Appeals to the Privy Council from Burma have always been very few, and as far as we can ascertain, there are no legal proceedings pending against the Secretary of State. Section 133 of the Act deals with contracts. The general effect of Clause 4, and of the new constitution of Burma, will be that if proceedings under that Section were in contemplation, they can be brought against the new Government of Burma. Subsection (3) is a saving subsection, protecting jurisdiction in British courts in respect of divorces already pronounced in Burma. Clause 5 provides for the repeal of Acts of Parliament relating to Burma, and references to Burma in other Acts. The same thing is also effected with reference to Orders in Council. These repeals are set out in the Second Schedule of the Bill.

I think that is all I need say at this stage on the Clauses of the Bill. I have little more to do than to commend the Bill to the House. When passed, it will close one chapter of the relations between the people of the United Kingdom and the people of Burma, and will open another. Although, if it is carried, Burma will leave the British Commonwealth, there will remain memories and ties of friendship between the two countries which will endure. I say, as I said at the start, that we all regret Burma should be leaving the British Commonwealth, but this is done by the will of the Burmese people, and I think we must accept their verdict.

4.04 p.m.

Mr. Churchill (Woodford)

I was rather surprised to see the benches opposite, particularly those below the Gangway, so thinly occupied upon an occasion which must, to hon. Members opposite, particularly in that quarter, be a joy-day—one of those moments in our history when they reach the satisfaction and fulfilment of long years of labour and endeavour. I remember reading the other day a speech by the Foreign Secretary in the country where he spoke of the announcements about India—the impressive scene, with the quiet little man and his quiet little voice sweeping away our position in India. I wondered, after this glowing description by a Member of the right hon. Gentleman's Government, that his followers have not hastened to be in their places in order to see the same performance repeated, if on an even smaller scale.

The position which was occupied by the National Government, of which I was the head, is set out in the White Paper of May, 1945, and the substance is contained in the first paragraph: It is and has consistently been our aim to assist her political development till she can sustain the responsibilities of complete self-government within the British Commonwealth and consequently attain a status equal to that of the Dominions and of this country. That was conditional upon a three years' breathing space for rehabilitation, and also to give time for the wishes of the people to manifest themselves calmly and deliberately, and under conditions of peace and order. A return to the constitution of 1935 was the objective in the interval. The framing of a new constitution for full "self-government within the British Commonwealth" subject to special protection for the frontier tribes—and particularly mentioned in the White Paper are the Shan States—from all of whom we received much loyalty and aid in freeing the country from Japanese invasion.

There would have been no difficulty in carrying out this programme in an orderly and careful manner. Half, perhaps one-third, or one-quarter, of the British troops squandered in Palestine on a policy now abandoned, the fatuity of which is now recognised, would have sufficed to enable the transfer of power to a Burmese Government, on the basis of Dominion status, to be carried out by regular and measured steps, and with due consideration for all interests, opinions and feelings involved in that population of many various strains. Instead, the whole business has been conducted by the British Government from weakness and not from strength. The breathing

space has been curtailed and we are now confronted, not with Dominion status, which, as in the case of India, we considered an indispensable stage in any policy to which we on this side of the House were committed but Burma has been plunged at once into full independence.

This Bill is to cut Burma out of the Empire altogether, and to make her a foreign Power. At the earliest moment when these intentions to hustle the whole process through were known—although at that time the right hon. Gentleman did not mention independence, and seemed to indicate that a decision in that sense was not probable—I protested. The right hon. Gentleman made a statement, and on 20th December, 1946, I made an immediate protest. I said: It was said, in the days of the great Administration of Lord Chatham, that one had to get up very early in the morning in order not to miss some of the gains and accessions of territory which were then characteristic of our fortunes. The no less memorable Administration of the right hon. Gentleman opposite is distinguished for the opposite set of experiences. The British Empire seems to be running off almost as fast as the American Loan. The steady and remorseless process of divesting ourselves of what has been gained by so many generations of toil, administration and sacrifice continues. In the case of Burma, it is hardly a year since, by the superb exertions of the Fourteenth Army and enormous sacrifices in life and treasure—sacrifices in British blood and in Indian blood—the Japanese were forced to surrender, destroyed, or driven out, and the country was liberated. And yet, although barely a year has passed away, there is this extraordinary haste that we should take the necessary measures to get out of Burma finally and for ever. The same formula the right hon. Gentleman says will be used as was used in the case of India, with the same extensions he put on to that formula when the Indian Mission was sent out, eliminating the—"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1946; Vol. 431, c. 2343.]” At this moment, as there had been no Question before the House, you, Mr. Speaker, did me the honour to interrupt me, so that I was not able to conclude my sentence, which would have finished—" “eliminating the stage of Dominion status”. There is great importance in the stage of Dominion status, in that it does give a definite period in which, with all the advantages of Dominion Government and the full authority attaching thereto, all matters can be considered without heat or prejudice; in which those who feel that they would wish to adhere to and enjoy the great advantages and protection afforded by the British

Commonwealth of Nations to all its members, would have an opportunity of making their weight felt, without any question intervening of direct interference by British administrators in their local affairs.

The Prime Minister said that it was necessary for him to go back into the recent past history and to give us his version. I will follow him briefly over that course, but I think I must place a little different emphasis upon some of its episodes. Following on his announcement, and the comments which I have just read to the House, which I made then, a delegation of the most distinguished and leading representatives in Burma, or persons selected by the Government, was invited to London in January, and the British Government arranged with them for the acceleration of the whole process of getting rid of Burma. All the leading Burmese with which the Prime Minister negotiated, lunched and dined on that occasion have either been murdered, or are being tried for their lives for the mass murder of the Burmese Cabinet in July. The two outstanding figures of that delegation were U Aung San and U Saw. It is interesting to look at the respective parts which they played in the war.

U Aung San went over to the Japanese, and raised what we might call a Quisling army to come in at the tail of the Japanese and help conquer the country for Japan. Great cruelties were perpetrated by his army. They were not very effective in fighting, but in the infliction of vengeance upon the loyal Burmese—the Burmese who were patriotically fighting with British and Indian troops to defend the soil of Burma from Japanese conquerers [sic]—great cruelties were perpetrated on those men, because they had helped us to resist the Japanese.

After two or three years of desperately hard fighting, under climatic conditions and conditions of disease indescribably painful to British troops—two or three years of a struggle swinging to and fro, sometimes with most anxious crises, at length the balance turned in our favour. When it turned, U Aung San, as soon as he saw that Japan would be defeated— and it became quite evident that it was a matter of time only as to who was to win the great struggle—made overtures to Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander, that he was willing to come over to the winning side and bring his army with him, for what it was worth. I was, at that time, responsible, and upon the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, and with the approval of the Cabinet, we accepted those overtures.

I was in favour of that because of the general aim and importance of shortening the war, saving the unnecessary shedding of British blood, and bringing the whole of the Burma position forward into line with the American advance in the Pacific. Of course it is not a very agreeable transaction, when a traitor rebel leader, who has come in with foreign invaders, brings his army over to your side, when so many cruelties and outrages have been perpetrated—still, in war time, the great thing is to get to the end of the war as soon as possible in a victorious manner. I certainly did not expect to see U Aung San, whose hands were dyed with British blood and loyal Burmese blood, marching up the steps of Buckingham Palace as the plenipotentiary of the Burmese Government.

The case of U Saw is equally odd or even odder. In the autumn of 1941, this gentleman visited this country for consultations. He was the Prime Minister of the Burmese Government, which had been set up on the 1935 Constitution model. At the request of the India Office, I received him, and I also received from him strong assurances of loyalty and fidelity. He left to return to Burma by the Western route. He traversed the Atlantic, the broad expanses of the North American continent and embarked upon the Pacific, arriving at Hawaii on the night of 7th December, 1941, when the Japanese Pearl Harbour outrage had just been committed. The whole place was in confusion, a large portion of the United States fleet was sunk or burning and great numbers of casualties had been inflicted. The scene was not at all well adapted to make a favourable impression upon the Oriental mind. It was evident that U Saw could not continue his journey by the westward route. He returned to Europe, and at the first moment when he could find a Japanese Consul, which was in Lisbon, he offered his allegiance to Japan. We are, of course, a very careless, happy-go-lucky people, but in wartime some pains are taken. We became aware of his message, overtook him in the air as he was flying across Palestine, and forced him to land. He was interned until the end of the war.

Such were the two figures whom the Government welcomed as the outstanding authorities with whom they were to confer and to whom they were to confide the future of Burma, where 15 million people had dwelt for more than 60 years in peace, justice and contentment under British rule. U Saw is now on trial for the murder of U Aung San and most of his Cabinet. I will make no further comment because the case is sub judice. But however

the matter may be viewed, the Government can hardly be congratulated on the choice they made of the hands into which Burma, its fate and its future are to be delivered. I trust they will be found more fortunate in the new men with whom they have now to deal.

Today we are confronted with the result of complete independence and the cutting of Burma out of the British Empire and out of the protection of the British Empire. There is to be no interval stage of Dominion status where with calm and with deliberation all parties, all interests, all sections of the community and all creeds would see where their final fortunes would best lie. There are grave doubts that the assent of the frontier tribes has been honestly and genuinely given. I do not consider that we have any guarantee that there has been a fulfilment of our duties towards those who fought valiantly at our side. Indeed, I am told that through these mountainous regions, this half circle of mountains and hills about which the Prime Minister spoke, there is a condition of armed preparation and incipient revolt prevailing. About 12,000 murders and dacoities or armed robberies are reported to have taken place in the first seven months of this year and this is only a prelude—

The Prime Minister

Which is below the average.

Mr. Churchill

The average must have been upset by the extraordinary events of the last five or six years but even if it were only an average at 12,000 murders and dacoities amongst a population of 15 million, it would hardly be convincing proof of their fitness for full self-government.

This is only a prelude, in my view, to the bloody welter which I fear will presently begin, as it has in India, with which the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Economic Affairs has been so intimately concerned. No effective provision has been made for the protection of, or fair compensation to, important British commercial interests, built up over many years to the mutual benefit of the Burmese and British peoples. The Constitution provides that private property may be expropriated—that is British private property—under a law which leaves it to the Burmese Government to prescribe if and what compensation should be payable.

There is to be national treatment of public utilities and national treatment of all natural resources and other measures which are fashionable in Socialist States. The Burmese Government is like our own, a Socialist Government aiming at the nationalisation of all important industries, but 60 per cent of the British businesses and installations, according to the statement by a Burmese Minister last month, will be in the hands of the Burmese nation. Independent Burma is, we are told, to be a Socialist State. No effective provision has been made for compensation such as has been practised here even by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who sit opposite. It rests with the Burmese Government, whose country is far from rehabilitation, and whose finances are in a disorder rivalling our own, to decide in the case of any dispute what, if any, compensation has to be given to their great industries which have been growing up for generations and from which this country has received an external source of wealth, and in which the people of Burma have themselves found great employment and increases of local wealth, which are the foundations of the revenue of the Government.

This is what we are invited to assent to and to become responsible for in the Bill which is now before Parliament. We on this side of the House have no power to prevent what the Government intend to do, but we have to consider what our own attitude must be on an occasion of this kind. I say that we can accept no responsibility for this Bill, and I do not think it should be settled merely on questions of oil companies or vested interests. It raises whole issues affecting the British Commonwealth of Nations and our actions must be based on Imperial and moral grounds. We accept no responsibility for this Bill. We wish to dissociate ourselves from the policy and the methods pursued by the Government. They must bear the burden and it falls with peculiar weight upon the Prime Minister himself. I interrupted him the other night and said that I did not mean to charge him with personal blood guilt. There is a difference; I certainly did not. He individually is a humane man, but he is in the position of the signalman who has made a fatal mistake rather than that of the murderer who has placed an obstruction on the line. The responsibility rests upon him in a broad political manner, and I am bound to say I would be very sorry to go down to history bearing upon me the name and the burden which will rest on him. The Government must bear the burden.

Burma is an appendage of India and is likely to reproduce, though, of course, on a far smaller scale, the horrors and disasters which have overspread her great neighbour and which should ever haunt the consciences of the principal actors in this tragedy. All loyalties have been discarded and rebuffed; all faithful service has been forgotten and brushed aside. There is no assurance that the power of the new Government will be sufficient to maintain internal order, or, I might add, national independence against far larger and far more powerful neighbours. We stand on the threshold of another scene of misery and ruin, marking and illustrating the fearful retrogression of civilisation which the abandonment by Great Britain of her responsibilities in the East have brought and are bringing upon Asia and the world. I say this to the Government: You shall bear that burden. By your fruits you will be judged. We shall have no part or lot in it. We have not obstructed your policies or Measures and they must now take their own course. We, at least, will not be compromised or disgraced by taking part in them, or denied the opportunity of pointing the moral to the British nation as and when occasion may occur. On those grounds we shall, at the close of the Debate, move the rejection of the Bill.

4.31 p.m.

Mr. Wyatt (Birmingham, Aston)

This afternoon we have had an excellent exposition from the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) of what a genuine Tory faith in Empire really means. The Tory belief in Empire means, "Be dominated by us. If you don't like it, get out." That is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman has been saying this afternoon. In the last six or seven months the right hon. Gentleman has been doing his best to insult and to denigrate the two Dominions of India and Pakistan, despite the fact that both of those countries fulfilled his first qualification for freedom from British rule. They both voluntarily said, "Please may we become Dominions of the British Commonwealth?" The right hon. Gentleman says, "Thank you very much. I will now proceed to tell you that you are unfit to govern yourselves."

The right hon. Gentleman has gone further than that. He has described the people of India as so many cannibals butchering each other. Does he really think that is the way to bind together the British Commonwealth of Nations? Does he really think that, when two countries are newly set up and inaugurated, it is a help to them in their great difficulties, and makes them

feel sympathy for the British nation, to be insulted by the Leader of the Opposition? It is very remarkable that the right hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler) has not been present during the speech of the Leader of the Opposition. For that, of course, there is a very obvious reason; he does not agree with a single word of what the right hon. Gentleman has just said. Nor do many other Members of the right hon. Gentleman's party. There was a marked lack of enthusiasm, except when the right hon. Gentleman was making a mockery of murders in Burma, among his own supporters for the statement he has just made.

What does the right hon. Gentleman want? Does he want us to continue to rule Burma by force? If he wants that, then he must say so quite clearly. We cannot give a country Dominion status if it is not willing to accept it. If a country says, "We want to be free; we don't want Dominion status as an intermediate stage," the only way we can persuade it to have Dominion status is by force. If the right hon. Gentleman really thinks we have been wasting our troops in Palestine, what sort of policy does he propose for Burma? Force, or get out? If the right hon. Gentleman thinks Burma would be likely to accept Dominion status after a speech of the kind to which we have listened this afternoon, he really should think again.

The position with regard to Burma is something quite different—as the right hon. Gentleman well knows, because his own father was the Minister responsible for the annexation of the Kingdom of Burma—from the position in India. Burma is a nation which has never lost its nationhood. It is quite true that there was a dispute between King Thibaw in the early 1880's, and a British trading company, and that in that dispute the British trading company was in the right; but the very first British Governor who was sent by the right hon. Gentleman's father to take over control of Burma said that annexation and direct rule of that country was unnecessary, and that a protectorate would have sufficed just as well, or a treaty arrangement of the kind which we had with Nepal. Burma has never forgotten that, and knows that she is a nation. She has never been disunited and split up by internecine strife in the same way as many of the States of India were. The result is that at the very first opportunity she has looked for her freedom, her old nationhood and independence.

If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that I am speaking very wildly this afternoon, perhaps he will look again at the leading article of "The Times" of 28th October. In that leading article the Government are criticised, it is

true, but for what were they criticised? The Government were criticised for going too slowly with the independence of Burma after the end of the war. In referring to the announcement of the presentation of the Burma Independence Bill, "The Times" leading article said: “Before that announcement, the Government had shown themselves somewhat slow to appreciate the vigour of Burmese nationalism after the war, and the strength of its resentment at the restrictions on national progress embodied in the White Paper of May, 1945.” What does the right hon. Gentleman's programme amount to? He has protested against restrictions in this country, but he wants restrictions for all the other countries he can possibly lay his hands on. He does not want to try to make a friendly arrangement with a nation which was wrongly taken over by his own father and to be in association with them, after they have achieved their independence. He wants to stamp on them and keep them down by force. He explained this afternoon that we would not have needed as many troops in Burma to keep the people down by force as we needed in Palestine. That is the long and the short of his programme. Every time he has stated a fact he has misstated it wherever possible. For example, U Saw was not the most prominent, or one of the most prominent, members of the delegation, as anybody who has studied the affairs of Burma would be able to inform the right hon. Gentleman—and as his right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden will be able to inform him afterwards.

Nor is it true to try to denigrate U Aung San as a traitor to his own country or even to our country. The right hon. Gentleman well knows the difficulties facing any leader of a nationalist movement in South-East Asia during the war, when they were overrun by the Japanese. Why should not U Aung San seek to make the best arrangement for his people that he could? Why should he be regarded as having special affinities or ties with this country demanding his allegiance, not having been particularly helped by the right hon. Gentleman? Why should he not be regarded as a hero by his own people? The right hon. Gentleman may disagree with him about the things he did, but it is not the way to win the hearts or the affections of a people to insult their favourite leader—

HANSARD 1803-2005→1940s→1947→November 1947→25 November 1947→Lords Sitting

BURMA INDEPENDENCE BILL

HL Deb 25 November 1947 vol 152 cc846-924

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

The Secretary of State for Burma (The Earl of Listowel)

My Lords, before moving the Second Reading of the Burma Independence Bill, I have it in command to acquaint the House that His Majesty, having been informed of the contents of the Bill, is prepared to place his prerogatives and interests, so far as concerns the matters dealt with by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament.

…

The new Constitution of Burma is a remarkable and statesmanlike document, consisting as it does of many of the best elements in the written Constitutions and the constitutional practice of those countries in which the Parliamentary system of government has taken root. It proclaims a more varied list of individual rights, both male and female, than the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the Constitution of the United States of America and its acceptance of the duties of the State to secure the fulfilment of these rights is in complete accordance with the modern view of the functions of a welfare State. It is a delightful compliment to us that Burma has borrowed the essential principles of our system of Parliamentary government as the keystone of her own democracy. There will be a Parliament with two Chambers, to which Ministers will be responsible in the usual way. Parliament will itself be directly responsible to the electorate, which will choose its representatives by universal adult suffrage. One slight difference, which some noble Lords may consider an improvement on our practice, is that General Elections will take place at intervals of not more than four years instead of five. The civil liberties which we also associate with democracy as a genuine article—the freedom of the Press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and, most important of all, freedom of conscience—are all enshrined in different provisions of the Constitution.

was held in February of this year between representatives of Ministerial Burma and representatives of the Chin, Kachin and Shan peoples. It was agreed at the conclusion of this conference—the Panglong Conference— that co-operation should start forthwith, and each of these frontier races decided to send a representative to be associated with the Government of Burma. In May, a joint committee of Burmese and non-Burmese reported unanimously in favour of the participation of the frontier areas in the work of the Constituent Assembly. This recommendation was accepted by all concerned, and the frontier areas thereupon chose forty-five representatives to sit with the Burmese delegates in the Constituent Assembly. They made a useful contribution to the drafting of the new Constitution. When the final draft was submitted to the assembled delegates on September 25, it was carried by a unanimous vote, which included the assent of representatives of the plains [of the] Karens and Karenni States.

The willingness of the minorities and frontier peoples to collaborate with the Burmese in the new State is explained by the safeguards and opportunities offered to them in the terms of the Constitution. Their interests are protected in two ways, by a guarantee of fundamental rights, and by the large degree of self-government they will obtain as units in the structure of the Federal Union of Burma. The Constitution provides that all citizens of Burma, irrespective of birth, religion, sex or race, shall have equality before the law, immunity from discrimination, and equal opportunity of entry into public or private employment. These rights are enforceable in the Courts, and cases can be carried on appeal to the Supreme Court of Burma.

The federal structure of the Constitution will allow the immediate creation of three semi-autonomous States, the Kachin, Shan and Karenni States, within the framework of the Union of Burma. Moreover, if a majority of the Karens in the hills and plains agree that they want a State of their own, a Karen State to include the promised Karenni State can be added at some future date to the present number. The Union Government will naturally deal with matters of common concern to the whole of Burma, such as defence, foreign relations, communications and currency, but the State Governments will have a free hand to manage their own internal affairs, the right to raise taxes to finance a wide range of administrative functions, including local communications and social services, and a Minister to urge their point of view in the Cabinet. As a further protection for their interests in the Legislature, the minority races are to have weighted representation

in the Upper House, the Chamber of Nationalities, which will give them a majority of the seats as compared with the Burmese members. It should be noted that none of these constitutional provisions relating to the frontier areas can be altered without the consent of the majority of the members representing the race or races affected in the Chamber of Deputies.

I know, my Lords, that we all feel a particularly soft spot for the Karens, who played such a gallant part with Force 136 in the war, when many of them parachuted back into Japanese-occupied Burma. In the course of my short stay in Rangoon in September I had most friendly talks with representatives of all sections of Karen opinion, and I was delighted to find that most of the Karens I met were anxious and willing to co-operate with the Burmese in the building up of a great new country. It is extremely reassuring to know that the present arrangements, which give the Karens a homeland in the new Karenni State, a special region with administrative autonomy in the Salwean [sic] District and perhaps adjacent areas, the right to run their own schools in the plains, representation in proportion to their population in the Lower House, and a Karen Minister to look after their minority interests in the Burmese Cabinet, have received the full approval of the majority of the Karen people.

If further evidence is required of the genuine desire of the Burmese to give the minority races a square deal, it is surely provided by their choice of a Shan—the Saohpalong of Yawnghwe, whom we have the honour to have listening from the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery this afternoon—as the first citizen of their country in his capacity as the President Designate of their new Republic. This settlement does the utmost credit to the generosity and statesmanship of Thakin Nu and his colleagues in the Government of Burma, and to the willingness of both sides to bury their past differences and to work together for the future greatness of Burma. It has laid the firm foundation for a strong and united country.

This sequence of events in the last eighteen months would not have turned out so happily but for the presence in Rangoon of our Governor, Sir Hubert Rance. It is impossible to over-estimate what we owe to him for his wise guidance of Burma through her post-war difficulties and in shaping the outline of a new relationship with us. His soldierly directness of speech, his capacity for inspiring trust, and his sympathy for their national aspirations have won him a unique place in the hearts of the people of Burma and their leaders. His administrative and organizing ability has also been of

special value in the reconstruction of the country. He has been splendidly supported throughout his term by Lady Rance. In spite of ill-health, she has lightened his burden as only a wife can do, and has undertaken many tiring and exacting duties with a zest and cheerfulness that have made her second only in popularity to him.

Notes: After several debates and discussions in Parliament, the Attlee Government as well as the Opposition Leader, the Hon. Sir Winston Churchill, were at first doubtful whether U Nu as the Prime Minster would be capable of administering a new Nation with so many diverse ethnic populations, and were concerned for the welfare of the minority peoples of the Frontier.

After listening to the Constitution read out by the Secretary of State for Burma (the Right Hon. William Hare, Earl of Listowel), the Bill of Burma Independence was passed; Burma was to become Independent on 4 July.

Did the Secretary of State for Burma also receive the 1947 Constitution instead of the one U Nu and his team drafted in September, as noted earlier by Sao Hearn Hkam?

Abbreviations

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League

BIA Burma Internal Army

BNA Burma National Army

BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party

FACE Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry

FPNCC Federal Political Negotiating and Consultant Committee

KIO Kachin Independence Organisation

KMT Kuomintang

KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation

MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

NUF National United Front

PVO People’s Volunteer Organisation

SCOUHP Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Committee

TNLA Ta-ang National Liberation Army Glossary

Chao; Zhou prefix title of royalty

Dawmaw temporary residence made of bamboo

Duwa title of Kachin chief

Frontier Areas areas bordering other states or countries

Hkun title used for male elders/officers

Keng state, e.g. Kengtung, Keng Lun

Lawksawk one of the 34 states that made up the Federated Shan States

Mong a state

Myosa a lower rank in the Sao Hpa

Sao prefix title of royalty; also means owner of something Sao Hpa Sawbwa Head of State; Prince; Chief of a State

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